Hazid Record

Preliminary Design Major Accident Safety Report for King Street Gas Storage Facility Appendix B : HAZID Record
Document No: NPL-01-R-01 Issue: 3.0
APPENDIX B HAZID RECORD
Risktec Solutions Limited
Page B1 of B21
Preliminary Design Major Accident Safety Report for King Street Gas Storage Facility Appendix B: HAZID Record
HAZID RECORD
REF No. GUIDEWORD HAZARD DESCRIPTION CONSEQUENCES RISK POTENTIAL SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATING FEATURES ACTIONS/ COMMENTS
CONS.
FREQ.
Node
1: Initial Cavity Filling Hazards additional to Nodes 2 and 5 included here for Initial Cavity Filling. All other hazard entries as Nodes 2 and 5. Engineering safeguards and mitigations all as per Preliminary Engineering Report, 1670-010-000-RPT-001 Rev 02 September 2007 unless otherwise specified
Page B2 of B21
REF No.
GUIDEWORD
HAZARD DESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
RISK POTENTIAL
SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATING FEATURES
ACTIONS/ COMMENTS
CONS.
FREQ. - Solution mining/initial gas filling of cavities to be carried out by specialist co ntractors - Thickness of pillar material between the cavities controlled during cavity creation to prevent cavity collapse due to inadequate support. - Cavity size/spacing based on geological surveys and detailed computer modelling - Will be undertaken as first live commissioning of the well undertaken under Principal Contractors HSE and Commissioning regulations and procedures. - Pressure integrity checks of both cavity and equipment/piping prior to initial cavity filling. - Cavities that fail the integrity check are not used. - Installation of Xmas trees (snubbing) by specialist contractors - Free flow gas import used if possible, hence avoiding potential leaks from gas processing plant
1.1
Mechanical failure - cavity
Loss of containment - gas
Release of flammable gas, ignited or unignited
Low for small releases, high for large releases
High for small releases, low for large releases
1.2
Corrosion - internal - external
No additional hazards to Nodes 2/5 identified.
Page B3 of B21
REF No.
GUIDEWORD
HAZARD DESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
RISK POTENTIAL
ACTIONS/ COMMENTS
CONS.
FREQ. - Snubbing is carried out by a specialist contractor, using a standard, well understood technique
1.3
Incorrect operation - valve/ compressor/ pump operation - maintenance
Snubbing operation
As 1.1
High
Low
Snubbing operation fitting of surface Xmas tree and subsurface safety valve to a well, at the end of the initial filling operation. -
1.4
High/low temperature/pressure/flow - mechanical integrity
Low pressure
As 1.1
As 1.1
As 1.1
- Mechanical integrity checks include pressure testing of both cavity and equipment/piping prior to initial cavity filling. - Cavities that fail pressure test are not used - Round the clock monitoring of process parameters during initial cavity filling with gas with continuous adjustments as necessary based on comparison with computer modelling.
High/low temperature/ pressure/flow
As 1.1
As 1.1
As 1.1
- Round the clock monitoring of process parameters during initial cavity filling with gas with continuous adjustments as necessary based on comparison with computer modelling. -
1.5
Knock on effects - Effects of an event at one item on the process area on another item - non-process fire or explosion (e.g. sub station fire, transformer explosion)
Page B4 of B21
REF No.
GUIDEWORD
HAZARD DESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
RISK POTENTIAL
ACTIONS/ COMMENTS
CONS.
FREQ. - High integrity pressure switches to be included in the design - Vent provision for washing plant - Controls for gas entrainment to be included in the FEED and Detailed Design stages. - As 2.1
1.6
Misrouted gas
Gas breakthrough
Loss of containment
As 1.1
As 1.1
1.7
Vehicle impact - lorry/ tanker - fork lift trucks - private vehicles - trains - farm vehicles - aircraft
1.8
Missiles - compressed gases - fast moving machinery - explosive materials/processes
1.9
Cranes - operational use - maintenance use - construction
Page B5 of B21
REF No.
GUIDEWORD
HAZARD DESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
RISK POTENTIAL
ACTIONS/ COMMENTS
CONS.
FREQ.
1.10
Knock-on effects - event at nearby facility - event on nearby roads - offsite pipeline release - field fire in area
1.11
Dropped items - SSV or Xmas tree dropped during snubbing operation
Loss of containment due to dropped load onto live plant - gas Loss of containment due to dropped load onto wellhead
As Node 1.1
As Node 1.1
As Node 1.1
- Lifting procedures/ controls to be developed by operator/owner - As Node 1.1
1.12
Natural hazards - flooding - wind - earthquakes - lightning - cold weather
As Node 2
As Node 2
As Node 2
As Node 2
As Node 2
As Node 2
1.13
Loss of services - power - other
As Node 2
As Node 2
As Node 2
As Node 2
As Node 2
As Node 2
1.14
Security - vandalism
As Node 2
As Node 2
As Node 2
As Node 2
As Node 2
As Node 2
Page B6 of B21
REF No.
GUIDEWORD
HAZARD DESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
RISK POTENTIAL
ACTIONS/ COMMENTS
CONS.
FREQ. - Short term storage only of re turned salt solution - Bunding around brine storage tanks for 110% capacity of the largest brine storage tank. Bunds will be of waterproof construction compliant with BS 5328. - Isolation of salt solution supply to tanks on high level detection in tanks - Majority of piping is buried - EIA taken into account in the design - Facilities will meet PPC regulations - Facilities to be designed, constructed and commissioned in accordance with best practice and national/international standards (see 1670-010-000-RPT-001 Rev 02) - The design will be reviewed and additional studies undertaken as part of the FEED and Detailed Design stages including Fire and Explosion Assessment - Design will be subject to Operational review - Maintenance, asset integrity and monitoring controls to be developed by site operator/owner
