Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
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<c
VOLUME I - TEXT
f.
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REGRADED BY AUTHORITY OF BY ON
Table of Contents
Page
A. Survey of Means Available 1
1. General Factors 1
a. National 1
(1) Political.. . 1
(a) Introduction 1
(b) Density of Population 2
(c) Ethnic Groups 3
(1) General 3
(Z) Quantitative Ethnic Composition 3
(3) Languages 4
(? Religion 4
Ethnic Distribution of Peoples of the
" * U.S.S.R 4
Indo-Europeans 4
Finno-Ugr ians 5
Japhetides ... 6
Turkic peoples 6
Mongol- Tungus-Manchu 6
(6) Ethnic Groups in the Caucasus 6
"" " Languages 7
Ethnic Distribution in the Caucasus 7
(d) Historical Growth of the U.S.S.R...* 8
( 1 From the Beginning to Rurik (4000
_) B.C.-860 A.D.) 9
(J2) Rurik to Genghis Khan (860-1237) 9
(3) Genghis Khan to Ivan the Great (1237 ~ " 1462) 10
(4) Ivan the Great to Peter the Great
" " (1462-1689) .o 10
(5) Peter the Great to the Crimean War
~ (1689-1853) 11
(6) Crimean War to the Russo-Japanese War
""" (1853-1904) 12
(7) The Decay of Czarism (1904-1917) 13
(7F) The Communist Experiment (1917-1927), 13
(9) Rise of Stalin and Soviet Nationalism
~ (1927-1942) 14
(e) Present Political Administration of the
U.S.S.R 18
(1) Actual Political Administration of the
" U.S.S.R " 18
2.
i n
jfj
IV
C.
3.
VI
BLES
Title A. Page
1
1
3
15
29
49
54
55
56
64
66
69
72
76
81
.95
96
97
98
101
102
104
114
115
120
125
126
140
141
142
143
145
153
157
165
Survey of Means Available , 1. General Factors i e.. 0. Table I: Population totals II: Chronology of Russian history III: Critical materials IV: Pipelines in the Caucasus , Vt Black Sea ports.. VI: Caspian Sea ports VII: Mineral production in the zone of the interior. VIII: Ural-Volga refineries IX: Non-ferrous metals and minerals in the Urals... X: Power stations in the Urals XI: Industries in the Urals XII: Industrial resources of West Siberia.... XIII: Industrial resources of Central Asia XIV: Agriculture - Northern Region XV: Agriculture - Central Region XVI: Agriculture - Middle and Lower Volga Region.... XVII: Agriculture - North Caucasus and Transcaucasus. XVIII; Agriculture - Ural Region XIX: Agrioulture - Siberia (West of Lake Baikal).... XX: Agriculture - Central Asia 2. Factors Directly Applicable to the Armed Forces Table I: Order of battle II: Naval forces .... III: Airplane numerical strength according to type:
ju March, 1941.... .....,..., W March, 1942 IV: Infantry weapons V: Anti-tank - anti-aircraft weapons VI: Artillery VII: Motorization - mechanization VIII: Characteristics of airplanes IX: Port facilities - Soviet ports. X: Port facilities - Pahlcvi and the Persian
Gulf ports XI: Daily supply requirements (maintenance only)
of large Soviet units..
Vll
166
180
182
195
198
231
'*, , i J
* ' 'l
i '
IX
IV..,
if * * -> m '
A.
National.
(1) Political.
(a) Introduction. The people of the U.S.S.R. in
their numbers and distribution, in their ethnic divisions, in their
historical development, and in their present political administration,
exhibit major strengths and some weaknesses.
The population of the U.S.S.R. in 1939 was
exceeded only by India and China; losses have reduced it by 30$. Two-
thirds of the remaining population live west of the Volga River.
The multiplicity of ethnic groups in the U.S.S.Rf
16 major nationalities (represented in constituent republics) and in numerable minorities--renders uniform government policy difficult.
Separatism is not, howevef, an important problem. Great Russians
(58y) and other Indo-Europeans comprise B0% of the population; Turkic
tribes, 14$; and the rest, 6%. The Russians are still largely Greek
Orthodox in religion; most of the Turkic peoples are Sunnite Moslems.
The Russians live largely in the cultivable areas of European Russia
and Western Siberia; scattered near rivers and railroads elsewhere.
The Finno-Ugrians live in the forests and tundras of Northern Russia
and Siberia west of the Yenisei River- The Turkic groups predominate
everywhere in Central Asia except the Ferghana Valley, which is Tadzhik
(Indo-European) territory. The Mongol-Tungus-Manchu are found primarily
in the Far East; west of Lake Baikal, the principal groups are the
Kalmyk along the Volga and near Biisk, the Buriat north of Irkutsk, and
the Tungus along the Yenisei River. The Japhetides are indigenous to
the Caucasus. In general, one-third of the population of that area is
Russian; the rest, including the Japhetides, are quite heterogeneous,
the result of the crossroads location of the Caucasus since time
immemorial.
Russian history is the record of centralized
authority--Czarist or Communist--uniting a confusion of peoples and
environments. Russia's strength has been proportional to the firmness
of its ruler. The government was strong during the successful repulses
of Charles XII and Napoleon; weak, before the Mongol conquest and the
defeat by the Central Powers in World War j. Russia's outstanding
^-J^wi'^uV]iriiH!l
6.7 170,000,000 ( 2.6) 6.5 108,809,469 ( 2.5) 66.0 (25.5) 31,850,307 3,209,727 37.2 (14.4) (19.7) 3,542,289 50.9 1,281,599 42.7 (16.5) 1,253,985 2.8 ( LI) 16.9 6,282,445 ( 6.5) 10.3 1,485,091 ( 4.0) 2.2 6,145,937 ( .8) 7.4 1,459,301 ( 2.9) (c) Ethnic Groups. (1) General. The multiplicity of ethnic groups
in the U.S.S.R. renders any uniform government policy difficult. The
Soviet government controls these numerous peoples by exercising strict
rule from Moscow administered through policing and espionagethe
N.K.V.D. and the Communist Partyand by creating territorial-administra tive divisions according to racial differences, thus fostering limited
local autonomy. Each of the 16 constituent republics represents a
national majority; political subdivisions, national minorities. The
long historical intermingling of these peoples has reduced separatism
somewhat. The melting-pot tradition illustrates great assimilative
powers and facilitates further expansion and absorption.
(2) Quantitative Ethnic Composition. Great
U.S.S.R. R.S.F.S.R. Ukrainian S.S.R. Azerbaidzhan S.S.R. Georgian S.S.R. Armenian S.S.R. Turkmen S.S.R. Uzbek S.S.R. Tadzhik S.S.R. Kazakh S.S.R. Kirghiz S.S.R.
VW J
J
'4 -
Russians form 58% of the population, Ukrainians 17$, White Russians 3$,
Uzbeks 3$, Tatars 3$, Kazakhs 2$, Jews 2$, Azerbaidzhans 1$, Georgians
1$, and Armenians 1$. No other nationality listed in the 1939 census
numbers 1$. Russians and other Indo-Europeans comprise about 80$ of
the population, Turkic tribes 14$, and the rest 6$.
(Z) Languages. Each nationality speaks its
native tongue, but Russian~is the secondary language in all U.S.S.U.
republics. Russian is taught in all schools, and since the Soviets
simplified Czarist forms its use has become much more widespread.
The four general language groups in the
U.S.S.R. comprise the following percentages of the population*
Indo-Europeans, 80$; Russians 78$, Armenians
1%, Poles and Germans 1$.
Altaic peoples, 16$; Turkic branch 14$,
Manchu-Tungus-Mongol branch 1$.
Finno-Ugrians, 1$.
Japhetides, peoples living exclusively in
the Caucasus, 3%; Georgians 1%, Abkhaz-Cherkess group, Chechen, and
Lesghin tribes, 2$.
Semites, mainly Jews, 1$.
(4) Religion. Russians primarily are believers
of the Greek Orthodox faith, the official State religion of Czarist
Russia. There are some Roman Catholics and Protestants. Most of the
Turkic tribes are Sunnite Moslems. Mongols as a rule are Buddhists.
Russian political domination has had little influence on the native
religions of nationalities, except for the present younger generation of
Russians who have been versed in Communism and may be generally anti religious.
(5) Ethnic Distribution of Peoples in the
U.S.S.R. (See Map 2). Indo-Europeans, mainly Russians, live all over
the U.S.S.R., largely in cultivable areas of European Russia and Western
Siberia; scattered near rivers and railroads elsewhere. The portage
system had great influence on Russian expansion and settlement- Russians
are overwhelmingly Slav, but near ethnic boundaries show marked admixture
with neighboring nationalities. Great Russians, forming tho bulk of the
entire population, live mostly in the R.S.F.S.R. in European Russia
around Moscow. They were known as Muscovite Russians, having settled
around Moscow after the Mongol invasion forced them from Kiev. They were
- 5
and extending to the Yenisei, especially along the Ob River. The Finns
have intermingled with the incoming Slav population. Their culture is
most evident among the forests and marshes south of the tundra zone,
and along the central course of the Volga* Karelians inhabit the
Karelian-Finnish S.S.R.; Samoyeds, ancient inhabitants of Northern
Siberia, live in the tundras north of the 65th parallel to the north east of the Finns; and Mari (Chuvash) and Komi (Permians), the Ifoscow
and Molotov areas respectively. Other Finno-Ugrians, numerically small,
are scattered over northern Russia.
Japhetides. (See (6)).
.6
- 7
customs of those peoples with whom they came .in contact. Azerbaid zhani, belonging to the Turkic branch of the Altaic peoples occupy
the Azerbaidzhan S.S.R. and are found in the Dagestan A.S.S.R. They
are scattered through the Armenian S.S.R., especially in the Nakhi chevan A.S.S.R,, an Azerbaidzhan province in the southern part of the
Armenian S.S.R. Kumyk belong to the Turkic Branch of Altaic peoples
and live in northeastern part of Dagestan A.S.S.R. Nogais belong to
the Turkic Branch of the Altaic peoples and inhabit the Steppes
between the Kuma and Terek Rivers, in the Northern Dagestan A.S.S.R.
and eastern part of the Ordzhonikidze Krai on the Caspian Sea. The
Kirghiz of the Caucasus are a branch of the Kazakh (formerly called
Kirghiz-Kaisak) a Turkic tribe inhabiting the Kazakh S.S.R.
(d) Historical Growth of the U.S.S.R. (See Map
4 and Table II). Russian history is the record of a centralized
authorityCzarist or Communistuniting a confusion of peoples and
environments. Russia has been strong if controlled by iron-clad
rule, weak otherwise. Itsfetoryis one of alternating influences
from the East and I V s thrusting modern progress onto a country
/et characteristically backward, yet constantly expanding and growing in
power. Its present outstanding weakness, technological dependence
on the West, was lessened by Stalin*s forced industrialization; in
the past, Peter's westernization and Genghis Khan's orientalization
similarly raised Russia's cultural level#
The people of Russia have been restless
pioneers. Peasant families and half-wild Cossacks, fighting and
mixing with native tribes, expanded Russia. Their stamina in
war and peace has been incredible. Ignorant yet avidly eager for
knowledge, stolid yet stubborn and undisciplined, compassionate
and callous, submissive and rebellious, the Russians have been
an enigmatic people.
Historically, Russia's strength has been pro portionate to that of its ruler. With stable government Russia has
resisted tremendous onslaughts as those by Charles XII and Napoleon;
with internal weakness it fell to the Mongols and collapsed in World
War I. Dictators, organizers,, realists desirous of personal aggran dizement and sovereign control have done most for Russia. Her innum erable factions have demanded a firm, even ruthless, rule. Fear and
terror have been determining factors; liberty and justice according to
western standards have been unknown. Rather, revolutionary tendencies,
always latent in Russia, have been used by strong rulers for the co
Exiles conquered
Loyal opposition to the government and demo cratic processes have never been a constructive influence in Russia.
Many leaders had liberalistic aspirations, but mild liberalism co existing with secret terrorism simply resulted in internal corruption
and finally disaster.
(1) From the Beginning to Rurik. (4000 B.C. 860 A.D.). Russia's history begins in Central Asia at Anau where
domesticated horses and camels were found about 4000 B.C. and in the
North Caucasus where a pastoral and metal-working civilization connected
with Mesopotamia existed about 3500 B.C. The political unit of Russia,
however, did not appear until the tenth century A.D. Slavic culture
appeared about 3000 B.C. Eastern Slavs were not in Russia until
400 A.D.; they settled in the Ukraine near the Pripet Marshes, a region
which became the melting pot for three groups of peoples; hunters and
fishermen from Scandinavia, probably Finno-Ugrians; peasant farmers
from the Ukraine and Balkans, probably Indo-Europeans; and nomads from
Central Asia and the North Caucasus, probably Altaic peoples, mainly
Turks, Huns, and Scyths.
The numerous cultures of these peoples
were leavened by influence from the West, primarily by Greek colonists
in the Crimea about the fifth century B.C., the Romans and Persians
following the Macedonian Wars by the second century B.C., and Teutons
and Huns migrating from the north and south respectively between the
fourth and sixth centuries A.D. Byzantine culture exerted the greatest
influence on Russia. Trade routes between Scandinavia and Constantinople
crossed Russia. Merchants, particularly from Byzantium, did not
attempt to conquer Russia, but their culture strongly influenced
Russian life, religion and art. Scandinavian Vikings called Varangians
or Rus penetrated northern Russia, and gradually established political
domination over the Slav communities. According to tradition the Scandi navian Rurik ruled in Novgorod, the largest and northernmost of the
Russian principalities, in the ninth century. He is recognized as the
founder of the Russian dynasty.
(860-1237).
(Z) From Rurik to Genghis Khan Several Slavic states ruled by Grand Dukes developed. Having no
central ruler encouraged rivalry and internal warfare. Disunity made
Russia an easy prey to the invading Golden Horde. Kiev, the heart of
old Russia, was the most powerful and centrally located of the 12
Russian principalities of the Middle Ages. Trade with the Byzantine
Empire continued; its influence predominated during the reigns of
iUbh
wai^J
t(%
-11
- 12
societies became powerful forces; the principal ones were the Social
Democrats, industrial workers (the Bolsheviks led by Lenin were the
extreme left wing of this group); Social Revolutionaries, jingoists
and terroists inspired by earlier Populist movements; and Liberal
Unionists, intelligentsia, desiring a liberal constitution (the most
important group at the time).
{]) The Decay of Czar ism (190.4-1917).
Russia's foreign policy and internal corruption caused the decay and
final collapse of Czarism. Her Far Eastern policy provoked the war in
which Japan at last defeated Russia overwhelmingly. Internally the
crown was wracked by graft and corruption. It sought to quell internal
disturbances on the one hand by increasing terrorism--the Black Hundreds
were created to augment the Okhrana--and on the other by attempting to
reform autocratic methods, but efforts were insufficient. A constitution,
granted after strikes by industrial workers in 1905, failed to solve
ever increasing problems.
Germany's strengthening position was a
constant threat to Russia, and resulted in a series of pacts with
England and France prior to Germany's attack on Russia in August 1914.
During the war Russian troops suffered devastating defeats. Corruption
was revealed within the army as well as in the court. General
Sukhomlinov was proved traitorous. The aristocracy's corruption was
particularly evident in the Czarina's involvements with Rasputin and
other powerful groups of mystics and magic healers. Dissatisfaction
increased in other circles; the condition of industrial workers and
peasants continually grew worse. Elements of revolution reached the
boiling point after continupd defeats on the battle front and at home.
In March 1917 the aristocracy revolted.
The Duma refused to obey imperial orders and set up its own Provisional
Government headed by Alexander Kerensky, a Socialist and Minister of
Justice. This band of intellectuals failed, too, because they refused
to be realistic in their dealings with the fundamental revolutionaries- workers and peasants--whose strength was increased by the continual
defeats of their enemies at home and abroad, and who finally seized the
government by force in November. They were Bolsheviks headed by Lenin
and Trotsky, who had been sent from Switzerland via Germany in a sealed
car to foment revolt. They made peace with Germany in March 1918.
Much territory was lost including Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, Baltic
provinces, Finland and Transcaucasia. German occupation attempts, how ever, renewed bitter resistance particularly in the Ukraine.
(8) The Communist Experiment (1917-1927).
This period is marked by the assumption of power by the Communist Party
- 14
, Hi .
(Contd.)
Mongol conquest.
Friar Rubruk, Franciscan monk, emissary to Genghis
Khan.
(1462-1689).
4.
Ivan the Great to Peter the Great 1462-1505 1533-1584 1555 1589 1598-1613 1613-1645
5.
Peter the Great to the Crimean War 1689-1725 1709, July 8 1728 1762-1796 1768-1792 1772-1795 1798
Table II: Chronology of Russian History. 1885 1891 92 1894-1917 7. Merv taken.
Great famine.
Nicholas II.
(1904-1917).
(Contd.)
Russian-Japanese War.
China recognized autonomy of Outer Mongolia.
Germany declared war on Russia.
(1917-1927).
8.
1917, Feb. 27
Revolution began.
Provisional Government formed.
1917, March
Bolshevik Revolution.
1917, Nov. 6
(Oct. 24)
Gregorian calendar introduced.
1918
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Peace with Central Powers.
1918, Mar. 3
1918-20
Civil War.
1918, July 10
Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic formed.
1918, Dec. 30
Ukraine became part of Soviet Russia.
1919, March 2
Foundation of III International.
Hungarian Revolution.
1919
1919, Dec. 11
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic formed.
1920, April 28
Azerbaidzhan S.S.R. formed.
Polish War.
1920
1920, Aug. 11
White Russian S.S.R. formed.
Armenian S.S.R. formed.
1920, Dec. 2
1921, Feb. 25
Georgian S.S.R. formed.
1921, March 17
New Economic Policy adopted.
1922, Apr. 16
Russian-German Treaty of Rapallo. (Economic Agreement)
Stalin appointed Secretary General of Communist Party.
1922
U.S.S.R. organized. Russia, Y T i e Russia, Ukraine,
iht 1922, Dec. 30
Transcaucasia incorporated into U.S.S.R,
Russia supported revolution in China.
1924-26
1924, Jan. 21
Lenin's death.
1925, May 12
Uzbek, Turkmen, Tadzhik, Kazakh, and Kirghiz S.S.R.!s
formed.
9. Rise of Stalin and Soviet Nationalism, 1928-32 1932-33 First Five-Year Plan.
Famine.
(1927-1942).
? ; ; , . '
.7
"jr.1 Wi
' / " '
I!
Table II; Chronology of Russian History. 1933-37 1934 1934, Dec. 18 1936, Nov. 26 1936, Dec. 5 1938, July-Aug, 1938-42
1939, Aug. 23 1939, Sept. 22 1939, Nov. 30Mar. 31
1940, Mar. 31 1940, June 27 1940, July 21 1940, Aug. 2 1940, Aug. 3 1940, Aug. 5 1940, Aug. 6 1941, Apr. 13 1941, May 6 1941, June 20 1941, June 22
(Contd.)
elected.
combining executive, legislative, and judicial powers, operates govern ment administration. The soviet with authority vested in the individual
worker is the basis of U.S.S.R. administration, all of which is
pyramidally organized.
State Organization. Government leaders
are elected; any citizen of the U.S.S.R. is eligible. Suffrage is
universal and unrestricted for every citizen of the U.S.SR., 18 years
of age and over, engaged either in "productive work useful to society"
or enlisted in the Soviet army. The primary electoral unit is the cell,
composed of at least three members who are represented in the village,
town, and factory Soviets; then in raion Soviets. Delegates to krai
and oblast Soviets, elected directly by village, town, and factory
Soviets as well as through raion Soviets, elect delegates both to the
constituent republic in which they are situated and to the All-Union
Congress of Soviets to which delegates also come directly from village,
town, and factory Soviets. Subordinate administrative units within the
U.S.S.R. usually have theuhicameral system of-representation with supreme
local authority vested in the Executive Committees of their Supreme
Councils of Peoples1 Commissars or Deputies.
The highest representative council in the
U.S.S.R. is the Supreme Soviet, composed of five main departments which
handle state administrationT~~Of these departments,two--Soviet of the
Union and Soviet of Nationalities,--comprise the Council of Peoples'
Commissars (Sovnarkom). The system of representation is bicameral.
The five main departments of the Supreme Soviet are: Soviet of the Union
(representation according to population, with one for every 300,000
persons in the U.S.S.R.); Soviet of Nationalities (representation accord ing to subordinate administrative units on the following basis: 25
representatives from each constituent republic, 11 from each autonomous
republic, five from each constituent oblast, and one from each national
region); Supreme Court (elected by the Supreme Soviet); Prosecutor
(elected by the Supreme Soviet); Presidium, of the Supreme Soviet (the
governing board of the Supreme Soviet, composed of one President, 16
Vice-Presidents, one from each constituent republic, one Secretary, and
24 members),
The U.S.S.R. is a federation of 16 consti tuent republics. The Supreme Soviet delegates legislative power to a
Central Executive Committee (elected by Supreme Soviet) and executive
power to the Council of Peoples' Commissars, whose members arc appointed
by the Central Executive Committee. The Sovnarkom is composed of a
President, 14 Vice"Presidents, 41 Peoples' Commissars, and many Chairmen
of important government commissions. Commissars are directors of the
25 All-Union Commissariats and the 16, Union-Republic Commissariats Ail-Union Commissariats (primarily
national administrations) direct activities such as defense, foreign
affairs, foreign trade, industrial projects (Five Year Plans), and
communications. Administration in these commissariats is controlled
directly from the central government of the U.S.S.R. through inter mediate political units. Union-Republican Commissariats (primarily
local administrations with national control) direct activities such as
internal affairs, internal trade, and local industrial projects. Local
authorities direct activities according to the central government's
orders.
Party Organization. The only difference
between Party and state organizations is that the former is more
thorough, larger and stronger in every respect. The supreme organ of
the Communist Party, the All-Union Party Congress, is supposed to meet
every three years and elect a Revision Commission, Auditing Commission,
and Central Committee. The Central Committee forms the Party policies,
convenes the Ail-Union Party Conference annually and is organized as
follows: Secretariat (four members; Stalin, Secretary-General);
Politburo (nine members, most powerful men in the U.S.S.R.) and Qrgburo
(alternates and candidates to Politburo); Commission of Party Control;
Administrations (Cadres, Propaganda, and Agitation); Departments
(Mili'bary, N.K.V.D., Navy, Railroad Commissariat, Agriculture, Schools,
Organization, and Instruction).
(3) Administrative Divisions of the U.S.S.R.
