THE JOURNAL

OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

BUDDHIST STUDIES
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
A. K. Narain
University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA
Heinz Bechert
Universitiit Gottingen, FRG
Lewis Lancaster
EDITORS
Leon Hurvitz
University of British Columbia
Vancouver, Canada
j1Jiversity of California, Berkeley, USA
A. W. MacDonala
Universite de Paris X, Nanterre, France
B . .J. Stavisky
WCNILKR, Moscow, USSR
Alex Wayman
Columbia University, New York, USA
ASSOCIATE EDITOR
Stephen Beyer
University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA
Volume 1 Number 2 1979
c/o Department of South Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin, Madison,
Wisconsin 53706
THE JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
BUDDHIST STUDIES, INC.
This Journal is the organ of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
Inc., and will be governed by the objectives of the Association and will a c c e p ~
scholarly contributions pertaining to Buddhist Studies in all the various dis-
ciplines such as philosophy, history, religion, sociology, anthropology, art,
archaeology, psychology, textual studies, etc. The JIABS will be published
twice yearly in the Spring and Fall.
The Association and the Editors assume no responsibility for the views ex-
pressed by the authors in the Association's .Journal and other related pub-
lications.
Manuscripts for publication and correspondence concerning articles should
be submitted to A. K. Narain, Editor-in-Chief, JIABS, Department of South
Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin 53706, U.S.A.
The Editor-in-Chief is responsible for the final content of the .Journal and
reserves the right to reject any material deemed inappropriate for publication
and is not obliged to give reasons therefor.
Books for review should be sent to the Editor-in-Chief. The Editors cannot
guarantee to publish reviews of unsolicited books nor to return those books
to the senders.
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
Andre Bareau (France) Joseph M. Kitagawa (USA)
John Brough (U.K.) Jacques May (Switzerland)
M.N. Deshpande (India) Hajime Nakamura (Japan)
R. Gard (USA) John Rosenfield (USA)
B. G. Gokhale (USA) Bardwell L. Smith (USA)
P. S. Jaini (USA) David Snellgrove (U.K.)
J. W. de Jong (Australia) E. Zurcher (Netherlands)
Copyright The International Association of Buddhist Studies 1979
Sponsored by South Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wiscon-
sin, and by Professor Bardwell Smith, Carleton College, Northfield, Minnesota.
CONTENTS
I. ARTICLES
1.
Is the Buddhist Notion of "Cause Necessitates Effect"
(Paticcasamuppiida) Scientific? by A.D.P. Kalansuriya 7
2.
Chou Yung vs. Chang Jung (on Sunyatii): the Pen-mo
Yu-wu Controversy in Fifth-Century China, by
Whalen Lai 23
II. SHORT PAPERS
1. GUI;.aprabha's Vinaya-sutra and his Own Commentary on
the Same, by P. V. Bapat 47
2.
Ked, "Some," in a Pali Commentary, by 1. B. Horner 52
3. Comments on Zen, by M. Kiyota 57
4. The Freudian Unconscious and BhavaJiga, by O. H. de A.
Wijesekera 63
III. BOOK REVIEWS
1. Tibetan Buddhism in Western Perspective: Collected Ar-
ticles, by H. V. Guenther 67
2. Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism, by Geske
Lhundup Sopa and J. Hopkins 69
3. Shingon Buddhism: Theory and Practice, b y ~ . Kiyota 72
4.
Choix de Documents tibetains conserves it la Bibliotheque
Nationale, complete par quelques manuscrits de l'India
Office et du British Museum; presentes par Ariane
Macdonald et Yoskiro Imaeda 76
IV. NOTES AND NEWS
1. Presidential Address by Professor Gadjin M. Nagao 79
2. Report on the Proceedings of the First Conference of the
LA.B.S., Columbia University, New York, September
15-17, 1978 85
3. List of Members of LA.B.S. 92
V. OBITUARY
Yamaguchi Susumu, by Sakurabe Hajme
104
Is the Buddhist Notion of "Cause
Necessitates Effect (Paticcasamuppiida)
Scientific?
by A. D. P. Kalansuriya
Causality in Buddhism: an introductz"on
The notion of causality (P3:li: paticcasamuppada; Sanskrit: pratztya-
samutpada) is central to Buddhism. The Buddha testifies to its key
role in the Buddhist religion thus: "He who sees causality sees the
Dhamma" (yo paticcasamuppiidarJ'! passati so dhammarJ'! passati).l
In their own way, the Pilii Nikiiyas, employing the conceptual tools
available in the wider Indian thought, deal elaborately with this
notion. But then, does the notion of causality (paticcasamuppada)
express a universally valid truth? Does the causal argument here
render its conclusion certain or only highly probable? We shall at
tempt to answer these questions in this paper.
In the Sa'f!!yutta Nikiiya, the notion of causality is explained
in this way: "Causation has the characteristics of objectivity, ne-
cessity, invariability and conditionality" ( ... tathatii avitathatii an-
annathata idappaccayata ayurJ'! vuccati ... paticcasamuppada).2
Paticcasamuppiida is a combination of the two words paticca "de-
pendent" and samuppada "arising." Accordingly, paticca-samup-
pada denotes "dependent arising" or "conditioned origination" or
"conditioned genesis." The MaJihima Nikiiya explicates this caus-
ation by the following general formula: imasmi'f!! sati idarJ'! hoti,
imassa uppada idarJ'! uppaJihiiti; imasmirJ'! asati idaf!1. na hoti; imassa
nirodha idarJ'! niruJjhati.
3
A literal rendering of this reads as
follows: "When this is, that comes to be; from the arising of this,
that arises. When th.is is not, that does not come to be; upon the
cessation of this, that ceases also."
7
Philosophical analysis
At this juncture, philosophically speaking, an analysis would
make explicit the nature of the notion of causality in Buddhism.
But, then, which analysis? Thinkers may disagree. To put it dif-
ferently, would it bevalid to explain the central notions of Buddh-
ism by way of another religion? Or should they be explained by
way of modem science? Or should they be explained within their
own context (the natural context to which they conceptually be-
long).? Admittedly, we face a significant issue here, and it relates
to the nature of the function of philosophy. For, throughout its
long and varied history, 'philosophy' has meant many different
things. This is a complex issue which we cannot dwell on here. But
we shall clarify our position, very briefly, in this way. Along with
the later Wittgenstein, we say that "Philosophy is a battle against
the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language."4 The
reference here is to a thorough misunderstanding of our language.
But how has this misunderstanding of our language arisen? It is
due not to simple error, but to a bewitchment whose source lies
partly in the human propensity for seeking an essence, a unity or a
simplicity which is non-existent. And, therefore, a misunderstand-
ing of our language gives rise to a misuse of language which, in
tum, gives rise to perplexities. They baffle and confuse us. Wittgen-
stein himself saw a way through all this perplexity: "What is your
aim in philosophy?-To shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle."5
Accordingly, philosophy does not involve itself in the primary sense
of imparting straightforward factual information, but simply in de-
scription of the hidden and nebulous sources of our confusion and
bafflement; of showing how we are misled and how we can re-
orientate ourselves. The consequence is clarity, which means that
philosophical problems should completely disappear. To put the
point yet more explicitly, the conceptual tool which is emphasized
here is as follows: not to use words out of context and not to iso-
late a word from the life to which it belongs, in which it is used, in
which it has meaning. We wish to examine and analyse the truly
Buddhistic notion of causality by way of the above-mentioned
conceptual tool.
If we determine "not to use words out of their natural con-
text" as a central conceptual tool in our present analysis of the
notion of causality (paticcasamuppada), it is of prime significance
8
to note the nature of the conceptual structure of Buddhism.
6
The
Buddha, the founder of Buddhism, says the following about his
thought-process: "I am one of those who profess the basis of a
religion ... "7 In the same context, the Buddha clearly emphasizes
his ideology as religious. This is evident from the following: " ...
it was not useful, not related to the fundamentals of religion, and
not conducive to revulsion, dispassion, cessation, peace, higher
knowledge, realization and nibbiina."8 The logical nature of the
Buddhist religion is evidently hinted at,as will be clear from a care-
ful understanding of the above-mentioned contentions of the
Buddha himself. The religious nature of Buddhism is further made
explicit by the moral code and the procedural guide emphasized
by the Buddha with reference to the summum bonum-nibbana-
the transcendent. The moral code is embodied in the majjhz"ma
patipada, the middle mode of conduct by which the sage crosses
to the safety of nibbana-the final liberation of mind which is like
the extinction of a lamp. What gradually unfolds seems to be the
c:thico-religious nature of Buddhism as against its scientific or
empirico-epistemological or any other kind of nature. To make the
point clearer still, what is made explicit is that the central doctrine
of Buddhism remains an ethical one and never an empirical hypo-
thesis or theory or doctrine which is either 'true' or 'not-true'
('false') empirically. And this way of treating Buddhism-limiting
Buddhism to its natural context, namely, a religious one, may
elicit a combative counterblast from the Buddhist modernists. We
hope to argue against them in the sequel.
Ethics and causal formula
The main argument in our paper notes initially that the back-
ground of the notion of causality is ethico-religious. It should be
kept in mind, at the outset, that if the notion is applied without re-
ference to the other notions that form its normal background,
nonsense is produced, for the notion remains empty. This is what
the later Wittgenstein describes as "when language is like an engine
idling, not when it is doing work" (wenn die Sprache leerlauft,
nicht wenn sie arbeitet).9 We propose that the Buddhistic notion
of causality needs to be employed within the conceptual structure
of Buddhism to avoid it being made meaningless. Quoting from the
9
Nikiiyas themselves, we showed that the notion of causality (patic-
casamuppiida) is embedded not in a made-up scientific causal
formula but in an ethico-religious groundwork, essentially woven
into ancient Indian thinking. '
However, it appears that the Buddhist modernists are at
variance with our above contention. K. N. J ayatilleke and D.].
Kalupahana are the prominent Buddhist modernists who have for-
warded an argument basically different from ours. For instance
J ayatilleke contends, "Those occurrences which are causally con:
nected are considered to have the following relation, namely, that
(1) 'Whenever A is present, B is present' (imasmirrt sati idarrt hoti)
and (2) 'whenever A is absent, B is absent' (imasmirrt asati idarn. na
hot). This means that B does not occur unless A is present and B
occurs only when A is present. Thus a one-one correlation is estab-
lished between the conditions constituting the cause and their ef-
fect. This is a scientific view of causation as opposed to the practi-
cal common-sense view."lO Elsewhere Jayatilleke says that Buddh-
ism is concerned primarily with the sense of the notion of causality
which denotes the causal laws that operate in bringing about the
continued genesis of the individual.
ll
With reference to the notion
of causality, Kalupahana says, "Thus the causal principle as stated
in the Pali Nikayas and the Chinese Agamas seems to include all
the features of a scientific theory of causation-objectivity, unique-
ness, ,necessity, conditionality, constant conjunction, productivity,
relativity-as well as one-one correlation. "12
Although both these Buddhist modernists discuss at length
the notion of causality (paticcasamuppiida), it is difficult to take
seriously their assurances that it is similar to the scientific notion
of causality. For in this connection what they do is to follow the
'so-called' Mill's methods of induction. Even as Mill did, the
Buddhist modernists have to face the logical consequences of the
conception of a cause as a sufficient and necessary condition. To
put it differently, the occurrence of A necessitates the occurrence
of B; and B does not come to be without A occurring. Serious dif-
ficulties lie in determining whether, in fact, these relations hold.
Similar difficulties appear as regards the notion of causality in
Buddhism, if its difficulties are similar to those in Mill's methods
of induction. It is unnecessary to add that both J ayatilleke and
Kalupahana equate the nature and function of causality in Buddh-
Ism with those in Mill's method of induction by way of their 50-
10
called 'scientific view of causation.'
Both Jayatilleke and Kalupahana are true to the contentions
in the Nz"kiiyas when they emphasize and re-emphasize that the
order or the fixed nature of phenomena-the regular pattern of
phenomena or conditionality-exists, irrespective of the arrival of
the Buddhas. But this emphasis is not the end but the beginning of
the inquiry, namely, the serious need to note the logical nature of
the notion of causality. A paraphrasing of the significant words
that are made explicit with reference to Buddhistic causation such
as 'necessity,' 'objectivity,' 'invariability' and 'conditionality' will
not help at all to work out a good basis or a rationale. The point
we labour all along can be elucidated thus. What does the word avz"-
tathatii ("necessity") denote? J ayatilleke says that" ... since there
is no failure even for a moment to produce the events which arise
when the conditions come together, there is said to be 'necess-
ity.' "13 Kalupahana in his own way elaborates the denotation of
the word avitathata ("necessity") thus: "The traditional anthropo-
morphic meanings attached to the word 'necessity' have been re-
jected, and the empiricist view that it denotes a lack of exception
or the existence of regularity has been accepted."14 Ironically,
though, this way of treating the word 'necessity' can have an ad-
verse effect on the understanding of the true Buddhistic notion
of causality. To elucidate this point we shall take the first sentence
of the causal formula describing the nature of the conditioning of
the individual, namely, 'ignorance conditions the volitional activi-
ties' (avzJja paccaya sarrtkhara). But, then, what is the nature of the
causal relation between aviJja ("ignorance") and sarrtkhara ("voli-
tional activities")? J ayatilleke does not make any attempt to note
and specify the logical nature of this relation. Kalupahana's argu-
ments run a similar course. It is not very clear why the words
'necessity' and 'empiricality' are brought together in Kalupahana's
thesis. The problem seems not so much to be what is being affirm-
ed, as what is denied. To put it even more explicitly, it appears as
if there is a synthetic relation of necessitation, or alternatively, 'an
empirical necessity.' On the one hand, it is not at all clear what is
being denied and on the other, it is not clear what those who be-
lieve in synthetic relations of necessity take them to be. Therefore,
it is difficult to take seriously Kalupahana's assurance to the effect
that "necessity," when divorced of "anthropomorphic meanings,"
is equivalent to "a lack of exception or the existence of regularity."
11
For clarity's sake, can Kalupahana answer the following question:
How does one come across 'a lack of exception or the existence of
regularity'? By experience or by reasoning a priori? To hammer
the way out of the impasse of this causal hotch-potch is, of course,
possible, but very difficult and a shift of emphasis in the right
direction is called for. Apparently, such a shift of emphasis may
not be based on the attempts of either Kalupahana or J ayatilleke.
The reason relates to a misunderstanding of the limitations on the
subject matter at hand.
The implication here is the acceptance of the serious philo-
sophical technique of humbly trying to explore Buddhism from
within its own context. This philosophical technique is made ex-
plicit by Wittgenstein by his notion-"avoiding engine idling"-not
to use the central notions of an argument outside their territory.
And what Buddhist modernists have done is to wrongly read
hardened meanings of modern generations into Buddhist termino-
logy which, conceptually, belongs to the thought-structure of
ancient Indian philosophy. Admittedly, it would certainly be a
mistake to suppose that an introduction of Graeco-Roman philo-
sophical concepts is unwarranted. But our emphasis relates to an
exercise in which the effort should have been to reveal the limita-
tions of the subject matter at hand-Buddhism, in the first instance.
The Buddhistic 'causal relation ': Its nature
As a precursor to Kalupahana's likely answer, let us turn to
the question raised previously, namely, "How does one come across
a lack of exception or the existence of regularity"? In an empiri-
cist web of understanding, which incidentally is his approach, the
answer should simply be, "experience." But this is no more than
mere generalization of the data-of the observed (perceived) instan-
ces on which it is based. However, the propositions expressing
Buddhist causal laws or 'about' causal law-like instances such" as
avzJJii paccayii sankhiira ("ignorance conditions (= causes) volition-
al acts"), jiitz"paccaya jariimarar;a'Y{L ("birth conditions (= causes)
death"), etc., are no mere summaries of what has happened in the
past, of the states of affairs that might for instance be offered as
evidence in favour of such laws. If they are laws, the proper logical
form of such laws is best expressed through the hypothetico-con-
12
ditional 'if-then' rather than the categorical 'all. " . are.' To put
the matter thus would be worth the effort, since it would help
avoid all 'ontological commitments.'15 Therefore, what should be.
done in this connection is merely to investigate the applications of
the causal law. In itself, therefore, a causal law is a rule or a pre-
scription to which a truth-value cannot be assigned. The most we
could do is to apply it to various contexts, scientific, ethico-
religious, poetic, political and so on.
What emerges explicitly from this analysis, for the moment,
is that the Buddhist causal laws just noted are neither empirical
generalizations nor mere summaries of what has happened. They
simply are morality-oriented rules or prescriptions.
16
Admittedly,
the primitive causal formula in Buddhism which runs thus: z'mass'
,uppada z'da'YJ1, uppaJihiitz' ... imassa nz'rodha z'da'YJ1, nz'ruJihati ("from
the arising of this, that arises: upon the cessation of this, that
ceases also") testifies to this. Stated in an abstract form it reads
as follows: "From the arising of A, B arises; from the cessation of
A, B ceases also." When it is applied to "the continued genesis of
the individual" in the proper Buddhist context, philosophically
speaking, the central concern centers upon the need to note the
logz'cal nature of the relation between A and B. That is to say, to
note the logical nature of the relation-empirical (probable) or
ethical or necessary or a prz'orz' or empirico-necessary17 or any
other. But, then, what is the logcal nature of the relation between
cause and effect (abstract formula) or birth and decay-death or
ignorance and volitional acts (concrete formula)?
Buddhsm and Scz'ence
Let us turn, first, to Kalupahana. He says: "Without being a
partisan of anyone of these metaphysical views, the Buddha ad-
duced empirical causal explanations."18 We contend that what
Kalupahana's contentions amount to is, simply, a misusing of con-
texts-empirical and ethico-religious-from which the logical nature
of the causal relation in Buddhism is not made explicit. Admittedly,
the relation not only remains nebulous but is also attended by very
significant difficulties. We shall see one difficulty in what follows.
Does "decay-death" (the effect) follow by necessity from "birth"
(the cause)? The ethico-religious character of Buddhism is destroy-
13
ed if the answer to it is supplied in the negative. To put it different_
ly, one has to give an affirmative answer to the question just men-
tioned. And, therefore, empirical relations in the sense of "high
degree of probability" or "low degree of probability" are logically
not possible here. To Kalupahana, the case seems to be both ethico_
religious and scientific at the same time. That is to say, the relation
between "cause and effect" is both necessary and empirical. Ac-
cording to Kalupahana, the relation appears necessary, because
"decay-death must arise from birth" in order to retain the central
ground-work in Buddhism. To drive home the point, according to
the primitives in Buddhism, decay-death by necessity cannot arise
if birth is non-existent. The Sa1]'!yutta Nikaya testifies to this con:
elusion in this way: katamo ca paticcasamuppado? jiitipaccaya ...
jaramara1J,a1]'!19 ("What is causation? Upon birth, decay-death
arises"). Alternatively, within the conceptual structure of Buddh-
ism, it is theoretically impossible to entertain a view which em-
bodies the position that the effect (= decay-death) arises from cause
other than birth. However, if Buddhist modernists wish to argue
against this view (which in itself is a very difficult thesis), they
should incorporate two things:
(i) that the formula which involves "birth conditions
( = necessitates) decay-death" needs radical revision,
and
(ii) that a basically different alternative doctrine of salvation
originating from the very conceptual structure of Buddh-
ism is logically possible.
Needless to say, both (i) and (ii) cannot be accommodated
within the conceptual structure of Buddhism which is a religion
with a set moral code according to the Buddha himself.20 Why?
Because (i) and (ii) above adversely affect the very groundwork of
Buddhism. The reason relates to the logical impossibility of enter-
taining an alternative means other than the ariyatthangikamagga
with reference to the summum bonum (nibbana), within the con-
text of Buddhism. Logically speaking, the Buddhist conceptual
structure can accommodate only one means and only one goal.
Non-buddhist religious tenets or scientific tenets or poetic tenets
14
or any other tenets cannot be accommodated in it at all. It is evi-
dent, therefore, that to read e m p i ~ i c i s m into the truly Buddhist
causal formula is, first, a central philosophical error. Second, it
gives rise to considerable theoretical difficulties.
It is logical to entertain the following: The claim that "the
Buddha adduced empirical causal explanations," impressive though
this claim may be, remains unsupported. Again, J ayatilleke's
claim too, namely, "This is a scientific view of causation as opposed
to the practical common-sense view, "21 remains unsupported. Ad-
mittedly, as made explicit, causal explanations in Buddhism are not
empirical (i.e. scientific) but ethical. The central notions that arise
from its conceptual structure are ethical. To put the matter thus
would be worth the effort, since it would help avoid philosophical
errors, pseudo-problems and bewitchments. For instance, the rela-
tion between
(i) "Upon birth, decay-death is conditioned ( = necessitated)"
(jiitipacca"yii jariimarar;,ar(l,) ,
(ii) "Upon ignorance, volitional acts are conditioned ( = neces-
sitated)" (avzJj'ii paccayii sankhiira) ,
(iii) "Cause conditions ( = necessitates) effect," etc.,
are necessary ones. It is because birth necessarily conditions ( =
necessitates) decay-death, according to Buddhism. Alternatively,
the one and only way or patz"padii also has been designed on a
moral code by the Buddha to uproot the cause (birth), so that the
effect (decay-death) can be uprooted at the same time. And, there-
fore, what is implied is a necessary, sacrosanct and ethical relation
between cause and effect in Buddhism. We emphasize the ethical
( = sacrosanct) nature as the central characteristic of the notion of
causality in this ethico-religious ideology. Buddhist modernists have
made it a fashion to read hardened meanings of modern generations
such as empiricism, positivism, science, parapsychology, psycho-
logy, psycho-analysis, etc., into Buddhism, which is primarily built
on the constraints of agriculture, pastoralism and the environment
affecting it. These in turn are embedded in ancient Indian civiliza-
tion. This fashion almost amounts to a philosophical error, namely,
confusion of contexts-to expect an empirical (probable) relation
15
from an ethico-religious ideology where such a relation is lOgically
impossible. If Buddhist religious notions were to be carefully ana-
lyzed, for clarity's sake, within their own context, then the follow_
ing will be revealed:
(i) the ethico-causal formula
and
(ii) its application to phenomena.
The Sarrzyutta Nz'kaya testifies to this end thus: ... thz'ta va sa
dhatu dhammatthz'tata dhammaniyamata z'dappaccayata: (" ...
this order exists-the fixed nature of phenomena-the regular pat-
tern of phenomena").22 The exact meanings of the key notions in
this passage, such as order, fz'xed nature of phenomena, and regular
pattern, are not that clear. However, the same Nikaya n o t e ~ : jati-
paccaya jaramara1J,ar[! ("Upon birth, decay-death is conditioned").
Apparently, the case appears to be as follows: The abstract causal
formula makes explicit a necessary relatz'on between birth and
decay-death; and this is projected onto the external world of our
experience in concreto. The subconcept of compulsion or of
efficiency is implicitly contained in the Buddhist notion of caus-
ality. If so, it is not possible to take seriously the assurances of
Buddhist modernists-] ayatilleke, Kalupahana, and others-that
Buddhist causality is scz'entific.
In scientific practice, causality is dissociated from any notion
of efficiency or compulsion. That is to say, in the scientific con-
text, causal connection is replaced by a functional relationship of
a mathematical sort. Admittedly, once the mathematical function
is established, the agency of causal compulsion ceases to be a
problem for science. But such a complex theoretical exercise is not
undertaken in Buddhism. Again, the claim that Buddhist causality
is also scientific is further weakened, when Buddhist modernists
read the scientific notion of 'one-one correlation' into the wider
notion of patccasamuppada. What is a 'one-one correlation'? What
impact does it have on the truly Buddhist notion of causality
(pa#ccasamuppada)? The scientific investigator attempts to find a
relation that is equally determinate in either direction, that is, he
seeks a one-one relation: 'whenever X occurs, E occurs, and E does
16
not occur unless X has occurred':23 but this formula does not
mean "X will be followed by E" or "X will bring about E" or "X
gives rise to E" or "X necessitates E," put simply what accelera-
tiona particle will have under given circumstances, i.e., it tells us
how the particle's motion is changing each moment, and not wh"ere
the particle will be at some future moment. Therefore, the formula
which embodies 'one-one correlation' can absorb the idea that it is
not rendered necessary that causes should precede their effects.
Bertrand Russell has formulated this idea in this way: "The law
makes no difference between past and future: the future 'deter-
mines' the past in exactly the same sense in which the past 'deter-
mines' the future."24 But the Buddhist causal formula, even if it
implicitly contains a primitive one-one correlation, by necessity
cannot absorb this Russellean idea which is scientific, simply be-
cause its scope is thoroughly limited. For instance, the reversibility
of the temporal order of cause-effect direction cannot be accom-
modated in the Buddhist model; but the reverslbility--Of the tem-
poral order of events can be accommodated in the scientific causal
model without damaging it. In this sense, it is hardly possible to
accept the Buddhist causal formula as scientific. The truly
ic notion of causality, therefore, not only entertains probability
but is also capable of accommodating the notion of the reversibility
of the temporal order of events. What emerges explicitly from this
is that both the notions of "probability" and of "the reversibilty
of the temporal order" have no place in truly Buddhist causality.
This may be restated as follows: these notions are not ingredients
of truly Buddhist causality. Buddhist causality, therefore, is not
only primitive, but is also not scientific.
