The Political Structure of Constitution Making: The Federal Convention of 1787 Author(s): Calvin C. Jillson and Cecil L.

Eubanks Reviewed work(s): Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Aug., 1984), pp. 435-458 Published by: Midwest Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2110899 . Accessed: 11/11/2011 17:08
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ThePolitical Structure Constitution of Making: TheFederalConvention 1787* of

CalvinC. Jillson, LouisianaStateUniversity Cecil L. Eubanks, LouisianaStateUniversity
The authors contend ourunderstanding theFederalConvention of theConstitution that of and that produced beensubstantially unnecessarily it has and cloudedby an ancient dispute between the adherents twovery of broadtraditions political of A analysis. "rationalist" of interpretation line has consistently argued thecentrality ideas and political for of principles theoutcome theConvento of tion'sdebates, whilea "materialist" tradition consistently has stressed importance practical the of politicsand economicinterests. authors The thesealternative integrate traditions analysisand of explanation demonstrating a dynamic that by of relationship mutual interdependence existed between and in influences the Convention. authors The philosophical material both demonstrate, through empirical interpretive and of means,that, although questions bothphilosophical material and content and import werebefore Convention the of throughout, questions each general typedominated the Convention's attention the during particular and deciphasesof itswork.Therefore, focusof debate sion,as well as thevoting coalitions confronted another that one overtheissuesunder discussion, wereorganized around shared at principles some stages,whileat other timesthey wereorganized around material interests. conflicting

Eversincemenbeganreflecting politics on haveoscillated between two they diametrically opposedinterpretations. to is According one,politics conflict. . . . According theother . . , politics an effort bring to . is to abouttherule and oforder justice. -Maurice Duverger (1966, p. xii) Introduction Thisstudy contends ourunderstandingtheFederal that of Convention of and theConstitution itproduced beensubstantially unnecessarily that has and clouded byan ancient dispute between adherents twovery the of broad traditions politof ical analysis. Robert Dahl locatedtheepistemological sourceof thisintellectual "two different dispute identifying fundamentally for by types"ofexplanation the relationship between political institutions thebroader and socioeconomic culand tural contexts within which rise.Dahl (1963) has argued they that Rationalist "a . explanation . . givesprimacy the waymenthink to aboutpolitics.. . . But
*Earlier versions thispaperwerepresented of before LSU Political the ScienceDepartment's colloquium "The Studyof Politics theSocial Sciences" and at the 1982 Southern on in Political ScienceAssociation meetings. are very We grateful themany to friends colleagues and whocontributedvarious forms support, of counsel, encouragement and during development. its Specialthanks go toThornton Anderson, Larry Dodd, Leroy Vincent Rieselbach, Ostrom, William Eric Riker, Uslaner, ChrisWolfe, Bolner, Jim Robert Becker, Crabb,Lance Brouthers, RickWilson. Van and

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of beliefs therulers it sincemendo nothaveequal power, is thephilosophical . explanation. . holds . critical. . . A Materialist as] that [treated particularly are of or is aboutpolitics a rationalization defense the that . . thewaypeoplethink . will maximize their think that institutions they social, and economic political, explaand (pp. 107-8). Because rationalist materialist ownmaterial interests" different episteare behavior based in radically and political of nations politics by exclusive been they traditions, havefrequently viewedas mutually mological fervor. whoadhere them to with ideological devotees on of Convention of Weargue the dispute studies theFederal that impact this has One wholly unfortunate. lineofinterpretation clearandalmost has beenboth to principles theoutand political of for argued thecentrality ideas consistently of has the whiletheother stressed importance debates, comeoftheConvention's interests. politics economic and practical of traditions explanation these In this we to study attempt integrate alternative of interdepenthat relationship mutual and analysis demonstrating a dynamic by in influences theConvention. and between philosophical material denceexisted on types is Ourthesis that principles guidedaction distinguishable of questions, encroached and interests state, regional personal, on other ofquestions sets while the impact and andin somecases overwhelmed subordinated, independent upon, type of that we of ideas. Moreimportantly, demonstrate questions each general so phasesofitswork, that the attention during particular dominated Convention's wereorganized aroundshared coalitions voting at some stages,the dominant wereorganized around timesthedominant coalitions whileat other principles, material interests. conflicting PrincipleversusInterest Interpretations: Conflicting MinPrime convinced British that century entered twentieth the Americans Conof the had Gladstone captured specialcharacter theAmerican ister William work off everstruck at a given in it stitution describing as "the mostwonderful of timeby thebrainand purpose man" (Smith,1980, p. 94). Yet,less thana J. (1907) setthetoneforan explicitly decadeintothenewcentury, AllenSmith that ofthe work arguing "theAmerican by materialist interpretation Convention's the of was and set up to perpetuate ascendancy scheme government planned of this theproperty-holding (p. 298). CharlesA. Beard (1913) elaborated class" of ofthe of and "economic interpretation" motives theFramers theoutcome their of Convention He that"the members thePhiladelphia deliberations. concluded directly, immediately, exceptions, which the a were, drafted Constitution with few the from, estabeconomic advantages and personally interested and derived in, (1913, p. 324). of lishment thenewsystem" the had the against Founders becomeless personal, By mid-century, charges the in John butno less materialist character. P. Roche(1961) applied assumptions that and of ofdemocratic to pluralism his analysis theConvention concluded the exampleof "political Constitution no morethana particularly was impressive the under pressure sewntogether (p. improvisation" 810). It was "a patchwork

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ofboth of time events a group extremely and by talented democratic politicians" Rochedid notintend reading "suggestthat Constihis to the (p. 815). Though on tution rested a foundation impure base motives"(p. 801) many of or analysts of feared that cumulative the materialist of impact his and other interpretations theFounding diminished nation's had the senseofdirection purpose. and Walter Lippmann (1955) concluded "thepublic that philosophy guided nation's [that the is early development] in largemeasure intellectually discredited amongcontemmen. . . . The signsand seals of legitimacy, rightness of truth, or porary and havebeen taken overby menwhoreject. . . thedoctrine constitutional of democracy" (pp. 136-37). The recovery a soundand effective of "public philosophy" notcome did quickly. Fullytwenty yearsafter Lippmann wrote, Martin Diamond(1976) was to forced conclude that"the old rootAmerican ideas havebeen challenged on nearly every front cast intodoubt themostpowerful and by intelcontemporary lectual currents" 3). In defense theFounders thepolitical (p. of and system that a Diamondadopted promoted viewthat and evencombatthey created, clearly, the of over interively, emphasized impact ideasandpolitical principles material ests in theConvention. arguedthat"the Convention He suppliesa remarkable the of matters of example . . . howtheoretical govern disposition practical matters"(Diamond,1981,p. 30). In Diamond'sview,"thedebate overtheConstitution a climactic was between rivalpolitical two of encounter theories howthe endsof democratic consent, liberty competent and government bestbe obcan of on tained"(1981, p. 54). Despitetheprofound impact Diamond'swork many of students American politicalideas and institutions, others have continued to embrace predominately the materialist that haveidentified Smith, view we with Beard,andRoche. of Despitethepersistence thislong-standing of dispute within tradition the constitutional studies,we take the view of MauriceDuverger thatpoliticsis boththeinstrument which certain dominate "alwaysand at all times by groups others . . andalso a means. . . ofachieving . of someintegration theindividual intothecollectivity thegeneral for good" (1966, p. xiii). Therefore, seekto we construction demonstrate debate that moved, between levelsof constitutional two in of and that theselevelsrepresented shifts therelative significant importance in political principles material and interests theConvention. Thisreading theConvention's of work beengiven has theoretical impressive distinctions the support twoimportant by analytical concerning logicalstructure of constitutional choicemade some twenty Buchanan and yearsago by James Gordon Tullock elaborated more Ostrom. Buchanan and and recently Vincent by Tullock to a (1962) begantheir attempt develop "positive"or "economictheory of constitutions" distinguishing the between "operational" levelofpractical by and constitutional ofdecision-making" 6). Ostrom level politics the"ultimate (p. on (1979) has expanded thisdistinction explaining choiceat "the constiby that levelfocuses tutional sets uponalternative of rulesor institutional arrangements . . .that applyto the taking future of decisions" (p. 2). At the operational