(See Map 5 ) . In April 1941 the only consequential political subdivisions
in addition to the 16 constituent republics were those within the-
R.S.F.S.R., the Ukrainian S.S.R., and White Russian S.S.R. They are
listed as follows, with parentheses indicating capitals, and asterisks
indicating German-occupied territory within political boundaries (see
Map 1 for front line as of May 1942):
R.S.F.S.R. (Moscow)*Kraist Altai
(Barnaul), Krasnoyarsk (Krasnoyarsk), Krasnodar (Krasnodar), Ordzhonikidze
(Voroshilovsk), Primorski (Vladivostok), Khabarovsk (Kharbarovsk);
Oblasts: Arkhangelsk (Arkhangelsk), Vologda (Vologda), Gorki (Gorki),
Ivanovo (Ivanovo), Irkutsk (Irkutsk), Kalinin (Kalinin), Kirov (Kirov),
Kuibyshev (Kuibyshev), Kursk (Kursk), Leningrad (Leningrad), Molotov
(Molotov), Moscow (Moscow), Murmansk (Murmansk), Novosibirsk (Novosibirsk),
Omsk (Omsk), Orel (Orel), Penza (Penza), Rostov (Rostov-on-Don), Voronezh
(Voronezh), Ryazan (Ryazan), Saratov (Saratov), Sverdlovsk (Sverdlovsk),
Smolensk (Smolensk), Stalingrad (Stalingrad), Tambov (Tambov), Tula
M.-irf"' nl'r ?
fltfl-.JJ..
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MATERIAL
Copper
TABLE III
CRITICAL MATERIALS
PRODUCTION REASON FOR CLASSIFICATION NORMAL ESTIMATED PRESENT OUTPUT AS CRITICAL 100,000 tons Possibly Insufficient pro1936 includ150,000 tons. duction for waring copper time needs* extracted both from ore and reclaimed
metal.
58,000 tons in 1936 Probably about the same or slightly higher Insufficient production
SOURCE OF
OUTSIDE SUPPLY United States South America
REMARKS
Lead
Zinc
Insufficient production partly due to loss of a zinc distillation plant in the Ukraine, Insufficient production of rare
metals
United States
TABLE I I I
MATERIAL
CRITICAL MATERIALS (Cont.)
PRODUCTION REASON FOR SOURCE OF
CLASSIFICATION OUTSIDE SUPPLY
NORMAL ESTIMATED PRESENT OUTPUT AS CRITICAL ? ? Insufficient domestic production United States
REMARKS
U.S. exports
(1941)
Electrodes 568,000 lbs.
Abrasives 660,000 lbs.
114,000 tons
of aluminum
requested
from the
Harriman
Mission.
Electrodes
and Abra sives
Aluminum
10,000 tons; possibly 20-30,000 tons depending on functioning of Urals plant and extent Zaporozhe plant was evacuated. Nil
United States
Canada
(Mercury
300-500 tons
Mexico via
United States
Reported
deposit
at Khai darkan,
Kirghiz
SSR produc tion, if
any, un known.
-&'
"
'
"
"
~ "~'V
*=- ~
1-;
" . -<
>^Siv
'.->
mTERIAL
PRODUCTION NORMAL ESTIMATED PRESENT OUTPUT 2,500-3,000 tons (1939 est.)
About the same REASON FOR CLASSIFICATION AS CRITICAL
Insufficient resources SOURCE OF
OUTSIDE SUPPLY
TABLE I I I
REMARKS
Nickel
Canada
New Caledonia
I !
9,600 tons of
nickel reques ted from the
Harriman
Mission;
Canada is fur nishing 900
tons monthly;
yearly re quirements
estimated at
15-20,000 tons
Tungsten
India
China
Bolivia via
the United
States
48,000 tons of
tin requested
from the
Harriman Mis sion. Imports
from China via
Sinkiang.
1941 exports
of ore and
concentrates
(gross weight)
2,312 short
tons.
Tin
r.^--2&
Molybdenum
Negligible
Negligible
Insufficient resources
United States
r^i
MATERIAL
TABLE III
CRITICAL MATERIALS (Cont. )
PRODUCTION
REASON FOR
SOURCE OF
NORMAL ESTIMATED
OUTSIDE SUPPLY
CLASSIFI CATION
AS CRITICAL
PRESENT OUTPUT
Exact data not available:
up to 1940 production was
only about .01 - .05 of
domestic demand.
9,000 guns 6,000 tanks Reduced by at least 35^, i.e., present output would equal 5850 guns and 3900 tanks. See "Remarks." Insufficient
resources
Mexico
Bolivia
REMARKS
Antimony
United States
Britain
Canada
1
^
^ '
Includes
tanks, Bren
carriers guns,
ammunition,
jeups, trucks,
parts and re placements.
(About 1,000
British
tanks have
been shipped.)
It is esti mated that
with Lend-
Lease aid
pre-war
Russian pro duction of
purely mili tary supplies
has been
maintained.
i
*,-:.
MATERIAL
Aircraft
TABLE I I I CRITICAL T^TERIALS (Cont.) PRODUCTION REASON FOR NORL1AL ESTIMATED CLASSIFICATION PRESENT OUTPUT AS CRITICAL 372 planes About 175 per See above5 also per month month; 78$ of chronic lack of (first half factories still efficiency. 1941) in Russian hands but 15% of these are within bombing range of the Germans. Insufficient production and loss of at least a half-dozen important machine tool plants
REIIARKS
United States Pursuit and Britain bomber planes. Lend-Lease Canada shipments (U.S. and Britain) more than 2,000.
Cfll
Machine Machine tools 3 Present capacity tools 53j900 units reduced because machinery in 1938. of loss of big semi-manu industrial factures centers in of iron, the Ukraine steel such as and other Kharkov. metals. 270,000 units planned for period 1938 1942.
United States
From Oct. 1, 1941-May 31, 1942, export arrivals of machine tools totaled 1,412 pieces, valued at about $7,400,000.
TABLE I I I
MATERIAL
REMARKS
United States
Large amounts
of high oc Dutch West
Indies
tane gas and
high grade
petroleum
products
shipped since
June 22, 1941.
Lack of natural
rubber and in sufficient syn thetic produc tion; loss of
factories in
occupied terri tory.
_
~
_ ! :
United States
72,000 tons
of rubber re Ceylon
quested from
the Harriman
Mission; 1942
requirements
estimated
by the Brit ish at
20,000 tons.
TABLE III
CRITICAL MATERIALS (Cont.)
MATERIAL
PRODUCTION NORMAL ESTIMATED PRESENT OUTPUT
REMARKS
Wheat and
An estimated* 5 million additional acres have been sown to grains, but even with good yields, the harvest will probably not be sufficient to feed adequately the population of un occupied Russia,
(?)
Loss of the United States Size of grain Ukraine and Cenreserves un t r a l Russian a g r i c u l known. Ext u r a l area. port a r r i
vals Oct. 1, 1941-May 31, 1942: wheat 26,D0 tons wheat flour -33,900 tons.
70-80$ of the country's output has been l o s t through conquest. United States Export a r r i - ti
Sugar
TABLE III CRITICAL MATERIALS (Cont.) MATERIAL PRODUCTION NORMAL ESTIMATED PRESENT OUTPUT Vegetable oil (1938) 570,000 metric tons. ? REASON FOR CLASSIFICATION AS CRITICAL Insufficient production of edible fats and lacking resources of tropical oils. SOURCE OF
OUTSIDE SUPPLY
West Coast
Africa (palm
oil)
United States
(lard and
coconut oil)
REMARKS
U. S. Exports
(1941): Coco nut oil-12,500
short tons;
Shipments of
lard and butter
Oct. 1, 1941 May 31, 1942
equaled 29,000
tons*
United States
Export arrivals
Mongolia
Oct. 1, 1941 South America
May 31, 1942:
Sole leather;
3,766 metric
tons; Army
boots:
846,000 pairs;
British ship ments very
large.
'/> ^ '.
*"""*^' i . r t
TABLE III
CRITICAL MATERIALS (Cont*)
MATERIAL
PRODUCTION
NORMAL ESTIMATED PRESENT OUTPUT 1938-1939 wool output -300 million pounds; 1939 woolen cloth -110,000,000 yards. Wool at approxi mately the 1938 39 level; all
textile pro-
duction re duced 35-40$
by losses.
REASON FOR
CLASSIFICATION
AS CRITICAL
Insufficient
domestic pro duction*
SOURCE OF
OUTSIDE SUPPLY
United States
Mongolia
South America
REMARKS
Wool and
woolen
goods
Large amounts .
of wool and
hair requested
from the
Harriman Mis sion; U.S.
export
arrivals of
army cloth
for Oct., 1,
1941-May 31,
1942 amounted
to 993,000
yards.
U.Sw exports
(1941)
valued at
$1,659,000.
t>
. . . ^
Scientific
and pro fessional
instru ments.
Insufficient
domestic
production
United States
MATERIAL
REMARKS
Chemicals,
medicines,
and drugs
(opium,
quinine,
serums,
etc.)
Export arrivals
of medical
items, Oct. 1,
1941-May 31,
1942 valued at
$1,750,000;
large amounts
of chemicals,
blending
agents, ex plosives ,
etc, also
shipped
during same
period.
either through fighting or deliberate destruction. In addition, indus tries, personnel and stocks were evacuated from many of these cities.
The Russians now claim to have put some industrial establishments in
recaptured towns back into operation. Most of these claims cannot be
confirmed, and on the whole seem hardly credible, except perhaps in the
case of the Donets Basin where several coal mines are said to have been
reopened.
Zone of Communications> The zone of communi cation is divided into four general regions from north to south.
The Northern Region includes Murmansk and
Archangel and extends south to the vicinity of Yaroslavl. The chief
importance of this area lies in the fact that it contains the ports of
Murmansk and Archangel, through which supplies reach the Soviet Union.-*
The Murmansk and Archangel-Vologda Railroads
connect these ports with cities in the interior industrial region.
There is an important rail connection between Belomorsk-Obozerskaya-
Kotlas, and supplies reaching Kotlas by way of this connection can be
transported up the Northern Dvina River to the interior of the country
during the ice-free season.
This region is not highly industrialized and
parts of it are only very sparsely settled. Its chief natural resources
are timber, fisheries, and the apatite deposits of the Kola Peninsula.
The locations of the main industries'and power stations are listed
below. Chief industries. Murmansk Kandalaksha Kirovsk Archangel ArchangelVologda Railroad Mezen Fisheries Sawmills Sawmills Canneries Apatite mines Sawmills Fisheries Sawmills Sawmills Fisheries
- 3,000 KW
- 5,000 KW
- 10,000 KW
- 50,000 KW
- 25,000 KW
- 3,000 KW
- 25,000 KW
- 25,000 KW
65 -1^6,000 KW
- 41 -
; - ; *
Vyksum,
near Gorki---Pipe steel mill Total These plants account for about one-half the Region which produced 1,1+35,000 metric tons mills in the central industrial area to the those at Tula, have, of course, either "been or partially evacuated.
Remarks
Moscow
Vlfrtu
!! , I
th
.
V , s '.'/. J 1.1 -?>
' - "
' / M \
- 42
Two refineries
Two refineries-
IP
ft .-V3 =I-J
i^gj y
Texfriles;
Location Moscow IvanoveNoginskProduct -Textiles including one
silk mill
-Textile s -Textiles
Power stations in the Moscow Central Region:
Location Source of power Capacity
-300 - 400,000 KV7"
50 200 25 10 50 100,000 KW
300,000 KW
50,000 KfT
St 25,000 KW
100,000 M
Remarks
100 200 25 25 10 -
200,000 KW
300,000 KW
50,000 KW
50,000 KVY
25,000 KW
995-1, 600,000 KW
Ammunition and Materiel;
Remarks Probably same a s chemi c a l plant above Some of these have doubtless been evacuated Evacuated?
- 44
V
;
/.
Location Vladimir
Remarks Evacuated ?
KovroY 2 arms factories Yaroslavl 1 tank factory Gorki 1 1 1 1 arms factory, 1 munitions factory tank factory airplane factory airplane factory
Penza
Volga Region. The Volga Region is here con sidered to include the region below the Moscow district as far south as
Rostov and as far east as Kuibyshev and the Ural River. The Volga River
and the railroad connections with the Caucasus are the important trans portation links. The principle industrial establishments may be listed
as follows:
Steel: 1,232,000 metric tons (1937). The bulk
of this production is accounted for by the Red October special steel
plant in Stalingrad which produced 7^.* 652 metric tons of steel in 1938.
Vehicles:
Location Stalingrad Type of products Tractor factory Heavy truck factory
Miscellaneous Industries
Saratov 2 oil refineries One Universal
refining and
cracking plant,
one "Polymerization
plant producirg
85 octane gas.
Remarks
U,000 tractors (1933)
Location Kazan
Power plants: Location Ulyanovsk Saratov Stalingrad Astrakhan Total Source of power Oil Coal Coal Oil Capacity 3 25 5,000 KW 50,000 KW
Ulyanovsk Stalingrad
Ammunition factory
Poison gas factory Tank factory Possibly identical
with the chlorine
plant listed
above
Saratov
Part of an airplane
factory which was dismantled
and shipped from Moscow.
- 46
^SfFi l!
Petroleum. Refineries: At present the percent age of total crude oil processed " y the Caucasian refineries is between
b 70 and 80$. The Caucasian refineries are listed as follows:
Location Number of refineries Percentage of refined products Remarks
Baku
Ik *
63.8 (193*0
31.1 (193*0
Leads in production
of gasoline; ^hird in
production of lubri cating oil.
k Foster-wheeler
6 Alco
3 Winkler Koch
1 Miller dewaxing
plant producing an
estimated ^3-53,0 0
tons of high grsde
>tfrm
refineries
Percentage of refined
products
Eemarks
55
- 48
1'ffin t.
Ml i.
in even worse condition at about the same time, and Soviet officials had
asked the advice of American experts on avoiding widespread fires in the
fields and town in case of bombing.
Petroleum pipelines. The Caucasus in 19^0 con tained about 70$ of the total length of pipeline in the country. Gener ally the pipelines parallel the railroads. The most important ones are
listed below:
Table IVt From - To Annual traffic Pipelines in the Caucasus.
Length No. pumping Date of Type of stations completion oil carried
Diameter
10"
13 16
1930
1906 192U 1928 1930 193^
885,000
Grozny Makhach Kala
600,000
8" 8"
10"
38^
8"
12".
67
303
Mangane s e : Next in importance to the Caucasian oil fields are the manganese mines at Chiatura in the Georgian Republic.
The mines, containing some of the world's finest manganese, are modern
and are equipped with concentrating machinery. In 1937, 1,650,000
metric tons of Mi-52$ are were produced by the Chiatura deposits. At
present, the location of the mines is a great disadvantage because of
the long railroad haul from the deposits in the southwestern Caucasus
to the steel mills of the Urals and west Siberia.
Copper: In 1937, the Alaverdi mines in north west Armenia and the Zangezur mines at Kafan in southeast Armenia pro duced about &fo of the copper mined in the Soviet Union, with a combined
output of around ^,000 tons.
'i.H.
Coal fields; The Caucasian coal fields pro duced slightly over ^,000,000 tons of coal in 1938, or about 0.3$ of
the country's total output. These fields are located as follows
North Caucasus
Khumara - Ordzhonikidze Krai
Mikoyan Shakhar - "
Akhmara - Georgian Republic
Transcaucasus
Akhmara - Georgian Republic
Tkvikbuli - " "
Steel: The steel production of the Caucasus
is very small. Official figures for 1937 for the "Southern Raiony"
which do not separate the North Caucasus and Crimea are 826,200 metric
tons, plus 600 metric tons for the Georgian Republic making a total of
826,800 metric tons. There are iron ore deposits at Chiragidzor near
Yukhary-Dashkesan, 180 mi. west of Baku, Azerbaidzhan Republic, and
17,900 metric tons of steel were produced in this region in 1937 The
grand total, therefore, is something over 8^0,000 tons. A large part
of this production, however, was accounted for by the Crimean steel
plants. Small ferrous metallurgy plants are located as follows:
Krasnodar, North Caucasus
Novorossisk, " " Tuapse, " " Sochi, There is also a ferro-alloy plant at Zestafoni
in Georgia, with a capacity of 60,000 tons annually.
Lead and zinc, mines: The Sadon mines, one
of the oldest lead-zinc districts in Russia, are located in the North
Caucasus, 25 miles southwest of Ordzhonikidzet Ore from the mines is
shipped to the Ordzhonikidze plant for treatment, listed under Indus tries. These mines produce an estimated 20$ of the Soviet Union's lead
and zinc Exact figures on lead production at the Sadon mines during
recent years are not available. The capacity of the Ordzhonikidze
zinc plant is 15,000 tons, but it is doubtful if it is working at this
level.
Other minerals: The North Caucasus contains
scattered deposits of platinum, molybdenum, chromite, and gold. Pro duction, if any, at ouch deposits is very small and figures on output
are not available.
- 50
10-25,000 kw
- I
Source of power
Capacity 1-3,000 kw
Remarks
Oil
Hydroelectric Oil
Hydroelectric
Oil
Hydroelectric
1+6,000 kw
100-200,000 kw Under construc-
tion in 1938.
10-25,000 kw
5-10,000 kw
531,000-1,10^,000
- 52
'4 W -'!';' ' ', ; ii,
;*/
Grain elevators
Krasnodar
Synthetic rubber
Kutaisi
Baku
Lithapone plant*
Textiles
Iodine and "bromine
extraction.
Helium extraction.
Fish canneries
Baku, Vicinity of
Caspian seacoast
Astrakhan
Fish canneries
Cotton textiles
Chapayev (Guryev)
Yerevan
Fish canneries
Synthetic rubber
Output 10,000 tons
(1935)
- 53
Remarks Experimental plant for the use of "by-products of oil, coal, and natural gas. Under construction. 70,500 spindles in
FREIGHT
TURNOVER, 1935
5,062,000** 1,21*1,000 1,507,000 2,502,000
*The Black Sea and Caspian merchant fleets are discussed under (2Xd).
**Normally the chief freight handled is oil.
^Largest turnover of any port in the Soviet Union; the freight, how ever, consists mainly of oil; oil also is the most important item in
the trad of Makhach Kala and Astrakhan.
Remarks
Copper
95
Yes
95 - 100
Yes
7 0 - 8 0 (?) Urals
Yes
Urals bauxite de posits are higher grade than the Tikhvin deposits near Leningrad. Urals manganese needs elaborate treatment "because of the high phosphe roid content.
Manganese
10 (1)
Urals, Siberia
Yes
Chromite
100
Urals
Yes
Russia one of
world's greatest
producers.
Coal
25 - 30
Siberia; Centr
Urals
Urals
Magnesite
100
Yes
Russia one of
world's greatest
producers
Platinum
100
Urals, Siberia
Most of the Russian
tin production comes
from eastern Siberia
*Nickel
Mercury
90 (7)
*Molybdenum
50 (?
Soviet molybdenum
resources insuf ficient.
Soviet tungsten
resources small.
Soviet vanadium
mostly imported.
*Tungsten
*Vanadium
60 ? 60 ?
Urals
Siberia
Mica
- 57
?
1
?
Yes Other deposits
occur in
Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan
100 100
Yes
Yes
Kola Peninsula
nepheline de posits furnish
the "bulk of
Russian phos phate production;
deposits of phos phate reported in
Central Asia.
Salt
Urals
Yes
- 58
Iron Ore.
Iron ore production in 1937 was as follows:
Chelyabinsk Ob last (including Magnitogorsk)
Sverdlovsk Oblast Chkalov Oblast Total - Urals Bashkir Republic Total - Urals and Bashkir Republic
7,152,200 metric tons
1,2^7,500
8^,600
,300
176,UOO
8,661,-700 metric tons
- 59
Location
Type of
products
Cast iron
Rolled iron
Steel
Remarks
Magnitogorsk
Chusovoi
(near Molotov)
Sverdlovsk
Iron
Iron alloys
Iron
Steel
Nadezhdinsk
Special
steel
Special
steel
Steel
Iron
Steel
Ferro-alloys
Zlatoust
(Zlatoustovsk plant)
Bakal
Orsk,
southern Urals
Belorets,
Bashkir Republic
Ferrous
metallurgy
IMP? AWSH
- 60
> $
- 61
65 75
Varying 3O/o 90-95
t'i"';'
TABLE VIII
URAL - VOLGA REFINERIES
Location
Type
Production
Remarks
Bashkirskoe
Refinery
(near Kuibyshev)
Syzran
Refinery
Volga fields To be completed in 1940; present status unknown. Emba fields (by pipe lines ) Ishimbayevo fie Ids First section r e ported i n opera tion in the early part of 194-0. Reported under construction in 1940. 1
Orsk
>terlitamak
Ishimbayevo
Refinery
Chusovoi
tolotov
Puimazy
Typo
Production
Source of crude
Remarks
Alco plant
20$ yield of 75 oc- Ishimbayevo tane = 80,000 tons. fields 30$ y i e l d of 65 oc tane fta 120,000 tons. Unknown Possible: annual capacity i n 7O,5SO tons of gas per y.^ar of which 30$ i s 90-95 oc tane 21,000 tons. Actual; 12,000 tons of 85-90 in 1940 (See also remarks) Ishimbayevo fields Gas to be furnished by 1. Ufa poly merization plant. 2. Saratov polymeriza tion. 3. Grozny polymeriza tion. Ishimbayevo fields Produces 85 octane gas Theoretically when the Grozny Saratov, and Ufa polymer ization plants furnish the planned amounts of 85 oc tane, this hydro genation plant can furnish 40-50,000 tons of 90-95 oc tane a year. Scheduled to open in 1940.
(2)
CD
- " * * ) *
(3)
Lummus plant
1,000,000 (crude)
Estimated: a 158,000 tons of 75 octane gas annually. b 240,000 tons of 65 _ octane gas annually.
Bauxite
Chromite
Copper
- 66
Metal or Mineral
Cryolite
(artificial)
TABlft IX Continued
Location
Plants at Polevskoi,
(30 mi. southwest of
Sverdlovsk); Revda
(under construction)
(28 mi. west of Sverd lovsk) .
Remarks
Fluorspar for arti ficial cryolite comes
from Amderma; capacity
4,500 tons.
Gold
Magnesite
Manganese
Chief deposits:
Qrsk-Kalilovo,
(30 mi. W of Qrsk),
and Marsyata (35 mi.
N of Serov.)
Deposit reported in
Upper Rezh River
Valley ( 5 mi. N of
^ Sverdlovsk).
Deposits on the
Kama River
Serov
Mercury
Mica
Production, if any,
very small.
Production very small
Molybdenum
- 67
Metal or Mineral
Nickel
TABLE IX Continued.