The logical nature of the Buddhist causal formula becomes
even clearer once the notions of order and of the fixed nature of
phenomena, as understood within the Buddhistic context, are
further elaborated. How are we made aware of the so-called fixed
nature of phenomena and the order in the cosmos? Is the order in
the cosmos universally valid? Clear answers to both these questions
are found in Buddhism. For instance, the fixed nature of pheno-
mena and the order in the cosmos were discovered by the Buddha
and revealed to us. Kalupahana puts the idea in this way: "Thus,
having experienced particular instances of causation through sen-
sory as well as extrasensory perception, the Buddha arrived at a
general theory of 'causality' or 'causal uniformity,' which could be
17
considered a universally valid principle."25 But, if the order and
uniformity in the cosmos are universally valid, the causal relation
which is said to exist between cause and effect-birth and decay_
death, ignorance and volitional acts-is also universally valid. To
clarify it further, the relation between cause and effect in primitive
Buddhism is certairi (or necessary). It is not possible, therefore, to
take seriously the assurance of either J ayatilleke or Kalupahana
that Buddhist causality is scientific and empirical (probable).
The necessary character or the universally-valz"d character of
Buddhist causality (paticcasamuppiida) makes the Buddha's 80-
called generalization unassailable and sacrosanct. And this position
is consistent with Buddhism, the religion of the Buddha: but it
must also be emphasized that the sacrosanct Buddhist position is
basically different from that of science. In Buddhism:
(i) "birth (jiiti) necessitates or produces decay-death (jarii-
mararJ,af!1, )," which expresses a necessary connection.
But in science the scientist looks for a general law of the following
form:
(iia) "whenever an event of type X occurs, an event of type Y
occurs."
An example will make explicit the scientific causal formula:
(iib) "whenever a gas is heated, its volume remaining constant,
its pressure rises."
This proposition expresses the connection between the two events
"a gas being heated" and "the pressure rising." But it does not
express a necessary connection; it expresses a probable connection
of a high degree of probability only. Therefore, the notion of "one
event necessitating this or that event" is not implicitly contained
in the scientific concept of causality, whereas this notion is implicit-
ly contained in Buddhist causality (paticcasamuppiida). To repeat,
first, Buddhist causality not only expresses a necessity, a produc-
tion, but also emphasizes a necessary connection; and, second,
Buddhist causality is unassailable. Truly scientific causality denies
18
both necessity (necessary connection) and unassailability. The idea
is better expressed by D.M. Taylor and A.J. Ayer. With reference
to the notion of necessity, Taylor says: " ... the notion of one
event necessitating another is senseless."26 And as regards the
notion of unassailability, Ayer says, " ... no laws are sacrosanct,
none is safe from rejection in the light of further experience,
because, while we have to rely on some laws in building up our
picture of the world, they do not always have to be the same ones
... so there is no scientific hypothesis, no factual generalization of
any kind and no presupposition, of which we can say that it is
unassailable."27 And as Buddhism accepts necessity, unassailabili-
ty and sacrosancticity, what emerges into explicitness is the basic
distinction between science and Buddhism. It is the case that both
science and Buddhism use the word 'causality' in their respective
argumentations, deliberations, presuppositions, etc. However, this
is not going to make Buddhism scientific.
Religious systems, inclusive of the Buddhist one, originating
in the desire for practical rules of good conduct are basically
primitive. The central attempt in religions is to solve certain prob-
lems that are not yet treated as coming within the scope of science.
Alternatively, the meaning of a word in a religious ideology,
which emphasizes rules of good conduct, is not identical with a
technical word in a scientific language. What we mean here is that
the meaning of a technical term in a scientific language cannot be
derived from the meaning of the same word in ordinary language.
The way in which the concept of causality in Buddhism is given
application by Buddhist modernists is unintelligible. It involves
the conflation of a concept from one category with another taken
from another category. This gives rise to meaninglessness of one
kind or another. Admittedly, therefore, one has to be extra careful
when borrowing scientific terms and using them elsewhere-in
religion, politics, poetics, aesthetics, ethics and so on.
Again, in certain areas of science, the scientists go one step
further towards a special technical langauge. Here one is involv-
ed, not only with a special terminology of words with very differ-
ent meanings, but with the fundamentals of a specific linguistic
structure. All these lend weight to the thesis that Buddhism and
science are basically different in nature, scope and goals. Any
attempt to explain Buddhism through science, therefore, leads to
emptiness alone.
19
Conclusion
The notion of necessary connection made explicit in Buddhist
causality (pa#ccasamuppiida), conceptually speaking, is consistent
with that of nibbiina-the summum bonum. It is this consistency
that elicits the ethical nature of Buddhist causality as against the
so-called empirical (scientific) one. For instance, the notion of
paticcasamuppada ("causality") not only emphasizes jati ("birth")
necessitating jariimara1J,am ("decay-death"), but is also included in
the uprooting of jiiti ("birth") which is nibbiina ("emancipation ==
freedom"). To put it differently, if jiiti ("birth") is not uprooted,
the person is reborn in an unending manner (it necessitates jarii-
mara1Jarrt and punabbhavo). It must now be very clear that the only
salvation is the attainment of nibbiina and that the only means is
the ariyaHhangikamagga. The implication, soteriologically, is the
logical impossibility of an alternative doctrine of salvation in
Buddhism. Logically it suggests the necessary (certain) character
of the relation between jiiti ("birth") and jariimara1Jarrt and punab-
bhavo ("decay-death" and "rebirth"). Cannot one attain nibbiina
by following a means other than the ariyaHhangikamagga? The only
possible answer is in the negative. For, within the strictly limited
religious model in Buddhism, it is not possible to entertain any
alternative doctrine of salvation. Emancipation ( = nibbiina) is the
only salvation meaningful and the ariyatthangikamagga the only
means by which it can be attained. Therefore, an alternative doc-
trine of salvation in Buddhism is simply self-contradictory. If so,
this doctrine must have a central impact on notions such as jiiti
("birth"), jaramara1J,ar(! ("decay-death"), punabbhavo ("rebirth"),
avzJj"ii ("ignorance"), sankhiira ("volitional acts"), etc. This is be-
cause these ideas have no meaning outside the context of Buddhism.
To put the point differently, they have meaning only within
the limited boundary of the Buddhist religion. The notion of pro-
bablity is foreign to the ethico-religious conceptual structure of
Buddhism which is embedded in ancient Indian (aryan) thinking.
To elaborate: If Buddhism were to be meaningful, avzjjii ("igno-
rance") must necessitate smikhiira ("volitional acts") and jiiti
("birth") must necessitate jariimara1J,a'Y[! ("decay-death"). The
words used in this type of discourse have emotive meaning only.
By emotive meaning, we mean a disposition to produce emotion-
al and attitudinal effects on the hearer, the follower, the disciple
20
or anyone else. Therefore, from a logical point of view, there exist
no probable (empirical) relations. The only relation that exists
between cause and effect or avijja and sankhara or jiiti and jarii-
mararJ,af!'l or any other in Buddhism is a morality-oriented necessary
one. If so, it is needless to add that an alternative doctrine of salva-
tion in Buddhism is theoretically non-present, because there is no
space for doubt-denial conditions or probability-conditions or In-
ductive generalizations or mathematical deductions.
NOTES
Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Sri Lanka, Peradenia, Sri
Lanka.
1. Ed. V. Trenkner and R. Chalmers, Majjhima Nikaya, Tr. I. B. Horner,
Middle Length Sayings, Vol. I, London, PTS, 1954-9, 190-l.
2. Ed. L. Feer, Sarrr-yutta Nikiiya, Tr. C.A.F. Rhys Davids and F.L.
Woodward, Vol. II, London, PTS, The Book of the Kindred Sayings, 1917-30,
26.
3. Majjhima Nikiiya (op. cit.,) Vol. I. 262-4.
4. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford, Basil Blackwell,
1953, p. 47e.
5. Ibid., p. 103e.
6. I have dealt with this notion, elaborately, elsewhere: see A.D.P.
Kalansuriya, "The Ethico-religious Nature of the Conceptual Framework of
Buddhism, Dialogue,Vol. IV, Nos. 1 & 2, August, 1977, pp. 51-60.
7. MaJi"himii Nikaya, Vol. II, 21l.
8. Ibid., 431.
9. Philosophical Investigations, p. 51.
10. K.N. ]ayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, London,
Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1963, p. 449.
11. K.N: ]ayatilleke, The Message of the Buddha, Ed. Ninian Smart,
London, Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1975, p. 197.
12. D.]. Kalupahana, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism,
Honolulu, The University Press of Hawaii, 1975, p. 98 ..
13. Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, p. 447.
14. Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 93.
15. A.D.P. Kalansuriya, "Wittgenstein, Meaning Model and Buddhism,"
Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. IV, No.3, April 1977, pp. 381-91.
16. See, "The Ethico-religious Nature of the Conceptual Framework of
Buddhism," Dialogue, Vol. IV, Nos. 1-2, August 1977.
17. Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, p. 453: "It closely resembles
the Regularity Theory except for the fact that it speaks of the empirical
necessity (avitathata)."
21
18. Causality, p. 143.
19. Sarr;yutta Nikiiya, Vol. II. 25.
20. MaJi"himii Nikiiya, Vol. II. 21l.
21. Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, p. 449,
22. Sarr:tyutta Nikiiya, Vol. II. 25.
23. L.S. Stebbing, Modern Introduction to Logic, London, 1945, p. 264.
24. Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic, Longmans, 1919, p. 195.
25. Causality, p. 107.
26. D.M. Taylor, Explanation and Meaning, Cambridge University Press
1970, p. 5. '
27. A.J. Ayer, Probability and Evidence, London, Macmillan, 1972, p. 25.
22
,
Chou Yung
a
vs. Chang J ung
b
(on Sunyatii);
The Pen-rna Yu-wu
c
Controversy in Fifth-
Century China!
by W haZen Lai
Since the Wei-Chin period, the goal of learning has been that
of embodying the Tao and penetrating the Hsiian
d
(Dark
Mystery). Both Tao and Hsiian pertain to the origin, pen-
yuan. e The Three Hsiian-Lao-tzu, Chuang-tzu and the I
Ching-and the Buddha-Dharma were teachings investigating
the origin and reverting to the Controversies over the
similarity and difference between Sakyamuni and Lao-tzu
were all centered upon concept of pen-mo (origin and
end). Those siding with Sakyamuni would deride Lao-tzu for
abiding the end aspect. Those honoring Lao-tzu would
say that Sakyamuni failed to attain the origin.
2
The above observation of T'ang Yung-t'ung in his magnum opus
brings out one of the key concerns in the early encounter between
the Buddha-Dharma ("Buddhism") and the native traditions of
China. The paradigm of pen-mo (origin and end) was drawn from
the Chinese native outlook more than from Buddhist thought pro-
per. The implied cosmo gonic sequence in pen-mo is that pen sig-
nifies the essential fountainhead while mo denotes the less essen-
tial subsequents that draw their life from the one origin. Applied
to the evaluations of different ideologies, spokesmen naturally
saw their own ideology as grounded in the origin and relegated
their opponents' position to the lesser subsequents. Although
the pen-mo paradigm existed in Han thought, the. organic ties
between the two were such that whatever has an origin naturally
has an end. Much of Han cosmo gonic speculations were based on
the assumption of pen-wu mo-yu: in the origin, there was wu
(pre-being), but in the end, yu (the many existents) evolved.
23
Whether the origin was called the Tao, the One, Ultimate Unity,
Ultimate Simplicity, Spirit, or the Original Ether, the general
consensus was that it brought forth the myriad things of this
"below-form" (hsing-hsia
f
) or material world.' Instead of endless_
ly speculating on the mysterious origin, Han Confucianism con-
fidently analyzed the specifics of present on tic realities; the latter
held the key to the universe just as much as the former. It was
only with the Neo-Taoists that disenchantment with the existents
occurred, and a trend styled "repressing the mo in reverence for
the pen" began.
3
Since Wang Pig the .word wu took on the new
meaning of absolute "nonbeing," a mathematical zero. The line
in Lao-tzu (interestingly absent in the Ma-wang-tui Lao-tzu):
" ... and being comes from nonbeing," became the basis for Wang
Pi's nihilism. Confucian ming-chao
h
, because it was a teaching
fixated on names (ming, i.e. the subsequents, mo, of things), was
looked upon as missing the origin. Confucius the Sage himself,
however, was elevated above Lao-tzu precisely because, in know-
ing the Tao, he was silent about it. He who knows does not speak.
When the Buddhist tradition found a foothold among Chin-
ese intellectuals, the pen-mo value scheme was applied to it.-Aside
from the partisan position already cited, there were those who
argued that the Tao and the Dharma were essentially one pen and
that the two teachings of the Buddha and Lao-tzu were historical
mo-manifestations. The sentiment that stressed one origin for all
three teachings, each penetrating the ultimate in its way, was fairly
strong; and this metaphysical "One and Only" even became the
basis of the doctrine of "sudden enlightenment."4 The basic para-
digm of pen-mo, or its variant, pen-chi
i
(origin and trace), was to
be the framework for analysis from the Six Dynasties period down
to the Ming-Ching syncretism. Pen-chi became the logic of the
honj suz)'aku
j
doctrine in Japan.
5
Its cousin, t'i-yungk (substance
and function), evolved into a philosophical category for all schools
in China.
6
A full treatment of these issues would not be possible
in this limited space; moreover, aspects of the Buddho-Taoist en-
counter have already been introduced by other scholars .. Many of
the pen-mo controversialists were crudely partisan and too predict-
able; on the other hand, many of the syncretists were well-meaning
and pious but lacked a discerning eye for the real issues. The
exceptions are Chang Jung and Chou Yung, whose exchange of
VIews IS partially preserved by Seng Yu
l
in the Hung-ming-chz'.m
24
Two famous gentry Buddhists of their day, they argued for and
against the basic equivalence of the Tao and the Dharma with a
rare ability to anticipate each other. Unlike other debates, this one
progresses internally, and some of the ideas evolved were incorpor-
ated into subsequent thinkers' reflections on this issueJ Much has
been written on the initial Neo-Taoist appropriation of the empti-
ness (sunyata) idea by way of Wang Pi's wu (nonbeing). The dif-
ferences between these two concepts are demonstrated here at
length in the exchange between Chang Jung and Chou Yung.
Both the substance and the impact of this exchange went beyond
those of Seng Chao'sf earlier critique. The "pairing of concepts"
(ko-i
o
), that is, mistaking wu for sunyata, did not end with Seng
Chao but with Chou Yung's attack on both Taoism and the
Ch'eng-shih
P
(Sa ty asiddh i) theory of "being and nonbeing" (yu-
wu). For these reasons, the present article will take, to my know-
ledge, the first comprehensive look at the letters of these two
fifth-century figures.
The Parties
Chang Jung (444-497) was a scion of a noted Southern fami-
ly which descended from a high official of the Chin dynasty. For
generations the Changs had mingled well within gentry-Buddhist
circles, and were on familiar terms with monks of ming (renown).
They wrote treatises on matters of faith, patronized the Sangha,
and wrote laudatory pieces for Buddhist masters upon their pass-
ing away. In his youth, Chang Jung received a gift from the Tao-
ist master Lu Ching-hsiu.
q
Known as the best of the Four Changs
(the other three were his cousins), he was especially famous for
his understanding and argumentation: "an artist without a master."
At his death he held in his left hand the Classic of Filz"al Piety and
the Lao-tzu and in his right the shorter Prajiia-paramita Sutra and
the Lotus Sutra, symbolizing his being at peace with the norms of
the Confucian tradition, the Tao, the idea of emptiness or wisdom,
and his devotion to the Buddha Sakyamuni.
8
It was during an ill-
ness sometime between 463 and 493 that he authored his "Family
Instructions" (Men-lu
T
)9 and sent it out to Ho Tien, Ho Yin, Kung
Chih-kuei, Kung Chung-chih, and Chou Yung for their edification.
The Hos and the Kungs were eminent families.
25
Chou Yung (Shan-tz'u
P
) was of a family of similar eminence
,
though one of his arlcestors had been outspoken against the Bud-
dhists. Yung himself went to the capital from Shu (Szechuan) and
was renowned enough to be invited by Emperor Ming of the Sung
dynasty to be his "intellectural" companion. A devoted Buddhist
layman and gentry hermit, Chou Yung prided himself on his vege-
tarianism and lamented still having a wife. He was knoWn especially
for a now-lost treatise, "On the Three Schools," in which he dealt
with three then-current typical Buddhist positions on the Two
Truths-on the relationship between phenomenal reality (yu) and
ultimate emptiness (wu). He received Chang Jung's "Family In-
structions" some time after, and felt obliged to disagree with its
equating of Buddhism and Taoism. Several scrolls of letters were
exchanged between the two mz"ng-shz"ht (men of fame), but Seng
Yu saw fit to excerpt only the first four letters, permitting Chou
Yung to have the last word. The Hung-mz"ng-chz" has recently been
critically edited with detailed notes and a Japanese translation by
the Jimbun Kagaku Kenkyusho of Kyoto University. Without
the Japanese effort in tracing the allusions and references the pre-
sent Jask would have been much more difficult. This more inter-
pretative approach, however, may be my contribution as well as
my responsibility.l0
The Issues
Two basic issues may be drawn from the Chang-Chou corre-
spondence. The first is the pen-mo paradigm, to which we have
previously referred. Chou Yung questioned the assumption of
equivalence in the "perennial philosophy" of Chang Jung. He
therefore represented the "purist" Buddhist defending the faith.
Our sympathy will probably vary according to where we ourselves
stand on such matters: Chou Yung will be either "refreshingly
clear-headed" or "unnecessarily tendentious."
. The second, pen-wu (original nonbeing), figures as a more
substantive ideological issue. When the doctrine of emptiness was
introduced to China, it was often understood a la Wang Pi: Things
are empty (sunya) because they are "originally nothing" (pen-wu).
"Being comes from nonbeing," says Wang Pi: "Nonbeing is the
substance (the t'z", substratum) of being." The Chinese should not
26
be blamed too much for this misappropriation of the sunyata
doctrine, because Chih-chien in his translation of the Prajiiii-
paramta Sutra chose pen-wu for sunyatii or tathata (suchness).
"The Tathagata is pen-wu; the various dharmas too are pen-wu."
It took Kumarajlva to settle on the term k 'ung
U
for sunya and
sunyata, and Seng Chao to undermine the pen-wu interpretation.
ll
That interpretation says: .
Wu predates the myriad transformations and k 'ung is the
beginning of the various forms. The people are entangled in
the subsequent existents (mo-yu). By abiding psychically
with pen-wu, the deviant ideas will cease.1
2
This interpretation translated the original Buddhist insight of the
emptiness of the self-nature (svab-hava-sunya), of any given entity
as s, into the Han cosmogonic concern. It made sunyata into an
a prz"ori source for all realities and missed the point of seeing
what-is as such as empty. Seng Chao criticized the pen-wu school
in his Chao-Iun,v stressing its unwarranted bias for the nihilistic:
They ... inclined towards nihilism, holding wu in high re-
gard in their interpretation. Thus they identify the being of
(je-yu-yu
W
) as wu, and likewise the nonbeing of
not-nonbeing (je-wu-wu
x
) also as wu. However, upon in-
vestigation, the original text says that the not-being (je-yu)
is not truly being (wu-yu); and the not-nonbeing (je-wu)
is not truly nonbeing (wu-wu). Why do they misread it and
insist on negating the being of not-being and the nonbeing of
not-nonbeing? Theirs is nothing but a desire to hold onto
nonbeing.
13
The one-sided view of the pen-wu school ran indeed counter to the
middle-path philosophy of the Buddhists (Madhyamka). Despite
Seng Chao's alleged victory, the old mentality found a devious
way to reassert itself, this time by relying on the Two-Truths dis-
tinction. The Ch'eng-shih masters misappropriated this doctrine
and relegated, in various fashions, the basic pen-wu mo-yu (origin-
al nonbeing, subsequent being) structure into the two-tiered
Realities (sc).14 Realities are ultimately empty but in appearance
seemingly real. As I have shown elsewhere, Chou Yung criticized
this sophistry of compartmentalizing yu and wu in his San-tsung-
lun. Y This treatise was known to Chang Jung. Aware ofthe nihil-
27
--------- ----
ist charge, Chang argued that Lao-tzu intuitively knew of the iden_
tity of yu and wu (being z"s nonbeing, or, form z"s emptiness) but
that circumstances forced him to preach a state 6f wu outside the
parameters of yu (existents). As we will see, this drew another
volley of fire from the tireless dialectician Chou Yung.
The wu issue aside, we should not overlook the living person_
alities. Their dilemmas, their faith, their informed outlook and
ideas, their ability to articulate alien or new ideas in a native lan-
guage, their humaneness and, I sense, that irrepressible "quarrel-
someness" of mz"ng-shz"h salonists are transparent in the letters.
Chang Jung's "Family Instructions,"15 incidentally, would predate
the Famly Instructz"ons for the Yen Clan of the same genre. The
Yen compilation is usually regarded as the earliest surviving work
of its kind, and in its comprehensiveness it still is.
My translation of the letters below is fairly complete as far
as the major issues are concerned. The mutual point-by-point
citations by the parties are left out, as are greetings etc.l
6
I have
tried to be both faithful and readable in the translation, as well as
to elucidate the issues. Matters pertaining to religion and politics
in the South will be appended towards the end.
Chang Jung's Men-Lu
28
For generations, our family has been devoted to the Buddha.
On my mother's side, there has long been a reverence for the
Tao. The Taoist and Buddhist traditions are not two in their
attainment of the Ultimate. "Cultivating passivity without
any stirring," the pen is reached-this is where they are the
same. "Responding (to external stimuli) and thereby pene-
trating all,"17 (the pen) accommodates itself to the (differ-
ent) trace-subsequents, and differences arise. The situation is
comp;trable to the fact that aithough the same music was not
kept up (by different dynasties), the wisdQm of the Five Em-
perors was not departed from. Or, although the same rites
were not inherited, the sageness of the Three Kings was not
unrevered as a model. How can it be said that their ways. are
different just because of variance in time, or that their in-
tentions are not one just because of divergences in dynastic
practices?18 How can one follow the follies of the common
people and question the (one common) spiritual Absolute?
Now I see the man of Tao and the follower of the marga
competing.
19
Like the Confucians and the Mohists, they la-
bor on nghts and wrongs. Once upon a time a wild goose
flew across the horizon, but at such a distance that it was
difficult to tell what it was. The people of Yiieh thought it
was a wild duck and the people of Ch'u thought it was a
. swallow. Among men there are differences (of opinion) like
those of Ch'u and Yiieh, but the wild goose is nevertheless
just one wild goose. This is because although the lucid pen
is one, (each) man tends to regard his own view (alone) as
faithful to it. The pen flows out into the traces and is dif-
ferentiated, and we tend to gather around where it might
happen to befall. You may all choose to be singlemindedly
devoted to the Buddha's trace but let us not speak ill of the
origin of the Tao.
20
. Chang Jung circulated this men-lu, "penetrating to the origin of
. the two paths," among the two Hos and Kungs and Chou Ylmg,
soliciting their reactions. "The song of the bird near its death is sad,
as man too speaks well at his own twilight," Chang confessed dur-
ing his illness. Fearful of the "frailness of the breath," astonished
by the "unpredictability of life," and alert to the "seamless flow
of time," he desired to leave behind a guide for his descendants.
21
Chou Yung's Reply and Counter Questions
Chou Yung humbly thanked his friend but subtly stated his
preference immediately. Next to the Buddha, he treasured Con-
fucian norms. On a par with the Sage were the Yellow Emperor
and Lao-tzu, whose profundity, despite the corruptions of their
later spokesmen,22 was to be honored. He states, however,
I have abandoned previous opinions and insist upon d i f f e r e n ~
tiating the pure from the less pure. Thus too, in my discern-
ment I have separated out the red from the purple .... Where
traditions agree or disagree cannot be glossed over. How they
are the same or different should be proven with due refer-
ences. What you said in your treatise-that they are one on
account of the attained pen-seems to differ from my idea of
similarity. How they differ on account of the times is also not
what I mean by their difference.
23
Having drawn the battle line, Chou Yung countered Chang'S thesis
29
paragraph by paragraph. He began with the issue of pen-i chi-i
z
(one
origin, different traces).
You said that in their origin they are o n ~ . What do you mean
by this "origin"? In the Taoist tradition, this would mean es.
sentially the Tao and Te chapters of the Lao-tzu, would it
not? In the Buddhist tradition, this ought to refer in essence
to prajna (wisdom). What the Tao-Te chapters value as the
highest is the hsu-wu,aa the vacuousnonbeing. What prajiiii
meditates upon is the thorough (psychic) reflection of the
nature of reality, dharmata. Hsu-wu and dharmata may be
similar in their passivity, but their ways of abiding in this
(psychic) passivity are different. When you say, "In the at-
tainment of the Ultimate, there is not-two," do you mean the
attainment of the Ultimate within the hsu-wu, and do you
mean that this is not-two vis-a-vis dharmata? Or do you mean
that there is, beyond the two items here, a higher pen beyond?
Or do you mean that there is no difference in the meaning of
hsu-wu and of dharmata themselves? If there is aseparatepen,
I would like to know what it is. If the two (pens) are not dif-
ferent, I would like to know how they are not.
24
Chou Yung raised the basic question against all who pose a theory
of the unity of all philosophies or religions. Is the unity, the pen,
drawn from one of the traditions, or beyond all known precedents
in the traditions? If the former, then it would be biased; if the lat-
ter, it would mean founding a new pan-tradition with no basis in
any! If the pen is that of the two original traditions, how to recon-
cile the two pens of hsu-wu and dharmata? Purists can always
plague the compromiser25 chasing his "wild goose."