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operational level,on theother hand, "one is concerned withwho gets what, when, how,"andat thislevel,"theprimary and preoccupation inquiry with of is theplayofthepolitical gamewithin givensetofrules" (ibid.,p. 1). a Whenconcern focuses exclusively uponchoiceand decisionat theconstitutional level,Buchanan Tullock and (1962) suggest theconstitution-maker that mustaddresstwo related analytically but distinct sets of issues or questions. "Individuals choose,first all, thefundamental of organization activity. of Secondly, they choosethedecision-making rules" (Buchanan Tullock, and 1962,p. 210). This distinction highlights factthat first the the order business of during constitutional constructionto address is in what, this essay, willcall "higher" we levelquestions regime of typeand of thebasic options institutional for design. Onlywhen these decisions havebeenmadedoes choicepass to what willrefer we to as a "lower" levelof constitutional design,where decision the rulesthat will regulate order and behavior within regime's the institutions selected. primary are These"lower" levelchoicesspecify waysin which the later decisions operational willbe made,bywhom, overwhat and of range issues. At the "higher"level,theconstitution-maker wrestles withgeneral questions concerning scope, scale, and form the to Will appropriate government. the regime an aristocratic, be or democratic, mixedrepublic? Will thegovernment have a legislative an executive or focus?Will its legislature bicameral be or unicameral? Will itsexecutive one manor several? be These questions less are to likely be decided with to reference theeconomic socialrole,ormaterial status, characteristicstheconstitution-maker with of than reference his philosophical to assumptions the concerning interplay human among nature, political institutions, andthegood society. As the general institutional designand therelationships will pertain that its among component become the parts constitution-maker clear, individual moves closer therealm practical to of The politics. questions dominate "lower" that this levelof constitutional designconcern regulation political the of behavior through rulesgoverning specific such matters citizenship, as and suffrage voting, eligito bility office, representation. choicesmadeconcerning and The thesematters determine context day-to-day the of at or politics theoperational practical level. Therefore, questions thislevelare muchmorelikely be decidedwith at to direct reference thepolitical, to economic, socialcharacteristicsthechooser, and of his or with state, hisregion than reference his philosophical to principles. Ourintention this in that of essayis to suggest thedivision scholarly analysis into rationalist versus or materialist principle versus interest interpretations ofthe Convention's work from tendency scholars focuson one levelof derives a of to constitutional choiceortheother. Thosewhopositthedominance ideasin the of Convention concentrated attention have their almost on exclusively the"higher" levelof constitutional choice,where groupis choosing the among regime types versus smallrepublic (as in extended Thoseanalysts whopositthedomforms). inanceof interests theConvention focused questions the"lower" in have on at levelof constitutional choice,wheredebateoverspecific decisionrules(as in

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in tendsto bear much proportional versusequal representation thelegislature) of politics. character practical more interest-laced the concentrated "higher"level on whentheConvention Further, showthat we formed alonglinesof intellectual design,coalitions questions constitutional of the from the work, delegates thesephasesof theConvention's cleavage.During opposedthemore locallyoriented MiddleAtlantic states more nationally oriented When focus the shifted periphery. the and delegates representing northern southern represented rules, eachofwhich among specific decision to "lower" levelchoices of of within overtheinstitutions governand an alternative distribution authority interest, and geographic by ment, statessplitalonglinesdefined economic the versus South). size (largeversus small),andregion (North state The ExtendedRepublicversusTraditional Republicanism: Powerand Principle 29 first debate, May to 9 June, The Convention's twoweeksof substantive important clashof ideas at the"higher"levelof constitusaw a fundamentally choice(Jensen, tional 1964, p. 43; Smith,1965, pp. 36-41). In broadoutlines to similar thosesketched Martin Diamond,DouglassAdair(1957) has by very in a was Constitution born a clashbetween newscience that argued theAmerican and of republican Enlightenment, traditional by politics,spawned theScottish and In that Adaircontended "the mostcreative philorepublicanism. addition, schoolofscienceandpolitics thePhiladelphia in of sophical disciple theScottish . Convention James was amazing political prophecy . . Madison,"and "his most of couldbe madea the Statesanditsvariety interests was that size oftheUnited of and (1957, p. 346). guarantee stability justiceundera new constitution" to of a Madison's theory the "extended republic"sought offer positivenew to for to "a remedy thediseasesmostincident approach providing republican (Earle, 1937,p. 62). republican government" from delopposition Madison's"new science"metsubstantial Nonetheless, that the republicanism had informed Revoluegateswhoclungto thetraditional of As constitutions, theArticles Confederation. Martin and tion,theearlystate of resulted Diamond(1972) correctly noted:"The mainthrust theopposition the governments republics), (small from more argument only state that the general couldbe madeeffectively and republifree notsomehugecentral government, can" (p. 635). scope and scale forrepublican These alternative visionsof theappropriate After decade on as a did opened. government notstand equalterms theConvention of upheaval at and turbulence thestateleveland impotence thelevelof the at solutions had come to be questioned traditional by republican Confederation, in Madisonarrived Philadelphia by Whereas nearly everyone rejected many. and in of witha new understanding thegoverning potential inherent therepublican to whosecredibilthe arrived republicans clinging old nostrums form, traditional the to (1955) has captured ityseemedclearly be on thewane. Cecilia Kenyon of them "men of little as by republicans describing predicament thesedispirited

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faith"(p. 3). Perhaps moreto thepoint, were"men of shaken men they faith," whosepolitical principles manynow thought to moreappropriate spawning a revolution to providing proper than the basis for just and stablerepublican government (Wood, 1969,pp. 396-413). and members theConvention sought enhance of who James Madison those to the and of dramatically authority independence thenational moved government and to decisively successfully capture Convention's the to agendaand therewith setthetone itsdeliberations. adoption, 29 May,ofMadison'sVirginia of The on Plan gave the "extended republic"men an initialedge because their general its On principles underlay specific provisions. 30 May,they to obviously sought this the on in solidify potential advantage putting Convention record favor by of radicalchange.Therefore, Edmund Randolph moved"thata nationalGovernto of ment [ought be established] Executive and consisting a supreme Legislative, Judiciary" (Farrand, 1911,vol. 1, p. 33). with Manydelegates but sympathized thisrootandbranch approach, others the to business enunwere wary, preferring incremental approach theConvention's ciatedbyJohn Dickinson Delaware.Dickinson of that simply thought wholesale change was unnecessary. mayresolve . "We therefore,. . that confederation the is defective; then to of and proceed thedefinition suchpowers maybe thought as to for . it beshould adequate theobjects which was instituted.. . The enquiry which should we 1. Whatarethelegislative vestin Congress. powers 2. What judiciary powers. 3. Whatexecutive powers"(Farrand, 1911,vol. 1, p. 42). the within Convention howto Table 1 highlights dramatic division the over and intentions underlay alternative proceedand overthepurposes that the apThe extended men(factor sought undertake to proaches. republic 1) immediately to theradicalchanges necessary institute truly a national government, the while in smallrepublic (factor favored men 2) incremental changes theexisting Confederation. fact The that two-thirds percent) thevariance therollof in nearly (64.3 call voting overtheConvention's twoweeksis captured thistwo-factor first by solution indicates thiscleavagewas both that deep and stable. The extended menfrom MiddleAtlantic republic the led region, byVirginia's MadisonandbyPennsylvania's WilsonandRobert James Morris, obviously heldtheearly initiative. largely This reflected fact thesmallrepublic the that men had yetto formulate acceptable an balancebetween national stateauthority and that couldbe offered a coherent as to alternative Madison'sVirginia Plan. As a consequence, their opposition lackedtheconviction cohesion characterand that ized thesupport Madison'sextended for republic. This uncertainty evident was in thefactthat twoof thesmallrepublic delegations, Massachusetts North and to Carolina,gave substantial cause. These two support the extended republic states their almost on split support evenly between twofactors, the whileno state thefirst factor even for provided modest support theincremental approach favored men. bythesmallrepublic