Location
Verkhne-Ufalei,
Rezh, Khalilovo,
Orsk (under con struction.
Deposits reported
northwest of Rezh
and in the Emba
River Valley.
Five platinum
bearing areas
Remarks
Production very small.
Phosphorites
Production, if any,
unknown.
Platinum
Potash
Solikamsk
Pyrites
Silver
Sulphur
Tin
Tungsten
Vanadium
- 68
TABLE X
POWER STATIONS IN-THE URALS
The most important electric power stations in the Urals (including Kazan, and Kuibyshev) are
as follows:
City Kuibyshev Kazan Berezniki Krasnokamsk
(25 mi. west of Molotov) Source of power Coal Coal Coal Coal Capacity 10 - 25,000 M (1938)
Remarks
25 - 50,000 KW (1938)
50 -100,000 KW (1938)
50 -100,000 KW (1938)
50 -100,000 KW (1938) 10 - 25,000 KW" (1938)
10 - 25,000 KW (1938)
10 - 25,000 KW (1938)
49,000 KW (1938) Unknown Undergoing enlargement
in 1939,
Station attached to
Novo-Tagil iron and
steel plant.
JJLIJi
Coal
Coal Coal Mixed fuel Coal Unknown
Kirovgrad (Kalata)
Coal
10 - 25,000 KW (1938)
(Continued) City Solikamsk Molotov Sredneuralsk (15 mi. north of Sverdlovsk, "Surges," Central Urals Electric Station) Sverdlovsk Berezovski (8 mi. northeast'of Sverdlovsk) Pervouralsk (25 mi. west of Sverdlovsk)
TABLE X
POWER STATIONS IN THE URALS
5,- 10,000 KW (1938) 100,000 KW (1939) Largest station in Urals and one of the largest in Soviet Union.
5 - 10,000 KW (1938) 10 - 25,000 KW (1938) 125,000 KW (1938) Attached to the alum inum plant. Under going enlargement.
Lignite Coal
100 -200,000 KW (1938) 10 - 25,000 KW (1938) Probably attached to the magnesite plant.
Coal
5 - 10,000 KW (1938)
(Continued) City Asha Magnitogorsk Orsk Chkalov (Orenburg) Ufa Ishimbai Belorotsk
i
TABLE X
POWER STATIONS IN THE URALS
Capacity 5 - 10,000 KW (1938 ) 100-200,000 KW (1938) 25,000 KW (1938) 3 5,000 KW (1938) Remarks
Source of power Coal Coal Coal Mixed fuels Petroleum Petroleum Coal
-a
TOTAL:
818,000 - 1,374,000 KW
"t"?
Sverdlovsk Electrical machinery (Ural Machine Heavy Machinery Plant or "Ural mash") Machine tools
Ufa
Chelyabinsk
Internal combustion
motors
Machine tools
Railroad equipment, trucks, etc-
Tractors
Car-"building 5^,000 freight,
tank and re frigerator car's
of 50-ton capacity
each
Orsk Eefineries
Miscellaneous industries -
Krasnovishersk (60 mi. N of Solikamsk)
Paper and pulp 23,600 tons
of paper
- 72
Location
Remarks
Krasnokamsk
Paper mill
(30 mi W of Molotov)
Ufa
Lysva (50 mi E of
Molotov)
Orsk
Chemical plants Location
Kazan
Woodworking
mills
Tinplate plant
Meat packing
Type of
product
Powder
Sulphuric acid
Nitric acid
Synthetic rubber
(divinyl)
Potash
Metallic magnesium
Fertilizers (incl.
ammonia)
War chemicals
Nitrogen fixation
Sulphuric acid
Soda
Coke-chemical plant
2,000,000 metric tons
Raw materials;
coal, salt,
30,000 metric tons potash,
57,toO " " limestone,
phosphor ites.
Attached to
Novo-Tagil
Iron and
Steel Plant.
50,000 metric
tons (non military)
Attached to
Magnitogorsk
Iron and
Steel Plant.
Production or capacity
Remarks
Solikamsk
Berezniki
Nizhni Tagil
Sverdlovsk
Hydrocyanic acid
Sodium
Coke-chemical plant
Magnitogorsk
73 ~
Production or
capacity
Remarks
Kazan
Berezniki
1 ammunition factory
1 arms factory
1 ammunition factory
1 plane factory
1 ammunition factory
1 arms factory
- 74
TABLE XI Continued.
Zlatoust Chelyabinsk Z arms factories 1 tank factory; greatly expanded with machinery evacuated from Kharkov. 1 tractor factory now converted to tanks annual capacity of 40,000 tractors. 1 airplane factory
Ufa
This list does not include factories which have been evacuated since the outbreak of Russo-German hostilities.
West Siberia. The industrial center of West
Siberia is the city of Stalinsk in the Kuznetsk Basin. The steel plant
at Stalinsk, working on coal from the Kuznetsk Basin and the iron ore
of the Gornaya Shoriya mines, produced 1,600,000 tons of steel in
1937, and 530,700 tons of special steel in 1938.
The Kuznetsk Basin contains coal of varied
types. Its production in 1937 amounted to 17,800,000 tons, dropping
to about 16,800,000 tons in 1938. In 1940, about 2,000,000 tons of
Kuznetsk coal were still shipped annually to the Urals. These ship ments are declining, due to the increasing amounts of coal now mined
in the Urals or sent from Karaganda.
The enormous deposit of anthracite at
Cheremkhovo, on the Trans-Siberian northwest of Irkutsk, supplies the
railroad. It produced more than 3,000,000 metric tons of coal in 1936,
There is also a coal field at Chernogorsk which is the chief source of
coal for the Abakan-Minusinsk region. Its production vras over half a
million metric tons in 1939.
Locomotive repair shops to serve the Trans-
Siberian Railroad are located in Omsk and Irkutsk.
A recent industrial development is the build ing of textile mills to work on Central Asian cotton.
This region also contains large resources of
timber, mostly-coniferous, along the Yenisei and Angara Rivers.
- 75
1938.
Gornaya Shoriya
(150 miles
south of
Stalinsk)
Novosibirsk
Iron ore
Metal working
Unknown
Stalinsk
76
(1956)
500,000 tons
Manganese
Planned exploita tion to serve Kuznetsk steel plants; actual production unknown,
2. Electric Power Stations. The present combined capacity of the main West Siberian power stations may "be set at around 500,000 KW. These
stations are listed "below:
Location Novosibirsk (a) Kemerovo Stalinsk Omsk Irkutsk Combined capacity: Source of power Coal Coal Coal Coal Coal Coal Capacity
50-100,000 KW
Unknown
50-100,000 KW
100-200,000 KW
10-25,000 KW
10-25,000 KW
220-550,000 KW
5. Chemicals. Stalinsk - Coke-chemical plant attached to the metal lurgical plant, capacity unknown.
Kemerovo - Chemical combinat comprising:
(1) (2) (5) (k) sulphuric acid plant
fertilizer plant, including nitrogen fixation.
coal liquefaction plant
coking plant producing "benzol and hydrogen
as ly-products.
- 77
Stalinsk
Irkutsk
5. Textile plants.
These mills obtain their cotton from the Central
Asian republics.
Novosibirsk
Barnaul
Belovo
Stalinsk
Prokopyevsk
Kemerovo
Krasnoyarsk
6. Cotton prints and
satins
Spinning and weaving mill
Cotton textiles
(planned in
Cotton Textiles
Dress goods
Textiles - (cotton?)
About 28 million
yards yearly.
Capacity unknown
Planned in 19^0
Planned in 19^0
Novosibirsk
Irkutsk
Omsk
Tomsk
fi!
- 79
Table XIII;
Bismuth from local Andrasman, deposits Tadzhikistan (70 mi. southeast of Tashkent) Balkhash, eastern Kazakhstan (on Lake Balkhash) Dzhezkazgan, Central Kazakhstan (also desig nated as Kar*salpai plant) Almalyk (50 mi. south of Tashkent), Uzbekistan Ridder, northeastern Kazakhstan Copper; ore comes from Kounrad deposit (15 mi* north of Balkhash)
Under construction for more than 10 years; exact oper ating status unknown; first metal produced in 1939.
Copper
Deposits at Karsakpai (a) Small works said to be the best (b) Kombinat in the Soviet Union* still under cons, in
Copper
Unknown
Remarks
Works on ores from
the Takeli, Achi-Sai
and Kan-Sai mines.
Coal
(Bituminous)
Large resources of
good quality coking
coal shipped to
Magnitogorsk and
other Ural metallur gical centers.
Capable of supplying
local needs.
Capable of supplying
local needs; some
mines not yet devel oped.
Supplies Aktyubinsk
0blast
Newly developed mine.
Coal
(Lignite)
Coal
11*3,000
metric tons
(1937)
Unknovn
Coal
Unknovn
Coal
100,000
metric tons
(plan) 19^0
Unknovn
Gold (contained in
lead ores.)
Petroleum
(a) Emba River fields,
Kazakhstan
Dos-sor, Makat,
Baichunas,
Iskine,
Koshchagyl
652,000 m.t.
(1938)
Capacity of
individual
fields un known
Unknown
Unknown
Changyrtash, Petroleum
Kirghizia (east
extremity of
Fergana Valley)
Kara-BogazGol Bay, Caspian Sea
Sodium and other
salts
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
- 83
XIII Continued^
Capacity or
production
Type of installatiqn
Sulphur
1,000 metric
tons
Remarks
Sulphur
1,500 metric
tons
1,500 metric
tons
2.
Hydroelectric
(Ulba River)
50-100,000 KW
Coal
Hydroelectric
1 1
3-5,000 KW
168,000 KW
total capac ity of the
project
Undergoing enlarge^
ment in 1939
2 turbo generators
installed at Komsomol
in 19*U' other 2
stations yet to be
constructed.
Supplies power to the
bismuth concentrating
plant.
Andrasman, Tadzhikistan
Petroleum
100-300 KW
- 84
w Jfl1
Location
Remarks
10-25,000 KW
10-25,000 KW
10-25,000 KW
Undergoing enlarge ment - 1939.
Undergoing enlarge ment - 1939.
Coal
Hydroelectric
and steam
Hydroelectric
10-25.000 KW
10-25,000 KW
10-25,000 KW
Kuva - Sai,
Coal
Uzbekistan (Fergana
Valley)
Total
10-25,000 KW
138-315,000 KW
3.
Chemicals
Type of Product
Capacity or
Production
Remarks
Ready for operation
at beginning of
Location
Chirchik,
Uzbekistan
Aktyubinsk
Unknown
Synthetic
Nitrogen and
nitrate fertilizer
Chemicals Unknown
- 85
\ ^ V'-F^
Unknown; Receive crude from Cheleken probably small Island and Nefte-Dag.
Miscellaneous Industries:
Type of Installation Capacity or Production
- 86
labor shortage, the time element, bad living conditions, and a possible
breakdown of the transport system.
Increased output due to evacuation. It is
estimated that in spite of the heavy losses due to exposure and break age suffered by machinery in the process of removal, industries evacu ated to the east by the Soviets have raised production in the unoccupied
regions generally as much as 10$. Some stocks were also removed, as
well as highly skilled personnel and their families. The general policy
was to preserve machine-building equipment, complicated dies and labor saving devices and other specialized equipment. Aircraft and munitions
plants were also evacuated, as well as portions of some steel plants
and the Zaparozhe aluminum and magnesium combine. Factories making
electrical equipment were sent to the Urals, and some aircraft ammuni tion and gasoline motor parts, sent to the Volga regions were producing
by the fall of ^
Soviet claims of increased production during
recent months. Soviet claims of increased production during recent
months tend to exaggeration and should be regarded with considerable
reserve. However, increases have been achieved in some fields during
the past winter and spring.
It is estimated that if Lend-Lease aid is
included, Eussian pre-war production of purely military supplies has
been maintained. The Caucasian refineries are now producing large
quantities of 85 octane gasoline, which with the addition of tetraethyl
lead and other agents imported from the United States, can be boosted
to higher octane for military use. In addition, efforts are being
made to open new oil and gas wells, and during 19^1 the United States
shipped $5,650,000 worth of petroleum and gas-well drilling apparatus
and parts to Russia. The Zlatoust and Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel
Works are reported to be making special steels almost exclusively, and
if any substantial increase in special steel output can be made, it.will
serve to cut down imports of this critical material. Coal output has
been stepped up to a small extent in the Urals, Central Asia, and Siberia.
Allegedly, production of electrical equipment has been stepped up kO<f>
in the Urals, due to evacuation and expansion of old factories. Efforts
have been made to increase the production of textiles and chemicals,
but information on results is not available.
The reasons for these increases are the
pressure exerted on the workers, longer hours, and perhaps improved
organization leading to greater efficiency. There have also been re ports that personnel in some important factories get better food, receiv ing hot meals at the plant. Some of the increases claimed for the
mines and metallurgical plants during the late spring were probably-
seasonal, since in winter the extreme cold interferes with their
operation.
Expansion of output of natural resources. A
moderate increase in the present output of the following minerals is
considered feasible during the next six months:
Iron and steel Copper Lead and zinc Coal Petroleum Aluminum
- 88
- 89
- 90
around and north of Moscow, and in cotton growing districts, principal ly in Uzbekistan, and 120 days in other regions. Drastic penalties
are provided in case of failure to comply with these decrees.*
Extension of sown area. According to recent
reports, the sown area has "been increased " y some 6,500,000 acres of
b which about 5 million were sown to winter crops. This acreage was dis tributed as follows:
Urals and Volga region - 1,500,000 acres
Kazakhstan - 1,000,000 "
+ Siberia - 1 , 000,000 "
Total 6,500,000
177
89
- 91
- 93
TABLE XIV
AGRICULTURE - NORTHERN REGION
A. Sawn Areas, 1938 * *
REGION WINTER WHEAT SPRING WHEAT WINTER RYE SPRING BARLEY OATS POTATOES VEGETABLES LEGUMES FLAX FOR FIBER FORAGE CROPS
to
74-0 4-90 Murmansk* 5,930 Karelian 1,980 7,170 31,880 15,320 39,040 21,250 2,220 4,940 490 22,490 ASSR Vologda 34,350 267,370 610,090 269,340 649,380 178,500 18,290 85,500 216,210 310,600 Arkhan gelsk 9,880 89,450 233,020 194,960 228,810 77,100 7,170 36,820 62,780 76,110 490 9,390 45,470 52,880 30,390 26,190 3,710 3,950 12,600 Komi ASSR
TOTAL
B.
REGION Murmansk HORSES
5,100
38,900 222,200
6,900
87,900
139,500 54,400
460,100
13,600 68,300
390,200
274,600
99,900
846,600
In thousands., of-head
TABLE XV AGRICULTURE CENTRAL REGION * A. Sown Areas, 1938 *# WIN TER RYE 12,216 H N SPRING SPRING TER V/HEAT BARLEY WHEAT 2,817 7,6U 1,143 OATS BUCK- M I L - POTA VEGE TOES TABLES WHEAT LET 674 1,693 4,014 494 LEFLAX SUNGUMES FLOWER FIBER SEED 1,559 1,083 1,078 FORAGE CROPS 5,608
1,793
#*-
I n thousands of a c r e s . B.
Live Stocky 1938
HOGS 2,867 SHEEP AND GOATS' 7,158
HORSES 2,063
CATTLE 5,323
Oblast
Kirov Oblast Tambov " Voronezh " Mari ASSR Mordovian " Udmurt "
TABLE XVI
AGRICULTURE - MIDDLE AND LOWER VOLGA REGION
A. Sown Areas, 1938 *
REGION WINTER
RYE SPRING WHEAT OATS SPRING BARLEY
SUN
FLOWER SEED
POTA
TOES
VEGE TABLES
LE GUMES
300
OTHER CROPS
TOTAL
Kuiby shev
2,195
1,047 171 1,454 71 725 319 385 669 101 209 3,712 1,439
357
449 152
121
46 36 39 50
Tatar
Saratov Stalin grad German
Volga
1
2,494
1,732 2,052 664
9,137
623 229 14 16
1,182
45
1,124
U
185
TOTAL
1,513
7,432
B.
REGION Kuibyshev HORSES 233 329 116 180
246
310 119 258
1,361 1,338
986 1,401
291
34
892
3,228
5,377
In thousands of head.
TABLE XVII
AGRICULTURE - NORTH CAUCASUS AND TRANSCAUCASUS
A. Sown Areas, 1938 ##
REGION N o r t h Caucasus T r a n s c auca su s TOTAL WINTER SPRING WHEAT WHEAT OATS WINTER WINTER RYE BARLEY ls 489 SPRING CORN BARLEY RICE POTA VEGE MELONS LE* TOES TABLES GUMES
2,988 520
52
1,410 34
714 477
362 78 440
354 46 400
100
97 197
3,508 1, 541
1,444 1 , 1 9 1
CO
REGION
CASTOR BEAN
SUN
FLOWER SEED 1,819 54 1,873
TOBACCO
COTTON
TOTAL
391 391
67 72
139
524 530
1,054
225
1 ,546
The North Caucasus here embraces the Rostov Oblast, the Kalmyk ASSR, the Krasnodar and Ordzhonikidze Krais, the Kabardino-Balkar, North -Osetian,'Checheno-Ingush and Dagestan ASSR and the Karachai Autonomous Oblast, The Transcaucasus embraces the Georgian, Azerbaidzhan and Armenian S.S. Republics.
- - - In thousands of acres. xx
TABLE XVII
HOGS
In thousands of head.
*See p. 53
- 100
TABLE XVIII
AGRICULTURE - URAL REGION
A. Sown Areas, 1938 x
999
461
2,047
1,397
911
5,815
7a
186 81
25 26 43 24
108 119
255 29 251 762
a
159
12,431 6,015
695 1,107
B. REGION Molotov (Perm) HORSES 198 187 459 190 262 1,296
Live S t o c k , 1938 **
CATTLE HOGS 288 261 SHEEP AND GOATS
TABLE XIX
AGRICULTURE - SIBERIA
(West of Lake Baikal)
A, Sown Areas, 1938
REGION WINTER SHIING RYE WHEAT OATS SHIING SUN BARLEY FL01ER SEED 273 190 112 217 105 POTA TOES VEGE TABLES LEGUMES OTHER CROPS TOTAL
Altai
Krasnoyarsk Irkutsk
o
CO
TOTAL
81 13 243 3
31 53 33 25 13 155
173 39 20 17 22 271
897 340
B.
REGION Omsk
HORSES
2,103
* *
**<*%
932,k9k
22 80
67,506
120,138
Total
1,120,138
- 103 r
WINTER RYE
SPRING WHEAT
OATS
POTA TOES
VEGE TABLES
TOTAL
495
1 496
8,039 x 1,403
120
1, 427
2 2 207 1 , 638
I
sitrr^
Tadzhik Kirghiz
TOTAL 1 2 3
658
701 10,921
2
369
1 ___ 1
252 49
4
20
50 51 9
11
7 378
31 356
9 130
13 3,552 15, 089 26 4,859 6, 999 8 824 1, 013 992 47 I t 976 6 2, 524, 100 1 1 , 3 3 0 27, 6011
In addition, 383,000 a c r e s were under winter wheat. In addition , 2 , 0 4 5 , 0 0 0 a c r e s were under w i n t e r w h e a t . In addition , 277,000 a c r e s were under winter barley. B. REGION HORSES
1
SHEEP AND GOATS
639 381
64
102
3,095 1,411
233 500 486
368 76 23
21
5, 288 3, 980
1, 831 1, 635 1, 886 14, 620
Kirghiz
TOTAL
362 1,548
91 579
5,725
In thousands of acres.
In thousands of head.
23
96
sunk since April 28.
357,81*9
186,000 173,257
219
1^,257
- 105
8
66
5
11
100
General operating conditions. Age; Approxi mately one-half of the Soviet merchant marine is obsolescent, consist ing of ships built before 1921. A little less than 2% of the total
number of ships was built between 1928 and 1932.
Condition. In general, the condition of
Soviet ships is poor. In 1938, only 21$ of Soviet ships met the
country's requirements for the safety of ship and cargo. Ships wear
out rapidly and often suffer from serious technical defects. Repairs
are haphazard and often take an inordinate amount of time. In addition,
ships go long periods without proper overhauling and drydocking, there by greatly lowering their speed and efficiency.
Operation. Operation of Soviet ships is
very inefficient. The average speed is slow, and standing time in
both the tanker and dry cargo fleets is excessive. Frequent ship wrecks are mostly the result of a lack of discipline and complete
disregard of navigation rules. Passenger and cargo service are both
poor. In addition, it is the regular practice to overload ships.
- 106
- 107
- 108
UNCLAS
- 109
- 110
- Ill
mm
Mai
( ^
- 1X3
2.
IT) Army.
See Map 8.
- uk
Table I
Order of
Battle
Sector 1.
Units
Div.*
Men
662,000
50;000
6,600
3, 500
8,000
13,000
81,100
Ul0,000
25,600
17.500
1^,000
16,000
98,200
581,300
1,370,000
8^0,000
66,000
i)-2,000
8^,000
60,000
278,000
1,370,000
Tanks
Planes . 950
Northern:
Murmans k- R ims koye
Infantry**
Cavalry-
Tank (Brig
.)*#* Air
Overhead
Total
Pudozh-Kalinin
Infantry
Cavalry
Tank (Brig
.) Motorized
Air
Overhead
Total
62
950
1
i
2
8 5
.
in
k
5
800
55.5
127
6k0
800 1950
6k0
21+00
2.
Central;
Klin-Stalinogorsk
Infantry
Cavalry
Tank (Brig
.) Motorized
Air
Overhead
Total
Qk
10
12
12
1950 2^00
15
127
1950
21+00
Note: Totals of men, planes, and tanks in the various sectors and
Western Front are given in round numbers.
- 115
Order of Battle
Units
Div.*
Men
1,100,000** 200,000 52,800
^2,000 70,000
20,000 76,000 1+60,800 210,000 52,800
21,000 1+2,000 20;000 38,000 383,800
Tanks
Planes
113
20
3100*** 1760**
8
12 10
1900
Air
5
^9
21
800
1900
800
8 6
6 5
900
800 900 800
Air
Overhead Total
Caucasus
Infantry Cavalry
Tank (Brig.)
*
O
16
2 1
21
160,000
19,800
7,000
l+,000
Air
Overhead Total h. Grand Total: Western Front Ground Air
160
5000
270 32
For purposes of computation, tank "brigades are figured at two to a tank division. ** Less 155,000 losses in Kerch and Kharkov.
*** Less 700 lost in Kerch and Kharkov.
**** Less 600 lost in Kerch and
W"1
*
116
Table I
Order of Battle
(continued)
Sector Units(Divs.) No, 5In training,
Communications Zone 55 Infantry,
Tank, etc.
