JAMES DUERLINGER

VASUBANDHUS PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF THE  IPUTR IYAS THEORY OF PERSONS (I) VATS

INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of his Refutation of the Theory of Self   (Atmavadapratisedha), the appendix to his Treasury of Knowledge with . . Commentary (Abhidarmakosabhasya), Vasubandhu presents a series of philosophical objections to the Vtsputryas theory of persons.1 A a theory of persons is a metaphysical account of persons which includes or implies accounts of their nature, existence, unity, and identity over time. The Vtsputryas theory in the Refutation explicitly concerns a only the nature and existence of persons. What is meant by persons is that to which we refer when we use the pronoun, I, and its equivalents in other languages, to refer to ourselves. I present here the rst of three articles in which Vasubandhus objections to the Vtsputryas theory a and their replies to these objections are reconstructed and evaluated.2 The theory to which Vasubandhu objects is that persons (pudgala-s) exist in the sense that they exist apart from being perceived or conceived3 and are neither other than nor the same as4 the phenomena (dharmas) in dependence upon which they are perceived and conceived.5 Both Vasubandhu and the Vtsputryas believe that the phenomena a in dependence upon which persons are perceived and conceived are the bodies and mental states of persons. Let us, as Vasubandhu and Vtsputryas do, refer to these phenomena as the aggregates (skandhaa s).6 What is neither other than nor the same as the phenomena in dependence upon which it is perceived and conceived is a phenomenon which the Vtsputryas call inexplicable (avaktavya).7 Let us say a that persons conceived in dependence upon the aggregates are the objects of the concept of ourselves. The Vtsputryas are claiming a that these objects exist and are inexplicable. I shall also express their theory by saying that we exist and are inexplicable, since I shall use we (us, ourselves, etc.) to refer to the objects of the concepts of ourselves. Their theory may also be expressed by the claim that we exist and are neither other than nor the same as our aggregates, where

Journal of Indian Philosophy 25: 307335, 1997. c 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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our aggregates is used to refer to the aggregates in dependence upon which we are perceived and conceived. Vasubandhu and the Vtsputryas agree that we are by convention a   conceived to be appropriators (upadatar-s) of the aggregates, which   are therefore called the appropriated aggregates (upadanaskandha-s), and that we are not correctly conceived in this way if we are the same as our aggregates. By virtue of being conceived as appropriators of the aggregates, they also seem to agree, we are conceived to be perceivers of objects, thinkers of thoughts about them, performers of actions and experiencers of the results of these actions. Vasubandhu thinks that we are incorrectly conceived in these ways, since he believes that we are in fact the same as our aggregates. The Vtsputryas think that we are a correctly so conceived, since they believe that we perceive ourselves when our aggregates are present, and that what is perceived in this case is not the same as our aggregates. Although the perception of ourselves which attends the presence of our aggregates, they believe, establishes our existence, it does not establish our conceivability apart from the aggregates, since we cannot be conceived without reference to them. In this rst article I shall reconstruct and assess what I shall call Vasubandhus two-realities objection to the Vtsputryas theory, the a Vtsputryas aggregate-reliance reply, Vasubandhus causal objection a to this reply, the Vtsputryas re-fuel reply to this objection, and a the Vtsputryas middle-way argument for their theory. In the second a article, I shall reconstruct and assess Vasubandhus objections to the Vtsputryas re-fuel reply and their replies to these objections. In a the third article, I shall reconstruct and assess Vasubandhus objections to their theory that inexplicable persons are known to exist by perception and their replies to these objections. Then I shall make my nal assessment of the entire exchange.

VASUBANDHUS TWO-REALITIES OBJECTION

The Refutation begins with a statement of Vasubandhus own theory of persons. He argues that liberation from suffering is not possible for the Trthikas,8 who do not accept the Buddhas teaching that we are nothing but our aggregates, which are a collection of substances (dravya-s) of different sorts in a causal continuum, since their belief that we are substances separate in existence from our aggregates will prevent them from abandoning the grasping at a self which causes them to suffer. He claims that we are our aggregates, since only the aggregates are known, by means of direct perception (pratyaksa) and sound inference .

