Mind Association

Quine's Holism and Functionalist Holism Author(s): Michael McDermott Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 110, No. 440 (Oct., 2001), pp. 977-1025 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3093563 Accessed: 07/12/2010 10:27
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Quine's Holism and Functionalist Holism

MICHAEL MCDERMOTT One central strand in Quine's criticism of common-sense notions of linguistic meaning is an argumentfrom the holism of empiricalcontent. This paper explores (with many digressions)the severalversionsof the argument,and discoversthem to be uniformlybad. There is a kernelof truth in the idea that 'holism',in some sense, 'underminesthe analytic-syntheticdistinction',in some sense;but it has little to do with Quine'sradicalempiricism,or his radicalscepticismabout meaning.

Quine'sattackon intuitive semanticsis no seamlessweb. The two main threads, separateand independent, are the argumentfrom behaviourism and the argument from the holism of empiricalcontent. They are of very differentstrengths.If you grant its premiss,the argumentfrom behaviourismis good-simple, tight and to the point. But the holism espoused in ?5 of 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' is no threat at all to intuitive notions of synonymyand analyticity. If the key argument of 'Two Dogmas' was no good, what was the secret of its success?The explanation is that there is a kind of holism which does indeed imply a kindof demolition or demotion of the ASD (analytic-synthetic distinction). There was something real around where Quine was pointing; but nothing big enough, by light of day,to worry friendsof meaning. In section 1 the argumentfrom behaviourismis reviewed,along with certainlesser argumentsof Quine's.Our main topic, Quine'sholism of empirical content, is introduced in section 2. Succeeding sections examine the differentversions of that doctrine, and the differentversions of the argument from holism against the ASD. Quine's slogan is that the 'unit of empirical significance'is the theory; his argument,at its simplest, is that thereforesmallerlinguistic items have no semantic properties. In section 8 we notice a non-Quinean kind of holism (although some have mistakenlyattributedit to Quine), accordingto which words and sentences do have meaning afterall, but their meaning is determinedby some theory. I focus on one ratherplausibleview of this kind, and examine its consequencesfor the ASD.

Mind, Vol. 110 . 440 . October 2001

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978 MichaelMcDermott

1.

1.1 Common-sense semanticsis mentalistic. sees verbalbehaviouras It a product of two distinct causal factors, belief and linguistic competence. 'Belief' here is to be understoodnon-linguistically. Manyphilosophers think that if such notions as belief and desirecan be made sense of at all, it will be, as a first step, in terms of some notion of linguistic meaning (i.e. for publiclanguage).What I call mentalismholds, on the contrary,that thought is conceptuallyprior to language. On the basis of this distinction it defines such notions as synonymy and analyticity. Two sentences are synonymous, in a broad intuitive sense, if they command assent and dissent concomitantly, and this is due strictly to word usage ratherthan to non-linguistic belief. A sentence is analyticif it commandsuniversalassent,and this is due strictly to word usageratherthan non-linguisticbelief. This is intralinguistic synonymy. Quine thinks that the intuitive notion of interlinguisticsynonymy is also defective. His argument, in rough outline, is that the closest approximationto the intuitive notion that can be formulated in behavioural terms is not close enough: for therewill alwaysbe translationsof a given sentencethat are equallycorrect by the behaviouralstandardbut not equallycorrectby the intuitive standard.It seems to havebeen establishedbeyond need of furtherdiscussion, however,that Quine'snumerous attemptsto clarifythis indeterminacy of translation thesis, and to argue for it, have been unsuccessful.I shallthereforeconcentrateon intralinguisticsynonymy. Also it is broadsynonymy.For example, any two analytic sentences for are synonymousin this sense. Similarly, any sentences and any anasentencet, s is synonymouswith sAt. In intuitiveterms,this is perlytic haps equivalenceby meaning ratherthan equivalencein meaning. Such a broad concept of synonymymight be unsuitablefor some philosophthat a more fine-grainednotion ical purposes. But it is uncontroversial of synonymy can be defined in terms of the broad intuitive sense. See,
for example, ?14 of Word and Object (Quine 1960): given a broad syn-

onymy notion for wholes, we could define synonymyfor parts as interthen a narrownotion of synonymyfor the salvameaning; changeability wholes could be defined by appeal to synonymy of the homologous parts. 'So let us concentrateon the broaderand more basic notion of sentencesynonymy.'(p. 62) formulations of the mentalistic concepts are Quine's, near My
enough. (For synonymy, Quine's actual words are '... rather than to how things happen in the world' (Quine 1960, p. 62). I presume this is

just a slip: he does not mean that the mentalist thinks that our assent-

Holism 979 Quine'sHolismand Functionalist

ings reflect how the world actuallyis (perhaps unbeknown to us), but how we believeit to be. For analyticitywe get the opposite combination: 'true purely by meaning and independently of collateralinformation'
(p. 65). I presume Quine meant to say 'assented to purely by meaning and independently of collateral information' There are two acceptable ways of aligning the relevant concepts: (i) truth as a product of language and fact, (ii) assent as a product of language and belief. The second group of concepts have to do with language users; the first do not. Quine says 'One usually hears the matter described in terms rather of truth values than of assent and dissent; but I warp it over to the latter terms in order to maximise chances of making sense of the relation on the basis of verbal behavior'. (p. 62) Good idea: but warp it over consistently.) Many mentalists would protest that our formulations of analyticity and synonymy are defective because we need to bring in a notion of rule as well: meaning is a matter of what people should say, given their beliefs, not what they do say. But this refinement would not help the mentalist meet Quine's attack.' Quine rejects the distinction between verbal habit and non-linguistic belief (or 'collateral information', to use Quine's characteristic phrase). What we have, objectively, is just the observable verbal behaviour, and dispositions to behave. The distinction between the two causal factors is illusory. This is what I call Quine's behaviourism. Quine's behaviourism has been obscured from many readers by his attempts to make it seem less controversial. Quine is prepared to consider attempts to analyse intuitive semantic concepts in behavioural terms. For example, suppose that someone dissents from the sentence 'Brutus killed Caesar'. From a common-sense point of view, there are two possible explanations: (i) historical ignorance, (ii) linguistic incompetence. Hoping to preserve some contact with common sense, Quine suggests that he too can distinguish two kinds of case, depending on how the speaker would assent to and dissent from other sentences.That is compatible with behaviourism. What the mentalist asserts, and the behaviourist denies, is that the distinction is a distinction between possible inner causes of verbal behaviour, not between possible patterns of verbal behaviour.
'A mentalistmight rejectthese definitions on other grounds,too. For example,there is a currently fashionable view according to which such notions as analyticity and synonymy apply (if they make sense at all) in the first instance to beliefs(independent of public language):two sentences are synonymous,for example,if they expressnot the same belief, but 'synonymous'beliefs! This curious view is commonly associated with the language of thought hypothesis, though perhapsnot actuallyentailedby it.

980 MichaelMcDermott

as Quine'sdoctrine might be better characterized 'verbalbehavioursince it has no place for any other behaviourthan assentingto senism', tences (when stimulated). (This has strikingconsequencesfor Quine's account of translation,for example.Supposewe have a tentativetranslation manual equating native sentence S with 'It is going to rain'.We will be pleasedto observethat assentto S correlateswith umbrella-carrying. But for Quine such non-verbal behaviour is objectively irrelevant.) Behaviourismis sometimes said to be the thesis that semanticknowledge and worldly knowledge are mutually 'inextricable',that our linguistic dispositions are never 'pure'.Quine's view is that there is no distinction between semantic and worldly knowledge, not that they alwaysgo together. The weakerthesis might be enough to imply that there are no analytic sentences; but it would cast no doubt on the meaningfulness of 'analytic',or of 'synonymous',or on the claim that some pairsof terms are synonymous. Now it certainlyseems to follow from behaviourismthat the mentalistic definitions of 'synonymous'and 'analytic'fail:they are based on a falsepresupposition.I can see no way of avoidingthis conclusion. As far as I can see, anyonewho hopes to defend mentalisticsemantics must attack Quine's case for behaviourism. I would not argue with Quine's demand that any acceptable linguistic or psychological concepts must be in some way linked to behaviour. The further demand that they be linked exclusively to verbalbehaviour, and that they be to as analysable simple dispositions verbalbehaviour,however,is unreasonable. If the intuitive concept of belief is an integralpart of a theory which explains non-linguistic behaviour,2that should be enough. On such an analysis,belief would be availablefor use in the analysisof linguistic meaning. There are, of course, grounds on which to question the explanatory pretensionsof mentalisticpsychology,and Quine gives many of them. The issues here cannot be avoided,I think, by the defenderof mentalistic semantics.But they will not be discussedin this paper.I will be discussing certain attempts to define the intuitive semantic concepts in non-mentalistic terms, and Quine's arguments, from holism, against them. 1.2 Mentalisticsemantics had been out of favour among philosophers
2This is meant to include the explanationof verbalbehaviourunder a descriptionnot presupposing the concept of linguisticmeaning:he made such-and-suchnoises becausehe believed that making such-and-suchnoises would get him something he desired.

Holism Functionalist and Holism 981 Quine's long before Quine. Its popular replacement was truth-conditional semantics. On this approachmeaning is a relationbetween words and the world, rather than between words and thought. It sees truth as in generala product of two factors,languageand the world;whereasmentalism sees linguisticbehaviouras in general a product of two factors, language and thought. Truth-conditionalsemantics provides obvious parallels to the mentalistic definitions of synonymy and analyticity. Two sentences are synonymous (in the broad sense) if they have the same truth value in virtue of meaningsalone and independentlyof fact. A sentence is analyticif it is true in virtue of meanings alone and independentlyof fact. Quine's main objection to the classicaltruth-conditional definition of 'analytic'is very simple and, I think, very effective.What does 'independently of fact' mean? Is the truth of 'Everythingis self-identical' dependent on the fact the everything is self-identical?Why not? The definition seems to be irremediably unclear. I think Quine's argument is effective-against the classical truthconditional definition of 'analytic'. does not work againstthe mentalIt istic definition. The problem was to say why the fact that everythingis self-identicalis not a genuine fact,when the fact that Brutuskilled Caesar is. Youmight be inclined to wonder,analogously, why the belief that everythingis self-identicalis not a genuine belief, when the belief that Brutuskilled Caesaris. But there is a natural,non-circularcriterionfor the mentalist to appealto: the role of the allegedbelief in the explanation of non-linguistic behaviour. Folk psychology can tell us what would cause someone to believe that Brutus killed Caesar,and what effects the belief would have in various circumstances.But what causes the belief that everything is self-identical?What effects does it have? How would someone behave who did not believe that? If a man believed that his wife, say,was not self-identical,how would he behave towardsher? (The man who thought his wife was a hat is not relevant: he never thought 'My wife =:my wife'.) It is not just that no one does think that anythingis non-self-identical:no one doesbelieve that there have never been black dogs, but psychology can tell us what kind of experience would produce that belief, and what kind of behaviour it would produce in various circumstances. A non-self-identical wife, and however,is literallyinconceivable; the responsiblecontraceptiveis the nature of psychological explanation. The point is that there is no non-linguistic behaviour, no matter how crazy, which would be explainedas a product of the belief that somethingis non-self-identical; and hence no non-linguistic behaviour, no matter how sane, which

982 Michael McDermott would be explained as a product of the belief that everything is selfidentical. Quine's argument against the truth-conditional definition is rather untypical of his central concerns. One sign of this is that the focus of the unclarityallegationis on 'fact'ratherthan 'meaning'.This is actually the way one would expect an argumentagainstthe ASD to go. If we are aftera distinction between analyticand syntheticsentences,it does not seem crucialto clarifythe featurewhich they are supposed to have in common, namely that their truth value depends on the meanings of their component words. 'Brutuskilled Caesar'would be false if 'killed' is happened ratherto have the sense of 'begat';'Everything self-identical' would be false if 'everything'happened ratherto have the sense of 'nothing'.The intended distinguishingpoint is that 'Brutuskilled Caeworldhad been different. sar'would be false if the non-linguistic Quine's argument is in 'Carnap and Logical Truth' (Quine 1966a, p. 106). Although the definition at which it is aimed is prominent in 'Two Dogmas',Quine's treatment of it there is not very easy to follow. In ?1 Quine seems to be rejecting the definition on the grounds that there are no such entities as meanings (p. 22; see also paragraph1 of ?4). But when he sums up the argumentso far in the final paragraphof ?4, he still does not deny (indeed he says it is 'obvious')that 'language' is a factor, along with 'extralinguistic fact',in the truth of sentences: then is it still OK to define 'analytic' as 'true in virtue of language alone'?From here on the key point becomes holism-that the distinction between the two factorsin the truth of sentences applies only collectively, not to individual sentences. The question of whether meanings are entities was a red herring,as Quine made clearlater (e.g. 'Replyto Alston'Quine 1986a,p. 73). Anotherpuzzle is that Quine seems to think that the definition 'true in virtue of meanings alone' is somehow discredited by the failure of the otherdefinitions discussed between ?1 and ?4 (e.g. 'reducibleto a logical truthby putting synonymsfor synonyms').But I cannot tell why he might think this. The textualevidence that he does think it is (i) the last paragraphof ?4, and (ii) the second-last paragraphof ?5. In each place he saysthat on a certainnaturalassumption-namely, the falsity of holism-we coulddefine 'analytic'in this way,and then: (i) 'But, for all its a priori reasonableness,a boundary between analytic and synthetic statements simply has not been drawn';(ii) 'But I hope we are now impressed with how stubbornlythe distinction between analytic and synthetic has resistedany straightforward drawing.'The 'but' cerseems to suggest that the demonstrated difficulty of defining tainly