6. Far East InfantryTank, etc.
50
Men 550,000
Tanks Planes
500,000
1*, 150,000
7.
6,000,000
(b) Organization. The operation of the high com mand and the General Staff of the U.S.S.R. is characterized by three
factors: authority through personal prestige as well as law; extreme
duplication of personnel in key positions, and fluid, temporary organi zations for specific purposes. The available data indicate confused,
overlapping channels of command and communication.
Since July 20, 19^1, Stalin has held all the
key civil and military positions. Simultaneously, he is the chairman of
the following party agencies: the Revision Commission, the Secretariat
of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, the Organization Bureau,
the Supreme Military Council (Red Army), the Supreme Naval Council, and
the Control Bureau (N.K.V.D.). He is also a member of the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., Prime Minister and Commissar for
Defense.
Below Stalin is a maze of superior councils
the Political Bureau, the Supreme Military and
of national defense: Naval Councils, the Soviet of People1s Commissars, the Committee for
Defenses, the Supreme Economic Council, etc. The great overlapping
of personnel and of functions, and the rivalry for power create indeci sion, confusion and unwillingness to take responsibility.
Theoretically, the Commissariat for Defense
(War Department) is only one of several equivalent administrations Navy, Aviation Industry, Armament, Mortars, Shipbuilding, etc. Nor mally, however, although policies are formulated by the thirteen members
of the Supreme Council for the Army, the Commissariat for Defense
executes all military affairs. It consists of the Commissar, 1^ Assist ant Commissars, one of whom is Political Commissar and 9 are generals;
the General Staff and 20 Administrations. The General Staff includes
the Chief of Staff (Marshal Shapoahnikov), a Deputy (Political)
- 117
1 f ? ^ ,
- 118
- 119
Navy.
(a) The estimated personnel strength of the Soviet
Navy as of June 1, 19^1, was 8,000 officers, 67,000 men and from 45,000
to 50,000 trained reserves.
The estimated materiel strength as of June 1,
194l, was as follows: 3 battleships, 23,000 ton, 12-12", 10-4.7",
6-4.1" E.A., 3-4" A.A., 4-3" H.A., 2-1.5" A.A.; 9 cruisers, 8,000 ton
and 7,200 ton, 9-7-1", 6-3.9", 4-1.46" A.A. or 11-5.1", 5-4.1",
7-3.1" H.A., 2 Vickers A.A., 6m A.A.; 6 destroyer leaders, 2,900 ton,
6-5.1", 6-1.81" A.A., 6-0.5m A.A., or 5-5.1" H.A.; 2-3", 2-1.1+6" A.A.;
38 destroyers, 1300-1700 ton, some I*-5.1", 2-3", 2-1.46" A.A., some
5-4" H.S., 2-3" H.A., others 4-4", 2-3" H.A.; 49 old destroyers,
800 ton, 2-4", 3-3" H.A.; 257 8ubmarines, 200-1200 ton, from 2-3.9",
2 smaller, to 1-1.46" or 1-1.81".
The following chart shows (a) the fleet organ ization and distribution as of June 1, 1941, with (b) losses, badly
damaged or sunk as of March 1, 1942, and (c) remaining ships:
Table II Naval Forces
Baltic Fleet Northern Fleet Black Sea Fleet Pacific Fleet remainder
(2)
a
Battleships Cruisers Leaders Destroyers Destroyers, old Destroyers, small Mine layers Mine sweepers Mine trawlers Gunboats
b 2
a 1
c 1
4 4
18
3
1
5
2
3
1
2-3
67 30rO3
5
2 2
7
4 8 4
12
10
3-6 3 8 5
7 9 14
7
60
10
30
5 96
29 12
18
7
5
' A
x.'Y^
- 120
Table II
(continued)
Naval Forces
Baltic Northern
Black Sea
Fleet Fleet
Fleet
Pacific
Fleet
remain der
a
Torpedo cutters
Icebreakers
Depot-oilers
In all
Submarines - (Tonnage)
K L P D (1120) (1000) (1000) (1000)
a
100
12
23$
80
10.
5
20
50
1-2
3 "
u3*"Uu
13
6
15
3
7
7
2
9
5
k
3
15
14
25
h
3
1
12
1 2
7
6
17
Qk
S H
(700)
Shch (550)
B
A
M (188)
(600)
28 .
35
36
2
13
50
105
CVJ
Total Submarines
88
26
40
103
257
p ^v^ii.'"'"
118?
- 121
Commander Rear-Admiral Vice-Admiral Rear-Admiral Vice-Admiral Rear-Admiral Rear-Admiral A. G. Golovko V. F. Tributs F. S. Oktiabrsky I . S. Yumashev Abankin F. S. Sedelnikov
Northern Fleet Baltic Fleet Black Sea Fleet Pacific Fleet Amur River Flotilla Caspian Sea Flotilla
Khabarovsk Baku
? R.
- 122
- IZk
I 15,155
I 16
MIG 5
Total
Attack
E 5,6,10
R 2, SSS
G-V-25 (?)
Total
Bombardment,
Light
PE 5
SB 2,5
Total
Bombardment,
Medium
66 116 40 222 40
110
5
155
450
56
1500
48 1548
48
1560
150
1608
155
160 160
14
14
DB 5
Total
Bombardment,
Heavy
TB 5,5,6
Total
Seaplanes (F.B.)
Total
Miscellaneous
DC 5, etc.
Total
Grand Total
600 600
60
60
500 500
50
50
360 560 21
21
300 300 780
950 71
300 50
' 50
162
162
6756
50
Type Pursuit (fighters) Attack Observation Light Bombardment Medium Bombardment Heavy Bombardment Training Patrol Miscellaneous Totals Grand Totals (Army and Navy) Experimental Second Line Total
95^
300 1506 500 800
78
200 ' 120 578
326
5562 350
1+200-1+500
is adopted from the Germans; and failure to bring in foreign special ists due to distrust and suspicion.
Generally, the industry is ridden with
excessive centralization and is characterized by its mediocrity. Its
mediocre position has been induced largely through excessive political
interference (A. N. Tupolev, the famous aircraft designer, and other
high officials in the industry have been purged), paucity of engineer ing skill, low productivity of labor and inefficiency in planning.
Estimated production. The estimated monthly
production of service type aircraft in series appeared to have reached
an all time high during the first six months of 19I+I. This was about
372 planes per month. The most reliable source at the time reported
the bulk of production carried by seven factories:
- 126
Type Pursuit Pursuit Pursuit Light "bombers Light and long range " Long range bombers Light bombers
Monthly Production
78 77 77 78
21 20 21
372
It has been reliably reported that the average
time between major overhauls for Soviet military aircraft is 150 fly ing hours.
Engine Factories and Production. The produc * tion of military and civil airplane engines was carried on in 1 + or
more factories. As was the case of airplane factories, four out of il l-
carried the bulk of the production. The first six months in 19^1 the
principal factories are reported to have produced as follows:
Plant No. Name Location Motovilikhi Moscow* Rybinsk* Type Wright Cyclones Soviet "Liberty" Eispano-Suiza Gnome-Rhone Monthly Production
19 2k 26 29
Stalin Frunze
(?)
Baranov Bolshevik Zaporz*
(February
* B 5f
S 55
S 62 16
32 100 132
kS
kQ 6k
Aircraft normally carried on warships: (June 1, 19M.) Fleet Arctic Ocean 1 destroyer 1 depot ship Type Warship Seaplane Each
- 129
~nr
Baltic Sea 1 h 2 1 Black Sea 1 3 1 1 1 Pacific Ocean 2 1 1 2 1 Lake Onega 1 depot ship Grand Total destroyers guard ship depot ship icebreakers icebreaker 1 each 1 battleship heavy cruisers light cruiser depot ship depot ship heavy cruiser destroyers training ships depot ship 1 1 each 1 each
k 11 2 1 each 2 12 15
~w
k 1 each 3 12
77
War losses have not been included in the
above list.
(f) Seaplane Production. It is extremely doubt ful if any seaplanes are now (March, 19^+2) being produced. Soviet
land planes are easily adaptable to wheels, skis, or pontoons. Sea plane production and factories have been reported as follows:
- 130
**
Captured by Germans.
See also Replacement of Personnel.
- 131
reliability of leaders and the free support of the masses were the
foundations. Personal leadership and even personal magnetism were
essential, with control decentralized, masses small, supply minimal.
Infiltration, sabotage, subversion and propaganda played equal roles
with formal tactics. The fronts were fluid, and wide raids and attacks
from all directions constantly took place. The principal objectives
were railroad communications and cities. Improvisation of tactics,
weapons and transport was normal.
(2) Immediately after the Civil War, the
Soviets began an intensive policy of military education, even for their
former high commanders. The artillerist Frunze dominated Russian
teachings. The doctrine of a People's1 Army was established, with em phasis upon territorial rather than regular troops.
(3) With the rise of Stalin, the leadership
of Tukhachevsky and the close collaboration with the Reichswehr, a
professional army spirit developed. An enormous, highly formal, and
very competitive school system was evolved. The gap between officers
and men widened and the political commissar was relegated to a secondary
role. The composition of the army changed from three-quarters terri torial to three-quarters regular. Major changes in materiel were intro duced, with great increases in artillery, tanks and planes. There were
many experiments with new weapons, such as paratroops. The Blitzkrieg
doctrine was developed, jointly with the Germans.
This period had its culmination in the
Russian successes in Manchuria in 1937-38, when mechanization crushed
the Japanese. Major weaknesses, however, were uncovered in the
Finnish War of 1939-^0: the training of junior officers was imperfect,
and small units were badly handled; the high command was demoralized
by the purges begun in 1935> and supply difficulties arose. Mechani zation functioned poorly in winter weather.
(k) Timoshenko began to rectify the errors
of the Finnish War in 19^0. Emphasis was placed upon initiative and
upon small group training. The construction of defensive positions
was stressed. Additions were made to artillery, particularly anti tank guns.
(!>) The German War caught the Red Army in
process of reorganization, with a mixture of traditions. The theories
of the Blitzkrieg failed quickly; at no time could the Russians succeed
in envelopments. Commitments of tanks in-mass simply led to rapid
annihilation. Consequently, smaller mixed teams took their place,
with artillery support for tanks, and close coordination between air
and ground. Flexibility and adaptability to new tactics replace
standard offensive theories. German encirclements forced decentrali zation; German occupation revived guerrilla tactics, which were closely
coordinated with the operation of organized troops. Static, localized
- 132
or crossed him.
- 13U
- 135
Characteristica of Materiel.
IT] General: Soviet designers attempt to achieve the
following ends:
(a) Operational dependability under continued
adverse conditions rather than maximum peak performance.
(b) Ease of mass production with an emphasis on
a few basic types, simplicity of design, interchangeability of parts,
minimal finish of accessories and parts of secondary importance.
(c) Minimal use of rare materials, especially
inflammable ones and those subject to damage by frost, etc. Thus rubber,
felt, copper, and similar products are used sparingly, and only at
essential points.
(d) Simplicity of operation and ease of repair.
Positive mechanical actions are stressed against more efficient but
more delicate hydraulic boosters, etc.
(e) The weight of the fire power rather than the
volume is most important. High muzzle velocity is stressed for all
AA and AT guns; muzzle brakes are widely used.
(f) The maximum possible thickness of armor must
be used at all essential points.
(g) All vehicles and tanks must have a maximal
horse power/weight ratio; fuel capacities must suffice for at least
90 miles.
(2) The quality of design:
{aj Soviet experimental design has been good,
although occasionally daring and impractical. The radio-operated
mine and the rocket bomb are recent inventions. The Stormovik is a
powerful attack plane. The self-propelled armored sleigh was used
during the Finnish War of 1939-^0.
(b) In actual practice, the Russians have tended
to make intensive studies of advanced foreign models, to buy the best
of these, and to produce them in mass. Minor improvements are con stantly being attempted. Thus the tracks, turret and other parts of
the British Valentine tank have been remodeled. On the other hand, the
inadequacy of the Soviet machine-tool industry and the lack of large-
scale experimental facilities make radical changes extremely difficult:
basically, all Russian tanks are only developments of British (Bren
carrier, Carden-Lloyd, Carden-Lloyd Amphibian and Vickers) and American
(Christie) prototypes.
(c) Lend-Lease aid from the Americans and the
British has introduced a large number of new types of materiel:
notable are Hurricane and P^O fighters, and B25 and Boston bombers;
Matilda, Valentine, M3 Light and M3 Medium tanks, Bren carriers, ban tams (peeps); Boys AT rifles; 2J- ton Studebaker trucks; 1^ ton Ford,
Dodge and Chevrolet trucks.
- 136
mm
- 138
- 139
Table
Infantry Weapons
Caliber
Weight
lbs.
Max. Rn.
yds.
Article
Rifle,
Rifle, auto
Rifle, auto
(LMG)-x-
i l- 1
Make-Type
Year
MM.
7.62
7*62
7*62
7,62
7.62
M.V
f.p.s.
Feed
Rds.
Mossin-Nagant
1891/30
1936
1938
9.35
8.69
20.7
2,200
2,820
2,770
Clip 5
AVS
Degtyarev
3,025
2,025
Drum 47
o
i
Carbine
MG, heavy
Wtf sub.
Mortars, trench
Mortars, trench
Mortars, trench
Stokes-Brandt
Stokes-Brandt
Maxim
Bergman
1910
1909/10
7,26
39,6
1. 0 1
25.3
2,200
5,500
2,640
Mag 5
2,840
Belt 250
Drum 70
1940
1,650
880
1,100
3,300
924
50
81
81
990
* British designation
MM*
13*77 7^62 12*7 13-2 20
M/V
2,540
2,840
2,805
2,840 !
2,740
2*640
[MG-AA
MG-AT or AA MG-AT or AA
DK
Hotchkiss
Cannon,-AT or AA Oerlikon Auto Cannon, AT Cannon, AT Gun, AA Gun, AA Gun, AA "Leningrad" Rheinmetall Zik-5 Degtyarev 1930 1932/? 1933/36 1938 1934
572 737
990
37
45
76.2
2,500
2,560
3,070
85
105 23,000
19,80022,500
ft
Table VI
Artillery
Article
Make-Type
Year
Yds. Range
M/V
f.p.s. Trail
IV)
76.2
1,930
1,100 1,250 2,180
Box Box
Split
(a)
' >1
MOTORIZATION - MECHANIZATION
...LtSWP
or M.G.
Table VII
raok
,0'
\ Av\'vV.i-.i..t.
Orew
Lght
Troops Carr:
8.
g* 6
*
Ton
1
1
Miles
i' s.
CO
Inohes
r- 0 1 AR
1 AR
1 - 2
1 - 2
2
1 AR
1 AB
ro <
Axles
Inohes
MC, motoroyole IE, with side oar SC, armored oar SC, " " SC, Amphibian armored oar S l e i g h s , armored S l e i g h s , armored M-l, oar M-U15, piok-up M-75, piok-up ZIS-101, oar GA2-A, truok AMD-3 ZIS-5, 6 truok TAG-5, 6, 10 truok Tanks T^27, "Tankette" ArmstrmpeUdetoy T-26, Tank Ford V-8, Meadow VI T-37, amphibian Soviet M-3U BT, Tank T-28, Tank - Annstrong-Siddeley T-32, 35 Tank T-50, armored gun
12-18
1 2
2-3
U U
2 1
3.2 7 9
1.U3
U7 U3 Uo 30
50 85 85
100
3 ( tr.)
3
2
2 2 2
15.7 23.6
35
J*3-*55
10-20
1 1
Bouy.
2 2 1 2 2 2 2
2.6 6.1
Uo Uo U5 55
30 15
12
50 50 60
100
u
16
20
U o
Uo
Uo
60
2| 3(i T)
2-3
2-3
6
6 6
9.75
2 10-12
75 Uo
90 350-500 U5O-75O 500-750
800
30
18
Tord Ford ( i ton) Chevrolet ( j ton) Buiok ?ord ( l ton) Eeroules (3-5 ton) leroules (5-10 ton) .16-.39 .19-.55 .2539 .79 1.37 1.37-2.3U 2.73 3.000 M B 6,000 MGj 50-Gun 3,000 M B 2,700 IKj 92-Gun U.OOO M3j 85-Gun
T T 1
1 - 2
1 - 2
1 - 2
-
3
2
3 5-7
T
6-9.5 3
U*
8
29
20-UO 20
56
U*
6*
36
F.T.)r 1
1 2
Bouy.
7-10
10-12* 8*
5-6
39 U2 U7
3-U
3-5
Lend-Lease Valentine, British ( I n f . Mk. I l l ) Matilda, British (Inf. Mk. I I ) Amerioan Light U-3 Amerioan ifed. U-3 Churcnill, British - A-22
( I n f . Mk. IV)
3 U U 6 5
25.2
15 15
37
25
1
135 95
265
36 36 Uo
_ -
Uoo
350
6,000 MG) 60-Gun 6,000 UG| 93-Gun 8,270 MG|103-Oun 7.I4DO U5 |1200gub|fQ Ul-75 mm.jl37-37iDji U.725 M5jl5O-Gunj 25 Smoke ^jOsab UO
1 (.33)
l (7.92)
1
1
1
1
1-75 ma.
1-3" how.
Bedford Ford-12 oyl. or l-2"pounder;
(58 now)
1 amis proj.2"
1-2 (7.92)
JB
Type Motor j
Pay 1oad (1
Fordlabill-
ition
a _S
(6) Armament (Air Forces). (See Table VIII.) Accord ing to the information available on individual planes it is evident
that all fighters are armed with four MGs (usually 7. 62 nm.cal.). New
types of fighters usually have two 7-62 mm. MGs and one 12.7 mm. MG.
The "Stormovik", a recent fighter model, carries
two wing MGs and 2-20 mm. wing cannon. The latest model of the
"Stormovik" is supposed to be armed with two MGs and two cannon of
either 37 mm. or ho mm. caliber. Its power plant is an in-line
2000 h.p. motor. It is supposed to carry one pilot and one observer.
This new "Stormovik" is reported to be heavily armored as far as pro tection of the crew and is ruggedly built. Its normal operating
height is 500 ft. - 1000 ft. It is quite fast as compared to modern-
day planes of similar design and power but is slightly handicapped
because of its heavy construction and armor plate. This plane was
designed solely as an attack-bomber to be used in direct support of
ground troops. The armament is located in the wings and is fixed.
The light and medium bombers have about the same
armament as the fighters except the guns are not fixed. On some new
models the 20 mm. cannon replaces the heavy MG.
The long-range bombers are armed, with three MGs.
Bombers large enough to carry a crew of six to eight men are equipped
with six MGs (7.62 mm.).
(7) Speed and radius of action (Air Forces). These
figures are estimated from the information available on the performance
of individual planes.
Type Old-type New-type Old-type New-type Old-type New-type fighters fighters (191+1) medium bombers medium bombers (19^1) L.R. bombers L.R. bombers (19^1) Speed
Top : Cruising Radius of Action 180 mi. 200 mi. 575 mi. 1500 mi. 1000 mi. 2000 mi.
2^5
355
CHARACTERISTICS OF AIRFLABBS
Table Till
172
166-235
215-250
2l6-260
390
372
14O8
1.1 h r s . 1.5 h r s . 1.5 h r s .
110
110
330
M-17; 1-700
H+5
170-180
19,000
27,860
16,000
620
500
2-7.62 3-7.62
560
1-700
220
22U
300
15,700 16,200 2f|8
260
M-62-Aj 1-800
U-25J 1-750
25,000
31,800
11,600
28,000
30,250
600
500
660
If-105-Ai 2-1200
M-103 2-860
U-105i 2-960
600 - 750
500 - 1.00C
' * * "w
1,300 - 1,100
2,200 - 1,320
M-87-B) 2-950
16,500
270
28,000
1,750 - 2,000
lW-62
2,200
M-3U 2-850
M-3Ul lt-850 M-35
150
169
250
21,300
16,000
U-7.62
W-62
5-7.62
8,800
6,600
6,800 93
120
14,760
250
is the fact that all technical and research experts are entirely
separated from the flying personnel and conduct few, if any, flights
under the authority of the Army or Navy. Consequently these technical
experts are not in a position to advise flying personnel and influence
them to further develop the technical knowledge of the Air Forces.
This is true of manipulating bomb sights and even true of navigation.
Compared to the other world powers the educational
standard in Russia is very low. This is true of officers as well as
enlisted men. Elementary arithmetical tables have been found in
Russian planes shot down over Finland and there are numerous reports
of Russian pilots being lost and failing to find their objectives due
to their lack of navigational knowledge. Russian pilots make great
use of railroads, rivers, etc as guides when flying cross-country.
Soviet pilots have undergone intensive training
under their customary winter conditions and they were able to keep a
much greater percentage of their equipment operating when temperatures
were very low than were their enemies.
The Russians have made considerable experiments
in keeping flying fields in condition for operation when the fields
are covered with snow. They have special tractor-drawn scrapers and
rollers and manage to keep their landing areas in fairly good condition
despite severe winter weather. The Russians have made wide use of a
motorized oil-heating unit that, during cold weather, keeps the lubri cating oil at a certain temperature and is equipped vith a pump to
quickly replace this oil in the planes when they are needed.
The Russians were successful in destroying numerous
German planes on the ground during winter surprise raids as the Germans
had insufficient time to fill their planes with hot oil and get them
into the air.
Generally speaking,Russian Air Force maintenance
is not excellent. Although it is reported that Soviet mechanics are
very clever at making replacement parts> etc. for planes, it is said
their combat planes are not kept in first-class operating condition.
d.
Facilities for the logistical support of the Vv'estcrn Front are weak.
Although the initial disposition and organization of ports, railroads,
airfields, roads and communications viere strategically souna, the
enormous extent and the poverty of the country prevented adequate
development. Improvements have been rushed during the war, particularly
in the Arctic and Persian Gulf supply routes, but the present effort
still is greatly handicapped by logistical difficulties. The meager
shipping, rolling stock, commercial trucking and air transports have
been markedly reduced by war losses. Even manpower has been seriously
affected. Only the most universal and stringent mobilization of man,
woman and child power has allowed maintenance of the needed armed forces
without a collapse in the labor supply.
The northern route of supplies into the U.S.S.R.
is severely hampered by ice, German air and naval operations, lack of
bottoms and limited interior transportation. During the winter of
1941-42, the port of Murmansk maintained a trickle of 80-90,000 tons
per month. With the opening of Archangel at the end of May, this flow
should be at least tripled.
The Caspian Sea is the center of Soviet water borne commerce, carrying fully half of the present total. Three of
its portsBaku, Astrakhan and Makhach Kalaare the greatest in the
U.S.S.R. The flow of supplies on its watersoil, ores, materiel,
grain--is crucial for the Russian war effort.
