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THE JOURNAL

OF THE iNTERNATIONAL ASSOCiATION OF


BUDDHIST STUDIES
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
A. K. Narain
University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA
Heinz Bechert
Universitiit Gottingen, FRG
Lewis Lancaster
EDITORS
Leon Hurvitz
UBC, Vancouver, Canada
'University of California, Berkeley, USA
Alexander W. MacDonald
Universite de Paris X, Nanterre, France
Alex Wayman B. J. Stavisky
WNIIR, Moscow, USSR Columbia University, New York, USA
ASSOCIATE EDITOR
Stephan Beyer
University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA
Volume 3
1980
Number 2
THE JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF BUDDHIST STUDIES, INC.
This J oumal is the organ of the International Association of Buddhist Studie
Inc., and is governed by the objectives of the Association and acce ;!
scholarly contributions pertaining to Buddhist Studies in all the varitu S
disciplines such as philosophy, history, religion, sociology, anthropology, artS
archaeology, psychology, textual studies, etc. The jIABS is published t W i c ~
yearly in the Spring and Fall. .
The Association and the Editors assume no responsibility for the views
expressed by the authors in the Association's Journal and other related
publications.
Manuscripts for publication and correspondence concerning articles should
be submitted to A. K. Narain, Editor-in-Chief,JIABS, Department of South
Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin 53706, U.S.A.
The Editor-in-Chief is responsible for the final content of the Journal and
reserves the right tOTeject any material deemed inappropriate for publication
and is not obliged to give reasons therefor.
Books for review should be sent to the Editor-in-Chief. The Editors cannot
guarantee to publish reviews of unsolicited books nor to return those books to
the senders.
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
Andre Bareau (Francej JosephM. Kitagawa (USA)
John Brough (U.K.) Jacques May (Switzerland)
M.N. Deshpande (India) Hajime Nakamura Uapan)
R. Card (USA) John Rosenfield (USA)
B.C. Cokhale (USA) Bardwell L. Smith (USA)
P.S.Jaini (USA) David Snellgrove (U.K.)
J. W. de J ong (Australia)
E. Zurcher (Netherlands)
Editorial Assistant: Roger Jackson
The Editor-in-Chief wishes to thank Rena Haggarty for assistance in
preparation of this volume.
Copyright The International Association of Buddhist Studies 1980
ISSN: 0193-600X
Sponsored by Department of South Asian Studies, University of
Madison.
ADDENDUM
1'&e followin?, c?rrections and inclusions made in the O?ituary
ir
au
! Demlevllle by W. Macdonald, III Volume. It.Issue 1,
i97
9
,ofthejIABS, due to madvertance on the part ofthe edItonal staff:
Airs de Touen-houang (Touen-houang k'iu). Textes a chanter des
VIlle-Xe siecles. Manuscrits reproduits en fac-simile, avec une
Iritroduction en chino is par Jao Tsong-yi, adaptee en franc;:ais, avec
la-traduction de quelques Textes d'Airs, par Paul Demieville, Paris,
Editions du Centre National de la Recherche scientifique, 1971,370
pages dont 182 enchinois, LVIII pI. h.-t., 116 images.
Entretiens de Lin-tsi, traduits du chinois et commentes. Collection
:Documents spirituels, 6, Paris, Fayard, 1972, 255 pages.
:'22: Adieu maman, BSOAS, XXXVI, 2, 1973, p. 271-286.
'2,3: L'iconoclasme anti-bouddhique en Chine, Melanges d'histoire des
religions offerts a Henri-Charles Puech, Ecole Pratique des Hautes
Etudes, 5E Section, Paris, 1974, p. 17-25.
24: Une descente aux enfers sous les Tang. La biographie de
Houang Che-k'iang, Etudes d'histoire et de litterature chinoises offertes au
Professeur jaroslav Prusek, BIHEe, XXIV, Paris, 1976, p. 71-84.
25: L'introduction au Tibet du bouddhisme sinise d'apres les
manuscrits de Touen-houang (analyse de recents travaux japonais) .
.contributions aux etudes sur Touen-houang. Edole Pratique des Hautes
Etudes, 4e Section (Hautes Etudes Orientales, 10): in the press, due
in 1979.
26: L'oeuvre de Wang le Zelateur (Wang Fan-tche), suivies des Instruc-
tions de l'aieul (T'ai-kong kai-kiao). Prierespopulaires des Tang (VIII-X
siecles) edites, traduit et commentes d'apres les manuscrits de
Touen-houang. BIHEe, 26, in the press, due out in 1980.
Demieville published over three hundred reviews, and more than a
hundred and seventy articles and books which are listed in the biblio-
graphies by Gisele de Jong and Yves Hervouet.
ERRATUM
The following correction should be made at the end of the article
by Michael Sweet, in Volume II, issue 2, ofthe.JIABS, 1979, due t()
inadvertance on the part of the editorial staff:
Page 87, under the heading NOTES, the address of Michael
Sweet is incorrectly given as Department of Religion, Williams
College, Williamstown, MA 01267. It .I'/lOliri rmr/: 639 Bluff St.,
Dubuque, IA 52000.
CONTENTS
1. ARTICLES
.1. A Yogacara Analysis of the Mind, Based on the Vijiuina Section
of'Vasubandhu's PaiicaskandhaprakararJa with GUI!a-
prabha's Commentary, by Brian Galloway 7
2. The Realm of Enlightenment in Vijiiaptimiitratii: The Formu-
lation of the "Four Kinds of Pure Dharmas", by Noriaki
H akamaya, translated from the Japanese by john Keenan 21
3. Hu-jan Nien-Ch'i (Suddenly a Thought Rose) Chinese Under-
standing of Mind and Consciousness, by Whalen Lai 42
4. Notes on the Ratnakuta Collection, by K Priscilla Pedersen 60
5. The Sixteen Aspects of the Four Noble Truths and Their
Opposites, by Alex Wayman 67
II. SHORT PAPERS
1. Kaniska's Buddha Coins - The Official Iconography of
Sakyamuni & Maitreya, by joseph Cribb 79
2. "Buddha-Mazda" from Kara-tepe in Old Termez (Uzbekistan):
A Preliminary Communication, by Boris]. Stavisky 89
3. Faush?ll and the Pali Jatakas, by Elisabeth Strandberg 95
III. BOOK REVIEWS
l. Love and Sympathy in Theravada Buddhism, by Harvey B.
Aronson 103
2. Chiikan to Yuishiki (Madhyamika and Vijiiaptimatrata), by
Gadjin Nagao 105
.3. Introduction a la connaissance des hlvin ba I de Thailande,
by Anatole-Roger Peltier 107
4. Buddhism, Imperialism, and War. Burma and Thailand in
Modern History, by Trevor Ling. 109
5.
Zhongguo foxue yuanliu liiejiang
(Brieflectures on the origins and development of Chinese
Buddhology), by Lii Cheng III
6.
The J aina Path of Purification, by P admanabh S. j aini 112
IV. NOTES AND NEWS
1. Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Executive Committee
and the Board of Directors of the 2nd Annual Conference
of the lABS at Nalanda, 1979 116
Contributors
118
AYogaclra Analysis of the Mind, Based
on the V ~ j i u i n a section of Vasubandhu's
p aiicaskandhaprakarar;a with
GUQaprabha's Commentary 1
by Brian Galloway
Buddhist philosophy concerns itself both with the exposition of ultimate
reality and the functioning of saT{lsara. For ultimate reality, most
Mahayanists historically have preferred the analyses of the Madhyamika
school; but for the functioning of saT{lsara, the Yogacara school seems to
have the more subtle and complex theory.
Before discussing it, however, we must decide how we are to deal
with the many technical terms found in its literature. There are those
who feel that technical terms should not be translated at all, and others
who translate them in some very idiosyncratic and inconsistent ways,
based on a supposedly superior understanding that they alone possess.
As for the first, it only needs to be pointed out that leaving a term
untranslated does not guarantee that we will understand it properly.
Having said this, it is apparent that our first task is to understand the
word's meaning, and this can only be done by examining the usage of
the word in the various contexts in which it is found, and by taking note
of the explicit definition of the word, if an explicit definition is found in
the literature. Then, having understood the word, we may indeed find
that there is an accurate English term with the same range of meaning.
Concerning the second group, we may say that their impression-
istic and haphazard method of translating might be justified in dealing
with texts written cryptically from the standpoint of ultimate reality,
provided that the translator shares the profundity of insight of the
original author. But it will hardly do in scientific/technical literature of
the Yogacara type. By scientific/technical I mean that this literature is
analogous to modern scientific exposition: it uses technical terms
7
strictly; it analyzes and categorizes; impressionistic or vague ramblings
are utterly foreign to it. The difference between it and modern scienti_
fic thought is only that the Buddhist technical writing takes as given the
thesis that there exists, objectively and in real truth, a state of mind
possible for a human being to develop, that is qualitatively differeni
from and better than ordinary consciousness: different; in that it
makes all worldly considerations pale into insignificance; better, in that
it makes for true happiness both for oneself and for the others that one
helps.
I have goen into the matter of Yogacira technical terms in a
previous article, "Vijiuina, Sa7(liiiii, and Manas," which was printed in
the Middle Way, Vol. 53, No.2 (Summer 1978). There I argued thatthe
words in the title have been incorrectly translated in the past,2 and
proposed the translations given in this chart:
Correct Formerly
Translation Prevailing Tr.
vZJnana
perception (consciousness)
sa7(lJna
recognition (perception)
manas conSCIousness (mind)
To recapitulate my arguments of that article: vijiuina is what happens
when there is a sense organ, a sense object, no obstruction between
them, and a mind that functions properly; it is the first mental event
that occurs and does not involve any "thinking" of vitarka-vicara or
kalpanii. It is "the naked, unadorned, apprehension of each stimulus"
(Conze quoting the Abhidharmakosa
3
); it "grasps the mere object" or
"the object alone" (don tsam 'dzin to: GUIfaprabha in his commentary on
Vasubandhu's Paiicaskandhaprakarar;a
4
). Vijiiiina therefore does not
correspond to the English word "consciousness", which always involves
an idea of selfhood (as I show by quotation from the Oxford English
Dictionary), but to perception in its strict, modern, scientific sense, that
is, sense-perception. (Thus vijiiiina corresponds to the German Wahr-
nehmung, not to Bewusstsein.)
Some may argue that the word "perception" (here I am bringing
in new arguments, not present in my earlier article) is properly the
translation of the logical term pratyak?a. So it is, but this does not pose a
problem here, because vijiiiina and p r a t y a s ~ a really mean the same
thing. In Dignaga's Pramii'f?asamuccaya we find that pratyak?a7(l kalpanii-
8
poqh
a
r[l5 which is exactly what is said of vijiiiina. "When the eye comes in
contact with a color, for instance blue, visual consciousness [sic] arises
which is awareness of the presence of a color; but it does not recognise
that it is blue. There is no recognition at this stage" (Rahula in What the
Buddha Taught
6
). Dignaga, while discussing pratyak?a, adduces this
quotation from an unspecified Abhidharma treatise:
eak?ur-J&'iiiinasamangt- nua7[! vijiiiiniiti no tu nz7amiti (Daa-2) 7
"One who can perceive by the eye, perceives blue, but not 'this is blue.'"
The point is that Dignaga quotes this as an explanation of the nature
of pratyak?a, though this word never appears there, and the quotation is
.couched entirely in terms of vijiiiina (the verb vijiiiiniiti is used). That is,
he takes pratyak?a and vijiiiina to be fundamentally the same. The
reason for using pratyak?a rather than the older term is probably two-
fold: it was desirable to have a special term for use in the context of
epistemology//logic (pramiirJa); and over the centuries the word vijiiiina
perhaps became debased in that there grew up around it a mass of
vague impressions (while its fundamental meaning of course remained
unchanged).
To return to my former article, I think I have shown that sarrljiiii
means "recognition." GUl].aprabha states that sar[ljiiii, "having discerned
the same object [as in a prior perception], grasps it with sureness" ('du
shes ni yul de nyid yong su bead nas nges par 'dzin pa ste).H Vasubandhu's
definition of sa7[!Jiiii, on which GUI]aprabha is commenting, is this:
"grasping an object by its sign" (yulla mtshan par 'dzin pa). 9 Sthiramati,
another commentator on this same text, explains that "a sign is the
particular of an object, blue, yellow, etc.; it is the basis of classification
of a phenomenon. Grasping by a sign is thinking, 'This is blue, this is
yellow' (mtshan ma ni yul gyi bye brag sngon po dang ser po La sogs pa dmigs pa
roam par gzhag pa'i rgyu'o. de La mtshan mar 'dzin pa ni 'di ni sngon po'o 'di ni
serpo'o zhes rtogpa'o).IO Rahula uses the word "recognition" as a defini-
tion of sa7[!Jiiii (though he translates it differently): sar[ljiiii "recognizes
that it is blue." II Buddhagosa, in his Visuddhimagga, defines it exactlyas
does Vasubandhu, and compares it to what happens when a carpenter
sees a pile of wood that he has previously marked with a sign to indicate
what type of wood it is (he recognizes it as previously classified).
As for manas, this is explicitly stated in Abhidharma works (includ-
ing the present one, as we shall see) to be associated with the illusion of
self, which means that it is realiy "consciousness" in English.
9
This may seem to be a great fuss about a few words; but these are
words of absolute and crucial importance. We cannot simply assume
that we k.now v:hat they These terms :nust be about; they
must be mvestIgated senously on a theoreucallevel and III a scientific
fashion. Of course, there are those who prefer to translate technical
terms however they see fit at a given moment, drawing on the latest
fashionable jargon of twelve different Western philosophical and
linguistic systems; but this sort of impressionist method of translation is
simply not accurate, authentic, or appropriate for serious scientific
Abhidharma works, however useful it may be when one is pretending
to be profound.
We usually think of the mind (the subject of this paper) as the
objective correlative of consciousness. But this is not the Buddhist view.
In Buddhism, the starting point of any discussion of the mind is not
consciousness but perception (vijnana); consciousness comes later. The
mind is seen as a group of perception-processes: sometimes as a group of
six, at other times as a group of eight. Vasubandhu, in his discussion of
perception, which becomes a discussion of the mind, in his Pancaskan-
dhaprakarar;a (which we shall now examine in detail together with
GUJ?aprabha's commentary),12 begins by asking the time-honored
question, What is perception? He answers his own question thusly;
vijnanam alambanavijnaptifJ/
"Perception is the manifestation of a phenomenon." Now we have two
more technical terms to discuss.
In calling the perceived object a "phenomenon" we are avoiding
asserting that any real object exists; phenomena may be expressions of
reality or illusions. This is in keeping with the Y ogacara belief that real
objects do not in fact exist philosophically.
For "manifestation" as a translation of vijnapti see Apte's Practical
Sanskrit-English Dictionary, wherein he defines it as "communication"
and "announcement." The manifestation of course takes place in the
mind.
GUJ?aprabha, in his commentary, now tells us that the phenomena
are of six kinds. Why only six? GUJ?aprabha and Vasubandhu are Yoga-
carins who intend to elaborate a doctrine of eight kinds, but they wish
first to establish the traditional-Buddhist six as a foundation on which
to build. GUJ?aprabha therefore lists the six; let us list them here
10
together with the corresponding sense-organs (called "supports" or
iiSraya in Buddhism) and the perceptions.
Perception Support
Phenomenon
(vijiuina) . (asraya) (iilambana)
eye-perception eye forms (riipa)
ear-perception ear sounds
nose-perception nose smells
tongue-perception tongue tastes
body-perception body tangibles
conSCIousness
. conSCIOusness elements (dharma)
perception (manas)
Concerning these terms, first we observe that it is unimportant whether
we use singular or plural forms; in English, plurals are perhaps better
here to indicate that we are not dealing with abstractions but with
specific realities.
Form (riipa) here means objects perceived by the eye, hence
"sights"; it should be noted carefully, however, that the same word
form/riipa has another meaning, in which it includes all of the above-
listed phenomena plus the first five supports (the material sense-
organs), plus something called "unmanifest form" (avijiiaptiriipa).
(Aside from this last, riipa in this sense corresponds to the Western
. concept of "matter" which is based on the idea that tangibles (spra<;tavya)
are basic but also can be apprehended also by form, sound, smell, etc.)
One has to judge from context whether form/riipa means sight-objects
or all manifest and unmanifest form (vi:jiiaptyavijiiaptiriipa).
The "elements" (dharma) in the above chart as objects of conscious-
ness (manas) are not all elements in the Yogacara list of one hundred
elements. All are grouped into five categories as follows.
Form (riipa) in the larger sense
Mind (citta), the eight perceptions about to be discussed
Mentals (caitta), certain mental functions, mostly emotions
Non-Mentals (citta-viprayukta), certain functions and processes
Uncompoundeds (asaT[tskrJa), including tathatii
The elements meant in the present instance as objects of consciousness
(manas) are the mentals, the non-mentals, the uncompoundeds, and
avij'iiaptiriipa. Concerning the six phenomena listed, GU[.laprabha now
11
tells us, "Their assimilation (khong du chud pa) is manifestation, is per-
ception. These are the six beginning perceptions (praV1:ttivijiiana)."
He continues, explaining the exact relationship between a per-
ception, its corresponding "support", or sense-organ, and its corres_
ponding "phenomenon", or object. (Rather than translate with painful
literalness, "If it be asked, what is eye-perception, it is ... " I prefer to
give, "Eye-perception is ... ")
"Eye-perception is the various manifestations of which the eye is
the support and forms are the phenomena; ear-perception is the
various manifestations of which the ear is the support and sounds the
phenomena; nose-perception is the various manifestations of which
the nose is the support and smells t:..he pheonmena; tongue-perception
is the various manifestations of which the tongue is the support and
tastes the phenomena; body-perception is the various manifestations
of which the body is the support and tangibles the phenomena;
consciousness-perception (manovijiiana) is the various manifestations
of which consciousness (manas) is the support and [certain] elements
the phenomena."
The next passage is somewhat confusingly written. Vasubandhu
tells us that perception "is mind (citta) and consciousness (manas),
because it is variegated (citra) and the support of consciousness (yid rten
byed pa, ?mana-asraya).
Perception (vijiiana)
/ ---......
mind (citta)
~
Variegated (citra)
Consciousness (manas)
~
Support of consciousness
What he means is this: "The six perceptions constitute the mind in the
traditional Buddhist view; this mind is variegated, or a variety, because
there is a sixfold variety of perception-processes, and because (as
GUI).aprabha will tell you) within each of the six there is a variety of
forms to be perceived. (Also, there is the pleasing pun of citra with citta.)
But the mind is more than this. The six perceptions form the support
of a seventh that arises on the foundation of the six. And this seventh is
consciousness (manas)."
GUI).aprabha tells us exactly how this arising takes place: "As it is
said,
12
Ri.ght after the cessation of the six,
Whate'er perception comes is consciousness.
That which occurs right after the stopping of whatever-it-may-be is
consciousness (manas). For example, the son of one may be the
father of another, the fruit of one [tree] becomes the seed of another,
and likewise when the six fruits of the beginning perceptions are
stopped, they become supports of the arising of another
and hence are called the supports of consciousness. So the mind has
been explained as the six beginning perceptions."
But, we must add, it has been explained as six perceptions giving
rise to the seventh, called consciousness (manas). And this must not be
confused with consciousness-perception (manovijiiana).
Now comes the crucial part. Vasubandhu here defines the mind
in a completely different way; but the new view will turn out to be fully
compatible with the old; it will supply a deep basis or foundation for the
old view. He states:
"In reality, the mind is the storehouse perception (iilayavijiiiina);
because it is the assembly (cita, another play on citta) of the seeds (bija) of
all compoundings (sa7[!skiira)." In this word sam means together, while
kiira is the vr:dhhi form of kr: 'make, do' plus a. Whitney, in his Sanskrit
Grammar (sees. 1145 and 1148b-c) says that such a formation may be
either a nomen actionis or a nomen agentis; thus our word may be trans-
lated either "compoundings" or "compounders"; the Tibetan 'du byed
could stand for either; the first is almost certainly correct and could
also have an agentive force. (Cf. asa7[!5kr:tal 'du ma byasl uncompoundeds.)
The word has at least two meanings: generally, all worldly things,
including all the five skandhas (See Rahula, What the Buddha Taught, p.
22 & no. 2, p. 57 & n. 2); that is, all things that consist of component
parts, hence all things that are subject to analysis (separation into
parts); in this sense we are tempted to translate "compoundeds" which
is probable and linguistically possible (though this would more specifi-
cally be sa7[!skr:ta). Excluded are space (iikiisa) , two kinds of cessation
(nirodha), and suchness (tathataj.
Specifically, in the Abhidharma, as here, sa7[!skiiras are the caitta-
dharmas other than feeling (vedanaj and recognition (sa7[!jiiii), plus the
cittaviprayuktadharmas. Since the sa7[!skiiras here are specific elements we
are tempted to call them "compounders", things that make up a
compounding; but for both senses "compoundings" may be the best
13
solution. Psychologically sa7[lskiiras are "unconscious tendencies."
So Vasubandhu has now defined the mind as the sarvaJa7[l
skar
abi-
jacita, the assembly of the seeds of all unconscious tendencies
Or
"compoundings." GUI).aprabha now tells llS, "'All compoundings'
means the passional elements They arise from four
conditions (pratyaya)." His next words are more easily comprehended
in the form of a chart:
Basic condition
(hetupratyaya)
Ruling condition
(adhipatipratyaya)
Immediate condition
(samanantarapratyaya)
Phenomenal condition
(alambanapratyaya)
Perfumings (vasanaj dwelling in
the storehouse perception
Six sense organs
Consciousness (manas)
Form, sounds, smells, etc.
Hetu is often translated as "cause", but a causeforces the result, whereas
a hetu merely provides the basis on which the result can OCcur. It
provides, in other words, the context within which the result can occur.
It should, therefore, be translated as basis. In Buddhist thought there is
no real "causation" at all, since events merely take place within a net of
interrelationships; they are dependent on each other in a sense (condi-
tioned origination, pratityasamutpada) , but they do not force each other;
they merely assist (in the French sense of being present): "this present,
that occurs."
It has been suggested that vrisana might better be translated as
"experientially initiated potentiality of experience" or some such. But
if Vasubandhu and others had wanted to use such an expression, they
could easily have done so in Sanskrit: anubhavasambhavanubhavasakyatii
might serve. If one translates vasanaliterally as "perfuming" the idea is
clearer. If one dips a cloth into perfumed water and then hangs it out to
dry, the perfume that has pervaded the cloth remains in it after the
water has all evaporated. Similarly the experiences and passions
remain in the storehouse perception (the Unconscious of Western
thought) after the initial stimulus is gone. The mind has been semi- .
permanently affected (since nothing at all is truly permanent in
Buddhism) and thus is called perfumed by the perfumings (vrisanal of
former action. The word perfuming does make the idea clear, and that is
why such a word was chosen by Vasubandhu and others in the first
14
;pla
ce
, rather than the phrase given above. .
::. Now GUI).aprabha wIshes to explam the process of the generatIon
compoundings, the perfumings, and the storehouse perception
'itself. Beginning with the beginning perceptions (pravrttivijillina) , he
states:
"Supported on the eye etc. and on form etc., eye-perception etc.
.arises. Immediately afterwards, the consciousness-perception (yid kyi
rnarn par shes pa, manovijiuina) becomes aware of (rtog go) the object
From completed awareness arises lust (raga) and the other
passions (klesa). Then action (karma) arises, which is called compoundings
(sa1[lskiira) of meritorious (pur}ya) , sinful (apur}ya), or neutral character.
Compoundings are here to be seen as mentation (cetanii). When the
action of their birth is stopped, they produce perfumings (vasana) in
the storehouse perception. In this way the passional elements produce
perfumings in the storehouse perception. From the greater and
greater assembling (cita) of all seeds of perfumings comes the mind."
,All this can best be seen in a chart (here "6P" means the six beginning
perceptions; "SP" means the eighth or storehouse perception):
Six organs
-+ 6P -+ manovijiiana Passions (kleSa) ---+
Six phenomena
Action (karma) I
Compoundings (saT[!skara)
Mentation (cetanii')
-+ Perfumings (vasanal ---+ SP
(Or is manovijiiana an error for manas, which is stated elsewhere to arise
out of the six?)
There is a certain reciprocity in this causal chain. GUI).aprabha
states, "As the storehouse perception is the basis (hetu) of all the passional
compoundings so do they in turn form the basis (hetu)
of the storehouse perception." This might be represented by an arrow
going back from "SP" to "Action/Compoundings/Mentation." But
GUI).aprabha does not say that the storehouse is the immediate basis of
action etc., so really the arrow should probably go from SP all the way
back to the six organs and phenomena; in that way the SP would form
the basis of Action, etc., through the causal chain. Now GUI).aprabha
explains:
"The storehouse perception becomes transformed into two parts,
15
called basis (hetu) and fruit (phala); the basis being the perfumings, the
fruit being the ripening (rnam par smin pa), which means production
(skyed) by the perfumings af former actian (piirvakarmavasana). Thus
we shauld see that an the basis of ane, the other arises. Far example,
the blazing af an ail lamp and its burning af the wick arise mutually at
the same time, and when there is a tent supparted an three pales, one
supparts anather by means af the third so that they do' nat fall; so the
basis of arising, whatever it may be, should be understaod to be the
starehouse perceptian.
"Since the starehause is a perceptian, what is its phenamenon and
what is its made?" Its phenamenan, af course, is the abject that it
perceives; since the ear perceives saunds, the nase smells, etc., what
does the starehause perceive, sil!ce it is said to be a perception?
Further, what is its mode (rnam pa, akiira)? This term apparently replaces
support (asraya, rten), since a support must be samething material, and
the storehause has no, material suppart. Vasubandhu answers both
questions by essentially not answering them:
"Its phenamenan and mode areundiscerned (aparichinna, yongs
su ma chad pa'o)." Nar daes GUIfaprabha camment. The matter is
covered, thaugh nane tao' clearly, in Sthiramati's cammentary to
Vasubandhu's Tri'Y(lsika; but it is a matter for anather paper.
Vasubandhu naw tells us that the starehause is "of ane class and
continually praduced" (rigs cigpa dangrgyun chags par 'jugpa'o). "Of one
class" means, accarding to, GUIfaprabha, that it is morally indifferent
(neither goad nor bad in its essence); while being cantinually praduced
means that it is momentary (it is produced again every mament). "That
it has ane nature (rang bzhin, svabhava) is known by authority (iigama)
and reasan (?nyaya). The autharity is the Blessed One's verse in the
[naw last?] Abhidharmasiitra:
The realm of time withaut beginning is
The place where all the elements reside.
Since this exists, the realms af sentient beings
And also, Blessed Rest, have been obtained.
GUIfaprabha takes "the place where all the elements reside" to be the
stare house perception.
He has adduced this quatatian in arder to, shaw an authority for
the marally neutral character af the starehause perceptian. But the
same quatatian serves equally to, shaw that the starehause exists in the
16
first place, as against those who do not believe in one's existence.
Vasubandhu and GUI)aprabha now try to demonstrate its existence by
means of reason.
First, they point to the meditational states called cessation attain-
ment (niradhasamapatti), non-recognition attainment (asaT[Ljiiisamapatti),
ind (plain) non-recognition (asarf}jiiii). When one is in these states, the
six beginning perceptions "also known as object-manifestation (v4ya-
vijiwpti)" are stopped; when one leaves these states, the six arise again.
They must have been stored somewhere; that somewhere is the store-
,house perception. GUI)aprabha asks: "If we do not accept a storehouse
perception, from what basis (hetu) will the six beginning perceptions
arise? Therefore we must accept a storehouse perception."
Further, it is maintained that without a storehouse perception it
would be impossible to enter, or more importantly to leave, the round
(saT[Lsara). This is also supported by the scriptural verse quoted ahove.
Finally, it is maintained that the storehouse is the basis even of the
material body. GUI)aprabha states: "Since these various (gang yin pa)
seeds of all passionate elements dwell in it, it is called
the storehouse perception. Again, it dwells in them as the actuality of
the basis (yang na de dag la rgyu'i dngas par gnas pa'o, ?hetuvastu)."
Vasubandhu now identifies the storehouse with certain other
. technical terms that were perhaps current in certain circles in his day:
'The storehouse perception is itself the ground (gzhi nyid; ?iidhara,
of all seeds, is the storehouse of the body, is the basical
(hetuka). [The two sentences of GUI)aprabha quoted just above occur
here.] It is that which resides in the body; again, it is appropriating
(adana) perception because it appropriates a body." Here GUI)aprabha
quotes the Sandhinirmacanasutra:
Appropriating perception is profound and fine,
And all the seeds flow onward like a river:
It is not right to view it as a self;
I did not teach it to the immature. 13
GUI)aprabha's comments are of little philosophical interest here, and
he does not explain how an immaterial storehouse perception can give
rise to a material body; one assumes that to the Yogacarins, materiality
itself is an illusion anyway.
Here the exposition of the storehouse perception in itself is
finished; but Vasubandu takes an extremely important step here. He
17
goes back to the seventh perception, "consciousness", manas, fo;
another look at it. We saw it before as arising out of the six beginnin'"
perceptions. Now we shall see it as rising out of the storehouse og
, r
eighth perception; we shall see it in its relation to the storehouse.
"In reality, the consciousness (manas) has the storehouse percep"
tion for its phenomenon." "This means that it phenorn
i
enalizes [sees] the storehouse perception as a self." ('.'dngos su na yid nz
kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la dmigs te" shes bya ba ni, kun gzhi rnam par shes pa
la bdag tu dmigs zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go.) Vasubandhu: "It is that
associated with the constant delusion of self (iitmamoha), view of self
(iitmadnti), egoism of self (iitmamiina) , and lust for self (iitmariiga), and so .
on." 14 "It is explained as operating always, and arises as'
good (kuSala) , bad (akusala) , and indifferent. His saying 'It is of onr
class' means [in contrast to what it means for the storehouse perception]
that it has a passionate (kI4ta) nature (rang bzhin, ?svabhiiva). 'It is
tinually produced' means that it is momentary. It operates always, but"
'It is not present in an Arhat, on the Noble Path, or at the time of the
cessation-attainment.' In the last two it is prevented from producing
perfumings; when one rises out of them, the seeds arise again from it.
In Arhatship they cease completely.
"With that, we have explained the eight perceptions that constitute l
the perception aggregate, [to wit] the six beginning perceptions, the'
storehouse perception, and the passionate consciousness (kI4tamanas).
The perception-aggregate has been explained."
So our chart of perceptions above requires these two additions:.;
Perception
Consciousness (manas)
aka kl4tamanas
Storehouse Perception
(iilayavijiiiina)
Mode (iikiira)
(not specified)
U ndiscerned
(aparichinna)
Phenomenon
Storehouse Perception
(falsely seen as self)
U ndiscerned
(aparichinna)
This has been only one section of a very elementary Yogacara
treatise, and the kind of problems that we encounter here should wanl
us against the error of thinking that we can fully understand this
doctrine quickly or easily or without rigorous scientific analysis. . .
Of course, such a treatise as this may raise more questions than it'
answers: for instance, how to reconcile the three views of manas presented: ..
as a sense organ giving rise to manovijiiiina; as arising from the six','
18
iJeginning perceptions; as arising from the storehouse perception. But
before studying this treatise we did not know enought even to ask the
question.
NOTES
I. I have used the edition of the Derge Tanjur. I have not been able to obtain the
Sanskrit of the Vasubandhu, and in any case I do not know whether it is the original or a
;etranslation from the Tibetan; if the latter, there would be no advantage in using it. In
most cases, the Sanskrit equivalent of a given Tibetan term is known; in a few cases above
Jgive the Tibetan where I am unsure of the Sanskrit.