Holism 983 Quine'sHolismand Functionalist

'analytic'in the ways discussedcounts againstthis definition too. (Gibson sees Quine'spoint as an argument.He worriesat greatlength (Gibson 1988p. 33-42) whether Quine can both argue from holism against the ASD (as he clearlydoes elsewhere)and use here a reductio argument holism from the non-existence of the ASD. I think Quine'spurpose for is to explain how people could have come to believe in an ASD, and to criticizetheir reasoning,not to argue for holism. In any case, the argument here, if therewere one, would be much worse than Gibson recognizes: Quine would be arguing 'If holism were false we could define 'analytic'as 'true by meanings alone';but we have found it impossible to define 'analytic'in various otherways;thereforeholism is true'.) 1.3 Other definitions of analyticity (and synonymy) are criticized by Quine also on the grounds of their unclearness.In each case he means that it is not apparenthow it will lead us to the ultimategoal of a clarification in terms of behaviour; or, more strictly, in terms of verbal behaviour. On the less strict meaning, I think this is a good objection. It seems certain that, in the long run at least, facts about linguistic meaning must turn out to be facts about language users.From Quine'spoint of view the truth-conditionalapproachto meaning improveson mentalism by leaving out the mind, but it goes wrong in leaving out verbal behaviouras well. That the criterionof clarityis a link to verbalbehaviouris made clear and Object(Quine 1960,p. 207), respondingto Grice by Quine in Word and Strawson's criticismof'Two Dogmas' referencesto behaviourin 'TwoDogmas' are few. At page 24 Explicit Quine says that synonymy needs to be clarified 'presumablyin terms relating to linguistic behavior'. Similarly at page 36, except that the effectthere is spoilt by the allowedalternatives: 'mentalor behavioralor cultural'. Perhaps the summary at the end of ?4 points in the same direction. Quine says that the first dogma is 'unempirical'and 'metaphysical', which means, for a verificationist, that it has not been and explainedin terms of observables; for linguisticor mental concepts the relevantobservablesare surelybehavioural. In 'Two Dogmas' the unclarity point was rather that an acceptable clarificationmust get out of the intentional circle. Grice and Strawson objected that some perfectly good concepts can only be explained in terms of each other.At one time Quine'sinclinationwas to concede the point: 'In recentclassicalphilosophythe usual gesturetowardsexplainamounts to something like this: a statementis analyticif ing "analytic"

984 Michael McDermott it is true solely by meanings of words and independentlyof mattersof fact. It can be objected, in a somewhat formalistic and unsympathetic spirit, that the boundary which this definition draws is vague or that the definiensis as much in need of clarificationas the definiendum. This is an easy level of polemic in philosophy,and no serious philosophical effort is proof against it' ('Mr. Strawson on Logical Theory', Quine and he 1966cp. 136).By Word Object saw things more clearly:it is essential to get out of the intentional circle; and, moreover,to establish an explanatoryconnection to behaviour. 1.4 The ultimate fate of any intuitive semantic notion depends, for Quine, on whetherit can be explainedin purelybehaviouralterms. For analyticity,Quine thinks that the leading candidate for a behavioural account is social stimulus analyticity. (A sentence is socially stimulus analyticif it would be assentedto by any speakerof the language,under any conditions of currentstimulation.)But it gets the extensionwrong: 'There have been black dogs' is socially stimulus analytic,but it is not analytic.Similarlysocialstimulussynonymy(social stimulus analyticity of the biconditional) is a poor approximationto sentence synonymy: 'Brutus killed Caesar'and 'Brutus killed Caesar and there have been black dogs' are socially stimulus synonymous, but not synonymous in even a broad intuitive sense. Analyticity and synonymy are no good because the closest behaviouralapproximationis in each case not close enough. 1.5 Quine'sthesis is that there is no way to make sense of the ASD. An alternativeinterpretationhas also become popular, mainly because of the influenceof Harman(1967).On this alternative view, Quine'sthesis is that all sentencesare synthetic. (Accordingto Harman,Quine'sdefinition of 'analytic'is 'true in virtue of meanings alone': he holds that the truth value of every sentence is partly dependent on non-linguistic reality.) Harman seems to be well awarethat what Quine actually says supFor ports the orthodox interpretation. the only defencehe offersfor his own interpretationis that it is not really an alternativeinterpretation: the theses respectivelyattributedto Quine ((i) 'analytic'and 'synthetic' are meaningless;(ii) all sentences are synthetic) do not reallyconflict! In support of this no-conflict claim, Harman argues as follows: 'If someone appearsto hold that there are analytictruths, but also agrees with Quine's argument that meaning lacks the required explanatory power, ... then an empiricist like Quine will say that this person has

Holism 985 Quine'sHolismand Functionalist

made his view meaningless ...'(p. 127).

What is 'the required explanatory power'? Lack of it is apparently supposed to make a view 'meaningless'for an 'empiricist' Harman is presumably referring to the verificationist principle that a sentence with no implicationsfor experienceis (if not analytic)meaningless.So he apparentlyreads Quine as arguing 'My opponent claims that some sentences are analytic; but he concedes, or should concede, that his claim has no implications for experience;thereforehis claim is meaningless'. This is a ratheruncharitableinterpretationof Quine-to see him as using againsthis opponent the (non-holistic) verificationprinciple he is explicitlyrejects.But let us suppose that the interpretation not too far from the truth. The question is, how does this support the no-conflict claim?Harman has Quine arguingthat the claim 'Some sentences are analytic' is meaningless. That has not the slightest tendency to show that Quine also argues,or could consistentlyargue, that the claim 'All sentencesare synthetic'is true. 1.6 In this section we have looked at a number of Quine's arguments against the ASD. They are all argumentsthat deserveto be taken seriously. But none of them has anythingto do with holism. 2. The empiricisttheory of content says,in generalterms, that the factual (or 'cognitive') content (or 'significance',or 'meaning') of a linguistic item of the relevantkind is determinedby the experiencesto which it is related in the relevant way. Quine embraces the empiricist theory on condition that the relevantkind of linguisticitem is takento be a whole theory (not a word or a sentence).This is Quine'sholism. As to the relevantrelationto experience,there aretwo main options. (i) It may be held that in generalsentences/theoriesare truein virtue of facts solely about experience.On this view two sentences/theorieshave the same content if any courseof experiencewhich would makethe first true would make the second true, and vice versa;a sentence/theoryhas no content if its truth value is independent of experience;and so on. This is phenomenalism. It may be held that in generalthe content of (ii) a sentence/theory is determined by how differentpossible experiences relate to it evidentially.On this view two sentences/theories have the same content if any course of experiencewhich would confirm/disconfirm the first would confirm/disconfirm the second, and vice versa;a

986 Michael McDermott sentence/theory has no content if no possible course of experience would confirm/disconfirm and so on. This is verificationism. it; My terminology here is largely stipulative. 'Phenomenalism' for instance,is often used for what Quine calls 'radicalreductionism'-the thesis that every sentence is translatableinto a sentence about experience. But we need some term for the weakerthesis (i). We might wonder,also, whether'verificationism' historicallyjustiis fied for (ii). Ayer'sposition in Language,Truthand Logic(Ayer1936), for example, was considerably more subtle. Ayer thought that some kinds of confirmationdid not count. For example,'I haveblood on my coat' might confirmthe hypothesis'I have committed a murder', he but did not want it to follow that it was 'part of the meaning' of that hypothesis. (p. 19) Similarly,observing that you were behaving as I do when in pain might confirmthe hypothesisthat you were in pain, on a 'metaphysical' (non-behaviourist) understanding, but that was not enough to show that the hypothesis would actually have any factual content, so understood. (p. 170) More generally,'Apreviously reliable authority says that p' seems to confirmp, for any p, but we would not want it to follow thatp has factualcontent, for anyp. How to define the desired, more restrictive,concept of confirmation?If it had not been for certain considerationsto do with holism, Ayerwould have defined it simply as the converseof entailment. (pp. 51-2) The attempt to take account of the holistic considerations led to his famously disastrous formulationof the verificationcriterion:h has factualcontent iff there is a backgroundproposition b such that, for some experientialproposition e, bAh entails e, and b alone does not entail e. Such subtletieswere superseded,however,by Quine'smore radicalholism. in Verificationism, our sense, is of course not the same as behaviourism. It could be combined, indeed, with a frankly mentalist view of meaning, as follows: We have beliefs (and desires), which are about nothing but the future course of our own experience; our sentences expressthese beliefs, and hence can differin content only if they would be confirmedor disconfirmedby differentexperiences. I mention this point because Quine's verificationism eventually comes to take on a decidedlybehaviouristtinge. As a reasonablebehavioural approximationto the idea that a certain experiencewould confirm/disconfirma sentence, he adopts the idea that a certain stimulus would prompt assent/dissent to/from the sentence; verificationism becomes the thesis that meaning is determined by stimulus meaning. Quine finds himself offering By the time of 'EpistemologyNaturalized', in defence of 'the verificationtheory of meaning'considerationswhich

Holism 987 Quine'sHolismand Functionalist

seem more relevant to the behaviourist part of the package:the language learnerhas 'no data but the concomitances of... utteranceand observablestimulus situation'(Quine 1969,p. 81). Quine himself was a verificationist,not a phenomenalist.(See particp. ularly'On the VeryIdea of a Third Dogma',Quine 1981d, 39.) But in the central text for Quine's holism, ?5 of 'TwoDogmas',the argument does not relyon that choice. He moves back and forth betweenverificationism and phenomenalism.The verificationistpath gives the section its title, and is favouredsomewhat overall. But the particularexample Quine gives of a holistic theory of empiricalcontent, the Aufbautheory (from which Quine sayshis holism 'issuesessentially'),is phenomenalist, not verificationist. And in the crucial last three paragraphsof ?5 experiencefiguresmore often as the 'factualcomponent [in] the truth of statements' than as the confirmer/disconfirmer. We can see why Quine might have wanted to keep both alternativesin play. Verificationism is generallyfelt to be much more plausiblethan phenomenalism, irrespectiveof whether the unit of significanceis the sentence or the theory. On the other hand phenomenalismhas a more obvious relevance to the definition of 'analytic'which Quine seems to have most squarelyin his sights-'true in virtue of meanings and independently of fact'.The phenomenalism-verificationism question could best be left open, Quine apparentlyfelt, for the purposes of 'TwoDogmas':holism was the crucialthing. Now what is the connection supposed to be, in ?5, between holistic empiricism and analyticity?One possible interpretationsees Quine as rebuttingwhat he takes to be an influential argumentfor the ASD (or because of for the adequacyof some particulardefinition of 'analytic'): the argument's premiss is false. On another interpretation, holism, Quine is offering an argument-a new argument, from holismagainstthe ASD (or againstsome particulardefinition of'analytic'). I think there is some truth in the first interpretation.(It is explicit in 'Mr Strawson' (Quine 1966c). Quine says that 'misgivings over the notion of analyticityare warrantedalso at a deeper level, where a sincere attempt has been made to guess the unspoken Weltanschauung from which the motivation and plausibilityof a division of statements into analytic and synthetic arise. My guess is that that Weltanschauung is a more or less attenuatedholdover of phenomenalisticreductionism' (p. 136). If Quine's diagnosis and rebuttalwere correct, it would be of true views are often acceptedfor bad reasons. fairlylimited significance: But in fact the diagnosis seems obviously wrong. Not many of those who accepted an ASD also accepted phenomenalism, or verification-

988 Michael McDermott ism, or any version of the empiricist theory of content. And even among those who did, there is no reason to think that the two views were causallyor rationallyconnected.) But the second interpretation the one we want. No one doubts that is there is an argument from holism against the ASD in 'Two Dogmas', and it is obviously not before?5. (In 'Mr Strawson'also, Quine implies that thereis also an argumentfrom holism againstthe ASD:the holistic empiricist 'may be expected to find no way of [defining 'analytic']'. (Quine 1966cp. 137))So, leavingaside Quine'sother aims, let us pursue the argument. The argumentseems to be that the targetdefinition of'analytic'has a falsepresupposition: namely,that the unit of significanceis the sentence. Given empiricism,we must take the unit of significance(i.e. 'empirical significance')to be the theory,not the sentence;and on holistic empiricism the targetdefinitionfails. And what is the target definition? There are two target definitions. The first is 'true in virtue of meanings alone'; in arguing against this definitionQuine uses the truth-conditionalformulationof empiricism, the phenomenalistversion-he takes his opponent to be a phenomenalist, and goes along with that for the duration of the argument.The second is 'vacuouslyconfirmed, ipso facto, come what may';in arguing against this definition Quine uses the verificationist formulation of empiricism. Let me consider the two versions of the argument separately. 3. 3.1 For the truth-conditionalargumentthe main text is the second-last of paragraph ?5. Quine denies that 'the truth of a statementis somehow analysable into a linguistic component and a factual component', though he accepts that 'in general the truth of statements does obviously dependboth upon languageand upon extralinguisticfact';and of course'The factualcomponent must, if we are empiricists,boil down to He a range of confirmatoryexperiences'. thinks it is 'nonsense, and the root of much nonsense, to speak of a linguistic component and a factual component in the truth of any individual statement',though he accepts that 'Takencollectively,science has its double dependence on language and experience'. (The second formulation seems to get the intended contrast better: experience makes sentences true collectively it ratherthan individually; is not a matter of generalversusparticular.) And the targetdefinition of'analytic' is 'the extremecase where the lin-