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TABLE 1 versus SmallRepublic: Extended Republic Power Principle-Two-Factor and for Solution Roll-Call Votes1-36, 29 May-9 June, Varimax Rotation (Ortho) 1 Extended Republic New Hampshire Massachusetts Connecticut New York New Jersey Pennsylvania Delaware Maryland Virginia Carolina North SouthCarolina Georgia Sumof squares of Percentage variance explained absent (.60) -.21 (.76) absent (.82) (.70) (.77) (.66) (.51) -.04 .27 3.50 35.00 2 SmallRepublic absent (.67) (.63) .29 absent -.10 .08 -.12 .32 (.68) (.86) (.81) 2.93 29.30
h2

absent .81 .44 .66 absent .68 .49 .60 .54 .73 .74 .73 6.43 64.30

NOTE:The following definitions help thosewho are notfamiliar withfactor to may analysis interpret tableaboveand thosewhich the follow. columns The headedby numbers titles and contain factor which variables loadings."The loadings. . . measure are (statevoting delegations) involved in what factor (coalition state of voting delegations) to what and degree.Theyare correlation coefficients between variables factors" and h2 . (Rummel, 1970,p. 137). "The column headed displays . . theportion a variable's of that accounted by thefactors is thesum is for (state's)totalvariance and of thesquared for loadings a variable"(Rummel, the that 1970, p. 142). Parentheses identify states as achieve coalition full defined factor of See membership, loadings .50 orhigher. themethodological for discussion thefactor of modelemployed thisstudy. in appendix a brief

Madison'svisionof a great commercial republic, ruledby a powerful national that with and government wouldregulate competence justicetheactivities of theseveral was directly Dickinson 2 June. on In states, challenged John by Dickinson's view, critical the in problem posedbygovernmenta free was society thedanger authority that concentrate becometyrannical and might (Bailyn,1969, this pp. 55-93). To minimize constant Dickinson danger, argued,thenational government shouldremain weak and "the Legislative, Executive, Judiciary & to departments ought be madeas independent as [separate] possible" (Farrand, 1911,vol. 1, p. 86). On 4 June, Madisonset aboutdismantling Dickinson'sargument the that of defense republican a of beliberty required strict separation responsibilities tweenthedepartments a modestly of national In empowered government. this

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important speech,Madisoncarefully presented explained theoretical and the unof derpinnings his "extended republic." William PierceofGeorgia recorded that "Mr. Madisonin a very able andingenious Speech. . . proved theonlyway that to makea Government answerall theend of its institution to collectthe was of wisdom itsseveral in parts aid of each other blurringpureseparation [by a of whenever was necessary" it powers] (Farrand, 1911,vol. 1, pp. 110). By stressing theprinciple "checks and balances" as a supplement buttress a of and to strict of "separation powers," extended the mensought create govto republic a ernmental in structure which eachdepartment fully was capableofandmotivated to self-defense. theintegrity thestructure itsability forestall If of and to tyranny by maintaining separate centers powercould be depended of upon,thengreat power couldbe given thenational to in governmenttheknowledge onebranch that wouldcheckpotential abusesoftheother. As thefullimplications Madison'sprogram of becameclearer thesmall to republic men,they struggled increasing with determination against idea that the substantial authority thenational at levelcouldbe either or necessary safe.On 6 June, Roger Sherman contended great that couldnotbe wellusedbecause power "the objectsof the Union . . . werefew" (Farrand, 1911, vol. 1, p. 133). Moreover, great powershouldnotbe housedat thenational levelbecausemost "matters civil & criminal wouldbe muchbetter the handsof the States" in (ibid.). Therefore, Sherman concluded, "theGenl.Government be [should] a sort of collateral Government whichshallsecuretheStatesin particular difficulties. I am againsta Genl. Government in favor the independence and of and confederationtheStates" (ibid.,pp. 142-43). of Madison Sherman's met opposition a "Genl. Government" challenging to by hisassumption theresponsibilities thenational that of government wouldbe few. In addition thoseobjects to noted Sherman by (defense, commerce, disputes and between states), the Madison"combined withthem necessity, providing the of moreeffectually thesecurity private for of and rights, thesteady of dispensation Justice" (Farrand, 1911, vol. 1, p. 134). Most of thedelegates agreedwhen Madisonarguedthatinterested local majorities been "the sourceof these had laws complained amongourselves"(p. 135). Madisonproposed sounjust of a lution theproblem majority to of tyranny fewothers that understood that and many as dangerously saw speculative. "The onlyremedy to enlarge sphere is the ... as faras thenature Government of wouldadmit.. . . This [is] theonly defense the against inconveniences democracy of consistent thedemocratic with form Government" 136). of (p. Madison'sopponents knewthat additional wouldhaveto be granted powers to a central but government, the idea of a truly national government clashed with directly thephilosophical with assumptions which they (andmost Americans withthem) beenoperating had sincebefore revolution. bereft viable the of Yet, alternatives, "menofshaken these faith"couldopposeonlyhalf-heartedly when Madison contended "it was incumbent [them] try [extended that on to this republic] remedy, . . . to frame republican and a on system sucha scale & in sucha