I have translated or paraphrased essentially everything that Vasubandhu and
GUf.laprabha say here; a few minor points are passed over cursorily. In a couple of places
their writing is not as clear as it might be (they at one point seem to be trying to talk about
tWO things at once); I have tried to straighten things out a bit in my exposition, but
I have not changed any of the ideas or technical terms, and all important points
translated verbatim.
2. Vijniina has been occasionally translated as perception, but never so far as I am
aware with any explanation of why this is correct and the more usual translation wrong. I
think it better to bring the whole matter out into the open.
, Throughout this paper I engage in discussion of the meanings of individual
Sanskrit words: this is not mere "philology" because we investigate the words not fortheir
own sake, but in order to understand the philosophical ideas they express. One cannot
understand an idea unless one first understands the words used to explain it! Dereliction
'of this principle is widespread, because people prefer to avoid the difficulties (and they
are genuine difficulties) of dealing strictly with these technical terms; and this enables
, them (in some cases) to read their own ideas into the texts.
The reader will note that my translations of technical terms are often quite literal
'(when I think that the literal meaning most clearly expresses the idea, as it often does),
and sometimes a modest departure fom literalness (when it seems better to translate the
meaning than the word, so to speak), Always I give the Sanskrit original if it can be
ascertained-unlike certain people, I am bound to say.
I do not believe in translating words inconsistently, but hold to the principle 0f one
English word for one Sanskrit word in the overwhelming majority of cases. Some main-
tain that the profundity and complexity of Buddhist philosophical thought constitutes an
excuse for their own terminological inconsistency and obfuscation (a hyper-intellectual
but essentially frivolous point of view, in that it does not meet the real requirements). On
the contrary, the more profound, subtle, and complex the thought, the more necessary is
terminological exactitude.
3. E. Conze, Buddhist Thought in India (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1973),
p, 189.
4. GUf.laprabha's commentary on Vasubandhu's Pancaskandhaprakarana: Derge
Tanjur si Ibl-3Ib7. Unfortunately, when working on this text, I neglected to take down
the specific page numbers. Nevertheless the quotation will be found to be accurate.
19
5. M. Hattori, tr. Dignaga on Perception, being the Pratyaksa pariccheda of Dia-n-,
. " ".,agas
Prama'!osamuccaya (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P., 1968), sec. C. of Skt. text (pa es
unnumbered in Skt.). like is named after (sec.
The two are not exactly Identical, smce vlJiiana appears wlthm the discussIOn of pratyafl.!ja as
its specificity (where vijiuina has at least two aspects [according to the logicians in general]
object-cognition [v4ayavijnana] and the cognition of that cognition). But it is clear tha;
they both are within the range of meaning of the English word perception. At any rate,
they bear much closer resemblance to each other than either does to "consciousness"
which is something else entirely. "
6. W. Rahula, What the Buddha Taught (New York: Grove Press, 1959), p. 23. In
case anyone wonders why Theravada sources are used in the discussion of a Mahayana
text, it is because the meaning of standard Abhidharma technical terms is the same in
both traditions. The Mahayanists after all built their Abhidharma thought on the same
early-Buddhist foundations.
7. Hattori, op. cit. Sec. Daa-2.
8. See n. 4 above.
9. Lac cit.
10. Derge Tanjur shi 195b6 ff.
II. Rahula lac. cit.
12. See n. 4 above.
13. This quotation also warns us against seeing the SP as a self. i It is a kind of
continuity (santana), to be sure, that plants for instance are continuities without selfhood
(a supposed self in plants is one of a number of wrong views refuted by the Buddha in one
of the Hinayana Sutras). In the Ratnarasi Siitra quoted by Santideva
Bendall, p. 201, Vaidya p. Ill, Eng. trans. p. 195) plants are stated to be asvamika and
amama (without "I" or "mine"). As Rahula says, "If we can understand that in his life we
can continue without a permanent, unchanging substance like Self or Soul, why can't we
understand that those forces themselves can continue without a Self or Soul behind them
after the non-functioning of the body?" (Ibid., p. 33. He also points out, p. 65 n. I, that the
Laitluivatiira emphatically denies selfhood in the Alayavijiuina or Tatluigatagarbha, p. 68 ff ..
of Suzuki, pp. 78-79 of SkL) That a continuity is not a self is implicit in the Vajracchedikii,
which denies atman, sattva,jiua, and pudgala, but not continuity, or functioning entities in
general. The accusation that the Yogacarins tend towards a self-theory is simply without
foundation.
14. Moha or mlldhi, mClna, and raga or sneha are four of the six passions, a
subdivision within the mentals (caittadharma). These four dhannos, then, when associated
with the illusion of , It man, are the constant accompaniments of the.manas. Five other
elements also accompany it, according to Sthiramati in his commentary to Vasubandhu's
TrirrlSiha: the five "everpresents" (sarvatraga) [that 1 have listed in the List of Technical
Terms]'
20
The Realm of Enlightenment in Vifiiapti-
1niitratii: The Formulation of the "Four
'Kinds of Pure Dharmas"
by Noriaki Hakamaya*
(Translated, from the Japanese,
6yJohrt Keenan)
Buddhist doctrine (buddha-desanii)had its beginning with the fact that
Gotama Siddhattha was awakened (buddha) to the truth (dharma), and
enunciated that inner experience in doctrinal teaching (dharma, i.e.,
desana). The subsequent history of Buddhist doctrine thematizes the
question of just how one can personally realize such an inner experi-
ence of enlightenment. In short, at its inception Buddhist doctrine
passed from the realm of inner enlightenment to that of enunciated
doctrine, while the subsequent history of doctrine passes from the
realm of enunciated doctrine to that of inner enlightenment.
However, inasmuch as words are unable to express inner experi-
'ence just as it is, the realm of enlightenment, which is mediated in the
words of doctrinal discourse, became somewhat distorted.
1
Thus, a
negative attitude developed in regard to words, for truth transcends
verbal expression (nirabhiliipya). The tradition repeats that this inner
experience of the realm of enlightenment (buddha) could be under-
stood only by another one so enlightened (i.e., a Buddha).2 But it is a
clear, objective fact that the passage from doctrine to enlightenment
* Translator'!; Note: Central to any religious thought is the notion ofthe ultimate,
This article treats the nature of the ultimate of Yogacara thinking, one of the founda-
tional synthesis of Mahayana doctrine. It thus deals with notions that are basic to all later
Mahayana thinking. It has been a strong point of Japanese Buddhology to interpret
,Chinese and Japanese doctrinal endeavours in light of their earlier Indian predecessors,
for without a clear understanding of Madhyamika and Y ogacara, later thinking has no
context in which to be interpreted,
Professor Hakamaya received his training at Tokyo University, and currently
holds a teaching position at Komazawa University in Tokyo. This article first appeared in
Komazawadaigaku Bukkyogakubu-Kenkyiikiyo, N. 34 (1976), pp, 1-46,
21
does indeed characterize the Buddhism of later times. On the other
hand, there was a conscious, subjective attempt to restore the inner
realization of enlightenment through doctrinal discourse, rather than
to regard enlightenment as ascertainable only by inner experience. Itis
this conscious endeavour that constitutes the internal history of
Buddhist doctrine. The everyday tendancy to move from words to
understanding is analyzed in such an endeavour, for the movement
from doctrinal discourse to enlightenment replaces the tendency to
move from direct insight to words.
3
Such an endeavour probably
formed the context in which the Yogacara masters first formulated
their thinking.
The present article does not attempt to describe the entire formu_
lation of enlightenment in Vijiiaptimiitratii, but rather? from the above
perspective, will examine the teaching concerning "The Four Kinds of
Pure Dharmas," i.e., the realm of in the context of the
trisvabhiiva doctrine, which is the fundamental insight of Vijiiaptimatrata.
This examination will be divided into four sections: 1) the realm
of enlightenment as expressed in doctrinal interpretations, that is, the
four kinds of pure dharmas, 2) verbal expression as doctrine and the
inner subjectivity of the practitioner, that is, the relationship between
the purity of object (alambana-vyavadiina) and the purity of path (marga-
vyavadiina) , 3) the relationship between the realm of enlightenment
and the inner subjectivity of everyday verbalization, that is, the relation-
ship between original purity (prakrti-vyavadiina) and dependent co-aris-
ing (paratantra), and 4) the realm of enlightenment as the radical re-
orientation of verbal activity, that is, the formulation of undefiled
purity (vaimalya-vyavadiina).
I
The Vijiiaptimiitra synthesis developed from a new awareness of
the meaning of the earlier scriptures, principally of the Prajiiaparamitri
literature. This new awareness was embodied in the trisvabhiiva doctrine.
4
In clarifying and re-interpreting these earlier Mahayana scriptures
(vaipulya) of the Prajiia lineage, Asanga thematized this trisvabhava in
chapter two, section twenty-six of his Mahiiyiinasa7[tgraha:
5
22
The Mahayanistic Vaipulyas
6
were spoken by the Buddha-Bhagavat,
and in this teaching the question is raised as to how one is to under-
stand the nature of mere imagining (parikalpita-svabhriva). It should
be understood as being synomyous with (paryriya) non-existence
(nristi). How should one understand the nature of dependent co-
arising (paratantra-svabhriva)? It should be understood to be like
(upama) a magical trick (mriyri), a mirage (marici), a dream (svapna),
a reflection (pratibhrisa) , an image (pratibimba) , an echo (prati-
srutkaj, as the moon's reflection in water (udakacandra), as a trans-
formation (nirmita). How should one understand the nature of
full perfection (parini
0
panna-svabhriva)? It should be understood
through the teaching of the four kinds of pure dharmas (caturvi-
dho vyavadrina-dharmalJ,). Among these four, the first is original
purity (prakrti-vyavadrina) , that is, suchness (tathataj, emptiness
(siinyata), reality (bhiitakofi), the unmarked (animitta), the highest
truth (paramiirtha). It is equivalent to the dharmadhritu. The second
is undefiled purity (vaimalya-vyavadrina),1 that is, the same [origi-
nal purity] inasmuch as it is free from all obstacles. The third is
the purity of path (mrirga-vyavadrina), which attains to the [unde-
filed purity], that is, all virtues (dharma) favorable to enlighten-
ment (bodhiprik0ikrih sarva-dharmrih). The fourth is the purity of
object (rilambana-vyavadrina), which gives rise to that [path], namely,
the doctrine of the true dharma of the Mahayana (mahriyrina-sad-
dharma). Because this [doctrine] is the cause of purity (vyavadrina-
hetutva), it is not merely imagined (parikalpita). Because it is the
outflow of the pure dharmadhritu (viSuddha-dharmadhritu-ni[jandatva),
it is not dependently co-arisen (paratantra). All pure dharmas are
included in this fourfold purity ..
Concerning this the versess say: Magical tricks etc. are pro-
claimed in regard to that which is produced (bhuta, i.e. paratantra) ,
and non-existence in regard to that which is imagined (parikal-
pita), and the four kinds of purity in regard to full perfection
(parini.<;panna). These purities are original purity, undefiled purity,
purity of path, and purity of object. All pure dharmas are
included in these four kinds of purity.
This passage is most important as a source for the interpretation
of the earlier Mahayana scriptures (vaipulya) in terms of the trisvabhriva
doctrine,9 but we here limit ourselves to an examination of the four
kinds of purity, which are explained as parini
0
panna-svabhriva, because
in this explanation the specific Yogacara understanding of enlighten-
ment is described. Vasubandhu comments on these purities:
23
Understand that wherever any of these four kinds of purity is
explained, there is Mahayana, and know that this is the manifesta-
tion of parini
0
panna of the trisvabhriva. 10
Thus the broad meaning of enlightenment, which is scattered
among the various Mahayana scriptures, is summarized under the
theme of this fourfold purity. Vasubandhu continues:
The fI:-st two of these four kind.s of purity are
(nzrvzkiira), and are the full perfection of full perfection, while th
last two, being unfailing (aviparyasa), are full perfection.
ll
e
This passage corresponds to verse eleven of chapter three of the
Madhyantavibhaga, which explains that "because parin4panna is both
unchangeable and unfailing, it is of two kinds." 12 The passage from the
Madhyantavibhaga is given as the response to the question of how the
path, being a conditioned dharma (sa1flSkrta), can be termed parin4panna.
This inclusion of the path within has a close connection
with the interpretation of the three meanings of paramartha as object
(artha), realization (prapti), and practice (pratipatti)Y In these three
meanings the compound parama-artha is to be understood respectively
as a tatpurw;a, karmadharaya, and bahuvrihi compound. 14 Artha-para_
martha, the truth of the ultimate object, is tathata, i.e., paramartha as the
object of transcendent wisdom (paramasya jitanasyartha}!,). Praptipara-
martha, realized ultimate truth, is nirva7}a, i.e. paramartha itself becomes
the transcendent object (paramo' arthalJ). Partipatti-paramartha, the ulti-
mate truth of practice, is paramartha inasmuch as the path of practice
refers to that which has ultimate meaning (paramo 'syarthalj,). 15 The path
is not itself paramartha, but inasmuch as it bears ultimate meaning, or is
in harmony with ultimate truth, it pertains to as unfailing
(aviparyasa). Tathata, which isjust as it is, whether one be conscious of it
or not, and nirva7}a, which embodies tathata in one's consciousness, are
both the unchangeable realm of enlightenment. But the conscious
practice (pratipatti-paramartha), which leads to these, is subject to .
change. However, because such consciousness has the realm of enlighten-
ment as its objective, it does not turn away from (aviparyasa) that
enlightenment, and, as such, is included in the broad meaning of the
realm of enlightenment.
We can outline the relationships of the explanations of the
MahiiyanasaT(lgraha vis-a-vis the Madhyantavibhiiga as follows: Parini:jpanna
embraces:
A) The unchangeable realm of enlightenment, which includes:
24
I) Original purity <prakrti-vyavadana), i.e., the truth of the ultimate
object (artha-paramartha read as a compound), which
. is the object of
2) Undefiled purity (vaimalya-vyavadana) , i.e., realized ultimate
truth (prapti-paramtirtha read as a karma dhiiraya compound).
:6) The unfailing harmony with that realm of enlightenment, which
includes:
I) Purity of Path (marga-vyavadiina) , i.e., the ultimate truth of
practice (pratipatti-paramartha read as a bahuvr-ihi compound),
which takes as object
2) Purity of object (alambana-vyavadana)-
The correspondence of purity of path (mtirga-vyavadana) to
practice (pratipatti-paramartha) is clear, for both treat of the path. Again
both texts similarly take undefiled purity (vaimalya-vyavadana) or reali-
zation (prapti-paramtirtha) as nirvii'T}a and consider it the result of prac-
tice. Furthermore, Sthiramati explains it as undefiled (nirmala) tathata. 16
However, the correspondence between original purity (prakrt;i-vyava-
diina) and the truth of the ultimate object (artha-paramartha) is not quite
clear. But, since both texts do identify them as tathata, one can conclude
that they do correspond, although the MahayiinasaT(tgraha's treatment
seems to be much fuller. Also, in their commentaries on the Mahayana-
;aT(Lgraha, both Vasubandhu and Asvabhava interpret prakr:ti-vyavadana
as tathagata-garbha, the "matrix of tathagatahood.
17
And both texts
agree that the fullness of the world just as it is (tathata) is tathiigata-garbha,
whether people are conscious of it or not. They further agree that such
is realized and known only by saints (paramasya i.e .
. tatpurU.)a compound). In his commentary Asvabhava interprets para-
martha as one of the synonyms of prakr:ti-vyavadtina. Although he
probably knew about the three interpretations of paramartha, he simply
interprets paramartha as a tatpuru}a compound, thus emphasizing that
the meaning of paramartha in regard to prakr:ti-vyavadtina is that which is
the object of the highest wisdom. 18
Thus, the first three of the four kinds of purity do correspond to
the three meanings of paramartha. But to what does the Mahayiina-
saT(Lgraha's purity of object correspond? This purity of object, just as the
purity of path, is included in the question of how a conditioned dharma
can yet be parini}panna, i.e. paramiirtha. Doctrine is expressed in words,
and such verbal expression is conventional (saT(tvrt;i) rather than ultimate
" (paramtirtha). 19 However, as the outflow of the pure dharmadhiitu (viluddha-
dharma-dhatu-ni}yanda) , doctrine is included within paramiirtha. This
paradoxical characteristic of doctrine is perhaps why the Mahayana-
saT(Lgraha's notion of alambana-vyavadana is not found in the Madhiiyana-
25
vibhaga. But we should carefully note that both purity of path and
purity of object involve the inner subjectivity of practice, and are both
objects of such practice. Both have this paradoxical nature, and both
are open to the same question. Due to the trisvabhava doctrine, both
play an important role in Vijiwpitmatrata, for the central theme of tri_
svabhava is that the inner subjectivity of practice is dependently co-arisen.
II
In the Madyantavibhaga, parmartha is explained in contrast to
sa1[lm:ti. Its explanation interprets the two truths, which were pro-
pounded in the Prajiiaparamita and Maahyamika literatures,20 in the
context of trisvabhava. Just as there are three meanings for paramartha,
so there are three meanings for sa1[lvrti, namely, conceptualization
(prajiiapti-sa1[lvrti), practice (pratipatti-sa1[l vrti), 21 and manifestation
(udbhavana-sa1[lvrti). These correspond respectively to that which is
imagined, the dependently co-arisen, and the fully perfected.
22
Thus
this interpretation differs from the three meanings of paramrirtha, in
which all three meanings are However, the third meaning
of sa1[lvrti as manifestation includes both sa1[lvrti and and
it is this that corresponds to the purity of objects. Since the text of the
}V1adhyantavibhaga is not entirely clear on this point, we will examine the
commentary of Sthiramati:
Sa1[lvrti as manifestation is an instruction by means of such syno-
nyms as emptiness (Sunyataj, suchness (tathataj, defilement (samala),
and undefilement (nirmala) , even although trans-
cends analytical understanding (vikalpa) and verbal expression
(abhilapa).23
When one indicates (sa1[lsucana) the dharmadhatu, which trans-
cends verbal expression (nirabhilapya), by means of words, such as
tathata, etc., then the manifestation (udbhavanaj and verbal expres-
sion (vyavahara), which arise from this treatment of dharmadhatu,
are sa1[lvrti as manifestation (udbhavanaj. 24
Manifestation as verbal activity in regard to dharmadhatu (dharma-
dhator vyavaharalf) is then quite similar in content to the purity of object
(alambana-vyavadana) , whereby doctrine is the outflow of the pure
dharmadhiitu. However, there is the important difference that, while the
26
former has the characteristics of both sa7[lvrti and parini!;panna, the latter
is defined only as p a r i n i ~ p a n n a , even although it is not the unchange-
able realm of enlightenment. The purity of object (alambana-vyavadana) ,
since it occurs in the path (marga) as conscious practice (pratipattipara-
rruirtha) does reflect everyday verbal activity, in which words lead to
understanding. But the main point emphasized in the explanation of
rilambana-vyavadana is the inner experience that is in harmony with and
flowS from direct insight out into words, from the realm of enlighten-
ment into doctrine. In contrast, sa7[lvrti as manifestation (udbhavana) ,
i.e., meaning verbally manifested, does nothing more than indicate
parini!;panna categories of thought. Within such limits, even parini!;panna
is located within the sphere of sa7[lvrti, because it is verbal expression. 25
On this level, the inner subjectivity of unconscious practice (pratipatti-
sar(lvrti) passes from words to understanding, and has the constant
danger of objectifying (prajiiaptisa7[lvrti, i.e., parikalpita) even doctrine
concerning p a r i n i ~ p a n n a , and turning it into conceptual knowledge
(prajiiapti) .
This same danger is present in regard to the purity of object, and
this is why Asanga emphasizes that it is neither that which is imagined
(parikalpita) nor the dependently co-arisen (paratantra). Asvabhava
does not comment in any detail upon the purity of object,26 but Vasu-
bandhu does take up Asanga's text:
With regard t_o the phrase "the purity of object, which gives rise to
this [path],"Z7 because all the virtues favorable to enlightenment
(bodhipak<jika-dharma) give rise to clear insight (abhisamaya), and,
because they are objects, they are "objects which give rise." More-
over, because they are pure, they are said to be "the purity of
object, which gives rise to this [path]." This is also the teaching of
the sutra, [geya], etc. in the twelve-section canon (dvadaSanga-
vacogata).28 Such being the case, whatever kind of doctrine arises
from that which is imagined (parikalpita), arises from impure
(samklda) causes. And whatever arises co-dependently (paratantra)
is not true. But, since it is the outflow of the pure dharmadhatu, [the
purity of object] is neither of these, is not untrue, and arises from
parini!;panna itself. 29
This commentary ofVasubandhu regards that which is imagined
and the dependently co-arisen as positive conventional dharmas and
describes them in a negative fashion even more than does Asanga in
the principal text, probably because (Vasubandhu) was intensely aware
27
of the above-mentioned danger. For when doctrine is conceptuall .
understood (parikalpita) in the passage from words to understandin:
then it will issue in verbal activity that is unconscious of paramarth ' .
. a
(pratipatti-sa7[Lvrti, i.e. paratantra). When doctrine is verbally expressed
by an inner subjectivity (paratantra) of unreal imagining (abhiitapari_
kalpa), then it is not true. Doctrine is constantly faced with this danger;
But doctrine itself, according to Vasubandhu, is the outflow of
pure dharmadhatu and is not subject to change, although the inner
subjectivity of the practitioner may be either conscious (pararniirtha) or
unconscious (sa7[Lvrtz) of the function of words in regard to paramiirtha.3o
The term dharmadhatu in the phrase viSuddha-dharmadhatu-n4yanda
is synonymous with prakrti-vyavadana, and can be expressed by other
similar terms, such as tathata, sunyata, bhiitakoti, animitta, and paramartha.
But within the limits that it is pure, i.e., as viSuddhi, it corresponds
rather to vaimalya-vyavadana.
31
Outflow means flowing out
of the same essence (sadrsal: syandal:), a result that is consistent with that
[essence] (tad-anuriipam phalam).32 How then does this outflow of the
pure dharmadhatu relate to the four kinds of pure dharmas? Doctrine
flows out from the same essence, and is a consistent result of the
dharmadhatu of undefIled purity. It takes as its object original purity.
Such doctrine is manifested to an inner subjectivity which is conscious
of paramartha, and in which the purity of path issues in the purity of
object. Doctrinal eunuciation, to be of the same essence as dharmadhatu,
implies the presence of one who has realized undefiled purity, which
intends original purity as its object. The inner experience of such
wisdom is termed non-discriminative wisdom (nirvikalpa-jiiana). But
doctrine is not the realm of no thought or no words.
33
Although this
inner experience is said to transcend verbal expression (nirabhilapya),
yet such intensely aware consciousness does manifest itself in verbal
expression. Even although it does indeed transcend such expression,
nevertheless, of necessity, it attempts to embody the directly experienced
insight in words.
34
At the initial moment, the object given in the
wisdom of undefiled purity (paramasya jiianasyarthal:, i.e. nirvikalpa-
jiianasyarthal],) i.e. the dharmadhtitu of viSuddha-dharmadhtitu, flows out as
the doctrine of wisdom and non-duality. This is doctrine as the outflow
of the pure dharmadhatu. And such is none other than the passage from
enlightenment to doctrine.
In the inner subjectivity of conscious practice (pratipattiparamartha)
doctrine issues forth in such a passage from direct insight into words,
rather than passing from words to understanding. This is vividly
28
'described in the A!itasahasrikii-Prajiuiparamita:
Truly, when doctrine (dharma, i.e. deSanaj is enunciated by the
Tathagata, those who cultivate that doctrine (dharma-deSanaj gain
insight into (sakSatkurvanti) and bear in mind (dharayanti) that
dharmata. And, having insight into, and bearing it in mind, what-
ever they say, or explain, or relate, or speak,,or clarify, or under-
stand is all in accord with that dharmata. Oh, Sariputra, such good
sons, when they narrate that dharmata, in nowise contradict it,
because such is the outflow of the certain doctrine of the Tathagata
(tathagata-dharma-desanaj. 3 5
Haribhadra explains that at the stage of nirvedbhagiya (i.e. that
which conduces to insight, the third stage of the path), one cultivates
the manifested doctrine, at darsanamarga (the path of insight) one gains
direct insight into it, and at bhavanamarga (the path of meditation) one
bears it in mind.
36
This explanation re-arranges the simpler Prajiia-
paramita exposition of the necessity of direct insight. In order to under-
stand doctrine, the dharmata must first be given in direct experience.
And then, by the radical re-orientation of the conventions of everyday
words, one experiences the passage from enlightenment to words, in
an outflow from direct insight into words. Spoken words then do not
run counterlo the realm of enlightenment. Those who have had such a
direct insight do enunciate meaning and embody it in words, as did the
sutra writers. In support of this, the thrust of poetic understanding cuts
through the conventions of everyday speech.
37
Thus Vijiiaptimatrata seeks for a radical directional re-orientation
from the passage from words to understanding to the passage from
direct insight to words. It takes as its source the Prajiiaparamita litera-
ture,38 and affirms such an occurrence in an inner subjectivity (asraya)
that is clearly dependently co-arisen. This is why Vijiiaptimatrata so
throughly analyzes this inner subjectivity of practice (pratipatti, i.e.
asraya) in its relationship to original purity.
III
In the Vijiiaptimritra systematization, everything is included within
dharmadhatu, which is prakrJi-vyavadana. It is important to emphasize
this point, for although Vijiiaptimatrata is formulated in the trisvabhava
thesis, and systematically analyzed in the related explanations of iilaya-
29
vijfuina, yet this entire endeavour is carried out from the prior direct
insight into dharmadhatu. The term vijiiaptimatra itself is an expression
of direct insight. A contrasting term is found in verse eighty-one of
chapter nine of the Mahayanasiitralarrz,kiira:
Bodhi (wisdom) is said to have been attained by those non-discri_
minative bodhisattvas, who have seen that everything that has
been explained is merely discrimination (kalpana-mritra).39
According to the commentary, the phrase "everything that has
been explained" refers to the mind previously attained (aupalambhika)
in contrast to bodhi.
40
Even though this insight is attributed only to
bodhisattvas, it probably also applies to the generality of people, for the
all-inclusive consciousness of both vijiiapti-matra and kalpanri-mritra is
given in a completely non-discriminative direct insight. One who has
had such an experience knows that he himself is included in dharma-
dhatu, i.e., in prakrti-vyavadana. Being so aware, he progresses along the
path of alambana-vyavadrina to marga-vyavadana and vaimalya-vyavadrina.
This systematization of object, practice, and result is clearly reflected in
the Vijiiaptimatrata literature. 41
However, what of the inner subjectivity that is unconscious of
paramartha (pratipatti-sarrz,vrti)? Certainly it is also included within the
originally pure dharmadhatu, which is, as mentioned above, also termed
tathagata-garbha. One must note carefully that here tathagata-garbha is
simply another way of expressing prakrti-vyavadana. To borrow Vasu-
bandhu's own terminology, whenever tathagata-gaTbha is explained,
there is Mahayana, because it explains the original purity of the four
pure dharmas.
42
Thus, it is a mistake to interpret Vijiiapti-matratri by
means of such tathagata-garbha thought as systematized in the Ratna-
gotravibhaga. But it is also a mistake to reject the notion of original
purity in Vijiiapti-matrata simply because it rejects that version of tathri-
gata-garbha. The first seems to be no longer present in the scholarly
community, but the second has not yet been entirely eradicated.
Nevertheless, there is no contradiction between prakrti-vyavadana and
the vijiiapti-matra thesis. Original purity includes all beings just as they
are, whether they are conscious of it or not. But at the basis (asraya) of
their conscious activity there is a contradiction. In analyzing the nature
of this conscious subjectivity, Vijiiaptimatrata does recognize that beings,
just as they are, are enmeshed in this contradiction. This is why Asanga
30
says that paratantra is not entirely non"existent.
43
Furthermore, Asariga's
statement, that if paratantra is non-existent, there would be no parini-
is further explained by Asvabhava to mean that even if both
were non-existent, parini
0
panna as prakr:ti-vyavadiina would still exist,
even though as vaimalya-vyavadiina it would not exist. 44 Thus, the
denial of the paratantric nature of inner subjectivity implies the non-
existence of undefiled purity as the conscious attainment of the result.
But even in this case, original purity would still be universal and
unchangeable. But it is only when the wisdom, which is the result of
undefiled purity (paramasya jiiiinasya) gains insight into original purity
(artha), which includes even unconscious beings (paramasya
i.e., prakr:ti-vyavadiina) just as it-is, that one becomes conscious of original
purity. Through the insight of such wisdom, the doctrine of the iilaya-
vijiiiina is formulated in the context of the trisvabhiiva. Thus the rela-
tionship between inner subjectivity and doctrine is the relationship
between the purity of path and the purity of object, which obtains in the
case of one who is subjectively conscious of paramiirtha. In the case of
one who is not so conscious, the relationship of his inner subjectivity to
doctrine is still defiled, and, while being included within original
purity, constitutes the relationship between paratantra (everyday con-
sciousness) and parikalpita (conceptualized doctrine). But, whether
conscious or not, doctrine arises in synergy with the same basic inner
subjectivity (asraya), and it is herein that the contradiction of conscious-
ness is most deep.
This relationship is set forth in the explanatin of the famous verse
on the beginningless dhiitu.
45
Asvabhava's commentary rightly indicates
that this contradiction exists within the same inner subjectivity:
31
"The dhiitu without beginning, etc." is without beginning (aniidi-
kiilika) because it has no limits for its arising (dang po'i mu, piirva-
koti). Dhiitu means cause (hetu), seed (bija). But what kind of cause
is it? It is the cause of all defiled dharmas (sarrtklesa-dharma), and not
the cause of the pure (vyavadiina). As is said in the next [chapter],
"the basis (iisraya), which becomes permeated by much listening
(bahu-sruta) is not comprised in iilaya-vijiiiina, but, being seeds,
just as is iilaya-vijiiiina, they are comprised in correct reflection
(yoniSo-manasikiira)."46 Because it means "holding, (rten, dhrti)," it is
"the basis of all dharmas (sarvadharma-samasraya)," and not because
it is their cause. The meaning of holding is the meaning of basis
(asraya), and since it does not have the meaning of cause, the term
"basis" is also employed. If this were not so, then the term "dhiitu"
alone would be sufficient.
47
_ This passage from Asvabhava explains the basic text of Asanga. 4&
Alaya consciousness is the cause only of defilement, i.e., of illusion, and
Asanga frequently indicates this contradictory nature of alaya-vij'iiana
in contrast to the hearing of doctrine (sruta-vasanaj within the same
inner subjectivity. It is not that consciousness is a mixture of both truth
and illusion.
49
The term dhatu in the original verse may refer to the
foundation (asraya) of all dharmas, and include both truth and illusion
but, if it be interpreted as alaya-vijnana, then, in the Yogacara
tion, it must be understood only as the cause of defilement.
