Philosophy Faculty Reading List 2011-2012 PART IB PAPER 02: LOGIC

SYLLABUS Theories of Meaning: Compositionality of meaning; meaning, truth and intentions; force and content. Quantifiers: The semantics of quantified sentences; referential and substitutional readings. Logical form: The purposes of formalization; logical form and theories of meaning. Names and Descriptions: Sense and reference; Russell's theory of descriptions; causal theories of names; identity. Variants of Classical Logic: Elements of modal logic; the uses and nature of possible worlds; intuitionistic logic; problems with intensional contexts. Theories: The axiomatic method; informal and formal theories; examples.
An asterisk* indicates a classic item or one which provides a good route into a topic.

LOGICAL OPTIONS Many of the units presuppose some acquaintance with formal logic over and above what is in IA Logic. You need (a) to deepen your understanding of some material on classical logic which you've already covered in an introductory way, (b) to understand some extensions to classical logic, (c) understand some rivals to classical logic, and (d) understand how logic is put to work in constructing formal theories. In particular: (a) Deepening your understanding of classical logic: i. Logic involves deduction, and you need to understand how a 'natural deduction' system of logic for propositional logic works. ii. And then understand how to add quantifiers to such a deductive system. iii. Further, you should understand more of the semantics for quantified logic. [See Unit 3] (b) Extensions to classical logic i. Basic propositional modal logic (the logic of "necessarily" and "possibly". The formal systems T, S4, S5 and their motivations. ii. Semantics for T, S4 and S5. [See Unit 7] (c) A rival to classical logic

INTRODUCTION Course Structure (exam alternative) The course is divided for convenience into 10 units. Units may be studied by attendance at lectures together with associated reading, by supervised essays, or by a combination of both methods. The course is assessed by a three hour examination in the Easter Term, in which students answer three questions out of at least ten set. Students vary in how many units they prepare, but as a rough guide it might be sensible to study about eight units during the year and to revise six thoroughly for the exam. Note that the exam may contain questions requiring knowledge from more than one unit. Note also that some of the reading lists in this guide are longer than it would be sensible to try to read for a single supervised essay: the intention is that supervisors can select from them the material they think to be most important. Course Structure (essay alternative) The student prepares two extended essays, each between 3,000 and 4,000 words long. Each should be on a topic covered in this course guide. The reading lists below may be used as a starting point, but candidates should bear in mind that their finished essays will be expected to show evidence of a greater depth of reading than would be normal in a single supervision essay. For more information on this alternative consult the Undergraduate Handbook.
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i. Intuitionism and excluded middle. ii. 'Harmony' in natural deduction as one route to a defence of intuitionism. [See Unit 9] (d) Logic at work i. The idea of a formal theory. [See Unit 10] These formal ideas are lectured in a structured course under the title 'Logic Options', borrowed from the useful BELL, J.L., D. DEVIDI, and G. SOLOMON, Logical Options (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2001). See also PRIEST, G., An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is, Cambridge University Press [2nd ed., 2008]. The latter is a door-stop of a book dealing with much more than you need, but it is a key text for modal logic done by trees, and it also covers intuitionistic logic, as well as other nonclassical logical options.
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Meaning and Truth UNITS 1 AND 2: THEORIES OF MEANING Marks, sounds and gestures can all have meaning, can be part of language. But how should we explain what it is to have meaning or to be part of some language? Two approaches to this issue will be considered. One suggests that we should look to the notions of 'use' and of 'speech act', that we should consider the beliefs and intentions of language users and the conventions by which they operate. The other approach insists that we shall not get real insight into meaning except by invoking notions such as `name', 'predicate', 'reference' and 'truth'. Are these views rivals or complementary? *DAVIDSON, D., 'Truth and Meaning', in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). Reprinted in P. Ludlow, ed., Readings in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997). [Also available online at www.oxfordscholarship.com] EVANS, G., and J. MCDOWELL, eds., Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976) [Introduction]. EVNINE, S., Donald Davidson (Oxford: Polity, 1991) [chs. 5-7].

Intentions *BLACKBURN, S., Spreading the Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). [ch. 4, 12. Also available in Camtools] *GRICE, H.P., 'Meaning.' Philosophical Review 66 (1957): 377-88. Reprinted in P. Strawson, ed., Philosophical Logic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967); also in A. P. Martinich, ed., The Philosophy of Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985); and in A. P. Martinich & David Sosa, eds, Analytic Philosophy: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001). *MILLER, A., Philosophy of Language (London: UCL Press, 1998). [ch. 7. Also available online at: www.myilibrary.com/?id=97109]. PLATTS, M., Ways of Meaning. 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997) [ch. 3]. Force and Content

UNIT 3: QUANTIFIERS Quantifiers: the semantics of quantified sentences; referential and substitutional readings.