30
What you said-how the ways differ with changing times-
is precisely where the teachings of the Buddha differ from
the Tao. That the meaning cannot be one due to different
periods is precisely how the teachings of the Tao depart from
the Buddha's. The Tao and the Buddha are two, a matter of
"either the duck or the swallow." However, what you honor
as the pen is the one thing called the "wild goose." The way
you straddle the Tao and the Buddha cannot but lose both
in the end. I wonder on what basis you come to know of this
(higher) pen, and by what principle you may so lightly regard
it. If you would still consider the two teachings simultaneous-
ly as pen, I am afraid that you can never resolve the emerging
controversies from both sides. Even if you follow both teach-
ings and intuit their origin, the origin is glimpsed through the
teachings themselves. If so, then you should, as it were, wear
a deerskin loincloth and go about with the hermit's rod, watch-
ing with disinterest the blind debates between the Confucians
and the Mohists. What cause is there for you to be involved in
the debate itself? However, as you have affirmed the mutual
origins as true and suggested that the division in "the traces are
both untrue, then you should abandon equally the "function of
the two traces. How is it that, as "men gather where it might
befall," you would diligently serve the Buddha alone and, in
your cultivation of the breath and the embrace of the One,
pay little homage to the Tao?26
The mystic-hermit who knows the union of teachings has always
been allotted his niche in Chinese society, somewhat comparable to
that of the Hindu sannyiisz"n, but left intentionally unstructured.
Chou Yung would rather the loinclothed eremite stay outside the
endless zsms of mundane men, but if Chang Jung so involved him-
self with another theory, he should live by its implications. Even
the mystic intuits the union through the medium of the teachings.
To relegate the teachings to mere accidents, i.e. not essentz"al to the
pen (in the manner of the antinomian Neo-Taoists), is to overlook
the organic nature of pen-mo (in the original Han Confucian sys-
tem). Means are no accidents. As Chou Yung himself was second-
arily devoted to the words of Confucius for a different end, he
concluded his letter with a further question to Chang J ung on the
status of Confucius. Are there one pen and three mo? Or are not
both pen and mo different in the three major teachings?27
Chang lung's Reply
In a common search for truth and Chang J ung
thanked Chou Yung for his wise words, and perhaps reminded his
critic that the treatise was written for a purpose. "I have yet to
forget my body (or self), and therefore I still preserve feelings and
sentiments. When the body disintegrates (or the self is emptied), it
will metamorphize into the Ultimate. "28 There is even the sugges-
tion that he delayed his departure in order to leave the Men-lu to
his family. The above lines are, however, an apology for not having
kept silent and not having remained aloof from all tendentious con-
31
troversies, because Chang Jung then explained, psychologically,
what he meant by "attaining the ultimate," in a language shared by
Buddhists and Taoists of the time.
The essence of the spirit is its ability to know. The Tao of
Tao-Te is that it can be known. That which can know and yet
does not know what can be known does not qualify to be
"that which can know." That which can be known and yet is
not known to that which can know is not truly "that which
can be known." Therefore we know that "that which can
know" must progress toward the Tao (the "known"), and
"that which is to be known" (the Tao) must cognize the pro-
gressing knower. [That is, spiritual wisdom in man and the Tao
are ontologically one.
29
] However inferior people stir up their
feelings and ruffle up (waves upon the passive psyche's) re-
flection,30 arousing desires and disrupting the spirit.31 Once
the spirit is so activated, then the functions of the conscious-
ness (shih-yung,ab derivative of the shen-t'i
ac
)32 will rise and
fall (fluctuate). Thereby the mind is turned upside down and
directed toward the inferior, and the (original passive) reflec-
tion is alienated from the Tao (its natural object). Now since
Lao-tzu could concentrate his spirit ether (consciousness)
until it attained a passive state and abode with the vacuous
(hsu), in full control of the body, he could be a vessel of the
luminous and embrace the One, residing in the unmoving and
penetrating the passive. What is passive by nature can pene-
trate,33 and therefore the reflecting can never cease. When the
body abides in the vacuous, everything is harmonious and in
tune with the Tao. If you want to deny Lao-tzu this passivity,
how can that be? If you want to deny the equivalence be-
tween passivity and the Tao, what basis is there? Now to posit
one passivity with two different spirits, or to posit one passive
spirit but two paths (i.e. Buddhist and Taoist), that I have
never heard of. Therefore the attainment of the Ultimate must
have the One as its nature ... The Emperors are five but the
spirit is one; the Kings are three but the Tao is invariable. Can
the squabble between the duck and the swallow settle the
matter of the wild goose?34
Like most perennial philosophers, Chang Jung based his theory of
the i-pen
ad
(one origin) on the mystical unity of the passive subject
and the Absolute. Psychology acts as the proof of his metaphysics
of the One. However, alert to current Buddho-Taoist debate, Chang
Jung anticipated the distinction between Lao-Tzu's wu and the
Buddha's k 'ung that he felt Chou Yung was going to raise. The
32
Buddhists had argued that they alone knew that "form is empti-
ness" (a seemingly inclusive middle) while Taoists knew only their
apparent opposition.
33
Although the doctrine of dharmata (as sunyata) intuits k'ung
in the midst of matter, and the doctrine of hsu-wu indeed sets
up a reality beyond yu (being), yet the two circle back and
meet at one point. This you should consider somewhat. It is
because the (Taoist) roving in emptiness banishes all (deviant)
thought, and the mind brushes off the dust (or klea, defile-
ments) by itself. And as the (Buddhist) mind does not waver,
its union reaches to the (Taoist) above-form. Therefore in
wang-yu
ae
(forgetfulness of being), Lao-tzu is comparable to
the Buddha, and in yu-wang
af
(the cessation of being, i.e.
emptiness)35 Sakyamuni does not displace Lao-tzu. As the
spirit is free, the essence will be harmonious, the self forgot-
ten, and a passive purity attained. The spirit then penetrates
all, fulfilling its functions (in t,he world). At this level, I do
not see any difference between Sakyamuni and Lao-tzu. With-
in this framework, I can only endorse their similarity. Their
attainment of the Ultimate is not two; those who empathize
with this will envision the One. However, ever since things
have been divided as stimuli, the psychic responses to them
have been hard to reintegrate. The myriad forms and the sen-
ses of sight and sound have interacted, and now subject and
object are aligned on opposite sides.
36
As the people's fix-
ation is deep, the cure must be gradual. Therefore Lao-tzu
hid the doctrine of "form as such (is empty)." He went along
with what-is (yu, what the people had) without their
feelings. He prized what-is-not (wu, what they had not), 7 try-
iny to steer them to the right way. This is because things have
their latent aspects and men their moments of aspiration for
nonbeing. If one can wake to the Western Wind (Buddha) in
the morning, dream of the Southern Genius (Lao-tzu) at night,
can one not rest with the Han Spirit (Confucius) in the day?
Now you may say that Lao-tzu failed to exhaust the meaning
of wu (nonbeing); then you have not gotten my meaning. If
you say he had penetrated wu (as sunya) but failed to pene-
trate yu (being, also assunya), you have a point but it is still
not what I meant. If you say that there is doubt whether he
had so elucidated it in his teaching, then why would the Bud-
dhist teaching, having itself penetrated being, still rely so
heavily on the (yu-) traces? If at that point you would like to
say that the Buddha relied on these in consideration of sit-
uations (as upaya), it would then not be diffferent from Lao-
tzu's practice of the same.
38
.
Chang lung thus well defended his thesis of the union of the teach-
ings at the ultimate level; for him, the Three Teachings were One
in essence and different only in manifestation (end, trace, func-
tion). To the other queries raised, Chang lung would not budge
from his position (a) that the differences were accident<J.l, not es-
sential; (b) that the "wild goose" transcended the either/or, and
those who knew this would not be bothered with futile debates; (c)
that he involved himself in the controversy only because he could
not ignore such one-sided debates; (d) that he, from his standpoint,
was no partisan 'as regards truth, as was charged; and (e) that he
would rather Chou Yung not rally Confucius in order to "surround
and stealthily attack" the Taoist. 'For him, the Three, nay, the
Hundred Sages of various traditions only expressed One Truth.
39
Chou Yung's Final Exercise of Dialectics
Chang lung'S qualifications of Lao-tzu's "nihilism," as well as
his apology for his seeming silence on the greater "form is empti-
ness" paradox, would have been sufficient safeguards against a les-
ser critic in the days of Seng Chao. After Seng Chao, the' Ch'eng-
shih masters-scholars of Harivarman's Ch 'eng-shih-lun (Satya-
siddhisastra)-unknowingly deviated from the orthodox Sunyavada
position of Nagarjuna. In their Buddho-Taoist synthesis, they too
tried to perfect a philosophical position in support of "apparent
being but ultimate emptiness." Often they relied precisely on the
pen-mo paradigm., suggesting that reality is essentially empty but
functionally real, i.e. t'i-wu yung-yuag (empty in substance but real
in function). Chou Yung had already criticized this in his San-tsung-
lun, and the best way to introduce this treatise without going into
the whole question of its original form is to cite the Nan-Ch 'i-shuah
account. After T'ang Yung-t'ung's emended version of this text, it
should read:
Chou Yung authored the San-tsung-lun, establishing the Real-
ist school (that would not deny provisional reality). Then he
established the Nihilist school (that negates provisional real-
ity) to undercut the Realist. Then he established the "Real-
is-Empty" school to undercut both.
40
.
Seng Chiian
ai
supplied two ingenious metaphors to describe and to
deride the imperfections of the first two schools. The Realist
34
"gnaws a chestnut empty," that is, he sees the substance of the
meatless chestnut to be empty without questioning the reality of
the untouched shell. The Nihilist "floats a melon in water," that
. is, negates its reality by pushing it momentarily into the water,
but, in the next minute, permits the same to appear as rea1.
41
The one compartmentalized yu and wu, being and nonbeing, into
the "inner" (meat) and "outer" (shell); the other cleverly juxta-
posed two opposites in one space (melon) in two different time
brackets (in and out of water). Only the third school, seeing that
"reality as such is empty," is qualified to have the highest insight.
Most interpreters would place Chou Yung himself in the third
school,42 but I think that in the exchanges with Chang Jung we can
see that he was better than that. His position is typically Madhyam-
ika, namely, not to have a position; his method is prasaJigika, the
ability to "take and break" any position, master of all but mastered
by none. Here we see the basic difference between Taoist hsu-wu
and Buddhist sunyata (k 'ung). The Taoist is ultimately committed
to an ontology ofthe hsu, the vacuously real, or to an antiontology
of the wu, still the source of all beings.43 The Buddhist point is ul-
timately more than just identifying opposites-one can find paral-
lels to that in Chuang-tzu. It is to be free from all positions by re-
alizing the antinomies in every position. It is the exercise of a philo-
sophical dialectic-not an ontological assertion-in order to cease
all mental games and cut through the web of our thought. Only
with this in mind can we understand and properly translate Chou
Yung's reply to Chang Jung's qualifi.cations.
35
Indeed, it is true that Lao-tzu hid the doctrine of "Matter as
such (is empty)"-just as you say. However, I am afraid that
is not yet the true "Matter as such." If that which can be hid-
den is hidden, then that which hides it would be expansive.
44
This doctrine (of an ontological Void) may not be limited to
Lao-tzu himself. This is because being is being by virtue of its
being known to things as being. Nonbeing is nonbeing by vir-
tue of the fact that it is known to men as nonbeing.
45
The
manner in which Lao-tzu, abiding with being, pointed ahead
to nonbeing is such that his (outlook) does not lie outside
the above-described [subject-object, ontological] framework.
This is the point in my humble treatise On the Three Schools:
there I can take up or let go, bridle and let run [in a truly
critical philosophy] in such a way that no one can transcend
its dialectics. This is why the Buddha's teaching can exercise
its (subtle) meaning and snatch away common sentiments and
ideas, and can apply words that go against the rules of lan-
guage. The doctrine that "As it is form, therefore it is empty"
therefore deserves to excel over all schools. Not having under_
stood this, how could Lao-tzu be counted within its rank?46
As the Neo-Confucians realized in the Sung period, it :was best not
to argue with the Buddhists "lest one fall prey to their arguments."
Whether Chou Yung was correct or not in his judgment, the record
-ending with this letter-is in his favor. He was not totally negative
toward the Taoists. The Taoist delight in hsu-wu was a needed cor-
rective to the confused world's fixation with the teeming realm of
yu (being). However, if Wang Pi and Ho Yen
aj
already conceded
that Lao-tzu was inferior to Confucius, how could Lao-tzu have
anticipated the wisdom of the still superior Buddha? Like other
Buddhist spokesmen of this period, Chou Yung could cite the many
manifestations of the Buddha and the doctrine of his final or re-
sidueless teaching to prove the brilliance of the "Sun and Moon"
(enlightened one). In the presence of this light, the lesser. torches
of human opinion and the lesser expediencies should be abandon-
ed.
47
Chou Yung would not agree to the psychological reductionism
of Chang Jung: that in passivity there is oneness irrespective of the
traditions. The ways of abiding in passivity can apparently differ.
The freedom of the spirit of Lao-tzu is the freedom beyond
the realm of being. The practice of harmonizing the essence
and self-forgetfulness in the Buddhist tradition is aimed, how-
ever, at abolishing both riipa and sunyata (form and empti-
ness) ... The spirit can be passive and not be the same; the
passivity varies and so do the two paths. What you have not
heard, I have heard already.48
Denying the equivalence of the psychic states,. Chou Yung refus-
ed to acknowledge the Taoist Tao as the Buddhist Tao. He de-
fended it as follows.
36
What is gained (in the Taoist path) is the passivity of the
spirit. What is lost, however, pertains to the emptiness of
matter (wu-hsu). If it is the passivity gained through passivi-
ty, it is not the ultimate passivity (or, it has not penetrated
to the true nature of what constitutes passivity). If the
(physical po) spirit is only spiritual within its own limits, it
is not the ultimate spirit (or,it has not thoroughly understood
the nature of spirit).49
As long as the Taoists cultivated only the passive side of their being
'or the vacuo,us nature of things, they would be biased and not at-
tain that Buddhist freedom from both extremes. Perhaps indirect-
ly aware of the fact that Chuang-tzu also spoke of the freedom
from oppositions, and consciously countering Chang Jung's claim
that the Taoist knew thoroughly the nature of being and nonbeing
(chin-yu, chin-wu
ak
),50 Chou Yung added the crowning touch:
The ability to exhaust both being and nonbeing (that is, to
see into their individual, opposite natures) is reserved only
for the most Ultimate of all men. The thorough knowledge
of being and of nonbeing, I can grant the Taoist to have. But
that state of mind known as "neither being nor nonbeing"
the Taoist tradition has yet to reach. "Neither being nor non-
being" is a doctrine about which even the Three Schools (in
the San-tsung-lun) were obscured in their understanding.
51
The original San-tsung-lun being lost, I have a suspicion that the
"Neither being nor nonbeing" option lay beyond the original tri-
partite division into the Realism of Being, the Nihilism of Non-
being, and the positive identity of Provisional Reality is Empty.
Pushed possibly by Chang Jung's defense of Lao-tzu, Chou Yung
came up with a higher negation-neither provisional reality nor
Emptiness-in the typical pyramidal negation of the Madhyamika
tradition in China. I suggest this reading of the last line instead of
the traditional one-that the fei-yu fei-wual. doctrine was to be in-
cluded within the third school-because I feel Chou Yung was pres-
sured by Chang Jung. In the next section, he was compelled again
to dispute the orthodoxy of the latter's interpretation of Lao-tzu.
If indeed Lao-tzu anticipated the Higher Truth, paramartha, in
Buddhist Madhyamika, it would be found in the text.
37
Is it to be found in the Tao chapters? Is it to be found in the
Te chapters? If you have gained this without reliance upon
the two divisions, then (this theory of a union of the Buddhist
and the Taoist tradi!ion) qualifies to be a third school by the
side of Lao-tzu and Sakyamuni. Then you may establish your
own school. It cannot be said to be established on Lao-tzu
(or, it is not something that I dare to propose).52
There are some more passages to follow. Although I regret that the
whole set ofle:ters has not I would with Seng
Yu, the complIer, that the basIc posItIOns were stated III the initial
exchange and that
53
for all practical purposes we can consider them
to have remained unchanged later. Chou Yung remained a Buddhist
dialectician to the end, and Chang Jung passed away at peace with
the Three Teachings in their Unity.
Historical SignzJicance
The debate between Chou Yung and ChangJung was not the
first <;r the last of its kind in the Six Dynasties period (420-589).
The Siinyavadins of China had prided themselves on intuiting the
identity of opposites (form and emptiness) before, but, as I men-
tioned earlier, Chou Yung was the most articulate and the most
progressive in this period (Sung, 420-479). He was so pivotal that
Chi-tsang,am the San-Iun
an
master in Sui (589-612), recruited him
into the orthodox Madhyamika lineage.
54
The honeymoon of Neo-
Taoism and Prajiiaparamita Buddhism was breaking up.55 In the
Sui-T'ang period, the so-called Sinicization notwithstanding, the
major Buddhist patriarchs continued Chou Yung's critical stance
against Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu. One of the common charges a-
gainst Taoism was its "otherworldliness." For those of us who un-
critically associate Taoism with a celebration oflife and nature, and
Buddhism with a cultivation of nirvii1Ja beyond this life, the charge
appears rather peculiar. However, in their contemporary terms,
Chou Yung and others indeed had a case. The Taoists were looking
for nonbeing beyond the realm of things; the Buddhists could find
the absolute where things simply were. The Bodhisattva's reaffir-
mation of the world ("sarr-siira is nirviir].a") was better than the
vain, selfish search for personal immortality. 56 The Buddha was a
powerful savior, more universalistic and compassionate than the
traditional Taoist sages. Chou Yung could say,
38
The Buddha responded to the world in manifestations that are
endless. (He) appeared as the leader of the scholars (Confu-
cius), as the Taoist national preceptor (Lao-tzu) ... as prime
minister and the elder of communities. How is it that Lao-tzu
had only one trace (manifestation)?57
The Taoists countered, of course, with their ovvn version-how Lao-
tzu appeared in the West (India) as the Buddha-in another and
cruder round of the pen-ma debates.
57
The disenchantment between Taoism and Buddhism was in-
evitable, for although Taoism helped to introduce the Buddhist
faith due to their natural affinity, the same familiarity bred in
time mutual contempt. The Buddho-Confucian controversies were
more related to matters of civic and familial duties, matters that
Buddhist apologists could accomodate with greater ease.
59
The
Buddho-Taoist controversies touched upon finer theoretical issues
like sunyatii and WU, dharmata and hsil. For some, like Chou Yung,
it became a matter of either/or. However, Chou Yung himself could
feel at home with Confucius, as Confucianism was a less direct
threat. It is perhaps significant that the Neo-Taoist style slowly
waned as the Six Dynasties drew to a close, and Sinitic Mahayana,
confident in its autonomy, arose in Sui.60 An example of this is
the following criticism directed against the Taoist tradition by
Chi-tsang, continuing Chou Yung's enterprise. The Buddha is for-
eign ("outer") and the Taoist is native ("inner").61 However, in
terms of their worth, the former is deeper ("inner") and the latter
is superficial ("outer"):
39
The outer teaching recognizes the one essence to all things;
the inner teaching can clearly perceive the Three Times
(past, present, future through which the Buddha lives).
The outer has yet to understand the workings of the five
senses; the inner develops the six supernatural powers
that penetrate to the most subtle.
The outer fails as yet to identify the myriad beings with the
great vacuity; the inner is able to discourse on the real
nature of all things (shih-hsiang,ao dharmata) without dis-
rupting the provisional realities (chia-ming,ap prajiiapti).
The outer fails to abide in wu-weiaq and roves simultaneously
among the myriad things; the inner establishes the real-
ity of the various dharmas without removal of suchness
as it is.
The outer still keeps to the gates of gain and loss; the inner is
able to eliminate both extremes within the one principle
(middle path) that is beyond all discursive words.
The outer has yet to permit the subject consciousness and the
object realm to cease; the inner perfects the mutual ex-
tinction of the means (subject) and the focus of contem_
plation (object).62
Again, this might not be the fairest of indictments against ideolo-
gical opponents, but the point is that the M-adhyamika has reached
beyond naive ontology, realist or nihilist, has penetrated epistem-
ology, and-in its critical philosophy or dialectics-has done away
with the subject-object distinction as well as all conceptual dualities.
Indeed, philosophical Taoism remained faithful to a simple na-
turalism, and even present-day religious Taoism maintains, much
to its credit, a concrete realism without all the secondary and ter-
tiary reflections of the Buddhists.
It is always tempting to look for the sociopolitical correlates
to ideologies. Much solid scholarship has demonstrated the social
and political factors in the rise of Neo-Taoism, and how both the
membership and the philosophy of the Neo-Taoists themselves
changed in time. The Neo-Taoist movement signalled an intellec-
tual dissatisfaction with Han Confucianism, especially when the
Han state faltered. The Neo-Taoists were patronized by Ts'ao
Ts'ao,ar a Realpolz"tiker who endorsed the old Taoist-Legalist tie
and the commitment to naturalism. The movement was curtailed
by the rise of the conservative Confucian Chin rulers, the Ssu-ma
3S
family. The Neo-Taoists became less political, sometimes even fa-
talistic (Hsi K'ang,at from a lower background). The collapse of
the North made the Buddhist option even more attractive ... and
so on. However, by the fifth century, so-called elite philosophizing
had been demonopolized. The Buddhist Sangha enfranchised many
brilliant minds from lesser backgrounds, with no direct political
position or clan ties; the Mou Shan tradition of religious Taoism
also championed the cause of the earlier Southern shamanistic
tradition, supported by earlier settlers. Both power bases grew
and flowered in the Liang period later on. The ideological com-
petition between the two camps was natural.
However, all these sub currents had almost nothing to do with
Chou Yung and Chang Jung, at least not in any direct or traceable
way. The debate they had was not a debate between a Buddhist
and a Taoist, but one between two gentry Buddhists with different
views on Lao-tzu's philosophy. Chang Jung was a Buddhist layman
from a Buddhist family who happened to ask his relatives not to
40
deride "the pen of the Taoists" "because he felt the pen was One.
lIe was? when compared with Chou Yung, from a more established
family, whose members had held a greater number of political
.offices. Chou Yung, on the other hand, was more eminent as an
individual, and in spite of his ties with the court and his official
posts, seems to have been a hermit. His more purist understanding
of the Dharma created in him a sharper tongue as a spokesman for
the superiority of the Dharma. He seems to have compartmental-
ized his life in such a way that Confucian duties were actively em-
braced without overlap. For Chang Jung, the synthesis of pen was
the only proper solution. Their disagreement led to no political
reprisal-that was the style of the North, not that of the gentry
Buddhists of the South. As belles lettres, their views made nice
conversation in the circuit of the salons, with minimal impact on
the Sangha itself.
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41
NOTES
University of California at Davis.
1. The present essay is related to two others, Whalen Lai, "Sinitic
Understanding of the Two Truths Theory in the Liang Dynasty: Ontological
Gnosticism in the Thoughts of Prince Chao-ming," and "Further Develop_
ments on the Two Truths Theory in China: Toward a Reconstruction of
Chou Yung's San-tsung-lun," both forthcoming in Philosophy East and West.
2. T'ang Yung-t'ung, Han Wei liang-Chin Nan-pei-chao Fo-chao-shih
(reissue; Peking: Chung-hua, 1955), pp. 465-66.
3. Ibid., p. 469.
4. Ibid., p. 467.
5. The tendency among Japanese scholars is to trace this theory back
to Chih-i the T'ien-T'ai
au
master instead of earlier; see Alicia Matsunaga, The
B u d d h i s ~ Philosophy of Assimilation: The Historical Development of the
Honju-Suijaku Theory (Rutland, Vermont: Charles .E. Tuttle, 1969).
6. Down to Chang Chi-t'ung's ill-fated and much-maligned theory of
"E.astern Learning as t'i; Science of the West as yung."
7. Primarily the San-Iun adoption of Chou Yung's critique by Chi-tsang.
8. T'ang, Fo-chiao-shih, pp. 428-29.
9. Ming Confucians probably saw it as their task to change the Buddhist-
sounding lu (also used for vinaya) into li.m
av
(treatise).
10. Gumyoshu Kenkyu (Kyoto: Kyoto University, 1975), III, pp. 358-
75. Space dictates that allusions go without notation here, and my diverg-
ence from their translation be on record instead of justified at every point.
11. T'ang, Fo-chiao-shih, pp. 238-242. Most detailed is the appendix
II, "Honwugi no genryu," in Imai Usaburo, Sodai Ekigaku no Kenkyu
(Tokyo: Meiji tsusho, 1958), pp. 478-84.
12. This is Chi-tsang's reconstruction attributed to Tao-an
aw
(sic); see
Tazsho Daizokyo (henceforth T.) 42, p. 29a.
13. T. 44, p. 152a.
14. The Two Truths were mistaken as realities instead of ways of know-
ledge; see Whalen Lai, "Sinitic Understanding of the Two Truths Theory ... "
15. It is not clear if Chang Jung had not excerpted this piece from a
larger work.
16. Full exchange in T. 52, pp. 38c-41b. Henceforth, I will cite
Gumyoshu's translation.
17. See Gumyoshu Kenkyu, p. 359, note 4; from the I Ching, Appended
Remark A: "I, Change, is without thought, wu-wei; passive, not moving,
(the milfoil sticks) responding will penetrate (to the structure of reality)."
18. The argument that philosophy should change according to the times
was one endorsed by many in this period to account for the advent of new
faiths.
19. In the pen-mo debate, sometimes the Buddhist and the Taoist were
aligned in the camp of Tao-chia in opposition to the ming-chiao of the
Confucians; see T'ang, Fo-chiao-shih, p. 466. The word tao is used twice here.
20. Gumyoshu Kenkyu, pp. 358-59.
42
21. Loc. cit.
22. Ibid., p. 361, referring probably to "religious Taoism."
23. Loc. cit.
24. Loc. cit.
25. In reverse, the "universalist" will charge the "purist" for his partic-
ularism.
26. Gumyoshu Kenkyu, p. 362.
27. Ibid., p. 363.
28. Loc. cit.; my interpretation differs. Feelings, ching,ax are natural to
life.