The interpretation of dhritu as tathrigata-garbha is a separate and
distinct tradition. V&'naptimatrata simply takes the Mahayana teaching
that saroa-sattvris tathagata-garbha (all beings are the womb of tathagata)
to refer to prakrti-vyavadana, and does not expatiate on the point. Thus,
inner subjectivity (sattva) , which is grounded upon alaya-vij'nana, is only
illusion, but it is included within prakrti-vyavadana. The practice of
listening to doctrine (5ruta-vasana) , which issues in the awareness of this
contradictory nature of consciousness, is marga-vyavadana, even though
it occurs within the same inner subjectivity. Such a radical reorienta-
tion, which occurs in the same inner subjectivity, is a direct reversal,
and Vijnaptimritrata sees such as the ouflow of the pure dharmadhatu
(visuddha-dharmadhritu-ni
0
yanda). In such a process, it is natural that
Vijnaptimritratri emphasizes that it is difficult to reveal alaya-vij'nana to
ordinary persons, who yet remain unconscious that it is the basis of
their inner subjectivity. 50 The foremost characteristic of rilaya is verbal
permeation (abhiluapa-vsanii),51 which is the passage from words to
understanding. However, the consciousness of this situaion,just as it is,
is bodhi, i.e., the passage from direct insight to words. Such a passage is
disrupted by the use of verbal meanings, for in their basic nature words
are unsuitable to enunciate direct insight. The basic capability of words
is to communicate, to describe. They are intended to evoke action, to
point to things. As such, words reflect the process whereby knowledge
selects from reality,52 and their efficacy is always selective and particular-
ized. Everyday understanding (vikalpa) is dependent upon the accumula-
tion of such selective knowledge in verbal traditions (abhilripa-viisanii'),
and only from this matrix can one move on to an understanding of new
affairs. But the understanding of new affairs, just as they are (tathatii'),
is not possible from a matrix of already-known verbalized thoughts.
53
Such an understanding demands a radical re-orientation of inner sub-
jectivity. This re-orientation is thematized as asraya-parivrtti, and is
nothing other than vaimalya-vyavadiina. In a word, this is the realm of en-
lightenment. Let us then turn to a fuller consideration of undefIled purity.
32
IV
Asvabhava, in his commentary, considers vaimalya-vyavadana as
self-evident: "This phrase is explained by itself."54 But Vasubandhu
adds some further explanation:
Vaimalya-vyavadana means that the very same tathata becomes
buddhata, which is characterized (prabhavita) as pure tathata,
inasmuch as it is free from the defilements of the obstacles, of
passion and knowledge. 55
The phrase "this very same certainly refers to prakrti-
vyavadana, for prakrti-vyavadana and vaimalya-vyavadana are the same
tathata. However, the latter is different, inasmuch as it is buddhata, the
attainment of that pre-eminent wisdom (paramasya jitanasya) ,
whereby one's inner subjectivity is radically re-orientated to that tathatii,
which is severed from (praha1Ja) the obstacles of passion and knowledge.
It is the result of consdous practice (pratipatti-paramartha). Sthiramati is
essentially in agreement with this commentary of Vasubandhu when
he explains the phrase prapti-paramartha in the Madhyantavibhaga as:
It has as its characteristic the re-orientation of the basis (asraya-
paravrtti) which is entirely undefiled (ekanta-nirmala) tathata.
56
Vaimalya-vyavadana, as the result of practice, is a unitary inner
experience, in which the severance from obstacles and the attainment
of wisdom are not two different things. The former emphasizes the
negative aspect of severance, the latter the positive aspect of wisdom.
The term that comprehends both of these aspects is bodhi. In the Bodhi-
pa!ala chapter of the Bodhisattvabhumi, bodhi is described as being both
the severance from the two obstacles, of passion and knowledge, and as
the corresponding establishment of the two kinds of wisdom. 57 In the
Bodhyadhikara chapter of the Mahayanasutralar[!kara, where bodhi is
thematized in verses fifty-six to seventy-six, the positive aspect is
emphasized. 58 Both Sthiramati and Asvabhava recognize the internal
unity of these verses, and offer almost the same commentary. For
reasons of space, we give the commentary of Asvabhava only:
33
After explaining the maturation of sentient beings (sattva-paripaka),
[the Mahayanasutralar[!karal discusses dharmadhatu-visuddhi. What
is their inner relationship (sar[!bandhana)? This relationship is
explained as bodhi. The text stated above:
By means of hundreds of difficult practices, having performed
rare ascetical practices, having amassed all good, havin
traversed a great time period (mahiikalpa) and
ages, having severed all obstacles, because he has destroyed
even the most subtle obstacle in all the bhumis: such is buddhata
!hus it is . like the opening of a basket that contains many
Jewels, WhICh has vast powers.
59
In this manner we have considered bodhi in general. After this
the text investigated the maturation of sentient beings from
state (avasthii) of having attained buddhatii. Bodhi is examined
from the aspects of its proper nature (svabhiiva), cause (hetu)
result (phala), activity (karman), associated [qualities] (yoga), and
function (vrtti).60 Thus is bodhi discussed.
But what does the bodhisattva cultivate? He cultivates the
seven stages (gnas bdun pO)61 from the stage that benefits both
himself and others to that of bodhi itself. Up to this point, bodhi has
been considered in a broad sense as it appears in all the sutras,62
but [in this part] it is considered as it appears in a particular sutra.
It is for this reason that the text takes dharmadhiitu-visuddhi as its
theme, and thus is correct. In the Buddhabhumi-sutra it says: "The
stage of Buddha (buddhabhumi) is comprised by the five dharmas,
namely, the dharmadhiitu-viSuddhi (the immaculate ultimate realm),
iidarSanajiiiina (mirror wisdom), samatiijniina (equality wisdom),
pratyaveh;anajniina (wondrous insight wisdom), and krtyiinWithana-
jniina (performance wisdom)."63 Because the Buddhabhumisiitra
first thematized dharmadhiitu-viSuddi, so it is treated first [in this
text]. Thus the analysis of the five dharmas must proceed as they
are given in the Mahiiyiinabuddhabhumisutra.
64
Dharmadhiitu-visuddhi is here understood as the object of the four
wisdoms, but this does not imply that it is to be equated with prakrti-
vyavadiina.
65
Rather, both the four wisdoms and dharmadhiitu-viSuddhi
are vaimalya-vyavadiina. This is so because verse fifty-six,66 which
explains the nature (svabhiiva) of dharmadhiitu-visuddhi, states that its
characteristic is tathatii severed from the defilements of the obstades of
passion and knowledge, and is also the unexhausted supernatural
power in both vastu1niina (i.e., tat-pnthalabdha1niina) and tad-iilambana-
jiiiina (i.e., nirvikalpa-jniina).67 Since this commentary parallels the
above description of bodhi, which is characterized as both serverance
and wisdom, dharmadhiitu-viSuddhi must pertain to vaimalya-vyavadiina.
In this understanding the terms dharmadhiitu-visuddhi and dharmadhiitu
are not synonyms. Dharmadhiitu, which is synonymous with prakrti-
vyavadiina, is the object of non-discriminative wisdom (tad-iilambana-
jniina) of dharmadhiitu-visuddhi. Thus the word visuddhi is not just an
34
unimportant adjective in the phrase dharmadhiitu-visuddhi, but is rather
to be taken in the same meaning as vaimalya. Dharmadhiitu-visuddhi is
thuS definitely not prakrti-vyavadiina.
The terms "resultative severance" and "resultative wisdom"
. emphasize severance and wisdom as the result of miirga-vyavadiina.
These topics are treated, respectively, in chapters nine and ten of the
Mahayanasaf(lgraha,68 as asraya-parivrtti and trikiiya.
69
But, if dharma-
dhtitu-visuddhi be identified with prakrti-vyavadiina, as the object of
wisdom (jiiiina) , then iisraya-pariivrtti, the radical re-orientation of
consciousness, loses much of its meaning, because its specific charac-
teristic is not original purity. Asraya-parivrtti takes place in the inner
subjectivity of the unconscious practitioner (iilaya-vijiiiina, i.e., para tan-
. tra), which is included within prakrti-vyavadiina. This inner subjectivity
then becomes vaimalya-vyavadiina, through the mediation of miirga-
vyavadiina, and cannot be termed prakrti-vyavadiina. Since that inner
subjectivity of the unconscious practitioner cannot of itself become
conscious of paramiirtha, the hearing of doctrine (sutra-viisanii), which
depends on iilambana-vyavadiina, is necessary.
Thus, the main import of this article is to describe the process
whereby the inner subjectivity that is unconscious of paramiirtha is
radically re-oriented to become so conscious, within all-inclusive
prakrti-vyavadiina, and, within this process, to examine the verbal enun-
ciation of the realm of enlightenment as asraya-parivrtti, which passes
from iilambana-vyavadiina (doctrine) to miirga-vyavadiina (practice), to
issue in vaimalya-v.'Yavadiina (realization). The development of the tri-
svabhava thesis seems to have occurred in tandem with the verbalization
bf this process.
If, then, the realm of enlightenment, which has vaimalya-vyavadiina
as its result, is the iisraya-parivrtti of iilaya-vijitiina, then what relation-
ship is there between sruta-viisanii, which plays such a crucial role in .
alaya-vijitana, and iisraya-parivrtti? Asraya-parivrtti specifically means the
. severance of the obstacles of passion and knowledge (kldajiteyiivaraTJa).
In Vijiiaptimiitratii, the severance of passion issues in the body of deliv-
erance (vimukti-kiiya), while the severance of both obstacles issues in
dharma-kiiya. Vimukti-kiiya is accorded but a low value, since it is seen as a
Hinayana result. 70 The severance of the more difficult jiteyiivaraTJa
then becomes a major theme of Mahayana. However, this contrasting
of klesiivaraTJa and jiieyiivararJa is not of ancient usage,? I and probably
developed together with the new understanding of the fundamental
function of iilaya-vijitiina as verbalization (abhiliipa-viisanaj. 72 If such be
35
the case, then we can conjecture that the severance ofjiieyavarana .
. IS
precisely the radical re-orientation of verbalization in alaya-vijiiana
whereby the pas.sage from words to understanding is reversed into th;
issuance of words from direct insight.
NOTES
1. This is the point of the Buddha's hesitation to enunciate the Dharma teaching,
even when importuned to do so by the Brahma Sahampati: "adhigato myaya7(i dhammo
gambhiro dwldaso duranubodJ;o santo par!to atakkavacaro nipuno parz4ita-vedaniYo." (SN, I, p. 136)
2. "tathagata eva Sariputra tathagatasya dharmam desayed yan dharma'f!iS tathagato
janati." (Saddharmapu"!r!arr7w, Nanjio ed., p. 30, 1 L 2-3). Another passage states thatthe
Buddha's wisdom is difficult to understand: "gambhiraJTl Sariputra d u r d ~ s a m duranu_
bodhaJTl buddha-jnanaJTl" (ibid., p. 29, L 2).
3. These two tendencies correspond to the two aspects of speech. In his Cours de
linguistique genera Ie (p. 166), Ferdinand de Saussure writes: "Un systeme linguistique est
une serie de differences de sons combinees avec une serie de differences d'idees." In this
article, then, we distinguish the meaning of words, which corresponds to a series of
thoughts from the physical enunciation of words, which corresponds to a series of
sounds. We understand things because of the meaning of everyday words, and this is the
tendancy from words to understanding. In contrast, as occurs in poetry, a unitary aware-
ness is first enunciated and given in direct insight, and then, from within that direct
insight, draws upon the power of words. This we consider to be the tendancy from direct
insight to words. In general, the former is the verbal understanding of adults, while the
latter can be seen in the verbal learning of children.
Furthermore, in this article the use of the term "direct insight" is quite close to
Bergson's notion of intuition: "Nous appelons ici intuition la sympathie par laquelle on se
trans porte a l'interieur d'un objet pour coincider avec ce qu'il a d'unique et par conse-
quent d'inexprimable." ("La pensee et Ie mouvant," Oeuvres, p. 1395)
4. For the Prajiitiparamitiiliterature, which treats parikalpita, vikalpita, and dharmatii,
and thus has a close relationship with the trisvabhava thesis, confer my article "Miroku
Shomosho Wayaku" in Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyo Gakubu Ronshii, No.6, pp. 210-190.
For an historical consideration of the date of the composition of this chapter, see my "A
Consideration of the Byam ~ u s kyi lehu from the Historical Point of View" in The J oumal of
Indian and Buddhist Studies, vol. XXIV, No.1, Dec. 1975. It appears that Asariga at least
knew about the existence of a Prajiiaparmita passage similar to this chapter.
5. E. Lamotte, Lasomme dugrand vehicle d'Asanga, I, pp. 37-38; II, pp. 120-122.
6. On vaipulya see my article "Asariga no Seitenkan - Abhidharma-samuccaya no
dharrnaviniscaya sho ni tsuite" in Sotoshii Kenkyiiin Kenkyiisei Kenkyii Kiyo, No.4, pp. 26-30.
It is here probably not the name of a particular siitra. Also confer Aramaki Noritoshi,
"Shodaijoron no Etakisho" (Paratantra-svabhava in the lvlahayanasamgraha) in Indogaku
Shironshtl, IV - V, pp. 49-50.
7. Forthe terms vaimalya and prak?ti see Ratnagotravibhaga (Johnston ed., p. 80, II,
15 - 16): "Tatra visuddhif; samiisato dvividhal prakr:ti-visuddhis vaima(ya-viSuddhisca." In the
thought of the Ratnagotravibhaga everything is explained by the relationship between
36
these twO, but in Vijiiaptimiitratii the further two categories of miirga-vyavadiina and iilam-
'bana-vyavadiina fulfill an important role.
8. The Madhyiintavibhiiga quotes this verse, and attributes it to the Abhidharma-
siitra: !vjiiyiidi-desanii bhute kalpitiin niisti-desaniil caturvidha-viSuddhes tu parini:jpanna-desaniil I
suddhih prakrti-vaimalyam iilambanam ca margatiil viSiddhiiniim hi dharmiiniim caturvidha-
grhitam. (Yamaguchi ed., p. 112)
9. See Hattori Masaaki, "Dignaga no Hannyakyo Kaishaku" in Osaka-furitsu
DaigakuKiyo Uimbun-shakai Kagaku) , vol. 9, pp. 12S-129. The same author indicates the
verse in Dignaga'sPrajiiiipiiramitiipi7fdiirtha (E. Frauwallner ed. WZKO, III, p. 142), which
parallels the verse quoted in the above note: prajiiiipiiramitiiyiirrz hi trin samasritya delaniil
};alpitarrz paratantrarrz ca parini:jpannam eva cal I sarvarrz kalpitarrz viniviiryatel
paratantrasya desaniil I caturdhii vyavadiinena
praj'nii-piiramitiiyiirrz hi niinyii buddhasya delanii. This same verse is alluded to in J iianasrl-
mitra's SiikiirasiddhiSiistra and in his Siikarasarrzgrahasutra (A. Thakur ed.,JiiiinaSrZmitrani-
bandhiivali, p. 5050, p. 549). Note that in place of the Mahiiyiinasarrzgraha's vaipulya, the
term prajiiiiparamitii is used.
10. yang gang du roam pa bzhi po de dag las gang yang rung ba zhig bstan pa ni theg pa
chen po stel yongs sugrub pa'i ngo bo ston payin noshes 'di ltarrigparbya'oll (P. ed., No 5551, Li,
ISOb6)
II. de la dang po gnyis ni mi 'gyur baryongs sugrub pa nyid kyi yongs su grub pa'ol! phyi
ma ni phyin ci ma logs par yongs su grub pa yin noll (ibid., ISOb6-7)
12. Niruikiiriiviparyiisa-parin4pattito dvayarrz. (Nagao ed., 41, I, 22)
13. Paramiirtha as practice (pratipatti) is closely related to samvrti as practice (prati-
patti) in the three kinds of sarrzvr:ti. Since the original term is the same, both are correctly
translated as practice. Dependent on whether this practice is conscious of paramiirtha-
satya or not, it is either paramiirtha or sarrzvr:ti. Thus in this article pratipatti-paramiirtha is
rendered as conscious practice, and pratipatti-samvrti as unconscious practice.
14. This interpretation of the grammatical forms is found in Bhavaviveka. See
Ejima Yasunori, "Bhavaviveka Kenkyu I" in ToyoBunkaKenkyujo Kiyo, No. 51, pp. 116-
117, and p. 130.
15. artha-paramiirthas tathatii paramasya jiiiinasyiirtha iti krtvii! priipti-paramiirtho
nirviinarrz paramo'artha iti kr:tviil pratipatti-paramiirtho miirggah paramo'syiitha iti krtvii! (MA V,
Nagao ed., p. 41, II. IS-20)
16. priipti-paramiirtho nirviinam,
(MAVT, Yamaguchi ed., p. 125, II. 19-20)
17. Vasubandhu's commentary reads: de yang de bzhin nyid du yodpa yin nasems can
thams cad laspyi' i mtschan nyid kyis deni yodpa nyidkyi phyirchos thams cad ni de bzhin gshegs pa'i
snyingpo can zhes gsungs soil (lSOa6-7). Asvabhava's reads: de bzhin nyid nigsan du mi 'gyur
ba'i phyir chos thams cad kyi spyi mtshan nyid yin tel de nyid la brten nas sems can thams cad ni de
bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po'ol zhes gsung rab las 'byung ngol! (2S2bl-2). Asvabhava simply
explains tathii as being within prakrti-vyavadiina, while Vasubandhu indicates that every-
thing is contained in prakrti-vyavadiina, but they appear to be in essential agreement. See
TakasakiJik.ido, Nyoraizo shiso no Kenkyu, pp. 329-330 for both commentaries.
IS. don dam pa ni ye shes mchog gis thob par bya ba'i phyir TO! (2S2b34). That which
must be realized by transcendent wisdom refers to the object realized (aTtha), but not to
the realization itself (priipti). His interpretation of paramiirtha means the same as
paramasya jiiiinasyiirtha, i.e., the object of the highest wisdom
37
19. SGf!!vTtir (MA V':C Yamaguchi ed., p. 124, I.l6)
20. See Fang-kuang Pan-jo (T. 8, p. 140a), Ta-hin Pan-jo (T. 8, p. 413c), TaP
an
_'
o
(T. 7, p. 422a), and the Tibetan translation of the PaiicavimSatisahasrika' (P ed., No.
Di, 228bl-3) and the (P ed., No. 732, Phi, 159a2-5). Also confe;
Conze, The Gilgit Manuscript of the II: bodhisattva mahiisattuah
dvayo satyayo sthitva sattvanam dharman desyati. Yaduta samvrti-paramartha-satyayo. (p. 89)',
and its corresponding section in Ta-hin Pan-jo, p. 405a. For an alternate interpretation of
the Madhyamika position, see Takahashi So, "Nagarjuna no Nitaisetsu," Shukyo Kenkyu,
No. 215, pp. 75-97.
21. For pratipatti-samvr:ti see note 13.
22. trividha hi saf!!v,rtih pratipatti-saf!!vr:tz"0! udbhavana-saf!!vrtiS
cal taya saf!!vr:ti-satyatvam muLa-tatve (i.e., svabhava-traye) yathakramam veditavyaml (MAV,
Nagao ed., p. 41, II. 11-13).
23. MAVr, Yamaguchi ed., p. 124, II. 12-14.
24. ibid., p. 124, II. 22-24.
25. Doctrinal explanations that flow from the pure dharmadhatu (dharmadhatu_
n4yanda) are always revealed from the side of Buddha. That is, original purity, as para-
masya is enunciated from the enlightenment of undefiled purity. Con-
ventional truth as manifestation (udbhavana-samvrti) implies the unenlightened use of
words to refer to .
26. de skyed pa 'i phyir dmigs pa rnam par byang ba zhes bya ba La de zhes bya ba ni lam dang
sbyar tel byang chub kyi phyogs la sogs pa'oll (282b7).
27. de skyed pa nyid kyi dmigs pa rnam par byang ba. This translation differs from that
in the immediately preceding note, as it is the work of a different translator.
28. For dvadruanga-vacogata see my "Yuishikisetsu ni okeru Ho to Hossh6"
(Dharma and Dharmata in Vijiiaptimatrata; in Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyo Gakubu Ronshii.,
No.5, p. 157.
29. P ed., No. 5551, Li. 180b2-6.
30. The Madhyantavibhaga!!ka treats the practice (marga-vyavadana) of ordinary
people. before they reach darsana-marga as follows: "Why does the practice of ordinary
people not fail, since it indeed can fail? Because it arises from sruta-vasana, which is the
outflow of the most pure dharmadhatu." (kathaf!! viparyasta sati, aviparyasanukula bhavatil
sruta-vasanaya utpannat). (Yamaguchi ed., p. 186, II.
5-7) Thus conscious practice, as unfailing, establishes marga-vyavadana.
31. See note 65.
32. Haribhadra, Abhisamayalamkiiralokii, Wogihara ed., p. 30, II. 8-9.
33. In Vijiiaptimatrata, non-discriminative wisdom (nirvikalpa-jiiana) is defined as
the denial of the five conditions, i.e., the severance of the five marks. See Dharmadharma-
tavibhaga (Yamaguchi Susumu's "Mirokuzo Ho-Hossho Fumbetsuron," in Yamaguchi
SusumuBukkyogakuBunshu, I, p. 189 and pp. 195-196, note 17). Also Mahayanasamgraha
(Lamotte ed., ch. VIII, sec. 2), Abhidharmasamuccaya (D ed., No. 4049, 74a 40, and
Abhidharmasamuccayabhiiojya (Tatia ed., p. 139, II. 10-26).
34. I t is in this regard that takes as its object nirvikalpa-jiiana.
See note 67, which deals with Asvabhava's commentary on the Mahayanasutralaf!!kiira.
35. AHadruasahasrika-prajiiaparamita, Vaidya ed., p. 2, I.lO-p. 3, I. 2; Wogihara
ed., pp. 29-30; Tao-hsing Pan-jo (T. 8, p. 425c); and Hsiao-hin Pan-jo (T. 8, p. 537b).
36. Abhisamayalaf!!kiiraloka, Wogihara ed., p. 30, II. 4-6.
38
37. See Georges Gusdorf, La parole, Introduction Philosophique, 3 (Presses V niversi-
haires de France, 1971), p. 73, II. 5-11.
38. Mahiiyiinasa7[Lgraha, chapter II, section 21; Abhidharmasamuccayabhiisya (N.
ed., pp. 137-139, chapter IV, section 195b).
39. PaJyatii7[L kalpanii-miitra7[L sarvam etad yathodita7fZ1 akalpabodhisattviinii7[L priiptii
Ihodhir niriipyatel {Levi ed., p. 49).
[ 40. Both the commentary ofSthiramati (P ed., No. 5331, Mi, 161b8-162a3) and
Jthat of Asvabhava (P ed., No. 5530, Bi, 84b3-4) are identical.
" 41. In Paramartha's translation, Vasubandhu's Mahiiyiinasa7fZgrahabhi4ya reads:
:iFrom these ten points, we devolve the three virtues, viz., the unequalled object, the
iunequalled practice, and the unequalled result. (T. 31, p. 156a) The Tibetan version, Don
;gsangbamamparphye babsduste bshadpa(Ped., No. 5553, Li, 359b3-6) has: the essence of
practice is divided into six kinds of (3) entering (praveSa), (4) cause-result (hetu-phala) , (5)
the distinctions of their practice (bhiivanii-prabheda) , and(6-7-8)the three learnings
The object (dmigs-pa, iilambana) is referred to as (1) the basis of the knowable
'ljiieyasraya), and (2) the characteristic of the knowable The characteristic of
"'.the knowable, as that which is to be known with certitude, is the actual real (dngos su rang
gi ngo bos) known object. The basis of the knowable is the object as point of support. The
:', result of such practice are the two pre-eminent elements of severance and wisdom, and
"thus they are explained last. The underlying theme of the above passage is The Discourse.
on the Mahayana Object, Practice, and Result.
..
42. See note 10.
if' 43. Mahiiyiinasa7[Lgraha, Lamotte ed., ch. II, section 25.

44. gnyis ka med na yongs su grub pa shin tu 'grub pa ma yin nam zhe nal rang bzhin gyis
fmam par byang ba ni 'grub kyil dri ma med pa'i roam par byang ba ni med do zhes Ian 'debs sol
F,(282a7-8).
, 45. aniidikiiliko dhiituh sarva-samiiSrayalfl tasmin sati gatilJ sarvii nirvii1}iidhigamo'jJi
': viii /, quoted from the Abhidharmasiitra in the jiiaptibhC4ya Mahiiyiinasa7[Lgraha,
chapter I, section 1.
'. 46. mang du thos pas bsogs pa'i gnas kun gzhi mam par shes pas bsdus pa ma yin lal kun
;?gzhi mam par shes pa ltar tshul bzhin yid la byed pas bsdus pa'i chos mams kyi sa bon gang yin pa'o.
:. This is cited from chapter III, section 1 of the Mahiiyiinasa7fZgraha, and reflects the state-
ment of Asanga himself.
47. P ed., No. 5552, Li, 238b8-239a4.
48. Vi Hakuju, in his Shodaijoronkenkyu (pp. 214-215), has argued that the
, original conception of Asari.ga was that iilaya-vijiiiina was both pure and impure, and that
f the notion that it is cause only of defilement began with Asvabhava and was inherited by
Dharmapiila. But Asvabhava's passage here reflects Asanga's statement in the Mahiiyiin-
sa7fZgraha, and thus the understanding of iilaya as cause only of defilement does go back to
Asanga.
49. Mahayiinasa7[Lgraha, chapter I, section 46; Lamotte, II, p. 66: "Is the permea-
tion of hearing (rruta-viisanii) comprised in iilaya-vijiiiina or not? Ifit is comprised in iilaya,
then how could it be the seed, which disciplines that consciousness? But if it is
not so comprised, then what is the ground (i.e. foundation) (asraya) for such a permeation
of hearing?
50. For example, chapter I, section 4 of Mahiiyiinasa7fZgraha quotes the Sa7[Ldhi-
nirmocanasutra verse on iidiina, a synonym for iilaya: iidiina-viiiiina ogho
39
yathii vartati saroavi}o/ biiliina rlULyi na frrakiiSi rrui hiiiva atrrui parikalpayeyuh/ / Also see note 52.
51. The l'vlahiiyiinasa,!,graha, chapter I, section 58, distinguishes three characteris_
tics of iilaya: verba} permeation (abhiliipa-viisanii), permeation of belief in self (iitmadrsti_
viisanii), and permeation of the elements of existence (bhaviinga-viisanii).
is the basis of nine of the eleven manifestations (vijiiapti) herein described, while the other
two correspond to and bhaviinga-viisaniis.
52. The famous parable of the group of blind men and the elephant in chapter I
of MS, section 20, expresses the difficulty of knowing iilaya-vijiiiina. (See Udiina, VI, 4, pp.
6S-69) The group of blind men selectively extract parts of the elephant. But, even by
gathering them together, they are unable to know the whole of the elephant. In order to
know the whole, just as it is, it must be given in direct insight.
53. Confer Bergson, "La pensee et Ie Mouvant." Oeuvres, pp. 1320-1323.
54. dri ma med pas rnam par byang ba zhes bya ba ni tshig de nyid kyis bshad zin to!!
55. P ed., No. 5551, Li, IS0a7-S.
56. MAVr, Yamaguchi ed., p. 125; cited in note 16.
57. tatra katamii. samiisato dvividham ca prahiiTfa,!, dvividha,!, ca jiiiina7!l bodhir
ity ucayate. tatra dividhia,!, prahiiTfa,!, klesiivarar:a'!' jiieyiivarar:a7!l ca.
dvividha,!, punar jiiiina,!, yat kleSiivaraTfa-prahiiTfac ca nirmala7!l saroa-klesa-niranubaddha_
jiiiina,!, jiieyiivarana-prahiiTfa ca yat saroasmin jiieye apratihatam aniivarana:iiiiina7!l. (B odhi-
sattvabhiimi, Wogihara ed., p. SS, II. 1-7)
5S. See my article "Asvabhava's Commentary on the Mahiiyiinasiitriila7!lkiira IX.
56-76" in The Journal oj Indian and Buddhist Studies, vol. XX, No. I, pp. 473-465.
59. Mahayiinasiitriilamkiira, IX, verse 3 (Levi ed., p. 33).
60. For these six meanings, see Takasaki Jikido, "Description of the Ultimate
Reality by means of the Six Categories in Mahayana Buddhism," in The Journal of Indian
and Buddhist Studies, vol. IX, No.2, pp. 24-33.
61. These words are translated as don rnam pa bdun in the Tibetan translation of
Sthiramati's commentary. They are probably cited from the Mahiiyiinasiitriilamkiira, but I
have been unable to locate the reference.
62. In place of "all the siitras" Sthirmati has Gzungs kyi bdang phyug go rgyal po, i.e.,
SaddharmapuTf4an7w, and so forth.
63. From this description, Asvabhava appears to consider the Buddhabhiimisiitra
as the basis of the Mahiiyiinasiitriila,!,kiira. Sthiramati is in accord with this understanding.
However, recently the opposite view has been expressed by TakasakiJikido in "Hosshin
no Ichigenron," in Hirakawa Akira Hakase Kanreki Kinen Ronshii - Bukkyo ni okeru Ho no
Kenkyii, p. 239, n. 3S.
64. P ed., No. 5530, Bi, SOb5-Sla5.
65. In the above cited article (note 63) TakasakiJikido mentions "the separation
of the wisdom aspect from the dharmadhiitu per se" and "the separation of the principle
from wisdom." I understand this as the distinction between dharmadhiitu and dharmadhiitu-
viSuddhi, i.e., as the distinction between prakr:ti-vyavadiina and vaimalya-vyavadiina. It is
clear that the historical development of this distinction in Y ogacara is of the utmost
importance. I think this distinction was first formulated as a description of vaimalya-
vyavadiina in the light of prakrti-vyavadiina, and did not see the basic dharmadhiitu-viSuddhi
as vaimalya-vyavadiina, i.e., as iiSraya-parivrtti. However, when viewed in this manner,
vaimalya-vyavadiina becomes absorbed into prakr:ti-vyavadiina. The result of such an
absorption is that tathatii, i.e., prakr:ti-vyavadiina becomes aloof from and unrelated to all
40
: dharmas. See my article "Shaja H akai Ko" (Historical Remarks on the Development of
Interpretations of Dharmadhatu-viSuddhi) in Nanto Buki1.ya, No. 37, pp. 1-28.
66. Vastu-jiuina-tad-alamba-vaSita-
(Levi ed., p. 44).
. 67. Asvabhava's commentary states: "Being tathata of all dharmas, it is characteri-
zed by purity fr.om the two obstacles of passion and knowledge. That is to say, because it is
purified from the of passion and knowledge, it has become of them. But
':what is pure? The tathata of all dharmas, and because of thIS we speak of asraya panvr:tf, (gna.s
, yongs su gyur pal of tathata. Vastu-jiiana is subsequently attained wisdom (tat-prHhalabdha-
jnana). By the word vastu (phenomenal) is meant the paratantric nature of alaya-vijiiana.
Because of this we speak of the radical re-orientation of the basis of the ineptitudes of
consciousness The radical re-orientation of this paratantric
,nature is the sphere (gocara) of nirvikalpa-p,Hhalabdha-jiiana, and is not the sphere of any
()tber widsom. Tad-alambana-jiiiina, the wisdom that intends that as its object, has as its
characteristic the supernatural power (vaSita) that knows not exhaustion, and because of
this we speak of the radical re-orientation of the basis of the path (miirgiiSraya-parivrtti).
The word tad [of tad-alambana-jiianal indicates the dharmadhatu mentioned above. As that
which is characterized by the abiding that knows no exhaustion, nirvikalpa-jiiiina attains
that abiding without exhaustion in tathata, because it freely, abidingly, and universally
operates. intends as its object that which is unfailing, and attains
abiding without exhaustion in regard to paratantra-svabhiiva." (81a5-b6) See my article
"Sanshu Tenne KCi" (On the TripleXsraya-pariv,tti) in Bukkya-gaku, No.2, esp. pp. 57-58.
68. See quotation in note 4l.
69. Mahayanasa'f(lgraha, chapter IX, section 1. Also confer chapter X, section 1.
70. Samdhinirmocanasiitra, Lamotte ed., Chapter X, section 2, p.149. The Mahii-
"yiinasa'f(lgraha, chapter I, section 10, explains that the reason why alaya, i.e; adana-vijiiana
,'is not presented to sravakiis is because this term "refers to a subtle object. Sravakiis do not
venture to know all knowable objects (sarvajiieya). Thus, without it being presented to
them, they realize wisdom. Because they realize vimukti-kiiya, it need not be presented to
'them. But bodhisattvas do venture to know all objects, and thus it is presented to them.