The Semantics of Quantified Sentences MATES, B., Elementary Logic. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972). [chs. 3 & 4. A more elegant technique]. NEWTON-SMITH, W., Logic: An Introductory Course (London: Routledge, 1985). [ch. 8. Elementary exposition of Tarski]. PLATTS, M., Ways of Meaning (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1997). [ch. 1]. TENNANT, N., Natural Logic (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1978), pp. 22-29. The Significance of Quantificational Logic

*AUSTIN, J.L., How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962). SEARLE, J.R., Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). [chs. 1-3]. Linguistic Conventions *BLACKBURN, S., Spreading the Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) [ch. 4.] LEWIS, D.K., Convention (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969). [chs. 1 & 4] Compositionality of Meaning *DAVIDSON, D., 'Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages', in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). [Also available online at www.oxfordscholarship.com] WIGGINS, D., 'Meaning and Truth-Conditions: From Frege's Grand Design to Davidson's ', in A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, edited by B. Hale and C. Wright (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997).
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*DUMMETT, M., Frege: Philosophy of Language (London: Duckworth, 1973). Reprinted in R. I.G. Hughes, ed., A Philosophical Companion to First-Order Logic (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1993). [ch. 2. An excellent discussion of Frege's invention of the quantifiervariable notation. Available on Camtools]. NOONAN, H., Frege (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000). [ch. 2]. Referential and Substitutional Readings *VAN INWAGEN, P., 'Why I Don't Understand Substitutional Quantification.' Philosophical Studies 39 (1981): pp. 281-85. Reprinted in his Ontology, Identity, and Modality: Essays in Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). BALDWIN, T., 'Interpretations of Quantifiers.' Mind 88 (1979): 215-40. DUNN, J.M., and N.D. BELNAP, 'The Substitution Interpretation of the Quantifiers.' Nos 2 (1968): 177-85. ENGEL, P., The Norm of Truth: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) [ch. 4].
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KRIPKE, S., 'Is There a Problem About Substitutional Quantification?' in Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics, edited by G. Evans and J. McDowell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976). [Important, but long and polemical and presupposes knowledge of other things.] QUINE, W.V., 'Existence and Quantification', in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.(New York: Columbia University Press, 1969). Reprinted in R.I.G. Hughes, ed., A Philosophical Companion to First-Order Logic (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993).

UNIT 4: LOGICAL FORM What is the point of putting English sentences and arguments into logical form? How do grammatical form and logical form differ? In what sense is grammar misleading and logic revealing? The Purposes of Formalization *QUINE, W.V., Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1960). [ch. 5, especially 33]. *SAINSBURY, M., Logical Forms. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001). [ch. 1 10-12 & ch. 6 1-3]. ALLWOOD, J.E.A., Logic in Linguistics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) [ch.10]. DAVIDSON, D., and G. HARMAN. The Logic of Grammar (Encino: Dickenson, 1975). [pp.15]. GEACH, P., 'Quine's Syntactical Insights', in Words and Objections: Essays on the Works of W. V. Quine, edited by D. Davidson and J. Hintikka, (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969). Reprinted in P. Geach, Logic Matters (Blackwell, 1972). QUINE, W.V., 'Logic as a Source of Syntactical Insights', in Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. Rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976). ZIFF, P., Understanding Understanding (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1972). [ch. 3]. Logical Form and Theories of Meaning *DAVIDSON, D., 'The Logical Form of Action Sentences', in his Essays on Actions and Events. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). [Read also the reply to Cargile, pp. 137-146. (Also available online at www.oxfordscholarship.com] *OLIVER, A., 'The Matter of Form: Logics Beginnings' in J. Lear and A. Oliver, eds., The Force of Argument (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), pp. 180-200. *SAINSBURY, M., Logical Forms (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). [ch. 4, 6 & ch. 6]. CARGILE, J., 'Davidson's Notion of Logical Form.' Inquiry 13 (1970): 129-39. DAVIDSON, D., 'Semantics for Natural Languages', in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). [Also at www.oxfordscholarship.com]
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EVANS, G., 'Semantic Structure and Logical Form', in Evans and McDowell (eds). Truth and Meaning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976). Reprinted (with an afterthought, pp. 405-7) in his Collected Papers (Oxford University Press, 1985), and in Ludlow (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1997). GRANDY, R.E., 'Some Remarks About Logical Form.' Nos 8 (1974): 157-64. LARSON, R., and G. SEGAL. Knowledge of Meaning: An Introduction to Semantic Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995). [ 3.3, 7.1 and 7.4. The syntactic concept of logical form, normally not used by philosophers.]. OLIVER, A., 'A Few More Remarks on Logical Form.' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1999): 247-72. WIGGINS, D., '"Most" And "All": Some Comments on a Familiar Programme, and on the Logical Form of Quantified Sentences', in Reference, Truth and Reality, edited by M. Platts. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), pp. 318-46.