Holism 989 Quine'sHolismand Functionalist

this guistic component is all that matters'; is evidentlya trivialvariation on 'true in virtue of meanings alone' We may agree, I think, that holistic phenomenalism is preferableto non-holistic phenomenalism. Quine'sargumentdoes depend, though, on his opponent'sacceptanceof phenomenalism:it requiresmore than just the assumption that there are two separatecomponents, linguistic and non-linguistic, in truth. If the factual component in the truth of sentences/theories were taken to be the external world, rather than experience, holism would not seem plausible. It would seem plausible to say that 'Brutuskilled Caesar'was true, as an isolated sentence, in virtue of a single historicalevent. Quine'sargumentis that if you want to be a phenomenalistyou should be a holistic phenomenalist,but the targetdefinition only works if you are a non-holistic phenomenalist. My objection is that the targetdefinition does not fail on the holistic assumption. How do things work, on Quine's picture? We have the facts, the full facts of experience.We have a true theory;that is to say,a certain infinite set of sentences are true. If the facts of experiencehad been different (but the language the same), a different theory would have been true. If the facts had been differentagain, a third set of sentences would have been true. Considerall the possible ways experience the might have gone-all possibilitiesregarding full facts of experience. Keeping fixed the other component, 'language',consider the corresponding true theory, the correspondingset of true sentences, in each case. Now considerthe sentenceswhich are membersof everytrue theory: they are true independentlyof experience.If the languagewere different, these sentences could be false;but they are true in virtue of the language only. There is no reason to doubt, on Quine's assumptions, that the targetdefinitionpicks out a definiteclassof sentences,or that it capturesthe intentions of those who use the word 'analytic'. If we assume that in generaleach sentencehas its own truthmakerin experience-the bit of experiencein virtue of which it is true-we can define 'analytic'as the specialcase of truth in virtue of meaningsalone. And if we assume that true sentencesare typicallyall made true by the same thing, the full actualcourse of experience,we can still define 'analytic' as truth in virtue of meanings alone. As we saw, there are other objectionsto defining 'analytic'in this way.And the whole idea of a distinction between languageand experienceas two factorsin the truth of sentences/theoriesis rejectedin Quine'slater work. But as long as you accept that distinction, as Quine does in this part of 'Two Dogmas', holism makesno difference.

990 Michael McDermott 3.2 Letme illustratethe point with referenceto the Aufbau.The part we are interestedin is the 'construction'of the externalworld (Part IV,A and B). Carnap,beginning with a primitive relation of similarity-andtemporal-precedencebetween elementaryexperiences,has assembled enough defined terms to enable him to talk about the assignment of colours to points in the two-dimensional visual field, at various times. As a small-scalemodel of the externalworld, he takesthe assignmentof colours to points in four-dimensionalspace-time. He has the colours; the space-time points he construes as simply quadruplesof real numbers. The next step is the crucialone. He introducestwo new predicates-'c [a colour] is atp[a space-time point]' and 'the observer's viewpointis at p' And he gives a set of rules to which the truth values of sentencesin the new vocabulary according are determined on the basis of the truth values of sentences in the old vocabulary. There are many such rules, but their overall effect, described in 'realistic' language, is that (i) truth values are to be assignedso that the actualvisual experiencematchesas nearlyas possible what the observer 'should' get when viewing the resultant world from the specifiedpoint of view; (ii) the resultantworld is to be as stable (with respectto colour change over time, colour variationbetween 'seen'and 'unseen'points, motion of coloured points, etc.) as possible. As Quine points out, Carnap was wrong to think that these rules amount to definitions.They do not provide translationsof individual sentences. The model is phenomenalist, in our terminology, but not reductionist. To apply the rules one would take all possible theoriesof the externalworld (a theory = an assignmentof truth valueto each sentence in the new vocabulary)and give each a score on the basis of certain overall features-some purely internal, others concerning the theory's match with the actual visual experience. Then the highestscoring theory is the true theory. The truth of the theory's individual sentences follows; but the true theory is arrivedat first, not by assembling the sentences individually certified as true. This is the holism which Quine admires. Despite its holism, however,the Aufbaumodel raisesno difficultyfor the definition of 'analytic'as 'true by meanings alone'.The model rests on an explicit distinction between the facts of experience and the linguistic rules. If there are sentences which turn out to be assigned the truth value 'true'by the highest-scoringtheory however experiencemay go, these are analytic. But are there any such sentences?Given the extreme artificialityof the model, I do not think it would discreditthe definitionof'analytic'if

Holism 991 Quine'sHolismand Functionalist

it turned out that no sentenceswere analytic.But there is in any case no reason to think that the model has this consequence.Although Carnap says that his rules are, collectively, to be 'satisfied as far as possible', some of them seem to be absolutely necessary.For example severalof the rules would be completely inapplicablefor a theory which put the observer'sviewpoint in two differentplaces at the same time: such theories are apparentlymeant to be definitelyexcludedfrom the comparison. If so, 'not-(the observer's viewpoint is at (x,y,z,t)and the observer's is at (x+i,y,z,t))' is analytic.Or consider the ordinarytruthviewpoint functional tautologies. Although Carnapdoes not explicitly say so, he obviouslyintends that the linguisticrules should includethe usual rules for the truth-functional connectives, so that all tautologies would appearin any theory selectedas true. Carnap's picture is holistic:the book of rules picks out the true physical theory, for the given facts of experience,as that which scoreshighest overall.But there is still a distinctionbetween analytictruths,whose truth value is determined by the rule book alone, and synthetic ones, whose truth value depends also on experience.Although all synthetic sentences share the same truth-maker-the full facts of experiencenot all sentencesare synthetic. 4. 4.1 Now to the verificationist version of the argument. he with Quine acceptsholisticverificationism: combinesverificationism the thesis that the unit of confirmationis not the sentencebut the theory. He says it is 'not significant'to speak of an isolated sentencebeing confirmed or disconfirmed; but we can speak of a theorybeing confirmed or disconfirmed. Quine'sfocus is on the unit of confirmation.He does not attemptto analyseor criticizethe notion of confirmationin any other respect.The argumentapparentlyuses an intuitive notion of confirmation,applied to theories. The thesis that the unit of confirmation is not the sentence but the theory, by itself, is 'confirmationholism'.It was promoted by Duhem, and accepted by the positivists (e.g. Carnap 1937,p. 318;Ayer 1936, p. 125f.). But Quine was the first to argue that confirmation holism makes impossible a verificationprinciple applicableto individual sentences:he was the first 'holisticverificationist'. Now the only place where a connection is explicitly made between verificationism and analyticity is the third-last paragraph. And all

992 MichaelMcDermott

Quine says here is that the dogma of non-holistic verificationismsupports the dogma of the ASD-not the other way round:'as long as it is takento be significantto speakof the confirmationand infirmationof a statement,it seems significantto speak also of a limiting kind of statement which is vacuously confirmed, ipsofacto, come what may; and such a statement is analytic.'Is this the argumentagainstthe ASD that we are seeking-'If the unit of confirmationwere the sentence,the defbut inition 'analytic= vacuously confirmed'would be satisfactory; the unit isn't the sentence;so the definition isn't satisfactory'? No. I think Quine should be read as assertinga biconditional.For the converseof the aboveconditionalnot only providesa basis for such an argument,it is also pretty obviously true: for if it is not significant to speak of the confirmationof an isolated sentence,it is presumablynot significantto speakof an isolatedsentenceas being confirmedby everypossible experience;and a definition accordingto which it is not significantto call a sentenceanalyticis clearlyno good. Quine's otherpremiss, that the unit of confirmation is not the sentence, seems uncontroversial.(The argument requiresonly confirmation holism, not verificationism. Verificationism is only needed to make the argument interesting,by making the target definition look plausible.)So Quine seems to have a good argumentagainst'analytic= vacuously confirmed'. However, (i) this definition of 'analytic' is so utterlyunmotivated,so obviously defective,even on the assumptionof non-holistic verificationism,that the additionalargumentprovidedby holism is of little importance.And (ii) a ratherobvious variant of the definition will, on Quine's assumptions, work adequatelyeven under holism. 4.2 First(i): I know of no empiricistbefore Quine who even considered defining 'analytic'on the basis of the VerificationPrinciple. A typical 'a formulationof the Principlewas Ayer's: statementis held to be literif and only if it is either analyticor empiricallyverifiaally meaningful ble'(Ayer1936p. 12). SimilarlyHempel: 'a sentence makes a cognitively meaningfulassertion... only if it is either (1) analyticor self-contradictory or (2) capable, at least in principle, of experientialtest' (Hempel 1950p. 108).The ASD was takenas somethingalreadysettled,and available for use in formulatingthe Verification Principle:not vice versa. sentenceswere supposed to havevacuous verificaCertainlyanalytic tion conditions. But this was also (and, in the positivist programme, more importantly)a featureof metaphysicalnonsense. It was not supposed to follow that there was no difference.But the distinction had to

Holism 993 Quine'sHolismand Functionalist

appealto something other than verificationconditions. (A verificationist believer in linguistic rules, for example, might have said that a sentence is meaningless,or not fully meaningful,if the rulesof languagedo not alwaysdeterminethe truth value (or acceptability)of the sentence, given the facts of experience;whereasa sentence is analyticif the rules of languagedetermine that it is true (or acceptable)whateverthe facts of experience.) Sloganisticformulationsof verificationismoften said simply 'meaning = verification conditions'. But all this meant was that, for fully meaningfulsentences,verificationconditions determined meaning:two sentences could not differin meaning (they would be synmeaningful onymous in the broad sense) if they had the same verification conditions. (Much confusion was caused by a certain terminological difficulty the verificationistsexperienced.Since analyticsentences and nonsense were both incapable of experiential confirmation, they were certainly regardedas having something importantin common: they both lacked ... what? Meaning? Then what is it that analytic sentences have and nonsense lacks?Wittgenstein said tautologies 'lacked sense',but were not 'nonsense'.Hempel distinguishes'logical meaning'from 'empirical meaning'.Ayertends to say that analytic sentences lack 'factualmeaning' but have 'literalmeaning'.No standardusageemerged.Perhapsthis to encouragedunsympatheticinterpreters think that confirmationconditions were supposed to exhaust 'meaning' in the broadest sense. (Quine, in 1986, attributed to his opponents a distinction between Quine 1986b,p. 207))). 'meaning'and 'content'('Replyto Hellman', 4.3 Secondly (ii): Quine holds that the unit of empiricalsignificanceis the theory.But that does not mean that synonymy,for example,cannot be definedfor sentences:it just means that synonymyfor sentencescannot be defined by directappeal to the verificationistprinciple. It may still be definableindirectly. The point is the same as that which Quine makes when he emphasizes that takingthe unit of empiricalsignificanceas the sentencerather than the term does not prevent us defining synonymy for terms indirectly: if we say that sentencesare synonymous (in the broad senseequivalentby meaning) iff they havethe same confirmationconditions, we can say that terms are synonymous iff replacement of one by the other in a sentence (i.e. in any sentenceof the relevantlanguage)yields a synonymous sentence (Two Dogmas pp. 37-8). (In ?3 of'Two Dogmas' Quine showed that interchangeability salva veritateis not an ade-

994 MichaelMcDermott

quate criterion of synonymy of terms-unless the language contains suitablenon-extensionalcontexts,in particularthe adverb'necessarily' What is now being discussed is interchangeability which preserves meaning-within contexts large enough to havemeaning, i.e. a meaning determinedby verificationconditions.) Quine'sholistic position is that theories synonymous (in the broad sense) iff they havethe same are confirmationconditions.Why can'twe say,then, that sentences synare iff replacementof one by the other in a theory (i.e. in any theonymous ory statedin the relevantlanguage)yields a synonymoustheory? Analogy aside, there is reason to think that if the account of synoncriterion for ymy for theories is intuitivelyadequate,the replaceability sentence synonymy must be too. For, assuming the desired broad notions of synonymy,we can argueas follows. If two sentencesare synonymous, replacementof one by the other in a theory must yield a synonymous theory. If two sentences are not synonymous, then there is a non-self-contradictorytheory in which one is affirmedand the other denied;but replacementof one by the other in this theory would yield a and self-contradictory, hence non-synonymous, theory. Given sentence synonymy, analyticity could be defined in the way Quine explains:as synonymywith some paradigmatically analyticsenare pigs'. tence, e.g. 'Pigs A verificationistwho held that only sentences, and nothing smaller, had verificationconditions should not infer that nothing smaller had meaning: on the contrary,Quine says, it would follow that terms did have semantic propertiesand relations such as synonymy.But, believing that only theories, and nothing smaller, have verification conditions, Quine himself infersthat nothing smallercan have meaning.3 4.4 My analogical argument against Quine rested on the premiss that terms are synonymousiff replacementof one by the other in a sentence yields a synonymous sentence ('Two Dogmas' pp. 37-8). This statement, and similar statements in Wordand Object (Quine 1960) ?14 and

elsewhere, are apparentlyretractedin ?22 of Pursuit of Truth(Quine 1990). Quine there advancesan argumentagainstany attemptto define synonymy of terms as interchangeability which preserves meaning bad. (within suitablylargecontexts). But the argumentis transparently criterion cannot work unless that the interchangeability Quine says the language contains suitable non-extensional contexts, in particular which Quine calls 'desensu. the specialkind of de dictobelief-ascription
3 It is sometimes debatedwhetherQuine is a meaning holist or a meaning nihilist. The answer is that he is a nihilist about word and sentencemeaning, deducingthis from his meaning holism.

