Factory at Chowsky (Germany vs.

Poland) Facts: Under the Geneva Convention, countries that took over German territory had the right to seize land owned by the Government of Germany and credit its value to Germanys reparation obligation. The said Convention adopted to implement the Treaty of Versailles that contained a requirement that certain territories be transferred from German to Polish Control and the status of other lands be determined by plebiscite. Any disputes that arose under the Convention were to be referred to the Permanent Court of International justice (PCIJ). Among the German controlled lands ceded to Polish control through plebiscite was the Region of Chorzow. Thereafter, a Polish court decreed that the land belonging to the German company, Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerrke A.G., be turned over to Poland. Litigation ensued on the question whether the land was property of Germany or if it was privately owned by the company. The dispute eventually reached the PCIJ which concluded that the land was privately owned and that Poland had seized private property. Issue: WON general principles of law are applicable in international law cases such as in this case. Ruling: Yes. General principles of law are applicable in this case. Such as the general conception of law that it is a general conception of law that every violation of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation. Another example would be the affirmation of private rights acquired under one regime does not cease upon the change of government. There is also the principle of estoppel and other principles. The Court stated that there can be no doubt that the expropriation.is a derogation from the rules generally applied in regard to the treatment of foreigners and from the principle of respect for vested rights. Thus, the Court enunciated the then existing international law that expropriations were not permitted and if they occurred, full compensation must be paid. The PCIJ clearly stated in this case that a State in breach owes to the affected State a duty reparation which must as far as possible, wipeout the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed. The general principle of international law is that a State which breaches its international obligation has a duty to right the wrong committed. Before undertaking this examination, the Court feels called upon to call to mind the following: In Judgment No. 7 it held that, as the expropriation allowed under Head III of the Geneva Convention, is a derogation from the rules generally applied as regards the treatment of foreigners and from the principle of respect for vested rights, and this derogation is itself of a strictly exceptional character, -any other measure affecting the property, rights and interests of German nationals contemplated in Head III and not supported by some special authority having precedence over the Convention, and which oversteps the limits of generally accepted international law, is incompatible with the regime established by the convention. The seizure of the property, rights and interests belonging to the German company was precisely a measure of this kind. It is in the sense that the measures taken by the Polish Government in respect of the above-mentioned Companies are, in the Courts opinion contrary to Head III of the Geneva Convention, and this in spite of the fact that they do not, properly speaking fall within the expropriations or liquidations regulated under that Head. Also in Judgment in No.7that one of the fundamental principles upon which the Head is based, as regards procedure, is that no dispossession may be effected without previous notice the real or apparent owner affording him an opportunity of being heard before the competent tribunal.

It is, moreover a principle generally accepted in the jurisprudence of international arbitration, as well as by municipal courts, that one Party cannot avail himself of the fact that the other has not fulfilled some obligation or has not recourse to some means of redress, if the former Party has, by some illegal act, prevented the latter from fulfilling the obligation in question, or from recourse to the tribunal which would have open, to him. AIR FRANCE, v. Valerie Hermien SAKS.

Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention makes air carriers liable for injuries sustained by a passenger "if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking." Respondent, while a passenger on petitioner's jetliner as it descended to land in Los Angeles on a trip from Paris, felt severe pressure and pain in her left ear, and the pain continued after the jetliner landed. Shortly thereafter, respondent consulted a doctor who concluded that she had become permanently deaf in her left ear. She then filed suit in a California state court, alleging that her hearing loss was caused by negligent maintenance and operation of the jetliner's pressurization system. After the case was removed to Federal District Court, petitioner moved for summary judgment on the ground that respondent could not prove that her injury was caused by an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17, the evidence indicating that the pressurization system had operated in a normal manner. Relying on precedent that defines the term "accident" in Article 17 as an "unusual or unexpected" happening, the District Court granted summary judgment to petitioner. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the language, history, and policy of the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Agreement (a private agreement among airlines that has been approved by the Federal Government) impose absolute liability on airlines for injuries proximately caused by the risks inherent in air travel; and that normal cabin pressure changes qualify as an "accident" within the definition contained in Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation as meaning "an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft." Held: Liability under Article 17 arises only if a passenger's injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger, and not where the injury results from the passenger's own internal reaction to the usual, normal, and expected operation of the aircraft, in which case it has not been caused by an accident under Article 17. (a) The text of the Warsaw Convention suggests that the passenger's injury must be so caused. The difference in the language of Article 17 imposing liability for injuries to passengers caused by an "accident" and Article 18 imposing liability for destruction or loss of baggage by an "occurrence," implies that the drafters of the Convention understood the word "accident" to mean something different than the word "occurrence." Moreover, Article 17 refers to an accident which caused the passenger's injury, and not to an accident which is the passenger's injury. The text thus implies that, however "accident" is defined, it is the cause of the injury that must satisfy the definition rather than the occurrence of the injury alone. And, since the Warsaw Convention was drafted in French by continental jurists, further guidance is furnished by the French legal meaning of "accident"when used to describe a cause of injury, rather than the event of injuryas being a fortuitous, unexpected, unusual, or unintended event.

(b) The above interpretation of Article 17 is consistent with the negotiating history of the Warsaw Convention, the conduct of the parties thereto, and the weight of precedent in foreign and American courts. (c) While any standard requiring courts to distinguish causes that are "accidents" from causes that are "occurrences" requires drawing a line that may be subject to differences as to where it should fall, an injured passenger is only required to prove that some link in the chain of causes was an unusual or unexpected event external to the passenger. Enforcement of Article 17's "accident" requirement cannot be circumvented by reference to the Montreal Agreement. That Agreement while requiring airlines to waive "due care" defenses under Article 20(1) of the Warsaw Convention, did not waive Article 17's "accident" requirement. Nor can enforcement of Article 17 be escaped by reference to the equation of "accident" with "occurrence" in Annex 13, which, with its corresponding Convention, expressly applies to aircraft accident investigations and not to principles of liability to passengers under the Warsaw Convention.

atmospheric tests, to cease the conduct of such tests (paras. 32-41 of Judgment); the C o w finds that the objective of Australia has in effect been accomplished. inasmuch as France has undertaken the obligation to hold no further nuclear tests in the atmosphere in ,the South Pacific (paras. 47-52 of Judgment); the dispute having thus disappeared, the claim no longer has any object and there is nothing on which to give judgment (paras. 55--59 of Judgment). Upon the delivery of the Judgment, the Order of 22 June 1973 indicating interim measures of protection ceases to be operative and the measures in question lapse (para. 61 of Judgment).