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. (anumana), to be the phenomena in dependence upon which we are conceived.9 This argument sets the stage for his introduction of the Vtsputryas theory of persons. They assert, he says, that a person a exists (pudgala santam icchanti). The Sanskrit word for person (pudgala) is being used here, as the Vtsputryas use it, to refer to a an appropriator of aggregates, which is not the same as the aggregates appropriated. The Sanskrit word for exists (santam) is used, as Vasubandhu also uses it, to signify the possession of existence apart from being perceived or conceived. So when the Vtsputryas assert a that a person exists, they are implying that the person to whom they refer is not the same as its10 aggregates and asserting that it exists. Vasubandhu begins his rst objection to the Vtsputryas theory of a persons by challenging them to explain whether, in saying that a person exists, they are claiming that a person is real in the way a substance is ~ (dravyasat) or real in the way a mental construction is (prajnaptisat).11 He continues:
If it is a distinct entity like bodily form and other such things [each of which is an entity of a certain sort],12 it is real in the way a substance is; but if [by analysis] it is [shown to be the same as] a collection [of substances of different sorts], like milk and other such things [each of which seems to be, but is not, an entity of a certain sort], it is real in the way a mental construction is. Consequently, if a person is real in the way a substance is, it must be said that it is other than the aggregates in the way that each of them is other than the others, since it will possess a different nature [than possessed by any of the substances of which the aggregates are comprised]. [If it is other than the aggregates, it must be either causally conditioned or causally unconditioned. If it is causally conditioned,] its causes should be explained. But if it is causally unconditioned, the false theory [of persons] espoused by the Trthikas is held and a person has no function [to perform in the production of aggregates]. If [a person is said to be] real in the way a mental construction is, [it is the same as the aggregates, and] this is the theory [of persons found in the Buddhas discourses and is] held by us.

According to Vasubandhu, to be real in the way a substance is is  to be an ultimate reality (paramarthasatya) and that to be real in the way a mental construction is is to be a deceptive conventional reality (samvrtisatya), as these realities are dened by the Vaibhsikas.13 What a. . . exactly are these two realities? The substances to which Vasubandhu refers in the passage above are distinct entities in the sense that they are phenomena which possess by themselves just one nature and are conceived on the basis of their possession of this nature. They are called ultimate realities, apparently, because they are what they are conceived to be. Substances are known to be what they are conceived to be because they continue to be conceived even if they are taken apart physically or are mentally analyzed into parts and brought to consciousness in that form. They continue to be

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conceived because they are conceived on the basis of natures they possess by themselves rather than on the basis of merely appearing to possess such natures. Substances may be causally conditioned (samskrta) . . and impermanent (anitya), as are the substances of the different sorts which comprise the aggregates, or causally unconditioned (asamskrta) . .  and permanent (nitya), as are space (akasa) and noncyclic existence . (nirvana). Mental constructions are called deceptive conventional realities because they are by convention conceived to be entities of a certain sort, and so, seem to possess by themselves just one nature on the basis of which they are conceived, even though they do not, yet are real, since analysis shows that they are collections of substances of different sorts. They are known not to be the entities they are conceived to be because they do not continue to be conceived if they are taken apart physically or are mentally analyzed into parts and brought to consciousness in that form. They are known to be collections of substances of different sorts because, when they are taken apart physically or are mentally analyzed into constituent parts and brought to consciousness in that form, what appear to consciousness are collections of substances of different sorts. Phenomena which are neither ultimate realities nor deceptive conventional realities do not exist, and so, are unreal (asat), since they are neither real in the way a substance is nor real in the way a mental construction is. In the passage quoted above Vasubandhu assumes, rst of all, that analysis of what is conceived, if it exists, reveals that it is either a substance or a collection of substances of different sorts. This is equivalent to the assumption that an entity which exists and is conceived is either a phenomenon which possesses by itself just one nature and is conceived on the basis of its possession of this nature or is a collection of such phenomena which seems to possess by itself just one nature on the basis of which it is conceived, but does not. Alternatively, we may say that Vasubandhu assumes that a concept of an object is formed either in dependence upon a substance or in dependence upon a collection of substances of different sorts which seems to be an entity of a certain sort, and that that in dependence upon which the concept of an object is formed must be the object of the concept. When an object is conceived in dependence upon a substance, he assumes, the object is correctly conceived. Phenomena, so conceived, exist, since they are substances. Vasubandhu believes that substances are known to exist by means of direct perception or sound inference. But when an object is conceived in dependence upon a collection