Holism Functionalist and Holism 995 Quine's (Suppose that, unbeknown to Tom, 'Hesperus' means 'the Evening Star';then 'Tom knows that Hesperus is the Evening Star' is true de sensubut false de voce.) A criterion of term synonymy which required in interchangeability de voceposition would be too strict. But we can't confine our attention to de re positions, Quine argues:we must require in interchangeability de sensupositions. But how to distinguishde sensu from de vocewithout assumingsynonymy? test Why can't the interchangeability be confined to de re positions? does not arguethat we can'tobjectivelydistinguishde re from de Quine dicto.His argumentis: 'If interchanges termswere allowedfor only in of de re use, we would end up defining sameness of meaning of terms as mere samenessof reference-a clearnotion, but not what we are looking for'. Quine is apparently forgettingthat the criterionof term synonymyat issue requires that the interchangespreservemeaning, not just truth. that the observation (For example,he would accept,in Pursuitof Truth, sentence 'This is a unicorn' is a big enough linguistic item to have a meaning of its own, that the position occupiedby 'unicorn'is de re,that 'goblin' is coextensive with 'unicorn',and yet that 'This is a goblin' is not synonymous.) (Quine'sargumentwas, I suspect, the product of panic induced by a realization he had blundered 'Useand its Placein Meaning'(Quine that in 1981)-see below.) 4.5 Grice and Strawson(1956)also arguethat statementsynonymycan be defined on the assumption of holistic verificationism. 'Quine does not deny', they say, 'that individual statements are regarded as confirmed or disconfirmed ... in the light of experience. He denies only

that these relations between single statements and experience hold independently of our attitudesto otherstatements.'So we can say that two statements are synonymous iff 'any experienceswhich, on certain assumptionsabout the truth-valuesof otherstatements,confirm or disconfirm one of the pair, also, on the same assumptions, confirm or disconfirm the other to the same degree'(p. 156). However, their argument seems to rest on a misinterpretation of Quine. I think Quine does deny that it makes sense to talk of the confirmationor disconfirmationof individualstatements,even 'on certain assumptions about the truth-values of other statements'.Certainlyhe would deny that 'e confirms s' can be true, irrespectiveof whether its truth value is supposed to depend on the truth values of certain other statements.

McDermott 996 Michael (When Quine considersGriceand Strawson's proposal,in Wordand his interestis in seeingwhetherit suggestsa definition of synonObject, termswhich does better than social stimulus synonymy in behavioural He argues (correctly, I think) that it does not (p. 64). My own ymy. proposalis also not meant to addressthat challenge.4) 5. 5.1 1 havebeen discussing?5 of'Two Dogmas' What about ?6?The section as a whole is ostensiblydevoted to giving some positive characterisation of a view which, while rejecting the two dogmas, is still empiricist, and to drawingthe consequencesfor ontological questions of rejecting the ASD. But the second paragraphseems to contain an argument, perhaps a new argument, against the ASD. 'If this view is correct',Quine says-i.e. the view summarised in paragraph i-'it becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic ... and analytic
statements ...'; and the following sentences appear to say why.

Let us begin by looking at the first paragraph.It sketches a distinctively Quinean version of verificationism. There are four main elements: (i) Deductivestructure Our knowledgeof the world ('so-called')is encompassedin a deductive system.We acceptnot only sentences,but also formal rules of inference accordingto which acceptanceof a set of sentences may require us to accept certain other sentences-and according to which, therefore, rejection of a sentence may require rejection of (at least one member of) a certain set of sentences. (It is possibleto accept the implying sentences and rejectthe implied sentences,but this constitutesrejectionof the rule.) truth values Quine does not say 'rules of inference'.He says 'entails', 'have to' be redistributed,we 'must' re-evaluatea sentence, and so on. But Quine'sterminologytends to createa suspicion that he is implicitly acknowledgingan ASD: doesn't 'p entails q' mean that 'Ifp then q' is Doesn't 'haveto' mean 'if you don't changemeanings'?I hope analytic? to avoid this suggestionby putting the point in terms of 'rulesof infer4 Gibson, incidentally,misinterpretsthe Grice and Strawsonproposal.As they-and Quineunderstand it, si and s2 are to be synonymous if, for any assumption about the truth values of other statements,s1and s2 have the same confirmationconditions on that assumption.For Gibson on notion of synonymy:s, and s2 are to be synonymous (1988,p. 94), the proposalis for a relativised an assumptionabout the truth values of other statementsif they have the same confirmationconditions on that assumption.

Holism Functionalist and Holism 997 Quine's ence'. After all, even an uninterpreteddeductive system has rules of inference.I sayformalrules to emphasizethat the user does not have to know the 'meaning'of a sentenceto applythe rule. Quine tries to avoid the suggestion by saying that 'the logical laws This can'tbe literallycor[are]simply furtherstatementsof the system'. rect, as Lewis Carrollshowed. I think Quine could be understoodhere in either of two ways. (i) Perhapshe is just ignoringfor the sakeof simplicity the system'sactual rules (i.e. its primitiverules). These will normally be very few, perhapsjust modusponens.The vast bulk of allegedly analyticinferenceswill requireas additionalpremissescertainallegedly and analyticsentences, thesearewhat he is referringto as 'simplyfurther statementsof the system'.(For example, if MP is the sole rule, we can't infer p from 'p and q';we need the furtherpremiss 'Ifp and q then p'.) (ii) Perhapshe means that there is no need to distinguishrules and sentences because a rule of inference, just as much as a sentence, can be I intuitively'synthetic'. think this is correct:as an alternativeto acceptthe sentence 'Allravensare black', you couldinclude in your system ing a primitiverule of inference'x is a ravenF-x black'. is Neither Quine'slanguagenor mine is explicitlybehavioural. As well as rules relatingsentencesto sentences,therearerules according to which experience may requirethe rejectionof a certainset of sentences; or, to put it the other way round, in virtue of which a set of sentencesmay have implicationsfor experience.(The second formulation is intended to be equivalentto the first. I do not mean that Quine thinks that statements or beliefs about future experience can be inferredfrom other sentences of the system. Quine does indeed say in paragraph4 that science is a 'tool ... for predicting experience';and a 'prediction' is, in ordinary language, a statement or belief about the future. But in the light of Quine's overall view the use of this term is best seen as an aberration.No statementsare 'about'experience.('Two Dogmas' p. 43) And he would presumablynot want to say that we have non-linguistic beliefsabout future (or past) experience.Such a mentalist position may be compatiblewith the positive claims of paragraph1, but does not seem to be requiredby them.) Thereis no reasonto assumethat theserules must be 'analytic'either. For example my system might have a rule linking 'This is John' with particular visual experiences: getting recalcitrant experiences would or requireabandonmentof 'This is John', abandonmentof the rule. But if I did abandon the rule I might have no inclination to describe the revision as a change in 'the meaning of "John"': might just be a reviit sion in my 'beliefsabout what Johnlooks like'.

998 MichaelMcDermott

In ?6 Quine seems to use the phrase 'empirical content' to mean what a sentenceor set of sentencesimplies about experience,directlyor indirectly,in virtue of such rules. (ii) Holism A single isolatedsentencetypicallyimplies nothing about experience.A sufficientlylarge set of sentences may have implications for experience (perhapsindirectly,via the implicationof certainother sentences);that is to say,the occurrenceof the recalcitrant experiencewill requirerejecat least one memberof the set;but not of anyparticularmember tion of -there will be a choice. (There will also be the option of rejectingthe relevantrules.) If we identifythe factualcontent of a sentenceor theory with its implications for experience, this amounts to a holism of content-sentences typicallydon't have factualcontent in isolation. This is not the same as the holistic verificationism of ?5, which apparently rested on an intuitive conception of confirmation. Confirmationis, intuitively,a matter of meaning.If we assume an ASD, we can reconstructan intuitive concept of confirmation as follows: e disconfirmsk (a set of sentences)iff the conjunction of k with all the analytic sentences of the language implies (via such of the rules as are analytic,if not all are) the non-occurrenceof e. I don't think Quine reallyintends to say that only a whole theory can have empirical content. It is hard to see how a deductively structured system could possibly have rules on which nothing short of a whole theory had experientialimplicationsand yet a theory did. Then what of all the passagesin which Quine insiststhat science is, in principle at least, linked to experience 'as a whole', since 'the logical truths at least ... are germane to all topics and thus provide connections' (Quine 1960, pp. 12-13)? Quine's point, I think, is that when expe-

rience requires that some member of a (limited) set of sentences be revised,the decision whichmember to revisewill rationallydepend on considerations affecting the whole system-what else will have to be revised,how it will affectoverallsimplicity,and so forth. There are two of aggregates, differentsizes, which are relevantto holism: (i) the smallest aggregatewhich has implications for experience; (ii) the smallest which 'will embody all the connectionsthat arelikelyto affect aggregate our adjudicationof a given sentence'.It is the second which, at least in principle,equalsthe whole theory. (The degree of holism in Quine's picture is thus pretty modest in comparison with the Aufbau. There, nothing short of a complete assignmentof colours to spatialpoints at a given time can be relied on

and Holism 999 Holism Functionalist Quine's to have implications for experience,in any sense. The Aufbauexample also highlights the differencebetween holism and deductive structure. Despite its extreme holism, there is no significant deductive structure in an Aufbautheory.) Quine's position allows, I think, that even a single sentence could have empiricalcontent-a sufficientlylong conjunction. In laterwork Quine also says that an observation sentence has an empiricalcontent of its own, but 'TwoDogmas' shows no signs of awarenessof a need to weakenthe doctrine of holism on this account. (iii) Universal revisability For any acceptedsentence or rule, there are experientialcircumstances in which its abandonmentwould be rational. This claim is often seen as an immediate consequence of Quine's holism. I don't know why. Holism implies that there is alwaysa choice what to revise,but that does not imply that anythingcan be revised. Quine seems to think there is a connection. But the only hint as to his reason is the final alternative in this sentence from paragraph2: 'Even a statement very close to the periphery can be held true in the face of recalcitrantexperienceby pleading hallucinationor by amending certain statements of the kind called logical laws'.This is hard to fathom. If I want to maintain 'There are no centaurs',for example, in the face of recalcitrantexperience,how could amending certain statements of the kind calledlogical laws help? In 'Replyto Vuillemin'Quine explicitly describesthe 'doctrine that every sentence is vulnerable'as 'holistic'.The only hint of a reason for the description comes when he continues, 'Even a truth of logic or mathematics could be abandoned in order to hold fast some casual statement of ephemeral fact';he gives intuitionist logic and quantum logic as actual examples. But how could a switch to intuitionist/quantum logic enable us to hold fast some casual statement of ephemeral fact?And surely this was not actuallythe motive of its proponents, in either case! vs (iv) Peripheral central Sentencesdiffer in how likely they are to be abandoned in the event of recalcitrantexperience. More precisely,a sentence is peripheralto the extent that, for some possible (not necessarily likely) experience, it would probablybe abandonedif that experienceoccurred. Claims (i)-(iii) are about rulesor norms,of formal deduction or of rationality,and what they permit or prohibit. (iv) is about the relative

1000Michael McDermott in likelihood, practice,of variousmoves allowedby the rules. 5.2 Our system of knowledge,as describedin (i)-(iv), is said by Quine to be analogousto a fabric,to a field of force, and to a network. The first two analogies are obviously weak. What would the threads of the fabric be? Statements?But everythread in a fabric is, typically, directly accessible at the periphery. A typical thread touches every threadrunning at right angles,plus its two neighbours;does this represent any interestingrelationamong statements? What is the periphery of a force field?What in the field do the statementsof the theory correspond to? The most popularanalogyhas been the net. The nodes are presumably supposed to be our theory's statements. Presumablythey are connected by paths representing relations of formal deducibility (according to the system'sprimitive rule/s). So a typical path will be from two points to a third. That'sone path, not two separatepaths. Can we understand that? Maybe we need something like nerve cells, each with severalinput lines and one output line, ratherthan paths.Now the statements at the periphery are those which imply something about A experience.What is distancefrom the periphery? connection consistof many steps?No, 'There are centaursor there are no centaurs'is ing supposed to be at the centre,though it will be deduciblepretty directly from 'There are no centaurs',at the periphery.We'dbetter mean distanceby 'distance':we can push nodes around, stretchingconnections where necessary,to get all the nodes where we want them. (For more detailson the relationof the net to experience,Quine refersus, in Word and Object,to Hempel. But Hempel's net floats parallelto the ground (experience):we can ascend from experienceto theory, and descend at a differentpoint, via strings ('rules of interpretation')linking certain What experience? points in the net to the ground.) What is recalcitrant is a revisionof the theory?What featureof a net correspondsto the possibility of alternativeadjustments to experience?It is hard to believe that the wide appealof the analogy comes from its being a genuine aid to understanding. Could it perhaps be functioning as a substitutefor understanding? 5.3 Claims (i)-(iv) all seem to be fairlyplausible,given a fundamentally verificationistorientation. A defender of the ASD would want to note that the changes referredto in (iii) might constitute changes in meanings, but he would not deny that language can change, does change, and should change in responseto empiricaldiscoveries.

Holism1001 Quine'sHolismand Functionalist

Now how, accordingto paragraph2, does this view give grounds for rejectingthe ASD?We may concede that nothing in (i)-(iv) entailsthat there is an ASD;but does it entail that there is not? What Quine saysis: 'it becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statements, which hold contingentlyon experience,and analyticstatements,which hold come what may. Any statement can be held true come what may
... Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune from revi-

sion. Revision even of the logical law of the excluded middle has been
proposed ... and what difference is there in principle between such a shift and the shift whereby Kepler superseded Ptolemy ...?'

