Amendment 17 Manner of Election and Appointment of U. S.

Senators
Amendment 17 Manner of Election and Appointment of U. S. Senators. Ratified 4/8/1913. History The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures. When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct. This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.

TITLE 26 - INTERNAL REVENUE CHAPTER I - INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY SUBCHAPTER A - INCOME TAX PART 1 - INCOME TAXES 1.1071 - 4 - Manner of election. (a) An election under the provisions of section 1071 shall be in the form of a written statement and shall be executed and filed in duplicate. Such statement shall be signed by the taxpayer or his authorized representative. In the case of a corporation, the statement shall be signed with the corporate name, followed by the signature and title of an officer of the corporation empowered to sign for the corporation, and the corporate seal must be affixed. An election under section 1071 to reduce the basis of property and an election under such section to treat the sale or exchange as an involuntary conversion under section 1033 may be exercised independently of each other. An election under section 1071 must be filed with the return for the taxable year in which the sale or exchange occurs. Where practicable, the certificate of the Federal Communications Commission required by 1.10711 should be filed with the election. (b) If, in pursuance of an election to have the basis of its property adjusted under section 1071, the taxpayer desires to have such basis adjusted in any manner different from the general rule set forth in paragraph (a) of 1.1071 3, the precise method (including allocation of amounts) should be set forth in detail on separate sheets accompanying the election. Consent by the Commissioner to any departure from such

general rule shall be effected only by a closing agreement entered into under the provisions of section 7121.

The issue of what standard of evidence will be used in determining the fate of Chief Justice Renato Corona has cropped up in the impeachment trial at the Senate. The prosecution is of the opinion that the standard should be substantial evidence, while the defense claims that it should be proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is now worth examining the different standards of evidence under the Rules of Court and related jurisprudence. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. [Montemayor v. Bundalian, 453 Phil. 158, 167 (2003).] In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given credence. Hence, when the complainant relies on mere conjectures and suppositions, and fails to substantiate his allegations, the administrative complaint must be dismissed for lack of merit. PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT Proof beyond reasonable doubt means proof to the satisfaction of the court and keeping in mind the presumption of innocence that precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that for which it is given. It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact charged is more likely true than the contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable certainty and moral certainty a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it. [People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 132895, March 10, 2004, 425 SCRA 136, 166, citing United States v. Reyes, 3 Phil. 6 (1903).]

The Constitution itself provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. An accused is entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion, with moral certainty. The necessity for proof beyond reasonable doubt was discussed in People v. Berroya [347 Phil. 410, 423 (1997)]: [Proof beyond reasonable doubt] lies in the fact that in a criminal prosecution, the State is arrayed against the subject; it enters the contest with a prior inculpatory finding in its hands; with unlimited means of command; with counsel usually of authority and capacity, who are regarded as public officers, as therefore as speaking semi-judicially, and with an attitude of tranquil majesty often in striking contrast to that of defendant engaged in a perturbed and distracting struggle for liberty if not for life. These inequalities of position, the law strives to meet by the rule that there is to be no conviction where there is reasonable doubt of guilt. However, proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered synonymous with the term greater weight of the evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. Preponderance of evidence is a phrase that, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. [Perfecta Cavile, Jose de la Cruz and Rural Bank of Bayawan, Inc. v. Justina Litania-Hong, accompanied and joined by her husband, Leopoldo Hong and Genoveva Litania, G.R. No. 179540, March 13, 2009, citing Go v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 883, 890-891 (2001).] Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides the guidelines in determining preponderance of evidence, thus: SECTION I. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party having burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear

upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
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The Corona Impeachment Trial: Inhibition of Senator Judges

January 24, 2012
Tags: Chief Justice Corona, Chief Justice on Trial, corona impeachment, corona trial, Impeachment, inhibition, inhibition of

judges,motion to inhibit, senate impeachment court, senator judges, voluntary inhibition of judges