The southern route of supplies has steadily grown
in importance. Carrying only 30,000 tons in the fall of 1941, it has
doubled its load. By the winter of 1942 it will carry far more than
Murmansk, providing major relief from the freezing of Archangel.
Airdromes and landing fields arc concentrated in
the MurmanskKandalaksha, Leningrad, Moscow, Rostov, Tbilisi and Baku
areas; they also parallel all the principal railroads. Many airdromes
are large and quite good. However, although large scale airdrome
construction is in progress, airdromes and even landing fields are very
sparse. The problem of adequate air support of the front is critical.
The Soviet railroads haul an enormous load of freight,
238 billion ton-miles in 1938, or four times the average ton-mile haul of
the United States. But war losses of trackage and rolling stock have been
severe. This has been aggravated by poor maintenance caused by a lack of
"'tis
- 147
- 148
- 149
'It,/ r f,
- 150
- 151
- 152
In
1 . Namo of Fort
ABCTIC WATERS i
M5?
TABLE DC! pr>7T FACIIll
:l
3 . Depth alongside Berths (feet) Railroad faoilitie 5. Storage oapeol ty and fuel stores . fa. Lilting equipment. 7. Convoking equipment. Vonthly capacity'of port in tons 9. Lleotrio power availa Die in kll< watts '"hipbuiiding and repair facilities. 11. 1-rinoipal exports . lcce.ltu.eoua ieoilities; remarks.
1. Murmansk
IS i n o l . 1 fuel 3-17' o i l tanker berth (Notei Soviet claim of 11+ oerths not confirmed oy : : , i . , Murmansk.)
Sails on a l l piers 20,000 sq. I t . at Yurntnsk covered storage for dry cargo. Unknown amount of fuel o i l , gasoline and cool storage for orthem Fleet use.
3u ton l i t . crane 1 coal conveyor, (sunk); otherwioe opt. J O ton/)-; O aerious s ho rtage. Sli transporter; 10 other con- 6 ton traveling veyors. orane; 9 non- plurcbing r . r . cranesi 1-U5 ton; B-7 ton.
en
Floating dock (built in England), c p t . 250 tons, in two seotions of 155 and 950 tons ; length 2UO'. "hipouiloing an repairing yard with traverser s l i p taking up to I'd trawlers 160' long. Ship. repairing yard, with 1600 ton floating dock. Taval port with HlOO ton f l o a t ing dock, 262' long. 2 modern dry dooks, 656' ana 328' long, max. draft 29.5 1 . 6 slips haul ing" up 700 ton ships.
uergency aiiBrves now used for pur poses other than un loading convoys i Derths (!.os. lt> and 17) at the Fishing Port; 19' depth alongside. 2 Derths at Yaenga Bay. 1 oertn at the Timber Lock, 1 berth at the Coastal Fatrol Dock. Tumarouna for convoy of 12 ships is 10-12 days from Iceland waters. An expansion of port f a c i l i t i e s ia in progress .
2 . Kandalaksha
2 berths where 2 loi at Shore ships can unload retro 1 dook. s imiltaneous ly 3 berths whioh can acoonsr.odate 3 ships simultaneously. >-20'; 1-16'
^O mi. spur connects port with ' urman rr.; rail to end of pier. 2 mi. spur connects port with Kern on Vurman rri 18,000-30,000.
3 . Ken
500-1,000.
Icebound ;.ov. 3^ :.ay 15. Sawoills, U. mi. below town, have own wharves and shops for small repairs. Icebound Dec. 1-IJay 15. Port recently developed 10r timber. Feasible 6UEaarine oase. Fort for assembly and loading of sown limber, fecause of shal low bar 5 nii. from Onega, usual to unload ships partial ly ay Darges to re duce dralt to lU1 . barges unloaded at nega. Dredging operations planned, sunmer of 19U2,
Belomorsk (Soroka)
l.uuo-j, 000.
5. Onega
3 berths.
XABLE H i
Name o f For t
Railroa d faoilities.
7. Conveying equipment.
6 . Arohangel a. Uolotovsk
5 ships ( i . e . , 1 tanker, U general oargo ships) oaa unload simultan eously. (Notei Joining 2 now separate wharves w i l l enable 6 to 7 ships to unload simultaneously by Sept., 19H2).
Low water (all berths?) 25.5'S ships drawing 26.5' oan use aoeeas oanal at flood. Ships dra ing 26' at low water oan be ao oommodated by Sept. 1, 19142.
3 steel storage fuel tanks2,000 ton opt.} 1 tank hulk of 4,000 ton opt.; 1 other nearly oomplete. U oonorete fuel o i l tanks (2 underground and 2 hulks )30,000 ton total opt. Soviets olaim 100,000 tons ooal in Arohangel area, mostly at Uolo tovsk. Many sawmills oloae by; covered storage spaoe probably avail able.
50,000 tons with Eleotrioity prob out improvements ably laid on listed in columns wharves. #2 and $12.
Im. V. Molotova Shipbuilding Yard (No. 402). Large naval base under oonstruotion 1 machine shops, foundries, oovered building ways completed. 2 destitp era nearly finished. Fall, 19U1. Large yard and building slip under oonstruo tion.
Naval port.
Pipe lines laid to 11 fliel storage teaks. Pipe lines to 2 wterTM paralleled by sttan heat pipes. Fuel pumps 18 tana opt./hr. Into 12 tank oars simil taneous ly at wharves.
5 berths.
All berths 1 23-2V Current dredging operations expeoted to allow 2o' draft ships to berth here by Nov 1942.
Only trammy to nainland. Solom balakaya Island Arohangel Town rr. bridge under oonstruotion (Notei when ioe oonditions on the N. Dvina H. permit, a rr. ii laid in winter from Arohangel to Solombal skaya I s . ) 1 line on quay; 5 traok sorting yard between quay and Bakar itsa Station.
Electricity in !>0,000 (est.). Ekononla Town; (Soviets nay use port for bunker probably on ing only.) wharves.
o. Bakaritsa
All bertha: 22' 12-15 Berths. (Hotel quay 1800 24' over bar. yards long ae oommodates 13-1; ships simul taneous ly}
1-10 to 12 ton traveling orane. (Notet Soviets plan to add transporter oranes up to 15 tons; 2 tractor oranes up to 3 tons; 75 ton rr oranes by Fall,
Some eleotrioally driven portable conveyors, reach ing only 14' above water level. Goodi removed by ships' derrioks oan be off-loaded from truoks to barges at several shallow loading wharves near rr. station.
120,000 (est.)
None reported.
Timber.
Quay 2230 yards long; about 1800 yard* suitable for dis charging oargo. 3 parts 1 1. Ho. seotion B O yards long; 19* O deep at s o . end, 22' 6" at no. end. One 10-12 ton traveling orane with' 150 yard range, 20' max. reach above water level at no. end. 2 . Central seotion, 430 yards long; for timber only. 3* So. section, 1000 yards long; 16' deep at so end, 23' at no. erd. Not a l l suitable for unloading.
7. Fort Dikson
Coal wharf under Depth off port going extension 7-10'. to 650'. 1 pile wharf, 380 x 65' Trans-Siberian rr. at Krasno yarsk 400 mi. upstream.
Bunkering and sub sidiary port. Power ful W/T for oommuni oation with a l l polar stations . Ioefree only 90 days per year.
6. Igarka
500-1000
TABiE H i
Has* of Port
U. Bailroad faollities.
6. Lifting equipment.
7. Conveying equipment.
Prinoipal aiporti .
. BALTIC SEA I 1 . Leningrad 10 wharves totalling 8 mi., about 125 bertha for vessels inol. 70 oeean-going 10-M1 wharves. 183,000 tons. 7 floating oranea 35, 40, 50, 70, 100, 150, and 200 tons. I'oohanioal load ings WX), 000-1(50,000 depending on ice conditions. 206,000 plus 96,000 from Svir s t a . , 56,000 from Volkhov Sta. 7 shipbuilding works for 2 oapi tal ships, U destroyers, sub marines, e t e . largest in U.S.". Timber, grain, ores, ooal, e t e . Ioebreakera 1 3-9,000 ton) 4-2,000 ton; 3-600 ton. Port loe bound Feb.-Apr. e' witt> ioebreakers.
I I I . BUCK SEA I BztenaiTe naval 1. Sevastopol (Facilities wharfage. now large l y evacu ated or destroyed Rails on wharves. 6 large o i l and gas tanks. Floating oranes 2-100 ton; 1-50 ton; 1-tiO ton; 1-25 ton; '2-20 ton; 1-5 ton. 25,500 (3 sta tions ) . U relnf. oonoiete No oonmeroei naval only. building s l i p s , max. 328'; 6 wooden s l i p s , nax 230'. 3 drydooks: 500', 680', T. 3 floating dooksi 1-300'. 2 marine railways, Grain, timber, o i l . lifting 700 and 350 tons . Second largest naval port in U.S.S.H.
2 . Hostov-onDon
2.5 mi.
Average 1 IV
Rails on wharves.
cn
1O-1U1 17-30*
120,000 tons, ovei 2 floating oranes 3 srato loaders, 15 and 50 ton. 5u t / i j 2 float 100 warehouses. ing grain loacBrs 50 t/h; 1 float ing elevator, 125 t/ii. 33,500 tons, 26 warehouses . i2,800 cons, 20 warehouses; 50,OOU ton o i l depot; 50,000 ton grain elevator. 2,000 tons; I4I tanks, 1600-i|200 tons eaoh, for crude o i l , kero sene, gasoline; 21 tanks, U,000-6,000 tons. 20,000 sq. yds. cold storage plant. 3 steam shovels for orej 2-l60 t/h; 1-80 t / h . 2 electric ore cranes 12.5 tan, with 66' radius. 2 electric port able cranes3 ton, with 50' radius. Floating oranes, 40 and 25 tons. 2 floating oranesj kO-50 ton; 6 portable cranes, ?-15 tons; 2 portable oranes, 2 ton. Several grain and s a l t loaders.
lu-25,000.
3 . Yeiak U Kovorossis'
Hails on -aharves.
Sails on all wnarves.
3,000-5,000. 10,000-25,000.
Repair yards.
Conveyors 1 2^0,000 1 floating ooal, 100 t/h; 2 grain, 100 t/h; 1 oeEPTit barrels; pipeliie to o i l pier. nil pipeline; 2 grain conveyors, 50 t/h; various other conveyors. U5,OOO-6o,00O without o i l erths; o i l oertha, 100,000 to 150,000.
"mil repair yard Grain, o i l , oemant. Sinoe siege of Sevastopol," main with U small naval base of Blaok slips.
y. Tuapse
16-30*
5,000-10.000.
6. Poti
2,255 berths
15
20-23'
120,000-150,000.
Bion Sta., 1&0U0; Fort repair work Abasha Sta., 1 ;hops with s l i p 3,000. lifting 500 tons.
10,000 ton vessels can berth alongside wharves; 22,000 volt ourrent from Rion stepped down in port by 2EO/38O volt transformers.
2 . Number and/or 3 . Depth along length of side berths berths (wharf (feet). age).
4* Railroad faoilities .
6. Lifting equipment.
7. Conveying equipment.
7 . Batumi
2.253
berths.
13
23-32'.
Rails on a l l wharves.
40 ton floating orane; f-8 ton traveling oranes with 50' radius
Pumps and pipe lines at all berths; several traveling oon voyors for grain
100,000 without o i l ; oil berths, 100,000; small vessels and barges, 2^0,000
Oil, manganese.
8 and 10 i n . pipe lines from Baku; seoondary submarine base; 9 J of turn O4 over la o i l .
17. CASPIAN SEA I 1 . Astrakhan Pipeline. 800,000 tons during navigatio season; mostly tankers and barges . 450,000-500,000
tons; mostly tanke rs and barges.
Shipbuilding yan with slip of 565'i floating dock 1,700 ton opt. Ship-repairing shop with float ing dook for ships of medium tonnage. Navy yard and ship-repairing yards, one having 1 single and 1 double dook, both taking largest Caspian ships. Steamers up to 5,000 tans can be constructed.
2 . MakhaohKala
3 large o i l reservoirs, 14 smaller, total opt. 2.5-3 mi 13 ion tons . aria, ble i oon stant dredging. Rails on dry goods pier. Numerous o l l storage tanks and reservoirs up to 10,000 ton opt. 50-ton floating orane; 2-ton oranes on dry goods pier, e t c .
3,000-4,1X50.
New o i l harbor opened in 1938; 2 pipelines to Grozny refineries. Ioe nay stop navigation for short period In Jai By far the largest port In the U.S.s.R Base of the Caspian Sea f l o t i l l a .
3 . Baku
80 piers, mostly for o i l , along c mi. of water front} 3,720 yds for o i l j 2,too yds . f o r dry goods.
8" and 10" pipe lines to Batum; annual cpt. l,U60,000 tons, l,6l42,OOO tons res p.
1,000,000
200,000-300,000.
4 . Kr&snovodsk
15 piers on pile (of whioh 5 de oayed) in ..est em Harborj 21 wooden piers (of whioh 15 at oayed in VI"ra Harbor).
iioatern Harbor 5-a'i ufra Hartcri 10-12'j 16' along 2 bertas of o i l piers.
2-3 ton Hwny good ware houses; oil tanls, oranes. total opt. 12,000 tons.
Grabs and con veyors with opt of 50 t/hj float ing grain transshipper, 50 t / n .
140,000
500-1,000.
Oil from Cheleken Island, stored in tanks at s t a . , used by rr.; mny oil reservoirs at land ing plaoe 5.25 mi east of Krasnovodak
i !
i\
II
i !
I
Vi l [yrv (O.Vi ii
. N'ame o f P o r t . Number and/or length of berths (wharf age). 1. Depth along side berths
( f e e t ) .
k- Railroad facilities. I . PAHLKVI U berths I Customs and s l i p customs quay, 669' way quays; LI'5". long, min. widtn 0 2 ' , aooommodates 3-500 ton s h i p s ; slipway quay i n Naval Yard, 160' Long, a d j . terrain 197' wide. 1 mole-1600 1 long; 1 mole-1000' long insufficient depth or unloading facilities.
i1 n i! I
1 7.
Conveying equipment.
None; port oleared oy truoks. toad to Kaiuin takes 500 tons daily in dry weather; 250 in wet.
V.'arehouse cpt.i Closed sheds 6H56 sq. f t . Open sheds 7iil6 sq. f t . Closed sheds (damaged but largely useable )VldU sq. I t . Closed sheds (under oonstruotioo) - 1312 sq.
I t .
Maval Yard.
Transiti
U.S. '.E. -Iran.
en
SI
(-
I I . PEHSIAU GULF PORTSt 1 . Basra a. ~ _b. . ~ 1-J0001 wharf with 6 berths. 1-600' wharf. U deep-water berths finlshe or nearly finished. _d. 9 lighterage ~ berths. a. b. o. d. 26' . 20'. Deep water. "shallow water. lighterage. Karun Hiver bar water in low 19-21' et October. a_. 3 rr. spurs on wharl'. ii30,000 sq. f t . of transit sheds; 150,000 sq. f t . warehouses; limited adjaoent ing. !!o coal ordinarily. Fuel o i l at Aoadan plpel^-ie to he built. Vater laid on wharves; avail aftle from 600-ton self-propelled barge. Rr. to Anwar to oe completed July '1|2. Customs sheds 5,000 tons opt. Fuel at Abadan. 1-55 ton, 1-25 ton floating oranes; i- ton eleotrio; 1^> ton steam; U-3 2-3 ton steam; 5-1 ton eleotrio. probably 5-2 ton (liotei shortage of trained crane orews). 129,000 (l.'Ay 'Ji2); Ample eleotricitj 170,000 (July 'Ufd); for a l l purposes. with limited inoreasss thereafter Port Directorate and Gray, Mackentie marina vnrkshops. No dry dook or large slipway. Lighters, diving equipment. 1 salvage steamer. Main supply base of British 10th Army; port of entry. Land Lease to Turkey. Longest vessel swing ing safely in river 650'. Good anchor age for 22 vessels between outer bar and "'jargit wharves.
2 . Khorram shahr
a. ~ b. ~
Concrete whar: 11+00' . 2 deep water Berths and 2 "I" shaped lighterage berths to be completed by Aug. 1, 'Ij2; other work ir progress. o. 5-liEhter ~ jetties on so bank of Karun at Persian yaval Base.
a. 2 0 ' .
T>. Deep water.
o". Shallow water
~ for lighters
only.
Ueager repair shops. barraoki and jetties of Persian Navy. Tremendous port ex pansion underway.
n !
\ \
r ~ \
j
1
"if if
' 1 j1 '
Jr
i
'!\\ V-. \ \
L D
nirO)rO)|i,
r
1
!! i
i
^ ^ ^
p
1 . Name of Fort 2. Number and/or length of berths (whtrf-
TABLE - PAKLEVI A U T E PERSIAN GULF PORT':. N H . Railroad faoilitis 5 . Storage oapaait y and fliel stores. 6 . Lifting equipment. 7. Conveying equipment. Monthly capacity of port in ton Eleotrio power a' able in k i l o watts.
Aba dan
General oargo wharf 150' long. 10 deep water s t e e l and oon orete J e t t i e s } 9 of then for o i l .
Concrete deok with narrow iuge rr. ana road alongside at wha rves.
Tank farm for refined petroleum produots, 3 million barrels opt] same for orude, 10 million barrels opt. 9 open-sided ware, houses 1 some open-storage.
b-3 ton eleotrio nes} 1 dumb 200-210 ton floating orane, unaDie to slew, requiring } tugs to maneuver. No oranes on jetty; 12 ton Diesel rr. wreoklng orane (radius U5') in yard.
10" pipeline.
2 small slipways} Crude and refined oil including 100 floating dook octane gasoline. 730 too opt.} Fueling ships. maohine shop. Ssell craft main tenance and con struction. 3,000 ton float ing dock} lifting apt. 6,000 tons) length U7T I i n ternal breadth 65.6'.
iiat a supply port of the C S . ' . S . ; fuels ships in Persian Culf traffio
U Bandar Snahpur
Jetty - 800' long 30' 1 bar at Khor 300' wide. Cause Eusa, 21+'} deep way 900 1 long ohezinel. oonneota with solid f i l l . (3 deep water and lighterage Berths to be oompleted by NOT. 'l.) One quay} oargo disoharged by lighters. Inner an oho rag 9
fo r TSS el 3 up to
5 . Bus hire
20'.
5,000-10,000.
CD i
- 159
- 160
- 161
3L.
29 ,200
2,600
26,600
2. 51 ,000
3. 46 ,700
20,300
26,400
126,900 tons/day
(b) The daily supply requirements of
various types of major Russian units are analyzed in Table XI. To
summarize:
'Unit 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Daily supply
*The 10,000 man Reserve Division would require about 250 tons.
**Use of the auxiliary Arctic ports and the spurs to the Finnish frontier
can increase this capacity by 2\%.
***Deductions have been made for the minimal support of the Leningrad
factory workers.
f ^
- 162
1. Northern 2. 3.
Murmansk-Rimskoye Pudozh-Kalinin Central (Klin - Stalinogorsk) Southern Yelets - Chertkovo Millerovo - Rostov
1 .0
0.1 0.9
2.0
1.9
0.9
1.0
a r :
'I i;U
'dr*.".^Jr~fit'''-1' '
- 163
flnit
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Day of march Daily movement by railroad of (miles) capacities listed below in tons;*
2500 5000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 Infantry Div. (regular strength)20 40 Cavalry Div. Tank Brigade 100 Motorized Div. 125 Tank Div. 100
22 44 25 25 15
45**
50 31
90
135
180
225
2*5*0*
W 36" TUo"
100 62
ITS
"2~BU
TSo"
150* 93
250
"250
rrt
a. ~
- 165
a.
Item
1.
2.
250 900
444 750
6000
2700
- 166
ll 1 , / H
(Contd.) No.. Wt./ltem (lbs.) 18,000 12,200 19,500 2860 14,000 19,000 6,000 550 2,790 6,270 1,840 1,390 990 Total Wt. (Tons). 990 3660 438 36 175 209 54 412 39 37 39 15 35 Shipping No. of Wt. (Tons.) o a r s . 1485 5490 657 54 262 313 81 618 59 56 49
Tractors 110
Trucks, plain, 2-|T600
Trucks,' special 45
3 axle
6.
Autos, (Fords) 25
7.
Armored Cars (Fords)25
8.
Tanks T26 22
9.
Tanks T37 18
10.
Wagons 1500
IX.
Howitzer, 122 mm. 28
12.
Howitzer," 152 mm. 12
13.
Guns, 76.2 mm 42
(AA & FA)
14.
Howitzer," 76.2 mm. 22
15.
Guns, 37 or 45 im 69
AT
b.
Motorized ^Infantry Division. No. "" Wt./ltem (lbs.) 250 Total Tvt. (Tons) 920 Shipping No. of Wt. (Tons) cars... 184
or 3 trains
Item 1.
7360
Men; packs, individual;
rifles
Tanks T26 35
Armored Cars (Ford) 9
Trucks, plain, (800)
2JL.T
Trucks, heavy (400)
trucks, special (200)
Autos (130)
Howitzer, 122 mm. 18
(2100 ton-equivalents)
332 518
94
63 4600 7200
3900 1600 185 25 5850
2400
277
37
- 167 -'
y
Table XII. Item (Contd.)
" "J
No.
Total Wt (Tons) 20 25 11
Plus 20$ for overhead: Plus 5 days' supplies Plus ton-equivalents: c. Tank Brigade.
, No Wt./ltem (lbs.) 250
Item 1.
No. of
cars.
Men; packs, 3500 individual; rifles 2. Tanks, T35 33 100 3. Tanks, BT 4. Tanks, T26 50 5. Trucks, plain, 2-|T(600) 6. Trucks, heavy (300) 7. Trucks, special (300) 8. Autos (100) 9. Guns, 76.2 mm. (12) 10. Guns, 45 mm. AT (6)
88
or 1g trains
-(1050 ton-equivalents)
1287 1930
1800
1200 712
475 5490
3660 4462
2975 3600
2400 219
146 15
11 4
3 18,232
3,656
21,888
970
22,858 tons
1,050
23,908 tons
- 168 y
No.
7000
Wt./ltem (lbs.)
250
2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
66 200 100
(1000) (500) (500) (200) (24) (12)
950
6100 4875 4000 9150 7312
6000
990
286 22 6
429
30
8
30,389
Plus 20$ for overhead: 6,074
36,463
Plus 5 days' supplies; 1,655
Plus ton-equivalent; e. Cavalry Division.