Thereseem to be two separatearguments. (i) Any sentence, even an allegedlysyntheticsentence, can be held true come what may, and hence holds true come what may, and hence is analytic accordingto the target definition ('analytic= true in virtue of meanings alone'). The premiss is true: because of holism-or, separately,because of universal revisability-any synthetic sentence can be held true come what may. But the argument is obviously invalid. If 'holds true come what may' is to have any relevance at all to the premiss, it must be understood in terms of what people hold true, hence, presumably,as 'must be held true'. But 'can' does not imply 'must'. (This is true whether Quine's 'can'and 'must' mean accordingto the system'srules of inference, or according to standards of rationality-or even, although this couldn't be what Quine means, according to rules of
meaning.)

(ii) Any sentence, even an allegedly analytic sentence, can be revised, and hence is syntheticaccordingto the targetdefinition. Again the premiss is true-not because of holism, but because of universalrevisability. this argumentis also obviouslyinvalid.There But is no inconsistencyin maintaining(as Carnap,and just about everyone else, did) that a sentence true in virtue of meanings alone can be revised.5If Quine had meant 'can be revised without changing meanings' the argument would be valid. But of course that can't be what Quine meant, since he thinks it senselessto talk about 'changingmean5 The point was made by Griceand Strawson.Gibson (1988p. 95) has offeredan ingenious reply on Quine's behalf. He points out that Grice and Strawson admit that if you accept both the ASD and universal revisabilityyou must accept a distinction between sentence revisions which change meanings and ones which don't. 'Then, saysGibson, 'why all this hocus pocus?'His point, he explains,is that acceptinga distinctionbetween sentence revisionswhich changemeaningsand ones which don't is tantamountto acceptingthe ASD. So if you acceptboth the ASD and universal revisability, have thereby,in effect, acceptedthe ASD. Cop that, Griceand Strawson! you

1002Michael McDermott ings'; and in any case the premiss is completely without support if so understood. There is also the rhetorical question at the end. Quine means that there is no differencein principlebetween the revisionsof theory which allegedlyinvolve a change in meanings and the ones which don't. If he could establishthis, it would be very relevant:it would undermine the ASD. But saying 'What differenceis there?'does nothing to show that there is no difference. 6. 6.1 Yetthere remainsa stubborn feeling that somethinginterestingand importantis being said againstthe ASD in ?6. What is it? of The hidden argumentconcerns, I think, the importance the ASD. Quine's target is certain definitionsof 'analytic'.He is not really concernedto criticizeour intuitive,non-philosophicaltalk of synonymyor truth by meaning, or to deny that it can be explained, or clarified, or tidied up. The notion of distancefrom the peripheryis offered,indeed, as an account of this intuitiveuse. It is actuallyin Quine'sinterestto be able to give such an account,becauseit providesan answerto the objection 'If there is no ASD, why do we think there is one?' The answer is, 'Becauseyou are misperceivingthe real differenceamong sentences in distance from the periphery'.If someone proposed to define 'analytic' as, say, 'maximallydistant from the periphery',Quine's main response would not be that the definition was unclear,or that it had a false presupposition, or that it did not capturethe intuitive use of the term, but had that it made it turn out that everything philosophers said about anawas false or trivial. (PerhapsQuine would object that distance lyticity from the periphery is 'only a distinction of degree'-meaning that there is no extremeposition, no sentenceshave zero likelihood of being revisedin responseto recalcitrantexperience.Would this be consistent with holding that some sentences are socially stimulus analytic?)The definitions of 'analytic'which Quine is concerned to attack are those which make analyticityseem philosophicallyimportant. The hidden argumentis, I think, a generalargumentfor the conclusion that there cannot be an epistemologicallyimportantASD. Epistemology is about the rationality of theory construction and adjustment. Quine's premiss is that a theory is 'a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of past experience'.He infers that the rationalway to revisea theory in responseto recalcitrant experienceis pragmatically-do whateveryields a theorywhich makesmany

Holism1003 Quine'sHolismand Functionalist

experientialpredictions, makes true experientialpredictions, which is simple, clear,etc., etc. Now suppose that there are 'rulesof meaning',so that thereis a distinctionbetween theory revisionswhich changemeanings and theory revisions which do not. How is this supposed distinction relevant?Consider for example the question whether we should accept such sentencesas 'Numbersexist','o 0 1' and so on. 'Weshould', says Quine's empiricist opponent (Carnap,say), 'because (i) they are analytic-acceptance of such sentences is requiredby certain rules of meaning;furthermore(ii) these aregood rules-acceptance of the sentences in question enablesus to have a systemwhich is empiricallyadequate, simple, and so on'. To which Quine responds, 'The last part of this is by itselfa full answerto the original question: we should accept the sentences in question because that is a rational way to achieve the purpose of our system. The detour via rules of meaning contributes nothing. The right way to make the revisions which you regard as But changingmeaningsis, we agree,pragmatically. also the rightway to make revisions which you do not regard as changing meanings ispragmatically. The supposed distinction between revisions which change meanings and revisionswhich do not is of no importance'.6 The premiss,about what theories are 'for',would not appealto nonempiricists. A realist, for example, might want to ask whether acceptance of sentences about numbers achievesthe rationaltheoreticalpurpose of correctlyrepresentinga realityindependent of our experience. But even an empiricist might object that the argument completely In ignores the function of languagein communication. Quine'spicture each of us is constantlyadjustingan inheritedverbalstructureto fit his own continuing experience. Quine's 'rationality'relatesto this essentially privatepursuit.7Imagine, then, a theorist who decides to simply interchangetwo predicatesthroughouthis theory,say 'buttermilk'and 'arsenic'(Hempel). This will not affectthe theory'spredictionsof experience, or its overallsimplicity.On Quine'sassumptions,there is nothing againstit. But in realitythere is something againstit (even from an empiricistviewpoint), because the languageof science is also a tool for
6 Churchland gives a version of this argument (1979, pp. 49-51), and it seems clear that he thinks the essence of it is in 'TwoDogmas'.Churchland's version is actuallyspoilt by an unnecessary overstatement. He imagines two theorists who accept all the same sentences but differ in which ones they call analytic, and argues that they do not differ in which sentences they should abandon in responseto the same recalcitrantexperience.But he adds, unnecessarily, that one theorist calls all his non-observationsentencesanalytic.This implies that the 'analytic'sentencescollectivelyimply observationsentences. Clearlythis theorist is using 'analytic'in a way no defender of the notion would condone.

7Dummett describesQuine'sview-in tic'

'Two Dogmas',not in Wordand Object-as 'solipsis-

1004MichaelMcDermott

communication.As well as rules of inferenceand generalprinciplesof thereseems to be a place for 'rulesof meaning',rules requirrationality, ing us to accept certain inferences and/or sentences, and to not abandon them without special public notice. The pragmaticvalue of such rules would be that a hearer could get useful information about the empirical content of a speaker'stheory from a single remark('Buttermilk is bad for Baby'),because a sharedbackground could be relied on. Prima facie, the existenceof rules of meaning seems to be explicableas a rationalresponseto the need for an effectivetool of communication. It could, perhaps, be replied that the obvious irrationality of the linguistic behaviour describedabove can be explained by generalprinciples of rationality, once we admit that language is a tool for communication, even in the absenceof any separaterules of meaning; or that theseallegedrules cannot be explainedin behaviouralterms;or etc. But it hardlyseems reasonableto just ignorethe use of languagein communication. Quine might reply that his argumentwas only intended to show the not unimportanceof analyticityfor epistemology, for the theory of language in general.If the argument is correct, 'The notion of analyticity then just subsidesinto the humblerdomain where its supportingintuitions hold sway:the domain of languagelearningand empiricalsemantics'.('Replyto Hellman',Quine 1986bp. 208) the On that understanding argumentseems to me to be as good as its But the question is, now, is it an argument from empiricist premiss. holism? Apparentlynot. A non-holisticsystemwould have rules linking each of its sentences,directlyor indirectly,with certainexperiences,so that occurrence of those experiences would require abandonment of the sentence. These rules would be rationallyrevisablein pursuit of a system which was simpler,clearer,and empiricallyadequate.If, in the interests of easy communication, it proved useful to classify some of these rules as 'rules of meaning', that would still be irrelevant to the merits of revising a rule in pursuit of the aims designatedby Quine as relevant-just as in the holistic case. epistemologically So we still do not have a good Quinean argumentfrom holismagainst the ASD (even in the presentweak sense of 'against'). 6.2 As I mentioned, Quine wishes to explainawayour intuitivebelief in an ASD. The 'TwoDogmas' explanation,in terms of a misperceivingof 'distancefrom the periphery',seems to be a ratherpoor one. Intuition says that 'There have been black dogs' is not analytic, despite its low likelihood of being revised.8

Holism1005 Quine'sHolismand Functionalist

Quine and othershaveofferedother explanationsof our intuitions of synonymy and analyticity (explanations which do not imply that the notions are philosophicallyimportant). One favouriteis that we intuitivelyjudge a sentenceto be analyticif the utility in communication of one of its words depends on generalacceptanceof the sentence.Why do we feel that 'Bachelorsare unmarried',for example, is analytic?'One looks to "unmarried man" as semantically anchoring "bachelor" because there is no socially constant stimulus meaning to govern the man" and you leaveit no use of the word;severits tie with "unmarried very evident social determination,hence no utility in communication' (Quine 1960,p. 56). Quine presumablythinks that this explanationcan be cashedout in behaviouralterms,but he does not suggesthow. In any case, the explanation seems to be simply false. Even if 'married' and 'unmarried'were banished from the language,the meaning and utility of 'bachelor'need not be affected.Perhapswe could do better if we said that a sentence is intuitively analytic if the utility in communication depends on its not being denied. But not much better: whatever the purposesof communicationaresupposedto be, in terms of which 'utility' is measured,I will presumablyhave difficultyachievingthem with 'black''dog'etc. if I deny 'Therehavebeen blackdogs'. Another explanation Quine offers is that we intuitivelyjudge a sentence analytic if everybody'learns that it is true by learning its words'
(Quine 1973, ?21). This is a real puzzler, since the essence of Quine's

behaviourismis that there is no distinction between learningthat a sentence is true and learningits words. '[The trouble is] that we have made no generalexperimentalsense of a distinctionbetweenwhat goes into a native'slearningto apply an expressionand what goes into his learning supplementary matters about the objects concerned.' (Quine 1960, p. 38) For a behaviourist,the present deflationaryaccount of 'analytic' can amount to nothing more than sayingthat everycompetent speaker has learnt, somehow, to assentto the sentence.And yet Quine saysthat we have here a closerapproximationto the intuitive notion than social stimulus analyticity. 6.3 I said that the definitions of'analytic' which Quine is concerned to attack are those which make analyticity seem philosophically important. Quine came to consciously see matters this way much later:
criticism (p. 59) of Quine'sexplanation.He saysthat However,I cannot endorse Churchland's 'Bachelorsare unmarried'comes out as not intuitivelyanalyticon Quine'saccount. But this is because he wronglyinterpretsQuine as sayingthat a sentence is relativelycentralif its abandonment would require manyfurtherrevisionsof the theory.
8

1006MichaelMcDermott

'Moreover I now perceive that the philosophically important question about analyticity ... is not how to explicate [it]; it is the question rather of [its] relevance to epistemology'. ('Reply to Hellman' Quine 1986b, p. 207) But I am suggesting that the idea may have been subtly at work already in 'Two Dogmas'. The argument in 'Reply to Hellman' is that, given holism, there is no need to explicate analyticity, because the main philosophical question which was supposed to be answered by appeal to the ASD no longer arises. The question, according to Quine, was how to 'account for the meaningfulness of logical and mathematical truths, which are clearly devoid of empirical content'. Quine's historical reconstruction seems to be pretty wonky. How could the analyticity of mathematical truths ever have been supposed to explain their having meaning but no content? Analyticity just is having meaning but no content. The orthodox view, which I see no reason to doubt, is that the main issue to which analyticity was relevant was the traditional dispute between rationalists and empiricists. The empiricist says that there is no a priori knowledge of the world; the rationalist objects 'What about mathematics?'; to which the empiricist replies that mathematical knowledge is not knowledge of the world, i.e. mathematical truths are analytic. I can't see that holism makes that dispute go away. I know of nothing Quine has said which even seems relevant to the question of the respective claims of reason and experience as sources of knowledge. In fact Quine is so little aware of the strand in the empiricist tradition which emphasizes the importance of experience as a source of knowledge that he can imagine that the relevant alternative to experience is not reason but extrasensoryperception! (E.g. Quine 199o pp. 19-21) Quine's 'empiricism' is wholly concerned with the empiricist theory of content (verificationism, phenomenalism etc.), not the empiricist theory of justification ('no a priori knowledge of the world').9 (Quine does mention, in 'Epistemology Naturalized', the thesis that all truths about the world can be deduced, with certainty, from known truths about experience; but this is not the same thing at all-or, for that matter, an authentic part of the empiricist tradition. Quine's 'naturalism', also, is sometimes seen as a restatement of the traditional empiricist doctrine that there is no a priori knowledge. But wrongly: Quine says that it is futile to try to evaluate scientific methods of arriving at knowledge (futile because the attempt would presuppose some
9 For a seminalpresentationof the distinction, see Stace (1944?11);endorsedby Hempel (1950 n.i).

Holism1007 Quine'sHolismand Functionalist

is firmerplace to stand); this does not imply that reasoning not among those scientificmethods.)
7.