WIMBLEDON CASE PCIJ 1923 At the end of World War I, Germany and the Allied Powers signed the Peace Treaty of Versailles. The Treaty was punitive in nature and did not allow Germany to add any reservations or to contest any provision contained therein. The provision most directly at issue in the Wimbledon case was Article 380, which provided that "[t]he Kiel Canal and its approaches shall be maintained free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations at peace with Germany on terms of entire equality. During the summer of 1920, Germany's neighbor Poland was at war with Russia, and Germany declared herself a neutral in the conflict. A French company chartered an English vessel, the S.S. Wimbledon, which the Polish government hired to carry war materiel to the Polish Naval Base at Danzig (Gdansk today). The most direct route from France to Danzig involved traveling through the English Channel into the North Sea and then through the Kiel Canal. The canal connects the North Sea to the Baltic Sea and lies just north of Hamburg with both of its banks in German territory. German money paid for its construction and German labor built it. On the morning of March 21, 1921, the S.S. Wimbledon arrived at the entrance to the Kiel Canal. Neutrality orders issued in the summer of 1920 prohibited the transport through German territory of war materiel destined for either belligerent. The Canal Director, relying upon these orders, refused to permit the S.S. Wimbledon entry into the canal. The French Ambassador urged the German government to allow passage to the S.S. Wimbledon, claiming that Article 380 of the Treaty of Versailles required Germany to do so. Germany, in response, asserted that Article 380 posed no obstacle to application in the Kiel Canal of the neutrality orders, which unambiguously prohibited the Wimbledon's passage. The German and French governments failed to agree and France ultimately re-routed the Wimbledon. The ship reached its destination thirteen days behind schedule, her charterers having suffered a substantial economic loss in the process. Negotiations between the Conference of Ambassadors and the German government, following the Wimbledon incident, failed to resolve the problem. The governments of France, Britain, Italy and Japan, with the agreement of the German government, brought their dispute to the Permanent Court of International Justice in accordance with the compromissory clause included in the Treaty of Versailles provisions which dealt with the Kiel Canal. France claimed that Germany's obligations under the Treaty were supreme and that Article 380 was a permissible infringement upon German sovereignty. Germany contended that the Treaty only applied insofar as it did not conflict with customary international law and that Article 380 violated her rights as a sovereign nation. Nine members of the Permanent Court joined in the majority opinion handed down August 17, 1923; the court issued two separate dissents Following a purely textualist approach, the court interpreted Article 380 with respect for its plain terms. According to the majority, the article clearly obligated Germany to allow free passage to all vessels, without distinction as to the nature of their cargo or their destination, with an exception only for vessels belonging to nations at war with Germany. The court continued:

Australia & New Zealand vs France 1974 ICJ Reports Simple Summary: France (defendant) was performing atmospheric nuclear tests in the South Pacific. Australia and New Zealand (plaintiffs) brought suit in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) demanding it order France to cease performing these tests. While the case was pending, France announced it was ceasing performance of tests and that it did not plan to perform any additional tests. The ICJ dismissed the case as it found it no longer necessary to resove the same. Facts: T he background of this proceeding involves French atmospheric testing of nuclear devices on Muroroa Atoll as French territory in the South Pacific (which testing was eventually moved underground and continued until a voluntary moratorium in 1996). The French atomic tests were not unlike similar US tests at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands 1946-1958. France's nuclear tests were part of its development of the force de frappe, or independent nuclear deterrent capability during the Cold War. The ICJ proceedings were brought just as France moved from atmospheric to underground testing. Australia's claim was that, because of its downwind location, it would inevitably be subjected to radioactive fall-out and thus France had no right to explode a nuclear device even on French territory without Australia's consent because of the presumed injury to Australian interests Decision: In its judgment in the case concerning Nuclear Tests (Australia v . France), the Court , by 9 votes to 6, has found that the claim of Australia no longer had any object and that the Court was therefore not called upon to give a decision thereon. In the reasoning of its Judgment, the Court adduces inter alia the following considerations Even before turning to questions of jurisdiction and admissibility, the Court has first to consider the essentially preliminary question as to whether a dispute exists and to analyse the claim submitted to it (paras. 22-24 of Judgment); the proceedings instituted before the Court on 9 May 11973 concerned1 the atmospheric nuclear tests conducted by France in the South Phcific (para. 16 of Judgment); the original and ultimate objective of Australia is to obtain a termination of those tests (pams. 32-41 of Judgment); France, by various public statements made in 1974, has announced its intention, following the completion of the 1974 series of