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of substances of different sorts, he believes the object is incorrectly conceived, since the object falsely appears to the consciousness which conceives it as an entity of a certain sort. What Vasubandhu calls a mental construction is the object of a concept formed in dependence upon a collection of substances of different sorts which seems to be an entity of a certain sort. The object is called a mental construction, I surmise, because its appearance of being an entity of a certain sort is mentally constructed. Although a collection of substances of different sorts does not by itself possess just one nature on the basis of which it is conceived, it is known to be the same as the object being conceived, Vasubandhu believes, by means of the analysis which eliminates the false appearance of the object being an entity of a certain sort, since what is present to consciousness after analysis is a collection of substances of different sorts. In the passage translated above, Vasubandhu in effect claims, (a) that if we are other than our aggregates, we are ultimate realities, (b) that if we are the same as our aggregates, we are deceptive conventional realities, and argues, on the basis of the assumption, (c) that we must be either other than our aggregates or the same as our aggregates, that we must be either ultimate realities or deceptive conventional realities. At rst sight, it would seem that Vasubandhus assumption, that we must be either other than or the same as our aggregates, is an application of the logical principle, that of any two things which exist, one is either other than the second or the same as the second, which is expressed in standard logical notation as (x) (y) ([x = y] v [x = y]).14 However, when he speaks of our being other than our aggregates, he does not mean that we are not identical to them. What he means is that we are not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from our aggregates in the sense that we are separable in existence from them, possess by ourselves just one nature and are conceived on the basis of our possession of this nature. If there can be phenomena which are separable in existence from other phenomena without being clearly and distinctly separable in existence from them, the claim that we are either other than or the same as our aggregates is not an application of a principle of logic. Both Vasubandhu and the Vtsputryas believe that we are other than a our aggregates if and only if we are substances which exist apart from our aggregates, and that we are the same as our aggregates if and only if we are reducible in existence to our aggregates. What they disagree about is whether or not we can exist without being substances which exist apart from our aggregates or being reducible in existence to our aggregates.

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In order both to avoid the impression that Vasubandhu is merely invoking a principle of logic in his objection and to incorporate a uniform terminology into my discussion, hereafter I shall substitute are clearly and distinctly separable in existence from for are other than in my discussion of the statement that we are other than our aggregates. And to make it clear that the statement that we are the same as our aggregates is a result of the reductive form of analysis used by Vasubandhu to show that we exist, I shall substitute is reducible in existence to for is the same as in my discussions of this statement. So Vasubandhu thinks that if we exist, as the Vtsputryas claim a we do, we must be either substances, which are clearly and distinctly separable in existence from our aggregates, as the Trthikas claim, or mental constructions, which are reducible in existence to our aggregates, as he himself claims. When the Vtsputryas claim that we exist, a Vasubandhu is objecting, they must accept the Trthikas theory of persons, which they cannot do, or his own theory, since there is no other alternative available. Vasubandhus objection to the Vtsputryas theory of persons may a now be reconstructed. According to the Vtsputryas, a (i) (ii) We exist. If we exist, we must be either clearly and distinctly separable in existence from, or reducible in existence to, our aggregates. If we are clearly and distinctly separable in existence from our aggregates, we possess by ourselves just one nature and are conceived on the basis of our possession of this nature. If we possess by ourselves just one nature and are conceived on the basis of our possession of this nature, we are ultimate realities. If we are reducible in existence to our aggregates, by convention we are conceived in dependence upon the collection of substances of different sorts called the aggregates. If by convention we are conceived in dependence upon the collection of substances of different sorts called the aggregates, we are deceptive conventional realities.

(iii)

(iv)

(v)

(vi)

Therefore, (vii) We are either ultimate realities or deceptive conventional realities.

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a The point of the objection, of course, is that the Vtsputryas only alternative to adopting Vasubandhus own theory of persons is to accept that of the Trthikas, and they do not accept that of the Trthikas. So how can persons exist if they are not reducible in existence to their aggregates?
 IPUTR VATS IYAS AGGREGATE-RELIANCE REPLY

The Vtsputryas reply to Vasubandhus objection is as follows: a

A person is neither real in the way a substance is nor real in the way a mental construction is, since it is conceived in reliance upon aggregates which pertain to ourselves, are appropriated, and exist in the present.

In other words, we are neither ultimate realities nor deceptive conventional realities, as Vasubandhu denes them, since we are conceived in reliance upon aggregates which possess the three attributes listed. Let us set aside for the moment a discussion of the three attributes of these aggregates so we may rst come to an understanding of the   Vtsputryas use of in reliance upon (upadaya) in the claim that a we are conceived in reliance upon aggregates. Although we exist, the Vtsputryas believe, we are inexplicable a phenomena in the sense that we are not ultimate realities, since we are not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from our aggregates, nor deceptive conventional realities, since we are not reducible in existence to our aggregates. We are neither clearly and distinctly separable in existence from, nor reducible in existence to, our aggregates, because we are conceived in reliance upon aggregates. But what is meant by our being conceived in reliance upon aggregates? To understand its meaning let us begin by seeing why inexplicable phenomena are not conceived in the way substances are conceived. Phenomena which are inexplicable, according to the Vtsputryas, a are like substances insofar as their existence is not reducible to that of a collection of substances of different sorts. But they are also unlike them insofar as they do not by themselves possess just one nature and are conceived on the basis of their possession of this nature. The Vtsputryas apparently believe that inexplicable phenomena do possess a by themselves natures by reason of which they exist, but not that they can be conceived on the basis of possessing these natures. It is precisely because the natures we possess by ourselves do not enable us to be conceived that we must be conceived in reliance upon aggregates. In the third article in this series I shall discuss Vasubandhus dispute with the Vtsputryas concerning how we are known to exist. If we are a