7.1 Quine's holism is a thesis about the unit of empirical content. We have so far looked at three conceptions of empirical content used by Quine in 'TwoDogmas',based respectivelyon truth-in-virtue-of,on an intuitive notion of confirmation, and on a relation of formal implication according to the rules of a deductive system. In his later work a somewhatdifferentconceptionbecomes prominent,and hence a somewhat differentversion of holism. Let us consider now what appearsto be a new argument against intuitive semantics, depending on this matureversion of holism. An observationsentenceis defined, behaviourally,as one for which assent or dissent is always prompted by current stimulation, in the same way for everyspeaker.In his laterwork Quine tends to regardthe observation sentence as the fundamental possessor of empirical content. Its empirical content is defined as its stimulus meaning. The empirical content of a sentence or theory in general is defined as the observation sentences it implies, according to the formal rules of the system. (The theory of empirical content in 'Two Dogmas' ?6 is thus modified by splitting the connection between theory and experience into two parts, one describedin terms of formal implication,the other in behaviouralterms.) Holism is now the thesis that mostisolatedsentenceshave no empirical content. The observation sentence is the exception-it 'has an empirical content all its own and wears it on its sleeve'.If all sentences were observation sentences, holism would not apply. What makes holism true (in a particularlanguage)is that not all sentencesareobservation sentences. Now the argument Quine uses against one candidate definition of synonymy depends, he thinks, on the fact that not all sentences are observation sentences. As we saw, Quine argues that social stimulus synonymy is not a good approximationto the intuitive notion of synonymy. For example 'Brutuskilled Caesar'is socially stimulus synonymous with 'Brutuskilled Caesarand there have been black dogs',but they are not synonymous. But he thinks that social stimulus synonymy is a good approximation to synonymy for observation sentences, indeed for occasion sentences generally.'When the sentences are occasion sentences,the envisagednotion of synonymyis prettywell realized

1008MichaelMcDermott

in intrasubjectivestimulus synonymy,especiallyas socialized.'(Quine

1960, p. 62) But if that is so, then if all sentences were observation sentences, and there were no sentences like 'Brutus killed Caesar' and so on, the objection to social stimulus synonymy would go away. So apparently we have here an argument against a suggested definition of an intuitive semantic notion which actually depends on the truth of holism. However, holism is still not a premiss of the argument: all the argument needs is an example of a pair of sentences which are socially stimulus synonymous but not synonymous, not a general principle which implies that there are such examples. And, more important, Quine is wrong to think that social stimulus synonymy is a good approximation to synonymy for observation sentences. 'Here is a rabbit', for example, is socially stimulus synonymous with 'Here is a rabbit and there have been black dogs', but they are not synonymous. The inadequacy of social stimulus synonymy does not apply only to standing sentences: holism, once again, makes no difference. (Similar considerations seem to refute Quine's claim that indeterminacy of translation does not apply to observation sentences. Let us define the word 'quabbit' as follows: x is a quabbit iff (i) x is a rabbit, and (ii) there have been black dogs. ('Define'? We are provisionally adopting the standpoint of intuitive semantics, for purposes of reductio ad absurdum.) Consider a manual of translation which differs from the homophonic only in translating John's 'rabbit' as 'quabbit'. It seems clear that no plausible behavioural concept of correct translation (no plausible set of 'constraints') could prefer the homophonic scheme to this alternative. Yet there is, by intuitive standards, a fact of the matter as to whether John really means 'quabbit' when he says 'rabbit'-even in the observation sentence 'This is a rabbit'.) Quine argues that in this case the mentalist should be satisfied with social stimulus synonymy: 'For we can argue [qua mentalists] that only verbal habit can plausibly account for concomitant variation of two occasion sentences, in point of assent and dissent, over the whole gamut of possible stimulations. There is still the unscreened effects of community-wide collateral information, but there is no evident reason not to count such information simply as a determinant of the verbal habit' Well, that's all very well for Quine to say: he thinks there is no difference between the hypothesis that a concomitance of assent conditions is due to current verbal habit, and the hypothesis that it is due to current community-wide collateral information. But the essence of our

Holism1009 Quine'sHolismand Functionalist

intuitive mentalism-its essential error,accordingto Quine-is to distinguish collateral information, even community-wide, from verbal habit, as factors in current linguistic behaviour. That is why we don't count 'There have been black dogs' as analytic. Why should Quine expect the mentalist to suddenly give up the distinction, just for occasion sentences? (Quine's identification of cognitive synonymy with social stimulus synonymy, for occasion sentences, is repeated in 'Use and its Place in Meaning',with a remarkableaddition. He claims there that a word is cognitively synonymous with a word or phrase if replacement of the one by the other in any occasion sentence yields a synonymoussentence. This claim is intuitivelyplausible.But, as Quine points out, it implies, if synonymyof occasion sentencesis definable,that the generalnotion of cognitive synonymy for terms is definable-contrary to 'Two Dogmas'!) 7.2 In the foregoing account of the observation sentence I omitted a detailwhich, while not relevantto the main argument,is of some independent interest. More precisely,Quine's concept is 'observationsentence modulo n seconds',meaning that everyspeakerwill give the same verdict when given a stimulus of length n seconds. A sentence may be an observation sentence modulo n seconds and not be an observation sentence modulo n-1 seconds. The empirical content of a sentence or theory, in general,consists in the implied observationsentences modulo n seconds, for a suitablen. Now if two theories differ in factualcontent, there is an observation sentence modulo n seconds implied by one theory that is not implied by the other,and hence a stimulusof length n secondswhich would disconfirm one theory but not the other. Quine'stheory of content therefore has the following consequence: any factual disagreement can be settled in n seconds. This would be a very interesting thesis, if only Quine had told us the value of n. Also I described the Wordand Object theory. It underwent later changes, most notably concerning the notions of the stimulusand the observationcategorical. In Wordand Objecta visual stimulus was a patternof ocular irradiation. Quine'ssettledview, from 1965on, is that a stimulusis a patternof firing of sensory receptors-a very different thing. The definition of 'observation sentence' in terms of uniformity of stimulus meaning across speakersthen seems to presuppose that differentspeakershave similarreceptors.Quine came to think the assumption extravagant. In

1010Michael McDermott 'EmpiricalContent'he adopted an ill-consideredalternativedefinition: an occasion sentenceis observationalfor a speakerif its stimulus meaning for that speaker is uniform over time. In Pursuit of Truth(Quine 1990 ?16) uniformity across speakersreturns to centre stage, but not uniformityof stimulus:all must assenton 'witnessingthe occasion'.But judgements of similarity of 'occasion'are not objective;they are exerIt cises ratherof 'empathy'. appearsto follow that the concept of observation sentence no longer has any place in a properlyobjectivescience of verbalbehaviour-though Quine does not explicitlydrawthis conclusion. PerhapsQuine would have done better to stick with the Word and Objectconception of stimulus, for the purpose of defining 'observation sentence'. Quine eventuallycame to see the empiricalcontent of a sentence or it theory as residingin the observationcategoricals implies.An observation categoricalis a sentencelike 'Wherethere is smoke there is fire';it is compounded out of two observation sentences-here 'Here is smoke' and 'Here is fire'-but is itself an eternal sentence. The prime reason for the modification was 'Problem1:observationsentences are occasion sentences, whereastheory is formulatedin eternalsentences, true or false once for all. What logical connection can there be between
the two?' ('Empirical Content', Quine 1981ap. 26)

The modification is, however, ineffective and unnecessary. The observation categoricalsdo imply observation sentences. For example 'Where there is smoke there is fire' implies the observation sentence 'Hereis smoke -- here is fire'.And any experiencewhich would disconfirm an observation categorical (in this example, an experience of smoke without fire) would do so by disconfirmingthe implied observation sentence. 7.3 There are passages in which Quine considers the criticism (as he evidently takes it to be) that the acknowledgmentof observation sena tences represents('strictlyspeaking,'in principle','legalistically') substantive weakening of the holism of 'Two Dogmas'. (E.g. 'On
Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World' Quine 1975, p. 314; 'Five Milestones of Empiricism' Quine 1981c, p. 51; 'Reply to Vuillemin' Quine 1986c, p. 620.) But his treatmentof the point is quite opaque. In

'Replyto Vuillemin'for example,he arguesthat the 'extremeholist'can accept that observation sentences have their own empirical content, because 'even an observationsentence can sometimes be disavowedto save a theory'. But how is this supposed to be relevant?If an extreme holist is one who holds that no sentencehas an empiricalcontent of its

Holism Functionalist and Holism 1011 Quine's own, Quine'spoint will not help him much, once he has admittedthat an observation sentence has an empirical content of its own. Also Quine's point seems to be false:by definition, an observationsentence cannotbe denied, given a currentstimuluswhich would prompt anyone to assent to it. The latter difficultyis actuallyraised by Quine himself: 'Witnessesmust agreein their verdicton an observationsentenceat the time'. He says, apparentlyby way of response, that 'the standing sentence that recordsthe observation is a theoretical sentence and can be But re-evaluatedafterward'. this seems to be irrelevantalso. I think Quine'scontortions were quite unnecessary.The correctway to reconcile the extreme holism of 'Two Dogmas' with the new theory of content is simplyto point out that the observationsentenceis an idealisation. In real languages,like English, no sentence has an empirical content all its own becausethereare no observation sentences. Evensuch a favourablecase as 'This is red' is only approximatelyobservational. (Feelinga familiarobject in the dark,I agreethat it is red;but the same stimulus would not prompt assent in all competent speakers.)Examples like 'Hereis a rabbit'and 'Here is smoke' need to be takenwith an even biggergrain of salt. 8. 8.1 Quine says the unit of meaning is the theory. He infers (wrongly,I think) that terms and sentences generallylack meaning of their own. According to an alternative interpretation, due mainly to Harman (1967), Quine does think that terms and sentences have meaning. His holism consists in thinking that their meaning is determined the theby ory in which they occur. Whichtheory?Harmansays it is the speaker's total theory-all the sentenceshe accepts. Harmandeducesthis position from Quine'saccountof translationin Wordand Object. Quine says, according to Harman, that a correct translation manual between the language of A and the language of B must translateeverysentenceacceptedby A into a sentenceacceptedby B. Harman'sQuine concludes that what A means depends on all the sentenceshe accepts. I earliercriticizedHarman'sinterpretationof Quine'srejectionof the ASD. The interpretation of Quine's holism as a doctrine of theorydependentword or sentencemeaning also has little to recommendit. First let me get out of the way one comparativelyminor respect in which Harman'sreasoning is not faithful to the actual Quine. Quine does not hold that a correct translation must translateevery sentence

1012MichaelMcDermott

accepted by A into a sentence accepted by B. The translation of an observationsentenceacceptedby A need not be actuallyacceptedby B, if their actual currentstimulation differs.And a stimulus analytic sentence for A must be translatedinto a stimulusanalyticsentencefor Bi.e. one that not only is accepted but would be accepted if his current stimulation were different.A more accuratesummarywould be that a correcttranslationmanualis one such that, for any condition C on current stimulation,if a sentenceis assentedto by A under condition C, its translation must be assented to by B under condition C. (Quine does not explicitlygive all the constraintson translationwhich are implied by this formula. For example, he does not explicitly require that if a sentence has a non-empty positive stimulus meaning and an empty negative stimulus meaning (e.g. 'There are centaurs'), its translation must have the same. But this is probablynot an intentionalomission.) But presumablyHarmanwould not reallywish to deny, on Quine's behalf, the relation between assent and current stimulation. Most adherentsof the view that the meanings of words are determinedby a theory seem to focus on 'theoretical'terms;they assume an independently-understood 'observational' vocabulary. The most charitable interpretationof Harman,I think, is to see him, somewhatsimilarly,as taking for granted a Quinean story about the meaning of observation sentences.The interestingquestion is how theoretical sentencesget their and Quine's alleged answer is, holistically-it depends on meaning; everything we accept (including which observation sentences we accept). On this charitable interpretation, how accurate is Harman's of representation Quine? In its favour,it at least attributesto Quine a behavioural account of his behaviouralaccount of translation).Harmanhas cermeaning (via tainly got right the point of firstimportanceto Quine, that if there is an acceptabledefinition of meaning, it is behavioural.It is true, also, that Quine does use his account of translation to give definitions of some concepts from intuitive semantics (e.g. observation sentence). And there are times when it is not very clear whether Quine is giving a behaviouraldefinitionof an intuitive concept, or merely attemptingto 'account for our intuitions'.Furthermore,there are times when Quine saysthat the question whethera behaviouralaccount of some semantic term comes close enough to capturing the intuitive use to count as a behaviouraldefinitionis not an important question (because a behaviouraldefinitionwould not havebad philosophicalconsequences). But none of these grounds for uncertainty applies to Quine's treatment of the intuitive concept of meaning itself (as applied to words or

Holism1013 Quine'sHolismand Functionalist

sentences). Quine is as clear as he can be that meaning can not be defined behaviourally,via his account of translation.His point is that translation does not proceed by equating words with 'the same meaning'. How on earth could the indeterminacy thesis be thought to be compatible with the idea that a correct translation is one which equates words with the same meaning?Harmanis, indeed, somewhat sceptical about indeterminacy, there can be no doubting Quine'sattachment but to it. the Further, Harman-Quinethesis seems to imply that any sentenceI is analytic,since your failureto acceptit would be constitutiveof accept your not meaning the same by it. Harman considers this problem specificallyin relationto the logical truths.For them, at least, he openly admits 'that a person who denies our basic logical principles thereby indicatesthat he misunderstands what he saysor means something different by his words from what we would mean'.(Harman 1967p. 132) Then why aren't they analytic? His answer is that, on Quine's view, although there are many sentences which cannot be denied without changing their meaning, there are none which can't be given up. 'One may give up even "Copperis copper"by refusingto have any expression corresponding to "copper"or by refusing to countenance the "is"of identity.'Well,yes;but would one be giving up 'Copperis copper'without changing its meaning? Wouldn't one be depriving it of meaning?