Over the weekend, news report came out that the defense panel in the Corona Impeachment Trial is planning to ask for the inhibition of certain senator-judges, ostensibly for showing bias and partiality towards the prosecution and acting as prosecutors themselves. We now tackle the rules and jurisprudence regarding the inhibition and disqualification of judges to see if there is legal basis for the defense panels plan. Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges, to wit: SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. This rule enumerates the specific grounds upon which a judge may be disqualified from participating in a trial. It must be borne in mind that the inhibition of judges is rooted in the Constitution, specifically Article III, the Bill of Rights, which guarantees that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. Due process necessarily requires that a hearing is conducted before an impartial and disinterested tribunal [Gutierrez v. Santos, G.R. No. L-15824, May 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 249.] because unquestionably, every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. All the other elements of due process,

like notice and hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would come from a partial and biased judge. [Rallos v. Gako, A.M. Nos. RTJ-99-1484 and RTJ-99-1484 (A), March 17, 2000, 328 SCRA 324.] The second paragraph of the rule addresses voluntary inhibition. Based on this provision, judges have been given the exclusive prerogative to recuse themselves from hearing cases for reasons other than those pertaining to their pecuniary interest, relation, previous connection, or previous rulings or decisions. The issue of voluntary inhibition in this instance becomes primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. [Latorre v. Ansaldo, A.M. No. RTJ00-1563, May 31, 2001, 358 SCRA 311.] It is a subjective test the result of which the reviewing tribunal will generally not disturb in the absence of any manifest finding of arbitrariness and whimsicality. This discretion granted to trial judges takes cognizance of the fact that these judges are in a better position to determine the issue of voluntary inhibition as they are the ones who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms. [Gutang v. CA, 354 Phil. 77 (1998).] Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the authority for voluntary inhibition does not give judges unlimited discretion to decide whether or not they will desist from hearing a case. [People v. Kho, G.R. No. 139381, April 20, 2001, 357 SCRA 290.] The decision on whether or not judges should inhibit themselves must be based on their rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the cases brought before them. [Gacayan v. Pamintuan, A.M. No. RTJ99-1483, September 17, 1999, 314 SCRA 682.] Similarly, the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latters sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. [Webb v. People, G.R. No. 127262, July 24, 1997, 276 SCRA 243.] The movant must therefore prove the ground of bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial.
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Day 3 of Corona Impeachment Trial SALN Drama

January 19, 2012
Tags: Chief trial,SALN Justice Corona, CJonTrial, CJTrial, corona impeachment, corona on trial, Corona SALN, Impeachment, impeachment

The legal fireworks in the impeachment trial of Chief Justice Renato Corona reached a crescendo yesterday with the testimony of Supreme Court Clerk of Court, Enriqueta Esguerra-Vidal. Called

yesterday to the witness stand by virtue of a subpoena requested by the prosecution, Ms. Vidal was at first a very hesitant witness. Questions propounded by Atty. Mario Bautista elicited very few information and were expectedly confronted by objections from the defense, led by Atty. Serafin Cuevas. Ms. Vidal eluded questions concerning the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) of Chief Justice Renato Corona and hid behind the 2 May 1989 En Banc Resolution of the Supreme Court that required authorization before the Clerk of Court can release the SALN of any justice. At the end, it took the queries of Senator Franklin Drilon andseveral senators-jurors and a firm order from Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile to convince Ms. Vidal to turn over the SALN of Chief Justice Renato Corona to the impeachment court. So what were the important legal lessons in day 3 of the trial? First, is the importance of obeying a subpoena. As defined under the Section 1, Rule 21 of the Rules of Court, a subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or the trial of an action, or at any investigation conducted by competent authority, or for the taking of his deposition. It may also require him to bring with him any books, documents, or other things under his control, in which case it is called a subpoena duces tecum. As seen yesterday, even if Ms. Vidal tried to convince the senators-jurors that she needed the authorization of the Supreme Court before submitting the SALN to the impeachment court, she had no choice but to comply since the said documents were requested through a validly issued subpoena. Had she continued to be non-cooperative, she could have been cited for contempt. Impeachment Court vs. Supreme Court As the impeachment trial progresses, it seems that the impeachment court and the Supreme Court are on a collision course due to the complex and conflicting issues being tackled. At no time has this been more evident than in yesterdays hearing when the senators-jurors asserted its independence from the Supreme Court on the issue of Coronas SALN. It seems that the impeachment court is of the opinion that they are a constitutionally created body and that the Supreme Court is co-equal to the Senate only when it is performing its legislative duties. It would be interesting to see if the Supreme Court can review the decision of the impeachment court later on. Lawyer vs. Senator-Juror Another interesting highlight of the impeachment trial yesterday was the objection posed by Atty. Cuevas to a question propounded by senator-juror Franklin Drilon to Ms. Vidal. A sheepish Atty. Cuevas had to backtrack when reminded by Senate President Enrile that this was not allowed under the Rules on Impeachment promulgated by the Senate.