For, if they did not know it, it would not be easy to realize the wisdom of all wisdoms
{sarua jiiajiiana)."
71. Sa'f(ldhinirmocanasiitra, IX, section 28 (Lamotte ed., p. 145, i. 33) appears to be
the first instance.
72. Asariga's statement in note 51 appears to be the first instance.
41
Hu-J an .Nien-Ch'ia
(Suddenly a Thought Rose): Chinese
Understanding of Mind and Consciousness
by Whalen Lai
The Issue: In the Awakening of Faith in Mahayana (Ta-ch'engch'i-hsin lun, b
henceforth abbreviated as AFM), is found a unique explanation of the
origin of avidya, ignorance:
HUjan nien-ch'i, ming wei wu-ming
C
. Suddenly a thought rose; this is called ignorance
This idea has baffled many modern scholars as it has traditionally
charmed many a Far Eastern Buddhist. What is meant by "suddenly"?
What constitutes "thought"? The most recent translator of the AFM,
Yoshito Hakeda, has appended this remark to the passage:
42
There has been much discussion on the meaning of hu-jan in
connection with the origin of ignorance, mainly on the basis of
interpretations proposed by Fa-tsang, d (l) that ignorance alone
becomes the source of defiled states of being. It is the subtlest; no
other state of being can be the origin of this. It is therefore said in
the text that ignorance emerges suddenly. (2) Commenting on a
quotation from a sutra, he says "suddenly" means "beginning-
lessly," since the passage quoted makes clear that there is no other
state of being prior to the state of ignorance. (3) The word
"suddenly" is not used from the stand point of time, but is used to
account for the emergence of ignorance without any instance of
inception .
. . . A monk of Minge China, glosses "suddenly" as pu-chueh, f
which may mean "unconsciously" or "without being aware of the
reason."
... If hu-jan is a translation of a Sanskrit word, the original word
asasrruit may be posited. Akasmiit means "without reason" or
"accidentally." I
,
4rhe above remark does not actually answer the question of the origin
;"pfthe concept, hu-jan (suddenly) or the identity of nieng (thought). We
Ybecome only more aware that hu-jan is one crucial justification fo!"
,(ck'an h (zen) "sudden enlightenment," itself a unique idea. Concerning
meaning of nien and wu-nien
i
(no-thought), I have shown in a
Slfelated that (a) Hakeda is not the first repeatedly to read nien as
vikalpa; AFM was bothered by ,the same
;;term; (b) but both managed to distort the original meaning; for (c) nien
,:is rooted in a peculiar understanding in. pre-Buddhist Han China.
2
is the incipient thought, associated with yin
k
that disrupts the
,(otherwise passive, yang, I mind. In this present article, I will cite more
time focusing upon the concepts of shih, m conscious-
.-ness, and hu-jan, suddenness-to again why the AFM cannot be
:)ully understood without to the native mode of thought.
! The origin of ignorance is naturally a mystery. The first of the
';;chain of causation (nidanas), avidya cannot be pushed back to any prior
icause. In the AFM metaphor of water and wave, the nien is a result of
;."the wind of ignorance"; in another place, nien comes after the deluded
'mind has been so perfumed. "Because Ignorance perfumes Suchness,
tthere is the deluded mind (wang-hsin)n . ... The unenlightened nien
?arises and lets manifest the deluded object-realm.") These inconsisten-
(ties perhaps cannot be avoided. It is part of the peculiar pratitya-
,samutpada, concomitancy of endorsed by the AFM.
4
Hakeda's
,explanation draws upon a similar paradox that attends the tathagata-
garbha, the embryonic Buddha in all sentient beings. The existence of
. this enlightened essence in unenlightened men is, by itself, a mystery.
'The agutakleSa (accidental defilements) on the innately pure mind are
'as inconceivable as the Buddha-essence itself. This ideology is basic to
-the AFM understanding of the nature and origin of ignorance, but the
,more direct precedent is to be found in the innovations in earlier
:'Chinese exegesis. Below we will trace the history of the concept of mind
'"and consciousness from early Chinese Buddhism through the Six
tDynasties to the AFM, itself.
A Clue from Shen-huiO and Tsung-mi. P The AFM defined much of
sinitic Mahayana thought that came after. One tradition heavily influ- .
enced by it is Ch'an. Although it is not always advisable to use Ch'an as
the standard for measuring the AFM (because of the way Ch'an takes
liberties with concepts), its more radical pronouncements can help to
bring our problem into the open. In the Yu-luq (Recorded Sayings) of
Shen-hui and in the Yiian-jen-lun
r
(Essay on Man) by Tsung-mi, we have
43
two rather intriguing passages holding a clue to the origin of the idea of
hu-jan. Shen-hui's question and answer is a bit puzzling on the first
reading:
Q. Why is ignorance the same as spontaneity (tzu-jan)?S
A: Because ignorance and Buddha-nature come into existence
spontaneously. Ignorance has Buddha-nature as its basis
and Buddha-nature has ignorance as its basis. Since one is
the basis for the other, when one exists, the other exists also.
With enlightenment, it is Buddha-nature. Without enlight_
enment, it is ignorance.
The hidden reference is to a passage in the NirvarJa sutra, a familiar one
known to Emperor Wu of the Liang dynasty t in his essay on Buddha-
nature.
5
The Chinese took it to imply the interdependence of wisdom and
ignorance. The next question in the Yu-lu alludes to a heretical under-
standing of "spontaneous causation." The Buddha taught that all reali-
ties are caused. A doctrine of spontaneity, the self-caused or the
uncaused, would violate this basic dictum in Buddhism. The self-
caused has been negated by Nagarjuna along with other fallacies (the
other-caused, the together-caused, the uncaused).6
Q: If ignorance is spontaneity, is that not identical with the
spontaneity of heretics?
A: It is identical with the spontaneity of the Taoists, but the
interpretation is different.
Q: How are they different?
A: In Buddhism both Buddha-nature and ignorance are spon-
taneous. Why? Because all dharmas depend on the power of
Buddha-nature. Therefore all dharmas belong to spontaneity.
But in the spontaneity of Taoism, "Tao U produced the One.
The One produced the two. The two produced the three.
And the three produced the ten thousand things."7 From
the One down, all are spontaneous. Therefore, the two inter-
pretations are different.
8
"Spontaneous" ignorance is in reference to the AFM idea of hu-jan
nien-ch'i. The association of spontaneous ignorance with Taoist sponta-
neity suggests a native source to hu-jan. If so, hu-jan might be a version
of tzu-jan. The difference between the two naturalnesses is not exactly
clear in the Yu-lu, but fortunately we have Tsung-mi's explanation.
In his Yiian-jen-lun, Tsung-mi turns also to the question of the
relative superiority of Buddhism vis-a-vis Taosim and Confucianism
44
over the understanding of" origin." Chinese naturalism is described by
him. as:
In Confucianism and Taoism, it is explained that all species such
as human beings, beasts, etc., are generated from and nourished
by the Great Tao of Nothingness. The principle of Tao gives rise
to the primal force [ether] which created Heaven and Earth
which then created the myriad things [in the sequence of One,
Two, Three and the ten thousand things). ... 9
Since everthing is natural, then evil, misfortunes, etc., would also be
natural. If everything is so ordained by Heaven, man can only accept
his fate (ming). v In contrast, even the Hinayanist would have a better
system, namely, recognition of cause and effect. Through such causae
tive analysis, man can change his fate and reverse the nidiinas producing
suffering. However, Hinayana is judged dualistic and, in the end,
Tsung-mi returns to the "higher naturalism" of the Hua-yen wand
Ch'an, basically the monism of Mind found in the AFM. From this
higher perspective, what was the one natural Ether in Chinese cosmo-
gony is seen as a self-bifurcation of the One Mind. Reality is, according
to the AFM, the transformation of the mind, the manifestation of
object-realm out of the evolving consciousness that became the iilaya-
vijiuina. 10 The one thought (nien) so splits the One Mind into the dualism
of subject and object. Tsung-mi describes the process as follows:
The Great Ultimate gives birth to the two poles (yin-yang). This is
the spontaneous Great Tao. The true essence is so understood (in
Taoism). However, in fact, it is the one thought (i-nien)X (in the
mind) that so transmutes itself into the seeing and the seen (i.e.,
the two poles). The (objective) Original Ether is only the movement
(tung)Y of the one thought (i-nien); it is only the object-realm (to
the subjective consciousness). II
By introducing nien into mind, the Buddhist system can account for
duality and yet find a way to eliminating delusion instead of passively
tolerating it as the natural fate. This final Mahayana teaching allows for
but does not endores Hinayanist dualism. Ignorance may be, in Shen-
hui's words, "spontaneous," but this "natural" factor is reducible to
being an accident in the mind. Buddha-nature is essential, as ignorance
is existential, spontaneity. The latter can be and should be transvaluated
into the former, for ultimately Buddha-nature is the sole truth and
45
reality. Thus, rfaoism represents ontological monism and fatalisrn
whereas AFM represents noetic non-duality and self-transbrmation:
Hence the superiority of the latter.
That clever distinction need not detain us at the moment. It is the
characterization of ignorance as spontaneous, tzu-jan, that intrigues Us.
The term hu-jan is indeed a radical form of tzu-jan. We find a similar
term used by Kuo Hsiang
Z
in his commentary to the Chuang-tzu. aa
Kuo Hsiang had rejected Wang Pi'sab idea that all existent things (yu,ac
being) come from non-being. Being cannot be derived from its
opposite. Being simply is. There is likewise no Heaven and earth prior
to the myriad things; it is not true that the many came from the three,
or the three from the two, or the tw..o the one. Rather, the term "Heaven
and earth" is the "name for the totality of the myriad things." But if all
things simply are, how do they come-to-be at all? Kuo Hsiang simply
said "they suddenlyare."
Since noncbeing is non-being, it cannot produce being. Before
being itself is produced, it cannot produce other beings. Then by
whom are things produced? They spontaneously produce them-
selves, that is all. (i.e. They suddenly are born.) 12
The actual expression used for "suddenly" is kuai-jan (erh-sheng)
which reads literally "In one chunk (they are born)." Kuai as noun
means "a lump, a piece." Jan makes the noun an adverb. In one piece,
things are. The noun has been used by Chuang-tzu. Nature is one great
kuai. (Creel has rendered it as the "Great Clot").13 In rejecting the
genesis ex nihilo, Kuo Hsiang gives us a supreme paradox similar to the
AFM's idea of a paradoxical hu-jan. Suddenly, a nien arose and igno-
rance is replete. However, Kuo Hsiang's "naturalism" still falls under
Shen-hui's and Tsung-mi's critique of fatalistic monism. In fact, Kuo
Hsiang is often judged to be a fatalist, precisely because he equated the
given (or jen-wei)ae with the tzu-jan.
14
Therefore, we have to look
deeper for a more subtle form of spontaneity, one involving psychol-
ogy. We will look at three cases of Chinese Buddhist understanding of
mind that anticipate the ideas in the AFM. These cases combine Indian
insights and Chinese predispositions.
46
(Consciousness) in the Feng1'a-yaoaf
A lay student of the famous monk, Chih Tun, ag Hsi Ch'aoah
1;(336-377) wrote the Essentials of Faith (Fengja-yao) to explain the
} 'purports Buddhist faith. The text has been translated in full by
Zurcher. IS There are also many insightful remarks in his notes.
more recent Japanese translation has not fully taken Zurcher's
.. work into account. 16 What Zurcher finds to be mistakes in Hsi Ch'ao's
{reading of basic concepts in Buddhism can also be seen as Sinitic creati-
!vity. Some of these ideas recur in the AFM but within a mature struc-
;ture. It is doubtful that the ideas are Hsi Ch'ao's; they went hack to
,Chih Tun and to Chih Ch'ien
ai
a century beforeY One basic "confu-
sion" surrounds the use of the word shih (consciousness).
Shih is An Shih-kao'saj choice for rendering vijfiiina, one of the
. five skandhas. However, there are overlaps with the other skandhas in
the Chinese exegesis:
Sanskrit An Shih-kao In the Nidiinas
riipa
form che
ak
color, form 4th member
vedana perception yang-t'ung
a1
itch-pain 7th
sa1[tjfiii conception ssu-hsiang
am
thinking
. sa1[tSkiira will sheng-ssu an life-death 2nd
vijfiiina conSCIOusness shih consciousness 3rd
,The skandhas should be discrete and separate, but Hsi Ch'ao follows a
current practice to interpret ssu-hsiang (for sa1[tjfiii) as:
To think in anticipation of what has not yet taken place is ssu;
afterwards to recall what has already happened is called hsiang.
This is based on a yin-yang bifurcation of functions. He also reads
sa1[tSkiira (life-death) liberally: it is the birth and death of momentary
thoughts.
The incipient hsin-nien
ao
(psychic thought) signals shengap (birth).
The miehaq (cessation) of the i-shih
ar
(intention-consciousness)
constitutes ssu
as
(death).18
However, the recollection of things past is also associated with karmic
retribution. Things can be stored away for ages only to sprout later.
47
That function is usually given over to the shih, vijiiana (consciousness).
By shih is meant what has concerned the mind, then is stored aWay
unforgotten. Shih can sprout in the bosom of men even after
kalpas have passed .... 19
Shih can fulfill this karmic function because vijiiana is the item
that survives death, ifbut for a limited time, to be born in the mother's
womb for the next rebirth. It is the third of the nidanas, and it carries
over the predispositions of the second, hsing (sa1(lskara). The twelve are:
ignorance --;. action intention --;. consciousness
name and form --;. six senses ->
avidya samskara vZJnana
niimarupa
contact --;. perception -;. cravings -;. clinging -;. becoming -;. birth -;. old age, death
sparsa vedana upddana bhava jati Jara-mara'f!-a
The series resumes at vijiiana after death. Hsi Ch'ao took the further
liberty of associating shih with the object of the mind. The six senses
(ayatana, fifth of the nidanas) are the five senses plus the mind, manas.
Each has its corresponding object. Eyes perceive sight, ears sound, etc.,
and all are paired to consciousness (vijiiana), i.e., eye-consciousness,
etc. Now, Hsi Ch'ao designates, as the object of manas, the shih
(consciousness) !
... The mind perceives thought. This thought is the same as the
skandha mentioned earlier. 20
This is not warranted in Sanskrit but rather natural to the Chinese. The
mind knows; what it knows is knowledge. The word shih happens to
mean "to know" as well as "knowledge." Therefore vijiiana is the object
to manas.
Finally, the frequent choice of sheng-ssu for sa1(lSkiira by An Shih-kao
can also be misleading, for its synonym sheng-mieh is used for sa1(lsara,
i.e., birth-and-death. In the nidanas, sheng-ssu is defined as the emer-
gence and cessation of mental phenomenon (jati-nirodha). At other
times hsing ( fJ ) is used for sa1(lSkiira, sometimes written as hsing ( jlJ ). at
Now, rebirth was seen as shih-shen pu-mieh, sui-hsing shou-shen, au and
that, upon a cursory reading, is "the spirit is immortal; it would take on
a body following its karmic due." This is how it is usually taken.
Technically though, it should be read as "the vi:jiiana does not perish,
48
but due to the action-intention (the 'grasping after') of the sa'f[lsktira, it
would in time be reborn (in the mother's womb) to resume a riipa."21
The overlap of sa'f[lsktira with the Chinese understanding of ssu-hsiang,
karmic recollection, is mentioned already. Sa'f[lsktira also overlaps with
the Chinese concept of i
av
(intention), also used to translate manas,
Strictly speaking, the Chinese should have kept these items apart;
sar(lj'na, jati-nirodha, sa'f[lSara, sa'f[lSktira, vijiiana, etc., are different. From
the Chinese liberal point of view, however, they can be justifiably fused.
The message then becomes this: "The mind has conscious (shih, vijiiana)
thought (nien). Thoughts (nien) rise and fall (jati, nirodha) in an instant
(nien, for k:;ana). Ergo, life-and-death (sheng-mieh, sa'f[lsara) is a correlate
of shih (consciousness). As an agent of karmic deeds (hsing, sheng-ssu,
sar(lskiira), consciousness is capable of recollecting (hsiang, of ssu-hsiang,
sar(ljiiii) past events after long lapses of time. The shih transmigrates
(into the mother's womb). The elimination of nien (thought, momen-
tariness), i.e., wu-nien (no-thought), is the pure state of mind in nirvar;tic
inactivity. The termination of shih (consciousness) likewise liberates."
We will find this structure in the Fengja-yao, as part of Hsi Ch'ao's
exegesis. But we also find it in the AFM, which is supposed to be an
Indian sastra. Without going into the whole controversy of the AFM
authorship and its redaction to the Sik:;ananada version, I will limit
myself first to a comparison of the F engja-yao and the AFM in order to
show this legacy of a sinitic psychology.
The Concept if Suddenness, HUj'an. Not only is the word hu (sudden)
actually used by Hsi Ch'ao, but the structure of his explanation of the
emergence of delusion in the mind is the same as the one in the AFM.
We read:
49
The siitra says, "It is mind that creates [determines one's rebirth
as] gods, men, hellish beings and animals; it is also mind that
attains the Way." Alllit
aw
(anxious pondering) springs from the
mind; each and every nien receives its retribution. Although
matter (event) has yet to take shape (hsing) , ax mysteriously the
Jarmic fate is already set. This is because ch'ing nienay (emotive
thoughts) are complete by themselves. Swiftly, abruptly, and suddenly (hu)
they appear with no gaps in between. The first stirring (chi-tung) az may
befine as a hair, but (its result) can eventuallyfill the universe. Reward
and punishment, rebirth in the six paths, are all determined by it.
Fortune and disaster, shame and regret, are decided in a moment.
Therefore the man of the Way should "be on guard while in soli-
tude." In his mind, he should guard against the tiniest beginning
of lii. With the ultimate liba (Principle) as his castle, he commands
over the pen (origin) and thus restrains the mobb (end). He would
not, prior to the events or actions taking form (hsing), so very
lightly arouse any hsin-nien, mental thoughts.
22
(Italics mine)
The sutra cited in the beginning is the ParinirvrilJa sutra (Hinayrina); its
use of the active verb tso
be
(create) charmed the Chinese then as the
line from the (Mahayana) DaSabhumika ("The three realms are created
by the mind") will charm the writer of the AFM. The mind creates the
world. The whole piece should be read, however, with this from the Po-
hu-t'ung, bd the locus classicus for understanding the dynamics of nien
and lii, in a discussion on hsing-ching: be "What is meant by nature (hsing)
and emotion (ching)? Nature is the workings of yang as emotions that of
yin. In the confluence of yin-yang is man born, endowed with the Five
Natures (the five moral virtues) and the Six Emotions (joy, anger, grief,
happiness, love and hatred). Emotions imply passivity; nature means
life. The reception of these procures existence itself." Therefore the
Kuo-ming-chiieh [Apocryphal book on the Classic of Filial PietyJ-here
the Po-hu-t'ung quotes from this text-explains:
Emotion rises from yin; it is desire in accordance with shih-nien, bf
the thought of the moment. Nature comes from yang; it is always
in tune with li, the Principle. Yang is considerate; yin seeks gain.
Therefore emotions are greedy but nature is directed at common
humanity.23
Hsi Ch'ao and the AFM drew from this psychology.Hsi Ch'ao's meta-
phor for karmic impact is taken from the I Ching, bg already well cited
in the period to show that China too knew of psychic retribution. The
pairing of nien with shih (time, moment) and the anchorage of li are
found in Hsi eh'ao as in the Po-hu-t'ung. A similar message is found in
this other passage:
50
The Vimalakirti Sutra says: "All the various dharmas take form
(hsing) according to i (intention, thought.) bh" The sign of fortune
stirs (within) as the incipient element; the affairs (of the world)
respond (without) as the consequent. As a nien rises, there is being
(yu). As a lii ceases, there is nonbeing(wu). Where the intention (i) is at
rest, all encounters run smoothly. Where the emotions (ch'ing) are'
obstructed, hazards abound. Therefore it is said that the cause for
penetrating all as well as for being impeded lies within and not
without. ... (for) nothing is more manifested than what is hidden.
24
(Italics mine.)
:'-:
From this, Hsi Ch'ao drew the conclusion that wu-nien is the gate to
enlightenment. The term wu-nien, used already in that sense in the
Ming-tu
bi
commentary (third century), will become pivotal in the AFM
, and Ch'an.
25
Hsin and Shih in the Prajiul, Schools
Contemporaneous with Hsi Ch'ao were the early schools of
,Emptiness. Among them are two that speculated on the emptiness of
mind and the illusions of consciousness. The first is the hsin-wu bj school
of Chih Min-tu, who came south in A.D. 326. As reported later by Chi-
tsang,bk
What it says is that when the sutras state "Various dharmas are
empty," the sutras only hope that the person would empty his
mind so as not to hold onto the empty illusions; therefore it is
called "Mind as Empty," hsin-wu.
26
.
;,' By emptying the mind, realities would be emptied. According to the
appended in the Shih-shuo hsin-yu, bl others also agreed
that the mind, burdened with defilements, sees differentiated realities,
whereas a pure mind would reflect all just as a mirror would.
17
Chih
';':
Min-tu, bm however, went on to negate even the mind. For that he was
, much criticized when the majority believed in the existence of an
entity (the luminous shen
bll
).28
, The other figure holding an idealist interpretation is Yu Fa-kai
bo
.' who proposed "shih-han."bp Tang Yung-t'ungbq takes a clue from
Ping'sbr Mingjo-lun
bo
and regards this to mean "shen-han-shih,"
, spirit includes, as its function, the consciousness. 29 Yu Fa-kai's position
is reportedly this:
The Three Realms are the abode of the Long Night. The hsin-shih
(pschic consciousness) is the primary cause of the Great Dream.
What we see as myriad realities are only things in a dream. When
one wakes from the dream or when the night finally dawns, then
the perverted, deluded consciousness would cease, and the Three
Realms will appear as altogether empty.30 (Italics mine)
,Realities are blamed on hsin-shih (mind-and-consciousness, but
consciousness is intended here, hsin being only an adjective, i.e. psychic
;' 51
consciousness). Shih-han should be taken as "(realities) are incorporated
under consciousness." It does not mean "consciousness being incorpo_
rated under spirit (or mind)," even though the latter ideology is not
rejected. For our purpose that ideology is also significant, for here is a
hierarchy in which shih is considered to be lower than mind, hsin. The
mind is deluded by consciousness.
The subordination of shih to shen (spirit) is found in Tsung Ping.
Tsung Ping followed his master, Hui-yuan. bt Hui-yuan had said:
Shen . . .lies beyond the parameters of the (yin-yang) hexagrams
and the (I Ching) emblems, hsiang
bu
. .. having no master (above
it) ... and is beyond all (finite) appellation. Stimulated by things, it
becomes active. Using numbers [yin-yang enumerations], it acts,
but (being itself above things and numbers) it neither ceases ... nor
ends. Things with feeling can be found via things; things with
consciousness can be sought out by numbers .... Thus we know:
transformations are perceived by feelings but the spirit transmi-
grates through rebirths. Feeling is the mother oftransformations
but spirit is the root of feeling. Feeling can react to things but
spirit can mysteriously transfer itself. The enlightened one would
revert to the pen, the fundamental (spirit) but the deluded ones
would (foolishly) chase after things.
31
In Hui-yuan, the pair corresponding to hsin and shih is shen (spirit) and
ling (the animated soul). One is higher, passive, while the other is lower,
active. It is ling that drags the shen down into the world of things, emo-
. tion and change. The logic is similar to the tension between hsin and
nien discussed earlier; both use the framework of Han yin-yang thought.
Tsung Ping substitutes shih for ling. This is partly in order to
underline the connection that shih has with sattva. Han-shih chih-liu
bv
(the species that has consciousness) is sattva, i.e., sentient beings. It is
from shen that shih (sentiency) emerges. The divine mind falls into
sentiency.
52
The alternation of yin and yang [in their differentiated forms] is
called the Tao. The [undifferentiated] state prior to yin-yang's
being distinguished is called shen, spirit. ... Following the Tao,
shen enters into ching-shen, (the human) spirit, but it remains
behind (above) yin-yang, not encompassed by them (not affected
by change) .... Although the ~ p i r i t of all sentient beings is ideally
one, in following the conditions (sui-yuan), bw it wavers and
changes to become the various, defiled shih (sentient beings) ....
The spirit (ching-shen)bx took on form (hsing) and populated the
five paths (of sarrzsara) in infinite numbers during the creation and
destruction of the Heaven and the Earth [the kalpasl . ... The
spirit is that which aimates (miao) by the myriad things. If it only
exists by virtue of form (body) and ceases to be along with the
(mortal) forms, then it would have been subservient to the then
primary body. If so, how can spirit be said to be miao (animating)
the form? 32
No, shen is the pen, basis; bodily form is mo, end, and not vice-versa.
The hierarchy of shen/ling, shen/shih, hsin/shih is duplicated in the
AFM. In the words of Fa-tsang, "the Suchness mind (chen-ju hsin) bz in
following conditions, sui-yuan, becomes the alayavijiiana." The word
sui-yuan is used by Tsung Ping in that sense already. Tsung Ping, of
course, did not know about the alayavijiiana. The AFM does. The
question, however, is: how orthodox or strict is the AFM's under-
standing of the alayavijiiana?
The AFM contains a unique theory about the evolution of the hsin,
i, and i-shih. ca Elsewhere these three would be usually taken to mean
iilayavijiiana (citta), manas, mano-vijiiana, but it is clear from the AFM
context that the hsin (citta) cannot possibly be the alayavijiiana; it stands
for the Suchess mind (or, rather, that aspect of it involved in sa,,!!sara,
i.e., the ju-lai-tsang hsin, cb the tathagatagarbha mind). The i is not manas,
the seventh consciousness; it is the i (intention) as used by Hsi Ch'ao
and others, meaning the "first stirring of mind." The i-shih is even more
baffling; it is not mano-vijiiana, but is explicitly identified as alayavijiiana
by the AFM. The commentators of the AFM tried, but no objective
scholarship has yet been able to establish the correlation of the AFM
psychic scheme with the one used in Indian Yogacara.
33
Briefly, the AFM evolution of mind goes through first five i (inten-
tions) to become the i-shih or alayavijiiana. First, there is karmic action
that upset the inactive mind; the mind evolves; then it projects (reality);
then it knows. From this fourth i, it is said that "corresponding to nien
(thought), the mind is continuing, hsiang-hsu, cc with no end."34 This
sequence is actually an expansion of the one found in Hsi Ch'ao. The
mind .at first is passive, until karmic forces move it. Stirred, it moves
outward and begins to create things. Forms rise out of its formless i
(intentions). As objects now appear, there is subject-object knowledge,
in the mode of thought, nien. Nien, however, implies ~ a ' f J a (nien-nien),
and so as thoughts follow thoughts, there is continuity (nien-nien hsiang-
hsu). cd The result is the fifth i of hsin, the i-shih, known as the hsiang-hsu
hsin, the continuous mind, i.e. citta-santana (mental continuum). This,
53
says the AFM, is the iilayavijiuina. Citta-santiina was originally a concept
denoting the continuity of mind, or stream of consciousness that is
impermanent and a series of k:)ar;as. For the AFM to so reduce iil
ava
_
vijniina might be a little oversimplifying. TheAFM description of ;he
hsiang-hsii goes:
The fifth (in the series of psychic emanations) is called the hsiang_
hsii-shih (continuity consciousness, a form of hsin, Mind). As the
various nien (thoughts) mutually respond (to one another), there_
fore (the Mind) h s i a n g ~ h s i i (continues) with no end. (This shih) can
retain all the good and evil karma of infmite past live with no
omission; it can bring forth the painful and joyous retribution,
past or present, with no mistake. It makes one suddenly recall
things gone by or present and in our delusions makes us anxious
over future things .... What is called i-shih (same as shih, conscious-
ness) is this continuity mind.
35
The function of this i-shih or "iilayavijniina" is basically the same as the
vijniina-sa7[tjnii in Hsi Ch'ao. No wonder that the iilayavijniina is the shih
in the AFM triad of hsin, i, and i-shih. As the karmic consciousness (born
in the womb), it carries over the sa7[tSkiira from one life to another. As
sa7[tjnii (ssu, hsiang in their divided functions), it recalls things and
anticipates things. The ArM only paraphrased Hsi Ch'ao's psychology.
Ch'eng-Shih ce Masters' Speculation of Citta-santiina
What is absent in Hsi Ch'ao but present in the AFM is the concept
of citta-santiina. Although the Buddhist in the third and fourth century
already knew of k:)ar;a and the momentary nature of thought, the first
sign of interest in the details of the mental process emerged only after
Sanghadeva's introduction of Sarvastiviida. Hui-yiian so posed problems
of discontinuity to Kumarajiva. What is available to the AFM but not to
Hsi Ch'ao is the water-and-wave metaphor of the Lankiivatiira sutra.
The metaphor has been somewhat subtly changed by the AFM.
Furthermore, the metaphor is used by the AFM to handle an issue not
central to the Lankiivatiira sutra: the problem of the continuity and
discontinuity between mind and consciousness. This passage in the
AFM well demonstrates this concern:
Q: If the mind ceases to be, then what becomes of continuity? If
54
continuity remains, then what is being extinguished?
A: The cessation is only the cessation of the forms of the mind
(the waves), not the cessation of the essence of mind (the
water). This is comparable to the wind (ignorance) [other-
wise invisible] taking on forms of movements vis-a-vis (the
wave-forms) the water. If the water (mind) ceases to be, then
the forms of wind (changes of consciousness and phenomena)
will end, for there would be nothing on which they can rely
(to become "visible"). Because the water does not cease to be,
therefore the forms of wind can continue. It is only the wind
(ignorance) that ceases. Accordingly, the movements cease.
The water itself does not cease .... It is only that as folly
ceases to be, the forms of the mind also cease. The wisdom
of the mind itself does not cease.
36
This problem of water and wave is the problem of substance and func-
tion (t'i-yung). cf T'i-yung affirms both the permanence of the water and
the variability of the waves. It is a solution to a predicament Chinese
found when faced with the doctrine of momentariness (k:jaTfavada).
The AFM even shares the concern expressed by Emperor Wu of the
Liang dynasty: "If there is no substance (of mind), there would not
even be sentient beings. If there is nothing lasting for them to rely on,
all things will then be extinguished." The Emperor and the AFM both
confront the hypothetical questioner, saying that it is only the form of
mind (consciousness) that ceases, not the basis of mind that supports all
things.37 The idea of a substratum, alien to early Buddhism, has by
then been reconfirmed by the tathagatagarbha philosophy, and given
even more positive readings by the Chinese. At times, the Chinese
verges upon satktiryavada arid t'i-yung seems more like the Hindu
bhediibheda.
The AFM choice for the water-and-wave metaphor, a la t'i-yung,
should well be seen as the final Chinese success at a format to handle
the paradox of the continuity of mind and the discontinuity of conscious-
ness. If so, it comes at the end of a search for the perfect analogy. The
question of hsiang-shu was one raised and answered by the Ch'eng-shih
(SatY2isiddhi) masters in the South in the early sixth century. Hsiang-hsu
chiacg (the falsehood due to continuity) is one of the three chia (false,
for false name, chia-ming, cli prajiiapti) considered by the Ch'eng-shih
tradition. Causation is one chia, provisional reality: a man is false
because he is a bundle of skandhas. Relativity or mutual dependence is
another chia, nominal reality: fatherhood and sonhood, being depen-
dent upon one another, are not absolute, and thus nominal. The
55
Ch'eng-shih school excelled in the causative analysis; San-Iun (Madhya_
mika) explored more the idea of interdependence. However, it is hsiang_
hsii that posed the greatest challenges. In what sense is this chia?