[T]he terms of article 380 are categorical and give rise to no doubt. It follows that the canal has ceased to be an internal and national navigable waterway, the use of which by the vessels of states other than the riparian state is left entirely to the discretion of that state, and that it has become an international waterway. From the inclusion of an exception for ships of belligerents with whom Germany may be at war, the court inferred that the drafters of the Treaty had "clearly contemplated the possibility of a future war in which Germany is involved." Therefore, the court concluded that if free access to the Kiel Canal could be modified in the event of German neutrality, "the Treaty would not have failed to say so. It has not said so and this omission was no doubt intentional." In the process of construing the text, the court recognized that "[w]hile disposed to give the limitation on Germany's sovereign power a restrictive interpretation . . . [the court was] obliged to stop at the point where the so-called restrictive interpretation would be contrary to the plain terms of the article and would destroy what has clearly been granted. "[T]he Treaty has taken care not to assimilate [the Kiel Canal] to the other internal navigable waterways of the German Empire." The majority summarily dismissed Germany's argument that Article 380 deprived Germany of rights essential in the notion of sovereignty and thus required a restrictive interpretation. "[T]he fact remains that Germany has to submit to an important limitation of the exercise of the sovereignty rights which no one disputes that she possesses over the Kiel Canal." "The Court declines to see in the conclusion of any treaty by which a State undertakes to perform or refrain from performing a particular act an abandonment of its sovereignty. No doubt any Convention creating an obligation of this kind places a restriction upon the exercise of the sovereign rights of the State, in the sense that it requires them to be exercised in a certain way. But the right to enter into international engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty." The majority concluded the German neutrality orders could not preempt the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. Because Article 380 explicitly authorized passage of the Wimbledon, allowing the ship to pass "cannot be imputed to Germany as a failure to fulfill its duties as a neutral. If, therefore, the `Wimbledon', making use of the permission granted it by Article 380, had passed through the Kiel Canal, Germany's neutrality would have remained intact and irreproachable. Asylum case: Columbia v Peru 1950 ICJ Reports 266 Facts: Victor Raul Haya de la Torre was a Peruvian national. In Oct 3rd, 1948 one military rebellion broke out in Peru which is organized and directed by the American Peoples Revolutionary Alliance led by Haya de la Torre. The rebellion was unsuccessful. The Peruvian Government issued a warrant for his arrest on criminal charges related to this political uprising. He fled to the Columbian embassy in Lima seeking for asylum from them. Columbia the requested permission from Peru for Haya de la Torres safe passage from the Columbian embassy, through Peru, going to Columbia. Peru refused to give such permission. Columbia then brought this suit against Peru in the International Court of Justice, based on the agreement made by both named Act of Lima. These are the submissions made by the two parties: 1) The Columbian had pleaded for the court to declare that Columbia had properly granted asylum based on 2 submissions: a. They are competent to qualify the offence for the purpose of the said asylum. b. That Peru is bound to give the guarantees necessary for the departure of the Haya de la Torre, from the country, with due regard to the inviolability of his person. 2) Counter-claim by Peru is that for the court to declare that the grant of asylum made by the Columbian Ambassador to Haya de la Torre was made in violation of the Convention on Asylum.

Arguments: Plaintiff (Columbian) arguments based on the Convention in force which are the Bolivarian Agreement 1911 on Extradition, the Havana Convention 1928 on Asylum, the Montevideo Convention 1933 on Political Asylum and American International Law. The Defendant (Peru) counter-claim relied on the rules of Havana Convention first, Haya de la Torre was accused, not a political offense but of a common crime and second, because the urgency which was required under the Havana Convention in order to justify asylum was absent in that case. Issues: 1. Based on conventions, which in force between both countries, and in general from American international law, whether Columbia competent, as the country granting asylum, to qualify the offence for the purpose of said asylum? 2. Was Peru bound to give the guarantees necessary for the departure of the refugees from the country, with due regard to the inviolability of his person? Decision 1) Columbia was not competent to qualify the nature of the offence by a unilateral and definitive decision binding on Peru. 2) Columbia was not entitled to claim that the Peru was bound to gives guarantees necessary for the departure of Haya de la Torre, with due regard to the inviolability of his person. 3) Peru counter-claim that Haya de la Torre was an accused of a common crime was rejected, therefore it was not in accordance with Article I, Paragraph I of the Havana convention. 4) Peru Counter-claim that the grant of asylum by the Columbian government to Haya de la Torre Torre was made in violation of Article 2, Paragraph 2 of the Havana Convention was approved by the court. Ratio Decidendi 1) The court reject the Columbian argument based on Bolivarian Agreement on the reason that the principle of International Law did not recognize any rule of unilateral and definitive qualification by the state granting diplomatic asylum. On the other hand, the Bolivarian Agreement laid down rules on extradition and it was not possible to deduce from them conclusions concerning diplomatic asylum as it was different in the meaning. The court also rejected the Havana Convention invoke by the Columbian as the convention did not recognize the right of unilateral qualification. And the third convention, Convention of Montevideo, had not been ratified by Peru and could not be invoked against it. As for the American international law, Columbia had failed to prove that it had constant and uniform practice of unilateral qualification as a right of the State of refuge and an obligation upon the territorial state. The fact submitted to the court disclosed too much contradiction and fluctuation, shows that therein a usage peculiar to Latin America and accepted as law. 2) The court also rejected the Columbian claim based on Havana Convention that the Peru was bound to gives guarantees necessary for the departure of Haya de la Torre, on the reason that the convention only applicable if the territorial State demanded the departure of the refugee from its territory. It was only after such demand that the diplomatic Agent who granted asylum could require safe-conduct.

3) Peru counter-claim that Haya de la Torre was an accused of a common crime was rejected on the reason that the refugee was charged for military rebellion, which was not a common crime as needed under the Havana Convention. 4) The court came into conclusion on Peru Counter-claim that the grant of asylum by the Columbian government to Haya de la Torre Torre was made in violation of Article 2, Paragraph 2 of the Havana Convention was on the reason that the absent of element of urgency needed to justify the asylum, in order to protect the person from danger. In this case the danger that only faced by Haya de la Torre is legal preceding that will be imposed on him, not a deprivation of his right. The Havana Convention according to the court was not intended to protect a citizen who had plotted against the institutions of his country from regular legal proceedings. Asylum could only intervene against the action of justice in cases where arbitrary action was substituted for the rule of law. Rationale 1) Before a convention can be accepted to be used as the law under Article 38 of Statute of International Court of Justice, it must be ratified by the contesting state. - This has been shown by the reluctance of the court to used certain provision in the convention as had not been ratified by the party country. - Ie: see rules on Montevideo Convention. 2) The principle of International Law that are not recognizing the rules of unilateral treaty. 3) This decision also shows us that in order for the custom to be international custom it must be a general practice. - Ie: see rules on American International Law

