Isaac vs A.L. Ammen Trans. Co.

, 101 Phil 1046 F: Plaintiff boarded defendant's bus as a paying passenger from Albay. The bus collided with a pick-up truck which was coming from the opposite direction trying to swerve from a pile of gravel. As a result, his left arm was completely severed. Plaintiff chose to hold defendant liable on its contractual obligation. Plaintiff brought this action for damages which the lower court dismissed holding the driver of the pick-up negligent and not that of the bus.

Issue : WON defendant observed extra-ordinary diligence or the utmost diligence of a very cautious person in avoiding the collision. YES. Held : The facts of the case show that the bus and the pick-up were approaching each other head-on. The bus swerved to the right and went over a pile of stones and gravel. Despite the efforts of the bus driver, the pick up car still hit the rear left side of the bus. The sense of caution one should observe cannot always be expected from one who is placed suddenly in a predicament where he is not given enough time to take the proper course of action under ordinary circumstances. Furthermore, plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence since he placed his left elbow outside the window. Ratio: A CC is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all circumstances. This extra-ordinary diligence required of common carriers is calculated to protect the passengers from the tragic mishaps that frequently occur in connection with rapid modern transportation. This high standard of care is imperatively demanded by the preciousness of human life and by the consideration that every person must in every way be safeguarded against all injury. Principles as to liability of CC: (1) the liability of a carrier is contractual and arises upon breach of its obligation; there is breach if it fails to exert extra-ordinary diligence accdg. to all the circumstances of each case (2) a carrier is obliged to carry its passenger with the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, having due regard for all the circumstances (3) a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently in case of death of, or injury to, passengers, it being it duty to prove that it exercised extra-ordinary diligence (4) the carrier is not an insurer against all risks of travel.

Fores vs Miranda, 105 Phil 266 F: Respondent, a professor of Fine Arts, was a passenger of a jeep registered in the name of Fores but actually operated by Carmen Sackerman. While the jeep was descending at Sta. Mesa bridge at excessive speed, the driver lost control of it causing it to swerve and hit the bridge wall resulting to injuries to its passengers including respondent who suffered a fracture of the upper right humerus. In an action for damages, the CFI awarded actual damages. The CA reduced the actual damages and added moral damages and attorney's fees.

Issue : WON the approval of the PSC is necessary for the sale of a public service vehicle even without conveying therewith the authority to operate the same. YES. Held : A transfer made without the requisite approval of the PSC is not effective and binding in so far as the responsibility of the grantee under the franchise in relation to the public is concerned. The law was designed primarily for the protection of the public interest. Issue : WON moral damages may be awarded. Held : In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation), proof of bad faith or fraud, i.e., wanton or deliberately injurious conduct, is essential to justify an award of moral damages. The exception to this is when a mishap results in the death of a passenger, in which a CC is liable to pay moral damages for the mental anguish by reason of the death of the passenger. So where the injured passenger does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. Under the law, the presumption is that common carriers acted negligently but not maliciously. The distinction between fraud, bad faith or malice in the sense of deliberate or wanton wrong doing and negligence (as mere carelessness) is too fundamental in our law to be ignored. A carrier's bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract was breached through negligence of the carrier's employees.

Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines vs IAC, 189 SCRA 159 F: Several passengers boarded the jeepney owned by spouses Mangune and driven by Manalo at Dau, Pampanga bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan. Their contract with Manalo was P24 for the trip. Upon reaching Tarlac, the right wheel of the jeepney was detached, so it was running in an unbalanced position. Manalo stepped on the brake, making a sudden U-turn and encroaching on the right of way of the other vehicles. The Phil. Rabbit bus bumped from behind the jeepney. As a result of the collision, 3 persons died while the others sustained injuries. Cases were filed against the spouses Mangune, Manalo, Phil. Rabbit and De los Reyes (driver).