Even during proceedings in regular courts, a judge is allowed to question witnesses and any lawyer worth his salt would not object to this. As held by the Supreme Court in several cases, a judge is called upon to ascertain the truth of the controversy before him. He may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent unnecessary waste of time (Domanico v. Court of appeals, 122 SCRA 218, 225 [1983]) and clarify obscure and incomplete details after the witness had given direct testimony. (Valdez v. Aquilizan, 133 SCRA 150, 153 [1984]). After all, the judge is the arbiter and he ought to satisfy himself as to the respective merits of the claims of both parties in accord with the stringent demands of due process. (People v. Ancheta, 64 SCRA 90, 97 [1975]). NOTEDPrivate Prosecutor Atty. Mario Bautista had to be reminded that he had to state the purpose of his witness testimonyAtty. Cuevas was very active in his objections and crossexaminations and came off as a better litigatorSenate President Enrile continues to be an effective and patient Presiding Officer, its a good thing that a lawyer, a very wise and experienced one at that, is the captain of a ship, which is always weathering legal stormsFrom their performance yesterday, it seems that the private prosecutors are also experiencing birthing pains in the impeachment trial, looks like its time to stop delegating litigation work on the law firm associates and hit the trenches once again.
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Day 2 of Corona Impeachment Trial

January 18, 2012
Tags: Chief Justice on Trial, corona impeachment, impeachment trial, Renato Corona

The second day of the Corona impeachment trial at the Senate proved to be interesting and delved into several basic legal principles and procedures. The first involves marital and filial privilege as brought about by the denial by the impeachment court of the prosecutions request to subpoena the wife and children of the impeached Chief Justice. Marital and filial privilege is found under Sections 22 and 24 (a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which state to wit: Sec. 22.Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latters direct descendants or ascendants.

Sec. 24.Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: (a)The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latters direct descendants or ascendants. The second legal principle tackled is the right to self incrimination. This issue cropped up when the impeachment court denied the prosecutions motion to subpoena several documents related to the purchase of properties allegedly acquired by Corona and his family through ill-gotten means. The right to self-incrimination is enshrined in the Bill of Rights and found under Section 17 Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. It is worth mentioning that an ordinary witness may invoke the right but he may only do so as each incriminating question is asked. On the other hand, an accused in a criminal case (who is akin to an impeached official) may invoke the right, but unlike the ordinary witness, he may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. Another legal principle that was discussed is the right of the prosecution to alter the sequence of the presentation of evidence. A lengthy debate ensued during the trial but it was unclear on whether this was indeed the right of the prosecution or merely discretionary upon the court. Eventually, it was agreed that the prosecution should just rearrange the sequence of the presentation of their evidence. The prosecution also seemed to have forgotten the best evidence rule and the manner in presenting documentary evidence in court when Cavite Rep. Elpidio Barzaga, one of the prosecutors, admitted before the impeachment court that they did not have witnesses to authenticate computer-generated documents from the Land Registration Authority (LRA) on Coronas alleged properties. The computer-generated documents may not pass the best evidence rule found under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which states: When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. Trial Notes.The lack of trial technique and practice of the prosecution was very evident in todays trial.The first issue was put to vote by the senators-jurors when Senator Alan Cayetano disagreed with Senate President Juan Ponce Enriles ruling to deny the issuance of the subpoena to Coronas family members. Eventually, the Senate President was upheld through a 14-6 vote. Is this a portent of things to come?.Those voting to uphold were Senators Jinggoy Estrada, Vicente Sotto III, Edgardo Angara, Joker Arroyo, Franklin Drilon, Francis Escudero, Gregorio Honasan,