The three grand masters of the Liang dynasty each had an opinion.
Chuang-yen ci
As one nien (thought)
ceases, something is
carried over to the
next. This is like
"transferring light
from one candle to
another," the flame
living on to the next.
K' ai-shan cj
A former nien turns
into a succeeding one
"temporally" with no
essential change in
essence, like "rolling
and unrolling the
same lotus leaf.'
Kuang-tse
ck
One nien succeeds
another with no onto-
logical continuity, like
"dripping droplets
giving the impression
of a flowing stream.
38
The first metaphor is the most basic; it has already been applied to the
continuity of rebirths. The third denies any real continuity; the whole
(the continuous stream of water) is a fiction created by the observer; in
truth there is only the discontinuity of droplets in momentary (k)a'YJa)
succession. I would have thought that the third one is closer to the
Indian norm. However, the Chinese preferred the second one: the
rolling and unrolling of the same lotus leaf. What that seems to endorse
is the reality of the object (the lotus leaf) and the attribution of its
apppearance and disappearance (the rolling and the unrolling) to the
subjective nien, thought. It is our perception that "packs and unpacks"
reality; reality as such remains the same.
Among the Ch'eng-shih masters, the first chia-that of causality-
is the most fundamental. It was then taken as the t'i (substance) of the
mundane truth, saf!lV1:ti-staya on the assumption that mundane (saD)aric)
realities are causative. The above chia-that of continuity-was seen as
the function, yung, derived from the t'i. Only because there are
causes and conditions that there is the chia of continuity (better, discon-
tinuity) in the succession of nien (momentary thoughts). There was some
disagreement over the status of the other chia-the falsehood of relati-
vity. Chuang-yen regarded it as purely nominal (ming), cl that is,
further superimposed and not directly warranted by causality, i.e.,
causality by itself does not suggest the relativity (of old age and youth).
K'ai-shan, on the other hand,. thought that relativity is just another
functional (yung) aspect. Both, however, utilized causality to break the
seeming reality of mundane truth so as to reveal its emptiness, and by
56
sO doing, align this emptiness (at the mundane level) with the Empti-
ness of the Highest Truth.
In light of this prior interest in continuity in China, the solution
offered by the AFM-the ingenious use of the water-and-wave meta-
phor to handle the subsistence of t'i (water) and the indissociably
dynamic aspect of its yeng (waves)-is a sinitic solution to a sinitic
problem. This aspect of the AFM understanding of nien (as citta-
santana) supersedes the more primitive reflections of the Po-hu-t'ung
and the apologetics of Hsi Ch'ao.
Conclusion: The idea of hu-jan nien-ch'i (suddenly a thought rose)
used to explain the genesis of avidya, ignorance, involves a classic intel-
lectual impasse, a paradox to resolve the paradox of the uncaused first
cause. The Chinese leaned toward hu-jan because of the native tradi-
tion of natural genesis, tzu-jan, in Taoism. However, Taoist tzu-jan is a
"single-cause" explanation that would easily recommend a fatalistic
acceptance of the what-is. Insofar as Buddhism is a religion or philo-
sophy of self-transformation, it has to go beyond that "naturalism."
Insofaras Mahayana cannot endorse any final duality (such as Hinay-
ana's sa'f{tsara and China had to come up with a psychic
monism, an idealism of the One Mind, that can be simultaneously the
cause of delusion as well as the basis for enlightenment. The intrusion
of the active nien into the passive mind, and the reversal of it by wu-nien
(no-thought), are the preferred solution to the AFM. The ideology of
nien is pre-Buddhist; the acknowledgement of the hu (suddenness)
mystique in the transition from passivity to activity is also sinitic. Even
though we might find similar emphases in Indian Buddhist thought,
for example, in the recognition of the subtlety of the subconscious will,
the cetana, etc., nevertheless the fuller structure of thought-the reli-
ance on t'i-yung to resolve the tension seen between the changeless
mind and the continuity consciousness-tells of a more immediate,
Chinese Buddhist exegetical inspiration.
57
NOTES
1. YoshitoHakeda, trans., Awakening of Faith attributed to (New York:
Columbia, 1967), pp. 50-51; passage on "suddenly a thought rose ... " in Taishii Daiziikyo
(henceforth T.) 44, p. 577c of the Paramartha text, 'interestingly edited off in the
text, T. 44, p. 586a. See note 2 below.
2. Whalen W.Lai, "A Clue to the Authorship of the Awakening of Faith: Siksananda's
Redaction of the Word Nien'."
3. See T. 44, pp. 576c, 577a; Hakeda, trans. cit., pp. 41, 55-56.
4. Water (Suchness), Wind (ignorance) and waves (form of consciousness, as well
as ignorance, alias sa'f!1Sara) are all concomitant. See brief explanation in Whalen Lai,
"Ch'an Metaphors: Waves, water, mirror, lamp," Philosophy East and West, 29.3 (1979),
pp.246-48.
5. Translated in my "An Essay on the Immortality of the Soul by Emperor Wu of
the Liang Dynasty," ] oumal of the American Oriental Society (forthcoming).
6. Madhyamika-kiirikii.
7. Lao-tzu, ch. 42.
8. Translation from Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book of Chinese Philosophy (Princeton:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1963), p. 443.
9. Translation with slight changes from Theodore de Bary et at ed., The Buddhist
Tradition (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 182. For more exact translation, see
Peter Gregory's Harvard doctoral dissertation (near completion).
10. See T. 44, p. 577bc; Hakeda trans. op. cit., pp. 46.-50.
11. De Bary ed., op. cit., does not translate this section in small prints.
12. Translation taken from Wing-tsit Chan, op. cit., p. 328, under section II.
Bracketed addition mine.
13. H. G. Creel, What is Taoism? (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 1970), ch. II.
14. The oft-cited example is Kuo Hsiang's reversal of Chuang-tzu's dictum: the
ring men put on the nostril of the buffalo is now seen as tzu-jan.
15. As appendix B to chapter three in his The Buddhist Conquest of China (Leiden:
E. J. Brill, 1959), I, pp. 164-76, with notes in II, pp. 372-8.
16. Gumyiishu kenkyu (Kyoto: Kyoto Univ.,Jimbun kagaku kenkyusho, 1974).
17. Concerning Chih Ch'ien, judgement is based on my study on the running
commentary to the Ming-tu-ching, chapter one (T. 8, pp. 478- 82), probably a work of his
student reporting the "master's" opinion.
18. Translation of this and above two lines cited mine, from T. 44, p. 86c; Zurcher
overlooks the significant structure of the passage here, see his trans., op. cit., I, p. 166.
19. Ibid., translation mine.
20. Translation mine; see Zurcher, ibid., p. 167 and note 46 in II, p. 376.
21. From ongoing study of the shen-pu-mieh controversy, focusing on Tsung
Ping's Ming10-lun and earlier (pre-420) reflections in China.
22. Translation mine; see Zurcher, op. cit., p. 167 where the link is overlooked.
23. Translation mine; see translation by Tjan Tjoe Som of this work by Pan Ku
(32-92), Po Hu Tung (Leiden: Brill, 1949-52), II, p. 565.
24. Translation mine; see Zurcher, op. cit., p. 172. Italics mine.
25. See note 17, finding partly reported in essay mentioned in note 2.
58
26. For convenience, the following citations can be found in Tang Yung-t'ung,
Han Wei liang-Chin Nan-pei-chao Fo-chiao-shih (Peking: Chung-hua reissue, 1955), p. 270
. for this citation.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., p. 267. In my judgement, a much-maligned figure; he is the only Prajiia-
ist that truly realized the fallacy of iitmagriiha.
29. Ibid., p. 265. Hisjudgement is misguided; see below.
30. Ibid., p. 264; passage cited from Chi-tsang's Chung-lun-so.
31. Translation mine, from T. 52, p. 31c.
32. Translation mine, from T. 52, pp. 9c-lOa.
33. See Hakeda's note in his translation cited, p. 47.
34. T. 44, p. 577b; Hakeda, ibid., pp. 48-49. Actually the AFM repeats itself, for
here it has mentioned a hsiang-hsil-i (continuous 'manas') just prior to its mention of a
hsiang-hsil-shih (continuous 'vijiUina').In one place, the Siksananda translation gives i for i-shih.
35. Ibid.
36. My translation from T. 44, p. 578a; compare Hakeda, op. cit., p. 55.
37. See T. 52, p. 54bc, and note 5 above.
38. Summary of positions found in Tokiwa Daijo, Shina Bukkyo no kenkyu.
Chinese Glossary
a
i1!Ut j
aa ]ff-'f
ba JlR ea 1(>
b ab :f sas bb
**
eb '* fox {i
c
:is.m1mfjlj
ac fl' be iF ee
d it foX ad

bd sfitiffi cd
e
S}j
ae J...m be 'Ii't!'.' ee Ji'X..
f
;;( jIi
af
bf 8=
cf
g

ag bg. M#.'l!
eg m. :is
h iI!< ah
4;p iE!;'
bh eh f,fJ'ilf
iIlE4-
,,,,/i.!J' al Y:ilW' bi S)j
Cl 1*
J
fr;fr:
aJ

bj
,L.,1m
ej
iI,4j(
k ak
-.
bk ek -jt WI:
I al !l Jill bi

cl :is
am

bm Y: J!l
n fr ,L.'
an bn f$
0 ;f$Wi
ao bo
'f f,fJ
P
*E: ap
bp

q
,*jj!:
aq iIiX bq

r
ar br
5<:!:jIj
s
jt
as
9E bs

at lJ-.:i
fi' bt
liil'
,.m
u
:@:
au
:j:$ ::{, iIiX 1i Jl: :'1l-
bu
v 1!J
av
""-
bv

w
.!IZ aw J1f bw

x
-*
ax
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bx ffl;f$
y iiJ
ay
'hll
by
try
z Wp
az m!!liJ bz
,L.,
59
Notes on the Ratnakii.,ta Collection
by K. Priscilla Pedersen
The Maharatnakuta-sutra is not a single Buddhist work, but a large collec-
tion of forty-nine works which comprises a section of both the Chinese
Tripitaka 1 and the Tibetan Kanjur. 2
The collection in its present Chinese form was compiled in the
T'ang dynasty by Bodhiruci, a South Indian Brahman and illustrious
Tripitaka master who arrived in China in 693. Bodhiruci brought with
him Sanskrit manuscripts which he used in making his version of the
collection. The Emperor <;:;hung-tsung requested him to translate the
Ratnakuta, and Chung-tsung's successor, Jui-tsung, also took a personal
interest in the project. Bodhiruci began work with a team of assistants
in 706 and completed the translation in 713. It was the last of the many
translations which Bodhiruci undertook before devoting himself to the
practice of meditation in preparation for his death. He died at a great
age in 727.3
In editing the collection, Bodhiruci used as they were previous
Chinese translations of twenty-three works. He retranslated fifteen
works of which he considered the previous translations inadequate and
newly translated eleven works, making altogether a total of the forty-
nine works of the collection as it now stands.
The history of the collection before Bodhiruci is obscure, and it is
uncertain when, where and by what processes a collection of this name
may have taken shape. One should note the following data inconsider-
ation of the question.
Examination of the Tibetan Ratnakiita collection does not help in
establishing a date before Bodhiruci for the collection's formation,
since it is likely that the Tibetan compilers followed the order of the
Chinese version, with which their Ratnakiita corresponds as to the
works induded and the order of arrangement.
4
Biographies of Hsuan-tsang record that on New Year's Day, 664,
when the famous scholar and pilgrim had recently completed his
60
translation of the voluminous Mahaprajiiaparamita-sutra, a group of
translator monks approached him and. asked him to trafls1ate the
Ratnakuta. Hsuan-tsang protested, saying that the work was as long as
the Prajiiaparamita. When pressed further, he opened the Sanskrit text
and translated a few lines, but then stopped saying that he knew he
would not live much longer and his strength was not equal to such a
task. 5 (Hsuan-tsang had actually already translated one large work in
the Ratnakuta, the Bodhisattvapifaka-sutra (Rk No. 12), shortly after his
return from India.
6
) This anecdote shows that in Hsuan-tsang's day,
some forty years before Bodhiruci's translation, Chinese Buddhist
scholars knew of the collection, it enjoyed prestige, and Hsuan-tsang
possessed some Sanskrit version of it.
The Li-tai-san-pao-chi
7
reports that the Gandharan translator
Jiianagupta, who arrived in Chang-an in 559, often said that in the
southeast of the country Che-chu-chia
8
(the modern Karghalik), in an
area of precipitous mountains, the following Buddhist scriptures were
kept as the country's transmission of Buddhist doctrine in twelve divi-
sions: Mahiisannipata, Avata7[lSaka, Vaipulya, Ratnakuta, Lankiivatara,
Lalitavistara, Sririputradhrira1Ji, 9 10 Tu;;riragarbha, II
Mahaprajiiriparamitri, Prajiiriparamitii in eight sections, and Mahiimegha-
sutra. Here "Ratnakuta" appears alongside titles of major collections or
classifications of scripture, such as Avata7[lSaka or Vaipulya. Jiianagupta's
account would make a "Ratnakuta" in some form as early as mid- or
early sixth century, and also associates it with a specific geographical
area.
Of the forty-nine works in Bodhiruci's collection, only five have
Sanskrit originals or fragments of originals now extant. 12 These are the
Sukhrivativyuha (Rk No.4), the Ri4trapiilapanprcchii (Rk No. 18), the
Kasyapaparivarta (Rk No. 43), the Ratnarasi-sutra (Rk No. 44) and the
MaiijusrzOuddhak!;etragu1Javyuha (Rk No. 46). As these remains represent
only a small fraction of the total body of the collection, they do not
provide much basis for speculation as to the manner of the collection's
formation or its date.
Quotations in other Buddhist works from works in the Ratnakuta
always refer to the quoted work by its individual title without referring
to it as part of a larger collection. One important exception to this is
discussed below. Seventeen of the forty-nine works are referred to in
the Mahriyanasutrrila7[lkiira and Sik!;ri.samuccaya, but the authors of these
works, Maitreyanatha and Santideva, do not mention a collection.
I3
Moriz Winternitz remarks in his A History of Indian Literature,.
61
.. the various single texts which are mentioned as parts of the
Ratnakuta in Chinese and Tibetan works only occur as indepen_
dent works in Sanskrit. .. Maitreyanatha quotes the Ratnakuta in
his MahayanasutralaqIkara, XIX, 29. The Ratnakuta is mentioned
in Mahavyutpatti, 65,39, but the single t<;xts, too, are enumerated
as independent works. Similarly, in the Sik!?asamuccaya, both the
Ratnakuta and the works which it comprises, such as the Ragra-
U and
others, are cited. When the Sik:;;asamuccaya quotes the U gra-
find the Ratnakuta side by side, as on pp. 146, 196, or
when the p. 54f., quotes first the Ratnakura,'
then the RaHrapala Sutra, and then again the Sutra,
and then again the Ratnakuta are quoted, it follows that Santideva
did not know the U and the
as parts of the Ratnakuta.14
Winternitz apparently was unaware when he drew this conclusion that
when Santideva cites a "Ratnakiita," he is referring to the work known
among Japanese scholars as the "old Ratnakiita," also called the Kiisya-
paparivarta. IS A. von Stael-Holstein in his edition ofthis text (published
at almost the same time as Winternitz's History) says that his investiga-
tion shows that all quotations from a "Ratnakiita" in the
are from this single work. 16
A number of studies have been done of the KiiSyapaparivarta. The
edition of Stael-Holstein includes Sanskrit fragments from a ninth- or
tenth-century Khotanese manuscript, with Chinese and Tibetan trans-
lations. Kuno Horyli has published fragments corresponding to sections
of Stael-Holstein's text, based on a manuscript also from the Khotan
area, and probably belonging to the third to fifth centuries. 17 The work
has attracted the attention of scholars because of its numerous and
early translations did the first of four Chinese translations
c. 147-186), and because a number of Mahayana works, some by
important authors, quote it. Quotations occur in the Ratnagotra-
vibhagamahayanottaratantrasiistra, 18 the MahayanasiitriilaT[lkiira, 19 Prajiia-
karamati's commentary on the Bodhicaryavatara,20 the Buddhagotra-
sastra, attributed to Vasubandhu,21 Candraklrti's Prasannapadii, 22 and
the 23 None of these, however, mentions the KiiSya-
paparivarta, or "Ratnakiita, " as part of a larger collection.
The sole exception to this is the DaSabhiimikavibh(4a, translated by
Kumarajiva and attributed to Nargarjuna.
24
This work refers to a
"Kasyapa section of the Ratnakiita"25 as well as to an
section"26 which the Mahiiprajiuipiiramitii-siistra
27
also mentions. Shiomi
62
Tetsudo
28
and Haseoka Ichiya
29
show that quotations in the DaSabhiimika_
vibh{4a from the U gmparipr:ccha and the Vimaladattaparipr:ccha-siitra
correspond to these sections (Nos. 19 and 33 respectively) of the Ratna-
kiita collection. 30
Scholarship has not established Nargarjuna as the author of the
DaSabhiimikavibhi4a. One thus cannot assume a connection between the
founder of the Madhyamika in the second century and a Ratnakiita
collection, although Madhyamika writers seem to esteem the Kasyapa-
paparivarta. Japanese scholars agree, however, that the DaSabhiimika-
vibh{4a quotations show that a Ratnakiita collection existed when
Kumarajiva was engaged in translation between 402 and 415. Kajiyama
Yuichi states that "it is certain that Kumarajiva was aware that RK was a
collection of sutras."31 If so, the collection would date as far back as the
fifth or even fourth century, but we still know nothing of the form of
the collection at that time, apart from its inclusion of the Kasyapa and
Ak;;ayamati sections and possibly of the other two sections mentioned.
Bodhiruci's collection is heterogeneous in composition. As the
name "Ratnakiita" or "heap of jewels" might suggest, it includes a
variety of types of works differing in content. According to the editors
of the Index to the Taisho Tripitaka32 and Nagai Makoto in his introduc-
tion to the Ratnakiita section of the Kokuyaku Issaikyo,33 the collection
contains "Hinayana" works (Nos. 29 and 49), two works translated by 1-
Ching which correspond to parts of the Mulasarvastivadin Vinaya
(Nos. 13 and 14),34 Jatakas (Nos. 16, 17, and 38), works corresponding
to parts ofthePrafitaparamita (No. 46), Pure Land works (Nos. 5 and 6),
works of "esoteric Buddhism" (which, I am advised by Professor Alex
Wayman, here means simply those containing dhara'T}Zs rather than
Tantric works properly speaking), and other works. The editors of the
Taisho index find that certain basic Mahayana concepts give a thematic
unity to the collection, while Sakurabe Bunkyo feels that the collection
is so miscellaneous as to have no real coherence. The very heterogeneity
of the collection might indicate that its compilers intended it to be a
cross-section of Buddhist scripture.
Let us now briefly review our collected evidence. The Ratnakiita
collection in a form similar to that in which Bodhiruci arranged it
probably existed in Hsuan-tsang's day. At that time it had prestige; on
the other hand, it is significant that unlike, for example, the Avata1{lsaka
collection, the Ratnakiita had had no previous Chinese translation as a
whole collection, either because the collection was unknown or because
its popularity was later in developing. The statement of Jfianagupta,
63
who in mid-sixth century refers toa Central Asian collection of scripture
including a "Ratnakiita," as well as other well-known works, is of
interest. References to a "Kasyapa section" and an "Aki?ayamati section"
of a Ratnakiita in Kumarajiva's translation of the Dalabhiimikavibhii)a
show that Kumarajiva knew of a collection of thi.s name. Scholars have
suggested that the Kasyapaparivarta or "old Ratnakiita," which has an
early date, was a nucleus around which other works in the collection
were assembled in the course of time. Taking this information and the
character of the collection into account, we can date the collection no
earlier than the fourth century and no later than the seventh century.
Indian authors do not refer to the Ratnakiita collection although they
quote from works included in it. This in itself is not sufficient basis for a
judgement that they did not know that the collection existed. In the
absence of positive evidence, however, we can say nothing about an
Indian Ratnakiita collection. The formation of the collection may have .
taken place not in India, but in Central Asia or China or both. We know
that the collection was probably current in Central Asia because of the
account of Jiianagupta, because Kumarajiva, who mentions a Ratnakiita
collection, was from Kucha, and because both existing fragments of the
Kasyapaparivarta or "old Ratnakiita" are from the Khotan area.
NOTES
1. Volume 11 of the Taisho includes the Mahiiratnakiita collection
proper, T No. 310, as compiled by Bodhiruci, and additional translations, not used by
Bodhiruci, of works in the collection. Nanjio Bunyiu's A Catalogue of the Chinese Transla-
tion of the Buddhist Tripipaka (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1883) lists Bodhiruci's collection as
No. 23, with additional translations following.
2. Section 6 (Dkon-brtegs), in six volumes.
3. Prabodh Chandra Bagchi, Le Canon Bouddhique en Chine (2 vols.; Paris, P.
Guethner, 1927-38), Vol. 2, pp. 542-43.
4. See Marcelle Lalou, "La version Tibetaine du Journal Asiatique,
Vol. 211 (1927), p. 233ff., and Sakurabe Bunkyo, "Saizo Daihojaku-kyo no kenkyii,"
Otani Gakhuo, VoI.11,No.3(September, 1930),pp.134-175.
5. See the Ta-t'ang-ku-san-tsang-hsuan-tsang1a-shih-hsing-chuang, T No. 2052,
Vol. 50, p. 219a, and the Ta-tz'u-en-ssu-san-tsang1a-shih-ch'uan, T No. 2053, Vol. 50, p.
276c. I am indebted to Professor Sakurabe for these references. See also Bagchi, lac. cit.,
and Arthur Waley, The Real Tripitaka (London: Allen & Unwin, 1952), p. 126.
6. See the Ta-tz'u-en-ssu-san-tsang1a-shih-ch'uan, T No. 2053, Vol. 50, p. 236a,
p. 254a, and p. 258a.
7. T No. 2034, Vol. 49, p. 103a. Again, I am indebted to Professor Sakurabe for
this reference.
8. :illf jtiJ i!1!! This place appears with the alternate name of Cho-chu-chia
( jtiJ i!1!! ) on Oshio Dokuzan's map of Indian Buddhist history, Indo-bukkyo-shi chizu
64
(TokyQ: Daiyukaku Shoten, 1927), map lOCation K4.
9. Ono Gemmyo's encyclopedia of Buddhist texts, Bussho Kaisetsu Daijiten (Tokyo:
Daito Shuppansha, 1933 -36) gives the Sanskrit title of this work as Anantamukhanihara-
dhiiraTfi, which is T No. 1016, Vol. 19. Nanjio'scatalogue, No. 353, gives the Sanskrit title
. Anantamukhasiidhakadhara'Tf"
10. This Sanskrit title is conjectural. T Nos. 1356 and 1358, Vol. 21, have similar
titles.
11. This Sanskrit title is conjectural, as I have not been able to locate such a title
in any catalogue.
12. Yamada Ryujo, Bongo Butten no shobunken (Tokyo: Heirakuji Shoten, 1959),
p.96.
13. Sakurabe, pp. 527-28.
14. Moriz Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature, rev. ed., trans. S. Ketkar
(3 vols.; Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1927), Vol. 2, p. 329.
15. In the Bodhiruci collection, this work has been retitled Samantaprabhasa-
bodhisattvapariprccha. Bodhiruci apparently made this change in order to avoid confusion
with Rk No. 23, MahaJWSyapasangitisirrzhanada or )!it foJ i!!H ~ Wi-
16. A. von Stael-Holstein, The Kasyapaparivarta, a Mahayanasutra of the Ratnakuta
Class (Shanghai: Commercial Press, Ltd., 1926), Preface, p. 16.
17. Kuno Horyil, "Sei-iki shutsudo Bukkyo oonpon to sono seitenshiranjo no
chii," Bukkyo Kenkyu, Vol. 3, No.2 (1938), pp. 1-40.
18. See Tsukinowa Keriryu, "Kobun Daihojakukyo ni tsuite," Bukkyogaku no
shomondai (Tokyo, 1935), pp. 849-869.
19. Stael-Holstein, loco cit.
20. Ibid.
21. Tsukinowa, loco cit.
22. Ibid. See also Hachiriki Hiraki, "Prasannapadii no inyo kyoten (2)-Ratnakuta-
sutra no inya ni tsuite," Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu, Vol. 15, No.2 (March, 1967),
pp. 720-723.
23. Stael-Holstein, loco cit.
24. T No. 1521, Vol. 26.
25 ... J ~ ~ ~ iii!! ~ 0'1
26. ~ :Ii ~ ~ ifi it D ~
27. T No. 1509, Vol. 25.
28. Shiomi Tetsuda, "Ryuju shain no daija kyaten no nisan ni tsuite," Shukyo
Kenkyu, New Series, Vol. 9, No.6 (1932), pp. 1031-1044.
29. Haseoka Ichiya, ',]ujubibasharan ni okeru KiiSyapaparivarta no inya no tsuite,"
Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenyku, Vol. 2, No.2 (March, 1954),.pp. 200-203.
30. See also Amano Hirofusa, "Hojakukyo ni tsuite," Indogaku Bukkyogaku
Kenkyu, Vol. 4, No.2 (March, 1956), pp. 464-465.
31. Kajiyama Yuichi, "Bhavaviveka, Sthirmati and Dharmapiila," Wiener Zeitschrift
fur die Kunde Sud- und Ostasiens und Archiv fur Indische Philosophie, Band XII-XIII, 1968-
1969 (Beitriige zur Geistesgeschichte Indiens-Festschriftfur Erich Frauwallner) , p. 197.
32. Index to the TaishO Tripi!taka, Vol. 6 (Hojaku-bu) (Tokyo: Daizakyo Gakujutsu
Yogo Kenkyukai, 1966).
33. Kokuyaku Issaikyo, Vol. 32 (HOjaku-bu, 1), (Tokyo: Daito Shuppansha, 1931).
34. See Marcelle Lalou, op. cit.
65
Selected List of Chinese Text Titles
2: fr
A vatarp.saka JJtt
Bodhisattvapitaka-sutra i!l"
+ 1.1 yy
Kasyapaparivarta i!m r:\1
Lalitavistara 15
Lankavatara m i!m
Li-tai-san-pao-chi t\; = J( #.2
Mahakasyapasangitisirp.hanada JiJ roJ i!m fr
Mahamegha-sutra * #.'If
Mahaprajiiaparamita JiJ roJ Jlj:[
Mahaprajiiaparamita-sastra * N
Maharatnakuta * J!t of!
Mahasannipata * '*'
Y:: iF1J BJi fr
Prajiiaparamita BJi:5
' Wf:: ?ii IE
I!i!:I Wi- ii{ fr
Ratriakuta .. of! 0 r J.l'!
Ratnarasi-sutra .. i i!l"
Ij,Ej Wi- ii{ fr
Sariputradharaf.1i :tl1i'? *IJ Jt ?ii IE
Sukhavativyuha It :!<Q "* fr
Ta-t'ang-ku-san-tsang-fa-shih-hsing-chuang * Jillf i& = ""E * IT AA
Ta-tz'u-en-ssu-san-tsang-fa-shih-ch'uan * 4 = y! rjJ
1f11 iWi i.il Nf>X:
11m -R: 4!J. fr
Vaipulya 15
t' .i5ili 1f ii{ m i!l"
Bodhiruci 1f P'l': ;;!;;
Hsuan-tsang ""E *
I Ching i'
Jiianagupta [iii] 1.l15 rI)'ijj
Kumarajiva M J1i,\' it
i!m
RK - Ratnakuta
T - Taisho Tripiraka
66
Proper Names
Abbreviations
The Sixteen Aspects of the Four
Noble Truths and Their Opposites
by Alex Wayman
The sixteen aspects of the four Noble Truths are not canonical and are
not found in tht; Abhidhamma of Southern Buddhism.
l
They are a
specification resulting from the version of the First Sermon of Buddhism,
the Setting into Motion of the Wheel of the Dharma, which, after
stating the four Noble Truths, adds a triple turning of the wheel with
twelve aspects. This is the of the Mahiivastu. 2
The sixteen aspects were possibly represented by the aniconic symbol
of the wheel of 16 spokes, four main ones and twelve intermediate
spokes. A number of illustrations of these Dharmacakra are collected
by Dhanit Yupho in a Bangkok publication.
3
The sixteen aspects are
treated in the Northern Abhidharma, as observed in Vasubandhu's
Abhidharmakosa, Chap. VII, verse 13, where a number of theories are
presented.
4
Besides, Asanga discusses the 16 aspects in his Sriivaka-
bhumi.
5
I have found the list in a native Tibetan text, lectures by Tsong-
kha-pa on Buddhist logic, where he presents a list of sixteen that are
the opposites or adversaries of the sixteen aspects, agreeing in large
part with one of the theories in the Abhidharmakosa. In short, the earliest
specification of the sixteen aspects is in the Northern Abhidharma
schools, and Sautrantika. However, if the list of terms origi-
nated in these Abhidharma schools it is curious that there should
remain some obscurity after their explanations.
Asanga's school contemplates the sixteen aspects in the category
of vipalyanii (discerning), i.e. discerning the truth (satya), after calming
the mind (samatha).7 This agrees with the Abhidharmakosa, which
identifies the list with prajiiii ('insight'),8 since the term prajiiii is fre-
quently equated with vipalyanii.
9
Tsong-kha-pa in those lectures refers
to Dharmaklrti's Pramiir;aviirttika, Svarthanumana chapter, verse 218
(Sastri's ed., but verse 217 in the autocommentary and Tibetan version):
67
"So as to determine the reality of rejecting and accepting together with
the means, by virtue of non-deception regarding the chief aim, there is
inference (anumana) in terms of the beyond." 10 The autocommentary
on this mentions the four Noble Truths, and the V ~ t t i clarifies that the
rejecting is of suffering and the source of suffering, that the accepting
is of cessation and the path. The beyond means the parok.<;a (what is
beyond sight), namely, the chief aim, NirvaI;la, which therefore has to
be inferred. Tsong-kha-pa takes for granted that his audience knows
that the sixteen terms and that they have opposites are referred to in
the PramaTfasiddhi chapter of PramaTfavarttika, namely in the block of
verses in Miyasaka's edition 146-283.
11
But Tsong-kha-pa expands to
sixteen terms using Abhidharma-type vocabulary, and this is reason-
able, since Buddhist logic has an Abhidharma base. 12 The Abhisamaya-
laT[ikiira summary of the Prajnaparamita includes the sixteen aspects of
the four Truths as a concentration in the path of the Sravaka (as does
AsaIiga), and a feature of this path is the identification of Nirvaf.la with
the Truth of Cessation (nirodha-satya).13
While the list of sixteen was included, or generally alluded to, in a
variety of texts as mentioned above, there is a question of how viable a
classification it is, i.e. to what extent such terms help to explain this
cardinal teaching of Buddhism-the four Noble Truths. We should
note that not only does the Southern Abhidharma textual tradition not
use the sixteen-term system,14 but also the SatyasiddhiStistra of Hari-
varman, completely devoted to the four truths, appears opposed to
employing this organizational teminology.15 To arrive at a conclusion
about these matters, it will be necessary to treat each of the sixteen
separately, using the above works. The Buddhist dictionary Mahavyut-
patti (nos. 1190-1205) gives the individual terms as follows: (Noble
Truth of Suffering,) dul},kham, anityam, sunyam, anatmakam. (Noble
Truth of Source,) samudayal}" prabhaval}" hetul}" pratyayah;. (Noble Truth
of Cessation,) nirodhah;, santah;, praTfital}" nil},saraTfal},. (Noble Truth of
Path,) margal}" nyayal}" pratipattil}" nairyar;,ikal},.