1.15
Salt solution - return piping to washing plant - salt solution tanks - washing plant
Loss of containment salt solution returned during solution mining and initial gas filling operations
Environmental effects - plant damage - contamination aquifers of
Medium/ high for large environmental releases. Low for small releases
As 1.1
Action 1 Confirm what are the volumes of the salt water storage tanks. Action on : Bob Pearson COMPLETE Action 2 Confirm the bunding arrangements for the salt water storage tanks. Action on : Bob Pearson COMPLETE Action 3 Confirm the liquid tightness of the bund floor of the salt solution tanks. Action on : Bob Pearson COMPLETE
Page B7 of B21
REF No.
GUIDEWORD
HAZARD DESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
RISK POTENTIAL
ACTIONS/ COMMENTS
CONS.
FREQ.
Node
2: Free Flow Import Engineering safeguards and mitigations all as per Preliminary Engineering Report, 1670-010-000-RPT-001 Rev 02 September 2007 unless otherwise specified
2.1 Mechanical failure - catastrophic vessel or pipework failure - leakage from (e.g.) valves, flanges, vessels, connections, pipewelds Loss of containment - gas Unignited release of flammable gas Low for small releases, high for large releases High for small releases, low for large releases - Facilities to be designed, constructed and commissioned in accordance with best practice and national/international standards (see 1670-010-000-RPT-001 Rev 0) - The design will be reviewed and additional studies undertaken as part of the FEED and Detailed Design stages including Fire and Explosion Assessment - Design will be subject to Operational review - Maintenance, asset integrity and monitoring controls to be developed by site operator/owner - Free flow gas import used if possible, hence avoiding potential leaks from gas processing plant - F&G detection system - ESDV on gas import/export line - Blowdown system Action 4 Confirm whether or not, during emergency venting, the process inventory only or whether well inventories as well are vented. Action on : AMEC Response: The vent stack/sterile area design will be developed during the FEED/Detailed Design phases of the project but will based on the following: - The automated ESD will vent the above ground Gas Processing facility only. Consideration will be given to manual initiation of venting of the well underground pipework in extreme circumstances (to be fully documented in the Major Accident Plan). Complete
Page B8 of B21
REF No.
GUIDEWORD
HAZARD DESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
RISK POTENTIAL
ACTIONS/ COMMENTS
CONS.
FREQ. - As unignited release above - PFP - Active fire protection - Hazardous area classification; equipment selected in accordance with Equipment and Protective Systems Intended for Use in Potentially Explosive Atmospheres Regulations 1996 - Adequate separation between flammable hydrocarbons and ignition sources, emergency services, main safety equipment and escape routes. - Layout principles to minimise distance between Control Room, Sub -stations, main safety equipment and escape routes. - Wellheads at least 300m from any off -site inhabited buildings. - B uildings to be adequately designed/constructed so as to fulfil their function under normal and emergency conditions - Gas ingress protection of buildings to be reviewed during FEED and Detailed Design stages. - Primary gas processing plant located a minimum of 250m from the site boundary fence
2.1 (contd)
Ignited release
Page B9 of B21
REF No.
GUIDEWORD
HAZARD DESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
RISK POTENTIAL
ACTIONS/ COMMENTS
CONS.
FREQ. - Adequate communications provision for use in both normal and emergency conditions - Adequate fire fightin g access to all areas, via alternative routes. - Sufficient means of escape to allow safe evacuation from all areas to designated muster point under emergency conditions - Orientation of gas plant takes into account prevailing wind direction in relation to safe areas, ignition sources, inhabited property and public roads/railway outside the boundary fence - Fire and explosion breaks included in the design; both within subdivisions of the process area and the site boundary; size depending on the level of risk. - Design incorporates results of liaison with emergency services and emergency planning authorities. - Emergency Response procedures/controls to be developed by operator/owner
2.1 (contd)
Page B10 of B21
REF No.
GUIDEWORD
HAZARD DESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
RISK POTENTIAL
ACTIONS/ COMMENTS
CONS.
FREQ. - As 2.1 - The design wi ll be reviewed and additional studies undertaken as part of the FEED and Detailed Design stages consideration of cathodic protection for buried pipework - All equipment/pipework designed for 25 year plant life - Mild steel pipework - Corrosion allowances includ ed in the design - Imported gas is clean and dry - Maintenance, asset integrity and monitoring controls to be developed by site operator/owner
2.2
Corrosion - internal - external
As 2.1
As 2.1
As 2.1
As 2.1
2.3
Incorrect operation - flow control high import flow rate
As 2.1
As 2.1
As 2.1
As 2.1
- Operational controls to be reviewed during the FEED and Detailed design phases - Considered to have little potential for leading to loss of containment
2.4
High/low temperature/pressure - process fluids
Cavity overpressurisation
As 2.1
As 2.1
As 2.1
- Pressure indication on import line - Methanol injection to prevent