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form willcontrol theevilswhich as all havebee-n experienced" (Farrand, 1911, vol. 1, p. 136). Whiletheconflict remained this"higher"levelof constituat tionalchoice,thesmallrepublic mencast aboutforalternatives Madison's to frighteningly radicalapproach. Nonecame readily hand(Diamond,1981, p. to 27). Large StatesversusSmall States: Powerand Interest of On 7 June tenor thequestions the before Convention the beganto drift from high the planeoftheory therough tumble practical, to and of interest-driven power politics. Dickinson the opened discussion 7 June restating modest on by the commitment thesmallrepublic of mento "the preservation theStatesin a of certain degreeof agency" (Farrand, 1911, vol. 1, p. 153). James Wilson,on behalfof the supporters the Virginia of Plan, observed thatthe "doubtsand in difficulties" surrounding place of thestate the governmentstheproposed systemderived the that seemedto pose to theindependence and from threat they of national to from effectivenessthe "he government; wished keepthem devouring thenational Government" (ibid.). whofollowed logicof Madison'sextended exThosedelegates the republic to initiative withthestategovernments be misused.Theirtheoleft pectedany retical principles them smallrepublics always told that had beenviolent shortand of livedbecauseinterested majorities, local possessed themeans, acted invariably unjustly. Therefore, CharlesPinckney proposed"thattheNational Legislature to all should should haveauthority negative [State]Laws which they judgeto be improper" (Farrand, 1911, vol. 1, p. 164). Madison secondedthe Pinckney an motion, saying he "could notbutregard indefinite that power[Pinckney had calledit a "universality power"]to negative of legislative of theStatesas acts to absolutely necessary a perfect system" (ibid.). to and Elbridge Gerry, Gunning Bedford, WilliamPaterson sprang thedeof the to fense thestates.Gerry scornfully rejected idea of "an indefinite power of negative legislative oftheStates"as thework "speculative acts projector(s)" whosetheory overwhelmed experience their had their and judgment (Farrand, his 1911, vol. 1, pp. 164-65). Bedford reminded smallstatecolleaguesof the in reinforced Bedford's remarks holding inherent sucha plan.Paterson dangers by up "Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania thethree and as and largeStates, the other as smallones" (p. 178). He concluded "the smallStates ten that willhave Committee. wouldbe swallowed She Wilson up" (ibid., pp. 178-79). James in the responded kindfor largestates. said that"if thesmallStates[would] He notconfederate thisplan,Pennsylvania [hepresumed] on and someother States, how notconfederate anyother" on Thisexchange would indicates (ibid.,p. 180). from and the focus shifted theories about quickly decisively Convention's general of thenature republican to of modesofrepresengovernmenttheimpact various tation particular on the charstates It and regions. also highlights interest-laced
to everything fear. .
.

on . New Jersey will neverconfederate the plan beforethe

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at acter(who getswhat,when,and how) of discussion the "lower" level of constitutional choice. Table 2 showshow dramatically voting the alignments changed whenthe from of Convention's attention shifted "higher"to "lower" levelquestions constitutional choice.During Convention's twoweeks, states theDeep the first the of and of South had (theCarolinas Georgia) beenwary Madison'splantoplacegreat at level.Nonetheless, extended the menhad successpower thenational republic of from Northeast theDeep overcome objections thedelegates the the and fully of Now Southto establish the national firmly principle a strong government. the Under these newcircumstances, question whowouldwieldthisgreat was power? therapidly states theDeep South of growing joinedMassachusetts, Pennsylvania, in 1 and Virginia (factor of Table2) to pursue proportional representationboth The housesof thenational legislature. largestates wereopposedbyfivesmaller 2 the statesfrom MiddleAtlantic region(factor of Table 2) demanding equal in of The representationat leastone branch theproposed legislature. opposition of in for voting pattern Table2 accounts overone-half (50.7 percent) thevariance 11 of in thevoting all thestates present between June 17 July. and when of The confrontation intensified 11 June on RogerSherman Connectibe to cutsuggested seatsin theHouseofRepresentatives allocated thestates that of with to in proportion thenumber freeinhabitants, each state haveone vote to TABLE 2 for versus SmallStates:Power Interest-Two-Factor and Solution LargeStates Varimax Roll-Call Votes37-156, 11 June-16 July, Rotation (Ortho) 1 LargeStates New Hampshire Massachusetts Connecticut New York New Jersey Pennsylvania Delaware Maryland Virginia North Carolina SouthCarolina Georgia Sum of squares of Percentage variance explained absent (.80) .13 -.02 -.13 (.65) -.08 .25 (.73) (.79) (.55) (.69) 3.13 28.45 2 SmallStates absent .13 (.59) (.52) (.75) .09 (.74) (.78) .08 .12 -.22 -.10 2.45 22.25
h2

absent .66 .37 .27 .58 .43 .56 .68 .54 .64 .36 .49 5.58 50.70

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in theSenate.The largestate menstilldemanded proportional representation in both houses.Rufus KingofMassachusetts WilsonofPennsylvania and countered in with motion a proposing "thattheright suffrage . . . [theHouseofRepreof in sentatives] ought to be according theruleestablished theArticles not to of but to Confederation [equality], according some equitableratioof representation," whichafter some discussion passed sevento threewithone abstention coalition (Farrand, 1911,vol. 1, p. 196). The largestate unanimously voted yes in andwasjoinedbyConnecticut pursuance Sherman's of suggested compromise. New York, NewJersey, Delawareopposedthemeasure, and whiletheMaryland weredivided.Wilsonthensought reinforce allegianceof the to the delegates to coalition awarding a southerners thelargestate by them three-fifths represenfor tation their slaves.OnlyNew Jersey Delawareopposed(ibid., p. 201). and Pressing largestateadvantage, the Wilsonand Alexander Hamilton movedthat to to of in "theright suffrage the2ndbranch Senate]ought be according the [the sameruleas inthe1stbranch" (ibid.,p. 202). Theyweresuccessful thesame by in in six-to-five alignment appears Table2. Thus,proportional that representation of bothhouses,for time, beenachieved thetriumph thelargestates. a had by The opposingcoalitions held firm through June,whenConnecticut's 29 the settlement. OliverEllsworth againdeclared needfora compromise Wilson, arguing againstanycompromise thelargestateson thiscrucialissue, adaby "If must takeplace,itcouldnever mantly rejected idea, saying, a separation the of happen better on grounds" (Farrand, 1911,vol. 1, p. 482). Gunning Bedford "I Delawareanswered thesmallstates, do not,gentlemen, you. If you for trust the and whatthenwould possessthepower, abuse of it could notbe checked; it prevent from you exercising to ourdestruction?" (ibid.,p. 500). comWith proceedings the at a obviously a dangerous impasse, compromise mittee chosenon 2 July notonlyfailedto include was that Wilsonand Madison butalso omitted one for in interest every of thestrong spokesmen thelargestate proportional representation. Elbridge Gerry, who someweeksearlier called had Madisona "speculative chairman. projector," elected was committee According to Gerry, smallstates the held"a separate . meeting . . ofmostof thedelegates 2 of thosefiveStates[factor of Table2], theresult which of was, a firm deteron of in mination their partnotto relinquish right equal representationthe the stillunyielding, Senate" (Farrand, 1911, vol. 3, p. 264). Withthesmallstates no coursewas left to compromise. 5 July, delivered report the of but On Gerry his committee theConvention. proposed: to of It "That in thefirst branch the nowin theUnion allowedoneMember every be for Legislature oftheStates each thousand Branch theLegislature of forty inhabitants.. . Thatinthesecond each Stateshallhavean equal Vote" (Farrand, 5 1911, vol. 1, p. 524). Between July and 16 July whentheConnecticut was Compromise finally adopted, North the andtheSouthbattled overtheapportionmentseatsin theHouseof Represenof tatives through additional two compromise committees interminable and floor debatesto insurethatthe regionsof the new nationwouldbe institutionally to their positioned defend paramount interests (Jillson, 1981,pp. 36-41).