Of the sixteen aspects, the easiest are the four of the set going
with the Truth of Suffering, mainly because the terms are so celebrated
in Buddhist texts. Leaving out the 'voidness' (sunya) term, the other
three are the well-known set of three characteristics (lak<;ar;,a) which all
constructed things (saT[iSkiira) have: impermanence (anitya), pain (dul},kha),
and non-self (anatman). For canonical references, one may consult
Nyanatiloka, Buddhist Dictionary, under Ti-Iakkhaf.1.a.
16
Asanga in the
68
section mentioned writes mostly about this set. 17 He introduces a group
of ten aspects (akiira) for treating the Truth of Suffering, namely,
aspect of 1) transformation (vipariYfama) , 2) destruction (vinasa) , 3)
separation (visa7!Lyoga), 4) closeness (sa7!Lnihita), 5) true nature (dlWrmatii),
6) fetters andbondage (sa'!lyojanabandhana), 7) the disagreeable (an4ta),
8) no security 9) non-apprehension (anupalambha) , 10)
non-independence (asvatantrya). He states that the aspect of imp erma-
nence is examined by five of these ten aspects, namely, of transforma-
tion, destruction, separation, closeness, and true nature. The aspect of
pain is examined by three aspects, namely, of fetters and bondage, of
the disagreeable, and of no security. The voidness aspect is examined
by one aspect, namely, non-apprehension (of a certain object). The
aspect of non-self is examined by one aspect, namely, non-independence.
The ArthaviniScaya-tika (author unknown, Tibetan Tanjur) briefly
explains the four in a description of the sam0kiira personality aggregate
(skandha): 18
It is impermanent, because it perishes in each instant. It is painful,
because possessing the nature (dharma) of birth, old age, and so
on. It is void, because those sa7!LSkiiras are not the self imagined by
the heretics. It is non-self because precisely those are not the self-
existence (svabhiiva) of self imagined by the heretics ..
One should also notice that Harivarman's work attributes the list
to an unnamed sidra passage: "dharma anitya dulJ,khalJ, sunya anatmanalJ,
pratityasamutpanna ... " but includes this passage and its discussion not
under the first Truth, that of Suffering, but under the third one, that
of Cessation! 19 Harivarman stresses pursuant to this passage the
voidness of dharmas, but also insists on voidness of self. Here there is a
difficulty shared with the Arthaviniscaya-tz7ui, as cited above, that in the
list of four terms including both void (Sunya) and non-self (anatmaka) , to
interpret the term 'void' as denying a self should make one wonder why
the term 'non-self is included as a separate aspect. Asanga was
apparently appreciative of this point, since for him the voidness aspect
is examined just by the aspect of non-apprehension without further
qualifying the non-apprehension.
Passing to the coverings or adversaries
20
of these four aspects in
Tsong-kha-pa's list,zl that the covering of impermanence is perma-
nence, of pain is pleasure, of non-self is self-is simple enough.
However, the covering he gives for voidness (sunya) is with a term
69
gcang, which I correct to bcang, "taking hold (of an object)." This agrees
with Asanga's "non-apprehension" for voidness in the present context.
The various explanations in the Abhidharmakosa seem not to take aCCOunt
of a requirement to show some adversity for the terms listed under the
Truth of Suffering, and in particular the term I render 'voidness.'
Presumably the adversity is the sense of 'voidness' that it is here the
absence of the thing one hunts and looks for, expects to find, leaving
one in a kind of despair. Asanga's 'non-independence' for non-self
does indeed take account of the adversative intention. It might be for
the reason which Vasubandhu gives as one tradition: 22 akiimakiiritvad iti
"because there is no performance of what one wishes." Harivarman's
placement of the list under the Truth of Cessation of course avoids the
implication of adversative sense that placement under Truth of Suffer-
ing entails. In support of his placement, there is the set called the four
'aphorisms of the Dharma'; cf. Mahiiyana-Sutrala7[lkiira, SVIII, 80, and
commentary: "Allsa7[l5kiiras (constructions) are impermanent; alisa7[l5kiiras
(motivations) are suffering; 23 all dharmas are non-self; NirvaDa is calm
(santa)." Observe that this set has an entry 'Nirvaq.a' in place of the
term 'void' of the other list, and that Harivarman practically equates
voidness (5unyataj with Nirvaq.a.
24
Before leaving the Truth of Suffering, it is well to mention even if
briefly the theory of three kinds of duly,khata (misery). Asanga (ViniSaya-
sa7[lgraharJz- on Cintamayz- bhumi)25 identifies the three with the three
standard kinds of feelings, painful, pleasurable, and neither painful
nor pleasurable. The first duly,khata is the misery of suffering (duly,kha),
and as the painful kind of feeling, it is the misery experienced and
acknowledged in the world, since the pair 'pain and pleasure' (duly,kha
and sukha) are among the eight worldly dharmas, of course compre-
hended by ordinary persons. The ArthaviniScaya-tikii (Tibetan Tanjur)28
describes this kind of duly,hata consistently with a detailed list that shows
it covers the pains people can do something about, as well as those
recognized to be outside of one's control. The second duly,khata is the
misery of change (viparirJama), and as the pleasurable kind of feeling, it
is not recognized as misery by ordinary persons. So Sa7[lyutta-Nikiiya,
Part IV (Saliiyatana-Vagga): / yam pare sukhato ahu / tad ariya ahu dukkhato /
"What others call 'happiness' that the noble ones call 'suffering."'27
The third duly,khata is the misery of motivations (sa7[l5kiira) , and as the
feeling that is neither painful nor pleasurable, it is also not recognized
as misery by ordinary persons. Asariga explains: 28 "It was in connection
with the misery of motivations that the Lord said: 'In short, the five
70
grasping aggregates are suffering.' What is the misery of motivations?
These and those bodies with motivations generated by karma and defile-
ment (kleSa) arising, ... " He also mentions that this misery is evidenced
by the four waywardnesses (viParyiisa) , i.e., regarding the imperma-
nent as permanent, the painful as pleasurable, the unclean as clean, the
non-self as self; and finally, that this misery is the trace (anuSaya) of
nescience (avidyii).
It is clear that the duf}kha of the first Noble Truth has a wider
scope than the ordinary person can understand, and has a metaphysical
side that is comprehensible to the iirya, in the ancient use of this word.
Some persons accordingly challenged the translation of duf}kha as
'suffering' or 'pain.' However, the present translator translates the
term in those two ways to accord with the various contexts in which the
term is found, sometimes in concrete senses to apply to old age, sick-
ness, and death; and sometimes in a metaphorical way. And to leave the
term untranslated, as has been recommended by at least one modern
author, would entirely defeat any communication of metaphorical
nuance.
As we pass to the remaining three Truths, it turns out that the
coverings in the list of sixteen adversaries become of greater importance.
The second set going with "Noble Truth of Source (of Suffering)"
has the requirement of providing cause or causes for the suffering
without constituting suffering. Here there are the aspects cause (hetu),
source (samudaya), production (prabhava), and condition (pratyaya). The
trouble with the Abhidharmakosa explanations in the main is that they
define these terms as various kinds of causes without thereby showing
their natures as causes for suffering. Asang2 is quite superior here
because he faces up to the necessity that they not only be causes, but
cause for suffering. 29 One of several variant explanations he furnishes
is especially interesting since it relates these terms to Buddhist Depen-
dent Origination (pratitya-samutpiida).30 This particular solution takes
the aspect of 'cause' to be craving (tn7Jii), 8th member of Dependent
Origination, heading the five members which bring about new destiny.
Asanga here says it is the cause of 'indulgence' (upiidiina) , and casts
gestation and suffering. The aspect of 'source' is indulgence (upiidiina),
9th member, which finalizes after the casting. The aspect of 'produc-
tion' is gestation (bhava), 10th member, hence embryonic life, prior to
the manifestation of suffering. The fourth aspect, of condition (pratyaya)
is birth (jiiti), the 11th member, which holds the seed offuture suffering,
and is the condition for old age, sickness, and death. Notice that in this
71
solution, 'birth,' 11 th member of Dependent Origination, is counted as
a cause of suffering and therefore not itself a suffering. The Madhya_
rriika tradition of the Pratz-tya-samutpiida commentary attributed to
N agarjuna, and a passage in the DaSabhiimika-siitra along the same lines,
disagrees because it counts 'birth' as one of the suffering members of
Dependent Origination.
31
Tsong-kha-pa's list of coverings or adversaries of these four
seems to amount to non-Buddhist positions.
32
Thus, for the aspect of
'cause,' from his list, positing that there is no cause of suffering
amounts to the position of the ancient materialistic Carvakas, the
position called ahetuka ('having no cause'), which Buddhism always
denounced. For the aspect of 'source,' positing the unaffIliated as the
cause, or positing only a single cause, might be equivalent to the fourth
account in the Abhidharmakosa
33
mentioning at this place a Lord
(ISvara), or'pradhana, since the Lord could be considered unaffiliated
to the effect, and pradJuina as the prakrti could be considered a
single cause. For the aspect of 'production,' positing (suffering) as
I
created by the evolution of the Sabdabrahman, would be a
theory according to S. Dasgupta;34 while the Abhidharmakosa here
mentions the evolutionary theory of the called parirpima, in
which the effect is'pre-existent in the cause. For the fourth aspect of
'condition,' positing (suffering) as created by a former ISvara-buddhi
(cognition of a Lord), is the same as given in the Abhidharmakosa.
When coming to the treatment of the third set under "Noble
Truth of Cessation (of Suffering)" and of the fourth set under "Noble
Truth of Path (leading to the Cessation)," AsaIiga contents himself with
a few neutral remarks, perhaps reluctant to enter into the controversies
involved in a longer treatment. Let us pass first to the coverings in
Tsong-kha-pa's list,35 namely, for the third set, cessation (nirodha), calm
(santa), the excellent (praTfita), exit (nilJ,saraTfa); and for the fourth set,
path (miirga) , principle (nyaya) , accomplishment (pratipatti) , way of
deliverance (nairyaTfika).
For the aspect of 'cessation,' the covering is the positing by one
gone astray that there is no liberation; for the aspect of 'calm,' positing
that there is a special liberation attended with flux of uncalmed defile-
ments; for the aspect of 'the excellent' (usually explained as anuttara,
'the best'), positing that there is a higher liberation than stopping
suffering; for the aspect of 'exit,' positing a temporary liberation and
that there is no final liberation.
For the aspect of 'path,' the covering is the positing that there is no
72
final path of liberation; for the aspect of 'principle' (= method), positing
that the insight comprehending non-self is not a path ofliberation; for
the aspect of 'accomplishment,' positing the situation of the object-
. scope while having gone astray; for the aspect, 'way of deliverance,'
positing that thereby there is no ability to put a final end to suffering.
The 'coverings' in Tsong-kha-pa's list for the third and fourth sets
amount to a paraphrase of the fourth Abhidharmakosa explanation. The
adversary views do help to bring out the meaning of the aspect terms
for these two sets.
Now, a striking feature of the aspects given under "Noble Truth of
Path" is that they are not obviously related to the usual statement of the
Path, namely, the eightfold members, frequently listed under the three
instructions which form the organization of Buddhaghosa's Visuddhi-
magga. These three are the Instruction of Morality, the Instruction of
Mental Training of samiidhi, and the Instruction of Insight. Even
though Asanga does not organize his Yogacarabhumi along the specific
lines of the well-known three instructions these categories
are basic for much of his writing. Examining the statements of Tsong-
kha-pa's adversaries for the four of this path group in comparison with
the fOUT of the cessation set, a suggestive parallel emerges, which may
provide an opening for relating the three instructions. By this I mean
to call attention to the covering of 'cessation' claiming that in fact there
is no liberation, while the covering of 'path' is the claim that there is no
final path of liberation; then, for the aspect of 'exit' claiming that there
is no final path of libertion, while the covering of 'way of deliverance' is
the claim that one cannot put a final end to suffering. These seeming
affiliations of statement gave me the idea that the two sets of four terms
might be correlated in their given order. Following this suggestion, I
may propose that the aspect of path (miirga) leads to the aspect of cessa-
tion (nirodha); that the aspect of principle (= method) (nyaya) leads to
the aspect of calm (santa); that the aspect of accomplishment (pratipatti)
leads to the aspect of the excellent (praTfita); finally, that the aspect 'way
of deliverance' (nairyaTfika) leads to the aspect 'exit' (nil},saraTfa). Then
the way of relating the three instructions follows readily, namely, that
the instruction of mind training is the principle or method that leads to
calm, since samiidhi is the standard procedure for calming the mind;
that the instruction of morality is the accomplishment that leads to the
excellent, which is consistent with ancient Buddhism's great stress on
morality and extolling of its merit; that the instruction of insight
(prajiw) is the way of deliverance that leads to the 'exit' or 'escape' from
73
phenomenal life, constituting the Arhat ideal of early Buddhism.
36
Such a correlation would leave the main terms of 'cessation' and 'path'
as headings under which are ranged the respective three aspects that
go with the three instructions. This is consistent with the early tradition
that takes 'cessation' as equal to Nirvaq.a, and with the Tibetan transla_
tion of this term as 'beyond suffering' (my a ngan las 'das pa). This is
because the thrust of these Abhidharma-type explanations. of the four
Noble Truths is that liberation amounts to the cessation of suffering
(dulJ,kha).
Besides, a feature of the first sermon, Setting into Motion the
Wheel of Dharma, in various versions, is to take the four Noble Truths
as objects. Thus, the statement is made: "Suffering, a Noble Truth, is to
be fully known (parijiieyam)." Again, "The Source of Suffering is to be
eliminated (prahiitavyalJ,)." "The Cessation of Suffering is to be realized
directly (siik!jiit kartavyalJ,)." "The Path leading to the Cessation of
Suffering is to be cultivated (dulJ,khanirodhagiiminz-frratipad bhiivayitavyii."37
This promptly raises a question: If cessation is to be realized directly,
i.e., siik!jiit, as though before the eyes, then how could this cessation be
equated to Nirvaq.a, if Nirvaq.a be taken in Dharmakirti's sense as some-
thing to be inferred rather than seen in direct vision? The resolution
here would be to take Nirvaq.a in such usage not to be identified with
cessation (nirodha). And we note that Dharmakirti is writing in the
mature Mahayana Buddhism period, when a Nirvaq.a of no fixed
abode (aprat4thitanirviiTfa) had come to the fore.
Thus, a consideration of the sixteen aspects of the four Noble
Truths, and their sixteen 'coverings' or adversaries, does appear to
bring out important features of the four Truths, and to make salient
certain striking differences of the traditions. The investigation attests
to the teaching of the four Noble Truths as basic to the earliest
Buddhism, and to later disputes of what to place under each of the
four. Thus, one strong current of interpretation took the sixteen
aspects as a guide, while another was either oblivious of, or uncom-
fortable with the neat list.
NOTES
1. Confer Louis de La Vallee Poussin, tr. L'Abhidharmakosa de Vasubandhu,
Septieme ... (Paris, 1925), p. 30, note.
2. Confer Franklin Edgert.on, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Reader (New Haven, 1953),
p. 17, introductory note about the two original parts of the Dharmacakrapravartana-siitra;
and p. 19, triple turning of the wheel in the second part, namely in the Mahiivastu version.
74
3. Dhanit Yupho, Dharmacakra or The Wheel af the Law (The Fine Arts Department,
Bangkok, Thailand, B.E. 2511; third edition, 1968). Among the illustrations, the twelve-
spoked wheel presumably or possibly symbolizes the twelve-membered dependent
origination (pratitya-samutpiida); the sixteen-spoked one, the sixteen aspects of the four
.Noble Truths;. the thirty-two spoked one, the Buddha himself with thirty-two charac-
teristics.
4. La Vallee Poussin, op. cit., Septieme, pp. 30-39.
5. The lengthy treatment begins with Lokottaramarga and then the exposition of
the vipari1Jiima kind of impermanence (anityatii), Sriivakabhumi, K. Shukla, ed. (Patna,
1973), p. 470, where the sixteen aspects are named.
6. Tsong-kha-pa, collected works (Tashilunpo edition), Vol. Pha, Tshad ma'i brjed
byang chen mo (Rgy,al-tshab-Ije's notes on Tsong-kha-pa's lectures), f. 13b, and following.
For the comparable Abhidharmakosa theory, confer La Vallee Poussin, op. cit., Septieme, p.
38, referred to simply as the 'fourth explanation,' which was appealed to by Samghabhadra
to demonstrate that the aspects are indeed sixteen.
7. Confer Alex Wayman, Analysis af the Sriivakabhumi Manuscript (Berkeley, 1961),
pp. 130-131, for the exposition, in particular, examination of the Noble Truth of Suffering
with the kind of discerning (vipasyanal called 'special knowledge' (pratisa:'!Ivid) of the
characteristics (lalqa7Ja).
8. La Vallee Poussin, op. cit., Septieme, p. 39.
9. Confer Alex Wayman, tr., Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real (New York,
1978), p. 28.
10. / hcyopadeyatattvasya sopiiyasya prasiddhitalf / pradhiiniirthiivisa,,!,viidiid anumiina,,!,
paratra vii //. By 'auto-commentary' is meant Dharmakirti's Sviirthiinumiina-pariccheda,
edited independently by Raniero Gnoli and by Dalsukhbhai Malvaniya; and 'v!ffi' means
the one by Manorathanandin.
11. This is the edition published in Acta Indologica II (Naritasan Shinshoji,japan,
1971172).
12. At least this is the case in Tibetan tradition, since according to my observation
the chief Tibetan commentators on Buddhist logic also wrote commentaries on either
Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosa or Asanga's Abhidharmasamuccaya.
13. Confer E. Obermiller, "The Doctrine of Prajiia-paramita as exposed in the
Abhisamayiila,,!,hiira of Maitreya," Acta Orientalia, Vol. XI (1932), pp. 18-19.
14. The well-known Pii.li exegetical work, the N etti-pakaraTfa (translated under the
title The Guide) applies six terms to the four Noble Truths (E. Hardy's edition, p. 8):
Admavo phalait ce dukkha"!,, assiido samudayo, nissaraTfa,,!, nirodho, upiiyo ii1Jatti ca maggo.
"Trouble and fruit are suffering; gratification is the source; exit is cessation; means and
command are the path." Here, 'means' and 'command' might be equivalent to the two
kinds of Patimokkha, by exhortation (oviida) and by command (ii1Jii); cf. C. S. Upasak,
Dictionary of Early Budhist Monastic Terms (Varanasi, 1975), p. 152; and A. Wayman,
"Ancient Buddhist Monasticism," Studia Missionalia, Vol. 28, 1979, p. 199.
15. N. Aiyaswami Sastri has reconstructed from Chinese to Sanskrit of the
SatyasiddhiSiistra (Baroda, 1975), and has translated it into English (Baroda, 1978).
16. Nyanatiloka, Buddhist Dictionary (Colombo, 1950), 155-6). The late Edward
Conze gave his views on the three, calling them 'marks' in his Buddhist Thought in India
(London, 1962), Part I, chapter 3.
17. See the references in notes 5 and 7, above.
75
IS. Photo edition of Peking Tanjur (PTT), Vol. 145,p. 162-1,2.
19. Aiyaswami Sastri, SatyasiddhiJiistra, Sanskrit, p. 354.
20. The 'coverings' are indicated by the word aTopya in Prama'0vaTltika, Pramana_
siddhi chapter, verse 271: aropya. .
21. See the reference in note 6, above.
22. La Vallee Poussin, op. cit., Septieme, p. 32.
23. I translate the word sa7f1Skiira differently in the first two aphorisms, because
when sa7f1Skiira is identified with suffering (duhkha) it is variously said to be the five
personality aggregates (skandha) OT to be 'with flux' (siisrava). On the other hand, the
samskiira said to be impermanent means all of the 'constructed natures' (sa7f1Skrta-dharma).
24. See N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Satyasiddhisiistra, Eng. tT., pp. 35S-359.
25. Asariga, Yogacarabhumi, PTT, Vol. Ill, p. 2S-3,4.
26. See n. IS, above, op. cit., p. 209-2,3.
27. In the edition of Bhikkhu J. Kashyap, The Sa7[!yutta Nikiiya, 4. Sajayatanavagga,
p. 116.16. .
2S. See no. 25, above, p. 2S-3,4.
29. See n. 5, above, op. cit., p. 493, where Shukla wrongly edits for
hetu; read instead: try'!aya "By cause (hetu) through craving
which casts suffering." The other three aspects are also explained as sources for
suffering.
30. Since there is further confusion in Shukla's edition (p. 493) at this point, I
have consulted the Tibetan translation, PTT, Vol. 110, p. 126-5-4,5,6.
31. DaSabhumikaiisiitra is cited in Siintideva's (Vaidya ed., p. 123.21-22),
happening to be in agreement with the Pratityasamutpiida commentary, that of the
members of dependent origination, avidya, and upadana are defilement (klesa);
sa7f1Skiira-s and bhava are 'action' (karma); and the rest are suffering Hence,
'birth' (jati) is counted as a 'suffering.'
32. See n. 6, above, f. 13b-6 to 14a-1.
33. La Vallee Poussin, op-. cit., Septieme, p. 3S.
34. Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy (Cambridge, 1940),
Vol. III, p. 5S.
35. See no. 6, above, f. 14a-l to 14a-4.
36. Tsong-kha-pa, brjed byang, n. 6, above, f. 13a-5, states: "The acarya (i.e.
Dharmakirii) ... took the prajita that comprehends non-self to be the chief (thing) of the
path to liberation from phenomeriallife, and the others to be ancillary."
37. So in the Lalitavistara, as presented in Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit
Reader (n. 2, above), pp. 22-23.
76
Kaniska's Buddha Coins - The Official
Iconography of Sakyamuni & Maitreya
by Joe Cribb
A clear picture of the development of the iconography of Buddhism is
an essential element of the study of the development of Buddhist
theology. The detailed examination of surviving material culture can
greatly enhance our understanding of the theological developments
apparent from the surviving scriptures. In spite of the importance of
the reign of the Kushan king for the development of Buddhism
both in its theology and its iconography, it is remarkable that the only
concrete official manifestation of that king's beliefs still remain
obscured to most students of Buddhism. The objects in question are
. the coins issued by that king depicting Buddhist iinages on their
reverses.
Whatever else can be claimed for these coins, it can be said
without fear of contradiction that these coins were struck during
reign and at his request. The details and style of the images
on them were the responsibility of the artisans involved in their pro-
duction with or without reference to the king, but the identity of the
images and their iconography rested with the king or his closest
. advisers.
Rosenfield (Dynastic Art oj the Kushans, Berkeley, 1967, pp. 69-74)
has discussed the rationale behind choice of reverse types.
He logically proposed that the selection of reverse types indicated the
nomination of individual deities as associates of the king, "divine
companions and supporters of the monarchy" so that the coinage types
were propagandist in nature. The deities chosen by showed
that he had adopted for this purpose, not only the religious beliefs of
the Parthians who ruled the central part of this empire before the
Kushan conquest, but also that of his Indian subjects. The only
important cult flourishing in his realm not represented on his coinage
was J ainism.
79
The selection by of Buddhist images as reverse types
implies the same process as his selection of the other religious images
on his coins, Literary sources, although all of a religious nature, are
dear testimony to adherence to the Buddhist religion, The
coins are an expression of this as well as being concrete evidence of it.
His witnessing this on his coinage also demonstrates the nature of his
belief in Buddhism. The I?uddha is depicted on the coinage in the same
way as the gods such as Siva, Mithra, Ahurmazda etc. By placing the
Buddha on a coin, Kaniljka has equated his position with that of deities,
and thereby implied for him a divine role. Such a bold statement of the
Buddha's godhead, is in keeping with the development during the
Kushan period of sculptural cult images of the Buddha, as opposed to
the early abstention from visual representations of the Buddha.
I have been conducting a detailed numismatic examination of the
coins of depicting the Buddha and will shortly publish my
findings together with a discussion of their iconographic and artistic
implications. These coins are not only important evidence of the
development of Buddhist iconography, but also represent crucial
dated (relatively) parallels to the earliest Buddha images which were
created by the sculptors of the Kushan realm at Mathura (and related
cultural areas) and Gandhara. I would like here, in advance of my
forthcoming detailed study, to outline these findings and point to some
of the resulting implications, particularly those of religious signifi-
cance. Although in the forthcoming publication I will be discussing
fifteen difficult varieties of the Buddha-image coins, there are essen-
tially two images presented on the coins-a standing and a seated
Buddha. The standing Buddha is shown with three different forms of
halo.
I Standing Buddha
80
a) Gold coins (stater and 1/4 stater) inscribed Boddo
Facing Buddha image, right hand raised in gesture of
reassurance (abhiiyamudrii), left hand at waist level holding
handful of cloak (sanghati). The Buddha is wearing the robes
of a monk-dhoti, uttarasanga and sanghati (over both shoulders).
Lines of all three garments are visible. Details of the head are
obscured by wear, but the enlarged ears and the dressing of
the hair into a topknot (ulni<;a) are clear. A numbus (in three
arcs) surrounds the head and body of the Buddha; on one
coin the arc around the head is marked by an inner arc.
b) Copper coins (tetradrachms and didrachms) inscribed Saka-
mana Baudo. Buddha image as on a), but the nimbus is drawn
as only one arc around the head and the left hand no longer
holds the cloak which is now hung over the forearm. (The left
a,rm of the Buddha on coins of this type juts out at an angle
from the body so that the hand rests at waist, lower chest or
hip level. Also on some coins the rigid stance of the Buddha is
replaced by a curved stance with outthrust hip.)
c) Copper coins (drachms) inscribed Sakam'(ano) Baudo
Buddha image as b) but nimbus is drawn with emanating rays.
II Seated Buddha
Copper coins (tetradrachms) inscribed Metrauo Baudo
Facing Buddha image seated in the lotus posture on a throne (on
one coin the throne is covered with a cloth which hangs between
its legs.) His right hand is raised in the gesture of reassurance and
the left rests on his upper thigh holding a water flask (kama1J4alu).
The Buddha is wearing the robes of a Brahman-dhoti and uttara-
sanga and sanghati (over left shoulder only) and jewellery, earrings,
necklaces and bracelets on wrist and upper arm. His hair is
dressed in a topknot (uJn4a). A nimbus surrounds his head
(except on one specimen where it has possibly been omitted by
mistake).
The standing image is identified both by its iconography and the
accompanying title Sayamuni (sage of the Sakya people) as the histori-
cal Buddha, Gautama. In Gandharan images and in all except the very
earlies Mathuran images the Sakyamuni Buddha is depicted in the
same guise, i.e. wearing monastic robes with the outer garment over
both shoulders and his hair dressed into a topknot. (The treatment of
details on the coins is paralleled by only a few of these images and the
implications of these parallels will be discussed in the forthcoming
publication). The official view of the iconography of Sakyamuni
Buddha as shown on the coins is seen to reflect that exhibited in the
contemporary sculpture.
The seated image is identified by its iconography as what is
normally called a "Bodhisattva" figure. The inscriptions on the coins
indicated that the image is intended to be Maitreya the Buddha-to-
come. It is normal to speak of Maitreya as a Bodhisattva because his
enlightenment is a future event, but the coin inscription clearly names
81
him as a Buddha i.e. as the Maitreya Buddha. Although not as common
in Gandharan and Mathuran statuary as Sakyamuni, images ofMaitreya
from those two schools survive and exhibit the same iconography i.e.
princely robes and ornaments, long hair dressed in a topknot and
water bottle held in left hand. As in the case of the standing Buddha the
official image of _Maitreya on the coin parallels the contemporary
sculpture. Both Sakyamuni and Maitreya are shown on the coins
making the gesture of reassurance (abhayamudrii). This gesture is the
most common found among the Buddhist sculptural images of both
Gandhara and Mathura.
The identity of the standing Buddha has long been recognised.
Even though only the inscriptions on the gold coins and on the copper
didrachm have as yet been correctly read, it was generally accepted that
the inscriptions indicate the same identity for the images as their icono-
graphy. My examination of these coins has shown that all the copper
coins have the same inscription Sakamano Boudo or an abbreviation of it.
The identification of the seated Buddha figure as Maitreya
is made here for the first time. This image has previously been viewed
as a variant for the standing Sakyamuni Buddha. Its iconographic
features have been overlooked and the inscription on the coins
showing it has been misread as being either a blundered version of the
inscription on the standing Buddha type copper coins or as a separate
inscription reading according to some Bago Boudo = Bhagawat Buddha
(meaning Lord Buddha or Buddha the God) and according to others
Go Boudo = Gotama Buddha. There is no evidence on the coins for
such readings. The reading proposed here Mitrauo Boudo is confirmed
by the iconography of the image.
Various misinterpretations have been made of the gestures made
by these images. The forthcoming publication of my study of these
coins will show that only the gesture of reassurance (abhayamudrii) is
depicted on them. There is no basis for the suggestion that the standing
Buddha is making any of the following gestures: vitarkamud'rii, dharma-
cakramudrii, varadamudra or vyakhyanamudra, or that the seated Buddha
is making any of the following: varadamudra, dhyiinamudrii or dharma-
cakramudrii.
The images presented on the coins are therefore two straight-
forward representations of Sakyamuni and Maitreya with orthodox
iconography conforming to the images found in contemporary sculp-
ture. The treatment of the images on the coins makes it clear that they
are derived from such sculpture. The current convention on
82
coinage for portraying the deities used as reverse types showed them
with a curved frontal stance with head turned right (occasionally left),
and right hip thrust out, but both the Buddha images being based on
sculptural prototypes. (Most of the other reverse types of are
derived from other coin types.) The sculptures in question are those
produced at Mathura and a few related narrative relief sculptures
from Gandhara. (The details of this relationship will be discussed in the
forthcoming publication.)
The images on the coins show therefore not only that
adherence to Buddhism was closely related to that of his subjects as
exhibited in the sculptural manifestations of their devotion, but also
that the images he chose to portray the Buddha were closely modelled
on these sculptures.
Among the sculptures from Mathura dateable to the reign of
either from their inscriptions or from their style there are
, -
sculptures of both S:ikyamuni and Maitreya exhibiting close parallels
of detail to the coin images. The reliquary excavated at
Peshawar and the casket found at Birmaran also show the same close
parallels.
It should be noticed that not only does the Bimaran casket's
Buddha (Sakyarp.uni) image show these close parallels to the image on
the coins, but the identity of the seated figure on the coin ,suggests a
new interpretation of the unidentified coinage depicted on the casket.
It has long been recognised that the Birmaran casket depicts (each
,
image is repeated twice) the S:ikyamuni Buddha making the gesture of
reassurance (within an arched niche) attended on the left and right by
Indra and Brahma (also in niches) turned towards the Buddha bowing
their heads and making the gestures of worship (anjalimudrii). Behind
Indra and Brahma is a fourth figure (also in a niche) whose identity has
not been ascertained. He is depicted facing forward like the Buddha,
but is making the same gesture as Indra and Brahma. Also his halo and
the position of his legs are the same as the Buddha's. His dress is similar
to the two Hindu deities, a dhoti tied at the front and a cloak thrown
across his chest and his left shoulder, hanging down from both hips. He
wears jewellery, a necklace, earrings and bracelets on wrist and upper
arm. His hair is tied in a topknot like the Buddha's but is worn long over
the ears. The iconography of this figure is that of a Bodhisattva. The
anjalimudrii is not a common gesture in Buddhist iconography except
for worshipping figures, but all other features, particularly the halo
and topknot point to such an identity. Although his characteristic water
83
bottle is absent, I propose that this figure should be identified as the
Maitreya Buddha. The appearance of Maitreya on Kani!?ka's coinage
and among the sculpture dateable to his reign point to the importance
of his cult at that date and no other "Bodhisattva" images are known to
have been made during or before his reign. The casket can be shown to
belong to the period of Kani!?ka's reign (see M. Bussagli "The problem
of Kani!?ka as seen by the Art Historian," A.L. Basham (Ed.) The Date of
Kani!jka, Leyden, 1968, pp. 39-56) and as stated above, exhibits a style
very closely related to Kani!?ka's coinage. The identification of the
fourth figure on the Bimaran casket as the Maitreya Buddha is
therefore in keeping not only with its iconography but also with
contemporary religious beliefs and practices.