hydrate formation - Operational controls to be reviewed during the FEED and Detailed Design phases
- As 2.1
Page B11 of B21
REF No.
GUIDEWORD
HAZARD DESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
RISK POTENTIAL
ACTIONS/ COMMENTS
CONS.
FREQ. - Incoming gas is dry
Hydrate formation leading to blockage/partial blockage 2.5 Knock-on effects - process fire or explosion - non-process fire or explosion (e.g. sub station fire , transformer explosion) 2.6 Misrouted gas Not considered to be a significant hazard. Only possible misrouting identified was through the gas processing plant operational issue. Loss of containment As 2.1 High Low
- Methanol injection to prevent

hydrate format - Pipelines mainly underground - As 2.1 - Operational controls to be developed by site operator/owner -
Page B12 of B21
REF No.
GUIDEWORD
HAZARD DESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
RISK POTENTIAL
ACTIONS/ COMMENTS
CONS.
FREQ. - Pipework mainly underground - Fencing round site, along roads, wellheads, gas processing plant and other critical areas - At specific points e.g. bends, n ext to key equipment, provision of Armco barriers - Individual access cul -de-sacs for wells; each road has at least 1 90 deg bend - Reviews of safeguards/ mitigations for vehicle impacts to be included in FEED/Detailed Design stages. - Access controls to site, wellheads and other critical areas to be developed by owner/operator - Construction controls for vehicles in force during construction - Gas plant construction will be complete prior to import of gas.
2.7
Vehicle impact - lorry/ tanker - fork lift trucks - private vehicles - farm vehicles - aircraft - construction vehicles
As 2.1
As 2.1
* Varies with vehicle, as follows: - lorry/ tanker - low - fork lift trucks - medium - private vehicles - low - farm vehicles - high - aircraft - low/very low - construction vehicles low Farm vehicles will have access to fields around the wellheads during site operation.
2.8
No hazards identified
Page B13 of B21
REF No.
GUIDEWORD
HAZARD DESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
RISK POTENTIAL
ACTIONS/ COMMENTS
CONS.
FREQ. - Dropped Object Assessment to be carried out during FEED stage of design - Operational controls for maintenance, crane and all lifting operations to be developed by site operator/ owner - No operational requirement for use of cranes - Construction controls during construction - As 2.1 in force
2.9
Loss of containment due to dropped load on live plant Loss of containment due to dropped load on wellhead
As 2.1
High
2.10
Knock-on effects - event at nearby facility - event on nearby roads, tanker accident leading to spillage/ fire - offsite pipeline release - field fire in area - vandalism
As 2.1
As 2.1
As 2.1
As 2.1
- Review of notification procedures for events at other local facilities, pipelines and roads to be included in FEED and Detailed Design phases - Provision of firebreaks with respect to farming activities to be reviewed in FEED stage of design - Pipelines in the area are buried - Holford Brinefield not considered to be a hazard because of distance from site - Morrisons depot is not a processing facility - Vent design includes provision of sterile area; vent stack and sterile area will comply with API-521, pressure Relieving and Depressuring Systems - As 2.1 and 2.14
Local facilities identified: - Ineos Gas Storage site - Holford Brinefield - Morrisons depot
Page B14 of B21
REF No.
GUIDEWORD
HAZARD DESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
RISK POTENTIAL
ACTIONS/ COMMENTS
CONS.
FREQ.
2.11
Dropped items - onto plant - onto wellhead - other
As 2.9
As 2.9
As 2.9
As 2.9
As 2.9
2.12
As 2.1
As 2.1
As 2.1
As 2.1
- Distances between the wells and the King Street geological fault taken into account in the layout of the wells and plant - Earthquake potential to be reviewed as part of the FEED and Detailed design - Results of the climatic data report to be considered in the FEED and Detailed design e.g provision of weather cladding for buildings - Provision of lightning conductors and earthing to be included in the FEED design - Site location is above local canal and river levels - Electrical surface heating for pipelines and related equipment requiring frost and maintained temperature protection - As 2.1
Flooding of wellhead pits due to high groundwater levels/ heavy rain considered to be an operational issue.
2.13
As 2.1
As 2.1
As 2.1
As 2.1
- UPS provision for critical systems and will allow safe and orderly shut down in the event of an emergency - plant is designed to fail safe
Page B15 of B21
REF No.
GUIDEWORD
HAZARD DESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
RISK POTENTIAL
ACTIONS/ COMMENTS
CONS.
FREQ. - Site security provision to be further considered in the FEED stage of the design - 24 hour site manning - CCTV provision - Fencing around site, wellheads, gas processing plant and other critical areas - Security and access control procedures to be developed by operator/owner