29. This subject-object analysis was both Buddhist and Taoist.
30. Chao,ay illuminate, reflect, is an attribute associated with the passive
mind. It is endorsed by both Taoists and Buddhists; the mirror analogy is also
shared.
32. Shih is considered to be mo, yung just as spirit; shen or hsin is re-
garded as pen, t'i; the practice was current already in Han yin-yang classifi-
cation.
33. The spirit is passive and it can penetrate, d. shen-t'ung. az
34. Gumyoshu Kenkyu, pp. 364-65.
35. A play on the order of words, wang-yu and yu-wang; a more subtle
play is found in the last line also, but it is less obvious in English.
36. Basic assumptions are k 'an-yin, stimulus and response, and the dif-
ferentiation of subject from object after sense-contact takes place; this is in
Han thought though shared by the Buddhists in a different vocabulary.
37. Ambiguity here is due to the term yu (being, have) and wu (non-
being, have-not).
38. Gumyoshu Kenkyu, pp. 365-66.
39. Ibid., pp. 366-68.
40. Cited in T'ang, Fo-chiao-shih, p. 741; translation here rearranged.
41. Ibid., pp. 742-47.
42. Ibid., pp. 750-753.
43. See the view of Taoist scholar, Michael Saso, stating the issue from
the Taoist side in an article to appear in a new series, Michael Saso, ed.,
Buddhist and Taoist Studies I (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1978):
volume in print but nbt available to the writer at the moment.
44. Meaning unclear; it seems to suggest an ontological void or womb.
45. That is, this is direct affirmation and not yet dialectical introspection.
46. Gumyoshu Kenkyu, p. 370.
47. Ibid., p. 371.
48. Ibid., p. 372.
49. Ibid., p. 373.
50. This charge however was still used later by Buddhists against the
Taoists.
51. Gp. cit., p. 373.
52. Ibid., p. 374.
53. Ibid., p. 375.
54. See note 1 above for essays related to this larger issue.
43
55. See Tokiwa Daijo, Bukkyo to ]ukyo, Dokyo (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko
1930) that surveys the exchange between the Three Teachings, esp. pp.
56. The greatest conflict came between early Pure Land masters and the
religious Taoists, with T'an-luan's stand far from being
57. Gumyoshu Kenkyu, p. 371. The Japanese honji-suijaku logic is fully
evident here.
58. T'ang, Fo-chiao"shih, p. 466. Taoists proposed their counter-theory
of Lao-tzu civilizing the barbarians, Lao-tzu hua-hu.
59. Often resolved on the Buddhist side by (a) apologetics proving the
ethical committments of the Buddhists, up to pairing the paiicasz1a with the
five Confucian virtues, or (b) Hui-yuan's stand against the king, based, none-
theless, on the positive function of such hermits and monks who t 'i-tao ,
embody the Tao, or are in communion with the pen, for the spiritual welfare
of the state.
60. The critical stance against Lao-Chuang of the early masters in Sui-
T'ang Buddhism tended to wane after 700 A.D.; Kamata Shigeo in his various
works touches on this.
61. T. 45, p. lc lists the geography, but 2a reverts back to the traditional
inner/outer distinction used already by Taoists who regard themselves to be
"inner" (also, pen). .
62. T. 45, p. 2a.
44
GU:Q.aprabha's Vinaya-sutra and his Own
Commentary on the Same
by P. V. Bapat
I have written a paper on GUl}aprabha's Vnaya-siitra
2
and have
given an idea of the general contents of the same by giving the
names of its various chapters and indicating their correspondence
with the Vnaya-vastu of the Mula-Sarvastivadins and with the
Pali Vinaya.
Gur;taprabha (5th c. A.D.?) has written his own commentary
(Sva-vyiikhyiina) on the Vnaya-sutra and he reveals several pecu-
liarities of the Buddhists, which are quite novel to orthodox schol-
ars. Elsewhere
3
, I have drawn attention to the use of the word krt
by the Buddhists to indicate the abbreviation of a passage, almost
similar to the use of pe (peyyiilam) in Pali texts.
In this paper I want to draw attention to some other peculiar-
ities of the Buddhists.
(i) iidau Kriyiipadasya prayogal}. (The use of an acton-
word at the beginning.)
GUI,laprabha, while commenting on the Vinaya-sutra No.267
Kiirayeranpiidadhiivanikiim, says (Plate Ill-A, Lines 2-3): -
kiimakiiro'tra, na niyama iti sandarsaniirtham iidau kriyii-
padasya prayogal}.
To show that there is an action of the will, an option, and not
an inexorable rule, there is the use of the action-word at the begin-
ning [of the siitra] , which says: "They may cause to be built a
place where [monks] can get their feet washed". In the Sanskrit
text of the siitra, the action-word karayeran is used at the beginning
of the siitra. This suggests that the managers of a vihiira may, if
they like, construct a place where monks could wash their feet.
There is no rule binding upon them to construct such a place. This
seems to be a very novel usage and Pfu:tinian scholars assure me that
47
such a usage is not met with in orthodox grammatical systems.
. In another place of (Plate IVB, Page 1,
Lme 7) Gur;taprabha has a sImIlar remark, whIle commenting upon
sutra No. 561: ,
kathanarrr- antarayiko syiid vii
"Declaring by the the impedimentary obstacles"
This is a matter to be done in both the Sanghas. This is
matter that involves a sense of shamefulness on the part of the
(lajjii-nimittam etat). The commentary adds:
uk'tarrr- tasmiit kiimaciira-vijiianartham iidau kriyapada_
prayogal;-.
"Therefore, it is said: the action-word (kathana) is used at
the beginning [of the sutra] to indicate the voluntary nature of
action". The declaration depends upon her will.
This additional example confirms the intention of Guna-
prabha in attributing a peculiar interpretation to the use of
word at the beginning of a sutra.
(ii) Woman's age at the time of her ordination into the
Buddhist Order. GUJ).aprabha, while commenting upon sutra 566
dviidasatva'Y[L upasampad vyuhatiiyiirrr-
"In the case of a married woman, the ordination requires
twelve years", says:

tvam
"In the case of an un-married [woman] the requirement is
of twenty years, and in the case of one who is married into [ another]
household, the requirement is of twelve years". In the case of a
(trainee), the ages prescribed by him are respectively
eighteen and ten.
This seems to be strange. Why is this distinction made between
a married and unmarried woman? The age-limit of twelve years in
the case of a married woman is also mentioned in Pali Bhikkhuni
Piitmokkha, Paci. 65-67; that of twenty years in the case of an
unmarried girl also in the same work, Paci. 71-73. In Pali Sutta-
vibhanga, there is no indication as to how this period is to be
counted, beyond that she has not reached the. age of twelve or
twenty (Vin. iv. 322, 327). In Sanskrit Bhiksu1'}z Vinaya also there
is the mention of the limit of twelve (Paci. 100, Page 245). E.
Waldschmidt and Gustav Roth explain that this period of twelve is
to be counted from marriage.
4
48
In Pali Vz"n i. 66, and Bhikkhuni Piitz"mokkha, Paei. 75, we
have the expressions, Bhkkhu dasavasso and Bhikkhunzparipur:trta-
. dvadasa-vassa, in respect of a Bhikkhu or Bhikkhuni, who is quali-
fied to give ordination (upasampadii) to another. It is the belief of
the Buddhists that with ordiation a new regenerated life begins
and so their age is understood in Buddhist eircles to begin with or-
dination. So in their cases their age is counted from their ordina-
tion. So a Bhikkhu of ten years standing and a Bhikkhuni of twelve
years standing from ordination is qualified to give ordination to
. others.
In. Bhikkhuni Piicittiya 65, there is the expression gihigata'f!/-
(corresponding to which in the Vinaya, Paei. 100, we
have grhi-caritaf!L) and so there is no justification to believe that
the age is not to be counted from birth. There are passages in the
Sutta-vibhanga which may throw light on the problem of twelve
years. dvadasa-vassa ca kho bhikkhave gihigatii khama hotz" sitassa,
urthassa, etc.: "A married woman, 0 Bhikkhus, is able to endure
cold, heat, etc ... " On the contrary) about an unmarried girl
below twenty, it is said that she is unable to endure cold, heat
(akkhamii hoti sitassa, u1J-hassa, etc. Vin. iv. 322, 327). So here we
get the explanation of the distinction deliberately made between
a married woman and an unmarried girl.
Bhadanta Maramba Ratanasara of Vidyalmkiir campus of the
University of Sri Lanka in reply to my query writes that the Sin-
halese Sanna (Comment) on the relevant word "twelve" explains
that the period of twelve years is to be counted from the time of
conception (patisandhto patthaya). This is a clear gloss preserved
in the Sinhalese tradition, though in Buddhist Theravada countries
the tradition of a Bhikkhun'i Sangha is lost. Professor A. Hirakawa
of Tokyo also writes to me that in China, Korea and Japan there
are really no Bhikkhunis. There are only sriimanerzs. He says that
in the Patimokkhas of schools preserved in Chinese, the
word twelve is to be interpreted as twelve from birth.5 There is no
justification for interpreting it as twelve from marriage.
And this very interpretation is further strengthened by GUJ?a-
prabha.
(iii) Dharmas and anudharmas of a woman-trainee
dharmas in which a woman is to be trained
before ordination are different from those in Pali. He mentions six
dharmas and six anudharmas (virtues and minor virtues) (Plate
49
IVA, Page 1, Lines 5-7). The six dharmas are: she should not (1)
go alone on a road, (2) cross a river, (3) touch a man, (4) sleep
with another in a lonely house, (5) go on an errand as a messenger_
woman, and (6) conceal the moral lapses of others.
Bhikkhunz Vibhanga (Vin. iv. 319), however, while comment_
ing upon Piicz"ttiya 63 mentions as six dhammas, the five rules of
a layman's good conduct (pancaszla) , namely, abstaining from
murder, falsehood, stealing, intoxicating drinks and violation of
celibacy, along with the sixth, abstaining from food at an impro-
per time (that is, after mid-day).
The six anudharmas, which are not found in relation to a
woman under training in Pali Vinaya, are given by GU1!-aprabha as
follows:
(1) Not to accept gold or silver, (2) not to shave off hair on
private parts, (3) not to dig earth, (4) not to cut green grass, (5)
not to relish what is not given, and (6) not to relish any kind of
storage.
Most of these rules of dharmas and anudharmas are covered
in the rules of Patimokkha for Bhikkhunis, but they are not pre-
scribed for women-trainees in Pali. Mahiivyutpatti (9320-21)
also mentions these words but does not specifically enumerate
them.
NOTES
1. "Discovery of a Sanskrit Text: Vinaya-sutra", Proceedings of the
26th Session of the International Congress of Orientalists (held in New Delhi
in 1964), 3, Part 1 (1969),343-4.
2. Dr. V. V. Gokhale and myself have been working for some years
upon GUI).aprabha's Vinaya-sutra and his own commentary and we soon hope
to prepare a critical edition of the first chapter of these texts for the K. P.
Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna. We must make it clear that this sutra text
on which we are working is not the one given in the Microfiche plates MBB-
197154, which were supplied to us by Dr. Christopher S. George of the Insti-
tute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, New York. That sutra is some
ordinary text extracted from Sarva-Thathagata Dvadaiasahasra-Parajika text
related to Vinaya, for the Buddhist laymen of Nepal. The manuscript of that
text is dated 1793.
3. Journal of the of Sanskrit, University of Delhi, 1 (Dec.
1971),58-62.
50
4. E. Waldschmidt and Gustav Roth, Bruchstuche des Bhiksunr-Prati-
der Sarvastivadins, p. 245, notes 3-4. . .
5. For another additional evidence, see Vin.-sutra, Bhiksuni-Vibhanga,
Prayascittika 49:
Piir7;iztliylim upasampad when the
twelfth year is completed, there is the time of ordination;
and Sutras 54-55:
51
Upasamplidane arvlik pari1J-rtayal;; virrtsater anyasyiil;:
In the case of a married woman, there is ordination when twelve years
are completed; before that (there is the time of training); in the case of
another, the period is of twenty.
----- - - ~ ~ -----------------
Keci, "Some," in a Pali Commentary
by 1. B. Horner
When I Was translating the Buddhava:rp.sa Commentary (BvA),
called Madhuratthavilasini, under the title of Clarifier of the Sweet
Meaning!, I became interested in the references to ked, "some", .
that occur there. These amount to seventeen. Here I propose to
put forward, without criticism, merely a selection of these after
making a few introductory remarks.
It would seem that even as the compilers of the Pali Canon
and commentaries knew of the PoraI).a or Ancients who were their
predecessors and could cite their sayings, so too the commentaries
knew what can only be presumed to be some of their contemporar-
ies who, like the compilers, devoted time and thought to the right
commentarial explanations of canonical words and phrases. These
commentaries, as we now have them, called these contemporaries
of theirs by such terms as eke, or more frequently ked, both mean-
ing "some"; they also knew "others" (as unspecified as are ked)
as anne and as apare. The indexes to some Pali Text Society pub-
lications, but by no means all, list references to the POraI).a. None,
I think, lists the references to keci, eke, anne, or apare, with the
outstanding exception of the Vocabulary to the Suttanipata Com-
mentary which also includes that on the Khuddakapatha Com-
mentary. Here therefore a good lead is given into one of the "un-
discovered corners of Pali literature" as Dr Lily de Silva calls it in
her pioneer, but short discussion of attempts made in the Suman-
galavilasini-tika(DAT) to identify the upholders of a view intro-
duced now and again by the Sumangalavilasini (DA) with the words
keci vadanti, some say2. She cites DA passages where the phrases
keci vadanti and eke vadanti occur. She also gives DAr's inter-
pretations of DA conceptions of the views held by eke and ked
and of who these eke and ked were supposed to be.
52
Dealing solely here with the Buddhavarpsa Commentary (BvA),
I will also deal solely with the views and readings it attributes to
keci, one reason for this being that I find no references to eke
there at all. To speak of anne and apare as well would lead me too
far afield,. though the BvA references to them are very sparse.
It seems that the Pali Commentaries, as finally formulated,
might agree with, disagree with, or make no comment on, thus ap-
parently accepting what they record keci to say, vadantz", or to
read, pathanti, presumably in the ancient commentarial manu-
scripts, potthake. This suggests that at least some of their views
were considered sufficiently important or interesting for notice
in the Commentaries, though of course we have no means of know-
ing how many were ignored or, supposing some were in fact ig-
nored, what were the reasons for doing so. We can, however, say
that such of their views as are recorded are not necessarily re-
garded with disfavour. They were not quoted for the sake of
showing them to be incorrect or holding them up to ridicule.
Rather, it might be that their views were quoted in order to
support, even perhaps to justify or lend weight to the commen-
taries' own interpretations.
For example, of the views ascribed to keci fourteen times in
the Suttanipata Commentary, there appear to be twelve times
when they are accepted and accepted almost as if they add to
knowledge. Similarly in BvA fourteen of the sixteen or seventeen
occurrences of what keci are recorded there to say or to read are
apparently concurred with since no adverse criticism is made. This
leaves only two out of the total number that incur definite dis-
approval.
This brings us to the question of the identity of keci. Who
were they? Can we know for certain? One supposes that they were
knowledgeable men, devoting time and thought to the Buddha's
teaching and the manner in which it should be understood and
perpetuated. Further to that, I can only say at present that DAr is
of the opinion they were residents, not of the Mahavihara at Anur-
adhapura, but of the Uttaravihara (DAr I 160 164 289, II 155)
or of the Abhayagiri (DAr I 207 316)3 both also at Anuradhapura
and assuming these two names do not refer to one and the same
Vihara, though it is more likely that they do.
4
Unfortunately BvA throws no light at all on the identity of
keci. That is one matter. How little these Theras of old realized
53
they were compiling for a posterity that after 2,500 years would
still be enormously interested and curious! But there is nothing to
be done at this distance of time. The other matter is the impor-
tance of collecting all the views that all the -Pali commentaries
ascribe to keci and so forth. There is much work still to be done
on the commentaries', and many aspects remain to be explored for
a fuller understanding of their structure, methods and function.
Though keci may not be of prime significance in themselves, it is
obvious they commanded a degree of interest and respect and
should not be lightly brushed aside. My attempts to begin to
collect the views attributed to them in BvA, and in BvA only,
now follow. Only a selection is given here, however, but enough I
hope to convey some idea of the treatment accorded to them.
Whether other commentaries show similar or different attitudes
to ked is a matter wide open to investigation.
(1) BvA, p. 13: "But some read: The Lord, chief in the world,
supreme of men, was asked by a host of Brahmas, their hands
clasped", ked pana: Bhagava ti Zokiidhipati naruttamo katanjaZi
brahmagar;,ehi yiidto ti instead of, as at BvA 5: Brahmii
ca lokiidhipatz" Sahampati katanjali anadhivararrt ayiicatha.
No comment made.
(2) BvA, p. 28: "Some read: in the zenith adorned with
jewels", nabhe ratanama'Y!itan ti ked, as does Bv I 5.1t
would seem BvA might prefer to read sabbaratanama'Y!q,itan, adorned
with all the jewels, and saying nothing about the zenith.
No comment. .
(3) BvA, p. 65 on Bv IIA 1: "A city named Amara means
that the city was named both Amara and Amaravati. But some ex-
plain it even here in another way. How can they when this was the
name of the city?"-keci pan 'ettha annena pi pakiirena var;,fLayanti;
kif!L tehi riama'f!1- pan' eta'f!1- tassa nagarassa?
We are not told what is ked's explanation.
Here there is a reprimand.
(4) BvA p. 76 on Bv IIA 30: "Possessed of eight special qual-
ItIes means: possessed of eight special qualities spoken of thus:
with the mind composed, quite purified, quite clarified, without
54
blemish, without defilement, grown soft and workable, fixed, im-
movable, I gained, I procured power in the superknowings (a.t.tha-
gur:tasamupetan ti evar[L samahite citte ... evarp, vuttehi a.tthagury,ehi
samannagatam abhinnabalam aharim anesin ti attho). But some
say: Endowed with the eight happinesses of recluses, and that
these are: not appropriating wealth and grain '" ( the eight are
now specified, and may be compared with Jataka \7, p.252-3).
These (i.e. "some", just above) say: Endowed with the eight hap-
pinesses of recluses, I created a hermitage - thus making a con-
nexion with the hermitage. This does not agree with the text":
keci pana: atthahi samar;asukhehz" upetar[L; atth' imani samary,a-
sukhani nama dhanadhaiiitapariggahabhavo ... imehz" atthahi sama-
r:tasukhehi upetar[L samupeta1?l assama1?l mapesin ti, assamena sam-
bandha1?l katva vadanti. Tarrt pa.liya na sameti.
Thus the interpretations postulated by "some" could hardly
be more clearly repudiated. According to the BvA compiler the
interpretation is connected with a material thing, namely a her-
mitage, rather than with the mind or mental activities, citta, as
is intended by the text, pa.H. Not to agree with or tally with the
text is quite a bad error on the part of any commentarial compiler.
Reprimand.
(5) BvA p. 152 on Bv IV 29: "samkilesamarary,a-p tadii ti .. ,
keci: sammohamarattarrt tada ti pa.thanti: dying then with defile-
ments (present) ... some read: dying then with confusion (present)".
Confusion is one of the defilements.
No comment.
(6) BvA p. 201 on Bv XII 26 explains cando taragar:te yatha
(as the moon in a host of stars) by saying: yatha gagane paripur;-
r:tacando taragarJe obhaseti pakasati evam eva sabbii pi disa obha-
seti ti attho,"as a full moon in the heavens ma!<-es effulgent and
illumines in a host of stars even so did he make effulgent all the,
quarters". To this it adds: keci cando pa"!-r:taraso yathii ti pathanti:
"some read: as the moon on the fifteenth (day)", and comments
that "the meaning is quite clear", so uttanattho va. This is because
the full-moon day and the fifteenth day (of the month) are reck-
oned to be one and the same. Thus it is apparent that for keci's
wording here there is
Acceptance.
55
(7) EvA p. 230 on Bv XVIII 12 which reads c'atuva'fl:1Japari_
vuta1fL where va1J1Ja appears to mean something like "kinds", for
BvA explains the compound as clltuparisaparivuta1fL, "surrounded
by the four companies" which, as it says, comprise warrior-nobles
brahmans, householders and recluses. It then adds catuva'fl:1Jeh
parivutan ti pathanti ked, " some read: surrounded by the four
va'Y!1Jas". But whether keci's understanding of va1J1Ja differed from
the commentarial one and for ked meant, for example, caste, the
four castes, or whether there was merely a difference in grammat-
ical construction is not easy to know.
No comment.
I hope I have put forward enough examples to indicate that
on this one subject alone the Commentaries, albeit one Comment-
ary only, contain a wealth of interest. I believe ked and their in-
terpretations are recorded with more or less frequency in probably
all the Commentaries. These also, on occasion and frequently in
Samantapasadika, the commentary on the Vinaya, name their
sources, the ancient commentaries such as tha Maha-atthakatha,
the Kurundi and the Mahapaccari.5 To collect their opinions ex-
pressed and preserved in the commentaries as we have them today
would be to render a good service to Pali commentarialliterature,
and should provide a valuable study.
NOTES
1. To be published by the Pali Text Society as Sacred Books of the
Buddhists No. 33.
2. Lily de Silva, ed., Dtghanikayatphakatha(ikii L"inatthapa'l!fwnii.
[DAr] (London: PaIi Text Society). Vol I lix f.
3. See DAr I p. LX.
4. See Dictionary of Pali Proper Names, s.v. both Uttaravihara and
Abhayagiri where it is said, "In the Chronicles Abhayagiri is referred to under
several names", one of which is Uttaravihara.
5. Mrs C.A.F. Rhys Davids in Buddhist Psychological Ethics, p. xxviii
gives a list of six ancient commentaries, known in particular to Buddhaghosa.
56
Comments on Zen
by M. Kiyota
This short paper is a review of Zenkei Shibayama, Zen Comments
on the Mumonkan (tr. into English by Sumiko Kudo). New York
and Scarborough, Ontario: A Mentor Book, New American Library,
1974.366 pp. Glossary and Index. Paperback.
This book consists of Shibayama's tesh8 on the popular
Mumonkan (Wu-men kiian) , composed by Wu-men in China in
early 13th century. Tesho are instructions on the goroku, a col-
lection of essential sayings of past Zen masters. Mumonkan con-
sists of 48 such sayings, each commented upon by Wu-men. Zen
Comments on the Mumonkan consists of Shibayama's tez"sho on
the Mumonkan. Shibayama was the roshi of Nanzenji Monastery
(representing the Rinzai tradition of Zen), Kyoto, from 1948 to
1967. He is a qualified tez'sho master. In this work, the Mumonkan
is translated in its entirety with Shibayama's own tez"sh8 added.
Both are rendered into English by Sumiko Kudo, a long-time
personal (and faithful) secretary to the roshi, and edited by John
Moffit. Kudo, I feel, deserves the highest praises for interpreting
ideas conceived and composed in a language (frequently expressed
in terse classical Zen vernacular) rooted in a tradition other than
the language into which she translates them. For this type of work
requires not only familiarity with the languages (classical Zen
vernacular, modem Zen Japanese, and English) but also consider-
able insights into the culture that those languages represent. This
work was occasioned by an invitation to the r8sh by Colgate Uni-
versity to deliver a series of lectures on Zen, an enterprise ap-
parently realized through the good offices of Professor Kenneth
Morgan.
This work provides many of us-absorbed in the painstaking
work of textual exegesis, thematic contextualization, and philo-
57
sophical interpretation of Buddhist texts and systems of thought_
a "refreshing breeze," for it communicates the Dharma through
direct discourse and simple metaphors without the contrivance of
logical structure and intellectual manipulation 'of ideas. This is im-
portant, for Zen ultimately consists of an experiential process, not
a noetic philosophy to be apprehended simply by the intellect, as
Shibayama rightly points out. To this end, Professor Morgan de-
serves credit. For, after the death of Charles Moore, a platform to
enable native Asian philosophers and religious practitioners to
speak their minds freely-from the perspectives of their own philo-
sophical tradition and religious training and without the imposi-
tion of Western concepts and bias-has not been adequately pro-
vided. In passing, it might be pointed out that Professor Morgan
has been involved in this type of what we might call a reverse
"out-reach" program, without the strain of 'cultural imperialism,'
since the fifties. The Path of Buddha, which he compiled and
edited in the late fifties, represents the culmination of such ef-
forts. Such a breed of man is in short supply nowadays.
In reviewing a book of this type-a translation of teisho plus
a teisho on tez"sho by a teisho master-it is meaningless to cite
one's own preference of terms, or, for that matter, to criticize the
contents of the teisho per se, because teisho consists of an intui-
tive insight (prajiiii) which is beyond the realm of conceptual
thought. We should, as Professor Morgan has seemingly done, en-
courage the practitioner to speak his own mind in a manner he de-
sires. Nevertheless, we must make clear that there is a distinction
between religious instructions designed to 'enlighten' people
(keimo, as the Japanese would gently put it) and scholarship. It is
this difference which I wish to point out. Furthermore, the fact
that this work represents a product of a reverse "out-reach" pro-
gram does not, by any means, mean that it cannot be criticized
(no matter how useful it may be in terms of keimo). But my cri-
ticism is not directed to the specific contents of the teisho, the
manner in which they are presented and translated, nor the intent
with which Professor Morgan encouraged the publication of .this
work. It is directed to issues to which, I feel, this work has not ad-
dressed itself squarely: the content of the experiential, the specific
meaning of the term "no reliance on letters," and the very nature
of teisho itself. This book is reviewed from the perspective of
modem Buddhology.
