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Financial Assistance MT Realisations Ltd (in liquidation) v Digital Equipment Co Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 494
M A Y E R BROWN R O W E & M A W
Financial Assistance
MT Realisations Ltd (in liquidation) v Digital Equipment Co Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 494
The Law Under s151(1) Companies Act 1985, where a person is acquiring shares in a company, it is unlawful for that company or any of its subsidiaries to give financial assistance for the purpose of that acquisition before or at the time of the acquisition. In addition, under s151(2) of the Act, where any liability has been incurred for the purposes of that share acquisition, no financial assistance may be given directly or indirectly to reduce or discharge that liability. Financial assistance includes the giving of a guarantee or other security or the making of a loan, or any other financial assistance given by a company the net assets of which are thereby reduced to a material extent or which has no net assets. Here, net assets means the aggregate of the companys assets minus the aggregate of its liabilities. The Case The case of MT Realisations Ltd (in liquidation) v Digital Equipment Co Ltd has once again reinforced the basic message that each situation should be judged on its own facts to determine whether unlawful financial assistance has been given. It is an indication of the complexity of this area that, while the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal both ruled that there had been no financial assistance, they gave different reasons for reaching their conclusion. In brief, the case concerned an allegation by the liquidator of MT Realisations Ltd (the Target) that the setting off of debts owed to the Target by the Seller against liabilities which had originally been incurred by the Purchaser at the time of the share acquisition (albeit incurred in relation to an assignment of loans to the Purchaser (such loans having originally been entered into between the Seller and the Target)) was unlawful financial assistance since it reduced a liability incurred for the purposes of the share acquisition. At both levels, the Court held that the setting off of the debts owed to the Target against the liabilities of the Purchaser to the Seller did not constitute financial assistance. In the Court of First Instance, the judge held that, while the loan assignment and share acquisition were entered into as part of the same deal (and the loan assignment had even acted as an inducement to the share acquisition, which would probably not have taken place without such inducement) the two were separate transactions and, consequentially, a restructuring of the payments under the loan assignment could not affect or reduce the liability incurred under the share acquisition. In the Court of Appeal, a different reason was given; namely that the
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Purchaser was entitled (under the assigned (and secured) loans) to require the Target to call in the amounts owed to it by the Seller and was free to use those amounts to pay off the Seller. The restructuring of the payments under the loan assignment was merely short circuiting the route that would be taken by the payments in any event (by setting off the debts directly) and the Purchaser was not getting anything from the Target that it was not already entitled to under existing arrangements. At the end of the day, it is difficult to draw out any hard and fast principles as to what may or may not constitute unlawful financial assistance in the future - each case will continue to
be dealt with on its own particular facts. It looks as if good legal advice when embarking on a share acquisition (or any dealings with financial obligations which are (or may be seen to be) connected with such a share acquisition) will remain crucial to ensure that the fairly draconian penalties attached to unlawful financial assistance are not incurred. A fuller version of this note appears at [www.mayerbrown rowe.com/London/groups/finance/news.asp] for further information or advice please email Nigel Wright (nwright@mayerbrownrowe.com) or Simon Pullen (spullen@mayerbrownrowe.com) or your usual contact.
Consumer Credit
Proposals to tackle extortionate credit agreements
Government plans to make it easier to challenge extortionate credit agreements published on 6 March 2003 have been welcomed by the Office of Fair Trading. The provisions of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 which allow individuals to challenge an extortionate credit agreement in court have been viewed as ineffective by the OFT for a number of years. The courts have construed the provisions strictly and in a limited way and because of the complexity and associated uncertainty and expense of litigation, the legislation has been not effectively protected consumers. In 1991 the OFT published a report on Unjust Credit Transactions and since then it has pushed for reform. The OFT Executive Director, Penny Boyd, believes it is a particularly significant problem because: Extortionate credit operates on the margins of the market where vulnerable consumers are susceptible to exploitation. The main aim of the Governments proposals are to increase the protection available to vulnerable consumers against extortionate credit agreements, reforming the licensing system and providing more accessible means of redress through either the courts or through alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Specific proposals welcomed by the OFT include: replacing the current grossly exorbitant test by one encompassing the less stringent concept of excessive payments; allowing the courts to consider matters arising after the agreement was entered into, including interest rate variations; including as one of the factors to be taken into account by the courts whether the transaction involved business activity which was deceitful or oppressive or otherwise unfair or improper in line with the Consumer Credit Licensing Fitness Test; encouraging greater use of time orders where the courts consider that the borrower should be allowed more time to repay, or that the length of the loan or the interest rate needs to be changed; requiring the courts to notify the OFT of extortionate credit cases, so that the OFT can provide a public record and issue guidance; giving the OFT and other qualified entities the power to seek a declaration that a particular credit transaction is unjust in its effect on consumers; giving the OFT the power to make restitution orders as a means of compensating consumers affected by extortionate credit deals; imposing an obligation on lenders to lend responsibly and with proper regard to the borrowers ability to repay; and extending the jurisdiction of the Financial Services Ombudsman to all consumer credit, as part of a range of mechanisms to enable consumers to complain about unfair terms and practices and seek redress.