Anyway,Harman'smanoeuvre is not available if the Harman-Quine thesis is understoodas sayingthat you must acceptany sentenceI accept if you mean the same by it; and that is what would follow from Quine's account of translation,if anythingabout sentence-meaningsdid, since Quine requiresthat the translation of an accepted sentence must also
be accepted.'0

I know of only one passage in Quine that could seem to support Harman'sinterpretation.Near the end of chapter1 of Word and Object, the following as a statement of holism: 'Unless pretty Quine gives firmly and directlyconditioned to sensory stimulation, a sentence S is
the 'O Essentially same problemhas been consideredby others, e.g. Churchland(1975pp. 46-7). He agreesthat there are sentenceswhich 'do not admit of a denial that is consistent with our current understandingof the terms they contain' Then why aren'tthey analytic?Churchland's answer is that such sentencesmay be false.A trickysituation-a sentencecan be false,as currentlyunderstood, but you can't say it is false, as currently understood! Churchlandhimself appears to get caught. He saysthat a denial of'Phlogiston is an elementalsubstance'for example, 'would indeed be inconsistent with our understanding of the term 'phlogiston' [our current understandingwhich, he says (Churchland1975p. 55), is the same as its original meaning].'And yet, he says,this sentenceis actuallyfalse.He seems quite oblivious to the implicationfor his own understanding of 'phlogiston'

1014Michael McDermott except relative to its own theory; meaningless

(Quine 1960, p. 24; there are echoes at p. 34 and

meaningless

intertheoretically'

p. 75.). This is not quite what Harman wants: to say that meaning is relativeto a theory is differentfrom saying that it dependson a theory. But, in any case, the statement is not to be relied on. Quine immediatelygoes on to say:'This point, alreadypretty evident from ?3 and from the parable of neutrinos in ?4, will be developed in more detail in chapter 2'. Evidently Quine is identifying holism with the indeterminacy thesis! To do this he must, at a minimum, be overlooking the differencebetween relativityto a theoryand relativity to a manual of translation.In such a context, we are entitled to regard his statement of holism as equally careless. (Quine's statement of holism here also seems to be designed to let him assimilate holism to the thesis that the only admissible notion of truth is a disquotational notion! All these connections are strongly hinted at, but not clearly stated,let alone arguedfor.)
Quine sometimes says things like '... the supposition that each state-

ment, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit of confirmationor infirmation at all' ('Two Dogmas' p. 41). It is just possible, I suppose, that Harman attaches some significanceto the 'taken in isolation'.(In 'Meaning Holism Defended' Harman says 'Anyversion of meaning holism saysthat there are cases in which partshave meaningbecause of their place in a largerwhole'. He gives Quine's holism as an example, but then says 'ForQuine, individualtheoreticalsentencessimply do not
have empirical meaning, taken by themselves'. (Harman 1993 p. 163, my

emphases) This is a rather conspicuous self-contradiction, unless he thinks the final phraseprovides a way out.) But such phrasescan serve no other function than merely emphasizingthat the topic is the statement, ratherthan the theory it is part of. Whether a statement is confirmableor meaningful cannot literallydepend on whether we 'take it in isolation' or not. If a statement-a particular inscription or utterance-- is part of some particulartheory,we can'tchangethat just by decidingto 'takeit in isolation'. Harmansaysthat Quine'sholism about meaning is inferredfrom his behaviouralaccount of translation.The orthodox (and correct)view is that it is inferred, rather,from his confirmation holism and verificaversion of meaningholism, tionism. Some authors,acceptingHarman's have thereforebeen led to ascribeto Quine a correspondingversion of confirmationholism, along the following lines: the confirmation conditions of a sentence are determinedby the totality of other sentences the speakeraccepts. (E.g. would a ringing in the ears confirm 'Brutus

Holism1015 Quine'sHolismand Functionalist

killed Caesar'?It might, for a speakerwho accepted 'If Brutus killed Caesarmy earswill ring'.) This is not Quine's confirmationholism, either.Quine'sview is that in generalit is 'not significant'to speak of a single sentencebeing confirmedby such-and-suchan experience-even if you add that whether this is true depends on something else. What can be confirmed is the of conjunction the sentence in question with all the other relevantsentences. (Actual formulations of this 'determined by' confirmation holism often don't make much sense: 'The justificationof a sentence depends on the justificationof every other sentence';'Everystatementin a theory (partially)determinesthe level of confirmationof everyother statement in the theory'.My formulationabove is meant to be charitable.) 8.2 Harman'sQuine says that what A means depends on all the sentences he accepts.Since, in practice,there will alwaysbe somesentences containing a given word that two speakers give different verdicts to, Harman-Quineinfersthat the identitytranslationscheme is neverquite correct,and hence that two speakersnevermean quitethe same by their words. This is a very anti-intuitiveconclusion. To some extent,however,this may be a resultof Harman-Quine's focusing on meaning in the idiolect of a single speaker. usuallymean by 'meaning'meaning for a group, We (Quine focuses on this especiallyfor a group such as 'Englishspeakers'. kind of case too.) For group meaning the analogous conclusion is that the meaning of a word depends on the sentencesacceptedby all members of the group. This is still anti-intuitive.For example,it implies that thereis no sentence of Arunta which means 'There have been black dogs', since no otherwise acceptabletranslationof that sentence would be accepted by Aruntaspeakers.(Until recently,at any rate,all dogs known to speakers of Aruntawere brown.) The thesis that the meaning of a word is determined by a theory would be more plausible,then, if we allowedthat the determiningtheory might include somethingless than all acceptedsentences. (Translation,also, could then be said to requirepreservationof assent not to all accepted sentences, but just to those of the elite subclass.) The trouble is that the proposed elite subclasswould seem to be in effect the analyticsentences:if Quine is right about the ASD there is no principledbasis for delimitingthe meaning-determining sentences. This is a problem for anyone who, like Harman, is trying to explain meaning in non-semantic terms. The thesis could be understood in a

1016MichaelMcDermott

less ambitiousway,however.Justtakingfor grantedan intuitive, unanalysed notion of meaning, a thesis to the effect that the meanings of some words are determined (in some specified way) by a theory could be substantive,plausibleand interesting. (Some authors reservethe name 'meaning holism' for the extreme thesis that the meaning of a word depends on all the sentencesaccepted by the group. Takingit for granted that meaning is determined by at least someof the acceptedsentences (others call this 'holism'also), they thereforeconfrontthe argument'No ASD,thereforeholism.'This argument is at the centre of many discussions of 'meaning holism', most
famously in Fodor and Lepore (1992).)

A second respect in which the Harman-Quine thesis is implausibly strong is in its requiring the meaning-determining theory to be accepted.It seems quite plausible to think that 'Phlogiston is an element' is a partial determiner of the meaning of 'phlogiston',even for modern speakerswho think that sentencefalse. Thirdly,the Harman-Quinethesis seems to be too strong in assuming that the meaning-determining theory must be formulated in the public language.For example,it is widely held to be constituspeaker's tive of the Englishmeaning of 'bachelor'that Englishspeakersassentto 'Bachelorsare unmarried'.But this seems to be definitelywrong. Suppose that the word 'unmarried' were simply banished from the language. There is no reason why 'bachelor'should not mean exactlythe same as before. Certainlyit seems essential that speakersshould apply 'bachelor'only to men they believeto be unmarried;but sayingso does not seem necessary. Even 'observationterms' (in public language) seem to be unnecessary.Supposeyou think that 'Ripetomatoes are normallyred' is constitutive of the meaning of 'tomato'. Now let us banish 'red' from the language-but people continue to believe that the things they call 'tomato' are normally red when ripe. Would the meaning of 'tomato' change at all? (It is extremely common for someone to believe something to be a particularcolour without havinga word for that particular colour.Ascriptionsof such beliefs are,however,usuallyde re.) It Foran actualexample,consider'cat'. seems that to know the meanof 'cat'you have to know what cats typicallylook like. But there is ing no way of putting that belief into words. (Except, of course, by using 'looks like a cat';but 'Catslook like cats' does not contribute much to defining'cat'.) 8.3 My discussion of holism and meaning is concerned throughout

Holism1017 Quine'sHolismand Functionalist

with public language.Parallelissues and argumentsconcerningthe socalled semanticsof the allegedlanguageof thought havebeen discussed (often in tandem) by many authors. The third objection would of course not applyin that context. It should be obvious that Quine'sdiscussion of holism and meaning is concerned, also, with public languagealone. If this is not obvious, it is mainly because of the influence of Harman (1967). Harman'sthird major errorin interpretingQuine is to representhim as supporting,in effect, a particularversion of the languageof thought hypothesis. According to Harman'sQuine, 'A general theory of language must ultimately attempt to explain linguistic and other behavior, and this requiresthe postulation of certainpsychologicalstates,e.g., desiresand beliefs.' (Harman 1967 p. 144) Harman-Quine insists, however, that these explanations require only the postulation of sentential attitudes (not propositionalattitudes), i.e. attitudes to sentences of the subject's public language. Harman'sexposition of the detailsof this sentential-attitude psychology is difficultto follow. Apparentlythere is some role to be played in psychologicalexplanationby knowing a translationof the subject'slanguage, although knowing a 'radical'(i.e., for Harman, a uniquelycorrect) translation is not necessary.But if we suppose that Karlaccepts the sentence 'Der Schneeist weiss' for example,how could our capacity to explain or predicthis behaviourbe assistedby knowing a translation of those words into English or Chinese, for example?(Knowing what the sentence means to Karlmight be helpful, but that is not what Harman proposes.) But, whateverthe details,it is clearthat the real Quine could not put up with it. There is no hint in Quine that 'acceptance' of sentences might explain non-linguistic behaviour.There is no hint that 'desires' directedtowardssentencescould explainanybehaviour.Quine'sfundamental objection to propositional-attitudepsychology applies equally to sentential-attitudepsychology:it postulates hiddencauses.Quine is preparedto consider suggestionsas to how belief might be defined as a disposition to observable behaviour; but not as a hidden cause of observablebehaviour. There is, indeed, a brief passage in ?44 of Wordand Objectwhere Quine unfavourablycomparespropositions with sentences, as objects for the attitudes.But the sentenceswere not assumedto be sentencesof the believer's own language: the Englishman, the Chinaman and the mouse would all believe-true an English sentence. Ascriptions of such attitudes would therefore not avoid indeterminacy. The supposed

1018 MichaelMcDermott

advantageof the proposal was ontologicalonly: the indeterminacy in the identity conditions for propositionswould be replacedby an indeterminacyin the truth conditions for 'believes-true'The proposal was seen as a contribution to the development of the low-grade canonical notation 'meantonly to dissolveverbalperplexitiesand facilitatelogical deductions',not the high-gradecanonicalnotation to be used in 'limning the true and ultimate structureof reality' (Quine 1960 p. 221) And even at that low level, the proposal was quickly rejected by Quine in favourof one which did awaywith objectsfor the attitudesentirely. 8.4 The idea that the meaning of a word is determinedby a theory has seemed plausible to many philosophers." (I mean this statement to cover views according to which the meaning of your words is determined by (some of) the inferences accept.I assumethat on any reayou sonable view the inferencefromp to q will be meaning-constitutiveor analytic or whatever iff the sentence p--q is.) Some (e.g. Dummett) have seen it, contrary to Harman, as an improvement on Quine's holism-an improvement because it would reinstate word and sentence meanings, the compositionalityof meaning, and so on. Another, approachto the converging,sourcehas been the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis definition of theoreticalterms. But the third objection above seems to be quite destructive of any version of the idea which tries to explain meaning, or the meaning of particularwords,wholly in terms of verbal behaviour. Bringingin belief seems to be unavoidable. The idea that the meaning of a word is determined by a theory has often seemed to be, in some perhaps ill-defined way, adverse to the ASD. Something of this opposition can, I suggest, survive the admission of belief. To dramatizethis point, I will describea view which combines the functionalistdefinitionapproachwith the whole box and dice of mentalisticsemantics-beliefs, rules of meaning, a mentalisticdefiand nition of 'analytic', so on. an earlierstatementof this view, see 'The NarrowSemanticsof (For
Names' (McDermott 1988). It diverges from Lewis's account (1970,

1972)in two main respects:(i) ForLewisthe meaning of a term is determined by its links with other words(of the public language).Forme the
" Quine'sanalogyof the networkseems to be attractiveto those who understandmeaning holism in this way:the meaning of a statementis said to be its place in a network.The analogyseems to me to be as unhelpfulin this connection as it is in understandingQuine himself. (See above). Some writers(e.g. Churchland1975p. 61) even use a networkanalogyin relationto the meaning of words.The nodes, now, are the words.A path betweentwo nodes indicatesthat thereis a semanticallyimportantstatementof the theory in which both wordsoccur.Such a networkwill have indefinitelymany kindsof path!