Portugal submits further that in the relations between Portugal and the successive sovereigns of the territories adjoining the enclaves, there was established and consolidated in the course of nearly two centuries, an unbroken practice in respect of the maintenance of the indispensable communications between coastal Daman and the enclaves; and whereas that practice was based, on the part of all concerned, on the conviction that what was involved was a legal obligation. It posits that general custom likewise fully confirms the right claimed by it and that the practice of States reveals no disagreement in this' connection. Thus, Portugal argues that it is in no sense claiming a right of access to Indian territory, but merely a right of transit, designed to assure the communications between the enclaves themselves and between the enclaves and the coastal district of Daman. This right of transit is claimed only to the extent necessary for the exercise of Portuguese sovereignty over the enclaves and in claiming this right Portugal in no way disputes that sovereignty over the territory, through which transit must be effected, belongs exclusively to India. It is in no way claiming to be entitled to withdraw persons or goods in transit from the exercise of that sovereignty, and does not directly or indirectly seek for them any immunity and that the transit forming the subject-matter of its claim therefore remains subject to the regulation and control of India, which must exercise these by taking, in good faith and on its own responsibility, the necessary decisions. Portugal prayed for the Court to declare that it has a right of passage through the territory of India in order to ensure communications between its territory of Daman (coastal Daman) and its enclaved territories of Dadra and Nagar-Aveli; that this right comprises the transit of persons and goods, as well as the passage of representatives of the authorities and of armed forces necessary to ensure the full exercise of Portuguese sovereignty in the territories in question. Because of the series of restrictions which India imposed over the contested right of transit, while not immediately rendering impossible the exercise of Portuguese sovereignty in the enclaves, undeniably gravely impeded it and were such as to be liable to paralyze it completely if exceptional events occurred which obliged Portugal to take rapid measures to ensure the maintenance of order at Dadra and Nagar-Aveli. Portugal claims that there was an insurrection lead by anti-Portugese groups in the enclaves which put its sovereignty over said enclave at risk and that the Indian Government took no measures to prevent the realization of such a design but, on the contrary, did not hesitate still further to weaken Portugal's capacity for resistance against the danger which threatened it, by increasing the restrictions placed upon transit. It prayed for the Court to adjudge and declare: (a) that the Government of India must respect that right; (b) that it must therefore abstain from any act capable of hampering or impeding its exercise; (c) that neither may it allow such acts to be carried out on its territory. Indias position over this matter is as follows: First, that the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter. Portugal has not established the existence of the titles which she has invoked, and that these titles must accordingly be regarded as non-existent, it must follow that the question of the grant or refusal of the passage claimed over Indian territory falls exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of India and that the dispute is outside the jurisdiction of the Court. Second, that the right claimed by Portugal is contradictory since it also allows India to regulate the same without restriction. Thus, the right of passage claimed includes no immunity is incompatible with the character of a State organ which necessarily regulates or attaches to armed military forces under command passing through foreign territory. Portugal is equally unfounded in her reliance upon recognition of Portuguese sovereignty in the enclaves, either contained in a treaty of 1779 negotiated by Portugal with the Maratha

Right of Passage over Indian Territory Facts: In its Application before the Court, Portugal claims to have a right of passage between its territory of Damao (littoral Damao) and its enclaved territories of Dadra and Nagar-Aveli, and between each of the latter, and that this right comprises the faculty of transit for persons and goods, including armed forces or other upholders of law and order, without restrictions or difficulties and in the manner and to the extent required by the effective exercise of Portuguese sovereignty in the said territories. It contended that India has prevented and continues to prevent the exercise of the right in question, thus committing an offence to the detriment of Portuguese sovereignty over the enclaves of Dadra and Nagar-Aveli and violating its international obligations deriving from the above-mentioned sources and from any others, particularly treaties, which may be applicable. It thus insists that India should put an immediate end to this de facto situation by allowing Portugal to exercise the abovementioned right of passage in the conditions herein set out.

Empire, orflowing from the attitude of the British or Indian Governments between 1818 and 1954; That the negotiations of 1779 never resulted in an agreement and whereas the draft treaty in contemplation in any event involved no transfer of sovereignty and that if it is true that sovereignty over the enclaves was subsequently usurped by Portugal, this could not give rise to any right of passage; Whereas the particular agreements concluded on this subject with Portugal were concluded for a short period, or were revocable, their content being always limited and very far removed from the definition of the right now proposed by Portugal. Far from revealing the existence of a general customary rule in conformity with the claims of Portugal relating to a right of passage, an examination of the practice followed, and in particular of the agreements which have been concluded on this subject, establishes the categorical refusal of States to be bound by formal undertakings either with regard to the transit of goods where the enclave is included within the customs regime of the State through which passage is to be effected, or with regard to the transit of armed forces at least where those forces exceed a given number, or where the passage is designed to prevent or to put down political, social or economic disturbances. Issues 1. 1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the matter? Whether there exists in 1954 of a right of passage in Portugal's favour to the extent necessary for the exercise of its sovereignty over the enclaves, exercise of that right being regulated and controlled by India. Whether India failed in 1954 to fulfill its obligation in regard to that right of passage and in the event of a finding of such failure, what the remedy would be for the resulting unlawful situation.

1783 and 1785 were intended by the Marathas to effect in favour of the Portuguese only a grant of ajagir or saranjam, and not to transfer sovereignty over the villages to them. The fact that the Portuguese had access to the villagesfor the purpose of collecting revenue and in pursuit of that purpose exercised such authority as had been delegated to them by the Marathas cannot, in the view of the Court, be equated to a right of passage for the exercise of sovereignty. However, the situation underwent a change with the advent of the British as sovereign of that part of the country in place of the Marathas. The British found the Portuguese in occupation of the villages and exercising full and exclusive administrative authority over them. They accepted the situation as they found it and left the Portuguese in occupation of, and in exercise of exclusive authority over, the villages. The Portuguese held themselves out as sovereign over the villages. The British did not, as successors of the Marathas, by themselves claim sovereignty, nor did they accord express recognition of Portuguese sovereignty, over them. The exclusive authority of the Portuguese over the villages was never brought in question. Thus, Portuguese sovereignty over the villages was recognized by the British in fact and by implication and was subsequently tacitly recognized by India. As a consequence the villages comprised in the Maratha grant acquired the character of Portuguese enclaves within Indian territory. For the purpose of determining whether Portugal has established the right of passage claimed by it, the Court must have regard to what happened during the British and postBritish periods. During these periods, there had developed between the Portuguese and the territorial sovereign with regard to passage to the enclaves a practice upon which Portugal relies for the purpose of establishing the right of passage claimed by it. With regard to Portugal's claim of a right of passage as formulated by it on the basis of local custom, it is objected on behalf of India that no local custom could be established between only two States. It is difficult to see why the number of States between which a Iocal custom may be established on the basis of long practice must necessarily be larger than two. The Court sees no reason why long continued practice between two States accepted by them as regulating their relations should not form the basis of mutual rights and obligations between the two States. As already stated, Portugal claims a right of passage to the extent necessary for the exercise of its sovereignty over the enclaves, without any immunity and subject to the regulation and control of India. In the course of the written and oral proceedings, the existence of the right was discussed with reference to the different categories making up the right, namely private persons, civil officials, goods in general, armed forces, armed police, and arms and ammunition. The Court will proceed to examine whether such a right as is claimed by Portugal is established on the basis of the practice that prevailed between the Parties during the British and post-British periods in respect of each of these categories. It is common ground between the Parties that the passage of private perons and civil officials was not subject to any restrictions, beyond routine control, during these periods. There is nothing on the record to indicate the contrary. Goods in general, that is to Say, all merchandise other than arms and ammunition, also passed freely between Daman and the enclaves during the periods in question, subject only, at certain times, to customs regulations and such regulation and control as were necessitated by considerations of security or revenue. The general prohibition of the transit of goods during the Second World War and prohibitions imposed upon the transit of Salt and, on certain occasions, upon that of liquor and materials for the distillation of liquor, were specific measures necessitated by the considerations just referred to. The scope and purpose of each prohibition were clearly defined. In al1 other cases the passage of goods was free. No authorization or licence was required. The Court, therefore, concludes that, with regard to private persons, civil officials and goods in general there existed during the British and post-British penods a constant and uniform practice allowing free passage between Daman and the enclaves. This practice having continued over a period extending beyond a century and a quarter unaffected by the change of regime in respect of the intervening territory which occurred when India became independent, the Court is, in view of all the circumstances of the case, satisfied