Issue: Who should be held liable? the Mangunes and Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corp. (Insurance co.) Ratio: The principle of last clear chance would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. On the presumption that the drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle are guilty and the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence, the SC held that the jeep made a sudden U-turn which was so abrupt that the other driver de los Reyes did not anticipate the sudden U-turn. The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and the spouses Mangune. In culpa contractual, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, and this disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event. The driver cannot be held jointly liable with the owners of the jeep in case of breach of the contract of carriage. The contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of the driver. To make the driver jointly liable would make the carrier's liability personal instead of merely vicarious and consequently, the victim is entitled to recover only the share which corresponds to the driver.

Ong Yiu vs CA, 91 SCRA 223 F: Atty. Ong Yiu was a passenger on a PAL Cebu-Butuan flight to attend court hearings in Butuan. His suitcase was accidentally sent to Manila. PALManila sent the suitcase to Butuan but the lock had been opened and a folder containing court documents was missing. Plaintiff refused to accept the luggage. PAL-Cebu delivered the luggage to Ong Yiu with the promise to investigate the matter. Plaintiff sued and was awarded moral and exemplary damages. CA reversed holding that PAL was guilty of simple negligence and denied moral and exemplary damages but ordered PAL to pay P100, the baggage liability assumed by it under the condition of carriage printed on the back of the ticket.

Held: PAL incurred delay in the delivery of petitioner's luggage. However, there was no bad faith. The liability of PAL was limited to the stipulations printed on the back of the ticket. While the passenger had not signed the plane ticket, he is nevertheless bound by the provision thereof; such provisions have been held to be part of the contract of carriage and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation. It is what is known as a contract of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract on the other; it is not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent. A contract limiting liability upon an agree valuation does not offend against the policy of the law forbidding one from contracting against his own negligence. Considering that petitioner had failed to declare a higher value for his baggage, he cannot be permitted a recovery in excess of P 100.00. Besides, passengers are advised not to place valuable items inside their baggage. Also, there is nothing in the evidence to show the actual value of the goods allegedly lost by petitioner.

Cangco vs MRR, 38 Phil 768 Facts: supra. EE riding on train who stepped on watermelons. Held: The conduct of plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly underway was not characterized by imprudence and that he was not guilty of contributory negligence. It is not negligence per se for a traveler to alight from a slowly moving train. MRR failed to exercise due care in not providing for safe exit of its passengers. It also failed to provide adequate lighting for its station. It is impt. to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. Its liability is direct and immediate (culpa contractual), differing essentially, from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in the selection and supervision of EEs (culpa aquiliana). The liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their servants or agents, when such act or omissions cause damage which amount to the breach of a contract, is not based upon a mere presumption of the master's negligence in their selection or control, and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability for the breach of his contract. When the facts averred show a contractual undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the breach of the contract is due to willful fault or to negligence on the part of the defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to warrant recovery. The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains. That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its nonperformance could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants.

Landingin vs Pantranco, 33 SCRA 284 F: Plaintiffs are parents of 2 girls who were passengers on a Pantranco bus on an excursion trip from Dagupan to Baguio. The bus was open on one side. The TC found that the crossjoint of the bus broke and the bus started to roll back. Some passengers jumped out. The bus driver maneuvered the bus safely to the mountainside. Two of the girls who jumped were seriously injured and died.

Held : In Lasam vs Smith, the court held that accidents caused by defects in the automobile are not caso fortuito. The rationale is that the passenger has neither the choice nor control over the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and appliances in use by the carrier. When the passenger dies or is injured, the presumption is that the CC is at fault or acted negligently. This is only rebutted by proof on the carrier's part that it observed extraordinary diligence required in Art. 1733 and the utmost diligence of very cautious persons required in Art. 1755. It does not appear that the carrier gave due regard for all the circumstances with cross joints' inspection the day previous to the accident. The bus was heavily laden, and it would be traversing mountainous, circuitous and ascending road. Thus the entire bus would naturally be taxed more heavily than it would be under the ordinary circumstances. The mere fact that the bus was inspected only recently and found to be in order would not exempt carrier from liability unless it is shown that the particular circumstances under which the bus would travel were also considered.