Ferdinand Marcos Jr., Panfilo Lacson, Lito Lapid, Sergio Osmena III, Francis Pangilinan, Ralph Recto, and Ramon Bong Revilla Jr. Those opposed were Senators Alan Cayetano, Pia Cayetano, Aquilino Pimentel III, Teofisto Guingona III, Antonio Trillanes IV, and Manuel Villar.The Supreme Court averted what could have been a constitutional crisis when it did not issue a TRO on the impeachment trial.
In Re Mallare, A.M. No. 533 September 12, 1974 This 1974 case, still cited today, said that in cases where a person needed to elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, the acts of registering to vote and exercising the right of suffrage were enough to show that he elected Filipino citizenship, without need for any formal declaration.

In Re Mallare
In the case of In Re Mallare, A.M. No. 533 September 12, 1974, the Supreme Court said that election of Filipino citizenship need not be expressly made.
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Mallares father Esteban was the illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, and believed himself to be Chinese. Mallare became a lawyer, but his admission to the bar was revoked because his citizenship was questionable.

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Issue Ruling

Is Mallare a Filipino citizen? [edit]

The Supreme Court reversed the revocation after finding that Esteban was a Filipino because his mother was not married to his Chinese father. Furthermore, when Mallare came of age, he registered as a voter and exercised his right of suffrage. The Court considered these acts to be enough to show that Mallare had elected Filipino citizenship, without needing any formal declaration on his part.

The Philippine Consulate in Chicago wishes to inform the public that pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225, also known as theCitizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, an individual, who was a natural-born Filipino citizen but lost his/her Philippine citizenship due to naturalization as a citizen of a foreign country, may now apply for the Administration of Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Applications of individuals residing within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Consulate General in Chicago (Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Nebraska, South Dakota, Ohio and Wisconsin) should be personally submitted to the Consulate General, Chicago. All interested individuals residing within the jurisdiction of this Consulate General may contact the Consular Section, Philippine Consulate General, 30 N. Michigan Ave. Suite 2100, Chicago IL 60602, at tel. no. (312) 332-6458 ext. 23 or fax no. (312) 332-3657 or e-mail at phchi@moon.igcom.net to secure an appointment for interview and administration of the oath of allegiance. Republic Act No. 9225 Petition for Dual Citizenship form (Download form) Frequently Asked Questions Relating to the Reacquisition of the Philippine Citizenship under Republic Act 9225

Please print the form in a legal size bond paper (8 1/2" X 14"). Consulate General of the Philippines Chicago http://www.chicagopcg.com/dual.html Can I acquire real property in the Philippines even if I am already a naturalized American citizen? Any natural-born citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship may acquire a private land up to a maximum area of five thousand (5,000) square meters in the case of urban land or three (3) hectares in the case of rural land to be used by him/her for business or other purposes. In the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted (please see Republic. Act 8179, Sec 10). (click here for more information >>) I would like to donate certain items (books, computers, medicine, etc.) to a beneficiary in the Philippines. Can said items be extended duty-free entry status and be brought into the Philippines without paying customs duties and taxes?

Food, medicine and other relief goods, books and educational materials, essential machineries/equipment, consumer goods and other articles may be granted duty-free entry by the Department of Finance and the Bureau of Customs, upon the recommendation of the Department of Social Work and Development or other concerned agency. Prospective donors can seek assistance from the Commission on Filipinos Overseas 1345 Citigold Center, Quirino Avenue cor. South Superhighway, Manila Tel # (632) 562.3852 Fax # 011.632.561.8332 E-mail cfodfa@info.com.ph

(click here for guidelines and procedure >>)