1.

Held 1. Yes. Indias claim that the titled invoked by Portugal are invalid calls for the establishment of the Courts competence to examine the validity of these titles.

To contend that such a right of passage is one which can be relied upon as against India, to claim that such an obligation is binding upon India, to invoke, whether rightly or wrongly, such principles is to place oneself on the plane of international law. Indeed, in the course of the proceedings both Parties took their stand upon that ground and on occasion expressly said so. To decide upon the validity of those principles, upon the existence of such a right of Portugal as against India, upon such obligation of India towards Portugal, and upon the alleged failure to fulfill that obligation, does not fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of India. 1. The right exists but the right is not similarly applicable as regards the passage of armed forces, police, armed weapons, etc.

Portugal relies on the Treaty of Poona of 1779 and on sanads (decrees), issued by the Maratha ruler in 1783 and 1785, as having conferred sovereignty on Portugal over the enclaves with the right of passage to them. India contends further that the Treaty and the two sanads of 1783 and 1785 taken together did not operate to transfer sovereignty over the assigned villages to Portugal, but only conferred upon it, with respect to the villages, a revenue grant of the value of 12,000 rupees per annum called a jagir orsaranjam. In this aspect, the Court sides with India. It appears that the Treaty of 1779 and the sanads of

that that practice was accepted as law by the Parties and has given rise to a right and a correlative obligation.

The Court therefore holds that Portugal had in 1954 a right of passage over intervening Indian territory between coastal Daman and the enclaves and between the ANGLO-FRENCH CONTINENTAL SHELF CASE enclaves, in respect of private persons, civil officials and goods in general, to the extent necessary, as claimed by Portugal, for the exercise of its sovereignty over the FACTS: The United Kingdom and the France in the English Channel area, the two states had enclaves, and subject to the regulation and control of India. As regards armed forces, consistently failed to reach agreement despite negotiation over a decade. The boundary to armed police and arms and ammunition, the position is different. It appears that be delimited more specifically lay off the entire southern coast of England and Cornwall, during the British period up to 1878 passage of armed forces and armed police from just easy of the Isle of Wight, and thence westwards into the Atlantic as far as the between British and Portuguese possessions was regulated on a basis of reciprocity. 1000metre isobaths. For various reasons, the Tribunal found it convenient to break the No distinction appears to have been made in this respect with regard to passage delimitation into three components: between Daman and the enclaves. There is nothing to show that passage of armed the areas to the immediate east and west of Channel Islands (as there was substantial forces and armed police between Daman and the enclaves or between the enclaves agreement between the parties as to the method of delimitation in those areas); was permitted or exercised as of the area to the north and north-west of Channel Islands (there being a dispoute as right. to whether the Islands were special circumstances). The parties had agreed to exclude the area to the immediate east and south of the Islands from Arbitration; and It would thus appear that, during the British and post-British periods, Portuguese the Atlantic sector (where there was again a dispute as to the effect of islands in armed forces and armed police did not pass between Daman and the enclaves as of the justification of boundary other than one based on equidistance). right and that, after 1878, such passage could only take place with previous Both the United Kingdom and France are the parties of the 1958 Convention on the authorization by the British and later by India, accorded either under a reciprocal Continental Shelf. However, France had made several reservations to the delimitation arrangement already agreed to, or in individual cases. Having regard to the special provisions of that Convention. The United Kingdom had in turn lodged various objections to circumstances of the case, this necessity for authorization before passage could take the French reservations and the Tribunal found it necessary not only to judge the validity of place constitutes, in the view of the Court, a negation of passage as of right. The the reservations. Without going into the substantive law on which this decision was based, practice predicates that the territorial sovereign had the discretionary power to it should be noted that the Tribunal found that the effect of reservations and objections was withdraw or to refuse permission. It is argued that permission was always granted, but to render some parts of the delimitation area subject to the regime of the 1958 Convention this does not, in the opinion of the Court, affect the legal position. and the other equitable principles of customary international law. In the event, the tribunal There was thus established a clear distinction between the practice permitting free found that there was little difference between the two situation, and went so far as to passage of private perons, civil officials and goods in general, and the practice venture the opinion that some of its comment were probably applicable to Article 71 of the requiring previous authorization, as in the case of armed forces, armed police, and Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT) which emerged from the Fourth Session of the Law arms and ammunition. of Sea Conference. That Article also appears unchanged as Article 83 of the Informal The Court is, therefore, of the view that no right of passage in favour of Portugal Composite Negotiating Text (INCT) which was produced after the Sixth Session. involving a correlative obligation on India has been established in respect of armed forces, armed police, and arms and ammunition. The course of dealings established ISSUE: In deciding the dispute, what law/source should the Tribunal take consideration of? between the Portuguese and the British authorities with respect to the passage of Is the equidistance rule, as a matter of practice be the sole basis in deciding the these categories excludes the existence of any such right. The practice that was matter? established shows that, with regard to these categories, it was well understood that passage could take place only by permission of the British authorities. This situation HELD: In reaching its conclusion, the Tribunal first noted that I, Article 6 of the 1958 continued during the post-British period. Convention was applicable, the use of an equidistance line or another boundary justified by There was thus established a clear distinction between the practice permitting free special circumstances did not imply that there were two separate rules. They were only the passage of private persons, civil officials and goods in general, and the practice two aspects of a single rule, and this meant that the question another boundary justified requiring previous authorization, as in the case of armed forces, armed police, and by special circumstances is an integral part of the rule providing for application of the arms and ammunition. The Court is, therefore, of the view that no right of passage in equidistance principle favour of Portugal involving a correlative obligation on India has been established in respect of armed forces, armed police, and arms and ammunition. The course of After referring to the records of the 1958 UN Conference on the Law of the Sea which dealings established between the Portuguese and the British authorities with respect produced the Continental Shelf Convention, the Tribunal noted that Article 6 was so worded to the passage of these categories excludes the existence of any such right. The as to avoid inequitable delimitations through rigid application of equidistance delimitation; practice that was established shows that, with regard to these categories, it was well and the combined equidistance-special circumstances rule, in effect gives expression to a understood that passage could take place only by permission of the British authorities. general norm that, failing agreement, the boundary between the states abutting on the This situation continued during the post-British period. continental shelf is to determined on equitable principles. Time and again the Tribunal emphasized that use of equidistance was not a controlling legal norm but was only one 1. This right was not, however, violated by India. element amongst other relevant considerations to be taken account. There was a concomitant tension between the two states arising from the insurrection Frances contention that all states being equal as political entities, they should share and loss of control of Portugal over one of its enclaves. India, having the power to equally in common continental shelf areas was rejected when the Tribunal said that not regulate the flow of traffic in the assailed right of transit, refused to grant passage to only would this amount to re-fashioning of nature but it would also have vast implications several Portugese people. The Court is thus unable to hold that India's refusal of for the division of the continental shelf among States of the World. The Tribunal also found passage to the proposed delegation and its refusal of visas to Portuguese nationals of it necessary to look at the equality of States in their geographical relation to the shelf. In European origin and to native Indian Portuguese in the employ of the Portuguese the case at bar, the coastlines of France and United Kingdom in the delimitation area were Government was action contrary to its obligation resulting from Portugal's right of almost equal, and thus the areas of shelf accruing to each would also be approximately passage. Portugal's claim of a right of passage is subject to full recognition and equal were it not for the presence of the Channel Islands. The resulting imbalance exercise of Indian sovereignty over the intervening territory and without any immunity