Landicho vs BTC, 52 OG 764 F: Landicho boarded a BTC bus. Before he did so, the conductor helped him in placing his two baskets of chicken inside the running board. After a distance, he claimed that he noticed one cage falling and he called the conductor's attention who did not respond. He tried to fix it himself resulting in his fall in which he suffered injuries.

Held : The facts show that the cage was not about to fall. Plaintiff was probably dizzy or sleepy that he fell from the truck. It is true that defendant being a CC is bound to transport its passengers from the point of origin to the place of destination, but the duty does not encompass all the risks attendant to a passenger in transit, for then the co. would be a good source of stipend for a family who would like to end it all by simply boarding, paying the fare and intentionally falling off. It is enough for the CC's EEs to see to it that the passenger places himself safely inside the vehicle, that it is operated carefully and that its mechanism is perfectly alright to prevent mishaps. It would be unreasonable to exact upon operators to determine beforehand whether a passenger is likely to fall dizzy or sleepy on the way, for that is the lookout of the passenger himself. A passenger must see to it that he seats himself in a safe portion of the vehicle.

Necesito vs Paras, 105 Phil 75 F: A mother and son boarded a passenger autotruck of the Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines. While entering a wooden bridge, its front wheels swerved to the right, the driver lost control and the truck fell into a creek. The mother drowned; the son was injured.

Held : While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers, it should nevertheless be held answerable for the flaws of its equipment if such flaws were discoverable. The liability of the CC rests upon negligence or his failure to exercise the utmost degree of diligence that the law requires. The rationale of CC's liability for manufacturing defects is the fact that the passenger has neither choice nor control over the carrier in the selection and use of the eqpt. and appliances in use by the carrier. Having no privity whatever with the manufacturer or vendor of the defective eqpt, the passenger has no remedy against him. In this case, the defect could have been detected with the exercise of utmost diligence by the CC.

La Mallorca vs CA, 17 SCRA 739 F: Husband and wife together with minor children boarded a La Mallorca bus. They alighted from the bus. The father returned to the bus to get their baggage. He was followed by his daughter. While the father was still on the running board awaiting for the conductor to give his baggage, the bus stated to run so that the father had to jump. His daughter was run over and was killed. The bus co. contended that when she was killed, she was no longer a passenger and the contract of carriage had terminated.

Held: Whether or not the relation between carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's premises is to be determined from the circumstances. In this case, there was no utmost diligence. The driver stopped the bus but did not turn off the engine. He started to run the bus even before the conductor gave him the signal. The presence of passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and the duration of the responsibility still exists.

Bataclan vs Medina, 102 Phil 181 F: The bus of Medina Trans left Cavite for Pasay with 18 passengers. Around dawn, the front tires burst and the vehicles began to zigzag until it fell into a canal and turned turtle. Some passengers were able to get out while four were trapped including Bataclan. Later, 10 men came to help, one of them carrying a lighted torch, fueled by petroleum. A fire started, burning the bus and the 4 passengers. Gas had leaked when the bus overturned.

Held: The proximate cause of the death was the overturning of the vehicle which was followed by the negligence of the driver and the conductor who were on the road walking back and forth. They should have known that with the position of the bus, leakage was possible aside from the fact that gas when spilled can be smelled from a distance. The failure of the driver and conductor to have cautioned or taken steps to warn rescuers not to bring a lighted torch too near the bus constitutes negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier. Aboitiz vs CA 179 SCRA 95 F: A farmer boarded a boat owned by Aboitiz at Mindoro bound for Manila. When the vessel arrived, Pioneer Stevedoring took over control of the cargoes loaded at the vessel and placed its crane alongside the vessel. One hour after he disembarked, he went back to get his cargo but the crane hit him and he died.