58
Throughout the work, the roshz" insists on the priority of Zen
experience-echoing one of D.T. Suzuki's major themes-and he
plays down the role of "letters/scripture" (the terms "letters"
and "scripture" are used interchangeably in this work). The fact
remains that there is no school of Mahayana developed in East
Asia which does not emphasize the experiential (my work, Shn-
gon Buddhism: Theory and Practice, 1978, for example, empha-
sizes the same), and there is no school of Buddhism which con-
ceives the "letters" as truth per se. In other words, emphasis on
the experiential and "no reliance on letters" -odd though it may
seem to a Zen practitioner-are not features unique to Zen (or the
Rinzai tradition of Zen which the roshz" represents). They are com-
mon Mahayana properties. But what is lacking in this work-like
many other works authored by Zen practitioners-is a structured
approach to describe the contents of the
We must remind outs elves that satori-the Zen equivalent for
enlightenment-as such is not the goal of Zen, as the roshi rightly
points out on many occasions. In fact, the very notion of en-
lightenment should be abandoned in Zen (datsuraku shin-shin, as
Dagen puts it) because the goal of Mahayana, of which Zen con-
stitutes an integral entity, is practice. Practice means the external
demonstration of prajiia (sunyatayam prayojanam), that is, the
creation of a new socio-religious human configuration through
the practice of emptiness. It is within the context of sunyatayam
pray ojanam , for example, that we can speak rationally of Buddh-
ism as an experiential philosophy. The roshi's statement, "Zen
is Zen experience," actually refers to this kind of practice and ex-
perience. Furthermore, what is important to note here is that this
kind of experience is communicated through "skill-in-means," as
it always has been throughout the history of Buddhism. In Mahaya-
na, "skill-in-means" refers to the ultimate (paryavasiina) of wisdom.
"Letters" and language, sounds and mantra, metaphors and
similes, ma1}(1ala and mudra, etc. are symbolic representation of
truth. They constitute the Buddhist "skill-in-means" through
which truth is communicated, and have always been the accepted,
effective, and only available instrument to communicate truth. If
this were not so, it would be strange that a great number of
Buddhist literary expositions-such as the Prajnaparamitii, Vajra-
cchedika, Vimalakirtinirdesa, La1ikiivatara, Awakening of Maha-
yana Faith, etc.-have been made available through many Zen
59
writers, such as, for example, D.T. Suzuki, Sh6san Yanagida, etc.
Both Y6sai of Rinzai and Dogen of Sot6 relied on "letters" to
compose the Kozengokoku-ron and Shobogenzo, respectively.
And Zen Comments on Mumonkan, itself, employs "letters" to
convey its tez"sho messages, though, in all fairness to the roshi, he
does point out the limitations of his own teisho writings. But this
is precisely the reason why a work of this sort should, I repeat,
take a structured approach to describe the experiential and pro-
vide a clear definition of what the term "no reliance on letters"
actually means within the context of the Zen tradition (which
does in fact employ "letters").
Now then, Zen apologists would stoutly maintain that Bodhi-
dharma came to China to spread the True Dharma from "mind-
to-mind" and did not rely upon the words of scripture. First,
whether Bodhidharma was a historical figure is highly question-
able, but we shall not get involved in a subject of this sort now,
for it has already been thoroughly discussed, by, for example,
Shindai Sekiguchi (Daruma daishi no kenkyu, Tokyo: Taisei in-
satsu, 1957). Second, a statement of this sort-"no reliance on
letters"-can be found in Ch 'an-yuan-chu-ch 'uan chi
(9th century), Tao-yuan's Chz"ng-te fu-teng lu (11th century),
Y6sai's Kozengokoku-ron (12th century), etc. But interestingly,
this type of a statement, though found in even earlier Zen texts,
was most strongly articulated in late T'ang, when Buddhist scholar-
ship began to wane, and particularly in Sung, when Zen began to
be absorbed by Confucianism (prompting Wing-Tsit Chan, for
example, to remark that neo-Confucianism is Zen plus Confucian-
sim. In his Shina bukkyo no kenkyu (Vol. III, Tokyo: Shunjusha,
1943), Daij6 Tokowa claims that "no reliance on letters," advoca-
ted strongly by Sung Zen practitioners, contributed to the decline
of Zen in China, for, in their insistence on "no reliance on letters,"
they ignored the classics. Within the context of the history of
Chinese Buddhism, a school of thought which failed to honor the
classics failed to renew itself, for textual studies not only involves
an exegetical exercise but the constant re-interpretation of systems
of thought from new perspectives in order to respond effectively
to actual historical situations.
More interesting to note is that, historically, the notion of
"no reliance on letters" was not at all times observed without
criticism, even within the Zen tradition. For example, the Tsu-
60
ting shih-yuan (Section 5), a catalogue of Zen works (compiled
ca. 1098-1100), says,
The patriarchs who transmitted the Dharma observed the
teachings of the Trip.taka together with practice. But after
Bodhidharma, mental marks (hsin-yin) were emphasized to
'see' one's own Buddha-nature. As a result, many practition-
ers lost sight of what we actually mean by "no reliance on
letters" and they conceived Zen as just sitting in silence.
These people are like a deaf-mute lamb!
As this statement clearly indicates, the ultimate purpose of Zen is
neither "no reliance on letters" nor just "sitting in silence." It
consists, most fundamentally of all, in arousing one's own b o d h i ~
citta-chien-hsing as the Chinese would call it, or kensho as the
Japanese call it, with the vigor of a koan. Kensho literally means
"seeing one's own nature." It corresponds to what the existential-
ists refer to as the "authentic self." Like the existentialists, a Zen
practitioner may be able to realize kensho through the means of
"letters. "
Teisho, like "letters," is a means to "see" the "authentic
self," which Mahayana maintains is based upon an insight into
non-duality. Teisho is designed to penetrate the realm of non-
duality, the realm beyond conceptual thought. It mayor may not
enable one to realize kensho. Granting that "letters" in themselves
offer no assurance of realizing kensho either, they nevertheless
have an equal-if not a better-chance to develop a rational under-
standing of what kensho is. But what is important to note here is,
as historians of religions constantly remind us, that any type of
religion is subject to the historical cycle of fossilization and re-
newal. To accept teisho without criticism is to fossilize Zen; to
critically examine teisho is to revitalize the 'spirit' of Zen. Critical
examination means to understand the doctrinal basis of Zen
thought through the means of "letters" and to interpret those
"letters" with prajiia insights. Tez"sho, observed in a didactic man-
ner as does this work, deprives one of the freedom to think criti-
cally and to digest ideas through the process of reasoning. Not-
withstanding the roshi's claim that tez"sho is free of dogma, the
manner of its presentation smells of dogma, because the roshi
simply offers flashes of insight without interpreting the doctrinal
basis of those insights and without contextualizing those insights.
Tesho in general tends to become sterile, ritualized and dogmatic,
61
as many-who have frequently participated in a private tet'sho
session (with a cool head) or have read an extensive range of teisho
literature in the original-can attest. Fully aware of this kind of
danger inherent in teisho, Seizan Yanagida approaches Zen histori_
cally and doctrinally (Mu no tankyii, Tokyo: Kadokawa shoten
. ,
1969), Shigeo Kamata investigates Kegon as the basis of Zen
thought (Chugoku kegon shzso no kenkyu, Tokyo: Tokyo Univer-
sity Press, 1975), Shun'ei Hirai examines the Chinese development
of prajna as the basis for the development of Chinese Buddhist
experiential philosophy (Chugoku hannya shiso-shi no kenkyu,
Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1976), etc. These are all faithful Zen practi-
tioners and eminent Buddhologists. Zen studies in Japan among
Zen scholars take a philological, philosophical and historical
approach to investigate the contents of the experiential. They
avoid offering flashing insights but present their views rationally,
based upon textual, doctrinal and historical investigation.
As a matter of summary, let me repeat that to understand the
contents of teisho rationally requires the contextualization of
those contents within the framework of basic Mahayana prinCiples
-such as prajnii, madhyama pratipiid, cz"tta-miitra, etc. This is
quite important because, as I see it, Zen has come a long way since
it was introduced to the West by D.T. Suzuki (also in a keimo
manner, though his studies on the Lmikavatara and his translation
of the Awakening of Mahayana Faith, accomplished during his
younger years, still warrant respectability), and, subsequently, in
the more flamboyant manner of Alan Watts and others. It is this
manner of spreading Zen in the West that prompted Edward
Conze, the eminent British Buddhologist, to caustically remark,
"Zen is nothing but prajnaparamita with jokes." If Zen is to be
taken seriously, as it should be, more serious work-which not
only moves the 'spirit' of man but which stimulates the reasoning
power of man-is certainly in need. This review, it must be made
clear, is not intended to criticize Zen nor the roshi simply for
the sake of criticism. It is intended to encourage Zen practition-
ers to examine Zen as an integral entity of the Mahayana tradition,
doctrinally and historically, so that they would be able to present
the experiential in a structured and rational manner.
The roshi and Miss Kudo-respectable practitioners and faith-
ful missionaries of Rinzai Zen-died in 1974, leaving behind them
this excellent piece of keimo literary work. Gassho.
62
The Freudian Unconscious and Bhavanga
by O. H.' de A. Wz"jesekera
Although several thinkers before him had observed the existence
of unconscious processes in the workings of the mind, the 'scien-
tific' concept of the Unconscious must be attributed to the un-
doubted genius of Sigmund Freud. According to him mental life
is the function of an apparatus made up of several portions, which
he compared to a telescope or microscope. To the oldest of these
he gave the name of id, which he believed contains everything that
is inherited, above all, the biological instincts which according to
him originate in the somatic organization. For the purpose of this
paper, it is necessary to lay stress on Freud's concept of the id as
a reservoir of the psychical forces which maintain the dynamism
of all the conscious and the unconscious factors of the human
psyche. Next he posited a later-developed region of mental life,
giving it the name of ego. This according to Freud is a part of the
id which has undergone a special development under the influence
of the external world. This is the agency which is in control of vol-
untary activity arising in consequence of the relation between sen-
sory perception and muscular action. Such, practically in Freud's
own phraseology,l is a description of the most important aspect
of the human psyche. What is important to note is that theid, as
Freud himself points out, is intimately connected to the Uncon-
sious, with the implication that the ego is closely associated with
the (waking) consciousness.
Several writers on Buddhist psychology who have discussed
the Therevada concept of bhavanga have taken it as referring to
some sort of subconsciousness or subliminal consciousness or un-
consciousness. Mrs Rhys Davids, who was the first to point it out
in her very first work
2
on Buddhism, published soon after 1911,
made this observation: "The Pall word bhavanga expresses both
(a) the objective aspect of vital functioning and (b) the subjective
63
aspect of our sub-consciousness, or mental state, when we are not
attending to anything ... " In her last work
3
on the subject she
had this to say of bhava?iga: "It was wanted for vital continuance
when the act of waking advertence, which we' now call attention,
is absent. The vital continuum with its potentiality of attention-in_
perception was ever proceeding (becoming) . . ." In the same
work she understood by bhavmiga "the stream of unconscious life"
(p. 407), which she also called "the flow of organic life" (p. 398).
Mrs Rhys Davids did not clearly identify bhavanga with the Un-
conscious of Freud, but generally took it as some sort of subcon-
sciousness as was posited by philosophical writers of the period.
In his work Buddhist Psychology o/Perception Saratchandra
translated the term bhavanga as the unconscious (p. 75), but no-
where discussed the relevant theory of Freud in relation to it, al-
though he attempted a comparison of Freud's theory of dreams
with that of later Buddhist works. My intention in this paper is
to attempt a little more detailed comparison of the Buddhist no-
tion of bhavanga with the Freudian concept of the Unconscious.
In a previous paper4 I have made an attempt to define the
provenance and the original significance of the term bhavanga.
The conclusion I arrived at was that the concept was not a later
product of Abhidhamma thought as believed by the above-men-
tioned wirters, but was already found in the early Canonical per-
iod, occurring as it does in the Anguttara Nikaya in a passage which
refers to rupanga, veda?iga, saiirLanga, bhavanga (II. 79). In agree-
ment with Keith's interpretation
5
of this passage I pointed out that
bhavanga here obviously stood for the two last factors, namely
sarr-khiirii and viiiiiana, in the well-known list of five skandhas.
I cited evidence from the Pali canon to justify such an interpreta-
tion. Students of Buddhism cannot miss the fact as found in the
formula of Dependent Origination (paticcasamuppiida) that san-
khara and viiiiiana are the conditons par excellence for samsaric
becoming (bhava). They are indeed, with antecedent avijjii, the
conditions for the arising of indivuduality (nama-rupa). It is there-
fore no cause for surprise if sankhiira and viiiiiana came to be re-
garded as the factors of existence (bhava-anga). This interpreta-
tion is supported indirectly by the usage of Sarvastivada Abhi-
dharma which applied the term bhavangani to all the twelve fac-
tors of becoming in the pratitya-samutpiida. As La Vallee Poussin
pointed out,
6
in the Sarvastivada tradition vzjiiiina came to be con-
64
sidered the bhavanga par excellence, but a closer study of the links
(nidiinas) of the paticcasamuppiida series as preserved in the Pali
Canon indicates that sankhiira which are the immediate conditions
for viftftana are even more as a factor in the develop-
ment of individuality. In fact in the Theravada Canon sankhiirii
are regarded as the most characteristic condition for becoming
(bhava). Hence it is that the samsaric being (satto) is characterized
in the Sarrtyutta Nikiiya (1. 135) as purely a complex of sankhiira
(suddha-sankhara-punja). Thus it would appear that the Pali Canon-
ical tradition which considers sankhara and viftftiina as equally im-
portant factors in samsaric becoming, that is to say as the two
most important constituents of bhavanga, is more legitimate than
the later developed doctrine of Sarvastivada which takes only vi-
jftana as the bhavanga par excellence. A study of the meaning of
sankhara in the Pali Canon clearly supports such an interpretation.
It is necessary at this stage to inquire into the meaning of the
terms sankhara and viftniina as they occur at the beginning of the
patz"ccasamuppiida series. A careful study of the relevant contexts
will indicate beyond doubt that sa'likhara signify the predisposi-
tions or tendencies resulting from previous voluntary action (ceta-
nii/kamma). This may be understood as the momentum resulting
from previous kamma. It finds a parallel usage in the physical
sphere when the term (abhi)sankhara is used to describe the con-
tinuing momentum of a wheel set rolling (Anguttara Nz'kiiya, 1. 112).
Hence we may understand sankhiira in this context as psychical
dispositions or tendencies, or generally as psychical forces. Similar-
ly, the term vinftana in the same context, althought generally
translated as consciousness, has a special meaning when it appears
as the precondition of niima-rupa. Now, students of Buddhism are
aware that by niima Canonical doctrine refers to vedanii, saftftii,
sankharii and viftftiina which are the constituents of empiric indi-
viduality. In this latter occurrence there is no doubt that viftftana
means consciousness. Thus the term viftftana as a prior link in the
paticcasamuppiida series must be understood as viftnana in a po-
tential form. In Western terminology this may be described as
noetic potential. Such a significance of the term may be understood
in the light of the concept of which is said to continue
from the past into the present life, and if samsara is not ended, in-
to the future also (see Digha Nikaya, III. 105). It is obvious that at
the non-empirical state viftniina is unconscious and becomes con-
65
scious only when confronted by the objective world in the percep_
tual process, etc. As we showed at the beginning of this paper,
Freud's concept of the human psyche consisting of id-forces and
the Unconsicous may therefore be considered to a large extent
parallel to the Buddhist notion of bhavanga which too, according
to our interpretation; is constituted by the sankharas or psychical
forces combined with viiiiiiina which in the empirical state appears
as consciousness which Freud attributed to the ego or the empiri-
cal agent.
NOTES
1. An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, London, Hogarth Press, 1949. See
especially Chps. I, IV and VIII.
2. Buddhism, Williams and Norgate (Home University Library).
3. The Birth of Indian Psychology and its Development in Buddhism,
London, Luzac & Co., 1936.
4. 'Canonical References to Bhavanga', Malalasekera Commemoration
Volume, ed. Wijesekera, Colombo, 1976, pp. 348 ff.
5. See his Buddhist Philosophy, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1923, p. 194
f.n.1.
6. Douze Causes, 40.
66
III. BOOK REVIEWS
Tibetan Buddhism in Western Perspective, collected articles by Herbert
V. Guenther. Emeryville, California: Dharma Publishing, 1977.261 pp.
The publication of a scholar's "collected articles" invites us to
view his development in a broad perspective and to consider on this
basis his overall strengths and weaknesses. The eleven essays gathered
here span a quarter-century, from 1950 through 1975, and cover topics
ranging from the Gar;4avyiiha Sutra to the philosophical background of
Tantrism' and the role of the spiritual teacher. It is clear from reading
them that Herbert Guenther's aims and methods have been unusually
consistent over a long span of time.
Prof. Guenther's professed aim, as expressed in the Introduction,
always has been to offer "a key to the understanding of Buddhism as
a living force of 'extensive becoming' that seems to constitute the
nature of human thought and spiritual growth." Western scholars-even
sympathetic ones-all too often have patronized Buddhist philosophy
by regarding it 1) as hopelessly subordinated to mysticism and there-
fore not to be considered in the same light as our "more rigorous"
Western systems, or 2) as hopelessly involuted and scholastic and there-
fore irrelevant to modern philosophical concerns. In the face of this,
it has been the singular contribution of Prof. Guenther to have at-
tempted to explain Buddhism in a manner consonant with recent de-
velopments in analytic and phenomenological philosophy: so certain
is he of Buddhism's significance for modern thought that his attempt at
elucidation has become nearly his exclusive preoccupation, to the point,
it must be said, where the lines between scholarship and apologetics at
times are blurred.
Those who are familiar with Prof. Guenther's work are aware that
he has fashioned a theory of translation that evolves from the attempt
to take absolutely seriously Buddhism's status as a "process" philosophy.
He believes, in effect, that a world-view that admits of no static entities
will be utterly misrepresented if its terms are translated "statically,"
i.e., on the basis of one foreign word's supposed equivalency to one
English word. He passionately affirms (on page x) that "I never could
67
(nor will I ever) subscribe to a mood of 'definiteness' because this mood
is soporific and geared to a static conception of man and the universe
and to a mechanical mode of dealing with them. Although a definiteness
with the deterministic interpretation displays a C"ertain attractiveness
which seems to be natural and more easy, this attractiveness is but the
pervasive fallacy of assuming that everything is reducible to quantifiable
platitudes. "
Prof. Guenther, in short, is not going to apologize for what others
regard as the turgidity or inconsistency of his translations: he regards it
as his duty to remain true to the difficulty and elusiveness of the Bud-
dhist concepts, and superficial readability be damned. Prof. Guenther
cannot be accused of incoherence, but his essays do raise a number of
disturbing problems.
The first, most eloquently posed by R.A. Stein in his Preface to
the Vie et Chants de 'Brug pa Kun legs Ie Yogin, is that ofthe degree to
which the implications of a word should be brought to bear on the word's
translation. For example, should the Tibetan rig-pa, generally rendered
as "knowledge," be translated as "Being qua being" and glossed as a
"value-sustained cognition having a strongly aesthetic character," or
again as a "peak experience," simply because these Western terms match
Prof. Guenther's notion of their interpretation by certain schools? Prof.
Guenther, needless to say, would maintain that it should, for the reasons
outlined above, but it is clear that such non-literal translations and
glosses leave us rather at the mercy of the translator's vision, for we
have no way of separating the original statements from their overtones,
since the rendering has combined the usually separate functions of
translation and commentary.
The problems inherent in such an approach are particularly evi-
dent in Prof. Guenther because he has chosen so frequently to translate
Buddhist vocabulary into the terms of such divergent Western disciplines
as biology, systems analysis, astrophysics and Heideggerian philosophy.
One is sorely tempted to ask, "Come on now, do the Buddhists really
mean all those things?" It is by no means self-evident that they do, but
in the absence of historical or contextual qualifications, there is no way
of telling from Prof. Guenther's work that there can be any doubt.
Prof. Guenther has worked closely throughout his career with
teachers from the 'Brug-pa bKa'-brGyud and rNying-ma schools of
Tibetan Buddhism, and he has made a real contribution by his exposure
through those schools of uniquely Tibetan contributions to Buddhist
philosophy. Nevertheless, one feels uneasy reading the essays in this
book, because one does not feel utterly confident that Prof. Guenther's
translations are capturing the spirit (let alone the letter) of the bKa'-
brGyud and rNying-ma thought that he discusses so extensively.
68
Even more disquieting is his tendency to homologize bKa'-brGyud
and rNying-ma thought with Buddhism (or even "Eastern thought") in
general. Running through most of these essays (and most of Prof.
Guenther's work) is a vital concern with the distinction between Mind
with a capital M (rig-pa, sems-nyid) and mind with a small m (sems).
The former is a pure, spontaneous, aesthetic, intuitive awareness, onto-
logically expressible as "Being-in-itself," while the latter is everyday
mental functioning: conceptual, rigid and very much "fallen" from the
pure state to which, nevertheless, it can return. The parallels between
such a view of man and that of Christianity (not to mention Bergson or
Heidegger) are startling indeed, but we may at least concede that such
a myth os is implied by many bKa'-brGyud and rNying-ma works. The
suggestion, however, that such a scheme somehow is the heart and soul
of Buddhism is, at the very best, arguable, and needs to be demonstrated
rather than simply asserted or assumed.
In short, then, Prof. Guenther's greatest strength turns out to be
his weakness as well: admirably, he seeks to demonstrate the relevance
of Buddhist philosophy to the contemporary crisis of the soul, but in
so doing he tends to substitute commentary for translation and philo-
sophical generalization for contextual analysis. In doing that, he draws
us far enough away from the work he is discussing that we no longer
are certain where we stand, and can, in the end, but report that this
does indeed seem to be "Tibetan Buddhism in Western perspective."
In that, there may be great psychological value, but the scholarly and
historical value often is problematic.
Regardless of the problems endemic to it, Prof. Guenther's is a
provocative and sometimes insightful corpus, and his ideas deserve
serious discussion. Tibetan Buddhism in Western Perspective will pro-
vide ammunition for both his supporters and his opponents and for that,
in addition to its numerous interesting essays (especially the seminal
"The Concept of Mind in Buddhist Tantrism," "The Levels of Under-
standing in Buddhism," and "The Philosophical Background of Bud-
dhist Tantrism"), it bears reading.
Roger Jackson
Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism, by Geshe Lhundup Sopa
and Jeffrey Hopkins, with a foreword by His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
New York: Grove Press, 1976. 164 pages.
Seven years ago, Herbert Guenther published the first substantial
English translation of Tibetan grub-mtha' (siddhanta) literature, includ-
69
ing in his Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice major portions
of dKon-mchog 'jigs-med dbang-po's Grub-pa'i rnam-bzhag rin-po-che'i
phreng-ba and Mi-pham's Yid-bzhin-rndzod-kyi grub-mtha' bsdus-pa.
Now, Geshe Lhundup Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins ,have brought out a
book that is in many ways an obverse, a mirror image of Prof. Guenther's.
Not only is their title very nearly the opposite of his, but the ordering
of material is reversed, too: Prof. Guenther devotes the first portion of
his book to "theory," i.e., to the four traditional schools of Indian Bud-
dhism, and the latter part to "practice," a discussion of the different
levels of Tantra; Geshe Sopa and Prof. Hopkins, on the other hand,
give the first half of their work over to translation of the Fourth Panchen
Lama's practice-oriented commentary on Tsong-kha-pa's Three Principal
Aspects of the Path to Highest Enlightenment, while the second half is
devoted to a complete translation of dKon-mchog 'jigs-med dbang-po's
Grub-pa'i mtha'i rnam-bzhag rin-po-che'i phreng-ba ("Precious Garland
of Tenets"). (I am not certain what prompted this latter ordering, as
the traditional emphasis-certainly in the dGe-Iugs-pa school, in 'Yhich
Geshe Sop a was trained-is on the mastery of theory prior to an under-
taking of serious meditative (particularly Tantric) practice.)
Geshe Sopa and Prof. Hopkins most markedly differ from Guenther
in a more essential way, i.e., in the theory of translation that they bring
to bear on the -Precious Garland. Prof. Guenther, of course, shapes his
translations with a complex, frequently-shifting vocabulary drawn largely
from recent analytic and phenomenological philosophy. He always has
disdained "literal-mindedness" and the one-English-word-for-one-foreign-
word equivalency employed by "philologists" who fail to understand
that a non-static philosophical system must be translated by "non-static"
means. I'm not sure that Geshe Sopa and Prof. Hopkins can be classified
as "philologists," but they have opted for a very literal rendering of
dKon-mchog 'jigs-med dbang-po's text.
The two different approaches are typified by the following ex-
ample. Prof. Guenther (Penguin edition, p. 109) translates a portion of
the yul-can ("The Owner of the ObjectIve Situation';) section of the
chapter on Cittamiitra as follows: "The substratum awareness is as
regards its internal experientially initiated potentialities of experience
(existentially and ethically) neutral, but is disturbed and divided by the
'constant' which as a primary factor [in cognitive life] is accompanied
by five ever-present function patterns as its assistants." Geshe Sopa and
Prof. Hopkins (p. 115) translate the same passage from the same "object-
possessor" (;;luI-can) section of the Cittamatra chapter rather differently:
"The followers of scripture assert that a: mind basis of all apprehends
[the five senses, the five objects, and] the internallatencies ... A mind
basis of all has the aspect of not discriminating its objects [it does not
'This is such and such'] and its entity is undefiled and neutral.
70
It is a constant main mind, associated only with the five omnipresent
mental factors."