in favour of Portugal. The Court is of the view that India's refusal of passage in those cases was, in the circumstances, covered by its power of regulation and control of the right of passage of Portugal.

andprima face inequity caused by the presence of the island therefore cited as another reason for not granting full effect. While the Tribunals discussion of islands, troughs baselines, the effect of coastal irregularities, and even the more general concept of natural prolongation, are important, it is clear tha its opinions as to the role of equitable principles will be most significant in the Law of Sea context. BARCELONA TRACTION The Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited is a holding company incorporated in 1911 in Toronto (Canada), where it has its head office. For the purpose of creating and developing an electric power production and distribution system in Catalonia (Spain). It formed a number of operating, financing and concession-holding subsidiary companies. Three of these companies, whose shares it owned wholly or almost wholly, were incorporated under Canadian law and had their offices registered in Canada, while the other companies were incorporated under the Spanish Law and had their offices registered in Spain. On the other hand, the Belgian Government alleged that some years after the first World War, Barcelona Tractions share capital came to very largely held by Belgian nationals natural or juristic persons and a very high percentage of the shares has since then continuously belonged to Belgian nationals. Barcelona Traction issued several series of bonds, the bonds was suspended on account of Spanish Civil War (1936). On 1948, 3 Spanish holders have acquired Barcelona Traction bonds. Subsequently, a judgment declaring Barcelona traction bankrupt was issued. The Belgian Government claims ownership of the company, while the Spanish government maintained that the Belgian nationality of the shareholders was not proven. There was conflict in this case on what laws shall be applied in resolving the ownership of the Barcelona Traction, thus, the parties upheld the said case before the ICJ. RULING: In seeking to determine the law applicable to this case, the Court has to bear in mind the continuous evolution of international law. Diplomatic protection deals with a very sensitive area of international relations, since the interest of a foreign State in the protection of its nationals confronts the rights of the territorial sovereign, a fact of which the general law on the subject has had to take cognizance in order to prevent abuses and friction. From its origins closely linked with international commerce, diplomatic protection has sustained a particular impact from the growth of international economic relations, and at the same time from the profound transformations which have taken place in the economic life of nations. These latter changes have given birth to municipal institutions, which have transcended frontiers and have begun to exercise considerable influence on international relations. One of these phenomena which have a particular bearing on the present case is the corporate entity. In this field international law is called upon to recognize institutions of municipal law that have an important and extensive role in the international field. This does not necessarily imply drawing any analogy between its own institutions and those of municipal law, nor does it amount to making rules of international law dependent upon categories of municipal law. All it means is that international law has had to recognize the corporate entity as an institution created by States in a domain essentially within their domestic jurisdiction. This in turn requires that, whenever legal issues arise concerning the rights of States with regard to the treatment of companies and shareholders, as to which rights international law has not established its own rules; it has to refer to the relevant rules of municipal law. Consequently, in view of

the relevance to the present case of the rights of the corporate entity and its shareholders under municipal law, the Court must devote attention to the nature and interrelation of those rights.

FISHERIES United

Kingdom

of

Great

Britain

vs.