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The coalitions had aligned that behind conflicting viewsof republican govfollowernment the first during Convention's twoweeksresurfaced immediately as focus turned ing the Connecticut Compromise the Convention's again to choice.Thesefamiliar questions the"higher"levelofconstitutional at coalitions, of stilldividedby philosophical differences concerning nature republican the for government, controlled Convention's the business thenextfiveweeks,well 1 intolateAugust. The smallrepublic men(factor of Table3) sought control to of thepotential abuseof governmental for power meansof a strict by separation and constitutional departments, a modest empowerment, theuse of explicit prohibitions restraints and wheredanger stillseemedto lurk.Madisonrepeatedly in favor "checksand balances" as a suppleof enunciated counterargument the of the men ment a pure"separation powers"that extended to republic considered referred debateoverquestions at definitive to whichthey and frequently during the"higher"levelof constitutional choice.He argued that
on if a Constitutional discrimination thedepartments paperwerea sufficient of security to wouldindeedbe superfluous. each against encroachments theother, further of all provisions of and it to Butexperience taught a distrust that had us security; that is necessary introduce the on such a balanceof powersand interests, will guarantee provisions paper.Instead as in that therefore contenting of ourselves withlaying downtheTheory theConstitution each it to to and department tobe separate distinct, was proposed adda defensive ought power each in In whichshould maintain Theory practice. so doingwe did notblendthedepartments the We effectual barriers keepthem to together. erected separate. (Farrand, 1911, vol. 2, p. 77; see also TheFederalist, nos. 47, 48, and51)

An initialglanceat Table 3 wouldseem to indicate thatthe six-member of from coalition largeand smallMiddleAtlantic states, ranging Connecticut to wouldagainoutnumber five-member coalition peripheral of Virginia, the states, madeup of New Hampshire Massachusetts theNorth and in withtheCarolinas andGeorgia theDeep South.Buton closeranalysis, match in the beginsto look more in of even,perhaps evenpositively skewed favor theperipheral group. 1 on The factor loadings theperipheral for states factor are notonlyquite but are clustered between and .79. Obviously, very .70 the strong, all five closely divisivebattles theseveral of weekspasthad cost thesmallrepublic coalition in of almost nothing terms support among coremembers. its Within coalition the of MiddleAtlantic the was The states, situation quitedifferent. smallstates had becomemuch of Thisis clearly more wary their largestate colleagues. indicated of commitments Connecticut, New Jersey, Delawareto the and by themodest coalition MiddleAtlantic of in states.Therefore, close voteson critical issues, thelikelihood that coalition MiddleAtlantic was the of wouldbe weakened states defection itssmaller of members. bytherelatively frequent On 17 July, day immediately the of the following resolution the struggle between largeandsmallstates the overpolitical control thelegislative of branch, thequestion thegeneral of form to establishment was appropriate theexecutive

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TABLE 3 SmallRepublic Extended Localistsversus Republic CosmopolitansTwo-Factor Solution Roll-CallVotes157-399, 17 July August, for -29 Varimax Rotation (Ortho) 1 SmallRepublic New Hampshire Massachusetts Connecticut New York New Jersey Pennsylvania Delaware Maryland Virginia North Carolina SouthCarolina Georgia Sumof squares of Percentage variance explained (.75) (.70) .24 absent .08 .16 .19 -.04 .19 (.71) (.79) (.70) 2.84 25.82 2 Extended Republic .14 .12 (.52) absent (.58) (.71) (.55) (.66) (.63) .21 .06 .19 2.36 21.45
h2

.58 .51 .33 absent .35 .53 .34 .43 .43 .55 .63 .52 5.20 47.27

taken Earlyin theConvention had of up. RogerSherman expressed doctrine the 1 executive power which smallrepublic to the men(on factor ofTable3) adhered when saidthat "considered Executive he he the as more than magistracy nothing an institution carrying willoftheLegislature effect" for the into (Farrand, 1911, viewswereimmediately vol. 1, p. 65). Sherman's challenged theextended by republic men(on factor of Table3), whoheldthat 2 neednotbe severely power if concentrationanysingle in of limited itsundue branch government avoided. was a Seen in thislight, powerful independent and couldbe usedto restrain executive a volatile potentially and dangerous legislature (Bailyn,1967,pp. 55-93; Wood, 1969,pp. 18-28, 352-59, 430-38). TheConvention on translated twoperspectives executive these quickly power or intothree majorstructural elements: modeof appointment thelegislature (by of by specially chosenelectors); and length term (tenure); reeligibility (Jillson, to 1979, p. 388). It was apparent thedelegates that theseelements werethemselves and all around question therelationship of interrelated that the they revolved of theexecutive branch thelegislature. to Charles Warren that (1928) has noted of "theviewsofmost thedelegates tolength term as tore-election as of and were on dependent themodeofelection"(p. 365). The battle overexecutive selection rejoined 17 July was on overtheclause "To be chosenby theNational after challenging two Legislature," which, pro-

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CalvinC. Jillson Cecil L. Eubanks and

won and weresoundly posalsfor popular election selection electors by rejected, unanimous approval.To counter peripheral the states' (factor1 of Table 3) of achievement selection thenational by legislature, MiddleAtlantic the states 2 of Gouverneur Morris Pennsylvania, (factor of Table 3), behind successfully a that moved strike "to be ineligible second to out time,"arguing todo otherwise wouldbe to institutionalize inexperience thehelmof thenational at government. was out term Whena motion defeated strike theseven-year as well,theConto vention left was with legislative selection a longterm seven and of years, with but reeligibility permitted; thus,virtually assuring, Madison's words,that"the in if on couldnotbe independent theLegislature, dependent thepleasof Executive ureofthat branch a re-appointment" for (Farrand, 1911,vol. 2, p. 34). Eventhe of advocates a broadly of empowered national executive hesitated theprospect at of an unrestricted eligibility successive to longterms office. EllsThe question executive of on selection reappeared 19 July, allowing The to the worth Connecticut reintroduce idea ofelectors. six MiddleAtlantic of in from Connecticut Virginia, to states, ranging a solidphalanx voted favor in of of and whilethethree states theDeep Southopposedelectors Massaelectors, dividedon theissue (Farrand, chusetts 1911, vol. 2, p. 58). Bothreeligibility the of anda six-year werealso quickly term approved. Though principle electoral in selection nowseemedto enjoymajority support theConvention, practical the as in of the question distributing among states they power participated that process continued defy to resolution (Thach,1923,p. 102). in of Thisproblem "lower" levelconstitutional design, allocation presthe idential electors among states, directly the was confronted 20 July on when Oliver Ellsworth, speaking thesmallMiddleAtlantic for states, proposed "thefollowing ratio: towit-onefor each Statenotexceeding 200,000 inhabitants, for two each for abovethatnumber notexceeding and 300,000 inhabitants, three each and, state exceeding 300,000" (Farrand, 1911,vol. 2, p. 57). James Madison,always the advocateand defender proportional of observed"that this representation, wouldmakein timeall or nearly theStatesequal. Since there all werefewthat wouldnotin time of them contain number inhabitants the entitling to 3 Electors" view the (ibid., p. 63). Withthisproportional representation again dominating New Jersey Delawareabandoned and largestatedelegations, their largestate of in colleaguesto join thefivemembers theperipheral coalition reinstituting a and legislative selection, longterm, an ineligibility. thereafter, ConSoon the vention for of adjourned tendaysto givetheCommittee Detail "timeto prepare andreport Constitution" the (ibid,p. 128). The critical questions facing Convention thethree the over weeksimmediof of on conately following delivery theCommittee Detailreport 6 August the the cerned stance thenewrepublic that wouldtaketoward citizens, its particularly thosecitizens who might holdoffice thenewgovernment. theone hand, in On thecosmopolitan from MiddleAtlantic the delegates states, generally supporting Madison's"extended helda cautious optimistically but view republic," positive oftheordinary citizen'sability participate a well-constructed to in national gov-