The cult of Maitreya, although later associated with Mahayana
Buddhism, was already present among the beliefs of the Hinayana
Buddhist sects flourishing in and before Kani!?ka's time. The reliefs
decorating the Sanchi Stupa (c 1 00 BC) refer to the cult of Maitreya, the
B uddha-to-be with depictions of the tree under which he would attain
enlightenment. The earliest dated cult figure of Maitreya (dated year
29 of Kani!?ka era i.e. in the reign of his successor H uviska) is dedicated
for a Hinayana sec, the Dharmaguptakas. Contemporary literary
evidence for the cult of Maitreya among other Hinayana sects has also
survived. The coin image adds another piece of evidence to this.
In conclusion the Buddha images used on Kani!?ka's coins show
that his adherence to Buddhism was a close reflection of the cults
prevailing in his realm. They demonstrate that Kani!?ka's faith involved
devotion to Sakyamuni and Maitreya, who were looked upon by him as
having quasi divine status, by means of devotional images. Furthermore
Maitreya was considered by him to be a Buddha as opposed to a
Boddhisattva. Such an attitude clearly foreshadows the manifestations
of Mahayana faith which began to appear in Gandharan sculpture
soon after Kani!?ka's reign. It also gives an indication that the nature of
Kani!?ka's adherence to Buddhism was a key factor in the development
of such beliefs in the Kushan realm and their subsequent spread to
Central Asia and thence to China.
84
85
Gold stater, inscribed Boddo, enlarged 2X
(British Museum ColI.)
Sakyamuni Buddha image from gold stater, enlarged 4X
86
I;
Q
Copper didrachm, inscribed Sakamano Baudo, enlarged 2X
(British Museum ColI.)
Sakyamuni Buddha image from copper didrachm, enlarged 4X
87
o
0
Copper tetradrachm, inscribed Mitrauo Boudo, enlarged 2X
(British Museum CoH.)
Maitreya Buddha image from copper tetradrachm, enlarged 4X
88
:")
...........
<-7
~
e ~ .
_".,,0
1/
0
6-
Copper tetradrachm, inscribed Metrauo Baudo, enlarged 2X
(British Museum CoIl.)
Maitreya Buddha image from copper tetradrachm, enlarged 4X
"Buddha-Mazda" from Kara-tepe
in Old Termez (Uzbekistan):
A Preliminary Communication
by Boris]. Stavisky
A wall painting depicting the Buddha sitting in the state of meditation
(dhyiinamudrii) was discovered in the autumn of 1979 on the Kara-tepe
hill, in Southern Uzbekistan (the ancient land of Bactria-Tokharistan),
where systematic C7xcavations have been carried out since 1961 by the
joint group of archaeologists and restoration experts of the State
Hermitage (Leningrad), the State Museum of the Art of the Peoples
of the East (Moscow) and the USSR Central Research Laboratory for
the Restoration and Conservation of Objects of Art (since 1979-the
USSR Research Institute of Restoration). 1
As a result of our excavations it has been established that a major
Buddhist religious centre existed on the Kara-tepe hill in the periphery
of the vast town-site of Old Termez in the 2!ld-3rd centuries A.D., the
period when the Kushan town of Tarmita (Termez) flourished. The
centre consisted of separate complexes which included both cave and
ground structures. For instance, the southern tip of the three-peaked
Kara-tepe hill revealed three such complexes (A, Band D). They
included cave temples and courtyards situated on the slopes ~ f the hill.
All these temples and courtyards are basically alike. Each temple was
actually a closed premise framed on all the four sides-by corridors with
two exits leading to the courtyard. Temple courtyards had porticoes,
the wooden roofs of which were supported by wooden columns with
stone Attic-type bases.
Fragments of Buddhist statues in stone and plaster, stone bas-
reliefs, and discs adorned with lotus flowers, and painted and gilded
stone umbrellas (chatras) are all evidence of the fact that the Kara-tepe
complexes were decorated with big and small sculptural elements.
Excavations of the courtyards yielded wall paintings. In the A and
89
B complexes were found fragments of polychrome paintings depictino-
o
figures of donors and two wall paintings of the Buddha and monks
under a tree were discovered in the B complex courtyard.
2
The
.entrance parts of the A and B cave temples yield.ed fragments of orna-
mental painting. In 1979 a remarkable wall painting depicting the
meditating Buddha was discovered in the D complex cave temple. It
was thus evident that figurative paintings as well as sculptures decorated
not only the courtyards but also the temples.
Among other finds of Kara-tepe are the numerous inscriptions.
Some undoubtedly belong to the heyday of this religious centre's
history. These are gift inscriptions and religious dictums on ceramic
vessels. They are in the Kharoshthi and Brahmi as well as in the
Kushan (i.e., modified Greek) alphabet, and in the so-called "unknown"
(or "Kambojian") script of Aramaic origin.
3
There are others, scratched
by visitors on the entrance arches and corridor walls, which may be
dated from the time of the centre's decline. Some of these graffiti
inscriptions-the so-called Bactrian or Kushan, Indian and Middle
Persian-seem to date from the end of the 3rd (?)-4th centuries A.D.,
whereas the Moslem inscriptions in Arabic date from the 10th to the
beginning of the 13th centuries A.D.
The wall painting in question was discovered in the course of
excavations of the northern corridor. This is on the southern wall,
which is dose to the passage leading to the cells and to the eastern exit
to the courtyard which gave access to the daylight (fig. 1). Unlike the
polychrome representations of the Buddha found in the B complex
courtyard, this D c ~ m p l e x cave-temple wall painting is monochrome.
The painter evidently took into account the fact that his creation would
get much less light than the murals in the temple courtyards and, not
resorting to various colours and hues, produced a splendid piece of art
using a single red over white plaster. Executed by a sure hand, the
contours of the figure and the folds of the robe (the head, unfortu-
nately, was almost completely destroyed by a later Moslem inscription)
makes the representation dimensional and convey the general philoso-
phical mood of the work. Artistic merits of the painting are yet to
attract the attention of art historians. However, what we got interested
in also was a detail of no small importance-a halo formed by two rows
of stylized but clearly discernible tongues of flame (fig. 2 and 3).
This detail is certainly not a chance phenomenon. It outlines the
syncretic nature of the representation, which combined the image of
the Buddha with the attributes of the god of light or fire. That at least
90
was how Lhe local people understood the image in the period immediately
after the Kara-tepe religious centre fell into desolation. This is evidenced
by the graffiti inscription, in the Kushan script, dose to the Buddha's
head, made by a visitor at the end of the 3rd -4th century A.D. (?). The
inscription which reads, Buddha-Mazda, and may be discerned quite
definitely, points to the syncretism of the Buddhist and the local East
Iranian Mazdaist cults.
As we know, the fire cult, one of the most widespread cults in
human history, has been traced in Hindutan and Central Asia, as well
as in other regions from ancient times up to the present. It would
therefore be hardly convincing to connect the appearance of the
general notion of a "light-bearing" or "shining" Buddha with any local
tradition. However, attempts to tie up concrete artifacts in which the
notion found embodiment with local cults might be quite legitimate.
Thus, the representations of the Buddha with tongues of flame rising
from his shoulders, to be seen on two bas-reliefs from the region of
Kapisa (the old Paropamisadae area),5 can be traced to the same tradi-
tion that gave birth to the image of a Kushan emperor with tongues of
flame over his shoulder. 6
It may be noticed that the above-mentioned bas-reliefs from the
Kapisa region, situated at the southern border of Bactria-Tokharistan,
have haloes framed with the tongues of flame similar, in the general
depiction of the type, if not in style, to that on the Kara-tepe painting.
Both the Kapisa bas-reliefs and the Kara-tepe painting probably refer
to the same historic period-the heyday of the Kushan Empire
7
, and
seem to have been created at monasteries connected with the Kushan
elite.
8
Most probably, in both cases, the "fire halo" has to be explained
by East Iranian Mazdaist traditions.
The Kara-tepe "Buddha-Mazda" as well as similar representations
with fire haloes await further study. But already at this stage one may
venture a question: are not such representations based on an apt
artistic method, devised by the Kushan artists in Bactria-Tokharistan
and in the neighbouring territories of the Empire, to create the
syncretic image of the "light-bearing" or "shining" Buddha? At any
rate, as far as I know, the Buddha's "fire halo" has not been found in
Indian monuments of the Kushan period. At the same time in China,
where the Central Asian followers of Buddhism played a considerable
role in its dissemination, this iconographic detail has been familiar
since the 5th -6th centuries.
9
It is to be found in Korea in the 6th - 8th
centuries
IO
and in Japan II and Thailand, 12 since the 7th-9th centuries.
91
As to India and Nepal, I have succeeded (thus far) in finding the "fire
halo" only in monuments which are dated in the 11 th -12th centuries. 13
NOTES
1. Major publications-Materials of the joint Expedition on Kara-tepe. (General
Editor, B.J. Stavisky) (in Russian):
Kara-tepe, I - The Kara-tepe Buddhist Cave Monastery in Old Termez. Moscow, 1964.
Kara-tepe, II - Buddhist Caves on Kara-tepe in Old Termez. Moscow, 1969.
Kara-tepe, III - A Buddhist Religious Centre on Kara-tepe in Old T ermez. Moscow, 1972.
Kara-tepe, IV -New Finds on Kara-tepe in Old Termez. Moscow, 1974.
Kara-tepe, V - Buddhist Monuments on Kara-tepe in Old Termez. (In the process of
publication.)
2 . For a colour reproduction of one of them see B.J. Stavisky, K Yugu ot Zheleznykh
Vorot (South of the Iron Gates), Moscow, 1977, pp. 88-89, fig. 47; for a drawing cf. B.J.
Stavisky, Kushanskaya Bactriya: Problemy Istorii i Kultury (The Kushan Bactria: Problems of
History and Culture), Moscow, 1977, p. 231, fig. 40. The scene is reproduced in the book by
David L. Snellgrove (General Editor), The Image of the Buddha, Serindia Publication/
UNESCO, London-Tokyo, 1978, fig. 142 on p. 193, unfortunately a mirror reflection.
The second scene is now in the process of restoration.
3. See Kara-tepe,I, pp. 62-81; Kara-tepe, II, pp. 32-39, 40-46, 47 -81,82-125;
Kara-tepe, III, pp. 114-117, 118-121, 122-128; Kara-tepe, IV, pp. 47-60, 61-69,
70-81.
4. See Kara-tepe, IV, pp. 82-87.
5. For the most recent data see David L. Snellgrove (General Editor), The Image of
the Buddha, pp. 186-187; figs. 136-137.
6. See John M. Rosenfield, The Dynastic Arts of the Kushans. Berkeley-Los Angeles, .
1967, p. 200.
7. See, for instance, H. Plaeschke, Buddhistische Kunst. Leipzig, 1974, taf. 27. (3rd-
5th centuries); S. Gaulier, R. Jera-Bezard and M. Maillard, Buddhism in Afghanistan and
Central Asia. Part I. Leiden, 1976, figs. 22,29 (2nd-3rd centuries).
8. John M. Rosenfield, op. cit., pp. 200-201.
9. David L. Snellgrove (General Editor), op. cit., figs. 155 (437 A.D.); 157 (477
A.D.); 159 (5th century and later); 161 (518 A.D.); 162 (522 A.D.), and 163 (536 A.D.). It
should be noted that a fire halo on figs. 155 and 157 is interpreted here, as in a number of
other publications, as an element of the Old Chinese tradition. Such haloes are to be
found in China up to the 17th century (ibid., fig. 283-1662 A.D.).
10. Ibid., figs. 172 (539 or 599 A.D.); 177 (early 7th century); 178 (around 700
A.D.); 181 (720 A.D.). Cf. fig. 303 (end of the 12th century).
11. Ibid., figs. 188 (last quarter of the 7th century); 197 (middle of the 9th century);
and 202 (end of the 9th century).
12. Ibid., fig. 106 (7th-9th centuries).
13. Ibid., figs. 202 (11 th century, India); 276 (lith -12th centuries, Nepal).
92
o
)(
'"
p..
E
o
u
o
.'" :',.,d
complex A comPlex B
Fig. 1 Plan of excavations 1979 (p-wall-paintings)
Fig. 2 Buddha. The wall-painting in complex D.
Fig. 3 Buddha (a drawing)
Fausb.;bH and the PaliJatakas
by Elisabeth Strandberg
In 1879 the University of Copenhagen celebrated the 400th anniversary
of its foundation by among other things conferring the degree of
doctor honoris causa on a number of academicians. Among these was
Viggo Fausb911. The very same body of scholars who decided to
honour F a u s ~ l l in this way had a few months earlier voted against his
candidature for the chair of Indology; it was due to the fortunate inter-
ference of foreign specialists that F a u s ~ l l was after all appointed
professor. One might therefore rather say that this appointment
forced the Danish University administration to confer the degree on
Fausb9lI; he had not taken the chance of presenting any Pali study for
the Ph.D. The lack of a thesis from his hand is unimportant in view of
the fact that his appointment to the chair enabled him to produce a
series of pioneering editions of Pali texts, which won him an indisputable
position among the great Indological scholars of the world. Had the
vote of his Danish fellow academicians prevailed, Denmark would have
been without its most prominent Indologist. The much contested
appointment to professor was only the last in an almost uninterrupted
series of obstacles which Fausb911 had had to overcome to be able to
realise the dream of his life: editing the Pali j;itakas. One might even
say that the more Fausb911 succeeded in his work, the harder the obsta-
cles became. Since very little is known to the scholarly world about these
. things, a contribution to this chapter of the history of the research is
presented here.
In spite of the many scientific and economic problems involved,
Fausb911 had already in the fifties of the last century set his mind on the
idea of editing the Pali Jatakas. He had only one manuscript at his
disposal, the one which Rasmus Kristian Rask had brought to Denmark
from Ceylon some thirty years earlier. Fausb911's teacher in Indology,
Niels Ludvig Westergaard advised him to begin with an easier and
more manageable project; Fausb911 followed his advice and the result
was his edition of the Dhammapada. 1
95
The general recognition which he won by this work enabled him
to secure financial support for a longer stay in London. From 1858 to
1860 he studied the Pali manuscripts of the British Museum and the
Royal Asiatic Society.
After his return to Copenhagen he continued his Pali studies and
by 1872 had published altogether 18 J atakas. 2 His working conditions
had improved slightly in 1861 when he was appointed as assistant in the
University Library. Until then he made his living by giving lessons in
secondary schools, his qualifications being a B.D. degree. And yet,
Indology remained a spare time occupation for him.
In 1873 was ready to start on his complete edition of the
Jatakas. Professor Childers had secured copies of a Sinhalese manu-
script to compare with the London publishers Triibner and
Co. had declared themselves willing to bear the cost of printing of at
least the first part and, finally, the Danish government had granted 500
Rigsdaler
3
as its contribution. At this stage appealed for
further help to the Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters as below,
The publication will according to the estimates of the printer comprise
166 sheets, vide the enclosed sample printed with three sizes of types
corresponding to the three different parts of the text (prose, verse, and
commentary). I hope to be able to produce one volume of 16 sheets a
year and thus bring the work to a completion within 10 years. Due to the
big size of sheet I have chosen and the compressed way in which the text
will be printed, each sheet will according to the estimates of the printer
contain almost twice as much as an ordinary octavo sheet hitherto used
by me; thus the sum granted to me by the government will give me
merely 15 Rigsdaler per sheet. This is the reason why I dare to apply to
the high Academy for further support.
4
The Academy agreed to support project with a sum of 300
Rigsdaler.
In 1877 finished the second and third part and summed
up his position in the new application to the Academy thus:
96
The first part of my project was received with general acclaim both in
the French, English and German scholarly world. (Professor Weber in
Berlin called it 'eine fundamentale Leistung'). Since then I have finished
the preparation of the second and the third parts (14 1/2 + 17112 + 15, in
all 47 printed sheets). The publishers have not withdrawn from the
project, neither has the Ministry of Education. The embarrassment
caused by the death of Professor Childers was overcome by the help
offered by M. Feer at the Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris; he is willing to
compare my Jitaka text with the Paris copy. The Buddhist priest
Subhuti goes on sending me copies from Ceylon; this summer a mission-
ary in Further India, Mr. Chard, seeing from my preface that 1 was in
need of copies to compare, sent me via the English Resident in Mandalay a
Burmese copy oftheJatakas ... 1 took the liberty to mention these things
in order to show that my endeavours have won support even at places
from where I did not myself expect it. My deferential supplication to the
Royal Academy of Sciences is therefore that it may grant me a similar
support for parts two and three as it did for part one.
s
What precisely happened to Fausblll's application is not clear from the
material preserved; yet, two drafts ofletters from Fausblll to Wester-
gaard as given below throw some light on it. Westergaard was the head
of the Academy committee appointed to decide on the fate of Fausblll's
application and his project.
To Westergaard who insisted on interpreting the Academy's report's
use of the word 'volume' of the J atakas as meaning 'two parts', I wrote
the following letter to remind him of my application which must have
been forgotten although it was composed in accordance with his own
advice.
(Here follows a verbatim repetition of the wording of the technical
details as given in the application of 1873). To this passage about his
rigorously economising lay-out FausblU adds:
You (Westergaard) remember that everything which I did at that time
was in agreement with your advice. Each sheet contains 24 quarters of
pages of the manuscript. It takes me at least 30 hours to rewrite it with
variants. The reading of this takes 6 hours. The proof reading must take,
I am sure, at least 10 hours. The Danish Society pays 25 Rigsdaler a sheet
(even for reprints), the ... society pays 30 and the projected journal. . .is
thinking of paying as much as 80 kroner. Yours sincerely V. Fausb<,jll.
Had the Academy kept my application apart it would have realised that
there was no need to make an inquiry concerning the meaning of part
and volume as long as the section, which it paid for, contained approx.
16 sheets in accordance with the enclosed sample.
6
It is not known whether Westergaard replied to this embittered
reminder. The fact is in any case that Fausblll did not receive any
support for his project at that advanced stage; it is all the more
surprising when one considers the fact that the Academy willingly
helped Fausbcpll to start it.
97
In June the following year F a u s ~ l l appealed to the Berlin
Academy for support. His petition started with a summing up of the
situation of his project:
Messrs Triibner in London hitherto took care of the publishing of the
Jatakassa AtthavaJ?J?ana, the Pali work which I have started to edit. The
firm, however, let me know that it will be forced to discontinue the
publishing due to the slow sale of the first volume. The firm estimates
that the cost of all five volumes will be 750. I would be very sad if my
project had to be suspended, not merely because I have worked on it for
thirty years; it is indeed with regret that one sees one's life's work lost,
but especially because of the great importance of this PaIi work.
FausbC/Jll adduces four points to strengthen his argument. The J;itakas
are valuable for
1. the depiction of social life in India in the Buddhist period ...
2. its role in the history of world literature, esp. fables and tales .. .
3. the detailed exposition of the theory of the transmigration of souls .. .
4. its contribution to the knowledge ofPali, that rich and hitherto prac-
tically unknown language.?
As a result of F a u s ~ l l ' s various appeals, the editor could report to
Triibner in October 1878 that he had secured a subvention of 1000
Marks from the Berlin Academy and 200 from the India Office
Library.
In the meantime Professor Westergaard had died and as many as
five applicants were interested in succeeding him. They were Fausl:xpll,
B.D., assistant in the University Library, Vilhelm Thomsen, Ph.D.,
docent extraordinary in Nordic Philology, Ludvig Wimmer, Ph.D.,
specialist in Runology within Indo-European Comparative Philology
and finally Edvard Brandes, B.A. and SC/Jren SC/Jrensen, B.D.
Thomsen and Wimmer applied at a stage when the University
thought of turning the chair into a chair of Indo-European Compara-
tive Philology, an idea which was, however, abandoned. The letters and
drafts of letters preserved from these five applicants show that the
intrigues among them were many and complicated. A merciless war
of nerves was declared against Fausbq,ll by his opponents. The details,
painful as they are, will be passed over.
Westergaard himself had already made it clear earlier in the year
that he considered Sq,rensen as his likely successor, keeping at the same
time his own close personal friend Wimmer interested in the chair.
98
Wimmer encouraged to withdraw, arguing that PaIi formed
only part of Sanskrit Philology and that his quali,fications therefore
lacked width. replied by underlining that Pati is part of Indian
Philology.
8
The Ministry of Education asked the Faculty of Humanities for
an evaluation of the applicants; a majority of 6 voted for Wimmer as
successor to Westergaard, whereas 5 preferred Faush<,lll. A minority
represented by Professor Johan Nicolai Madvig was against giving
preference by vote to the applicants, mainly because Wimmer and
Thomsen were members of the Faculty Board, while the other appli-
cants were not. closest supporter, Professor August Ferdinand
Mehren, was prevented from giving his vote, being held back by illness
in Italy. He reported to another member of the Faculty-and presum-
ably to the Ministry-that the news of Westergaard's death reached
him while he was taking part in the congress of Orientalists in Florence.
Professor Weber of Berlin took this opportunity to pronounce it as his
opinion that it would be only fair to make Westergaard's
successor, because of the scholarly fame had won as the pre-
eminent specialist of Patio Professor Mehren endorsed this standpoint,
being well aware of the objections concerning limited speciali-
sation.
9
Finally, a letter dated April 1879 from to Weber bears
witness to the debt which owed to Weber:
I seize this opportunity (of recommending a Danish student) to thank
you for your kind words about me to Professor Mehren. I do not doubt
that they have had a share in my getting the professorship after
Westergaard. I hope it will interest you to learn that the second volume
of my Jataka is finished ... 10
The Ministry of Education had thus decided to follow the opinion
voiced by the minority of the Faculty, and appointed as
Westergaard's successor, referring to the importance of Fausbq,ll's
special field of studies and the incontestable reputation which it had
won him abroad. 11
To credit we may add that once the tension was over, he
was able to joke about the drama and did his best to help his less success-
ful competitors. To Fr. Hammerich, his first teacher of Sanskrit, he
promised from then on
to work as if Death had already seized a tuft of my hair. 12
99
Fausbq,ll's income was 3.500 kroner a year. When learning that his
friend from Lund University in Sweden, E. Edgren, had gained the
chair in Nebraska (with the help of Whitney) with a salary of 10.000
kroner a year, he entreated Edgren to find him a similiar tidbit. 13
S. Sq,rensen was actively supported by Fausbll in his ambitious
Mahiibhiirata project, of which the index is still being used to this day.
When finally in 1886 Wimmer gained the chair of Nordic Philo-
logy, Fausbll congratulated him; a few years later Fausbll made a
final comment on the whole affair in these words:
I agree with you when you stress how fortunate it was for both of liS that
I, and not you, got Westergaard's chair, not because I got the bestofiton
that occasion, but because I am afraid that if the issue had been differ-
ent, two human beings would have been ruined; it would have been
definitely all over with Runology and Nordic Philology in your case ...
Furthermore it would hve been all over with Pali studies in my case. I
would most probably have lost energy and died a slow death. Thank
God that things went the way they did. 14
In 1888 after the completion of volume four of the Jatakas, Fausbfi'!ll
was awarded the Bopp prize by the Berlin Academy. In 1890 he was
appointed an honorary member of the Royal Asiatic Society. In the
years 1881 to 1894 Fausb!l1 had translated and edited the Suttanipiita 15
and finally in 1897 his goal was reached, the complete edition of the J iitakas
in seven volumes.
16
His production comprises also a book on Indian
Mytholog/
7
in 1902 and a whole series of publications in Danish on
Danish Folklore and popular literature, thematically in line with the
BuddhistJitakas. Towards the end of his life Fausbll became almost
blind from more than fifty years of work with palm leaf manuscripts.
In 1879, on the occasion of the conferring of the honorary doctor's
degree, Fausbll was invited by the University to write his biography.
When looking back on his life Fausbll considered his stay in England
the richest period in his life.
The English are right (he concluded) when they claim that there is a
world of a difference betwen the English and continental principles.
Everything essential in England has its source in the individual and aims
at the individual whereas on the Continent it is the state, the society
which occupies this double function. 18
Fausbll completely avoided Copenhagen's social life; he was charac-
terized 19 as a quiet, modest, most pleasant and equally endearing
100
learned old scholar, shunning publicity but enjoying world recognition,
w hen he retired as professor in 1902 at the age of 81. He died six years
later.
. NOTES
1. Ex tribus codicibus Hauniensibus Palice edidit, Latine vertit, excerptis ex
commentario Palico notisque illustravit V. FausblI, Copenhagen 1855.
2. Five Jiitakas, containing a Fairy Tale, a Comical Story, and Three Fables. In the
Original Pilii Text, with a Translation and Notes, Copenhagen 1861.
Two Jiitakas. The original Pilii Text, with an English Translation and Critical
Notes. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, December 1870.
The Dasaratha-Jiitaka, being the Buddhist Story of King Riima. The Original Piili
Text with a Translation and Notes, Copenhagen 1871.
Ten Jatakas. The Original Piili Text with a Translation and Notes, Copenhagen
1872.
3. In 1873 100 Danish Rigsdaler = 200 Danish Kroner were worth II sterling.
4. NKS 3871,4, Autumn 1873. All the letters and drafts quoted belong to the
manuscript department of the Royal Library, Copenhagen.
5. NKS 3871,4,05.12.1877
6. NKS 3871,4,3 1.12. 1877
7. NKS 3871,4,07.06.1878
8. NKS 3871,4,02.10.1878
9. Add 1013,4,12 .. 11.1878, toJ.L. Ussing.
10. NKS 3871,4,14.04.1879
11. National Archives of Denmark, Copenhagen:
Allerunderdanigst Forestilling om Besaettelsen af det ledige Professorat i den
indisk-orientalske Philologi og Literatur, Ministeriet for Kirke- og Undervisningsvaese-
net, 10.12.1878
12. NKS 3871,4,23.12.1878
13. NKS 3871,4,01.01.1885, to E. Brandes.
14. NKS 3871,4,03.05.1888
15. The Sutta-Nipata, a Collection of Discourses, being one of the Canonical
Books of the Buddhists. Translated from Piili. Oxford 1881, Sacred Books of the East, .
vol. X, part 2. 2nd Edition, revised, 1898, ibid. The Sutta-Nipiita, being a collection of
some of Gotama Buddha's dialogues and discourses. Part 1. Text, 1884; Part II. Glossary,
1894, Pilii Text Society, London.
16. The J iitaka together with its Commentary, being Tales of the anterior Births
of Gotama Buddha. For the first time edited in the original Piili. Vol. I, Copenhagen
1875-1877; VoL II - VI, 1879-1896; Vol. VII: Index to the Jiitaka and its Commentary,
containing a complete Index of Proper Names and Titles, together with a List of the
introductory Giithiis and an Index of Parallel Verses, by Dines Andersen. Copenhagen
1897. Postscriptum by V. FausWll, pp. I - XII.
17. Indian Mythology according to the Mahiibhiirata in outline, London 1902.
18. Levnedsbeskrivelser af de ved Kdbenhavns Universitets 400Aarsfest promo-
verede Doktorer, Copenhagen.
19. The Copenhagen paper Illustreret Tidende, 30.03.1902.
101
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The most recent issue, Vol. 2, No.2 (July 1980) contains these studies
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III. BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES
. Love and Sympathy in Theraviida Buddhism, by Harvey B. Aronson. Delhi,
India: Motihi.l Banarsidass, 1980. pp. viii + 127.
Western scholarly opinion on the topics oflove and compassion in
the Theravada has often been ambivalent. On the one hand, the scholar
of the Mahayana is inundated in a sea of scriptures which denigrate the
attainments of the sriivaka and pratyekabuddha. On the other hand, we
find statements to the effect that the arhant is capable of generating
great love (mahiimaitri) and great compassion (mahiikaruTfii). Indeed, the
Theravada tradition itself has always stressed love (mettii) and sympathy
(anukampii), and it is the great virtue of the work under review that it is a
systematic exposition of these doctrines in the Theravada.
In his six chapters (two on sympathy, two on love, one on the
brahmavihiiras, and one on equanimity), Prof. Aronson presents a very
thorough treatment of these doctrines. In one very interesting discus-
sion he elucidates which of these terms occur as technical terms in a
meditative context (these being mettii and kaTUTfii) and which occur in
more general circumstances (viz. anukampii and anuddayii). Thus, the
work by Dr. Aronson is a great asset in that it very clearly sets out for the
reader the terminology and the context in which it is found. There is
however, at times a tendency to take this division into "technical" and
"general" terminology to a bit of an extreme. This is the case, for
example, when the author suggests (pp. 16, 17) that the Buddha
restricted himself to using general, non-meditative terminology when
he spoke to "monks and laymen with little or no meditative experience"
because they "might have felt closed off from the religious life." The
important thing to note here is that although terms such as mettii may not
be used in technical contexts when a general audience is being addressed,
this by no means implies that they do not occur with non-technical
connotations. This is to say that when a term acquires a technical
meaning, it does not lose its ordinary signification. Indeed, Prof.
Aronson himself points out (p. 25, etc.) instances in which a meditative
term such as mettii is used in very general discourse, though, granted,
not in a technical sense. Thus, technical terms can (and do) appear in
general sermons.
By and large, Prof. Aronson's translation and treatment of Pali
terminology is very adequate (he even includes an English-Pari glossary).
Though I prefer to refrain from commenting on the translation of
I will do so here, since I very strongly object to the term
103
paccekabuddha being rendered "Non-enlightening Buddha" (p. 281).
Lexically, the word pacceka has nothing to do with "non-enlightening"
(assuming that by the latter we mean something associated to the root
budh). But even as a gloss, this translation does not do justice to the term
in question.
Dr. Aronson seems to be of the opinion that social interaction
between sangha and laity is a necessary prerequisite for the former to
"enlighten" the latter (see p. 2, for example). Since social interaction is
missing in the case of the paccekabuddha (though even this is questionable),
it seems that for Dr. Aronson he is a Buddha who does. not enlighten.
Now whether or not the first implicit assumption (concerning social
interaction as a prerequisite) is correct, it seems to me that it is certainly
not an assumption shared by the tradition. And it is of course the tradi-
tion which we must follow in the translation of terminology if we are to
make claims to representing anything other than our own views. Person-
ally, I would approach the translation ofthis term from a more etymo'lo-
gical point of view, stressing the characteristics of "individuality" and
"solitude" expressed by the term pacceka.
A considerable portion of the author's final chapter is devoted to a
criticism of W. King and M. Spiro for their bifurcation of Theravada
Buddhism into "kammatic" and "nibbanic" (the former being the striving
after the attainment of rebirth as a human or god by accumulating
virtuous kamma, while the latter is the search for Nibbana, the highest
goal, which transcends the bondage of kamma). Now Dr. Aronson claims
that this division is "doctrinally unfounded" (p. 79). Though these
authors do seem to misinterpret upekkha in their treatment of Nibbana,
and though the names "kammatic" and "nibbanic" may be unfortunate
choices, still the distinction being made here is not only valid but quite
useful. To present detailed arguments at this point is beyond the scope
of this review; suffice it to cite here a very eloquent statement of this
position on the part of M. Etienne Lamotte.