Held: Aboitiz is still liable for his death under the contract of carriage. The relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock. Once created the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers and what is reasonable time is to be determined from all circumstances and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. The CC-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his destination if the person remains in the premises to claim his baggage. The test is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the passenger near the vessel. A CC is bound to carry its passengers as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person with due regard for all circumstances. Bachelor Express vs CA 188 SCRA 217 F: Bus No. 800 owned by Bachelor Express and driven by Cresencio Rivera was the situs of a stampede which resulted in the death of passengers Beter and Rautrat. The bus came from Davao City on its way to Cagayan de Oro passing Butuan City. While in Tabon-Tabon, Butuan, the bus picked up a passenger. A passenger suddenly stabbed a PC soldier which caused commotion and panic among the passengers. Two passengers jumped out (finding of the TC which was reversed by the CA) of the bus and were found dead as a result of head injuries. The passenger- assailant ran away from the bus but was killed by the police. The parents of the dead passengers filed a complaint for a sum of money against the CC, the owner and the driver. The CC denied liability and alleged that the driver was able to transport his passengers safely to their respective places of destination except for the two passengers who jumped off the bus without the knowledge and consent, much less, the fault of the driver; that the CC exercised due diligence in the choice of its EEs to avoid as much as possible accidents; that the incident was not a traffic or vehicular accident but was an incident very much beyond the control of the CC; that the CC was not a party to the incident as it was an act of a third party who is not in any way connected with the CC and of which they have no control and supervision. The CC argued that the incident's proximate cause was the act of the passenger who ran amuck and which triggered off the commotion and panic. The TC dismissed the complaint. The CA reversed and ordered the CC, the owner and driver solidarily liable to the heirs of the deceased.

Held : The CC is liable for the death of the passengers. Bachelor Express as a CC is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious person, with due regard for all the circumstances. In this case where passengers suffered injuries which caused their death, under 1756, the CC is presumed to have acted negligently unless it can prove that it had observed extraordinary diligence. The CC raised the defense of caso fortuito. Art. 1174 provides that no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen were inevitable. In Lasam vs Smith, the SC held that a caso fortuito must have the following elements: (1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence must be independent of the human will; (2) It must be impossible to foresee the event; (3) The occurrence must be so as to render it impossible for the debtor to

fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (4) The obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of the incident and is within the context of force majeure. However, in order that a CC may be absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused by force majeure. The CC must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such accident. It must prove that there was no negligence or lack of care and diligence on the part of the CC. The TC and the CA had conflicting findings of fact. The SC upheld the findings of the CA-- the driver did not immediately stop the bus at the height of the commotion; the bus was speeding from a full stop; the victims fell from the bus door when it was opened or gave way while the bus was still running; the conductor panicked and blew his whistle after people had already fallen off the bus; the bus was not properly equipped with doors in accordance with law. It is therefore clear that the petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of fault and negligence found in the law governing CCs. The CC's argument that it is not an insurer of its passengers deserves no merit in view of the failure of the CC to prove that the deaths of the 2 passengers were exclusively due to force majeure and not to the failure of the CC to observe extra-ordinary diligence in transporting safely the passengers to their destinations as warranted by law. De Gillaco vs MRR, 97 Phil 884 F: Plaintiff's husband was a passenger in the train from Calamba to Manila. When the train reached the Paco Railroad, a train guard of MRR was in the station waiting for the same train to take him to Tutuban to report for duty. He had a long standing grudge against Gillaco and he shot and killed him upon seeing him inside the train coach.

Held : While a passenger is entitled to protection from personal violence by the CC or its agents or EEs, the responsibility of the CC extends only to those acts that the CC could foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree of care and diligence required of it. The OCC did not impose upon CC the absolute liability for assaults of their EEs upon the passengers. The act of the guard was entirely unforeseeable by MRR which had no means to ascertain or anticipate that the two would meet nor could it foresee every personal rancor that might exist between its EEs and its passengers. The shooting was a caso fortuito, both being unforeseeable and inevitable under the circumstances. When the crime took place, the guard had no duties to discharge. His position would be that of a passenger also waiting transportation and not of an EE assigned to discharge duties.