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as emnment broadly empowered govern to freely changing timesand an indeterminate future might dictate.On the other hand,the localistdelegates the of fearful concentrated of peripheral coalition, generally powerand supporting the "smallrepublic" tooka much optimistic ofthequality popular less view of view, and of participation of the feasibility constructing adequate"checks and balances" in anygovernment awarded discretion. smallrepublic The great menstill it to as as a thought bothwise and expedient depart little possiblefrom pure of of theory "separation powers." The debates occurred the that during weekof 9 to 15 August residency on for an qualifications theHouse and the Senateprovide exampleof themiddle states' openness theperipheral and states'skepticism toward nation's the citizens. a On 9 August, Gouverneur Morris for proposed 14-year residency requirement of the into Senators, "urging danger admitting strangers ourpublicCouncils" (Farrand, 1911, vol. 2, p. 235). CharlesPinckney agreedwhenGeorgeMason the indicated that"he shouldbe forrestraining eligibility the Senate,to into wereit notforthefactthatmany had foreigners served noblyin the natives," of MasonandMorris, Revolution (ibid.). PierceButler SouthCarolina supported so observing foreigners with that them "ideas ofGovernment distinct from bring oursthat every in of are point viewthey dangerous" (ibid.,p. 236). from Madisonandhis nationalistic states this supporters themiddle thought and to Madison indicated approach unnecessary, illiberal, unbecoming thenation. of to to [would]give a tincture illiberality theConstitution" bar new citizens from Senateforfully14 years,let alone to restrict highprivilege the that to natives. rose on Benjamin Franklin to Madison'ssupport, dwelling the"ilalso liberality," well as theadverse as impact European on of opinion, suchan idea in ensconced theConstitution. Wilson permanently joinedMadisonandFranklin in pointing "the illiberalcomplexion to whichthe motion wouldgive to the System" (Farrand, 1911,vol. 2, p. 237). The voteon Morris's for motion a 14-year then residency requirement, one for13 years,and, finally, another 10 yearswereall defeated a Middle for by Atlantic of states bloc from stretching Massachusetts North to Carolina.Finally, nineyears proposed narrowly was and Wilsonsought turn modto this approved. estvictory positive into momentum themiddle for state nationalists moving to by reconsider citizenship the requirement theHouse in order reduceit from for to sevenyearsto three. thismotion was defeated a united a Though by Periphery, futher was "a attempt madeto attach proviso thelimitation sevenyears] that [of should affect rights anyperson not nowa Citizen" (Farrand, 1, vol. [the of] 191 2, p. 270). In response, familiar a chorus voicesfrom Periphery of the argued that eventhispresumption favor immigrants had attained in of who citizenship understatelaws wouldconstitute danger. a John observed Rutledge that"the was withregard foreigners Citizens;as to now policyof precaution as great to thosewho are to be naturalized [the]future." in Sherman supported Rutledge with very the remarkable statement "theU. States that havenotinvited foreigners
in that "he thoughtany restriction the Constitution. . . improper:because it

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norpledged their faith that they shouldenjoyequal privileges withnative Citibut zens" (ibid.). Madison,Morris,and Wilsonpresented counterarguments, a when votes recorded familiar was the were pattern evident. Onceagain,a united of had coalition thePeriphery successfully exploited divisions the within more the diffuse coalition MiddleAtlantic of states transformconservative to its preferences intoconstitutional provisions. of With thesefundamental selection citizen and questions executive particito pation leasttemporarily at both coalitions influence resolved, sought exert their on collateral issues.The peripheral group so always thegeneral did for purposes of limiting and of power maintaining cherished the doctrine "separation powof ers." The middle coalition or state to eachdepartment, combinasought provide tions thereof, theability defend to itself. Oncetheintegrity thestructure of with was guaranteed, extended the mentookcareto avoidminute republic restrictions on theassumption future that new governments, confronting andunforeseen problems,wouldneedto drawon an unrestricted of options. range Selectionand the West: Slavery, Commerce,Executive State and RegionalInterest As the Convention movedintolate August,severalcritical issues at the "lower" levelof constitutional for choice,including someprovision thecritical regional issuesofslavery commercial and regulation, executive for selection, and forcontrol thewestern of it lands,stoodunresolved. Initially, seemedthatthe of dominant coalition peripheral states wouldresolve each of theseissuesin its own favor the of against increasingly desultory opposition theMiddleAtlantic states. themiddle As state coalition tottered toward collapse,themorecohesive peripheral coalition seemedto gather new strength itsnorthern southern and as and smoothly on came to an accommodation thedangerous and wingsquickly divisive issuesof theslavetrade commercial and regional regulation. on When debate theslavetrade on of General opened themorning 22 August, Charles Cotesworth went to economics theconof Pinckney directly theregional flict of of between states theUpper the South(Maryland Virginia themiddle and state of coalition) thestates theLowerSouth(theCarolinas Georgiaof and and theperipheral on coalition) thisvolatileissue. General Pinckney said, "South Carolina& Georgiacannot without do slaves. As to Virginia will gain by she Her stopping importations. slaveswillrisein value,& shehas more the than she wants"(Farrand, so interests dearto the 1911,vol. 2, p. 371). Fortheshipping northern oftheperipheral wing coalition Pinckney outtheprospect "the held that more slaves,themore to the produce employ carrying trade; The more consumptionalso, and the moreof this,the morerevenue the common for treasury" (ibid.). Dickinson others and from middle Though the Atlantic that further argued were on importations "inadmissible every of and safety," principle honor King the whenhe remarked "the subject spokefor dominant peripheral coalition that should considered a political in be light only" (Farrand, 1911, vol. 2, p. 372).

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that of King Viewedfrom practical this perspective, feared "theexemption slaves that import subjected it, [was] an inequality was to from duty whilst every other of & States" sagacity theNorthn middle couldnotfailto strike commercial the duty would agreed that allowance a modest for (ibid.,p. 373). General Pinckney for the one and quickly moved broaden ground to "remove difficulty," G. Morris of and to the regional concerns slavery commercial compromise include sensitive & mayform bargainamongthe Northern a regulation, saying,"these things of from Southern States" (ibid.,p. 374). A compromise committee one member each state was quickly appointed. later representative thecommittee, reported on Luther Martin, Maryland's an of involved interregional pro quid that substance thecommittee's the report and coalition."The the wingsof theperipheral quo between northern southern to wereverywillingto eastern their States,notwithstanding aversion slavery, to the liberty prosecute indulge southern the States,at leastwitha temporary gratify them, by Stateswould,in their turn, slave-trade, provided southern the acts" (Farrand, 1911, vol. 3, p. 210-11). laying restrictions navigation no on slaves untilat least importing The Deep Southwouldbe allowedto continue policyby 1800, whilethenorthern stateswouldbe allowedto set commercial vote legislature. simple majority ofthenational on and was to The Commerce Slave TradeCompromise reported thefloor In 25 the 24 August was notdebated but until August. theinterim, Convention issueof executive selection. Again,theMiddleAtlantic returned thecomplex to a of states.The precise werepowerless coalition peripheral states against united for was the before Convention whether Periphery's the preference legisquestion ballotsin theHouse and Senate, lativeselection wouldbe exercised separate by a nowsuggested, thehopeofdriving wedgebetween in Pennsylor,as Rutledge smallstateallies,by "jointballot" of bothhouses vaniaand Virginia their and that Sherman immediately objected the"jointballot" woulddevoting together. in intended them states prive smaller the "represented theSenateofthenegative and Massachusetts, in that house." Whenthevotewas taken, New Hampshire, Pennof theCarolinas weresupported thelargest theMiddleAtlantic states, by in the sevento four. Deleand sylvania, Maryland, Virginia, approving measure influence the in to their the states quickly sought reestablish gatesfrom smaller should have that selection by delegation presidential process proposing each state was was doneby "jointballot."The motion lostby one voteevenifthepolling and a singlevote,fiveto six, whenPennsylvania Virginia againjoinedthepeallies.Theremnants theMiddleAtlantic of states turn to backtheir former ripheral final state coalition avoided defeat postponing issue. the by successfully and of Whendebateon theprovisions theCommerce Slave TradeCompromovedto extend miseopenedon themorning 25 August, of General Pinckney of 1800 theperiod which freeimportation slaveswouldbe allowedfrom during the and clauseas amended, commercial to 1808.Onthis amendment, ontheentire and northNew anticipating Massachusetts, Connecticut, northeast, Hampshire, on for their ern over indirect control commercial support this regulation exchange