New Rules on Dual Citizenship
PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATIONS: New rules on dual citizenship: Filipinos with dual citizenships can now enter end leave the country, trouble free, as long as they present both their Philippine and foreign passports to immigration officers at the time of arrival or departure, according to immigrations Commissioner Alipio Fernandez Jr. This developed after bureau of immigration came out with new rules for arriving and departing passengers who availed themselves of the dual citizenship law passed by Congress last year. Under the law, Filipinos who became, or are intending to become naturalized citizens of other countries, have not lost their Philippine citizenship. According to Mr. Fernandez, a Filipino who presents a foreign passport shall only be given an indefinite stay in the country if he or she can show a valid Philippine passport or a certificate from the BI as proof of dual citizenship. The immigration officer then makes the appropriate stamp on both the foreign and Philippine passports of the passenger. Immigration executive director Roy Almoro said the new rules were issued in the wake of reports of misunderstanding between immigration officers and passengers with dual citizenship. Airport immigration head of supervisors Ferdinand Sampol said dual citizens who entered the country using foreign passports will be cleared for departure provided they present a valid Philippine passport and bureau of immigration certificate. The passenger is no longer required to present a certificate, exit permit or proof of payment of immigration fees.

WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP? Citizenship is personal and more or less permanent membership in a political community. It denotes possession within that particular political community of full civil and political rights subject to special disqualifications such as minority. 5 This status confers upon the individual certain prerogatives which may be denied the alien. Thus, the citizen enjoys certain exclusive rights, such as the rights to vote, to run for public office, to exploit natural resources, to operate public utilities, to administer educational institutions, and to manage the mass media. 6 Reciprocally, it imposes the duty of allegiance to the political community. 7 In the same way, Black defines it as the status of one who, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, or of a particular state, is a member of the political community, owing allegiance and being entitled to the enjoyment of full civil rights. 8 Philippine citizenship has always been valued and treasured by our Supreme Court that it once described it as "not a cheap commodity." 9 "Philippine citizenship is not a commodity or ware to be displayed when required and suppressed when convenient," says another case. 10 Justice

Melencio-Herrera dubs it as "a priceless heritage," 11 while Justice Cruz brands it as "a gift that must be deserved to be retained." 12

Primicias vs. Fugoso

In the case of Primicias vs. Fugoso, G.R. No. L-1800 January 27, 1948, the Supreme Court said that fear that trouble may arise during the rally was not enough reason to suppress the fundamental right of the people to free speech and peaceful assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances.

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In November 1947, the mayor of Manila refused to grant a permit to hold a public meeting at Plaza Miranda for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress of grievances. The mayors reason: "that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." A Manila ordinance at that time required a mayors permit to hold a parade or procession, or, by analogy, a public meeting or assembly. Primicias filed a case to compel the mayor to grant the permit.

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Issue Ruling

May the mayor be compelled to grant the permit? [edit]

Yes. The Supreme Court ordered the mayor to grant the permit, interpreting the ordinance to mean that the Mayor did not have the power to grant or refuse the permit, only the discretion to specify where the parade may pass or where the meeting may be held. The Court said that the constitutional right to free speech and peaceful assembly was a fundamental right of the people and may not be suppressed unless there was the probability of serious injury to the state, and quoted US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Whitney vs. California: "Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly.

Villavicencio vs. Lukban

In the classic case of Villavicencio vs. Lukban, G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919, the Supreme Court of the Philippines upheld the right of Filipino citizens to freedom of domicile .
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In 1918, the mayor of Manila, wanting to exterminate vice, had "houses of ill repute" closed. He then had 170 prostitutes forcibly rounded up, put on a ship, and sent to Davao as laborers. A writ of habeas

corpus was filed against the mayor on behalf of those women. The court granted the writ, but the mayor was not able to bring any of the women before the court on the stipulated date. [edit]

Issue Ruling

Were the mayor's acts legal? [edit]

The Supreme Court said that the mayor's acts were not legal. His intent of "exterminating vice" was commendable, but there was no law saying that he could force Filipino citizens to change their domicile from Manila to another place. The women, said the Court, although in a sense "lepers of society" were still Filipino citizens and as such they were entitled to the constitutional guarantees enjoyed by all other Filipino citizens. The right to freedom of domicile was such a fundamental right that its suppression could be considered tantamount to slavery.]