Maranan vs Perez, 20 SCRA 412 F: A passenger in a taxicab was stabbed and killed by the driver. The driver claimed self defense since accdg to him, he was stabbed first by the passenger. The taxicab operator claimed caso fortuito. Held: The NCC unlike the OCC makes the CC absolutely liable for intentional assaults committed by its EEs upon its passengers (Art. 1754). The CC's liability is based on either (1) respondeat superior or (2) the CC's implied duty to transport the passenger safely. Under respondeat superior (w/c is the minority view), the CC is liable only when the act of the EE is within the scope of his authority and duty. Under the second view, the CC is liable as long as the assault occurs within the course of the performance of the EE's duty. It is no defense that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the CC's orders. The CC's liability is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its own EEs. Three cogent reasons underlie this rule : (1) the special undertaking of the CC requires that it furnish the passengers the full measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed in the law, from violence and insults in the hands of strangers, other passengers, and from its own servants charged with the passenger's safety; (2) liability is based on the CC's confiding in the servant's hands the performance of his contract to safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith the duty of protecting the passenger with utmost care prescribed by law; (3) as between the CC and the passenger, the CC must bear the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the CC's EEs against passengers since it has the power to select and remove them. It is the CC's obligation to select its drivers with due regard not only to their technical competence and physical ability but also to their total personality, including patterns of behavior, moral fiber, and social attitude. Pilapil vs CA 180 SCRA 546 F: While on a bus, an unidentified bystander hurled a stone at the bus and hit Pilapil above his left eye. He sustained some injuries to his eye.

Held: The law does not make the CC an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers. Art. 1755 qualifies the duty of the CC in exercising vigilance to only such as human care and foresight can provide. The presumption created by law against the CC is rebuttable by proof that the CC had exercised extraordinary diligence in the performance of its obligations and that the injuries suffered were caused by fortuitous events. The liability of the CC necessarily rests upon its negligence, or its failure to exercise the degree of diligence required by law. Under Art. 1763, the diligence required, with regards to its liability in cases when intervening acts of strangers directly caused the injury, is the diligence only of a good father of a family and not the extraordinary diligence generally required. The rule is not so exacting as to require one charged with its exercise to take doubtful or unreasonable precautions to guard against unlawful acts of strangers. The CC would only be negligent if the tort caused by a third person could have been foreseen and prevented by them. The injury was in no way connected to the performance of the obligation of the bus company. It was caused by a stranger, over which the carrier had no control or even knowledge of, and which could not have been prevented.

Cariaga vs LTBCo., 110 Phil 346 F: Edgardo Cariaga, a fourth year medical student of UST, was a passenger of an LTBC bus which bumped against a train of MRR on the national highway crossing a railroad tract at Laguna de Bay. Cariaga suffered severe injuries on the head making him unconscious during the first 35 days after the accident, reducing his intelligence by 50% and rendering him in a helpless condition, virtually invalid, both physically and mentally. LTBC paid all medical expenses plus allowance during convalescence. Later, Cariaga's parents brought an action to recover damages from LTBC and MRR in the amount of P 312,000 as actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages. LTBC disclaimed liability and filed a cross-complaint against MRR for recovery of expenses paid by it to the plaintiff placing MRR negligent for not providing a crossing bar at the national highway railroad track. Laguna CFI dismissed the cross-complaint against MRR and held LTBC liable for P 10,000 as compensatory damages with interest. Plaintiff and LTBC appealed.