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CalvinC. Jillson Cecil L. Eubanks and

matter theslave trade, of joined theDeep Southto defeat MiddleAtlantic the of Withthesouthern states New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,and Virginia. halfofthecompromise easilyconfirmed, northern thus the sections dealing with commercial regulation postponed did notreappear were and until August. 29 In theinterim, delegates the from SouthCarolina maneuvered gainaddito tionalsecurity their for in property slaves,whilemanyother southerners grew increasingly had givenup too muchin agreeing comapprehensive they that to mercial half regulation simple by majority. Whenthenorthern ofthecompromise moved strike thesection to out didcomebefore Convention, the Charles Pinckney allowing simple majority decision commercial on that questions. Fearing theentireCommerce Slave TradeCompromise and (particularly right continue the to importations) comeunhinged, olderPinckney the might argued that "liberal the conduct toward viewsof SouthCarolina" shown thenorthern the states by had convinced that him "no fetters should imposed thepower making be on of commercial regulations" (Farrand, 1911,vol. 2, pp. 449-50). in Despitetheassurances offered General by Pinckney, opinion thesouthern ranstrongly theviewthat to commercial delegations regulation simple by majority Mason arguedstrenuously "the that was an invitation southern to destruction. will interests. Southern The Statesaretheminority Majority be governed their by willdeliver in bothHouses.Is itto be expected they that themselves boundhand & footto theEastern States?" (Farrand, was 1911, vol. 2, p. 451). Randolph to so driven declarethat"therewerefeatures odiousin theConstitution finally as itnowstands, he doubted that whether should ableto agreeto it" (ibid., he be of states commercial in the at p. 452). Putting interests thesouthern regulation states "wouldcompleat deformity thesystem" of thedisposalofthenorthern the a this rooted southern (ibid.).Despite deeply opposition, solidblocofsixnorthern from NewHampshire Delaware, to states, ranging joinedonly SouthCarolina, by and on defeated North Maryland, Virginia, Carolina, Georgia thequestion. SouthCarolina'sservice thenorthern to states was quickly rewarded an by additional increment security herproperty slaves.The Convention of for in apor labor" (Farrand, southern inter1911,vol. 2, p. 454). But,thecostto larger was South Carolina Carolina's blind ests,in which obviously shared, high.South of for in the pursuit security herproperty slavesbroke Southas an effective force in theConvention. Withtheperipheral coalition broken theshattering its southern of by wing andthecoalition MiddleAtlantic of tension states between disrupted a renewed by itslargeand smallmembers, toneof theConvention's dayswas unmisthe final of set that overcontrol theunsettled takably bythedebates beganon 30 August of western lands.Daniel Carroll Maryland openedthisconfrontation moving by to strike a provision out of "the consent theStateto [landsunder its requiring that jurisdiction] beingdivided"(Farrand, 1911,vol. 2, p. 461). Carroll argued this was an absolutely fundamental with those states didnotholdclaims that point
provedButler's proposal that "any person bound to service . . . [escaping] into another State . . . shall be deliveredup to thepersonjustlyclaimingtheirservice

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to vasttracts thewestern of territory (Jensen, 1966, p. 150; Rakove,1979, p. 352). Pennsylvania's James WilsonopposedCarroll'smotion, arguing that"he that knewnothing wouldgive greater justeralarmthanthedoctrine, a or that is its without ownconsent"(Farrand, political society to be tomeasunder 1911, vol. 2, p. 462). Thisargument struck delegates the from smaller the states yet as of in of another brazen rejection principle favor interest. Luther Martin said that "he wished Wilson thoughtlittle Mr. had sooner thevalueofpolitical of a bodies. In thebeginning, when rights thesmallStateswerein question, the of they were ideal the States wereto be affected, phantoms, beings.Nowwhen Great political wereofa sacred nature" the Societies (ibid.,p. 464). When voteswerecounted, NewJersey, Delaware, andMaryland stoodalone. from smaller It was eminently to thedelegates the states theConthat clear and was out vention once againslipping of control that dangerous consequences dominated executive the could result.If the larger stateseffectively selection landsin theWest, processand thevastresources represented theunsettled by whilethat thesmaller of their in couldonlybe enhanced, stature thenewsystem foremost theminds in decline.With theseconcerns states would justas certainly a of from of thedelegates from smaller each the states, committee one member on to matters still that remained undecided. state appointed 31 August resolve was and on The Brearley Committee postponed undecided on parts reported briefly 1 that the but September, it was notuntil4 and 5 September it delivered main of and to components itscomplex controversial compromise report thefullConvention. of Table 4 highlights the impact the issues thatbrokethedominant both in coalitions lateAugust thenature thenewalignments emerged and of that from theBrearley final Committee dominate Convention's days.The largestates to the 2 wereeffectively isolated (see factor of Table4), whilethefivesouthern states, across their in werescattered influence theConvention largely spent, harmlessly from all three in on factors Table4. The smallstates, theother hand,emerged a that to theBrearley determined defend report was designed ento Committee in for hancedramatically potential influence thenewgovernment their (Warren, 1928,p. 664). of of states had Mostof themembers thenewmajority smalland northern chosenelectors legislative to seselection specially longpreferred executive by a envisioned return electoral to lection. Brearley The Committee report selection, moreimportantly, failure anycandidate receivea majority the of to butperhaps of oftheelectoral voteswouldresult thereference thefiveleading in candidates for to theSenate(where smallstates an equal votewith largestates) had the the and that Senatewouldultithe finalselection. Madison,Morris, Mason feared decide"nineteen times twenty" in mately (Farrand, 1911, vol. 2, p. 500). Furas ther,treaties, well as ambassadorial, SupremeCourt, and othermajor administrative appointments to be madeby thePresident were only"with the Adviceand Consent theSenate" (ibid., pp. 498-99). And finally, of although

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CalvinC. Jillson Cecil L. Eubanks and TABLE 4 Defends Role oftheSmallStatesthe A NewNorthern Majority Three-Factor Solution Roll-CallVotes for 441-569, 4-17 September, Varimax Rotation (Ortho) 1 2 3 Southern Minority .25 -.18 .03 absent .18 .03 .18 (.59) .38 (.81) .11 .45 1.51 13.90
h2

Northern LargeState Majority Minority New Hampshire Massachusetts Connecticut New York New Jersey Pennsylvania Delaware Maryland Virginia North Carolina SouthCarolina Georgia Sumof squares of Percentage variance explained (.72) (.62) (.78) absent (.81) .16 (.74) .45 -.07 .04 .38 .45 3.29 29.90 .44 (.55) .22 absent .04 (.80) .04 .23 (.76) .05 (.55) .37 2.26 20.50