No. Fb./ltem (lbs.) Total Wt. (Tons) Shipping No. of
Wt. (Tons) cars.
38,098 tons
2,100
40,198 tons
Item
6600
250
825
160
830
990
or 17 trains
6640
900
2988
6. 7.
(11,900 ton-equivalents)
48 72
304 456
90 135
73 110
187 281
mi m
- 169
/ i ' . ^
( l1 .! ' '
In- T^
Table XII. (Contd.) e. Cavalry Division. Item 8. 9. 10. 11. Howitzer, 122 mm. Guns, 76 mm. Guns, 45 mm. AT Guns, 37 mm.
0.
12 24 10 64
- 170
-171.
ii'^ijj iu%%p}'-^-
- 172
Rye
1935 crop % from unoccupied part.
Sugar Beets
1935 crop % from un occupied
part.
tons
tons
tons
tons
tons
100
,000 144, 415, ,000 ,000 536, ,000 1,287, ,000 697,
100,000 415,000 1,016 ,000 268,000 1,089 ,000 386,000 842 ,000 348,000 300 ,000
___ ___ 13,000 276,000 1,015,000 124,000 724,oor 544,000 2,216,000 1,108,0 253,000 3,264,000 979,00L 16,000 8,000 15,000
- 173
is more or less offset by the fact that the military and civil population
is much denser than it is in almost all regions which afford a more
limited amount and variety of supplies. For figures on agricultural
production in this aone see under "Production Capacities".
(12) Replacement of personnel.
(a) Military Forces.
{!) Numbers, ""in June, 1941, the military forces
of the U.S.S.R. totaled the following:
Active Forces
Red Army 4,060,000
Air Force 150,000
N.K.V.D. 200,000
Red Navy 75,000
4,485,000
In addition, the first line reserves (with
conscript training) of the first (up to 35 years) and second classes
(up to 45 years), as well as reserve N.K.V.D. units, were immediately
mobilized!
Reserve Forces
1st Line Reserves
(trained)
1st Class (18-35) 3,900,000
2nd Class (36-45) 2,600,000
485,000 N.K.V.D. Reserves Plus regular forces
6,985,000
4,485,000
11,470,000
5,200,000
2,600,000
1,300,000
10,400,000
- 174
'"fc
'1
[ *[''.,] ! v l ! ' l
- 175
- 176
- 177
- 178
- 179
Zone of Combat.
Leningrad -- Port facilities; railroad communications; ships;
special steel; electrical and transport machinery;
rubber goods; boots and shoes; chemicals; textiles,
ammunition and materiel.
2.
Zone of Communications.
a. Northern Region.
MurmanskPort facilities; railroad connections.
ArchangelPort facilities; Dvina River shipping; railroad
connections; lumber yards (?).
VologdaRail connections; synthetic rubber factory.
Central Industrial Region. (Electric power stations not
.' listed but power facilities
may be assumed for all cities.].
Yaroslavl--Refineries; synthetic rubber; automobile works
and trucks; tank factory.
IvanovoTextile machinery, textiles.
MoscowSpecial steel and pipe steel mills; ball bearings;
and and Moscow defense area precision instruments;
Moscow railroad equipment; electro-technical products;
defense Stalin automobile plant; refineries (including gas
area. boosting by tetra-ethyl lead); chemicals; munition,
(a portion of these plants, particularly munitions,
have probably been evacuated); power stations;
railroad network leading to Moscow; Moscow Defense
Area: Podolsk, sewing machines; Mytishchi, rail road and street car building; Lyubertsy, agri cultural machinery; Kolomna, locomotives; Podolsk,
ammunition factories (probably evacuated).
Noginsk--Textiles.
StalinogorskChemicals (including poison gas).
Chemicals (at Bobriki).
GorkiPipe steel mill; machine tools; Diesel engines;
radio apparatus; Molotov automobile plant, ship building; chemicals, paper, arms, tank, and air plane factories; two refineries (at Sormovo).
j.;fcj?;\ | -
b.
- 180
Table XIII.
(Contd.)
- 181
B.
- 182
- 185
Don and Volga basins there is also a considerable number of lakes and
swamps.
The Northern Dvina and Pechora basins are subject to
yearly spring and summer floods of normally devastating proportions.
Extensive floods are also common in the other basins, but they are usu ally much less destructive. The spring thaw for a few weeks causes high
water and dangerously swift current in otherwise sluggish streams like
the Don and the Volga, Ice blocks traveling at high velocity render the
rivers impassable for weeks after the ice breaks up.
The Volga is 2,590 miles long and is navigable to within
65 miles of its source, in the Valdai Hills near Kalinin, only 750 feet
above sea level. At a distance of 1,500 miles from its mouth, the Volga
is only 190 feet above sea level and 280 feet above the surface of the
Caspian Sea. The average fall of the Volga is only 1:600,000, or one-
tenth of an inch per mile, as compared with 1:17,000, or 3,7 inches per
mile for the Amu-Darya River of Soviet Central Asia. At the latitude
of Stalingrad (49 N), where the Volga-Don canal has been projected, the
two rivers are only 48 miles apart. The Volga starts to thaw around
March 18 at Astrakhan, April 5 at Stalingrad, and April 9 at Kalinin on
its upper course, but only around April 14 at Gorki in its middle course.
The freeze, however, commences at the head and proceeds gradually down stream. The average navigation period is 205 days at Kalinin, 195 at
Gorki, 196 at Kuibyshev (formerly Samara), 210 at Stalingrad and 260 at
Astrakhan, The ice passage, during which navigation is practically im possible, lasts 3-8 days at Kalinin, 4-18 days at Gorki, 6-30 at Saratov,
3-17 at Stalingrad and 2-5 at Astrakhan. In the lower Volga, constantly
shifting sand bars and alluvial islands make it necessary to rechart the
fairway each year after the spring floods. The spring rains raise the
level of the rivur at many points as much as 40 or 50 feet. They are
followed by a period of dry weather, during which the shallowness of the
Volga and most of its tributaries, except the Kama (main eastern tribu tary from the Urals), causes extraordinary difficulties to navigation.
The Kama River rises at an altitude of 910 feet, about
100 miles west of Molotov (Perm), in a marshy area of the Ural foot hills, and describes a loop about 170 miles long, reaching northward
between 52 and 54 E and southward between 56 and 57 E along the
western side of the Ural Mountains to Molotov. Thence it pursues a wind ing course south-southwostward to 56 N (mouthof the Belaya River) and
then in a west-southwesterly direction to the Volga, which it joins about
50 miles south of Kazan. It is 1,170 miles long, and is navigable
throughout up to the mouth of the Vishera, 185 miles above Molotov, be yond which it is used only for log floating. The Kama is considered the
most navigable river in European Russia. The width of the channel and
the depth of the fairway are almost everywhere sufficient for free
- 184
navigation, and the shallows and bars appearing at mean water level are
far from "being so obstructive as those of the Volga. The mean fall of
the Kama is nearly k inches between the mouths of the Vishera and
Chusovaya (at Molotov), 3.6 inches between the mouths of the Vishera and
the Belaya (at the big southeastern bend) and nearly 3.5 inches between
the latter and the Volga. The Vishera, Chusovaya and Belaya, with a
dense network of short tributaries, drain the west slope of the Ural
Mountains. Along the whole section from the Vishera to the Chusovaya, a
distance of iQk miles, the right (weBt) bank of the Kama is flat and the
left is high, witji cliffs of hard limestone. Above Berezniki (midway
point), the mean channel is 700 to 1,^00 feet wide; below that point, it
widens suddenly and in places reaches 2,800 feet or more, but the width
of the fairway in some places, especially where the channel is divided
by islands, is inconsiderable and causes many difficulties to navigation.
The section from the Chusovaya to the Belaya, a distance of 33^ miles, is
flanked on both sides by a chain of sandy hills, the left bank remaining,
in general, higher than the right (west). The width of the channel
varies from 1,125 to 3>5OO feet, while the whole river bed may reach a
breadth of 2 miles or more, especially where there are numerous islands.
The minimum depth, even over the sand bars, is 6 to 7 feet. In the sec tion from the Belaya to the Volga, a distance of 237 miles, the right
(north) bank is the higher, but the hills, which reach a maximum eleva tion of 200 feet, recede some distance from the channel in places.
Most of the left (south) bank is low, quite flat and at many places
marshy. The channel in stretches free from islands is 1,1(00 to 3>5OO
feet wide, and in places as much as 3 miles. The depth in the straight
and free stretches reaches 60 feet or more and the fairway is wide. Be fore the Revolution, the steamers of the Kama basin comprised about
one-fourth of the entire Volga fleet, 75$ being tugs. The navigation
season lasts from 170 days at Berezniki to 192 days near the mouth. In
some years the Kama freezes after the first break-up, and a second ice
passage and flood period follow. Where the banks are low, wide areas
are flooded and the rise of the water level is small. In the lower sec tion, where the south bank is flat, the floods extend 7 or 10 miles, and
at the mouth 13 miles or more. The high-water level is generally in the
second half of May and lasts for two or three days; thereafter the water
falls until the middle of June, when the Kama reaches its mean level.
In view of the fact that the Kama runs from tho
industrialized section of the Ural Mountains toward the present theater
of war and is crossed by two main railroad lines coming across the Urals
from Siberia, this river acquires considerable strategic importance. In
addition to the two points of direct railroad contact, namely at Molotov
(Perm), where the lines from Nizhni Tagil and Sverdlovsk converge, and
at Sarapul, about 300 miles farther downstream, where the main Trans-
Siberian line crosses, the Kama has indirect contact with the line from
- 185
- 186
. Transcaucasia.* In hydrographically isolated Transcau casia, the Surami Ridge (north-south transverse spur uniting the Major
and Minor Caucasus) separates the Rioni River, flowing westward to the
Black Sea, from the Kura River, flowing eastward through the Azerbaid zhan Lowland to the Caspian Sea. The Araks River, separating mountain ous Soviet Armenia from the Ararat Range in Turkey, joins the Kura in
the center of Azerbaidzhan Lowland.
In the midst of the Armenian Highland and the Araks .by the Zanga River is Lake Sevan (in Armenian) Turkish), situated 6,230 feet above sea level and framed rocky mountain walls. Its maximum length is h-5 miles, 23 miles. Only k percent of the water entering the lake remainder evaporates. ,
connected with
or Gokcha (in
in by high,
its maximum width,
flows out; the
- 187
is only 1*0-50 feet above the river. The slope of the entire West
Siberian Lowland is extraordinarily gentle. At the railroad crossing
over the Ob near Novosibirsk, 1,700 miles from its mouth (Ob Bay), the
mean water level is only about 300 feet above sea level. The low-water
level in the Irtysh at Omsk is about 230 feet above sea level.
(1) The area known as the Vasyuganye, enclosed between
the Ob and the Irtysh as far south as Novosibirsk and Omsk (both on
55N, on the Trans-Siberian Railroad), is one vast expanse of almost
solid moss swampland, save for scattered areas which have been reclaimed
in recent decades. Only the narrow river zones between the swamps are
covered with trees, principally conifers and birch. Around 59, latitude
of the Vasyugan River, east tributary of the Ob, the maximum elevation
of the Vasyuganye Swamp above sea level is from 325 to 1*50 feet. In the
summer the hunters' trails along the rivers are the only means of pas sage. In the winter the whole area can be crossed by sled. In 1925,
the population was little over 1,000 or 0.02 person per square kilometer,
and preponderantly aboriginal.
Lakes of all sizes abound throughout the West
Siberian Lowland. By far the largest is the shallow Lake Chany, 335
feet above sea level and 60 by 35 miles in width, situated 25 miles
south of the railroad between 77 and 78E. Like many other large and
small lakes in the belt between 56 and 50 N, Lake Chany has various
short tributaries but no outflow. Its water contains about one-sixth
ounce of cooking salt and sulfuric acid salts per quart. The salt con tent of these lakes increases toward the mouth, but even to the north
of Lake Chany there are dead lakes containing considerable quantities
of various kinds of salts and acids.
A peculiar phenomenon, found nowhere else in the
world on such a maesive scale as in the middle and lower courses of the
Ob-Irtysh and tributaries is the starvation of fish caused by the pres ence of iron salts, the immense acidity of the water due to the decay
of organic substances; and the reduction of the quantity of free oxygen
through evaporation and fermentation ofthe organic substances, in sum mer and through isolation from the atmosphere by ice during the winter.
Even in the 0b itself, the saturation of the water with free oxygen is
25 percent below normal.
(2) The larger western part of the Central Siberian
Tableland is drained by the eastern tributaries of the Yenisei, of which
the most important are, from south to north, the Angara or Upper
(Verkhnyaya) Tunguska, the Podkamennaya or Middle (Srednaya) Tunguska
and the Monastyrskaya or Lower (Nizhnyaya) Tunguska. Since the watershed
between the 0b and the Yenisei lies comparatively very close to the
Yenisei, all the western tributaries of the latter are short and small.
- 188
- 189
- 190
' V
- 191
- 193
&
- 194
TABLE I
Principal Irrigated Areas
Ukraine
1. Dnestr Valley northwest of Odessa.
North Caucasus
2. Malokabardinski Irrigation System, enclosed by the great loop of
the North Caucasian railroad between Prokhladny and Grozny.
3 Irrigation District of the Terek and Kuma Rivers (Tersko-Kumski),
which flow into the Caspian Sea north of the Caucasus.
Transcaucasia
4. Mugan Steppe, southwest of Baku, between the Araks River on the
northwest and the Kura River on the northeast, with the large Lake Akh-
Chala in its eastern part.
5. Milskaya Steppe, west of the Mugan Steppe (see No. 4) and the
confluence of the Araks and the Kura. More than half the cultivated
land of the Azerbaidzhan Republic is irrigated, and the greater part
of the cultivated land lies in the central part of the republic. Ir rigation on an extensive scale has been practiced in Azerbaidzhan
from very ancient times, and remains of large canals and reservoirs
are found in areas which are now entirely waterless and uninhabited,
6. Maly Sardarabad Canal, irrigating more than 60,000 acres west of
Yerivan, capital of Soviet Armenia, with water from the Araks River.
The Araks and some of its tributaries are also used to irrigate various
other areas of different sizes in the southern half of Armenia. The
Zanga, passing through Yerivan, irrigates more than k^>, 000 acres south
of Yerivan along the Yerivan-Dzhulfa railroad. The Garni-Chai and
Debeda-Chai irrigate an equal area adjoining the former on the south east, likewise along the railroad. The Zapadnaya (Western) Arpa-Chai,
a parent stream of the Araks, irrigates 30>000 acres around Leninakan,
on the railroad northwest of Yerivan. Some of the canals and other
works date from ancient times, but many of them have been reconstructed,
enlarged and mechanized since the Revolution.
- 195
TABLE I
Principal Irrigated Areas
(Continued)
Western Siberia
7. Alei Steppe, along the Alei River and the railroad "between
Barnaul and Semipalatinsk, with its center at Aleisk, 180 miles due
south of Novosibirsk, 226 miles by rail.1
8. Irrigation system of the Uibat River, west of Abakan, branch
railroad terminus on the Yenisei River 170 miles south-southwest
of Krasnoyarsk.
Soviet Central Asia
9. Irrigation system of the Chu River, between Lake Balkhash and the
Kirgiz Highland, in southeast Kazakhstan; begun before World War I and
expanded since the Revolution.
10. Irrigation District of the Chirchik, Keles and Angren Rivers, east
tributaries of the Syr-Darya; the Keles passes northwest of Tashkent,
the Chirchik southeast of it, and the Angren farther south. Modern
irrigation was instituted here before the First World War.
11. Hunger (Golodnaya) Steppe--not to be confused with the much larger
Hunger Steppe west of Lake Balkhash--, 50 miles southwest of Tashkent,
between the southwest bank of the Syr-Darya, the Tashkent-Bukhara rail road and the Kyzyl-Kum Desert. The beginning of this project dates
back before the First World War.
12. Dalverzinskaya Steppe, along the Syr-Darya south-southwest of
Tashkent; an eastward extension of the old Hunger Steppe development
(No. 11 above) east of the railroad toward the mouth of the Fergana
Valley.
13. Irrigation systems of the Fergana Valley, using water from the
Syr-Darya, and both its parent streams, the Naryn and the Kara-Darya,
in the eastern panhandle of the Uzbek Republic and the northern pan handle of the Tadzhik Republic. Most of the canals date back before
the Revolution and some are of remote antiquity, but it is reported
that the whole system has boon undergoing a thorough overhauling and
important expansion during the last 15 years.
Ik. Surkhan-Shirabad Irrigation District, along the Shirabad River
from Shirabad south to Termez (on the Tashkent-Stalinabad railroad) in
the southern extremity of the Uzbek Republic.
- 196
TABLE I
Principal irrigated Areas
(Continued)
15. Valley of the Vakhsh (east of 68), a parent stream of the Amu-
Darya, in the southwest corner of the Tadzhik Republic.
16. The Oasis of Mary (formerly Merv) and Bairam-Ali (site of the
ancient Merv) in which terminates the Murgab River, coming northward
from Afghanistan; on the Tashkent-Krasnovodsk railroad west of 620 E.
Important modern irrigation works in this ancient irrigation area were
completed "before the Revolution,
Other areas of Russian Central Asia in which irrigation works of
considerable extent were in operation "before the First World War are:
17. The H i River Valley around Dzharkent and Alma-Ata (formerly
Verny).
18. Kopal and Abakumovskoye, on the north side of the Dzhungar Ala-Tau
Range, exploiting the upper courses of some of the seven tributaries of
Lake Balkhash from which the district east of Lake Balkhash was formerly
called the Seven-River (Semirechenskaya) Cblast, now named Alma-Ata
Oblast.
19. The Arys River around Chimkent; works reaching southward toward
the irrigated area around Tashkent.
20. The Zeravshan River, around Samarkand; works extended westward
since the Revolution. The Zeravshan, rising at the east end of the
Turkestan Range and flowing along its south side to Samarkand, does
not reach the Amu-Darya, pro"ba"bly "because all of its water is consumed
in irrigation.
21. The Amu-Darya Valley from the Afghan Border to Chardzhou, on the
latitude of Bukhara, with an irrigated zone reaching eastward along the
railroad to Bukhara (considerably expanded since the Revolution); also
a large part of the Amu-Darya Delta, east and north of Khiva.
22. The Tedzhen River, in the Tedzhen Oasis, west of the Mary Oasis
(see Wo. 16), on the Bukhara-Ashkhabad railroad,
23. A zone along the Bukhara-Ashkhabad-Krasnovodsk railroad to a dis tance of 170 miles north from Ashkhabad and 125 miles south from
Ashkhabad; exploiting short streams from the northeast slope of the
Kopet-Dag.
TABLE II
Rivers and Lakes at Present Exploited for Electric Power
European Russia
1. Tuloma, at Kola, on the railroad 7 miles south of Murmansk.
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TABLE II
Rivers and Lakes at Present Exploited for Electric Power
(Continued)
1^. Dzoraget, near Kalageran on Tiflis--Yerivan railroad, about kO
miles " y rail south of Tiflis, in Soviet Armenia.
b 15. Zapadnaya (Western) Arpa-Chai, at Kaps, 8 miles northwest of
Leninakan, which is 137 miles by rail southwest of Tiflis, in Soviet
Armenia.
16. Zanga, "between Lake Sevan and Yerivan, capital of Soviet Armenia;
project provides eventually for 9 stations aggregating 570,000 kw., or
12,000 more than the Dnepr Dam. According to latest available infor mation (19^2) two units are in operation: Kanaker I with ^2,000 kw.
and Kanaker II with ij-6,000 kw. The Gyumyush station, with 1^,000 kw.,
is under construction,
17. Okhchi-Sai, at Kafan, the terminus of a railroad running southwest
from Baku along the Araks River into the southeastern extremity of
Soviet Armenia.
Central Asia
18. urba, at Ulba, on the railroad spur of the Turksi"b Railroad from
Semipalatinsk to Ridder, about 10 miles southwest of the latter, in
the northeast extremity of the Kazakh Republic.
19. Chirchik, at Chirchik, 20 mileB northeast of Tashkent, on a rail road spur from Tashkent. There are four other hydroelectric stations
in the vicinity of Tashkent on tributaries of the Chirchik. The largest
one (10,000-25,000 kw.) known to be completed is at Kadyrya, 10 miles
northeast of Tashkent.
20. Varzob, 8 miles north of Stalinabad, capital of the Tadzhik
Republic.
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2.
TOPOGRAPHY,*
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201
foothills of the Caucasus. They divide this plain into the following
distinct lowland areas.
(a) The Dnepr Lowland, with large swamp areas
north of Kiev and dry, treeless steppe land south of that city.
(b) The Black Sea Lowland ("between the Dnepr and
the Crimean Peninsula), into which intrude the Volhynian-Podolsk Hills,
which extend eastward from Poland as far as 32 E and have a consider ably greater general elevation than the Central Russian Hills.
(c) The Oka-Don Lowland, continued north of the
Oka "by the swampy Moshchorskaya Lowland.
(d) The Kumo-Manych Sink, already mentioned.
(e) The arid and partly sandy Caspian Lowland,
extending in the form of a crescent with a maximum width of 2^0 miles
from the east end of the Caucasus around the northern third of the
Caspian Sea to the Ust-Urt Plateau west of the Aral Sea and south of
the Urals.
(5) A "branch of the Scandinavian mountain system
stretches over most of the Kola Peninsula except its south shore.
Average heights in different parts range from 500 to 2,000 feet. The
highest points are situated amid the group of extensive and highly
ramified lakes in the southwestern part of the peninsula, where Mount
Lyavachorr, "between Lakes Imandra and Umbozero, attains an elevation
of 3,893 feet.
(6) The foothills of the Urals protrude at many points
as much as 200 miles or more into the East European Plain, "but they
are much "broken up, and at a number of places more or less completely
severed from the Ural Ridge, by the numerous tributaries of the Volga
(especially the Kama) and of the Pechora. Their general height and
character are similar to those of the Volga Hills.
(7) The Crimean Mountains, geologically a spur of the
Caucasus cut off "by the Kerch Strait, extend along the southeast coast
of the peninsula from Sevastopol to the region of Feodosiya and reach
inland as much as 25 miles, the distance of Simferopol, capital of the
Crimea, from the coast. The main ridge (so-called "Yaila", meaning
"pasture" in Crimean Tatar) extends from Balaklava, southeast of
Sevastopol, to Stary Krym, west of Feodosiya, rising from both extremi ties to its highest point, Mt. Roman-Kosh, 5>O15 feet. It has a flat
surface with isolated summits. It slopes gently into the northern
valley, but drops off in rocky cliffs toward the south shore, a narrow
zone of health resorts and most highly developed agriculture.