Prof. Guenther's rendering of bag-chags (vQsana) as "the experien-
tially initiated potentialities of experience" is a typical instance of com-
but a literalism that translates kun-gzhi (which
denotes but does not translate the Sanskrit alaya-vijiiana) as "mind
basis of all" is not entirely helpful, either. Geshe Sopa and Prof. Hopkins
have insisted on translating virtually every Tibetan word as literally as
possible into an English equivalent, with occasionally unfortunate re-
sults. A minor, if egregious, example is the consistent use of "Foe
Destroyer" when referring to those who have reached the highest
Hinayana attainment: "Foe Destroyer" is a literal translation of the
Tibetan dgra-bcom-pa, but the Tibetan term was chosen on the basis of
a false Sanskrit etymology; the term arhat actually refers to "one who
is worthy." Other instances of excessive literalism include the trans-
lation of yongs-grub (parini!ipanna) as "thoroughly-established phe-
nomena," of kun-rdzob bden-pa (sa1flvrti-satya) as "truth for a con-
cealer," and of 'gro (gati) as "migration."
Though the translation of the Precious Garland does not read at
all smoothly, it should be pointed out in Geshe Sopa and Prof. Hopkins'
defense that if they have erred, it is to the preferable side: too much
literalism, in my opinion, runs far less risk of significantly distorting a
text than does too little. Furthemore, one begins to suspect after two
difficult renditions of the Precious Garland that it is not a work that
lends itself easily to translation. Grub-mtha' literature in general is
highly structured and condensed. Even the longer examples of the genre,
such as that of 'J am-dbyangs bzhad-pa, are nearly incomprehensible for
one without a considerable background in Buddhist philosophy and/or
a native informant. dKon-mchog 'jigs-med dbang-po's grub-mtha' is a
short one, concise to the point where it is barely more than an outline.
Because of this, nearly every sentence requires a page of historical and
scholastic elucidation. Geshe Sop a and 'Prof. Hopkins have interspersed
the text with a number of helpful clarifications, but one wishes that
there were far more of them, and in a somewhat less technical vocab-
ulary. One wishes, too, that the glossary at the back could have been
somewhat more complete and that the Tibetan and Sanskrit originals
of some of the more unusual translations could have been indicated
parenthetically in the text.
The text that comprises the first, "practice" portion of the book,
the Fourth Panchen Lama's commentary of Tsong-kha-pa's Three Prin-
cipal Aspects of the Path to Highest Enlightenment, had been previous-
ly translated in Geshe Wangyal's The Door of Liberation. Its retrans-
lation is justified by the relative unobtainablility of Geshe Wangyal's
book! as well as by the addition to the text of a number of visualization
71
details that, had been omitted from the earlier translation. The text is an
important and interesting one, giving detailed instructions on the pro-
cedure to be followed in a meditative sitting. The session described in-
volves visualization, prayer, mantra and a meditation that touches on
most of the major points of the lam-rim (a particular arrangement of
the "stages of the path" that is, in one form or another, central to the
practices of all Tibetan schools): the rarity and importance of human
birth, impermanence and the imminence of death, the of
salflsara, the cultivation of bodhicitta, and the meditation on emptiness.
Geshe Sopa's and Prof. Hopkins' translation is a clear and readable one,
prefaced by a detailed background discussion of lam-rim, and one wishes
that such detail could equally have been provided for the Precious
Garland translation. The difficulties with that translation notwithstand-
ing, though, the Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism provides a
tantalizing taste of the vast range of thought practice encompassed
by Tibetan Buddhism, and should-if used in concert with other texts-
prove useful to specialist and interested layman alike.
V. Olivetti
Shingon Buddhism: Theory and Practice, by Minoru Kiyota. Los Angeles
and Tokyo: Buddhist Books International, 1978. viii, 178 pp. Anno-
tated bibliography and glossary of technical terms. $7.95 (cloth);
$5.95 (paper).
Shingon Buddhism is a tightly structured and specialized treat-
ment of Shingon thought in relation to Mahayana philosophy. Shingon,
or specifically, "Shingon mikkyo," is the Japanese version of Tantric
Buddhism. Although Shingon had its roots in Indian Tantrism and was
colored by the Chinese Buddhist tradition, this brand of Buddhist
thought was as a distinct school of the Mahayana and
as an integral part of the' Japanese Buddhist tradition by Kiikai (A.D.
774-835) in the ninth century. In terms of its canonical sources, Shingon
owes its basic insights to two Indian texts, the Mahavairocana-sutra,
which transmits the Madhyamika system of thought, and the Tattva-
samgraha-sutra, which transmits the Yogacara-vijiianavada system of
thought. In essence, Shingon consists of a systematization of these two
doctrinal foundations of Mahayana. However, it differs from other
Mahayana traditions to the extent that it describes its doctrine through
symbolic representation, identifies Dharmakaya Mahavairocana, the
cosmic Buddha, as the embodiment of truth, and develops a new di-
mension of world order, the dharmadhatu, which in turn is also iden-
tified as Dharmakaya Mahavairocana.
72
Minoru Kiyota's monograph is a product, over the course of
many years, of serious Buddhological research into primary Shingon
sourses and is a substantial contribution to the development of Buddhist
Studies in the West. In its organization, the work consists of five sec-
tions: a historical introduction to Tantric Buddhism in the first chapter,
followed by separate chapters on Shingon doctrine and practice (chap-
ters II-V), and a concluding essay on the relation between Shingon
thought and Yogacara-vijiiiinavada Buddhism ("Epilogue"). In addition,
Kiyota has included at the end of the volume a selected bibliography of
books and articles in Japanese and English and a glossary of technical
terms. The bibliography is annotated and is a carefully chosen list of
secondary sources. Consisting largely of Japanese studies of the first
magnitude, it is extremely useful for those capable of employing con-
temporary Japanese Buddhological works on Shingon for further in-
vestigation. Readers unacquainted with Shingon jargon will also a p p r e ~
ciate the glossary attached at the end of the volume where Kiyota has
coined expressions for some 185 Shingon-related terms.
In reviewing a work of this sort, at least three strong points can
be discerned:
1. Kiyota has relied heavily on primary sources; portions of the
work contain canonical documents in excerpts translated by the author.
While it is regrettable that the author did not offer more lengthy trans-
lations, the present work is, of course, preceded by Yoshito Hakeda's
scholarly introduction to the life and thought of Kukai with a trans-
lation of his major works (Cf. Kiikai: Major Works, Columbia, 1972).
However, while this earlier study does give the English reader the first
coherent account of this school, the translations should be viewed as
background-not as an end in itself-for with Kiyota's doctrinal expo-
sition of the same primary sources, the translations become increasingly
useful and valuable. Given the current situation of a grossly inadequate
amount of intelligibly translated documents, this is not to imply that
translations of Buddhist texts are unimportant. Indeed, both works
complement each other and should be read together to gain a fuller
appreciation of Shingon thought. In light of this earlier study, Kiyota
has wisely chosen to focus in on the major aspects of Shingon theory
and practice.
2. The author has critically used secondary sources to present the
historical and religious background to Tantric Buddhism. Though he
does not go out of his way to find fault with the Japanese studies, his
treatment of their research is objective and his judgments are fair. As
evidenced by the manner in which he handles the materials, he also
shows an obvious sensitivity to historical data. The first chapter, which
examines the Indian doctrinal foundations of Tantric Buddhism, pro-
vides us with a concise treatment of the emergence of Tantric Buddhist
73
ideas during the mid-seventh century in India and a real attempt to eval-
uate the overall influence of Tantra on Buddhist thought. There is also
a valuable discussion of the organization of the two primary Shingo
n
siitras and an analysis of the geographical orgins .and transmission of
these siitras.
Chapter II ("The Shingon System of Doctrinal Classification and
Evaluation") involves a lengthy discussion of the p 'an-chiao exercise
within the context of Kiikai's thought. My only criticism of this section
is the author's discussion of the Chinese Tantric tradition, for there
is only a passing attempt to evaluate the influence of the Chinese mate-
rials on Kiikai's thought. Kiyota, however, is careful to remind us that,
while Tantric Buddhism established deep roots in Japan, it essentially
failed to sustain the interests of the Chinese. If there is any evidence of
Chinese influence, it is to be found in Kiyota's analysis ofthe p 'an-chiao
exercise which Kukai adopted from the Chinese textual tradition. In
other words, we must remind ourselves that Tantric Buddhism was un-
organized when Kukai began his investigation of the sutras and that,
while the Mahavairocana-sutra was known during the Nara period,
Kiikai's reason for going to China was to look for a commentary on
that sutra and to seek out a master of Tantric thought unavailable to
him in Japan. Thus, as Kiyota explains, "granting the fact that Shingon
is largely based upon texts of Indian composition and that its tradition
was transmitted to Japan from China, the formation of Shingon doctrine,
the systematization of Shingon as a distinct religious order, and the iden-
tification of Shingon as a distinct entity of Mahayana are attributed to
the creative efforts of KUkai." Nonetheless, one still is lead to the hope
that he will give us a study of the Chinese religious background at a
future date.
3. The most original and valuable part of the work is Kiyota's
analysis of Shingon doctrine and practice concentrated in chapters IlI-
V ("Shingon Doctrinal Concepts," "The Two M a ~ ~ a l a s , " and "The
Path to Buddhahood," respectively). In reviewing these key chapters,
it is perhaps best to summarize their major theme as I see it. The in-
terpretative principle of Kiyota is that Shingon is an existential phil-
osophy and that the crux of this system lies in an understanding of
what faith means within the Shingon context in particular and within
the Mahayana in general. Working from the perspective of the Mahayana,
his exposition of Shingon doctrine largely deals with soteriological
issues. The strength of Xiyota's research is seen in its theoretical for-
mulations and in the author's attempt to describe the Shingon view of
Mahavairocana both doctrinally and iconographically. As a school of
Mahayana, Kiyota claims that Shingon begins with the a priori view of
universal enlightement (e.g., the concept of non-duality, shinzoku [uri,
and its corollary doctrine of sokushin jobutsu) and that it emphasizes
74
wisdom as the sole vehicle to realize enlightenment. Focusing in on th
practice of compassion as the means to cultivate wisdom, Kiyota at
tempts to describe compassion as the act of implementing wisdom, or
in more practical terms, the application of religious insight on the phe
nomenal level. Thus, he claims that, in Shingon, enlightenment is nOl
the goal. Practice is. Practice, as he conceives of it, is enlightenment, or.
in more religious terms, a practice designed to realize one's inherent
Buddha-nature. In other words, Kiyota sees Shingon enlightenment as
the individual's intense awareness of his contingency to others and con-
ceives of the ultimate form of human liberation to consist of the prac-
tice of liberation. It is in this context that he identifies Shingon as an
existential philosophy. However, he goes on to say that, because
Shingon takes an a priori view of enlightenment, faith constitutes the
basic ingredient of theory and practice. Thus, he sees faith as the "un-
conditional acceptance of the proposition that the seeds of enlighten-
ment are inherent in all sentient beings," and claims that it is this kind
of faith that contributes to the Buddhist view of the awakening of man.
In these sections it is clear that the book is not written for the
novice, but for the advanced student and specialist of Sino-Japanese
Buddhism. The Western reader who has not already studied Japanese
Buddhism through either primary sources or secondary scholarly works
in Japanese is often likely to find Kiyota's discussion somewhat techni-
cal. Nevertheless, it does offer the student of Buddhism a detailed
picture of how Shingon thought can be analyzed within the broader
context of Mahayana Buddhism. In particular, the "Epilogue," which
summarizes the major doctrinal themes of the work, provides penetrat-
ing insights into Shingon from the perspective of the Y ogacara "three
svabbava theory".
In summary, by facilitating a better understanding of the religious
background and the dynamics of Shingon thought, Kiyota's work pre-
sents depth to the appreciation of Mahayana Buddhism. Although the
author touches only lightly on the religious and historical background
of Chinese Buddhism, he does show sensitivity to the many facets of
Sino-J apanese Buddhism which had created a new vision of things and
an ideal Buddhist image of man. The value of this work for the scholar-
ly study of Buddhism is seen in the fact that, behind the intricate ex-
pressions of Shingon doctrine, Kiyota shows that there isa humane
ideal that belongs to the empirical world. My only reservation about the
book is that, because the subtlety of thought involved is so focused and
expressed in an extremely terse manner, the work might be difficult for
the novice unacquainted with Buddhist terminology to follow the finer
points of his doctrinal exposition. A general introduction to the fun-
damentals of Mahayana thought coupled with an index might be ir
order. This does not detract from the value of the work as a whole, fo:
75
I feel that, to date, this small volume is the most comprehensive treat-
ment of Shingon theory and practice available in any Western language.
It is a welcome addition to the literature on Buddhism and is likely to
be the standard work on Shingon doctrine for some time. Its many-
sided information is certain to help formulate some tentative judgments
about the Sino-Japanese Buddhist tradition.
AaronK. Koseki
Mission Paul Pelliot: Choix de Documents tibetains conserves a la Bib-
liotheque Nationale, complete par quelques manuscrits de l'India Office
et du British Museum; Presentes par Ariane Macdonald et Yoshiro
Imaeda; Tome ler; Paris, Bibliotheque Nationale; 1978.
A stiff, pretective box contains photographic reproductions of
the documents chosen and a brief introductory and explanatory fasi-
cule. The documents are reproduced on the recto only of separate
sheets, numbered successively from 1-304. The choice of documents
was operated by Madame D.A. Macdonald, Madame A.-M. Blondeau
and Professor R.A. Stein. In the first instance the choice was guided by
the desire to make available for study those texts concerned with un-
known or little known aspects of Tibetan civilisation. However the im-
portance of the Chinese Ch'an dossier was also taken into account; and
Buddhologists will be grateful for the entries under Buddhism in the
brief summary of the contents of the manuscripts on p. 17-18 of the
fasicule.
In a short preface, Professor Stein situates the general importance
of these manuscripts and stresses the light they cast on the dim begin-
nings of Tibetan history and society. He sketches out the story of their
dispersion and their conservation; he renders homage to the previous
labours of Louis de La Vallee Poussin, J. Bacot, F.W. Thomas and Mar-
celle Lalou; he also tells us of his hope that the vocabulary of rare
words constituted by Marcelle Lalou will one day be published, com-
pleted by more recent research.
A list of the inventory numbers of the manuscripts reproduced in
this first volume is to be found on p. 16. Mademoiselle Marie-Rose
Seguy, ConServateur en chef it la Bibliotheque Nationale, Departement
des manuscrits, Section orientale, gives a general description of the
Tibetan collection from Tun-huang in Paris which includes over 2500
manuscripts of which 254 are bilingual or trilingual. She provides a
table of the Tibetan manuscripts containing texts, fragments or notes in
Chiense characters as catalogued in the Inventaire of Marcelle Lalou:
some of these were previously inventoried under two numbers, one
Pelliot Tibetan, one Pelliot Chinese, so this table will be of service to
76
those who wish to refer to these manuscripts. She further provides a
provisional list of the Chinese manuscripts containing texts, fragments,
or notes in Tibetan which did not find place in the same Inventaire. She
gives the inventory numbers of trilingual manuscripts containing texts,
fragments or annotations in Tibetan, Chinese and Khotanese. She lists
the bilingual or trilingual manuscripts containing texts, fragments or
annotations in Tibetan, Chinese and Yugur; and she draws attention to
55 manuscripts of the Tibetan collection which include paintings,
drawings or sketches.
Y. Imaeda and A. Macdonald explain (p. 15) how the documents
have been classified in the numerical order of M. Lalou's Inventaire
and make explicit their system of numbering folios, pages, note-books,
scrolls, etc. These two researchers have added brief but extremely use-
ful notes (p. 19-27), written in 1972, relative to fifty manuscripts of
the Pelliot Tibetan collection in Paris and two manuscripts of the India
Office, London, and providing references to pUblications and research
in progress.
As one would expect from the Imprimerie Nationale, the general
get-up of this very important publication is impeccable. There can
be no question of criticism in this short notice. We must express our
gratitude for the enormous, sustained effort to which this pUblication
bears testimony and congratulate all concerned in making more easily
accessible this priceless 'collection of materials. A difficult road for
future research has been opened. Surely some of the readers of this
Journal will negotiate it. Let us hope that Tibetans will be among them.
Alexander W. Macdonald
77
IV. NOTES AND NEWS
Presidential Address by Professor
Gadjin M.Nagao
In his presidential address delivered at the American Oriental
Society's annual meeting in 1951, Walter E. Clark of Harvard Uni-
versity discussed the prospective development of Indian Studies in
four major fields. They were:
1. The comparative study of Pali, Sanskrit, Tibetan, and
Chinese Buddhist Texts in the effort to reconstruct the history of
Buddhist thought,
2. A more detailed study of Hinduism,
3. The study of Indian history through archeology, and
4. The systematic collection of material dealing with the
practical affairs of life in medieval India.
These four areas of study anticipated by our very learned scholar
have in the succeeding years been developed even more extensively
than he might have anticipated.
Confining ourselves today to the first of the four topics, we
find that during the one generation since the time Professor Clark
made his observation, many Buddhist scholars have achieved scho-
lastic proficiency that is very impressive, to say the least. Let me
cite a few examples. There are:
1. John Brough's GiindhiiridharmapadaJ-
2. Sanskrittexte aus den Turfan{unden, published under the
supervision of E. Waldschmidt,
79
3. Franklin Edgerton's Buddhist Hybrz"d Sanskrit Grammar
and Dz"ctz'onary,
4. Copious text-editions and translations of Mahayanistic and
Abhidharmic texts by such scholars as E. Lamotte,G. Tucci, V.V.
Gokhale, and many others,
5. The rise o'f the study of Buddhist epistemological and
logical texts, led by E. Frauwallner, and
6. The recent interest in the study of Buddhist Tantric texts
pursued by many scholars, both on this continent and in Europe
and other countries.
The work accomplished by such scholars has been a landmark, but
their effort has not exhausted the field. There are still more texts
to be studied and still more difficulties to be overcome by our-
selves and the younger generation to follow us. In what direction
has the research done by former scholars been converging or
diverging? What are the desiderata of Buddhist studies today? The
present seems to be an opportune time to review the developments
in Buddhist studies and to prepare the way for the generation to
come.
In view of. the fact that Buddhist studies have now gained
recognition as an independent field in the humanities, this session
of the International Association for Buddhist Studies is a very
significant historical event. The independent status that Buddhist
studies have gained requires that the manner in which we continue
our research include at least the following two complementary
methods:
1. Analysz"s, which is utilized in the comparative study of
Pili, Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese Buddhist texts, and
2. Synthesis, which is utilized in the effort to reconstruct
the history of Buddhist thought.
By means of analysis, we will be able to establish as facts
the information gleaned from the data-be they textual, archeo-
logical, or in any other form-transmitted to us by our forerun-
ners. The Buddhist texts, which have come down to us through
various traditions and which have been found in various areas,
must be ever more critically and thoroughly analyzed, so that we
can gain the information hidden deep therein. I would even go
80
so far as to say that the best-known and best-studied texts still
await further investigation. I shall now give three examples to
illustrate this.
First, the Suttanpata, which contains perhaps the oldest
suttas of Buddhism, deserves to be re-examined in order to clarify
the earliest stages of Buddhism in relationship to the common as-
cetic background that may have been present before J ainism and
Buddhism developed their respective systems. Such an examina-
tion will shed light on the Buddhist scriptural developments that
followed as well. I believe that the outcome of such an analytical
study will take the form of fresh translations with extensive and
detailed philological commentaries in the manner in which Pro-
fessor K. R. Norman presented the Thera- and Therigatha.
Second, you may be aware that in Japan, the gigantic pro-
ject of publishing the "Sanskrit manuscripts of the Saddharma-
pw:uJarika, collected in Nepal, Kashmir and Central Asia," is
being undertaken by a team of scholars. This project is attempting
to present, for the first time, almost all of the available manu-
scripts (33 in number) of this most widely disseminated Maha-
yana siltra. The fruit of this project will not be a single critical
edition of the sutra, but will probably be a series of editions
based upon an investigation of a variety of recensions in accord-
ance with the lineage of each manuscript's tradition. The project
will probably extend itself into a comparative study between those
recensions and the Chinese and Tibetan translations. These scho-
lars are attempting to answer with the philological thoroughness
that H. Luders exemplified in his analysis of a few Central Asian
fragments of the Saddharmapundarika manuscripts fundamental
questions such as: In what languages and under what circumstan-
ces were the Mahayana sutras composed? and How did their Sans-
kritization take place?
Third, in my opinion, Asanga's Mahayanasan;graha is one of
the highest achievements attained by the Y ogacaras. In this text,
Asanga has attempted systematize all of the elements of Bud-
dhist as well as Mahayanistic. His text
is the text that expounds Buddhist philosophy, if ever there is to
be such a text. Professor E. Lamotte's research on this text is so
well known that there is no need for me to go into the details
of his work. In spite of the fact that Professor Lamotte's research
has shown signs of thoroughness and completeness, that should
81
not discourage us from re-examining the text. On the contrary,
Professor Lamotte's work should encourage us to look deeper into
the text so that we will gain a deeper understanding of the Bud-
dhist philosophy systematized therein. A close ,examination of all
the Chinese and Tibetan translations of this text and a comparison
of them with the Chinese and Tibetan commentaries, whose Sans-
krit originals have not yet been uncovered, disclose many discre-
pancies among the various renditions. These discrepancies may be
overcome by reconstructing a hypothetical Sanskrit text. We are
still in the dark as far as the historical development of the Yoga-
cara-vijnanavada texts are concerned, and therefore we must con-
tinue our study, by producing new translations of the text from
the hypothetical Sanskrit recension, if we are to come to an under-
standing of how Yogacara trends developed around the 4th to
5th centuries.,
The three examples that I have cited above will suffice to
remind us that Buddhist studies in the future will have to be
based upon a more critical and thorough-going philological analy-
sis of the Buddhist texts that have been transmitted to us through
several different traditions. In the present state of Buddhist stud-
ies, I feel that philology must precede philosophy or history, but
what is even more important is the fact that the former must not
nullify the latter.
This, then, brings us to the second method of research. Th.e
method of synthesis is necessary to bring together the facts that
we have accumulated through analysis and to reconstruct, as far
as possible, the history of Buddhist thought. This second method
of research must be emphasized because it seems to be unduly neg-
lected and almost disregarded at present. Some of you may take
exception to what I have just stated, and may argue that since we
have not yet progressed far enough in our analytical studies of
Buddhist texts, it is much too early to proceed to this second
synthetic method. That is, some of you may think that it is still
too early to attempt to reconstruct the history of Buddhist
thought. I must admit that I do not share such a view. Those who
use analytical tools without synthetic visions are just as blind as
those who possess synthetic visions but lack analytical tools.
How, then, should the history of Buddhist thought be re-
constructed in the present state of Buddhist studies? I do not
think that it will be a simple task, nor do I think that a mere ap-
82
plication of analysis will solye the problem. I will suggest six areas,
the study of which can give us some insight into how one might re-
construct the history of Buddhist thought. The six areas represent
six gaps. The process of bridging the gaps will result in combining
analytical tools with synthetic visions.
1. The gap between the Jain and the Buddhist traditions must
be bridged, because towards the end of the Vedic period, there
arose ascetic movements that intensified the meditative tendencies
found in the older Upanisads and that became the common back-
ground for the J ains and the Buddhists in developing their respec-
tive doctrinal systems. The common elements, not only of verses
and phrases, but also of vocab1.llary (e.g. asrava, bhava, karman,
etc.) found in the oldest strata of the two traditions must be col-
lected and studied anew. This, I believe, will elucidate the earlier
stages of both religions and define what those fundamental con-
cepts meant originally, as the late Professor L. Alsdorf proposed in
his Etudes jaina, etat present et taches futures.
2. The gap between the Theravada tradition and the Sarvasti-
vada and other traditions must be bridged, because as F. Weller ob-
served long ago and Professor J. Brough has reiterated, "Arbeiten
mit dem Palikanon allein sind unfriichtbar und zwecklos (studies
with the Pali canon alone are fruitless and purposeless)." We now
have important publications such as the Sanskrittexte aus den
Turfanfunden in addition to the Chinese and Tibetan translations
at our disposal. The philological comparisons between the corre-
sponding texts of different traditions as well as within a respective
tradition will undoubtedly unravel the formative process of pre-
sectarian Buddhist doctrines such as the dvadaiangapratityasamut-
pada, the paiicaskandha, the caturdhyana, the caturarupyasama-
patti, etc. By filling in this gap, the precise meanings of those al-
most impossible philosophical terms will become clearer.
3. The gap between the Madhyamika and the Vijnanavada
traditions must be bridged, because the Madhyamikas and the
Vijnanavadins were not, from the beginning, two antithetical
schools, as is usually assumed. They seem to have belonged to the
same Y ogacara movement that endeavored to incorporate into its
yogic system the Mahayanistic bodhisattvacaryas praised in such
sutras as the Prajiiiipiiramitas and others like the Dasabhiimika. In
this way, the Yogacara movement established the practical system
of the bodhisattvamarga. It is quite possible that the form of
83
Indian Buddhism that was imported into China through Chinese
translations that were done contemporaneously to the Buddhist
developments in India reflected the transitional development from
the earlier Madhyamikas to the later Vijii.anavadins. At any rate,
those contemporaneous Chinese translations must be exploited
with a critical eye, as they reflect the historical situation of Indian
Buddhism, which tended to be silent concerning anything concrete.
4. The gap between the Buddhist logical tradition and the
later Mahayanistic and Tantric traditions must be bridged, because
the great masters of Buddhist logic are often exponents of Some
form of later Mahayanistic or Tantric philosophy. The continued
efforts of scholars, based on the unified image of Buddhist activi-
ties as a whole, are now beginning to disclose the general climate
of Buddhist thought after the Gupta period.