UNIT 5: FREGE AND RUSSELL ON SINGULAR TERMS Around 1900 Frege and Russell developed fundamentally opposed semantic theories to account for how ordinary names refer. By investigating their reasons we shall be studying one of the central moments in the birth of analytic philosophy. *POTTER, M., 'The Birth of Analytic Philosophy', in The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, edited by D. Moran.(London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 43-75 [Also online at www.myilibrary.com/?id=183799] Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference *FREGE, G., 'On Sense and Reference', in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, edited by M. Black and P. Geach. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1952). Reprinted in A. W. Moore, ed., Meaning and Reference (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); and in P. Ludlow, ed., Readings in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997); and in A.P. Martinich & D. Sosa, eds., Analytic Philosophy: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001). DUMMETT, M., Origins of Analytical Philosophy (London: Duckworth, 1993) [ch. 7]. KENNY, A., Frege (London: Penguin, 1995). [chs. 6 & 7]. MCDOWELL, J., 'On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name.' Mind 86 (1977): 159-85. Reprinted in M. Platts, ed., Reference, Truth, and Reality: Essays on the Philosophy of Language (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1980); and in A. W. Moore, ed., Meaning and Reference (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). NOONAN, H., Frege (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000). [chs. 4 & 5]. Russell's Theory of Descriptions *RUSSELL, B., 'On Denoting.' Mind 14 (1905): pp. 479-93. Reprinted in his Logic and
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Knowledge: Essays 1901-1950, ed. R.C. Marsh (London: Allen & Unwin, 1956); and in his Collected Papers, vol. 4 (London: Routledge, 1994); and in G. Ostertag, ed., Definite Descriptions: A Reader (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998); and in A. P. Martinich & D. Sosa, eds, Analytic Philosophy: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001). *SMILEY, T.J., 'The Theory of Descriptions', in Studies in the Philosophy of Logic and Knowledge, edited by T.R. Baldwin and T.J. Smiley.(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp.131-61. BLACKBURN, S., and A. CODE. 'On the Power of Russell's Criticism of Frege: "On Denoting" Analysis 38 (1978): pp. 65-77. GEACH, P.T., 'Russell on Meaning and Denoting.' Analysis 19 (1959): 69-72. Reprinted in his Logic Matters (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972), pp. 27-31. KAPLAN, D., 'What Is Russell's Theory of Descriptions', in Bertrand Russell: A Collection of Critical Essays, edited by D. Pears.(Garden City, New York: Anchor, 1972). Reprinted in D. Davidson & G. Harman, eds, The Logic of Grammar (Encino, CA: Dickenson, 1975). POTTER, M., Reason's Nearest Kin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). [ 51-53. Available online at www.oxfordscholarship.com]. SAINSBURY, M., 'Russell on Names and Communication', in Russell and Analytic Philosophy, edited by A.D. Irvine and G.A. Wedeking. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993). SEARLE, J., 'Russell's Objections to Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference.' Analysis 18 (1958): 137-43. Other Descriptivist Theories *SEARLE, J., 'Proper Names.' Mind 67 (1958): 166-73. Reprinted in P.F. Strawson, ed., Philosophical Logic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967); and in P. Ludlow, ed., Readings in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997). GEACH, P., Mental Acts (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957). [ch. 16]. WITTGENSTEIN, L., Philosophical Investigations, Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953). [ 79].