CASE Norway

FACTS: in Sept. 1945, UK & Northern Ireland filed an Application instituting proceedings against the kingdom of Norway. The subject of the case is the validity in International Law of the lines of delimitation of the Norwegian fisheries zone laid down by the Royal Decree of 1935, for a part of Norway which was inconsistent with the rules of International law. The Government of the United Kingdom, in submitting this question to the Court, claims that: (a) the Norwegian Government, when it prescribes the base- lines from which the Norwegian fisheries zone is to be delimited, is bound to have regard to the applicable principles of international law which define the limits of national and territorial waters with particular reference to bays, islands and rocks; (b) the base-lines prescribed by the Norwegian Government in the Royal Decree of 1935, consist of straight lines joining points arbitrarily selected either on or off the Norwegian coast, in violation of the principles referred to in (a); (c) as a result, the Royal Decree of 1935 unlawfully purports to close to British fishing vessels considerable areas of sea off the coast of Norway which under international law are high seas and, as such, open to the fisheries of ail nations. Accordingly the Government of the United Kingdom asks the Court, after considering the contentions of the Parties (a) to declare the principles of international law to be applied in defining the base-lines, by reference to which the Norwegian Government is entitled to delimit a fisheries zone, extending to seaward 4 sea miles from those lines and exclusively reserved for its own nationals, and to define the said base-lines in so far as it appears necessary, in the light of the arguments of the Parties, in order to avoid further legal differences between them ; (b) to award damages to the Government of the United Kingdom in respect of all interferences by the Norwegian authorities with British fishing vessels outside the zone which, in accordance with the Court's decision under (a), the Norwegian Government is entitled to reserve for its nationals. The counsel for Norway argued that a.) the Royal Decree of 1935 is inconsistent with the rules of International law, and b.) Norway possess a historic title to all the waters included within the limits laid down by the decree. The counsel is asking the Court to declare that the delimitation of the fisheries zone fixed by the Norwegian Royal Decree is NOT contrary to International Law. The historical facts laid before the Court establish that as the result of complaints from the King of Denmark and of Norway, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, British fishermen refrained from fishing in Norwegian coastal waters for a long period, from 16161618 until 1906 when a few British fishing vessel appeared off the coast of Eastern Finnmark, then years later, appeared again in greater numbers. Trawlers appeared with powerful gears and the local population was perturbed. Measures were taken by the Norwegian government like the delimitation of the fisheries zone. Later on, few more arrest were taken by the Norwegian govt for violation of these measures. ISSUE: between the 2 government, whether the lines prescribed in RD1935 as the base

lines for the delimitation of the fisheries zone have or have not been drawn in accordance with the applicable rules of International law. HELD: The Norwegian Royal Decree of July 12th, 1935, concerning the delimitation of the Norwegian fisheries zone sets out in the preamble the considerations on which its provisions are based. In this connection it refers to "well-established national titles of right", "the geographical conditions prevailing on the Norwegian coasts", "the safeguard of the vital interests of the inhabitants of the northernmost parts of the country" ; it further relies on the Royal Decrees of February 22nd, 1812, October 16th, 1869, January 5th, 1881, and September 9th, 1889. The Decree provides that "lines of delimitation towards the high sea of the Norwegian fisheries zone as regards that part of Norway which is situated northward of 66 [degrees] 28.8' North latitude ... shall run parallel with straight base- lines drawn between fixed points on the mainland, on islands or rocks, starting from the final point of the boundary line of the Realm in the easternmost part of the Varangerfjord and going as far as Traena in the County of Nordland". An appended schedule indicates the fixed points between which the base-lines are drawn. By "historic waters" are usually meant waters which are treated as internal waters but which would not have that character were it not for the existence of an historic title. As has been said, the United Kingdom Government concedes that Norway is entitled to claim as internal waters all the waters of fjords and sunds which fall within the conception of a bay as defined in international law whether the closing line of the indentation is more or less than ten sea miles long. But the United Kingdom Government concedes this only on the basis of historic title; it must therefore be taken that that Government has not abandoned its contention that the ten-mile rule is to be regarded as a rule of international law. In these circumstances the Court deems it necessary to point out that although the ten-mile rule has been adopted by certain States both in their national law and in their treaties and conventions, and although certain arbitral decisions have applied it as between these States, other States have adopted a different limit. Consequently, the ten-mile rule has not acquired the authority of a general rule of international law. In any event the ten-mile rule would appear to be inapplicable as against Norway inasmuch as she has always opposed any attempt to apply it to the Norwegian coast. In this connection, the practice of States does not justify the formulation of any general rule of law. Court finds that the Norwegian Government in fixing the base-lines for the delimitation of the Norwegian fisheries zone by the 1935 Decree has not violated international law. The adaption of RD1935 was necessary by local condition of Norway.

PIL - Nicaragua vs US FACTS: In 1946, the US made a declaration containing the following reservation: this declaration shall remain in force for a period of 5 years and thereafter until the expiration of 6 months after notice may be given to terminate this declaration. In 1984, the US deposited with the UN Sec Gen a notification referring to the 1946 declaration, stating: the aforesaid declaration shall not apply to disputes with any Central American State or arising out of or related to events in Central America, any of which disputes shall be settled in such manner as the parties to them may agree. Nicaragua filed a claim against the US for damages in connection with military and paramilitary activities allegedly supported by the US in and against Nicaragua. The US argues that pursuant to the 1984 reservation that it made, the ICJ has no jurisdiction over the controversy, since it involves a dispute with a Central American State. Nicaragua argues that the ICJ has jurisdiction under the 1946 declaration, which was not terminated by the subsequent 1984 declaration, since the US never gave the 6-months notice of termination, as required by the reservation that it had made in 1946. According to Nicaragua, the US conceived, created, and organized a mercenary army, the contra force, in Nicaragua. The court found that contra force was not created by the US, but that a number of the operations were decided and planned, if not actually by the US advisers, then at least in close collaboration with them, and on the basis of the intelligence and logistic support which the US was able to offer. The US gave assistance to the contra force in the form of logistic support, the supply of information on the location and movements of the Sandinista troops, the use of sophisticated methods of communication, etc. However, the evidence does not warrant a finding that the US gave direct combat support. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the declaration is still binding on the US. 2) Whether the contras can be considered as organs of the US Government, or as acting on its behalf. RULING: 1)The ICJ has jurisdiction. The 1946 declaration is still binding on the US. The US cannot derogate from the time-limit proviso included in its 1946 declaration. The notion of reciprocity is concerned with the scope and substance of the commitments entered into, including reservations, and not with formal conditions of their creation, duration, or extinction. Reciprocity cannot be invoked in order to excuse departure from the terms of a States own declaration. Nicaragua can invoke the six months notice against the US, not on the basis of reciprocity, but because it is an undertaking which is an integral part of the instrument that contains it. The 1984 notification cannot override the obligation of the US to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court vis--vis Nicaragua.