S. The gap between Indian Buddhism and Chinese Buddhism
must be bridged, because the contemporaneous Chinese transla-
tions can assist in documenting the historical developments of
Indian Buddhism. Also, the developments that took place in China
must be understood in relationship to what was taking place in
India at that time. The importance of understanding the function
that Chinese records can play in determining the developmental
conditions in both India and China cannot be overly emphasized.
6. The gap between Indian Buddhism and Tibetan Buddhism
must be bridged because it is now impossible to make a thorough
study of Indian Buddhism without consulting the Tibetan trans-
lations, whether or not the Sanskrit originals are extant. We must
now study the enormous amount of Indian Buddhist texts that the
Tibetans have preserved in translations and also investigate the
manner in which the Tibetan translators understood these texts.
Moreover, an investigation into how the Tibetans developed their
own indigenous Tibetan Lamaism through fusion with their native
religious tradition must be made. The flood of Tibetan religious
texts, both canonical and extra-canonical, published in India and
other countries, will facilitate in clarifying the basic historical
events that took place in the development of Tibetan Buddhism
and in distinguishing Indian elements from those Tibetan elements
that constitute Tibetan Lamaism.
In conclusion, one of the directions that Buddhist studies
as an independent area of the humanities might take in the future
is to bridge the gaps that I have outlined above. Those topics
84
were selected because we scholars should not uncritI'call """ 'ent
. .. y aCC'r _
VIews of BuddhIst hIstory that are based on misconceptions, sheb.
as the view that the Hinayana and Mahayana are two antagonistic
movements, the former being inferior to the latter, and that the
Madhyamikas and Vijnanavadins are two antithetical schools, the
one propounding "non-being" and the other "being." By empha-
sizing the importance of philological studies, I am not deploring
the scarcity of philologically reliable works being done in our dis-
ciplIne. On the contrary, I welcome the recent trends that show an
increasing number of Buddhist scholars publishing very reliable
philological works, both in the West and in the East.
Report on the Proceedings of the First Con-
ference of the LA.B.S., Columbia University,
New York, September 15-17,1978
1. The International Association of Buddhist Studies, founded in
August, 1976 at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and duly incor-
porated in 1977, met for its First Conference at the Columbia Universi-
ty in New York from September 15th to the 17th, 1978. The organiz-
ing committee consisted of Professor Alex Wayman (Coordinator),
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Buddhist Studies, Colum-
bia University; Professor Theodore Riccardi, Jr., Director, NDEA Cen-
ter for South Asia Studies, Columbia University; and Professor A.K. Na-
rain, Professor of History and South Asian Studies, University of Wis-
consin-Madison and the General Secretary of the LA.RS .. The con-
ference was held on the 15th floor in the School of International Af-
fairs Building, at the Columbia University. Attendance at the panels
varied between 70 and 125 persons. The business meeting on the 16th
of September was attended by 48 members. Many of the participants
were housed in the New York Student Center of the Hotel Empire
(across from the Lincoln Center), and some made private arrangements
elsewhere and with friends. Necessary local expenses for the organiza-
85
tion of the Conference were met by funds of the NDEA Center for
South Asia Studies, Columbia University.
II. Professor Gadjin M. Nagao was the General President of the Con-
ference. Professor Theodore deBary, Vice-President and ProY-ost, Col-
umbia University, delivered the welcoming address at the opening
session on September 15th at 9.:00 A.M .. Papers were grouped in eight
panels as listed below:
1. Buddhism in Contemporary Context (Chairperson: Professor
Fredric Underwood)
2. Buddhism in General India Context (Chairperson: Professor
Theodore Riccardi, Jr.)
3. Pali Buddhism (Chairperson: Professor M.W. Padmasiri de
Silva)
4. History of Mahayana (Chairperson: Professor Philip Yampol-
ski)
5. Buddhist Tantras (Chairperson: Professor Alex Wayman)
6. Buddhist Art and Archaeology (Chairperson: Professor A.K.
Narain)
7. Buddhist Logic (Chairperson: Professor Alex Wayman)
8. Mahayana Doctrine (Chairperson: Professor Yoshito Hakeda)
_ The following persons, whose names are given below in alphabetical
order, read papers:
J.G. Arapura: "Reason and Transcendance in Mlidhyamika and
Vedlinta"
Harvey B. Aronson: "Immeasurable (appamaiiiia)"
A.L. Basham: "On SaIp.bodhi"
Daniel Bassuk: "Aldous Huxley's Understanding of Buddhism"
Raoul Birnbaum: "Some Underlying Principles of Early Bud-
dhist Wall-Painting in China"
George D. Bond: "The Paradox of Death in Theravada Buddhism"
Martha L. Carter: "Problems of Cosmological Buddha Iniages in
Central Asia and China"
Douglas D. Daye: "Falsifiability and Darsana Relevance in 6th
Century Buddhist Logic"
tion"
Thomas Dowling: "Indra Among the Buddhists"
George Elder: "Body in Tantric Buddhism"
Walter A. Frank: "Buddhism: Ethics for a Modern World?"
Ashok K. Gangadean: "The Nature of Nliglirjuna's Dialectic"
B.G. Gokhale: "Similes in the Plili Nikayas"
Luis o. Gomez: "Tun Huang Fragments on Amanasiklira"
Yoshito Hakeda: "Subhakarasimha's Esoteric Buddhist Medita-
*Helmut Hoffmann: "The First Section of the Buddhist Pilgrim's
Itinerary to Shambhala fl'Om the Indus Valley to the Crossings of the
Oxus"
86
87
Sechin Jagchid: "The Mongol Khans, Chinese Buddhism, and
Taoism"
Yun-hua Jan: "Confrontation between Ch'an Monks and Tibetan
Priests in Yuan China"
T. James Kodera: "Nichiren (1222-1282) and his Nationalistic
Eschatology"
* Aaron Koseke: "Chi-Tsang's Sheng-man pao-ku: Buddha-nature
and non-duality"
Lewis Lancaster: "Some Principles of Text Editing"
Jacques Maquet: "Contemporary Theravada Meditation - Ongoing
Research"
Esho Mikogami: "Some Remarks on the Concepts of arthakriyii"
Gadjin M. Nagao: "From the Madhyamika to the Yogadira Philo-
sophy"
Sung-bae Park: "Wonhyo's Contribution to Buddhist Thought in
Korea"
Howard Parsons: "Buddhism and Marxism: Compatabilities and
Divergences"
Julia Meech Pekarik: "The Flying White Horse"
D. Prithipaul: "Buddhist Themes in the Art of Richard Wagner"
Mokusen Miyuki: "A Jungian Approach to the Ideational Con-
tent of the Buddha's Enlightenment"
Ismael Quiles: "Nirvana and Metaphysical Experience"
James B. Robinson: "The Concept of Divinity in the Indian
Mahayana"
*D. Seyford Ruegg: "The Theory of Buddha-nature in Buddhist
Thought"
N.H. Samtani: "Mahayanic Elements in Thai Buddhism"
*Jagdish Sharma: "Buddhist and Jaina Yaksas"
Chang Sheng-yen: "The Layman Buddhism of Late Ming Dynasty"
*Upasak Chandrika Singh: "Buddhist Symbols on Indo-Greek
Coins"
*William Stablein: "A Bibliography of the Mahakalatantra"
Robert Thurman: "Buddhism and Individualism in Indian Art
and Society"
Taitetsu Unno: "Dependent Origination in Hua-yen Thought"
*Whalen Wai-Lai: "History and Prophecy in Mahayana: Sena
Giro (1889-1961)"
Ven Shig Hui Wan: "Prajnaparamita Thought and Chinese Ch'an
Leonard Zwilling: "The Tibetan Translation of Pramiinaviirttika
III, 3"
About another half a dozen papers received could not be read in the
absence of their authors. Seven listed above marked * could not be:;
present to read their papers.
III. The Business meeting of the general body of the LA.B.S. was held
on the 16th of September a ~ 1:00 P.M .. Professor G. Nagao, the Gener-
al President of the First Conference, and Professor A.L. Basham, who
succeeded Professor Nagao as the Chairperson of the Board ,of Direc-
tors and the Executive Committee, presided over the meeting. Professor
A.K. Narain, the General Secretary, first reported that he had received
messages of greetings and good wishes for the success of the Conference
from Professors Tucci, Bapat, Conze, Kenneth C. Chen, Waldschmidt,'
Demieville, Nakamura, Wijesekera, and others including H.E. the Am-
bassador of Sri Lanka in the U.S.A., Prosessor Karunaratne. He then
read a report on the activities of the I.A.B.S. and made a plea for in-
creasing membership. In the absence of the Treasurer, Dr. Beatrice
Miller, he read as below the consolidated statement of accounts of the
LA.B.S. up to September 11, 1978:
I. Membership
Membership Receipts: 1976177 1978
Full ($15.00) 68 90
Associate ($10.00) 06 05
Student ($5.00) 19 15
93 110
The number of members given above includes:
Founder Members
Life Members
Institutional
Total:
88
20
04
06
II. Income (dues)
1976 $2735.00
1977 $1705.00
1978 $2826.67
$7266.67
1979
04
01
05
III. Income (other)
Interest $50.50 (Bus Acct.)
1977 $68.41
1977 $24.92
9/11/78 $66.10
9/11178 $24.18
;T.,::.ot==al=..z,....<:9.!.../:..;11::..:./-'-7.=.8 _____ $2 34. U.
Total Income, 9/11/78 $7500.78
Note: This statement also includes two uncollected items:
J oumal Advertisements $200.00 (unpaid)
Balance 2 Found. Mem. $240.00
IV. Expenditures
Incorporation $570.10
V.LE.O.A. $50.00
Office supplies $89.75
Postage, telephone $458.49
Printing (brochures,
stationary, etc.) $172.20
Exchange $14.77
Total $1355.31
BALANCE AS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 1978: $6145.47
89
Following are the decisions ofthe Business Meeting:
1. The General Secretary informed the members that since the
fiscal year of the LA.B.S. is the calendar year, a duly audited statement
of the LA.B.S. accounts would be made by the Treasurer afte.r the end
of the year 1978. But since this was the first formal Conference of the
LA. B.S., she had prepared a consolidated statement for the information
of the members. The statement as given above was approved at the
Business Meeting. .
2. The Meeting was also informed of the various actions taken by
the General Secretary after the foundation of the LA.B.S. and before
the First Conference meeting at Columbia University, and they were
approved.
3. Professor AL. Basham was elected Chairperson of the Execu-
tive Committee in the vacancy caused by Professor G. Nagao, for the
residue of the latter's term.
4. Professors A. Bareau (France), and H. Nakamura (Japan), were
elected as Vice-Chairpersons in place of Professors A.L. Basham and
L. Ligeti.
5. The following were elected Honorary Felfowsof the LAB.S.:
Sir Harold W. Bailey (U.K.), Professor Louis Ligeti (Hungary), Professor
N. Poppe (U.S.A.), Dr. Sh5son Miyamoto (Japan), V.V. Gokhale
(India), Professor O.H. de Wijesekera (Sri Lanka).
6. The Meeting put on record their satisfaction at the publication
of the First issue of the Journal of the LA.B.S., and the Editorial team
was congratulated for their work.
7. Some names for Editorial Advisory Board were suggested. The
Editor-in-Chief was authorized to add some of the names if he thought
necessary.
8. The General Secretary informed the Meeting that some of the
members of the Executive had declined to continue for various reasons
and he was authorized to nominate replacements. Nominations already
made were approved.
9. The problem of membership from some of the Asian countries
on account of their economy and foreign exchange difficulties was dis-
cussed and it was decided to have a special rate of $5.00 for all mem-
bers from India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma,
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia, and
from such other countries- having similar problems, and to make at-
tempts to subsidize the balance of $10.00 for each such member by
raising it from other sources, private and public.
10. The General Secretary reported that the LA.B.S. has been
affitiated with the International Union for Oriental and Asian Studies
(U.l.E.O.A) and had thus made an application to the U.N.E.S.C.O.
90
through the LC.P.H.S. for financial support" for the 2nd Conference to
be held in Asia. This was approved.
11. The General Secretary then reported the communication
from the Secretary of the International Association of History of
Religions (LA.H.R.)" for the affiliation of the LA.B.S. with the LA.H.R ..
The matter was discussed and it was approved, subject to the condition
that it did not affect the LA.B.S. finances adversely.
12. Requests from Institutions to establish exchange relations
between periodicals issued by them and the LA.B.S. were discussed,
and it was resolved not to enter into such relationships for the time
being, as the LA.B.S. had no library and storage facilities of its own.
13. The General Secretary and Editor-in-Chief was authorized
to use 50 copies of the Journal as complimentary copies for individual
scholars, libraries, and Institutions. In addition, he was also authorized
to use whatever number of sample and review copies he thought neces-
sary for publicity and for raising funds and Institutional and Library
subscriptions.
14. It was resolved that the LA.B.S. take steps to investigate all
possibilities of support for the continuation of the Bibliograpbique
Bouddbique.
15. The General Secretary reported his negotiations for holding
the 2nd Conference of the LA.B.S. in Asia and mentioned the progress
he had made, and the possibilities. He was authorized to pursue the
matter and decide on the venue.
16. It was also decided that if the 2nd Conference would be held
in India or Sri Lanka the General President for the Conference should
be from the host country, and some names were suggested. The General
Secretary was authorized to consult with them and request their
acceptance.
17. The Meeting expressed thanks to the Columbia University
and particularly to Professors Alex Wayman and Theodore Riccardi
of the South Asia Center for theirinvitation to hold the 1st Conference
of the LA.B.S., and for their hospitality and nice arrangements. A
vote of thanks to them and their team was put on record.
18. The Meeting ended after a vote of thanks to the, President,
the Chairperson, the General Secretary and the Treasurer for their
work.
91
List of Members of I.A.B.S.
Abbreviations: (F)- Founder; (L)- Life; (1)- Institutional; (S)-
Student; (H)- Honorary Fellow; unmarked- Regular Full
Member
Arapura, Prof. J. G., Dept. of Religious Studies, McMaster Uni-
versity, Hamilton, Ontario L8S 4Kl, CANADA
Aronson, Prof. Harvey B., Dept. of Religious Studies, Cocke Hall,
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22903
Bahm, Prof. Em. Archie J., Dept. of Philosophy, University of
New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131
Bailey, Sir Harold, (H) Queens College, Cambridge CB3 9ET,
ENGLAND
Bajpai, Prof. Shiva G., Dept. of History, California State Univ.,
Northridge, CA
Baker, Richard D., 300 Page Street, San Francisco, CA 94102
Bapat, Prof. P.B. (H), Svlidhyliya, 772 Shivajinagar, Poona 4,
INDIA
Bardisban," John F. (A), 23447 Riverside Drive, Southfield, MI
48034
Bareau, Prof. Andre (F), College de France, 15 bd. Colbert,
92330 Sceaux, FRANCE
Basham, Prof. A.L. (F), Prof. & Head ofthe dept. of Asian Civiliza-
tions, Australian National University, Box 4, P.O., Can-
berra, A.C.T. 2600, AUSTRALIA
Bassuk, A. Prof. Daniel E. (A), Dept. of Religion, University of
South Florida, Tampa, FL 33620
Beane, Prof. Wendell C., 337 Graham St., Highland Park, NJ 08904
Bechert, Dr. Heinz, Seminar Fuer Indologie Und Buddhismus-
kunde, Der Universitaet Goettingen, Hainbundstrasse 21,
D-34 Goettingen, F.O.G.
"Bement, Michale B (S), 643 E.Johnson St., Apt. No. 12,Madison,
WI53703
Berry, Stephen Gerard (S), 474 West 238th St. Apt. 2F, Bronx,
NY 10463
Berry, Thomas 5801 Palisade Ave., Riverdale, NY 10471
Beyer, Prof. Stephan, 1230 Van Hise Hall, University of Wiscon-
sin, Madison, WI 53706
92
Bielefeldt, Carl, Dept. of Religious Studies, University of Virginia,
Charlottesville, VA 22903
Birnbaum, Prof. Raoul, 10 Park Ave., New York, NY 10016
Blackwell, Prof. Fritz, Dept. of Foreign Languages & Literatures,
Washington State University, Pullman, WA 99164
Bloom, Prof. Alfred, Dept. of Religion, 2560 Campus, University
of Hawaii, Honolulu, HI 96882
Bond, Prof. George D., Dept. of Religions, Northwestern Univer-
sity, 1940 Sheridan Rd., Evanston, IL 60201
Bongard-Levin, Prof. G. M., Armyanskiy Per 2, Instut Vosdoko-
ved, AN SSSR, Moscow, USSR
Boyd, A. Prof. James W. (A), Department of Philosophy, Colora-
do State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523
Braue, Prof. Donald Allen, 2564 Boyd Avenue, Fort Worth, TX
76109
Brown, William 1. (S), 1012 E. Dayton St. Apt. 4, Madison, WI
53703
Bruce, Prof. Robert, 510 Hillside Avenue, Prescott, AZ 86301
Buck, Harry M., Coordinator, Humanities, Wilson College, 1053
Wilson Ave., Chambersburg, PA 17201
Bull, Joanna (S), 20285 Croyden Lane, Topanga, CA 90290
Busick, Bonnie S., 223 W. Dutton, Kalamazoo, MI 49006
Cairns, Grace E., 2940 Tipperary Drive, Tallahassee, FL 32308
Carter, Prof. John Ross, Dept. of Philosophy and Religion,
Chapel House, Colgate Universtiy, Hamilton, NY 13346
Carter, Martha Limbach, 325 Lakewood Blvd., Madison, WI
53704
Chan-ngarm, Saeng, Faculty of Humanities, Chiang Mai Uni-
versity, Chiang Mai, THAILAND
. Chandra, Dr. Lokesh, Intl. Acac. of Indian Cul., J22 Hauzkhas
Enclave, New Delhi 16, INDIA
Chang, Prof. Chi-chlin, 3, Lane 5, Ching-Tien St., Taipei, Taiwan,
REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Chang, Prof. Rev. Sheng-yen (F), The Buddhist Association of the
U.S., 3070 Albany Crescent, W. 231st St., Bronx, NY 10463
Chang, Shong Te, No.8 4F Bldg. 65, Sheeng Hi Dist., Wai Shung
Hi, Taipei, TAIWAN
Chappell, Prof. David W., Dept. of Religion, University of Hawaii,
344 George Hall, Honolulu, HI 06822
Ch'en, Prof. Kenneth (H), Dept. of Oriental Languages, UCLA,
Los Angeles, CA 90024
Coburn, A. Prof. Thomas B.(A), Dept. of Religious Studies, St
Lawrence University, Canton, NY 13617
93
Colucci, Donald John (S), 316 H.B. Crouse Hall, Syracuse Univer-
sity, Syarcuse,NY 13210
Conze, Prof. Edward (H), Foxwell, Marston Road, Sherbourne,
Dorset, DT9 4BN ENGLAND
Corbin, Prof. Harry F. Box 73, Wichita State University, Wichita,
KS 67208
Corless, Prof. Roger, 2466 Hilgard Ave., Apt. 201, Berkeley, CA
94709
Crispin, Rena (S), 100 Craig Ave., Madison, WI 53705
Dani, Prof. A.H., Dean, School of Social Science, Post Box No.
1090, University of Islamabad, Islamabad, PAKISTAN
Dargyay, Dr. Eva K., Karl-Witthalm-Str. 11, D-8000 Munich 70,
F.R.G.
Day, Prof. Terence P., Department of Religion, University of
Manitoba, Winnipeg R3T 2N2, Manitoba, CANADA
Daye, Prof. Douglas, Dept. of Philosophy, Bowling Green Univ.,
Bowling Green, OH 43403
DeBary, Prof. William Theodore, 205 Low Library, Columbia
University, New York, NY 10027
. Dell, David J., South Asia Institute, Columbia Univ., New York,
NY 10024
Demieville, Prof. Paul (H), 234 Boulevard Raspail, 75014 Paris,
FRANCE
Diskul, Prof. M.C. Subhadradis (F), Faculty of Archaeology, Sil-
pakorn University, Bangkok, THAILAND
Dills, Barbara P. (S), 1337 Jenifer St., Madison, WI 53703
Dornish, Margaret Hammond, Assoc. Prof., Dept. of Religion,
Pomona College, Claremont, CA 91711
Dowling, Prof. Thomas L., 140 Cadman Plaza West ll-K, Brook-
lyn, NY 11201
Dragonetti, Prof. Carmen, Centro de Filosoficas,
C.I.F., Minones :w73, 1428 Buenos AIres, ARGENTINA
Dresden, Prof. Em. Mark J., 380 E. Rose Tree Road, Media, PA
19063
Dumoulin, Prof. Em. Heinrich, Sophia University, 7 Kioicho,
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, JAPAN
Elder, A. Prof. George R., 828 West End Ave., 11-F, New York,
NY 10025
Fenner, Edward Todd (S), Dept. of South Asian Studies, Univ. of
Wisc., Madison, WI 53706
Ferro, Nancy (S), Route 2, Box 51, Muscoda, WI 53573
Florida, A. Prof. Robert Edwin, Dept. of Religion, Brandon Univ.,
Brandon, Manitoba, CANADA R7A 6A9
94
Frank, Dr., Walter A., Universtiy of Bonn, SeIPinar for Central
Asia, Mavia Paci's Weg T, D 5300 Bonn, F.R.G.
Gangadean, Asttok K., Gest Center, Haverford College, Haver-
ford, PA 19041
Gard, Dr. Richard A., Director of Institute Services The Institute
for Advanced Studies of World Religions, M e l ~ i l l e Memorial
Library, S.U.N.Y. at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY 11794
Gelfman, Wayne (S), 15-8 Inamuragasaki, I-Chome, Apt. 2B,
Kanakura-shi, 248TE, JAPAN
Gimello, Prof. Robert M., Dept. of Religious Studies, Univ. of
California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106
Gokhale, B.G. (F), Asian Studies Program, Wake Forest Univer-
sity, Box 7547, Winston-Salem, NC 27109
Gokhale, Prof. V. V. (H), 39/1415 Prabhat Rd., Poona 5 Maha- .