*KRIPKE, S., 'Lecture 1 and 2', in Naming and Necessity. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980). Reprinted in P. Ludlow, ed., Readings in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997). *MCCULLOCH, G., The Game of the Name (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). [chs. 4, 8]. *MORRIS, M., An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). [ch. 4]. DEVITT, M., and K. STERELNY, Language and Reality (Cambridge, Mass., MIT, 1999) [ch 4] EVANS, G., 'The Causal Theory of Names', in Collected Papers. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985). Reprinted in P. Ludlow, ed., Readings in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1997). LYCAN, W.G., Philosophy of Language (London: Routledge, 2000). [chs. 3, 4. Available online at www.myilibrary.com/?id=35447]. Two-Dimensional Modal Semantics BALDWIN, T., and R. STALNAKER. 'On Considering a Possible World as Actual.' Aristotelian Society Suppl. Vol. 75 (2001): 141-74. CHALMERS, D.J., The Conscious Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). [pp. 56-65. Also available online at www.myilibrary.com/?id=45275]. Problems With Intensional Contexts *KAPLAN, D., 'Quantifying In', in Words and Objections: Essays on the Works of W. V. Quine, edited by D. Davidson and J. Hintikka. (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969). Reprinted in L. Linsky, ed., Reference and Modality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). *MELIA, J., Modality (London: Acumen, 2003). [Ch. 3. Also available on Camtools]. *QUINE, W.V., 'Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes', in Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. Rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976). GEACH, P.T., 'The Perils of Pauline', Review of Metaphysics 23 (1969): 287-300. Reprinted in his Logic Matters (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972), pp. 153-65. KAPLAN, D., Opacity' in The Philosophy of W.V. Quine, edited by L.E. Hahn and P.A. Schilpp. (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1986, expanded ed., 1998), pp. 229-89. LEWIS, D., 'Tensions', in Philosophical Papers. Vol. I. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). [Also available online at www.oxfordscholarship.com] QUINE, W.V., 'Intensions Revisited'. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977): 5-11. Reprinted in Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, edited by P.A. French. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), and in Quintessence: Basic Readings from the Philosophy of W.V. Quine, edited by R. Gibson, (Cambridge, MA.: Belknap Press, 2004). QUINE, W.V., 'Reference and Modality', in From a Logical Point of View: Nine LogicoPhilosophical Essays. 3rd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1963). Reprinted in L. Linsky, ed., Reference and Modality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). QUINE, W.V., 'Three Grades of Modal Involvement', in Ways of Paradox and Other Essays,
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UNIT 6: LATER THEORIES OF SINGULAR TERMS In the late 60s and early 70s Kripke, Donnellan and others developed theories of meaning that dispensed with the Fregean notion of sense; the meaning of a name was what it denoted. But 'Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Clark Kent' is true yet she doesn't believe that Clark Kent is Superman. How can this be so if 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' denote the same thing? Causal Theories of Names *AHMED, A., Saul Kripke (London: Continuum, 2007). [ch. 2].
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Rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1976). Reprinted in Quintessence: Basic Readings from the Philosophy of W.V. Quine, edited by R. Gibson, (Cambridge, MA.: Belknap Press, 2004). SMULLYAN, A., 'Modality and Description.' Journal of Symbolic Logic 13 (1948): 31-37. Reprinted in L. Linsky, ed., Reference and Modality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). UNIT 7: MODAL LOGIC Systems of modal propositional logic: T, S4 and S5. Semantics: accessibility relations between possible worlds. Statement of soundness and completeness results for T, S4 and S5. *MELIA, J., Modality (London: Acumen, 2003). [chs. 1, 2]. HUGHES, G., and M. CRESSWELL. A New Introduction to Modal Logic (London: Routledge, 1996). [pts. 1, 2 (Part 2 in particular, is quite hard)]. KRIPKE, S., 'Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic', in Reference and Modality, edited by L. Linsky. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). [Important, but hard going] KUHN, S.T., 'Modal Logic', in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by E. Craig, (London: Routledge, 1998). [Available online from www.rep.routledge.com/article/Y039] LEWIS, D., 'Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic', in Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). [Available online at www.oxfordscholarship.com] LOUX, M.J., ed., The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1979), pp. 15-28. MINTS, G., A Short Introduction to Modal Logic (Stanford, Ca. : CSLI, 1992). PRIEST, G., An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). [chs. 2, 3]. SAINSBURY, M., Logical Forms, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001). [ch. 5]. UNIT 8: NECESSITY AND POSSIBLE WORLDS When we speak of necessities and possibilities are we talking of objective facts or are we expressing features of our own psychology, e.g. facts about what we can imagine or find thinkable? If the answer is that necessities and possibilities are objective, how should we understand them? Is Lewis's realism about possible worlds the best way or will something less ontologically extravagant do the job? *LEWIS, D., On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986). [ch. 1, 1 & 2; ch. 2; ch. 3, 1 & 2; ch. 4, 1 & 2]. *MELIA, J., Modality (London: Acumen, 2003). [chs. 4-7]. *PLANTINGA, A., The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974). [chs. 1, 4. Available online at www.oxfordscholarship.com]
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ARMSTRONG, D., A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). BALDWIN, T., 'Kantian Modality.' Aristotelian Society Suppl. Vol. (2002):1-24. FORBES, G., The Metaphysics of Modality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985). [ch. 1]. FRENCH, P.A., J. T. E. UEHLING, and H.K. WETTSTEIN., eds., Studies in Essentialism, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XI (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986) [Papers by Adams, Stalnaker and van Inwagen]. KRIPKE, S., Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980). [Look in the index for the references to possible worlds]. LOUX, M., ed., The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1979) [Loux's introduction and papers by Adams, Lewis, Plantinga and Stalnaker.]. LOWE, E.J., A Survey of Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). [ch. 7]. ROSEN, G., 'Modal Fictionalism.' Mind 99 (1990): 327-54.