The remaining three-fourths of the peninsula is
more or less arid lowland. Some elevations under 600 feet occur in the
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- 204'
remainder of the range ig more or less "barren and devoid of trees and
other large-size natural vegetation. The frequency of earthquakes in
Armenia indicates the recent geologic origin of the Minor Caucasus.
The Ural Mountains.
(1) The Urals are a very old mountain fold chain which
has "been much worn down " y long cycles of erosion, but still represents
b a fairly sharp dividing line "between the drainage systems of European
Bussia and Western Siberia from near the Arctic Sea as far south as
the Ural River, at 51 N. Beyond the Ural River it is continued toward
the Ust-Urt Plateau and the Aral Sea by the less distinct Mugodzhary
Range, also the remnant of a fold formation, having a maximum altitude
of 2,. 100 feet. Konstantinov Kamen, at the northern extremity of the
Urals, is 1,466 feet high, and is still covered with snow in July,
being only about 25 miles from the Kara Sea. The highest point in the
entire chain is Telpos-Iz, 5,505 feet high, on 63 0 55 N. North of
this point there are a number of peaks between 3,000 and 5,000 feet
high. South of it, they become lower: Mount Isherim (6l U N), con sidered as dividing the North from the Central Urals, is 4,325 feet
high. In the populated and industrialized part, from Nizhni Tagil
southward to the Ural River, the altitudes range between 1,500 and
3,500 feet. On the west side of the Urals, the foothills are well
developed, but on their east slope they are almost totally absent.
The slope to the pass leading over to Sverdlovsk is so gradual that
the summit is imperceptible to a traveler on the Trans-Siberian line,
which crosses at this point.
The northern and central parts of the Urals are
covered with a rich growth of many varieties of trees. Southward from
Sverdlovsk the forest covering thins out more and more though far more
rapidly on the east slope. The region around Magnitogorsk, (on the
east slope), the new metallurgical center created in the midst of a
wilderness, is almost treeless. The Central and Southern Urals are
extremely rich in a majority of the most important minerals, many of
which have been exploited for more than a century.
Siberia.
JT) The West Siberian Lowland has been more fully
described under "Hydrography", since water occupies an exceptionally
large part of it. However, in the salt-lake zone along its southern
side there are extensive areas of more or less dry steppe land. The
largest of these are:
(a) the Ishim Steppe, situated between the upper
Tobol (southwest Irtysh tributary) and the Upper Irtysh, and traversed
by the Ishim River (also a southwest Irtysh tributary);
<e. d.
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Low, short ranges, unconnected with each other, alternate rapidly with
areas of small, low, isolated hillocks having rounded contours. Entirely
level sections are rare, though the Kazakh Fold-Land resembles a steppe
in the character of its vegetation and the lack of forest.
(2) The Turgai Gates (Turgaiskiye Vorota), 20-100
miles wide and over 250 miles long, are a gap "between the Kazakh Fold-
Land and the Southern Ural Steppe. They connect the head of the Ubagan
River, a tributary of the Tobol, and the salt lake of the same name
(50 by 5-10 miles) with the head of the Turgai, a tributary of the salt
lake Chelkar-Tengiz The Turgai Gates themselves contain a large number
of small salt lakes, and a few large ones. The highest part of the gap
is "barely U00 feet above sea level, while the plateau to the west, form ing the watershed between the Turgai and the Ishim (irtysh tributary),
attains 1,000 feet above sea level. The tableland on both sides of the
gap is also known as the Turgai Mesa Land, as it consists of low, iso lated plateaus or mesas, between and around which lie steppe plains,
sandy areas or lakes.
(3) The Tarbagatai Range, marking in its eastern half
an east-west section of the Kazakh-Chinese border along hj N, extends
along the south side of the basin of Lake Zaisan, official source of
the Irtysh, toward the Turkistan-Siberian Eailroad ("Turksib"). Its
average elevation is 5*000-7,000 feet, its maximum point (Tas-Tau),
9,600 feet. Its most used pass, Khabar-Asu, 8,200 feet high, leads
over to the Chinese-Turkic town of Chuguchak, an important point on an
ancient trade route. West of the railroad, the Tarbagatai Range is
continued northwestward by the lower and more sprawling Chingiz-Tau
Mountains, which merge with the Kazakh Fold-Land around 78 0 E, thus
completing the physical dividing line between Siberia and Soviet Central
Asia.
{k) The Dzhungar Ala-Tau Range, marking in its eastern
half another east-west section of the Kazakh-Chinese border along ^5 N,
curves southwestward to the railroad and the valley of the H i , tribu tary to Lake Balkhash. On the Chinese side it reaches through the
area between Lake Ebi-Nur and the H i to join the northeast extremity
of the T'ien Shan Range around the headwaters of this river. It reaches
elevations of 15*000-16,500 feet and is covered with small glaciers,
1-3 miles long.
(5) With the exception of the Fergana Valley, and a
few smaller irrigated areas, oases and very restricted river valleys,
the lowland interior of Soviet Central Asia is one vast area of more or
less sandy wasteland, measuring about 1,^00 miles from the Tarbagatai
and Dzhungar Ala-Tau Ranges in the east to the Caspian Sea in the west,
200 to 300 miles from north to south in its eastern half, between the
Kazakh Fold-Land and th Kirgiz Highland (T'ien Shan Range), and 700
to 1,000 miles in its western half, between the Southern Urals and the
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"border with Afghanistan and Iran. The following are its most important
divisions, from east to west:
(a) The Sary-Ishik-Otrau Sands, "between Lakes Ala-
Kul and Balkhash.
(b) The Hunger Steppe (Golodnaya Step, or Betpak-
Dala), extending west from Lake Balkhash to the Sary-Su Eiver (6j-6Q
E) and south to the Chu Eiver (roughly along V? W ) ; a desert plateau,
800-950 feet above s.l., dropping from a 12-20 foot ledge toward the
Sary-Su and sloping rather gently toward the Chu.
(c) The Muyun-Kum Sands, south of the Hunger Steppe
and enclosed "between the Chu River, the Talas Ala-Tau Range and its
northwest spur, the Kara-Tau Range; average elevation 350 feet.
(d) The Kyzyl-Kum ("Red Sand") Desert, enclosed by
the Hunger Steppe, Muyun-Kum Sands and Kara-Tau Range on the east, the
highlands of Kirgizia and Tadzhikistan on the southeast, the Amu-Darya
River on the southwest, and the Aral Sea on the west; covered almost
entirely with stationary eand and sandhills. Throughout the Kyzyl-Kum,
areas of sandhills alternate with takyrs, smooth, hard, clayey areas
like a par^uetted floor, in the depressions "between the sandhill ridges.
In the early spring these fill with water, forming lakes, sometimes a
dozen or more miles long, which dry out "by the end of April or May. In
other seasons, the Kyzyl-Kum is almost inaccessible "because of the
nearly total lack of water, though it contains ancient irrigation sys tems and fortifications of "burnt "brick. The southeast corner of this
desert, southwest of Tashkent and the Syr-Darya River and west of the
mouth of the Fergana Valley, is also known as the Hunger Steppe, --to
"be distinguished from the much larger Hunger Steppe described above
under No. 2. In this arid forest plain, extensive irrigation works
had "been completed and were partly under construction even "before the
First World War; under the Soviet regime they have "been considerably
expanded. The Kyzyl-Kum as a whole declines toward the Turanian Low land, which extends from the Aral Sea to a distance of 50-100 miles
and is included in the desert.
(e) The Kara-Kum ("Black Sand") Desert, covering
most of the area "between the Amu-Darya on the northeast, the Afghan
border, the Caspian Sea and the Ust-Urt Plateau on the northwest, and
extending some 600 miles from southeast to northwest and 200-300 miles
from northeast to southwest. Most of it is lower than the Kyzyl-Kum
Desert. The sands alternate between dunes and sand steppe. The hills
vary from a few feet to 25-35 feet, the usual height being 20-25 feet.
They are irregular in shape, but all their slopes are gentle and rein forced with vegetation. Parallel sand ridges, with slightly undulating
crests usually 50-70 feet high, are scattered throughout the northwest
part of the desert as far east as 59 E (east of Ashkhabad). The
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distance "between them is usually 200-280 feet, "but ranges from 150 to
700 feet. The depressions are characterized by the formation of takyrs,
as in the Kyzyl-Kum Desert.
(f) The Ust-Urt Plateau, occupying most of the
area "between the Aral Sea, the Amu-Darya Delta, the Kara-Kum Desert
(on the south), the Mangyshlak Peninsula of the Caspian Sea and the
North Caspian Lowland; a monotonous plain of horizontal strata of clay
and stone, covered with sand or salt lakes, and surrounded on all four
sides "by precipices, which are 88 feet a"bove the level of the Aral Sea,
up to 1,000 feet above the level of the Caspian Sea, and are almost
everywhere clearly defined.
(g) The Bolshiye Barsuki ("Big Badger") Sands,
6-27 miles wide and about 125 miles long, extending northward from the
northwest side of the Aral Sea, and the 50-mile long Malyye Barsuki
("Little Badger") Sands, to the east of the former.
. Border Passages and Ranges of Asiatic Russia. The
border between Asiatic Russia on the one hand and Iran, Afghanistan,
China and Mongolia on the other is for the most part marked by high
mountain ridges. The only important gaps in these border chains are:
(l) Border Passages.
(a) The 60-mile broad Southeast Caspian Lowland,
which extends 1+0-50 miles over into Iran. A strip of lowland shore at
least one mile broad reaches westward along the south shore of the
Caspian and is followed by the railroad from the Caspian port of
Bender-Shah, in the southwestern extremity of the Southeast Caspian
Lowland, to Teheran.
(b) The 100-mile broad sand-desert valley of the
Amu-Darya, nearly all of which lies in Afghanistan, since a number of
north-south spurs of the Tadzhik Highland abut on the north side of
the river. But to the south and east of the valley lies the mighty
barrier of the Hindukush, watershed between the Amu-Darya and the
basins of the Indus and the Tarim (in Chinese Turkestan), reaching
altitudes of more than 25,000 feet.
(c) The gap of the Kok-Shaal River through the
Kok-Shaal-Tau Range at ^0 55' N, 76 k^ E, connecting southeast
Kirgizia with the Kashgar basin.
(d; The 111 Valley, leading over to Kuldzha (in
Chinese Turkestan), beyond which it is shut in by the convergence of
the Dzhungar Ala-Tau and T'ien Shan Ranges, which extend along the
north and south of the valley from Kazakhstan and Kirgizia, respec tively. From Sary-Ozek, on the railroad 10^ miles north of Alma-Ata,
a highway runs along the north side of the 111 Valley into the Chinese
province of Sinkiang, where it turns northeastward across the 5 8 9 9
- 209
feet high Talki Pass in the Dzhungar Range to Lake Ebi-Nur, whence it
rims eastward to Hami, and on to Lanchow and Chungking.
(e) The Dzhungar Gates (Dzhungarskiye Vorota), a
waterless gap 5 to 10 miles wide, extending south-southeastward from
Lake Ala-Kul across the Kazakh-Chinese border to the region of Lake
Ebi-Nur and separating the east end of the Dzhungar Ala-Tau Range from
the Barlyk Range in China.
(f) The 30-mile "broad valley of the Chyorny (Black)
Irtysh, which rises in the Mongolian Desert southwest of the Mongolian
part of the Altai Mountains, crosses the "border at kQ N and empties
into Lake Zaisan, considered the source of the Irtysh.
(2) Border Ranges, Between the Southeast Caspian Low land and the Kara-Kum Desert the Iranian border range of Kopet-Dag
protrudes some 75 miles into Soviet territory. The western edge of
this spur lies approximately on 55 E. Its northeastern edge is delim ited by the Ashkhabad railroad. It reaches a maximum elevation of
9*685 feet on Soviet territory, in Mt. Vazarash, southwest of Ashkhabad.
It has only a few small streams and scant forest.
From this spur to the Amu-Darya Valley the boundary
skirts the foothills of the great mountain systems of Iran and
Afghanistan. Thence eastward to Lake Zor-Kul (source of the Pamir),
it is marked by the Amu-Darya, Pyandzh and Pamir Rivers. The remainder
of the Soviet border, from Lake Zor-Kul to Transbaikalia, follows in
general the crests of some of the highest ridges in the Pamirs of
Tadzhikistan, the T'ien Shan Ranges of Kirgizia, and the Altai and
Sayan Ranges of south central Siberia. The following are the principal
ridges forming this boundary line:
(a) The Vakhan Range, between Lake Zor-Kul and
the southwest extremity of the Tadzhik Republic. The Bender Pass, 25
miles east of Lake Zor-Kul, is around 15,000 feet high.
(b) The Sary-Kol Range, forming the eastern
boundary of Tadzhikistan and the watershed between the Ak-Su, indirect
tributary of the Pyandzh, and the Yarkend-Darya basin in Chinese
Turkistan. The few passes over it exceed 1^,000 feet. The important
Beik Pass, near its southern end, where it merges with the Vakhan
Range and the Hindukush, is 15*3^0 feet high.
(c) The Kok-Shaal-Tau Range, marking the eastern
boundary of the Kirgiz Republic with the Kashgar Basin. The Kugart
Pass (7U 0 30' E. kO6 20' N) is about 12,000 feet high; the Bedel Pass,
in the middle of the range southeast of Lake Issyk-Kul, over 13,000
feet high. There are many glaciers throughout the range, and an espe cially heavy concentration in a 15-mile section on either side of
Dankov Peak, 17,700 feet high, about 70 miles south of Bedel Pass,
> r^i
:
The eastern extremity of the Kirgiz Republic, embracing a roughly cir cular area 55-65 miles in diameter, is occupied "by a solid nucleus of
glacier-covered mountains, the Khan-Tengri, with Khan-Tengri Peak,
22,735 feet high, and others over 20,000 feet.
(d) The Sailyugem-Shapshal Range of the Altai
Mountains (see "below), "between the Chyorny Irtysh Valley and 89 E.
(e) The Western Sayan Range, winding from 89 to
96 E in a generally northeast or east-northeast direction along the
Mongolian Border, from the Altai Mountains to the east "boundary of the
Krasnoyarsk Krai. The altitudes of the main ridge are from 5,000 to
9,200 feet, those of the passes from 6,000 to 7,000 feet. It rises
"beyond the timber line (5,700-6,200 feet) throughout, and the crest is
mostly jagged with sharp peaks, and has numerous small lakes and tarns
on "both slopes. The Shabin-Daban Pass (91 35' E ) , leading from the
Abakan "basin into Mongolia, is 6,700 feet high. A main thoroughfare
from Abakan -Minusinsk crosses the main ridge from the Us Valley (paral lel to the main ridge) to Kyzyl on the Mongolian part of the Yenisei
in the Tuva People's Republic, over an unnamed pass 5,655 feet high.
North of the main ridge there are a number of secondary ranges.
(f) The Eastern Sayan Range, very sparcely popu lated and one of the least known areas in Siberia, runs southeastward
from a point not far southwest of Krasnoyarsk, unites with the north east end of the Western Sayan Range and continues southeast along the
Mongolian "border to the Dzhida and Selenga Rivers, south of the south west end of Lake Baikal. Its highest point, Mount Munku-Sardyk, on the
"border north of the Mongolian Lake Kosogol or Khubsugul-Dalai, has an
elevation of 11,210 feet, and is the source of several of the large
glaciers of the range. The few passes are 6,000 to 8,000 feet high.
The Eastern Sayan as a rule slopes gently toward the north and east
(toward the Irkutsk amphitheater) and steeply toward the upper Yenisei
and Lake Kosogol (101 30f E, in Mongolia). The prevalent forms are
massive and rounded, with "broad, level or slightly undulating crests,
over which sometimes rise level summits. On the upper parts there are
small glaciers and snowfields, "but scattered rocks predominate. The
snowline is at 9,^00 feet on the north slope, at 10,000 on the south
slope; the timber line, at 6,500-7,100 feet. The Eastern Sayan Range
sends out a large number of spurs, 5,000 to 9,500 feet high, northwest ward or northward toward the Trans-Siberian Railroad.
The Tadzhik and Kirgiz Highlands.*
(l) The general direction of the ridges within this
highland area is from east to west. Those of the Kirgiz Republic abut
on the border range (Kok-Shaal-Tau), as the principal rivers here cut
* Map 15.
h.
- 211
across the "border. Those of the Tadzhik Republic are largely separated
from the "border range (Saryk-Kol) by rivers (Ak-Su, Ak-Baital, Muz-Kol,
Kara-Dzhilga) running parallel to the "border range, and "by Lake Kara-Kol.
in the northeast corner of the Republic. However, the valleys them selves lie at elevations of 10,000 to 1^,000 feet, so that the entire
territory of the MountainouB Badakhshan (Gorno-Badakhshanskaya) Autono mous Ob last, occupying the eastern half of the Tadzhik Republic, is a
single, unbroken mass of highland, the Pamir Highland, measuring some
180-200 miles east to west and 90-110 miles from north to south. A
zone with a maximum width of 30 miles on either side of the "border be tween the Oblast and the western half of Tadzhikistan J.s a vast glacier
area, culminating in Stalin Peak (72 E, 59 N ) , 2^,359 feet high, at
the eastern end of the Peter the Great Range (maximum altitude over
20,000, passes 11,000-12,000 feet). It is separated from the Trans-
Alai Range by the Muk-Su, indirect tributary of the Amu-Darya. The
Darvaz Range, paralleling the Peter the Great Range on the south, is
equally high and contains many glaciers.
(2) The eastern half of Tadzhikistan is separated from
the Kirgiz Republic by the Trans-Alai (Zaalaiski) Range; the western
half by the Alai and Turkestan Ranges. All three have large glacier
areas. Lenin (formerly Kaufman) Peak (73 E ) , 23,162 feet high, is
one of the highest points in the Soviet Union. To the west of Lenin
Peak is the Ters-Agar Pass, 12,^92 feet high; to the east of it, the
Kyzyl-Art Pass, 13>9l6 feet high. The Alai Range, extending along the
north side of the Alai Valley (valley of the Kyzyl-Su, Amu-Darya
tributary) into Kirgizia as far as the southeast end of the Fergana
Range, is the main watershed between the basins of the Syr-Darya and
the Amu-Darya. Its principal pass is the Taldyk Pass, 11,860 feet
high, which is crossed by an old cart road, now converted into a motor
road, leading from Osh, at the head of the Fergana Valley, to the Alai
Valley. From the Alai Valley this road continues southward across the
Trans-Alai Range by the 13,920-foot high Kyzyl-Art Pass, then along
the east side of Lake Kara-Kol, across the 15,315-foot high Ak-Baital
Pass, down the Ak-Baital River to the Murgab and across the Naiza-Tash
Pass, then westward through the southern part of the High Pamirs
through the Alichur Valley, across the 13,600-foot high Tagarkaty Pass
and the 1^, 100-foot high Koi-Tezek Pass and finally down the valleys
of the Tokuz-Bulak and Gunt Rivers to Khorog (37 30f W ) , on the
Pyandzh River and the Afghan border. From Murgab, on the Murgab River,
a cart road runs up the Ak-Su River valley into the southeast corner
of Tadzhikistan.
(3) The Fergana Range, 120 miles long, extends north westward from the junction of the Alai and Kok-Shaal-Tau Ranges along
the northeast side of the Fergana Valley to the Naryn River. It has
an average elevation of 1^,000 to 15,000 feet and contains a number of
broad around the tangent between these two ranges is covered with
numerous glaciers, up to 6 miles in length.
(7) Both the Kirgiz Range and the Trans-Ili Ala-Tau
drop steeply to the northern plain and their upper parts are traversed
"by a "broad "belt of fir forest, usually wreathed in rain or snow clouds.
i . The Altai Mountain SyBtem.* The Altai Mountains extend
. from the northeastern extremity of the Kazakh Republic through the
Altai Krai (District) to the western end of the Western Sayan Range
(89 0 E). Their snow covering is heavy and they have numerous glaciers.
The snow line is between 10,000 and 7,800 feet.** The Altai ranges
become gradually lower toward the north and west where they merge into
the steppe land.
(1) The so-called Inner Altai occupies the southern
part of the Altai Krai, along and north of the Kazakh border. Its
southernmost range, the Kholzun Belki, is 90 miles long, 6,000-9,000
feet high, only a little above the snow line, with small snow fields
and hanging glaciers. The summits and watersheds are flat and often
swampy. The Kazakh border is continued southeastward by the Listvyaga
Range, having a maximum elevation of 8,320 feet and rising little above
the timberline.
(2) North of the Listvyaga Range and almost completely
encircled by the Katun, Argut and Kok-Su Rivers lie the Katun Belki,
the highest mountains in the Russian part of the Altai (as distinguished
from the Mongolian part). The average altitude is about 10,000 feet
and they are covered with eternal snow throughout their entire length,
down to 8,500-7,800 feet on the north slope and to 10,000-8,700 feet
on the south slope. In the central and eastern parts there are solid
ice caps up to 25 miles in breadth. The Belukha, about 1^,800 feet
high on its east summit, 1^,700 feet on its west summit and 13,300 n
its saddle, is the tallest peak in the entire Altai. It is located ap proximately in the middle of the Katun Belki, at the tip of a northward
loop in the Kazakh border. The total area of its glaciers is about
23 square miles.
(3) East of the Argut River, the Southern Chuya Belki
reach eastward to the Sailyugem border range. They attain their highest
point in Mount Dzhan-Iiktu, around 13,000 feet high, and have 5 large
See Map l6.
Because of their more or less extensive covering of perpetual snow,
the main ranges are known as "Belki" or "Whites", plural of belok,
"the white of an egg or the eye", sometimes also rendered by
U
T!
- 214
- 215
north, curves northward "between the east side of Lake Teletskoye and
the left shore of the Bolshoi ("Big") Abakan River and forms the water shed between the headwaters of the Yenisei and the Biya, a tributary of
the Ob.
(9) The west and east boundaries of the southeastern
panhandle of the Novosibirsk Oblast mark the crests of the two north ward continuations of the Abakan Range which enclose the Kuznetsk Valley,
containing the "Kuzbas" (Kuznetsk Basin) mining and industrial area;
(a) on the west, the gold-bearing Salair Ridge,
beginning northeast of Lake Teletskoye. It is 150 miles long, but not
high: Mount Kopna, in the north, is less than 2,000 feet high;
(b) on the east, the Kuznetski Ala-Tau (scientific
name), known to the natives only under various other names. It reaches
elevations of 7^000 feet in its southern part, east of Stalinsfc , but
does not exceed 5>000 in its middle, east of Leninsk-Kuznetski, and
toward the Trans-Siberian Railroad it gradually passes over into undu lating plains. The peaks of the southern part of the Kuznetski Ala-Tau
are covered with snow nearly all summer.