2.14
As 2.1
As 2.1
As 2.1
As 2.1
- Shooting
As 2.1
As 2.1
As 2.1
As 2.1
- Consultation by site operator/ owner with local farmers/other gun owners about shooting activities
Page B16 of B21
REF No.
GUIDEWORD
HAZARD DESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
RISK POTENTIAL
ACTIONS/ COMMENTS
CONS.
FREQ.
Node
3: Assisted Import Engineering safeguards and mitigations all as per Preliminary Engineering Report, 1670-010-000-RPT-001 Rev 02 September 2007 unless otherwise specified No additional hazards identified to Nodes 2 and 5.
REF No.
GUIDEWORD
HAZARD DESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
RISK POTENTIAL
ACTIONS/ COMMENTS
CONS.
FREQ.
Node
4: Free Flow Export Engineering safeguards and mitigations all as per Preliminary Engineering Report, 1670-010-000-RPT-001 Rev 02 September 2007 unless otherwise specified No additional hazards identified to Nodes 2 and 5.
Page B17 of B21
REF No.
GUIDEWORD
HAZARD DESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
RISK POTENTIAL
ACTIONS/ COMMENTS
CONS.
FREQ.
Node
5: Assisted Export Engineering safeguards and mitigations all as per Preliminary Engineering Report, 1670-010-000-RPT-001 Rev 02 September 2007 unless otherwise specified. Additional hazards to Node 2 recorded here. Other entries as Node 2.
5.1 Mechanical failure - catastrophic vessel or pipework failure - leakage from (e.g.) valves, flanges, vessels, connections, pipewelds As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 - Compressors located in separate buildings and have separate MCCs - Cavity design/development methodology prevents marl entrainment - Dehydration facility in the gas processing plant - As 2.1 5.2 Corrosion - internal - external Corrosion/ erosion as a result of: - Drop out products - Wet gas - Hydrate particles 5.3 Incorrect operation - flow control high import flow rate No additional hazards identified As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 - Drop out products and wet gas upstream of gas processing facility only - Methanol injection hydrate formation - As 2.1 to prevent -
Page B18 of B21
REF No.
GUIDEWORD
HAZARD DESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
RISK POTENTIAL
ACTIONS/ COMMENTS
CONS.
FREQ. - Design intent is for operation outside the hydrate band - Compressor design as per API 617, Axial and Centrifugal Compressors and Expander-Compressors for Petroleum, Chemical and Gas Industry Services - System designed for maximum NTS range of temperatures and pressures - DCS for process control - Maximum design pressure of the compressors ~85 bar - Effects of over -pressured gas expected to have minimal effects on the large NTS inventory - As 2.1
5.4
High/low temperature/pressure - process fluids - hydrate particles
Loss of containment due to compressor damage from hydrate particles
As 2.1
Low risk
5.5
Knock-on effects - Incident at one compressor nd affects the 2 compressor
As 2.1
As 2.1
As 2.1
As 2.1
- Compressors housed in separate buildings including separate MCCs - Protection of the compressor buildings to be considered at the FEED and Detailed Design stages - As 2.1
5.6
Misrouted gas - gas processing facilities bypassed
- Assisted export used when cavity gas pressure < required export pressure. Hence, gas processing facility is the only route for gas export
Bypass of gas processing facilities not considered to be a credible hazard
Page B19 of B21
REF No.
GUIDEWORD
HAZARD DESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
RISK POTENTIAL
ACTIONS/ COMMENTS
CONS.
FREQ. - Bunding around methanol tanks for 110% of the larger methanol tank but takes into consideration the lost volume in the base of any other tanks or equipment - Spill containment around hoses - Design of methanol storage area to be further considered at the FEED and Detailed Design stages - Operational controls for tanker deliveries to be developed by site operator/ owner - As 2.1
5.7
Vehicle impact - methanol tanker - As 2.1
Loss of containment methanol
As 2.1
As 2.1
As 2.1
40 te methanol tankers to make daily deliveries. Tanker inventory 25 te methanol
5.8
As 2.1
As 2.1
As 2.1
As 2.1
- Operational controls regarding gas cylinders and use of equipment to to be developed by site operator/ owner - Explosives not expected to be used on site - As 2.1
5.9
As 2.1 and 2.9
As 2.1 and 2.9
As 2.1 and 2.9
As 2.1 and 2.9
- Current design intent is for skidmounted compressors - Lifts over live plant to be further considered at the FEED and Detailed Design stages - As 2.1 and 2.9
Page B20 of B21
REF No.
GUIDEWORD
HAZARD DESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCES
RISK POTENTIAL
ACTIONS/ COMMENTS
CONS.
FREQ.
5.10
Knock-on effects - event at nearby facility - event on nearby roads, tanker accident leading to spillage/ fire - offsite pipeline release - field fire in area - vandalism
No additional hazards identified
5.11
Dropped items - onto plant - onto wellhead - other
5.12
5.13
5.14
Page B21 of B21