UNIT 9: INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC When we taught you propositional logic in your first year, perhaps we were misleading you. Versions of verificationism have led some philosophers to doubt the law of the excluded middle (that P v P for any P). This unit is an introduction to the study of reasons for doubting whether the classical logic you have been taught is correct. It leads naturally into the question, studied further in Part II Philosophical Logic, what sort of truths the truths of logic are. Introduction and Elimination Rules *PRIOR, A., 'The Runabout Inference Ticket.' Analysis 21 (1960): 38-39. Reprinted in P. F. Strawson, ed., Philosophical Logic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967). BELNAP, N.D., 'Tonk, Plonk and Plink', Reprinted in P. F. Strawson, ed., Philosophical Logic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967). PRIOR, A., 'Conjunction and Contonktion Revisited.' Analysis 24 (1964): 191-95. Intuitionistic Logic VAN DALEN, D., Logic and Structure. 3rd ed. (Berlin: Springer, 1994). [Ch 5 5.1 and 5.2. Available online at http://tinyurl.com/34uzd48]. HEYTING, A., Intuitionism: An Introduction (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1956). [ch. 1]. MCCARTY, D.C., 'Intuitionism', in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by E. Craig. (London: Routledge,1998). [Available from: www.rep.routledge.com/article/Y062] PRIEST, G., An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) [ch. 6].

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Link with Verificationism MCDOWELL, J., 'Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism', in Truth and Meaning, edited by G. Evans and J. McDowell. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976). MISAK, C.J., Verificationism: Its History and Prospects (London: Routledge, 1995). [ch. 4]. Paradox of Knowability *WILLIAMSON, T., 'Intuitionism Disproved?' Analysis 42 (1982): 203-07. DUMMETT, M., 'Victor's Error.' Analysis 61 (2001): 1-2. EDGINGTON, D., 'The Paradox of Knowability'. Mind 94 (1985): 557-68. WILLIAMSON, T., 'On the Paradox of Knowability' Mind 96 (1987): 256-61. UNIT 10: THEORIES Euclid's axiomatization of geometry, Peano's axioms for arithmetic, and the axioms of order these and many others are examples of the application of the axiomatic method. In this unit, we shall consider the idea that a system of axioms can be thought of as implicitly defining the primitive terms occurring in it. We shall also introduce the notions of consistency and independence and ask whether the consistency of an axiom system entails the existence of referents for the primitive terms. *FREGE, G., and D. HILBERT. 'The Frege-Hilbert Correspondence', in Gottlob Frege: Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence, edited by G. Gottfried, et al. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980). *WILDER, R.L., Introduction to the Foundations of Mathematics (New York: Wiley, 1952). [chs. 1, 2]. BARKER, S., Philosophy of Mathematics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964). [ch. 3]. BLANCHE, R., Axiomatics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962). DUMMETT, M., 'Frege on the Consistency of Mathematical Theories', in Frege and Other Philosophers. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). pp 1-16 [Available online at www.oxfordscholarshiponline.com] GRAY, J., Ideas of Space: Euclidean, Non-Euclidean, and Relativistic. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). [For the background on non-Euclidean geometry] LAKATOS, I., 'A Renaissance of Empiricism in the Recent Philosophy of Mathematics?' in Mathematics, Science and Epistemology, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2.(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). Reprinted in T. Tymoczko, ed., New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). POTTER, M., Set Theory and Its Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). [Section 1.1 The Axiomatic Method. Also available online at www.myilibrary.com/?id=75496 ]. RAMSEY, F.P., 'Theories', in Philosophical Papers, edited by D.H. Mellor. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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