3. WEATHER o
- 216
Leningrad, Moscow and Voronezh lie roughly in the same belt as the Aral
Sea and Lake Balkhash, with a mean daily temperature "below freezing for
120-150 days, and Arkhangelsk and Sverdlovsk lie in the same "belt as
Karaganda and northeast Kazakhstan, with a mean daily temperature "below
freezing for 150-180 days. The region of Lake Peipus, only some 125
miles southwest of Leningrad, has as few days of mean daily temperature
below freezing as the north shore of the Caspian Sea and Alma-Ata,
namely 110 to 120. These phenomena are due mainly to the fact that the
ice-free North and Barents Seas exert an absolutely greater tempering
influence in winter than in summer, when their moderating efficiency is
reduced by the great masses of icebergs passing into them from the
Arctic.
In the larger part of Siberia, average January tempera tures are below -k F, while July temperatures, even in the northern
half, sometimes considerably exceed the mean temperatures of the hottest
parts of Soviet Central Asia. At Verkhoyansk (in the upper Yana Valley,
east of the Lena, only 1 within the Artie Circle), where the lowest
temperatures (-9U0 F) in the world, not excluding the polar regions,
have been recorded, temperatures as high as 9^ F have been recorded
in June-August; and the mean temperature during the same period is 56 0
(60.3 in July), though the thermometer has been known to sink to 18 F
during that period. At Tomsk the mean June-August temperature is 62,
the maximum 96 0 , the minimum 28; at Krasnoyarsk, 63.1, 103 and 2k,
respectively; at Yeniseisk, 62.9j 96 and 30, respectively; at
Ashkhabad, in the Kara-Kum Desert, 83.7> 113 and 53> respectively;
and at Termez, on the Afghan border, 87.3 average and 118 maximum;
at Astrakhan, 7^-6, 110 and U30, respectively. The remarkably hot
though short summers throughout Siberia make agriculture possible even
beyond the Arctic Circle.
No part of the Soviet Union is absolutely free from
frost. Even in Tashkent and the Fergana Valley freezing weather is
frequent enough to exclude the profitable raising of citrus fruits,
though they are much better protected from the north winds than are
the cotton-growing Amu-Darya lowlands. Even the middle course of the
Syr-Darya River freezes. In the whole northern hemisphere, the only
other rivers that freeze farther south are those of Northern China.
On the Caspian shore, the winters are warmer than in the plains and
valleys of Soviet Central Asia, since the middle and southern parts of
this great inland sea do not freeze, and warm winds are not v&re.
Krasnovodsk has a mean January temperature of yj ,h, as compared with
32.9 at Ashkhabad, and its December-February minimum is 1, as compared
with -lh at Ashkhabad. The mean summer temperature in the Transcaspian
area is above 86 F, considerably higher than at the equator.
- 217
For details of freezes and thaws in the Volga, Yenisei, etc., see
under "Hydrography."
- 218
kO to 2^0 miles along the north and south side of the 5OO-56O mm. zone,
and reaches down along the east side of the Sea of Azov, the south shore
of the Crimea (see belov) and around the foothills of the Northern and
Southeastern Major Caucasus.
On the Crimean Peninsula, an anomaly with respect to
rainfall, the precipitation increases from less than 300 mm. (11.8
inches) in the north to ^00-500 mm. (15.7-19-9 inches) in the south
part of the steppe and in the foothills, and even more in their forested
parts. The maximum, about 1,000 mm. (39. *- inches) falls on the southern
4 mountain ridge (Yaila). In the main, the Crimea is poor in rainfall.
Many places suffer from water shortage, sometimes water must be carried
from one village to another. The regions of Kerch and Yevpatoriya are
particularly dry, but in the latter there is a vast supply of ground
water at a depth of 15-30 feet, which is pumped up by large plants.
Elsewhere great reservoirs have been built or were under construction
before the present war.
The main ridges of the Major Caucasus, save for its
eastern extremity, lie in the 500-1*000 m . zone, together with western
Transcaucasia (west of the Surami Range). Sukhum has an annual precip itation of 1,000 mm., and the region of Batum (Adzharistan) has 2,^00 mm.
(9^-5 inches), the rainfall here being by far the heaviest in the
Soviet Union throughout the year and very favorable for the growing of
tea. The region of Lenkoran, on the southwest side of the Caspian Sea,
receives 1,000 mm., also distributed more or less equally throughout
the year. The Armenian plateau, eastern Azerbaidzhan and Dagestan
(eastern end of the Caucasus), on the other hand, receive only 250-300
mm. (about 10-12 inches) a year, and require irrigation. The south
slope of the Minor Caucasus belongs mostly to this zone, the north
slope to the ^00-500 mm. zone.
The Kirgiz, Eungei Ala-Tau and Trans-Ili Eanges of
northern Kirgizia, together with the basin of Lake Issyk-Kul and the
region around Alma-Ata, are covered by an isolated 500 mm. zone, where
300 mm. of rain fall during the summer half of the year.
Outside the main 1+00-500 mm. zone described above, the
amount of precipitation in general diminishes progressively toward the
Arctic, Black, Caspian and Aral Seas, and the Lena River valley.
Odessa, the northern part of the Crimea, Saratov, Chkalov (Orenburg)
and Omsk are in the 300-i<-00 mm. (about 12-16 in.) belt, likewise the
Kola Peninsula, Igarka on the lower Yenisei and the greater part of
the basins of the Yenisei tributaries, the Upper (Angara), Middle and
Lower Tunguska Rivers. The rainfall in Siberia is usually sufficient
- 219
- 220
excrement during the winter often proves difficult, and conditions this
spring have been unusually bad. The spring thaws disseminate sewage
over large areas and contaminate supplies of drinking water.
Eussian troops are required to "bathe at least three
times a month, except during the winter months, when they bathe only
as the opportunity occurs. Shower trucks, disinfecting stations, etc.,
are said to be at their disposal, but it is extremely doubtful that
they are sufficiently numerous or well organized to serve the entire
army adequately.
It is the established policy of the Red Army to billet
troops in private houses wherever possible, but its regulations pre scribe that they bivouac outside a community if contagious diseases
are found in it or if it is within easy reach of enemy fire. When the
community is small, first choice of quarters is given to the hospital
unit, cavalry needing shed cover, and the staff.
Special attention is paid in the Red Army to the care
of the feet and the trimming of toenails. The regulations prescribe
that the hair should be cut short, but not shaven (as is done by many
Russians in the summer). During the march, soldiers are advised to
put white handkerchiefs under their hats, but never to remove their
hats. In cold weather, they are advised to wrap paper over their socks
and, if possible, to cover their faces with vaseline or grease. They
are warned not to sit or lie on the snow during halts. Before a march,
especially on a hot day, the troops are directed to drink their fill of
water, eat bread well sprinkled with 8 grams of salt ( a little less
than a teaspoonful), then drink more water until their thirst is fully
quenched. On the march and during the first two short halts no water
at all is drunk. On the third short halt, after resting for 5 minutes,
1 to 2 glasses of water are drunk in small swallows, the water being
kept in the mouth a long time. During the long halt and also after
a rest of 15 to 20 minutes, not more than 2 glasses of water are drunk.
The meal during the long halt includes not less than 10 grams (l tea spoon) of salt with bread. After eating and before starting after the
long halt, the men drink their fill of water.
Medical Facilities.
(1) Personnel"! Red Army doctors working at the front
must have military knowledge as well as medical training, and must
understand complex military operations. Seven percent of the wounded
officers are doctors. More than 50 percent of the Red Army doctors,
75 percent of the dentists and 50 percent of the nurses are women. Al most all the auxiliaries are women. The women who go to the actual
- 223
front are volunteers who are put in special medical brigades. They
are expected to endure the same hardships as the men at the front.
Every group of 200 men has k men-nurses for first aid. One man in
charge of 25 soldiers always remains near them, bandages wounds and
also tries to assure protection against a second wound by temporarily
sheltering the wounded man in a less exposed place, such as a small
trench, until he can be removed to the rear. He must also take immedi ate measures to protect the wounded against the cold with blankets,
sheepskins and chemical warmers.
In 1938, an official Soviet journal gave the total
number of physicians in the Soviet Union as around 110,000, compared
with 19,785 in 1913.
(2) Hospitals and Beds. Russian authorities assert
that there are between 600 and 1,000 large sanitary bases distributed
in the rear of the divisions. They regard the following disposition
of beds as a necessary minimum, though it is not known to what extent
it is being filled: 15 beds per 100 men in action, 30 percent being
in the rear of each army, U5 percent further back from the front and
the rest in the hinterland. They claim to have thousands of hospitals
averaging 500 beds, and often with as many as 2,000. All treatment
is guided by the one aim of sending the men back to the front as soon
as possible. Six or eight hospitals are attached to each Army, one
or two specializing in radiology, orthopedics, etc. Only those
casualties who may be made fit for further service are given special
treatment. There is a vast radiological organization, with mobile
posts at the front and large centers in the rear. The wounded, after
first aid, are picked up on the battlefield as soon as possible and
taken to the battalion first aid post, about 500 yards behind, then
further back to the regimental post, where they get tea, food, and
alcohol. Ambulances for transportation to the rear are heated with
coal and contain padded sleeping bags, furs, etc.
In 1938, an official Soviet journal gave the total
number of hospital beds in the Soviet Union as 672,000, compared with
175,500 in 1913. But hospital service has doubtless been preempted
by the Army to such an extent that little or none is available to the
civilian population.
(3) Medical Supplies. Before the war, medical supplies
and equipment were on hand in limited quantities only. It is known
that there have been acute shortages in certain medicines and essential
laboratory supplies in recent months. Among the supplies most urgently
requested from the United States are sulfidine, antitetanic serum,
antitoxin serum, novocaine, chlorethyl for narcotic use, and surgical
instruments of small dimensions, which have to be renewed very often,
such as scalpels, Kocher pincers, etc. ;
- 224
- 225
- 226
5.
DISTANCE TABLE.
Air Line Distances from Moscow to
Miles Alma-Ata Ankara Armavir Baku Basra Berlin Cairo Chelyabinsk Dnepropetrovsk Gorki Irkutsk Kabul Karaganda Kharkov Kiev Krasnoyarsk Krivoi Rog Leningrad 1,925 1,200 London Magnitogorsk Molotov (formerely Perm) Nizhni Tagil Novosibirsk Omsk Reykjavik Rome Rostov Sevastopol Stalingrad Stalino Stalinsk-Kuznetski Sverdlovsk Tula
Miles
1,550
870
720
81J-5 1,750 1,590 1,900 1,1*90
510
1,210
1,950
1,010
1,925
950
565
250
2,600 2,1^-0 1,520 lj-15 1*80 2,090
600 810
570 550
1,955
890
120
585
580
Ufa
Yaroslavl
750
180
6.
VITAL AREAS.
- 227
- 228
Fortifications.
a. The large system of forts constructed by the Soviets in
Western Russia, the so-called Stalin Line, was overrun by the Germans
by early July, 19lil, None of these fortifications are in Russian hands
at the present time. However, since September, 19hl, literally mil lions of people have been put to work building field fortifications
and trenches along the entire front, as far back as the Volga River,
After reaching the Volga this line extends in a general southerly di rection along the line of that river. The line has been extended clear
into the North Caucasus, Log and earth bunkers, portable concrete pill boxes, barbed wire and mines have been extensively used. Inhabited
pointsvillages, towns and citiesform the centers of resistance.
The local population provides the necessary garrison. Thus a defen sive zone 500 miles deep has been created.
b. In Northwest Russia the ports of Archangel and Murmansk
(and the coast and land areas in their vicinities) are protected by
extensive land and sea fortifications (the kinds and extent of these
fortifications are indicated by Maps 17 and 18). It may be concluded
that the coastal fortifications protecting both ports are too exten sive to permit a successful attack from the sea. However, from recent
evidence, it may be concluded that the defenses from air attack are
inadequate, at least in the case of Murmansk. The vulnerability to
air attack arises from the generally poor quality of Soviet antiair craft defenses, an apparent paucity of interceptor aircraft and lack
of heavy bombers for operations against nearby hostile airdromes and
installations. Because of the latter deficiencies German land based
bombers and long range fighter planes have bombed constantly, heavily
and successfully British and United States convoys during the approach
to Murmansk and after arrival at the port.
. The Caucasus Mountain range, arising from the foothills
of the North Caucasus and running in a southeast direction about 700
miles from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea, forms a tremendous natural
barrier against an invasion of Transcaucasia from the north. There
are only three passes over the Caucasus, all of which could easily be
made inaccessible to an enemy force. The only land routes for by passing the Caucasus Mountains are the Black Sea coast road or the nar row strip of passable but difficult terrain between the Caucasus Moun tains and the Caspian Sea coast. Both of these routes, especially the
former, are hard for any type of force to traverse and are easily
defensible because of their narrowness and the high ground which over looks them from the land side.
- 229
- 230
NORTHERN WATERS
1. 2. Murmansk Polyarnoye
3.
Kandalaksha
U.
Kern
(See Map 17)
5.
Belomorsk
6. Solovets
7. Archangel: a.Modyngski Island
(See Map
k k k
batteries k k
h h h
6
3 3
3 3
7.1?
>cuns (uncertain)
gun*.
guns
A.A. guns
guns
guns
guns
guns
guns
guns
A .A. guns
18)
b.Yagri Island
c.2j mi. VJ. of
Nikolski Monastery d.Modyngski Island, Nikolski Island,
Hanni Island, Kego
Island, Yagri Island,
Molotovsk.
BALTIC SEA
Leningrad:
a.Kronstadt (figures do
not include
practically
useless 6, 9
and 11 in.
guns, model
S.I? 6
6
h k
21
8 3U 58
12
10
6
U.7
3
3
guns
i i
i i
u
I I
32,000
2U,000
16,000
16,000
9,300
9,800-12,000
1877)
b.Gulf of Finland
" northeast of
~ Kronstadt:
(1) on islands
10
10
guns
it
1 *
U.7
2U,00C
l6,00C
15,OQC
- 231
Name of Place
Number of Pieces
Caliber o
Armament
(inches)
md of
Armament
field guns
A.A. guns
guns
it
it
it
tt
Range
Yards
9,300-10,900
9,800-10,900
27,000
16,000
16,UOO
15,000
9,800
9,300
9,800
U U
12
3
3
8
6
h.l
3
3
3
1U 8
2U
BIACK SEA
9.
Sevastopol:
a.Cape Ulukul
(10 miles
north of Sevastopol) b.Sevastopol (from Kacha River to Cape Khersonesski)
field guns
A.A. guns
h h
12
3
lU
12
8-12
guns
A.A. guns
guns
i t
u
i t i i i t
8 8 8 8 8
8
10
8 6 5.1
I I
U.7
8 3 6
12
I I
t i
i8
; 37 32
c.Cape Feolent
h d.Balaklava
h
(15 miles south8
east of Sevastopol)
h
no coast defense
10 Rostov-on-Don batteries
CVI
h h
howitzers
t i
A.A. guns
i t
i t
3 15 . 3
8
A.A. guns
guns
A.A. guns
i t
- 232 "
NameJ of Place
Number of Pieces
i t
i t
Range Yards
11.
Novorossisk
(Hqrs. Uth
Black Sea
Defense
Zone)
Tuapse
h h h
2 (?)
8 (?)
unknown
12
8
5.1
6
12.
t i
unknown
A.A. guns on
railway mountings
guns
i t
t i
i t
t i
13. Poti
liu Batumi
h (?)
2 (8?)
8 (12?)
12
10
(12?)
CASPIAN SEA
6
5.1
U.7
15.
Baku
9 batteries
i
8 (1 bat t rest unknown
- 233
1Factors.
- 234-
Strength and characteristics of armed forces. Mobili zation of reserves and induction of newly trained men have raised the
Army in the western front to 270 divisions, with 55 more in training.
About 12 million men are in action or in training in various echelons.
Production of strictly military supplies plus Lend-Lease aid are
sufficient to provide minimal equipment, although inadequate to replace
additional heavy losses or to sustain major offensive operations. The
efficiency of the small units is good, particularly in defense, although
vast differences exist between crack Guard units and mediocre reserves.
The engineers and artillery have been excellent; infantry and cavalry,
good; tanks, good in close support missions.
The Navy maintains significant combat units only in
the Black Sea and the Gulf of Finland. Its performance in combined
operations--landing, artillery support of coastal defenses, supply
and evacuations--has been outstanding.
The Air Forces on the western front number about
5000 airplanes, about 60$ of which are attack planes or light or
medium bombers. They are organized into some 30 Air divisions, with
total personnel strength of about 120,000. Their missions, which have
been performed fairly well, are the close support of ground troops with
the destruction of personnel and materiel in the field and the inter ception of enemy bombers. The purely defensive role of the Air Forces,
however, must be stressed.
The home guards have performed essential and heroic
services. Men, women and children have rapidly dug and erected large
systems of fortification. They have trained in spare hours to serve
as army replacements. They have fought tenaciously by the sides of
regular troops. After German occupation, they have carried on an
active and exhausting guerrilla war.
f. Military doctrines, leadership, morale and stamina.
The greatest strength of Soviet tactical doctrines has been their
fluidity and openness to experimentation. New ideas--parachutists,
tank-riding infantry men, etc.--are always being attempted. At present
the following principles appear to be stressed: thorough training of
small units, extensive infiltration and careful reconnaissance, coordi nation of all arms in small combat teams, preparation of deep perpendic ular defenses with strong points at inhabited centers.
Stalin's leadership is genuine. His mastery of
practical psychology, his intense nationalism, his knowledge of
Russia's problems, and his harsh and relentless will place him in the
tradition of previous great Russian rulers. Among military men,
--236
^ " . ' ; . ! , * .:
Timoshenko is excellent. A thoroughly trained, capable and unassum ing soldier, he was given a leading role in the reorganization of the
Army after the Finnish War. He has "been Russia's best commander in
the present war. His colleagues and students--Zhukov, Cherevichenko,
etc.,--hold other major commands.
The commanders of small units are generally well trained,
stern disciplinarians and good leaders. The political commissars are
fanatically determined to maintain the resistance of their units. The
private soldier is stolid, able to endure extreme hardships, and willing
to fight to the finish.
g. Materiel. The major advantageous trends in Soviet
materiel design have been the following: ability to operate under
adverse conditions; ease of mass production; simplicity of design; ease
of operation, maintenance and repair; and minimal use of critical ma terials. The caliber of guns is as large as possible; mortars, howitzers
and guns are sharply distinguished. Within each category, however, each
should be multi-purpose, e.g., AA and AT. In vehicles and planes, long
operating range and maximum armor are stressed. Maintenance is note worthy for its improvisation and field repair of major assemblies; fine
tooling and delicate work, on the other hand, must always be sent back
to the factories. Cold weather maintenance is ingenious and relatively
efficient.
h. Logistics. The system of ports, railroads, air fields,
roads and communications, although far too thin, was developed (even
in Tsarist times) in accordance with strategic and basic economic needs.
The Arctic supply route, limited to 80 - 90,000 tons per month during
the winter, can handle all the traffic reaching it during the summer.
The capacity of the Southern route has been considerably expanded this
year, and by the coming winter it should be able to offset the freezing
of Archangel. Soviet railroads, despite extreme deficiencies in roll ing stock, shortage of trained personnel and severe climatic conditions,
carry four times as many tons of goods per mile annually as do the
railroads of the United States. Relatively good railroad and support ing road nets exist in the Moscow and--to a lesser degree-Worth
Caucasian sectors.
Local supplies of fodder and grain are available to
some extent on the front from Tikhvin to Orel from May to September.
Manufactures within the combat zone are provided by Leningrad and
Moacow. Shipping for the support of forces is available in the Gulf
of Finland and the Black Sea.
- 237-
All able-bodied men from 16 to 50 are required to under go 110 hours of basic military training over a five months' period.
The period of training in troops is thus definitely shortened. On
occasion pre-military training units have even engaged in combat. At
least five million men, compensating for the war losses to date, have
been added to the Soviet Army in this way.
Men, forces, nor engaged impressed into duty The mobilization of women and children (12 to 55) not in the armed
in essential industry or agriculture, have been
on state or collective farms or tractor stations.
human power in the U.S.S.R. is absolutely complete,
liffil
--238
~ 239
- 240
since the beginning of the war- This loss was equivalent to the
entire first-line strength of the U.S.S.R. a year ago.
In operations, staff work, liaison and communications
have been poor. Bombardment aviation, both land and naval, has
been negligible.
L' Military doctrines, leadership, morale and stamina.
The blitzkrieg doctrine popular in the U.S.S.R, before the war nearly
proved its undoing. The Russian units massed on the western front
for offensive operations, unprepared for defense, were readily en circled. Hasty commitment of tank and air reserves--as at Sianlai- resulted in enormous losses. The blitzkrieg doctrine had to be dis carded.
Far too many politicians dominated the Red Army in
June, 19^1. Budyenny's reliance upon river barriers, his rudimentary
ideas of flank security, and his lack of appreciation of the capabil ities of tanks and combat engineers led to disaster in the Ukraine.
Voroshilov was considerably more competent; lack of aggressiveness
was his principal defect. Fortunately, these and other politicians
have been replaced by abler leaders.
g. Materiel. The development of Soviet materiel has been
seriously retarded by dependence upon foreign prototypes, and the lack
of taps and dies. As a result, most models are obsolescent; changes
in motors and frames have been particularly slow. As a whole the peak
performances of Soviet materiel are below those of other nations.
Losses and Lend-Lease aid have thoroughly complicated
materiel. By October, 19^1, even Renault tanks were being pressed
into service. The United States and Britain have added five new
types of tanks alone. A crowning touch has been the use of German
vehicles captured during the winter campaign. Consequently, the
problems of organization, supply, maintenance and replacement are
virtually inseparable.
Soviet mechanics are interested only in keeping their
materiel in action; the quality of performance is incidental.
h. Logistics. The capacity of railroads and roads to the
front strains to maintain the present forces; full simultaneous use
of Russia's manpower is logistically impossible. In fact, only in the
Moscow and Rostov sectors can rapid troop movements on a major scale
take place. Elsewhere a static defense in great depth is forced on
the Russians. This condition is aggravated for tanks, artillery
-..241
the year, and while a Japanese attack would be a major blow, Russian
resistance should " e adequate to maintain a vigorous fight and to
b protect its vital centers. On the other hand, the U,S.S.R., without
great amounts of material and considerable numbers of first-rate
troops from the U.S. and Britain, does not have the power either to
expel the Germans from its territory or to open up effectively a
Pacific theater
- 243 ~