2) No, the contras are not agents of the US government. The evidence is insufficient to demonstrate the total dependence of the contras on US aid. A partial dependency may be inferred from the fact that the leaders were selected by the US, and from other factors such as the organization, training and equipping of the force, planning of operations, the choosing of targets, and the operational support provided. There is, however, no clear evidence that the US actually exercised such a degree of control as to justify treating the contras as acting on its behalf. Therefore, the contras, remain responsible for their own acts, in particular for alleged violations by them of humanitarian law. For the US to be legally responsible, it would have to be proved that the State had effective control of the operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed. NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF CASES By Althea Mae Casador in 2 MANRESA SY 2011-2012 Edit Doc Judgment of 20 February 1969

delimitation on an equidistance basis, since the use of that method was a rule of general or customary international law, automatically binding on the Federal Republic.

Federal Republic of Germany

On the other hand, the Federal Republic of Germany contends that correct rule was one according to which each of the States concerned should have a "just and equitable share" of the available continental shelf, in proportion to the length of its sea-frontage. This is also called as the Apportionment Theory. Also, it is imperative to note that the Federal Republic of Germany did not ratify the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf even though they were one of the original signatories. ISSUES 1.

Whether or not Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf binding for all the parties in the case. Whether or not the Equidistance Principle embodied in the abovementioned law NATURE OF THE CASE inherent in the basic Doctrine of the Continental Shelf. The dispute, which was submitted to the Court on 20 February 1967, is related to the Whether or not the Apportionment Theory forwarded by the Federal Republic of delimitation of the continental shelf between the Federal Republic of Germany and Germany is applicable. Denmark on the one hand, and between the Federal Republic of Germany and the What are the Principles and Rules applicable in the case at bar? Netherlands on the other. The Parties asked the Court to state the principles and rules of international law applicable, and undertook thereafter to carry out the delimitations RULING on that basis. FACTS The waters of the North Sea were shallow, the whole seabed, except for the Norwegian Trough, consisting of continental shelf at a depth of less than 200 metres. Most of it had already been delimited between the coastal States concerned. The Federal Republic and Denmark and the Netherlands, respectively, had, however, been unable to agree on the prolongation of the partial boundaries referred to above, mainly because the parties are forwarding different rules and principles they believe is most appropriate in settling the dispute at hand. Positions of the Parties 1. Under the formal provisions of the Convention, it was in force for any individual State that had signed it within the time-limit provided, only if that State had also subsequently ratified it. Denmark and the Netherlands had both signed and ratified the Convention and were parties to it, but the Federal Republic, although one of the signatories of the Convention, had never ratified it, and was consequently not a party. Though it was contended that the rgime of Article 6 of the Convention had become binding on the Federal Republic, because, by conduct, by public statements and proclamations, and in other ways, the Republic had assumed the obligations of the Convention, it was clear that only a very definite, very consistent course of conduct on the part of a State in the situation of the Federal Republic could justify upholding those contentions. When a number of States drew up a convention specifically providing for a particular method by which the intention to become bound by the rgime of the convention was to be manifested, it was not lightly to be presumed that a State which had not carried out those formalities had nevertheless somehow become bound in another way. 2. Rejecting the contentions of Denmark and the Netherlands, the Court considered that the principle of equidistance, as it figured in Article 6 of the Geneva Convention, had not been proposed by the International Law Commission as an emerging rule of customary international law. This Article could not be said to have reflected or crystallized such a rule. This was confirmed by the fact that any State might make reservations in respect of Article 6, unlike Articles 1, 2 and 3, on signing, ratifying or acceding to the Convention. Furthermore, while a very widespread and representative participation in a convention might show that a conventional rule had become a general rule of international law, in the present case the number of ratifications and accessions so far was hardly sufficient. As regards the time element, although the passage of only a short period of time was not necessarily a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law on the basis of what was originally a purely conventional rule, it was indispensable that State practice during that period, including that of States whose interests were specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked and should have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law was involved. Some 15 cases had been cited in which the States concerned had agreed to draw or had drawn the boundaries concerned according to the principle of equidistance, but there was no evidence that they had so acted because they had felt legally compelled to

Denmark and Netherlands

In furtherance of their claim, Denmark and Netherlands argue that the prolongation must be effected on the basis of the Equidistance Principle, citing Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958. The pertinent portion of Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf provides: xxx xxx

2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured. xxx xxx

It had been maintained by Denmark and the Netherlands that the Federal Republic was in any event, and quite apart from the Geneva Convention, bound to accept

draw them in that way by reason of a rule of customary law. The cases cited were inconclusive and insufficient evidence of a settled practice. The Court consequently concluded that the Geneva Convention was not in its origins or inception declaratory of a mandatory rule of customary international law enjoining the use of the equidistance principle, its subsequent effect had not been constitutive of such a rule, and State practice up to date had equally been insufficient for the purpose. 3. The court rejected the Apportionment Theory as it was seen to be at variance with the most fundamental of all the rules of law relating to the continental shelf, namely, that the rights of the coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf constituting a natural prolongation of its land territory under the sea existed ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land. The task of the court is to delimit, not to apportion the areas concerned. The process of delimitation involved establishing the boundaries of an area already, in principle, appertaining to the coastal State and not the determination de novo of such an area. The notion of apportioning an as yet undelimited area considered as a whole was inconsistent with the basic concept of continental shelf entitlement. 4. The legal situation was that the Parties were under no obligation to apply the equidistance principle either under the 1958 Convention or as a rule of general or customary international law. The basic principles in the matter of delimitation, deriving from the Truman Proclamation, were that it must be the object of agreement between the States concerned and that such agreement must be arrived at in accordance with equitable principles. The Parties were under an obligation to enter into negotiations with a view to arriving at an agreement and not merely to go through a formal process of negotiation as a sort of prior condition for the automatic application of a certain method of delimitation in the absence of agreement; they were so to conduct themselves that the negotiations were meaningful, which would not be the case when one of them insisted upon its own position without contemplating any modification of it. This obligation was merely a special application of a principle underlying all international relations, which was moreover recognized in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations as one of the methods for the peaceful settlement of international disputes.