.77 .73 .63 absent .69 .66 .59 .61 .73 .65 .45 .53 7.06 64.30

in the theHousewouldcharge President impeachable the disposioffenses, final tion these of wouldoccurintheSenate.Theseprovisions thesmaller charges gave of wouldbe fearfully states whatmany thedelegates direct over thought control in of theappointment, and conduct office, removal thePresident. Boththelarger 2 states (factor ofTable4) andtheDeep South(dispersed acrossfactors 2, and 1, of 3 of Table4) opposedthesedramatic enhancements senatorial authority. Yet, nor as theConvention entered final its the days,neither largestates thesouthern the Committee and to werein a position opposeeffectively Brearley states report and states stood thedetermined of phalanx smallMiddleAtlantic northeastern that behind it. The great of many addedto theSenateto fear delegates that powers was the in had enhance roleof thesmallstates thenewgovernment setthestagefor the of Muchof 5 September taken by theexpression suchfears was aristocracy. up andbythesearch waysto alleviate for without of them reducing influence the the smaller states overtheprocessof executive Mason feared selection. that,"conshould be sidering powers thePresident . . . theSenate,if a coalition the of & established the between thesetwobranches, willbe able to subvert Constithey tution comments "dwelt on the (Farrand, 1911, vol. 2, p. 512). Randolph's

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in of tendency suchan influence theSenateovertheelection thePresident of in to addition itsother to powers, convert bodyinto real& dangerous that a Aristocracy" (ibid.,p. 513). In light thesefears, by small statemenas well as large,it is not of felt surprising theresponse that was immediate overwhelmingly and positive when for Connecticut's of Roger Sherman, speaking thedominant majority smallnorthernstates, that in that proposed recourse theevent no candidate a majority had of theelectoral votes president for but should be to theSenate, to "theHouseof not .. Representatives . eachStatehaving vote" (Farrand, one 1911,vol. 2, p. 527). Mason quickly that mode best as lessening responded he "liked thelatter the aristocratic influence theSenate" (ibid.). Nearly on as everyone agreed, thevote on Sherman's motion approved toone,with was ten Delaware alonestilladamant in about this allowed small the retaining authority theSenate(ibid.). Thissolution in states retain to their dominant selection position theexecutive process,while the that Senatehadcometo be a dangerously the simultaneously alleviating fear the powerful body.Withthislast and mostdifficult question finally resolved, Convention hurried toward adjournment. Conclusion of We beganthisessaywithan argument aboutthenature political reality, of namely, it is characterized the interaction alternative that visionsof the by or interest common community's general good withthe partialand exclusive interests theindividuals, of groups, classes,states, regions comprise and that the community. Throughout essay, havesought showthat debates this we to the and decisions theFederalConvention thedistinctive of bear marks that of grudging accommodation between principles interests is characteristic demoand that of cratic politics. such of General principles, as republicanism, federalism, separation powers, checks the of andbalances,and bicameralism, define structure government only in vagueoutlines. discussion general of servesmerely to Therefore, principles the the interests thecommon and identify broadpathsalongwhich general good ofthecommunity be pursued. can from Other considerations, primarily deriving and and diverse political, economic, geographic interests, suggest often virtually consisdetermine modifications, the adjustments, allowances principled and that this tency must make political to expediency. James Madisonmadeprecisely point in a letter accompanied copyof thenewConstitution to Jefferson a sent in that Parisin late October1787. Madisonexplained of that"the nature thesubject, and the diversity humanopinion,. . . the collisionof local interests, the of will . . . account . . for irregularities of . the pretensions thelarge& smallStates and which be discovered [the will in newgovernment's] structure form" (Farrand, Hamilton constrained warn to his Alexander felt 1911,vol. 3, p. 136). Similarly, that "our choiceshould be of readers thefirst in number TheFederalist though directed a judicious of ourtrueinterests, and unbiased estimate by unperplexed not with publicgood, . . . theplan . . . affects the byconsiderations connected

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a of in interests, to involve itsdiscussion variety objects not particular too many (Earle, 1937,p. 3). foreign itsmerits" to and between principles and the to In ourattempt illustrate explain interaction devices.The first interpretive we Convention, used three in interests theFederal choice, a distinction between "higher"levelof constitutional was a theoretical to of the and where expected found influence principle guideaction,and a we and we the choice,where expected found influ"lower" levelof constitutional and interests be decisive.The seconddevice,factor to enceofpolitical economic record by theConvention. left voting was used to analyzetheroll-call analysis, amongthe that formed coalitions the this Through means,we identified voting in business. Finally, engaged we stagesof theConvention's states thevarious at in to debates order linkthecontending of a close examination theConvention's at of principle the"higher" patterns political to voting coalitions theconflicting at interests and economic, geographic patterns political, of levelandto opposing choice. the"lower" levelofconstitutional of its Convention 1787, from opening on day that Federal the We conclude confronted distinct, two but on adjournment 17 September, its 25 Mayuntil final was What design.The first general. aspectsof constitutional related, intimately As considered be should constructed? thedelegates of government kind republican human the between nature, visionsof therelationship alternative and discussed of socialorder, temper the and of institutionsgovernment, thequality theresulting of Some measure was deliberations quietand philosophical. and toneof their choicebecause was detachment possibleat the"higher"levelof constitutional of how little indication precisely the provided overgeneral principles thedebates of wouldaffect specific the interests over choiceof one setofprinciples another or individuals, states, regions. particular of design, they considered Whilethedelegates questions basicconstitutional aroseas they of that oblivious theconflicts interest inevitably to seemedalmost theories and choice,wheretheir movedto the "lower" levelof constitutional for and into arrangements governing. wouldbe shaped molded practical principles cametothefore, debate tempers flared, distributional intensified, When questions of touching upontheallocation represenand conflict Questions predominated. and of of and the tatives presidential electors, status slavery, regulation thenalandsdirectly affected political, the economic, and tion'scommerce itswestern and Indeed,itwas onlyat of classes,states, regions. andsocialinterests distinct whereinterests clashed so construction, this "lower" level of constitutional with that was loudly, theConvention threatened dissolution. 1983 submitted September 21 Manuscript 5 received January 1984 Final manuscript
APPENDIX Note Methodological in or factor In thisstudy, employ we primarily itsroleas a "confirmatory" "hypothesisanalysis factor maybe used to checkor device.As Harman "Confirmatory analysis (1976) explains, testing"

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test. . . a givenhypothesis aboutthestructure thedata" (p. 6). The introduction thispaper of to offers hypothesis a designed explainthecomplex to interactions characterized Federal that the Convention's business. Others haveoffered alternative explanations. Factor analysis will aid in showing which these of explanations comports mosteasilywith empirical the "structure thedata." of This study employs principal a component Q-factor analysisthroughout (Rummel,1970, pp. 112-13). We group states (variables thematrix in columns) thebasisoftheir on responses the569 to roll-call votes(cases in thematrix rows)taken during Convention. 12 states attended the The that the Convention in comprise variables thisstudy. the TheyareNewHampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut,New York,New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,South votestakenduring the Carolina,and Georgia.As indicated above, thecases are the569 roll-call in The Convention recorded Farrand's RecordsoftheFederal Convention 1787 (1911). Votes as of in as werecoded foranalysis follows: 1-yes, 2-no, 3-absent, 4-divided. Each factor analysis in a matrix was thisstudy beginsfrom correlation (Nie, 1970). Since voting theConvention by state of votes deletion absences divided and allowseachcell rather byindividual than delegation, delegate, of between states yesandno voting. two in to the matrix define degree association ofeachcorrelation

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