Held: The train driver was not negligent. He sounded the train's whistle four times before the intersection, which were heard even by the bus passengers. The bus did not slow down but instead the bus driver tried to pass the intersection before the train. In addition, another LTBC bus which arrived ahead of the bus in this case, at the crossing heeded the train whistle by stopping and allowing the train to pass. Clearly, the bus driver was negligent in totally disregarding the warning. On the other hand, MRR cannot be held to be contributorily negligent because LTBC was not able to discharge its burden of proof when it alleged that MRR violated its charter by failing to ring the locomotive bell. The evidence shows that Ed C. had been rendered physically and mentally invalid by the accident. He suffered head injuries specifically a fractured right forehead necessitating the removal of all the right frontal lobe of his brain, which reduced his intelligence by 50% so that he can no longer finish his medical course. In addition, he has to lead a quiet and retired life because if the tantalum plate which replaced a portion of his skull is pressed in or dented, it would cause his death. LTBC admitted that under Art. 2201, it is liable for damages that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach and which the parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. It however claims that the said provision contemplates only the medical, hospital, and other expenses in the total sum of P 17,719.75. The SC ruled that the income which Ed could earn if he should finish the medical course, and pass the corresponding board exams must be deemed included because they could have reasonably been foreseen by the parties at the time he boarded the bus. While his scholastic record may not be first rate, it is sufficient to justify the assumption that he could have finished his course and would have passed the board exams in due time. As regards the income that he could possibly earn as a doctor, P 300 (accdg. to LTBC witness, Dr. Doria) could easily be expected as minimum monthly income of Ed C. had he finished his studies. Compensatory damages should be increased to P 25,000. The claim for moral damages could not be granted because Art. 2219 enumerates the instances when moral damages may be recovered and the present case does not fall under any of them, even par. (2) thereof because this case is not one of quasi-delict and could not be considered as such because of a pre-existing contractual relation between Ed C. and LTBC. Neither could LTBC be liable under Art. 2220 because it did not act fraudulently or in bad faith. Attorney's fees could also not be granted because this case does not fall under Art. 2208. The claim by the parents for actual and compensatory damages is also without merit because the present action is based upon a breach of contract of carriage and the parents were not a party thereto, and were not themselves injured as a result of the collision.

Villa Rey Transit vs CA, 31 SCRA 511 F: Policronio Quintos boarded a Villa Rey Transit bus at Lingayen, Pangasinan for Manila and was seated on the first seat right side. When they reached the national highway in Pampanga, the bus frontally hit the rear side of a bull cart filled with hay. The end of the bamboo pole tied to the cart hit the windshield and landed on the face of Quintos who was seated in front. He died of cerebral injuries. His sisters and surviving heirs brought an action against the bus co. The TC and CA held Villa Rey liable for P 63,750.00.

Held: The determination of damages due is dependent on 2 factors : (1) on the no. of years on the basis of which damages shall be computed (life expectancy); and (2) rate at which the losses sustained should be fixed. CA determined life expectancy accdg. to the American Expectancy Table of Mortality; and since Quintos was around 30 years old at the time of his death : 2/3 x [80 - 30] = 33 1/3 years. The bus co. wanted to use the 4 year basis adopted in Alcantara vs Surro but the court held that the case is not controlling as it did not lay down any rule on the length of time to be used in the computation of damages. In fact, it declared that there is no fixed basis for determination of indemnity and much is left to the discretion of the court considering the material damages involved and that there can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations. Villa Rey impugns the decision on the ground that damages will have to be paid NOW where most of those sought to be indemnified will be suffered years later. This argument if offset by the fact that payment of the award will take place upon the finality of the decision, fixed at the rate of P 2,184 per year and did not anymore compute the potentiality and capacity of Quintos to increase his future income, upon conclusion of his training, when he would be promoted and receive a higher salary. In determining the losses sustained by the dependents and heirs of Quintos. they consist NOT of the full amount of his earnings but of the support they would have received from him had he not died. In fixing said amount, the necessary living expenses should therefore be deducted from his earnings. The amount recoverable would therefore be the NET earnings, which is the portion which the beneficiaries would have received. To this sum must be added P12,000 pursuant to Art. 104 and 107 of the RPC, in relation to Art. 2206, NCC and P 1,727.95 for the amount actually spent by the sisters for his medical and burial expenses and P 2, 500 attorney's fees.