The ideal followed by the upasaka is inferior to that of the b h i k ~ u . The
religious works toward NirvaJ?a ... he actively works toward personal
sanctification and toward his own deliverance, without worrying about his
neighbor. As for the upasaka, he aspires to paradise, to a good rebirth in
the world of either gods or men. (Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien, p. 72, my
translation.)
In his discussion of whether Theravada Buddhism should be
characterized as egocentrically motivated, altruistically motivated, or
whether there exist both of these elements, Dr. Aronson sees "the ethical
structure of Theravada Buddhism as either altruism or hybrid (egocen-
trism/altruism)" (p. 91). He adds that "we can interpret the isolated
instances of egocentric exhortations as being intended for flagging
104
practitioners who were not even capable of seeking their own welfare,
let alone that of others" (p. 92). First of all, the cases of egocentric
exhortations are not "isolated instances": at least no more isolated than
the instance (Digha ii, 119) on which the author bases the claim for
altruism. What is more, there are here some problems of hermeneutics.
Why consider "altruism as the "actual" ethical stance of the Theravada,
while considering as upaya statements such as "one's own goal should not
be forsaken for another's no matter how great" (Dhammapada, v.l66-
attadattham paratthena bahuna pi na hapaye). No convincing reason is given
for believing this (and not the converse) to be the case.
Now the points raised thus far are for the most part controversial
in their own right, and my raising them is in no way meant to depreciate
Dr. Aronson's extremely valuable work. It should be stressed that the
strong point of the book is its general excellence as an ex positive and
philological work, not concerning itself with issues in the philosophy of
love and compassion in any great detail. For those of us who (for better
or for worse) have been bitten by the bug of dialectica philosophica, we can
only hope that Dr. Aronson will one day honor us with a volume on the
Buddhist philosophy of love, comparable in quality to the present, more
descriptive work.
Jose Ignacio Cabez6n
Chukan to Yuishiki (Madhyamika and Vijiiaptimatrataj by Gadjin Nagao.
Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1978, pp. x + 606 + 45.
This volume is a collection of twenty-five articles that Professor
Nagao has written over the last forty years. They are divided into two
sections. The first contains essays of a more general nature, while the
second contains those directed to more specific topics. Also included is a
general index in Japanese, Sanskrit, and Tibetan, an index of titles of
sutras and siistras, and a listing of modern works, both in Japanese and
Western languages, which have been referred to in the articles.
Although these articles were written at different times and on
different themes, they evince Professor Nagao's overarching thesis of
the organic relationship between Madhyamika and Vijiiaptimatrata.
There has been the tendency to see Madhyamika as the doctrine of
emptiness over against Vijiiaptimatrata as the teaching of being, and
105
thus to regard these schools as being diametrically opposed. Such an
understanding of the dichotomous relationship of Madhyamika and
Vijiiaptimatrata is apparent in the history of the dispute between later
Madhyamikas (such as Bhavaviveka) and later Vijiianavadins (such as
Dharmapala), in the argumentation between the Chinese schools of San-
lun hsueh and Fa-hsiang, and in subsequent developments in both China
and Japan.
Furthermore, the Tibetan tradition, which bases itself firmly
upon Madhyamika thought, tends to de-emphasize any intimate relation-
ship of that thought with Vijiiaptimatrata.
However, Professor Nagao strongly and consistently argues that
Madhyamika and Vijiiaptimatrata are organically related and not in any
way opposed to one another. The splitting of them into disparate,
contradictory positions, he argues, is a later development, and does not
represent the original lines of Mahayana thinking in India. Madhyamika
is understood as the immediacy of direct, religious insight, while Vijiiapti-
matrata is taken as an attempt to systematize doctrinally the content of
that insight. The basic Madhyamika themes are identified as the fusion
of the two notions of pratityasamuptiida and sunyata, and the consequent
understanding of the synergistic relationship between the two truths of
paramiirtha and sa1[tvr:ti. These themes are taken over by the Vijiianava-
dins and grounded in the dependently co-arisen nature (paratantra-
svabhiiva) of consciousness (iilaya-pravr:tti-vijiiiina). It is within this para-
tantric consciousness that one's awareness can be radically re-orientated
(asraya-pariivr:tti) from the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhiiva) that
would see the self and things as given external units of meaning to the
awareness that all things are empty of any such imagined reality (i.e.
parini{panna-svabhiiva). Thus the Madhyamika themes of pratz-tyasamut-
piida and sunyatii are reworked within the context of conscious interiority,
and become grounded within consciousness itself. The Vijiiaptimatrata
synthesis then treats the same Madhyamika themes, but from a different
point of departure.
Of special note in this regard is the first essay, "Chiikan tetsugaku
no konponteki tachiba" (The Basic Standpoint of Madhyamika Philoso-
phy), which is more of book-length size than an essay. Professor Nagao's
treatment of Madhyamika is not from a pure Madhyamika doctrinal
position, but rather he frequently interprets Madhyamika from Yogacara
doctrinal themes. Although he himself notes (p. VII) that some may
criticize such a procedure, it is entirely consistent with his overall under-
standing of the relationship between these two schools. He thus follows
the development of the basic Madhyamika themes not only through
Candrakirti and Bhavaviveka, but also through the Vijiianavadins
Asariga, Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, and Dharmapala.
106
Such an understanding of the organic relationship between
Madhyamika and Vijiiaptimatrata is the hallmark of Professor Nagao's
thinking, and it forms an always-needed antidote for the tendency to
read later sectarian diffrences back into the formative stages of Mahayana
doctrinal development.
John Keenan
Introduction a la connazssance des hlvn ba
1
(f.L'(,a{)-WO) de Thailande, by
Anatole-Roger Peltier. Paris: Publications de l'Ecole Fran<;:aise d'Extreme-
Orient, vol. CXV, 1977.214 pages, 3 plates.
The work published by A.-R. Peltier is an important contribution
to our knowledge of Thai Buddhism.
After the stack of works written on Thailand, one might have
thought that the essential had been said about this country and its inhabi-
tants. However, A.-R. Peltier has us discover a category of monks who
are at the center of a phenomenon that-has profoundly affected the reli-
gious attitudes of Thais, and of whom no one until now has spoken, nor
even mentioned the existence: the hlvn bal.
The hlvn ba
l
are Buddhist monks, living or dead, who are considered
to be endowed with supernatural powers that they put to the service of
living beings, and who are objects of great veneration by faithful lay-
people of all social classes. This category of thaumaturge monks, which
appeared shortly after World War II, and was popularized by the press,
counts around 400 representatives distributed throughoutthe territory
of Thailand, and its audience varies from the boundaries of a village to
the whole country, sometimes even overflowing Thailand's borders.
The epithet hlvn ba
l
is neither a title recognized by the religious
authorities nor a grade of the Buddhist hierarchy, but solely a qualifier
attributed by lay-people, and by them alone. The giving of this qualifier,
which neither the hierarchy nor the Minister of Cults condemn or even
criticize, is not bound to any formal rule. Its attribution is only made to
monks to whom lay-people attribute an exceptional degree of sanctity-
acquired through the experience ofthe mental disciplines of vipassanii
kammaHhiina and the practice of dhutanga-and in whom they recognize
the powers of a healer, aptitude in preparing a lustral water with
magical virtues, the knowledge of "magical" formulae (giithii iigm and
mantra), as well as other accessory qualities that vary infinitely, and of
which the most common are the possession of a "divine sight," of a
"speech with marvelous power," the capacity to displace oneself from
one point to another in an instant, to stop rain, etc.
107
In the course of these last fifteen years, the number of monks to
whom the faithful have attributed the qualifier hlvn bal has multiplied,
which is what has led A.-R. Peltier to treat this phenomenon. After
having inventoried the 392 hlvin ba 1 fairly noted becalJse they have been
the subject of a newspaper article or publication, he explains the causes
-multiple and mutually imbricating-that are at the source of this
multiplication, and which are all of psychological or economic origin. In
effect, the Thais, like certain of their neighbors, have a culture that
imbricates the marvelous to the everyday, which permits them toaccept
the exploits of the hlvn bal as a possible reality. Furthermore, they have
too a predilection for protective amulets, which have been ~ o r e and
more in demand to the degree that wars and insecurity have developed
in this part of the world. "Miracles" having been attributed to certain of
them made or blessed by monks, this whole category of amulets was not
long in being presented as a talisman of invulnerability. Everyone
wanted to have one, which incited more and more monks to make them
or bless them, and it set flowing a veritable commerce. And, as there
always was one of the faithful to think he had been protected from a
catastrophe by one of them, he attributed the merit to the sanctity of the
monk from whom he took it, and that [monk] was not long in being seen
to qualify as a hlvn ba 1.
The commerce in amulets that has developed over fifteen years,
as well as the multiplication of hlvn bal and the extension of the geo-
graphical area of the fame of those attributed with extraordinary
powers, has transformed these monks into veritable mass-media stars.
This has not failed to arouse sometimes violent reactions, not by the
religious hierarchy, but by the small, citified intellectual elite and by
some monastic disciples of Buddhadasa, who do not hesitate, in the
name of Buddhist orthodoxy, to oppose certain practices of the hlvn bal
and the cult that is rendered them.
As for the mass of the faithful, the great majority refuse to deny
the marvels that are the magical powers attributed to the hlvn bal or the
amulets coming from them. This has led A.-R. Peltier to ask if the belief
in hlvn bal does not have a Mahayanist resonance, since deceased hlvn
ba
l
intervene in the human world as bodhisattvas are supposed to-but
differently from the latter: it is not to restore justice or help beings attain
salvation, but to protect just those faithful that venerate them and carry
amulets with their effigy or coming from them. This has also led Peltier
to ask if the powers conceded tne hlvn ba
l
, which most often serve only
to satisfy exclusively worldly desires, are not the outcome of a distant
tantric influence. Ultimately, the popularity of the thaumaturge monks
called hlvn ba
l
has seemed to the author unconsciously to be the expres-
sion of a religious pan-Thaism.
108
This study, which offers in its appendices succinct biographies of
eleven hlvn ba
1
and a very good bibliography in the Thai language, " ...
does not pretend to be exhaustive. As its title indicates, it only embarks
upon a theme ... " and will be followed by other publications on the hlvn
bal. We hope that A.-R. Peltier will quickly produce a sequel to this first
study, which could have been presented and developed with such clarity
and precision only by a researcher with a perfect knowledge of the
language, society and Buddhism of Thailand.
Pierre-Bernard Lafont
(translated from French by Roger Jackson)
Buddhism, Imperialism and War. Burma and Thailand in Modern History, by
Trevor Ling. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979. xvii + 163 pp.,
map, appendix, references, glossary, index.
Trevor Ling's Buddhism, Imperialism and War is an outstanding
work of comparative history, with emphasis on Buddhism and nationalism
in Thailand and Burma and on particular wars between these two
nations. The details of this historical account, especially those on post-
colonized Burma and the relationship between Theravada Buddhism
and nationalism, which were the main forces in creating the present-day
situations in Burma and Thailand, are remarkable and useful to the
reader.
In his Introduction, Ling explains that the main purpose of his
book is to clarify the extent to which religious ideals affect (or do not
affect) the public and political life of a society in which they may be
theoretically honoured. In this same chapter, Ling admits that there are
differences between Thailand and Burma and points out that these
differences are partly ethnic and cultural, and partly political, the politi-
cal differences arising partly out of the history of the modern period,
though not entirely. Ling proceeds to prove these difficulties quite
successfully by giving us comparative accounts of the different political
events and situations in Thailand and Burma, particularly British
colonization and the Burmese reaction against colonization as seen in
the gradual development of present-day Buddhism and the political
situation in Burma, as opposed to the independence of Thailand and its
smoother political and religious development. These differences are
demonstrated in Chapter 4, "The Growth of Nationalism: 1900-1945,"
in which Buddhism and nationalism in Burma and Thailand are explained
'and compared. Chapter 5, "Buddhism and Nationalism in the Post-War
109
World," is mainly devoted to the dilemma, religious values, capitalism,
and the environment in Burma while the situation in Thailand is
included under the subsection "The Sangha as a Tool of the Thai State."
The comparison would be more weighty if the events in Thailand were
explained and compared with those in Burma in greater detail.
The contents of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 point to the relation-
ships and the mutual influences between political events and religious
(Buddhist) concepts in Burma and Thailand, such as the policy and
behavior of the pious U Nu, discussed in Chapter 5. However, on page
140 of Chapter 6, Ling comes to the abrupt conclusion that "The inci-
dence of international warfare bears no positive correlation to the domi-
nance, or absence, of anyone religious tradition." This is quite confusing,
particularly when we consider that the decisions and actions of warfare
are determined and carried out by human beings who are more or less
molded and guided by their religious concepts. In this Chapter 6, Ling
turns to a psychological approach, using the "non-aggression" in Buddhist
interpersonal behaviour as an explanation for wars in which the partici-
pants were "dastardly in danger. .. and cruel in victory," particularly the
wars of 1767, when Ayudhya was sacked and ruined by the Burmese.
This, again, is quite confusing and surprising for Ling suddenly turns to
the village level-interpersonal behavior of the Thai villagers based on
the study by Herbert Phillips, while on page 43 Ling has suggested that
the cruelty of the 1767 wars was due to the decision of the pious
Burmese King Alaungpaya and his successor, who became blood-thirsty
in war. Also, we must bear in mind that not all wars between Burma and
Thailand were that cruel. For example, historians consider the war of
1569 when Ayudhya was taken by the Burmese troops under Bayin-
naung as a fair war and victory without much cruelty. Ling mentions this
war of 1569 but does not compare it with the war of 1767.
In suggesting reasons why two Buddhist nations, Burma and
Thailand, have been so warlike, Ling's book has not added much to our
understanding of the subject. Ling's treatment of this most controversial
issue is limited only to a psychological approach. As noted, for example,
Ling chooses to believe in "ritual aggression" and the suppression
among the Thais and Burmese of hostile feelings which then, in war
against an enemy kingdom, are angrily released by undisciplined troops.
It would be more interesting if Ling would concentrate more on detailed
accounts on Thai and Burmese military social organization and the
questions of racial and linguistic differences and prejudice, for which I
believe a strong case might be made.
The conclusions of my critique of this are as follows:
(1) If the analysis is based on a psychological approach, more materials
and details must be brought to the analysis, not just the study on the
110
particular Thai villages of Herbert Phillips. Phillips' study cannot
explain behavior in the villages of Burma, and his study is not
valid for Thai villagers in different regions, either.
(2) The nature of Southeast Asian kingship which is comprised of
four main elements, namely Devaraja, Rajadharma, Dharmaraj,
and the Law of Karma is not dealt with in this book. The explana-
tions of Southeast Asian kingship and leadership are essential for
the analysis of the national level incidence such as warfare between
nations.
(3) This would be a more interesting and challenging analysis of
"Buddhism, Imperialism and War" if:
(a) The incidence and results of several more wars between
Thailand and Burma were considered and compared; and
(b) The social organization (on different levels-from village to
nation) of Burma and Thailand were used along with the
psychological approach.
But, in sum, these critiques do not detract the value of this remarkable
Buddhist and historical study written with arguable concepts that should
challenge scholars working in Southeast Asia Area Studies for years to
come.
Somchintana Thongthew-Ratarasarn
Zhongguo foxue yuanliu lUejiang r:p ~ {:J1; ~ 1J,j\ yf,E ilia ~ (Brief lectures
on the origins and development of Chinese Buddhology), by Lii Cheng.
Beijing: Zhonghua shuju r:p 1!f fij] 1979. 396 pp. (no index).
From 1961 to 1966 Lii Cheng, while atthe Social Sciences Division
of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, gave a series oflectures. This book
is a compilation of students' notes to these lectures by Huang Xinchuan,
plus some additional material. The book itself is divided into two parts: a
preface and nine lectures plus a concluding lecture which discusses
Buddhism in the Song and Ming Dynasties; and a supplement consisting
of 14 additional essays. Five of these supplementary essays were written
between 1954 and 1956. The four-part preface outlines the contents of
the book, the source materials and methodology used, as well as related
writings and how this book attempts to differ from them. The nine
lectures deal with a number of diverse topics in Buddhism up until the
end of the Tang Dynasty, such as the first transmissions of Buddhism
into China (historically and textually), research on PraJiiaparamita
logic, Buddhist schools of the Six Dynasties period, the origin and
III
development of the various sects and the popularity of the various
meditational schools in the Six Dynasties period. The supplementary
essays deal with such things as some aspects of the period and compila-
tion of the Sutra in Forty-two Chapters, short discussions of some early
Buddhists such as An Shigao ~ ill ~ , Zhi Qian :Y: ~ , and Zhu
Shixing * IT ,a discussion of various problems in the thought of
the early Zen sect, and relatively lengthy discussions of the major
Buddhist schools of the period, e.g., Three Treatise, Tiantai, Huayan
and Zen. The last essay deals with Buddhism in the Song Dynasty.
Briefly, this book is important for a couple of reasons. First, it
attempts to view Buddhism and Buddhology not just as an isolated
stream, but as a component in the overall social and intellectual history
of China. Secondly, it is an attempt to evaluate Chinese Buddhism from
a more Chinese perspective, i.e., without relying solely on Japanese
scholarship. Hopefully, these trends will continue to develop so that
world research on Buddhism might be enriched by another mature,
developed perspective. Indeed, a brieflook at projects now in progress
at the Comparative Religions section of the Academy of Social Sciences
in Beijing would seem to indicate that Chinese scholarship along these
lines may soon bear some important fruit.
Bruce Williams
The Jaina Path of Purification, by Padmanabh S. J aini. Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1979. xv + 374 pp. Illustrations, Bibliography,
Glossary, Index.
Professor J aini states in his preface that this volume of 374 pages is
an attempt to "introduce J ainism, not only as a religious tradition, but as
a literary and sociohistorical one as well." Few such introductory volumes
have succeeded so well. This is a valuable pedagogical tool: it presents
the essence, development, and the facts about the subject it introduces.
Most such volumes succeed in presenting the structure and development
in a broad outline which precludes facts. Others are just shopping lists of
facts which are extremely useful for research reference but indigestible
for gaining an introduction.
In nine chapters Professor Jaini systematically presents: Mahavira
and the Foundations of Jainism; The First Disciples and the Jaina
Scriptures; The Nature of Reality; The Mechanism of Bondage; Samyak-
DarSana: The First Awakening; Vrata and Pratima: The Path of the
112
Layman; Jaina Rituals and Cermonies; The Mendicant Path and the
Attainment of the Goal; Jaina Society through the Ages: Growth and
SurvivaL
The point of reference is the experience of J ainism today, and this
is the vantage point by which the material is brought to life. The book
begins with the immediacy of a newspaper account:
It is August, 1955. On the holy mount of Kunthalagiri, in the state of
Maharashtra in India, an old man called Santisagara (Ocean of peace) is
ritually fasting to death.
The book concludes with a question pertinent to J aina ethics even today.
!tis designed to test exactly the Jaina commitment to ahir:p.sa (non-
harming).
Question: If a snake is about to bite me, should I allow myself to be bitten or
should I kill it, supposing that is the only way in which I can save myself?
One could quantify this impression of vitality: on every page one finds
evidence of the living reality of Jain ism, i.e., Jaini's reference is to Jainas
(and Buddhists etc.) not to J ainism (and Buddhism etc.). When discussing
history, ritual, and even philosophy, Professor Jaini names the people
who participate in the history, perform the ritual, and profess the philo-
sophy. Within the chapters on philosophy, I opened at random to pp. 92
and 93 .
. . . Consequently, the Sarp.khya too ends up by saying that "bondage" of
by the prakJ;'ti is illusory and not to be taken as real. 6
The J aina maintains that both these schools can be categorized as
"extremist" (ekantavada), propounding a one-sided dogma of eternalism
(nityavada) ....
The Buddhist-particularly the abhidharmika, who upholds a doctrine
of discrete (niranvaya) and momentary elements (dharmas)-is
considered an ekantavadin of the other type, ...
fn. 6 quotes the SaTflkhyakiirikii, k. 62: tasman na badhyate ...
Compare these paragraphs from another volume introducing another
Indian religion.
These are the five methods. [Methods have been given in the above para-
graphs.] Some authorities assume that it is faith which saves, others that it is
repetition of the holy name. There was much controversy on the first and
the fifth of the above methods since, according to some they savoured too
much of self-reliance.
Note in this passage that the authorities and the "some" are unnamed.
The Indic language equivalences for "faith," "repetition of the holy
name," and "self-reliance" can only be guessed at.
The passage quoted above in a book by Edward Conze (Buddhism:
113
Its Essence and Development. New York: Harper Torchbook, 1959, p. 158).
Had I chosen a lesser scholar's introductory volume, the comparison
would have been pointless; it would not have sufficed to show Jaini's
particular excellences.
Professor J aini gives an enormous amount of factual detail in the
material designed to introduce Jainism "to those with only a general
knowledge of India and its major faiths" (p. xii). Jaini rightly assumes
that the student new to Jaina material will be able to select those state-
ments and technical errns helpful to his increasing acquaintance with
Jainism.
Although doctrinal explanations have been kept as simple as possible, it
has nevertheless been necessary to introduce a number of Sanskrit and
Prakrit technical terms. Each of these is italicized and defined at the point
of its initial appearance in the text; thereafter, the reader is referred to the
Glossary of Sanskrit and Prakrit Words, wherein short definitions and page
references for such terms are to be found. I have included a large amount
of canonical and commentarial material, in the original languages, among
the footnotes. This has been done to partially overcome the difficulty of
finding such material in libraries outside of India. It is hoped that the
passages this made available will be of benefit to those specialists who wish
to consult them. (p. xii)
Altogether, another scholar can adopt, with good results, the
method and mechanics of Professor Jaini's presentation, but in any field
there will be few scholars who can display so much control over so much
material. The final vitality of this presentation of Jainism-and the
J ainas-is the usefulness of this relatively slim volume for Indic scholars
-both beginners and those well-established.
As an lndic scholar dealing with Women's Studies, I would fault
Professor J aini's presentation of the J aina women mendicant, which is
relegated to a footnote. In this footnote, given below, Prof. Jaini demon-
strates the value of his book: he gives a good summary of mendicancy
for women in India, updates information given in such excellent
volumes as S.B. Deo's History of Jain Monachism (Poona, 1956), and gives
good advice about the sociological research to be done. Even so, more
complete treatment would not have been out of place.
114
It should be noted that brahmanical society has never approved of
mendicancy for women; even a widow is required by law to stay in the
household under the protection of her son (cf. Manusmrti: ix, 3). As for the
Buddhists, it is well known that Sakyamuni agreed only reluctantly to the
establishment of a this lasted but a few centuries
within India and is now practically defunct in the Buddhist countries of
Southeast Asia. Thus it appears that J ainism alone favored the idea of an
order of nuns. The canon speaks of a large number of female mendicants
(sadhviji) in the order of Mahavira (see above, Ch. 1), and even today nuns
constitute a majority in both the Svetambara and Sthanakavasi sects. (See
pIs. 28 and 30.) According to the most recent census, taken in 1977, the
Svetambarashadapproximately 1,200 monks and 3,400 nuns, the Sthiinaka-
vasis 325 monks and 522 nuns. Among Digambaras, where the number of
mendicants has always been small, there were at last count about 65 monks
(munis), and sixty and ailakas, and fifty nuns (aryikiis and
[These figures are based upon personal communication from Dr. NaginJ.
Shah (Svetiimbaras), Mr. Kantilal D. Kora (Sthiinakaviisis and Tecipanthis),
and Pandit Narendra J. Bhisikar (Digambaras.] The preponderance of
women (most of whom are widows) in the Jaina mendicant order has yet to be
examined from a sociological perspective. (note 8, pp. 246-47)
Had the footnote been part of the text, one conjectures, there might
have been, for example, more information about Candana, the founder
of the Jaina women's mendicant order under Mahavira. The stories
about her entrance to the order are found in Mrs. Sinclair Stevenson's
The HeartofJainism (New Dehli, 1970 [First Indian Edition], p. 66). Were
these stories in non-canonical texts or were they part of an oral tradition
available to Mrs. Stevenson? There is much historical examination, as
well as that from a sociological perspective, which remains to be done on
the J aina woman mendicant.
Frances Wilson
115
IV. NOTES AND NEWS
MINUTES OF THE JOINT MEETING OF'THE EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE AND THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE 2ND
ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE lABS AT NALANDA, 1979
It was resolved that:
1. The Secretary's report for the year 1979 read by Professor A.K. Narain,
and the Treasurer's Report for 1979 read by Dr. Beatrice D. Miller be
approved.
2. With a view to consolidating the lABS management, the Board of Directors
and the Executive Committee of the lABS be merged into a new body to be
called the Governing Body, or by a suitable name which would be acceptable
by the "Rules of Incorporation", consisting of 21 members. So also, to make
the editorial management more compact, the Editor-in-Chief may make
suitable changes in the editorial team, and finally, the General Secretary shall
be empowered to make recommendations for such changes as necessary in
the Constitution and the By-laws of the lABS, keeping in view the above-
mentioned items and such other items which are in the interest of the consili-
dation of the lABS management, before the next election due in 1981, which
may be conducted by mail.
3. Such members of the lABS who haven't paid their dues to date be dropped
from their present membership in the important bodies of the lABS, and the
General Secretary be authorized to delete the names of those not in good
standing. Further it is recommended that in nominating names for the new
Governing Body and Editorial team, the matter of indifferent or irregular
participation in lABS activities be taken into consideration.
4. Professor Akira Yuyama, Regional Secretary, Asia, be authorized to open
a banking account in Japan for the purpose of collecting dues from Japanese
members whenever necessary, and maintain an account to be periodically
transferred to the Treasure of the lABS in consultation with the latter. Such
facilities may be made available for other areas if found absolutely necessary
and in the best interest of the lABS.
5. The lABS is pleased to confirm the acceptance ofthe invitation and other
actions of the General Secretary to hold the 3rd Conference at the University
of Manitoba, in Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, from August 17-22, 1980. He
is authorized to deal with the Secretariat in the International Association
for the History of Religions (IAHR) and the local hosts in whatever way
necessary for the success of the conference.
116
6. Such members of the lABS who retire from active service in their profes-
sion may, on application, get a subsidized membership in the lABS at a rate
of $10.00 per year.
7, A vote of thanks on behalf of the lABS be conveyed by the General
Secretary to:
117
d. Professor M.K. Verma, Chairman of the Department of South Asian
Studies at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA, for continuing
to extend the support of the Department of South Asian Studies to the
lABS.
h. Mr. Jean d'Ormesson, Secretaire General du CIPSH, Maison de
l'UNESCO, 1 rue Miollis, 75015, Paris, France, and Professor Louis
Bazin, Le Secretaire General, Union Internationale des Etudes Orientales
et Asiatiques, 77, quai du Port-au-Fouarre, 94100 Saint-Maur, France, for
their efforts in securing the fmancial aid from UNESCO which contributed
greatly to the success of this conference.
c. The Governor of Bihar, H.E. Dr. A.R. Kidwai, for inaugurating the
conference, and Rev. Fuji Guruji of Japan for gracing the Opening
Session.
d. Dr. S.C. Upasak, Director, Nava Nalanda Mahavihara, for his untiring
efforts towards the success of this conference.
e. The Government of Bihar and its senior officers, in particular Dr.
Damodar Thakur, Director of Public Instruction.
f. The Archaeological Survey of India, The Japanese Temple, The Wat
Thai Temple, The Indo-Tibetan Cultural Society, those in charge of the
entertainment programs, and all of the faculty and administration, staff
and students at Nalanda, and such other bodies and persons who helped
make the conference a success.
g. The Chairperson of the lABS, Professor A.L. Basham, and the other
officers of the association, in particular Dr. Beatrice D. Miller, the
Treasurer, and Professor A.K. Narain, the General Secretary, to Dr. P.
Pradhan, the President of this conference, and to Ms. Rena Haggarty,
the office assistant to the General Secretary.
CONTRIBUTORS
Jose Cabezon
Department of South Asian Studies
1244 Van Hise Hall
University of Wisconsin
Madison, WI 53706
Professor ].W. Cribb
The British Museum
Dept. of Coins and Medals
London WCIB 3DG
ENGLAND
Mr. Brian Galloway
4365 Alder Dr.
San Diego, CA 92116
Professor Noriaki Hakamaya
Setagaya-ku
Nozawa 3-39-15-405
Tokyo,JAPAN
Mr. Roger Jackson
Department of South Asian Studies
1244 Van Rise Hall
University of Wisconsin
Madison, WI 53706
Mr. John P. Keenan, Lecturer
Department of South Asian Studies
1248 Van Rise Hall
University of Wisconsin
Madison, WI 53706
Mr. Pierre-Benard Lafont
Directeur d'Etudes
4e Section
l'Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes
45-47 rue des Ecoles
Paris 5
FRANCE
Professor Whalan W. Lai
Department of Religious Studies
University of California
Davis, CA 95606
118
Professor K. Priscilla Pedersen
Department of Religion
Swarthmore College
Swarthmore, PA 19081
Mrs. Somchintana T. Ratarasarn
Department of South Asian Studies
1232 Van Hise Hall
University of Wisconsin
Madison, WI 53706
Professor Boris J. Stavisky
WNllR
10, Krestyansaya PI.
J-I72, Moscow 109172
USSR
Professor Elisabeth Strandberg
Nitibej 11
DK-2000 Frederiksberg
DENMARK
Professor Alex Wayman
Department of Middle East Languages
and Cultures
Columbia University
603 Kent Hall
New York, NY 10027
Mr. Bruce C. Williams
Department of East Asian Languages
and Literature
1212 Van Hise Hall
University of Wisconsin
Madison, WI 53706
Professor Frances Wilson
Department of South Asian Studies
1246 Van Hise Hall
University of Wisconsin
Madison, WI 53706
The International Association of Buddhist Studies, Inc., January, 1980
:
(lCE CHAIRPERSONS:
rREASURER:
:;'ENERAL SECRETARY
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF):
:;'ENERAL SECRETARY PRO TEM:
\SSOCIATE SECRETARY:
:<.EGIONAL SECRETARIES:
EDITORS:
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
MEMBERS:
ADDITIONAL MEMBERS OF THE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS:
HONORARY FELLOWS:
A.L. Basham (Australia)
Andre Bareau (France)
Hajime Nakamura (Japan)
Beatrice Miller (USA)
A.K. Narain (India)
Bardwell Smith (USA)
Charles S. Prebish (USA)
Luis Gomez: For the Americas (USA)
Akira Yuyama: For Asia (Japan)
Erik Zurcher: For Europe (The Netherlands)
Heinz Bechert (Germany)
Leon Hurvitz (Canada)
Lew Lancaster (USA)
Alexander W. MacDonald (France)
Boris J. Stavisky (USSR)
Alex Wayman (USA)
Lokesh Chandra (India)
A.H. Dani (Pakistan)
M.C. Subhadradis Diskul (Thailand)
Robert]. Miller (USA)
Ismael Quiles (Argentina)
Theodore Riccardi, Jr. (USA)
Richard Gombrich (U.K.)
Jan Yun-Hua (Canada)
P.V. Bapat (India)
Sir Harold W. Bailey (U.K.)
Kenneth K.S. Ch'en (USA)
Edward Conze* (France)
Paul Demieville* (France)
V.V. Gokhale (India)
Ms. LB. Horner (U.K.)
Etienne Lamotte (Belgium)
Shoson Miyamoto (Japan)
Nicholas Poppe (USA)
Guiseppe Tucci (Italy)
P.L. Vaidya* (India)
Ernst Waldschmidt (Germany)
O.H. de A. Wijesekera (Sri Lanka)
Susumu Yamaguchi* (Japan)
* Deceased