In addition to these proposals the OFT also argues that the court should be able to reopen an agreement of its own motion. This would be a valuable additional protection for consumers who are unrepresented in court action. The Government consultation document Tackling loan sharks and more! is available through the DTI website (dti.gov.uk). If you would like further information on the potential impact of the Governments proposals please contact Stephen Walsh, (swalsh@mayerbrownrowe.com) or your usual contact at the firm.
Key Differences Between the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and the U.K. Insolvency Act 1986
We have prepared a brief summary highlighting some of the key differences between corporate insolvency under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the Code) and the English equivalent, the Insolvency Act 1986 (as amended the IA), focussing primarily on issues relating to procedure, the position of creditors vis-a-vis the debtor company and certain policy considerations. This is especially apposite since the Enterprise Act 2002 has amended IA to promote a rescue culture and collective insolvency procedures at the expense of certain creditor friendly procedures. The text of this summary can be found at www.mayer brownrowe.com/london/groups/finance/news.asp. For further information please contact Simon Pullen (spullen@mayerbrownrowe.com), Ian Coles (Icoles@ mayerbrownrowe.com), any member of the Restructuring and Insolvency Team or your usual contact here.
(The text of the Act can be downloaded from www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2002/20020040.htm.) Abolition of administrative Receivership
As is currently the case, an administrator may also be appointed by court order on the application of the company, its directors or one or more creditors of the company. The Act also alters the purposes of administration. There is now a hierarchy of objectives, according to which the administrator must perform his functions. The objectives are: 1) rescuing the company as a going concern; or
Administrative receivership involves the enforcement of a floating charge holders security, without the need for an application to court. In practice, salvaging viable parts of the struggling business may not be top of the administrative receivers list of priorities, since he owes his primary duty to the charge holder that appointed him and his priority will be to realise assets to satisfy the charge holders debt. Although it is often the case that a going concern sale is the best way to maximise the return to the floating charge holder, the Act seeks to alter the priorities, so that rescue becomes an objective rather than simply an occasional happy coincidence. Under the Act, administrative receivership is abolished, except in relation to certain capital market and other transactions (public-private partnership projects, utility projects, financed projects and financial market contracts). However, floating charge holders will still be able to appoint administrative receivers under floating charges created before the Act comes into force. New administration procedure Administration is, by contrast, a collective procedure designed, above all, for cases where the whole or part of a business may be rescued. An administrator is appointed by the court, as the law currently stands, and he owes duties to all the companys creditors. An important benefit of the procedure is the imposition of an automatic moratorium that
2) if (1) is not reasonably practicable, achieving a better result for the companys creditors as a whole than would be likely if the company were wound up; or 3) if neither of the objectives above is reasonably practicable, and the interests of creditors of the company as a whole are not unnecessarily harmed, realising property in order to make a distribution to one or more secured or preferential creditors. More stringent time periods now apply to the conduct of an administration. The initial creditors meeting must be held within 10 weeks and the administration will automatically end after one year, subject to an extension being ordered by the court or agreed to by a specified proportion of creditors. Measures benefiting unsecured creditors Abolition of Crown preference The current position is that many debts due to the Crown (including debts due to the Inland Revenue, Customs & Excise and social security contributions) take priority over debts owing to floating charge holders and unsecured creditors. However, the Act will abolish the Crowns status as a preferential creditor. The good news for employees is
that their claims, together with their employers contributions to occupational pension schemes, will retain their preferred status. Creation of a ring-fenced fund There is also good news for the companys unsecured creditors. Where there is a floating charge over property of a company, unsecured creditors will, in future, have a prescribed part of the companys property made available to them for the satisfaction of their debts. The provisions will apply to all types of insolvency regime, including liquidation. The creation of a ring-fenced fund in this way may counterbalance any benefit that floating charge holders derive from the abolition of Crown preference.
Conclusion The corporate insolvency provisions of the Act will promote the use of administration as a means of rescuing failing companies. However, the phasing out of administrative receivership is likely to be a slow process, given that floating charge holders will retain the right to appoint administrative receivers under floating charges created before the Act comes into force. Whether the provisions will have the intended effect of rescuing a greater number of companies from the brink of insolvency remains to be seen. Sally Baker is a solicitor in the Restructuring and Insolvency Group of Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP
Notes
This update contains a brief summary only of recent legal developments. For further details and/or advice on a particular article please contact the lawyer(s) named below it. 11 Pilgrim Street, London EC4V 6RW, Tel: +44 (0)20 7248 4282, Fax: +44 (0)20 7782 8774 Website: www.mayerbrownrowe.com/london Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP, 2003. Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw is a combination of two limited liability partnerships, each named Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP, one incorporated in England and one established in Illinois, USA. If you would prefer not to receive future publications or mailings from Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP, or if your details are incorrect, please contact us by post or by email to businessdevelopment@mayerbrownrowe.com.
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