Holism1019 Quine'sHolismand Functionalist

defining theory is a belief,not an assertion.(ii) For me it is crucialthat theoretical terms can be used referentiallyby someone who believes that the defining theory is not perfectly realized.Lewis says he agrees, but some of his most important resultsseem to depend on a 'simplifying' assumption to the contrary:e.g. the 'definability'(i.e. by necessary and sufficient conditions) of theoretical terms, and the possibility of mandatory reductions. (The apparentlyconflicting alternativeshere could be reconciled if we assumed that for any theory T there is a weakertheory T' such that any possible nearestand near enough realization of T would be a perfect realization of T' (which could then be regardedas the real defining theory). But I do not think this is a safe assumption.)) Assume,then, that we havebelief ascriptions'S believesthatp',whose status is securelyfactual.The nonlogical terms which can occur in the content-sentencep are our O-terms. For simplicitywe assume that the O-terms are all names-of individuals, sets, properties, or whatever. (The logical particlesinclude 'is a member of', 'has',etc.) Let Tbe a theform, in this vocabulary: ory, in Ramsey-sentence 3xl ... 3xn T(X,..., xn). We shall say that T defines ci for S iff S uses zi as a name for the ith member of the n-tuple which is the nearestand near enough realizerof T(xl,..., xn); that is to say,iff (i) if, accordingto his beliefs,there is an objectwhich is the ith member of the nearestand near enough realizerof T(x1,..., xn), he calls it
Ti,

and (ii)if, accordingto his beliefs,there is no objectwhich is the ith member of the nearest and near enough realizerof T(x1,..., xn), he says 'Thereis no such thing as i'. T defineszi for languageL iff thereis a meaning rule accordingto which T defines Tifor speakersof L. Then the thesis I think plausible is that many, perhaps most, names in English are defined by a theory in this way.

1020Michael McDermott It is not claimed that the theory which defines a term is alwaysthat propounded by the first user of the term; nor that it alwaysconsists of those sentencescontainingthe term which are 'platitudes'or 'common knowledge';nor that a term is alwaysdefined for a speakerby his total theory.Thereneed be no generalanswerto the question 'Whichtheory definesa name?'All that is true in generalis that each term is definedby some theory or other. We still seem to have a testable, non-vacuous, empiricalthesis. Nor is it claimed that all words are defined by a theory. The logical particlesare an obvious exception. It might be thought that another obvious exception is the O-terms themselves. But remember that in my version the O-terms are our I terms, the terms we use in the content sentences of belief-ascriptions. did not requirethat S himself must have these words in his vocabulary, or direct translationsof them. If he does, they will be exceptionsto our thesis. For example, if our psychology is preparedto attributeto S the belief that something is red, then the relevant connection between speech and thought may be simply that he calls something 'red' if he believes that it is red. My own view, however,is that a decent psychology will not use such terms as 'red' in its belief-ascriptions. It will ascribebeliefs (and desires)which are in a certain sense about nothing but the subject's inputs and outputs. Redness, no less than electronhood, will be seen as something postulated to explain certain facts about the subject'sin/outputs:S believesthere is a stable,naturalproperty of objectswhich causes, in specifiedcircumstances,input of suchand-such a kind, and he calls it 'redness'.(See, further, 'The Narrow Semanticsof Names'.) I am, however,awareof one respectin which our thesis may be unrealisticallystrong. For most names the defining theory is probablynot exactly the same for all speakers of the language. This is one kind of vagueness-small differencesbetween speakersin standardsfor correct use. (Another kind of vagueness comes from the fact that speakersfor whom a term is defined by exactly the same theory may still disagree about (i) the relativesemanticimportanceof differentparts of the theory, and (ii) how near to perfect a realization has to be to be near enough.) It was obvious all along that the vaguenessof many terms in natural languagewould make it harderto find water-tightexamplesof analytic sentences.I will follow the traditionand idealisevaguenessaway.I want to show that there is anotherreason why analyticsentencesare hard to find.

Holism1021 Quine'sHolismand Functionalist

(Quine touches on the matterof vaguenessin ?4 of'Two Dogmas':'It is often hinted that the difficultyin separatinganalyticstatementsfrom syntheticones in ordinarylanguageis due to the vaguenessof ordinary languageand that the distinction is clearwhen we have a precise artificial languagewith explicit "semanticalrules".This, however,as I shall now attempt to show, is a confusion.' I think it is Quine who is confused here. What Quine shows in the rest of ?4 is that an explicitlisting of a language'ssemantical rules, under the heading 'semanticalrules', does nothing to clarifythe meaning of that heading.But this has nothing to do with vaguenessof the terms in the languageitself.) I said that our thesis is testable.How could it be tested? Given a term Ti, the first step is to think of a candidatefor the defining theory T.Next, how do we test the hypothesisthat Tiis definedby P? That depends on what exactly constitutes the existence of a meaning rule for a language.But presumablyif there is a rule requiringassentto certainsentencesunder certainconditions of belief we should expect to find at least a fairlygood correlation.Now we can test the claim that ti and cjare definedby T for a particularspeakerS as follows.Arrangefor
to S's beliefs to vary, and put 'Tli?Tj' him each time: S should assent iff he

believes that 3y 3z (FyAGzAy?z), where Fy entails that y is the ith member of the nearestand near enough realizerof the realizationformula of T, and Gz entails that z is the jth member of the nearest and near enough realizerof the realizationformulaof T. (Common-sense mentalism says that it is possible in principle to know what a man (or a mouse) believesand desireswithout firstknowing the meaning of his words.) 8.5 Our functionalist thesis has as consequences two points which Quine and other opponents of the ASD have made much of. (i) If ti is definedby a theory T,thereneed be no sentences,or hardly any,which are analyticin virtue of the meaning of ti. For one thing, the defining theory may not be fully expressible in words. If it is, then we have the 'normal' statement of the theory, using the theoretical terms it defines: T(T1,...,Tn). This long conjunction (typically) will not be analytic:it will of course be assentedto by competent but speakerswho believethe theory has a unique perfectrealizer, not by competent speakerswho believe the theory has no perfect realizer,or no nearestand near enough realizer.(The 'modifiedCarnapsentenceof the theory-which says that if T has a unique perfect realizer then T(r1,..., Tn)-will be analytic, however.) Also there is no reason to

1022MichaelMcDermott

expect that any significantnumber of the component parts of the theory will be analytic:typically,just about any part of the theory can be denied. Indeed,just about any part of the theory can typicallybe denied even consistentlywith referentialuse of its terms. Consider'Phlogistonis an element'. It is probably part of the theory which gives 'phlogiston' meaning. But we think that it is false, becausethere is no such thing as phlogiston. Perhapsthose who say it cannot be denied by competent speakersreallyhavein mind the conditional'If phlogiston exists,it is an element' (Whatmattershere is the existenceof the kindphlogiston,not the existenceof instancesof it. Compareunobtainium349 (Lewis):there is such a thing as unobtainium349, there is not any of it.) Let us although saythat a sentenceis referentially analyticif it cannot be denied consistently with referentialuse of its terms. Then the importantpoint is that 'Phlogiston is an element' does not seem to be even referentiallyanalytic: it would have been possible to say 'Phlogiston exists, but it is a In compound' under the rule of meaningfor 'phlogiston'. general,there is no reason to expect that T(c1,..., Tn), or any of its component parts, will be even referentiallyanalytic. It might be true that the realization formula has a conjunct such that any nearestand near enough realizer of the formerwould be a perfectrealizerof the latter,but this does not seem to be typical. So our thesis certainly seems to imply that analyticity lacks the importancewhich at least some philosophershave attributedto it. We cannot say,for example,that the meaningof a word is in generalconstituted by the analytictruths in which it occurs. Our total verbaltheory cannot be divided up into those sentences which 'fix the meaning' of our terms and those which 'saysomething about reality'. just Typically, about all the component sentences in which a term occurs non-vacuously will be synthetic. This is a point which Quine treats as a key point in the case against intuitive semantics. He says 'We do not learn first what to talk about and then what to say about it' (Quine 1960,p. 16). His exampleinvolves two physicistsdiscussingwhetherneutrinoshavemass;the point of the story is apparentlythat their respectivetheories cannot each be separated into a part which defines 'neutrino' and a part which describes neutrinos. This is his main illustrationof'holism', as that is understood
in Wordand Object.

(ii) It is often said that the distinctionbehind our talk of analyticand syntheticis reallya distinction of degree,and that it is a defect of this or that definition of the terms that it does not admit intermediatecases.

Holism1023 Quine'sHolismand Functionalist

Our functionalist thesis can endorse this criticism, and supply a remedy. An analytic sentence is, on our mentalistic assumptions, one which you cannot deny without breakingor rejectingthe rules of meaning for L, whateveryour beliefs. Now if xi is defined by T,the component sentences of T(x1,..., Tn) which contain xi will have the propertythat you cannot deny too manyof them, whateveryour beliefs,without breaking or rejectingthe rule of meaning for Ti-or rather,that you cannot deny too many of them consistentlywith referential of ti. Such sentences use are semantically important for i.'12 And in determining whether 'too many' of the relevantsentenceshavebeen rejected,some sentencesmay count for more than others:these sentenceshave moresemanticimportance for xi. Then analyticity is just the extreme case of overriding semantic importance.At the opposite extreme are sentenceswhich are of no semantic importance for any ti. (Perhaps it would be better to reserve 'synthetic' for them.) It is a virtue of our functionalist thesis that it enables us to see analyticity (and, perhaps, syntheticity) as just the not-so-important extreme case of an underlying distinction of degree which does have some claim to philosophical importancesemantic importance.13

The term 'semantic importance' comes from Churchland (1979pp. 51-4), but my use of it differsfrom his. For Churchlanda semanticallyimportant sentence is one public rejection of which is incompatible with effectivecommunication-if you reject it you will be suspected of not knowing the meaning of some of its words. Now any sentence which (in intuitive terms) expresses a belief which is commonknowledge satisfythis definition:for example, 'Therehave been black dogs'. will But this sentenceis not semanticallyimportantin my sense. Churchlandalso gives a list of featureswhich 'make'sentences more semanticallyimportant: being universally accepted,being 'general', being frequentlyinvokedin the drawingof everydayinferences,being one of a small number of such sentences,and being commonly used in introducing the relevant term. But a sentence can have maximal semantic importance in my sense (and, it would seem, under Churchland's definitionof semantic importance)without having any of these featuresbut the first:e.g. 'It is rainingor it is not raining' (And the firstfeatureis not sufficientfor semantic importance,in my sense or his.) Likemine, Churchland's notion of semantic importanceis explainedin terms drawnfrom the common-sense intentionalvocabulary: there is no pretencethat it is being definedbehaviourally. Churchlandhas an argument(p. 52) to show that semanticimportancein his sense has nothing to do with analyticity.I agreewith the conclusion, but I cannot understandthe argument.The argument is: Imagine two people who accept exactlythe same general sentences,but disagreeas to which of these sentences are analytic. Despite the disagreementabout analyticity,they can communicate without misunderstanding, as long as they continue to accept the same general sentences. My puzzle is that the argument says nothing at all about semantic importance in Churchland's sense:how can we tell what communicationdependson, if we assume from the start that neither speakereverwants to changethe other's'general'beliefs?
13 I am indebted to

12

anonymous refereesfor many helpful comments and suggestions.

1024MichaelMcDermott

Department of Philosophy The University of Sydney NSW 2006 Australia michael.mcdermott@philosophy. usyd.edu.au References

MICHAEL MCDERMOTT

Ayer, A. J. 1936: Language, Truth and Logic. Harmondsworth: Penguin, rpnt 1971. (ed.)1959: Logical Positivism. London: Allen and Unwin. Carnap, R. 1928: The Logical Structure of the World. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, rpnt 1967. - 1937: The Logical Syntax of Language. London: Routledge. Churchland, P. 1979: Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dummett, M. 1973:Frege:Philosophy of Language. London: Duckworth. Fodor, J. and E. Lepore 1992: Holism: A Shopper's Guide. Oxford: Blackwell. -(eds) 1993: Holism: A Consumer Update. Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi. Gibson, R. 1988: Enlightened Empiricism. Tampa: University of South Florida Press. Grice, H. P. and P. F Strawson 1956: 'In Defense of a Dogma', Philosophical Review, 65, pp. 141-158. Hahn, L.E. and P.A. Schilpp (eds) 1986: The Philosophy of W.V Quine. La Salle: Open Court. Harman, G. 1967: 'Quine on Meaning and Existence I', Review of Metaphysics, 21, pp. 124-51. - 1993: 'Meaning Holism Defended', in Fodor and Lepore 1993, pp.163-171. Hempel, C.G. 1950: 'The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning', in Ayer 1959, pp. 108-129. Lewis, D. 1970: 'How to Define Theoretical Terms', Journal of Philosophy, 67, pp. 427-446. - 1972: 'Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50, pp. 249-258. McDermott, M. 1988: 'The Narrow Semantics of Names', Mind, 97, pp. 224-237. 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in Quine 1953bpp. 20Quine, W.V. 1953a: 46.

Holism 1025 Holism Functionalist and Quine's 1953b:From a Logical Point of View. New York and Evanston:
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New York:RandomHouse. 1966b:The Waysof Paradox.

-1966c: 'Mr Strawson on Logical Theory', in Quine 1966b, pp. 135155. - 1969a: 'Epistemology Naturalized', in Quine 1969b pp. 69-90.

--

New Yorkand Lon1969b:Ontological Relativityand OtherEssays. don: ColumbiaUniversityPress. La -1973: TheRootsof Reference. Salle:Open Court. - 1975: 'On EmpiricallyEquivalentSystemsof the World',Erkenntnis, 9, pp. 313-328. - 98ia: 'Empirical Content' in Quine 1981b,pp. 24-30. 1-98b: Theories and Things. Cambridge and London: Harvard Uni-

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1-981e: 'Use and its Place in Meaning', in Quine 1981b,pp. 43-54. - 1986a: 'Reply to Alston, in Hahn and Schilpp 1986, pp.73-75. --.1986b: 'Reply to Hellman', in Hahn and Schilpp 1986, pp. 206-208. 1-986c: 'Reply to Vuillemin, in Hahn and Schilpp 1986, pp. 619-622. -1990: Pursuit of Truth. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press. Stace, W.T. 1944: 'Positivism', Mind, 53, pp. 215-237.