rashtra, INDIA
Gombrich, Prof. Richard (F&L), The Oriential Institute, The Uni-
versity of Oxford, Pusey Lane, Oxford OX1 2LE, ENGLAND
Gomez, Prof. Luis, Dept. of Far Eastern Languages and Litera-
tures, Frieze Bldg., The Universtiy of Michigan, Ann Arbor,
MI48104
Graham, Prof. Thomas, Dept. of Religious Studies, University of
Winnipeg, Winnipeg, Manitoba, R3B ZE9, CANADA
Granoff, A. Prof. Phyllis E., Dept. of Religious Studies, McMaster
University, Hamilton, OntariCjl,.L8S 4K1, CANADA
Grosjean, Mia Emlen, 123 East 75th St. New York, NY 10021
Haines, Ms. Judy F., 290 Potter Place, Weehawken, NJ 07087
Hakeda, Dr. Yoshito, 408 Kent, Columbia University, New York,
NY 10027
Hamilton, James Patrick (S), 5800-10 Bjelde, Monona, WI 53716
Han, Prof. Ki Doo, Won Kwang University, Iri City, Chollapuk-do
510-11, REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Hanson, Mervin V. (S), Dept. of Religious Studies, University of
British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, CANADA
Hanson-Barber, A.W., 544 W. Wilson St.,Madison, WI 53703
Harris, Collett C., c/o Benjamin G. Cox, 914 South Center St.,
Terre Haute, IN 47807
Harrison, Paul Maxwell (S), Dept. of South Asian and Buddhist
Studies, Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National Uni-
versity, P.O. Box 4, Canberra, A.C.T. 2600, AUSTRA-
LIA
Heine, Steven (S), 335 S. 18th St., Philadelphia, PA 19103
Hejib, Alaka Vasant, Faculty of Religious Studies, MCGlli Univer-
sity, 3520 University St., Montreal, Quebec, H2X 1W4,
CANADA
95
Hoffmann, Prof. Helmut, Dept. of Uralic and Altaic Studies,
Goodbody Hall, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN
47401
Hopkins, Prof. Jeffrey, Dept. of Religious Studies, Cocke Hall,
Univ. of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22903
Horner, LB. (H), 62 South Lodge, Circus Road, London NW8
9ET, ENGLAND
Hurvitz, Prof. Leon (F), The Univ. of British Columbia, 2075
Wesbrook PI., Vancouver, British Columbia, V6T 1 W5,
CANADA
Inagaki, Hisao, 83 Leeside Crescent, London, NWll OJL,
ENGLAND
Inokuchi, Taijun, Shinfuyacho-Sanjo, Kyoto, 606, JAPAN
Ishii, Prof. Yoneo, The Center for Southeast Asian Studies,
Kyoto University, 46, Shimoadachi-cho, Yoshida, Sakyo-ku,
Kyoto 606, JAPAN
Jackson, Prof. Herbert C., Dept. of Religious Studies, Michigan
State Univ., East Lansing, Michigan, 48842
Jacobson, Prof. Em. Nolan P., 1612 Clarendon PI., Rock Hill, SC
29730
Jagchid, Prof. Sechin, Dept. of History, 230MRSB, Brigham
Young University, Provo, Utah 84602
Jaini, Prof. Padmanabh S., Dept. of S & SE Asian Studies, U. of
Cal., Berkeley, CA 94720
Jamspal, Lozang (A), Lamaist Buddhist Monastery of America,
Box 306 A RD 1, Washington, NJ 07882
Jan, Prof. Yun-hua (F), Dept. of Religious Studies, McMaster
University, 1280 Main St. West, Hamilton, Ontario L8S
4K1, CANADA
Kajiyama, Prof. Yuichi (F), Dept. of Buddhist Studies, Kyoto
Univ., Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606, JAPAN
Kanda, A. Prof. Shigeo H., Dept. of Religious Studies, California
State University, Chico, CA 95926
Kang, Kun Ki (S), 340 E. 34th St. No. 9H, New York, NY 10016
Katz, Nathan, Dept. of Religion, Temple University, Philadelphia,
PA 19122
Kawamura, Leslie S., Religious Studies, The University of Calgary,
2920-24th Ave. N.W., Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4, CANADA
Keel, Dr. Hee-sung, Dept. of Religion, St. Olaf College, Northfield,
MN 55057
Keyes, Prof. Charles F., Dept. of Anthropology, Univ. of Wash-
ington, Seattle, WA 98195
Keyt, Christine Mullikin, 12032 36th Ave. N.E., Seattle, WA
98125
96
Ki Doo, Prof. Han, Won-Kwang University, Iry City, Cholla
Pukdo 510-11, REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Kim, Hee-Jin, Dept. of Religious Studies, Univ. of Oregon,
Eugene, OR 97403
King, Sallie Behn (S), 2818 Sommers Ave., Madison, Wi 53704
King, Prof. Winston L., 518 Caldy Place, Madison, WI 53711
Kirk, Prof. James A., Dept. of Religious Studies, The Univ. of
Denver, Denver, CO 80208
Kirtz, William D. (S), 104F Eagle Heights, Madison, WI 53705
Kitagawa, Dean Joseph M., Office of the Dean, The Divinity
School, The Univ. of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637
Kiyota, Prof. Minoru (F), Dept. of South Asian Studies, 1242
Van Hise Hall, Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706
Kodera, A. Prof. Takashi J., Dept. of Religion, Wellesley College,
Wellesley, MA 02181
Kohn, Richard Jay (S), 916 E. Gorham St., Madison, WI 53703
Krishan, Y.C., 11/55 Dr. Zakir Hussain Marg, Bapa Nagar, New
Delhi 110003, INDIA
Ku, Cheng-mei (Kathy) (S), 505-D Eagle Hts., Madison, WI 53705
Kiiloy, Hallvard, K. (F), UNICEF, Box No. 1187, Kathmandu,
NEPAL
Kurtze, Susan S. (S), Box 610, 3600 Chestnut St., Philadelphia,
PA 19104
Kvaerne, Prof. Per, Religionshistorisk Institutt, Postboks 1010,
Blindern, Oslo 3, NORWAY
Lamotte, Prof. Etienne (H), Place du Roi Vainquer 15-Bte. 10,
B- 1040 Bruxelles, BELGIUM
Lancaster, Prof. Lewis, Dept. of Oriental Lang., The U. of Calif.,
Berkeley, CA 94720
Lang, Karen Christina (S), 4059 8th Ave. NE No. B, Seattle, WA
98105
Langbauer, Prof. Delmar, Dept. of Religion, University of Puget
Sound, Tacoma, WA 98416
Lange, Prof. Emil F., Dept. of Religion & Culture, Wilfrid Laurier
Univ., Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3C5, CANADA
Lee, Dr. Cyrus, Dept. of Philosophy, Chinese Culture College,
Yang Ming Shan, Taipei, TAIWAN
Lethcoe, Nancy R., 4952 Morland, R.R. No.1, Victoria, B.C
V8X 3X2, CANADA
Lewis, Todd (S), Box 88 Hollow Rd., Skillman, N.J. 08558
Ligeti, Prof. Louis (H), V. Belgrad rakp. 26, 1056 Budapest,
HUNGARY
Likhitanontl, Dr. Likhit, Faculty of Humanities, Chiang Mai
Univ., Chiang Mai, THAILAND
97
Ling, Prof. Trevor O. (F), Dept. of Comparative Religion, The
University, Manchester.M13 9PL, ENGLAND
Locke, John K., St Xavier's School, G.P.O. Box 50, Kathmandu,
NEPAL
Macy, Joanna Rogers (A), 3508 Lowell St. N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20016
Macdonald, Prof. A.W. (F), L.A No. 140 du C.N.R.S., Faculte des
Lettres Universite de Paris X, 92001 Nanterre, FRANCE
Maquet, Prof. Jacques (F), Dept. of Anthropology, Univ. of Cali-
fornia, Los An&.eles, Los CA 90024
Marchand, Deborah Lynn (S), 5210 Hedden Circle, Middleton, WI
53562
Martin, Prof. Richard B., Area Collections Dept., Univ. of Virgin-
ia Library, Charlottesville, VA 22901
Martinson, Paul V., 2303 Doswell Ave. St. Paul, MN55108
Matsumura, Hisashi (S), Dept. of South Asian & Buddhist Studies,
Faculty of Asian Studies, The Australian National Univ.,
P.O. Box 4, Canberra, AC.T. 2600, AUSTRALIA
Maxwell, Dr. Natalie, Box 125, 1, Port Murray, NJ 07865
May, Prof. Jaques, 68 Ave. de Rumine, Ch. 1005 Lausanne,

Mayer, Prof. John R.A, Dept. of Philosophy, Brock Univ., St.
Catharines, Ontario, CANADA
McClung, Prof. Larry, Dept. of Religion, Moravian College, Beth-
lehem, PA 18018
McGinty, Prof. Park, Dept. of Religious Studies, 324A Maginnes
Hall No.9, Lehigh Univ. Bethlehem, PA 18015
McMullin Neil F., 157 Shelbourrte Rd., Rochester, NY 14620
Meadows, Carol Jean, 276 Riverside Dr. New York, NY 10025
Melzer, Philip, 4000 Thornapple St., Chevy Chase, MD 20015
Mendelson, Dr. Edward Michael, 96A New St., New Hope, PA
18958
Mikogami, Esho, c/o Dept. of Buddhist Studies, Ryukou Univ.,
Shichijo Omiya, Kyoto 600, JAPAN
Miller, Dr. Robert J. and Dr. Beatrice, 1227 Sweet Briar Rd.,
Madison, WI 53705
Miller, Stephen, 145 E. 15th St., Apt. No.4-V, New York, NY
10003
Miyuki, A. Prof. Mokusen, 1508 Westmoreland Dr., Montebello,
CA 90640
Morgalla, Janina W. (S), 906 S. Brooks St., Madison, WI 537 5
Morgan, Prof. Kenneth W., 52 Henry Ave., Princeton, NJ 08540
Muck, Terry C., Dept. of Religions, Northwestern Univ., 1940
Sheridan Rd., Evanston, IL 60201
98
NiJ.gao, Prof. Gadjin M.(L & F), 1 Sennyuji-sannai, Higashiyama,
Kyoto 605, JAPAN
Nakamura, Prof. Hajime, The Eastern Institute, Meiko Building,
Soto-kanda 2-12-4, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, JAPAN
Narain, Prof. A. K. "(F&L), 1242 Van Hise Hall, Univ. ofWiscon-
sin, Madison, WI 53706
Nattier, Janice J. (S), 15 Pleasant Ave., Somerville, MA 02143
Nielsen, Prof. Niels C. Jr.! Rice Univ., Dept. of Religious Studies,
Houston, TX 77001
Norman, Prof. Kenneth Roy (F), Faculty of Oriental Studies,
Sidgwich Ave., Cambridge CB3 9DA, ENGLAND
O'Hanlon, Prof. Daniel John, The "Jesuit School of Theology at
Berkeley, 1735 Le Roy Ave., Berkeley, CA 94709
Palmer, Prof. Spencer J., 156 JSB Religious Studies Center,
Brigham Young Univ., Proveo, UT 84602
Park, A. Prof. Sung-Bae, Program in Religious Studies, 105 Old
Physics, State University of New York, Stony Brook NY
11794
Parsons, Prof. Howard L., Dept. of Philosophy, Univ. of Bridgport,
Bridgeport, CT 06602
Paul, Prof. Diana, Dept. of Religious Studies, Stanford Univ.,
Stanford, CA 94305
Pauly, Else (L&F), Byskellet 8, DK 2960 Rungsted Kyst, DAN-
MARK
Penkower, Linda L. (S), 535 W. 110 St. No. 14F, New York, NY
10025
Pilgrim, Richard B. (A), Dept. of Religion, 316 H.B.C., Syracuse
Univ., Syracuse, NY 13210
Poppe, Prof. Nicholas (H), 3220 NE 80th St. Seattle, WA 98115
Potter, Prof. Karl H., Dept. of Philosophy, Univ. of Washington,
Seattle, WA 98195
Prebish, Prof. Charles S., Dept. of Religious Studies, Pennsylvania
State Univ. 1001 Liberal Arts Tower, University Park, PA
16802
Prithipaul, A. Prof. K. Dad, Dept. of Religious StUdies, The Univ.
of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, T6G 2E6, CANADA
Quiles, Dr. Ismael, Universidad del Salvador, Callao 542, Buenos
Aires, ARGENTINA
Raducha, Joan A. (S), 610H Eagle Heights, Madison, WI 53705
Rao, M. Rajagopala (A), Dept. of Philosophy, Gettysburg College,
Gettysburg, PA 17325
Rasmussen Douglas James, 6101 Eagle Heights, Univ. of Wiscon-
sin, Madison, WI 53705
99
Ratnayaka, Prof. Shanta, Dept. of Philosophy and Religion, Uni-
versity of Georgia, Athens, Georgia 30602
Ray, Prof. Reginald Alden, Naropa Institute, 1111 Pearl St.,
Boulder, CO 80302
Riccardi, Jr., Prof. Theodore (F), Dept of Middle East Languages
& Cultures, Columbia University, 624 Kent Hall, New
York, NY 10027
Robinson, Hannah G., Institute for Advanced Studies of World
Religions, 5001 Main Library, S.U.N.Y. at Stony Brook,
Stony Brook, NY 11789
Robinson, Prof. James B., Dept of Philosophy and Religion, Univ.
of N. Iowa, Cedar Falls, IA 50613
Roth, Prof. Gustav, Seminar fuer Indologie und Buddhismuskunde,
Hainbundstrasse 21, 3400 Goettingen, FEDERAL RE-
PUBLIC OF GERMANY
Ruegg, Prof. D. Seyfort, Dept. of Asian Languages and Literature,
Gowen Hall DO-2l, Univ. of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195
Samtani, Prof. N.H., Buddha Kuti, Banaras Hindu Univ., Varana-
si-5 (U.P.), INDIA
Santucci, A. Prof. James A., Dept. of Linguistics & Religious
Studies, California State Univ., 1800 North State College
Boulevard, Fullerton, CA 92634
Sarkar, A. Prof. Kalyan K., pept. of Asian Studies, Univ. of Wind-
sor, Windsor, Ontario N9B 3P4, CANADA
Schopen, Gregory (S), c/o Dr. V. C. Thorpe, 106 S. Sumner St.,
New Castle WY 82701
Schuster, Prof. Nancy, Dept. of Religion, Wesleyan Univ., Middle-
town, CT 06457
Shafer, Prof. Robert Lloyd, Dept. of English, Western Michigan
Univ., Kalamazoo, MI 49008
Sharma, Arvind, Lecturer, Studies in Religion, Universicj of
Queensland, Brisbane, 4067, AUSTRALIA
Sharpe, Patricia L. (S), 5728 S. Slackstone St. Apt. 103, Chicago,
IL 60637
Sherburne, A. Prof. Richard, Loyola Hall, Seattle Univ., Seattle,
WA 98122
Shig, Prof. Hiu-Wan, Prajiia-dhyana. Sangharama, No. 22., Lane
110, 2Sec., Yang-te Rd., 111 shih-Lin, Taipei, Taiwan, RE-
PUBLIC OF CHINA
Shimomisse, Prof. Eiichi, Dept. of Philosophy, California State
University, Dominquez Hills, Carson, CA 90747
Smith, Prof. Bardwell, (L&F), Asian Studies Program, Carleton
College, Northfield, MN 55057
100
Smith, Bill (S), Box 912, Sta. 2, Amherst College, Amherst, MA
01002
Snyder, Jeanette Marie, c/o Midori Snyder, Apt. M, 405 N.
Francis, Madison, WI 53703
Sopa, Geshe Lhundup (F), Dept. of South Asian Studies, 1250
Van Hise Hall, Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706
Soule, Katheryn A., 9691 Delta Line Rd., Blaine, WA 98230 .
Spae, Rev. Joseph J. CCIM (A), 32 Geldmuntstraat, B-8000
Brugge, BELGIUM
Spellman, Prof. John W., Institute of Asian Cultures, Univ. of
Windsor, Windsor, Ontario N9B 3P4 CANADA
Spiro, Prof. Melford E., Dept. of Anthropology, University of
California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92037
Sprung, Prof. Mervyn, Dept. of Philosophy, Brock Univ., St.
Catherines, Ontario, CANADA
Stablein, William, 5253 15th N.E., Seatde, WA 98105
Stalker, Susan C. (S), 3418 Sansum St., Apt. 1, Philadelphia PA
191Q4
Stavisky, B.J., WCNILKR, 10, Krestyansaya Pl., J-l72 Moscow,
109172, USSR
Streng, Prof. Frederick J., Dept. of Religious Studies, Southern
Methodist Univ., Dallas, TX 75275
Sumner, Bradford Roberts (S), 153 Elm St., Northampton, MA
01060
Swearer, Prof. Donald K., Dept. of Religion, Swarthmore College,
Swarthmore, PA 19081
Takeuchi, Prof. Shoko, 2-59, Hamadacho, Amagasaki-shi, Hyogo,
660, JAPAN
Tanabe, Jr., Visiting Acting Assistant Prof. George]., 66-851
Haleiwa Rd., Haleiwa, Hawaii 96712
Tatia, Prof. Nathmal, Nava Nalanda Mahavihara, P. O. Nalanda
803 111, Bihar, INDIA
Terakawa, Prof. Shunsho (F), Shin Buddhist Studies Dept., Otani
Univ., Kita-ku, Kyoto, JAPAN
Thaw, Dr. U. Aung, Director, Archaeological Survey of Burma,
Rangoon, BURJ\tlA
Thompson, Kirill O. (S), 2440 Date St., Apt. 1106, Honolulu,
Hawaii 96814
Thurman, Prof. Robert A. F., Amherst College, Dept. of Philo-
sophy & Religion, Amherst, MA 01002
101
Tominaga, Thomas T., Asst. Prof., Dept. of Philosophy, Univ. of
Nevada, 4505 Maryland Parkway, Las Vegas, NV 89154
Tucci, Prof. Giuseppe (H), ISMEO, Via Merulana, 248, 00185
Roma, ITALY
Underwood, A. Prof. Frederic Bradley, 626 Kent Hall, Columbia
Univ., New York, NY 10027
Unno, Prof. Taitetsu, Dept. of Religion, Smith College,. North-
ampton, MA 01063
Upadhyaya, Prof. K.N., Dept. of Philosophy, 121 George Hall,
2560 Campus Rd., Univ. of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822
Victoria, Brian Andre (S), 928 South New Hampshire, Los Ange-
les, CA 90006
Waldschmidt, Dr. Ernst (H), Prof. Em. of Indology, University of
Gottingen, Hainbundstrasse 21, D-34 Gottingen, FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Wayman, Prof. Alex, Dept. of Middle East Languages & Cultures,
Columbia Univ., 603 Kent Hall, New York, N.Y. 10027
Weinstein, Prof. Stanley,- Dept. of Religion, Yale Univ., New
Haven CT 06520
Wekerle, Prof. Frank F., Director, Institute of Religion & Social
Science, Dept. of Philosophy, Hofstra Univ., Hempstead,
New York 11550
Welbon, Prof. G. R., Dept. of Religious Thought, Box 36, College
Hall, Univ. of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104
Welty, Leslie C. (S), 1315 NE 47th, Apt. F, Seattle, WA 98105
Wijesekera, Prof. O.H. de A. (H), 613 High Level Rd., Nugegoda,
SRI LANKA
Wilkinson, Christopher (S), 6202 25th N.W., Seattle, WA 98115
Williams, Bruce Charles (S), 916 E. Gorham, Apt. A, Madison,
Wisc.53703
Willis, A. Prof. Janice D., Dept. of Religion, Wesleyan Univ.,
Middleton, CT 06457
Wilson, Prof. Frances, Dept. of South Asian Studies, 1242 Van
Hise Hall, Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706
Wortz Dr.' Edward C., 580 Prospect Boulevard, Pasadena, CA
91103
Yamada, Prof. Isshi, Dept. of Religion, Northwestern Univ., 1940
Sheridan Rd., Evanston, IL 60201
Young, Katherine Kidd, William and Henry Rirks Building, 3520
University St., Montreal, Quebec H3A 2A7, CANADA
102
Young, Serinity, 99 Claremont Ave., New YODk, NY 10027
Yuyama, Akira, Director, The Reiyukai Library, 5-3-23 Torano-
mon, Minato-ku, Tokyo 105, JAPAN
Zelliot, Prof. Elanor (F), Carleton College, Northfield, MN 55057
Zurcher. Prof, Erik (F), Oosteinde 16, Warmond, NETHERLANDS
Zwilling, Dr. Leonard, 148 Tinker St. Woodstock, N.Y. 12498
Zysk, Kenneth G. (S), Dept. of Asian Civilizations, P.O. Box 4,
Canberra, A.C.T. 2600, AUSTRALIA
Naropa Institute (1),1111 Pearl St., Boulder, CO 80302
NDEA Center for South Asian Studies (1), 113 3 lAB, Columbia
Univ., New York, NY 10025
The Reiyukai Library (I), 5-3-23 Toranomon, Minato-ku, Tokyo
105, JAPAN
The Department of Religious Studies (I), The Univ. of Calgary,
2920-24th Ave., N.W., Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4, CANADA
Seminar fur Indologie und Buddhismuskunde (I), Der Universitat
Gottingen, Akademie d. Wissenschaftern D-34 Gottingen,
Hainbundstrasse 21, F.O.G.
103
with the studies on and the Vigrahavya.vartani,
both of which appeared in 1929.
His scholarly fame was established soon after his retum to
Japan with the publication of his excellent studies on the Madhy-
anta.vibhiigatika based on a manuscript from Nepal which S. Levi
had entruste.d to him for researches. Since then his tireless efforts
bore a succession of achievements. In his later life he was not o.nly
ranked among first class scholars but also esteemed for his ad-
visory opinion on the rapidly changing society of Japan.
105
Yamaguchi a brief sketch of career
1895
1922
1924-31
1927-29
1934-64
1935-50
1948-52
1950-58
1957
1964-76
1965
1976
Born in Kyoto on jan. 27.
Finished the Post-graduate Course of Shinshu
Otani Daigaku.
Asst. Professor, Otani Daigaku.
Studied in Paris.
Professor, Otani Daigaku.
During these years, made lectures in Kyoto Dai-
gaku, Ryukoku Daigaku and other universities.
A member of the Japan Science Council.
President, Otani Daigaku.
Selected for the honorary membership of la
Societe Asiatique.
Professor, Kyoto Sangyo Daigaku.
Elected a member of the Japan Academy.
Passed away on Oct. 21.
A Lz"st of Prof Yamaguchz"'s Prz"ncz"pal Publz"catz"ons
1. Vi:rp.satika-vrtti, Chinese and Tibetan Versions COqJ.pared and
Annotated (included in Sasaki Gessho:
A Comparative Study on the Virpsatika of the Vijiiana School,
Tokyo, 1923).
2. Mahayanasarpgraha, Text in Tibetan (appended to Sasaki
Gessho: Mahayanasarpgraha; Four
Chinese Versions Compared, Tokyo, 1931).
3. Sthiramati, Madhyantavibhagatika, Exposition systematique du
Yogacaravijiiaptivada. Edition d'apres un manuscrit rapporte
du Nepal par M. Sylvain Levi. Tome I-Texte, Nagoya, 1934.
4. (-), (=) Abhidharmakosavyakhya Ch. 2,
a Japanese translation in collaboration with Wogihara Unrai,
2 vols., Tokyo, 1934-39.
5. Sthiramati's Madhyanta-
vibhagatika, annotated translation into Japanese, Nagoya, 1935
(Tome II in sequence of3).
6. [ Madhyantavi-
bhaga, Chinese and Tibetan versions compared, with an index to
the Sanskrit text of Madhyantavibhagatika as an appendix,
Nagoya, 1937 (Tome III in sequence of3 & 5).
7. K 1P: l1" .0 fir A Study on the Fifth Chapter of
the Madhyamakahrdaya, Tokyo-Kyoto, 1941.
8. Essays in Madhyamaka Buddhism (including the
studies on the Madhyamakakarika, the the Vaidal-
ya-siltra, the etc.), Tokyo-Kyoto, 1944.
9. -::5 < .o}j I, II Prasannapada Madhya-
makavrtti of Candraklrti, Ch. I-XI, annotated translation into
Japanese, Tokyo-Kyoto, 1947-49.
lO. History of Prajiia Thought, Kyoto, 1951.
11. 0) nlt*ffifB The KarmasiddhiprakaraI,la of Vasubandhu
(Tibetan text of the PrakaraI,la; a Japanese translation of both
the PrakaraI,la and commentary on it), Kyoto, 1951.
12. .0 Tokyo, 1952 (Eng.
tr. by Watanabe Shoko: Dynamic Buddha and Static Buddha,
Tokyo, 1958).
13. )]{#I!-mM Textual Study in Vasubandhu's Vijiiana
Thought (i.ncluding annotated translation into Japanese of the
106
ViI!1satika, the TriI!1sika and the together
with Vinltadeva's commentaries), in collaboration with Nozawa
Josho, Kyoto, 1953. .
14. 7'7:/ Fifty Years of Buddhist Study in
France, Kyoto, 1953.
15. Textual Study on the Kosa (annotated tran-
slation into Japanese of the 3rd chapter of the Abhidharmakosa
together with Yasomitra's commentary), in collaboration with
Funahashi Issai, Kyoto, 1955.
16. -1:/ Cultural History of India (a Japanese translation
in collaboration with Sasaki Kyogo of S. Levi's L'Inde civilis a-
trice), Kyoto, 1958.
17. What is Buddhism? -Introduction to Buddhology,
in collaboration with Ocho Enichi, Ando Toshio and Funahashi
Issai, Kyoto, 1961.
18. Vasubandhu's Upadesa to the Amitayul;tst1tra,
Kyoto, 1962.
19. An Introduction to Buddhist Thought, Tokyo,
1968.
20. JlJ I::::J Selected Essays in Buddhist Studies by
Yamaguchi Susumu, 2 vol., Tokyo, 1972-73.
21. Buddhist Scripture (ed.), Translation into Japanese of
Selected Parts from the Nikayas and Mahayana St1tras, Kyoto,
1974.
22. Index to the Prasannapada Madhyamaka-vrtti, 2 vols., Kyoto,
1975.
107
ERRATA TO ISSUE 1
Professor Waldschmidt, who did not have the opportunity to
check the proofs, asks for the following corrections:
p. 25, line 10: "on the request" (scl. of the Buddha) instead of "on
their request".
p. 26, line 20: ".1" instead of ".i",
p. 27, line 14: "supposed" instead of "suppose".
p. 27, line 17: "Mara" instead of Mara".
p. 28 line 1: "bhikru" instead of
p. 28 line 31: "iiyu-?mato" instead of "iiyusmato".
p. 29, line 5: Insert: Again and repeatedly you should preach to
the monks the sermon of letting in and not letting in (sensitive
influences) .
p. 29, line 13: "udgrhI.1idhv(am) " instead of "udgrhnidhv(am)".
p. 30/31: Exchange R-and-O, 0 and Rrespectively.
p. 33, line 22 has to read: "anavassutapariyiiyarrz, ca / tarIJ sur;,iitha
siidhukam manasi karota bhiisissiimiti." in one or two cases a
(not ii) has been printed.
CHAIRPERSON
Gadjin M. Nagao
1 Sennyuji-sannai, Higashiyama, Kyoto 605, Japan
. VICE CHAIRPERSONS
A.L. Basham
Australian National University
Canberra, A.C. T. 2600, Australia
Louis Ligeti
H-1364
PF 107 Hungary
D.H. de A. Wijesekera
613 High Level Road
Nugegoda, Sri Lanka
GENERAL SECRETARY
A. K. Narain
Department of South Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin, Madison,
Wisconsin, 53706, U.S.A.
(Asia)
Yuichi Kajiyama
Kyoto University, Japan
SECRET ARIES
(Europe)
Erik Zurcher
Warmund, Nerherlands
(Americas)
Bardwell L. Smith
Carleton College, Northfield,
Minnesota
ASSOCIATE SECRETARY
Charles F. Prebish
Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802, U.S.A.
JOINT LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
AND THE EXECUTIVE
Gadjin M. Nagao (Japan); A.L. Basham (Australia); Louis Ligeti (Hungary);
D.H. de A. Wijesekera (Sri Lanka); Beatrice D. Miller (U.S.A.); A.K. Narain
(U.S.A.); Yuichi Kajiyama (Japan); Bardwell L. Smith (U.S.A.); Erik Zurcher
(The Netherlands); Heinz Bechert (West Germany); A. W. Macdonald (France);
M.C. Subhadradis Diskul (Thailand);Jan Yun-hua (Canada); Richard Gombrich
(United Kingdom); Charles F. Prebish (U.S.A.); Leon Hurvitz (U.S.A.); Pad-
manabh S. Jaini (U.S.A.); Alex Wayman (U.S.A.); Lokesh Chandra (India);
A.H. Dani (Pakistan); Ismael Quiles (Argentina); Theodore Riccardi (U.S.A.);
U. Aung Thaw (Burma).
HONORARY FELLOWS
P. V. Bapat (India); Kenneth K.S. Ch 'en (U.S.A.); Edward Conze (United King-
dom); Paul Demieville (France); LB. Horner (United Kingdom); Etienne
Lamotte (Belgium); Giuseppe Tucci (Italy); P.L. Vaidya (India); E. Wald-
schmidt (Federal Republic of Germany); S. Yamaguchi (japn).