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Preliminary Design Major Accident Safety Report for King Street Gas Storage Facility Appendix B : HAZID Record

Document No: NPL-01-R-01 Issue: 3.0

APPENDIX B HAZID RECORD

Risktec Solutions Limited

Document No: NPL-01-R-01 Issue: 3.0

Risktec Solutions Limited

Document No: NPL-01-R-01 Issue: 3.0

SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATING FEATURES

Mechanical failure - cavity

Loss of containment - gas

Release of flammable gas, ignited or unignited

Low for small releases, high for large releases

High for small releases, low for large releases

Corrosion - internal - external

No additional hazards to Nodes 2/5 identified.

Risktec Solutions Limited

Document No: NPL-01-R-01 Issue: 3.0

SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATING FEATURES

Incorrect operation - valve/ compressor/ pump operation - maintenance

High/low temperature/pressure/flow - mechanical integrity

High/low temperature/ pressure/flow

No additional hazards to Nodes 2/5 identified.

Risktec Solutions Limited

Document No: NPL-01-R-01 Issue: 3.0

SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATING FEATURES

No additional hazards to Nodes 2/5 identified.

Missiles - compressed gases - fast moving machinery - explosive materials/processes

No additional hazards to Nodes 2/5 identified.

Cranes - operational use - maintenance use - construction

No additional hazards to Nodes 2/5 identified.

Risktec Solutions Limited

Document No: NPL-01-R-01 Issue: 3.0

SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATING FEATURES

No additional hazards to Nodes 2/5 identified.

Dropped items - SSV or Xmas tree dropped during snubbing operation

- Lifting procedures/ controls to be developed by operator/owner - As Node 1.1

Natural hazards - flooding - wind - earthquakes - lightning - cold weather

Loss of services - power - other

Risktec Solutions Limited

Document No: NPL-01-R-01 Issue: 3.0

SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATING FEATURES

Environmental effects - plant damage - contamination aquifers of

Risktec Solutions Limited

Document No: NPL-01-R-01 Issue: 3.0

SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATING FEATURES

Risktec Solutions Limited

Document No: NPL-01-R-01 Issue: 3.0

SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATING FEATURES

Low for small releases, high for large releases

High for small releases, low for large releases

Risktec Solutions Limited

Document No: NPL-01-R-01 Issue: 3.0

SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATING FEATURES

Low for small releases, high for large releases

High for small releases, low for large releases

Risktec Solutions Limited

Page B10 of B21

Document No: NPL-01-R-01 Issue: 3.0

SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATING FEATURES

Corrosion - internal - external

Incorrect operation - flow control high import flow rate

High/low temperature/pressure - process fluids