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to comprehend fully what the Vtsputryas mean by our being conceived a in reliance upon aggregates, we need to anticipate their views about this matter. The Vtsputryas will claim that we are known to exist by a means of perception. Vasubandhu will have difculty understanding this claim, since he assumes that a perception which establishes the existence of the object of a concept must involve a discrimination of the single nature the object possesses by itself. Only if the single nature an object possesses by itself is discriminated when the object is perceived, he believes, can the existence of the object be established by the perception, since a discrimination of this nature is what determines the content of the concept of that object. Let us call a perception of this sort a clear and distinct perception of the object of a concept. The Vtsputryas, however, do not believe that we possess by ourselves a single natures the discrimination of which is included in the perception which establishes our existence. In other words, they do not believe that the perception which establishes our existence is clear and distinct. Nonetheless, they believe, the existence of the object of the concept of ourselves is established by perception. How is this possible? How can a perception establish the existence of the object of the concept of ourselves if it is not a clear and distinct perception of this object? It is possible, they believe, if the concept is not formed on the basis of a clear and distinct perception of ourselves, but on the basis of clear and distinct perceptions of phenomena which are present when we are being perceived. Since our natures cannot be discriminated when we are perceived, the concept of ourselves must be formed on the basis of clear and distinct perceptions of the phenomena present when we are perceived. These phenomena are the aggregates. We have come to see the difference between the way in which the Vtsputryas believe we are conceived and the way in which ultimate a realities are conceived. Ultimate realities are conceived on the basis of the single natures they possess by themselves, while we are conceived on the basis of the single natures of the aggregates present when we are perceived. What is the difference between the way in which the Vtsputryas think we are conceived and the way in which deceptive a conventional realities are conceived? Vasubandhu likens our being conceived in reliance upon aggregates to the way in which milk is conceived in dependence upon its constituents. The aggregates in reliance upon which we are conceived, according to this comparison, must be that to which the concept of ourselves is applied, just as the collection of phenomena in dependence upon which milk is conceived is that to which the concept of milk is applied.

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Vasubandhu assumes in both cases that that in dependence upon which a concept of a phenomenon is formed is that to which the concept is applied. Let us call that in dependence upon which a concept is formed the cause of the concept, meaning by this that it determines the content of the concept formed. Let us also call that to which a concept is applied its object. The Vtsputryas claim that the object a of the concept of ourselves is not its cause. Part of what they mean to express by saying that we are conceived in reliance upon aggregates is that the aggregates are the cause of the concept of ourselves without being its object. The theory that the object of a concept must always be its cause I shall call the theory of cause-dependent objects of concepts. Vasubandhu accepts this theory, while the Vtsputryas do not. Since we are cona ceived in reliance upon aggregates, according to the Vtsputryas, a our aggregates cause the concept of ourselves, but they are not its object. This is another implication of our being conceived in reliance upon aggregates upon which the Vtsputryas draw in their reply to a Vasubandhus two-realities objection. One of the forms which the Vtsputryas reply from aggregatea reliance can take may now be reconstructed. (i) (ii) We are conceived in reliance upon aggregates If we are conceived in reliance upon aggregates, we do not posses by ourselves single natures on the basis of which we are conceived. If we do not possess by ourselves single natures on the basis of which we are conceived, we are not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from our aggregates.

(iii)

Therefore, (iv) (v) We are not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from our aggregates. If we are not clearly and distinct separable in existence from our aggregates, we are not ultimate realities

Therefore, from (iv) and (v) we may infer, (vi) Moreover, We are not ultimate realities.

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(viii)

If we are conceived in reliance upon aggregates, our aggregates are the cause, but not the object, of the concept of ourselves. If our aggregates are the cause, but not the object, of the concept of ourselves, we are not reducible in existence to our aggregates.

Therefore, from (vii) and (viii) we may infer, (ix) But, (x) If we are not reducible in existence to our aggregates, we are not deceptive conventional realities. We are not reducible in existence to our aggregates.

Therefore, from (vi) and (xi) we may infer, (xii) We are neither ultimate realities nor deceptive conventional realities.

Vasubandhu, we shall see, would reject premise (vii) of this reconstruction. But since the objection he is about to make against the reply is directed against its unreconstructed form, the objection will merely assume the falsity of premise (vii) rather than show it to be false. We must be careful at this point not to draw the conclusion that the Vtsputryas mean to deny the truth of the Buddhas doctrine of a two realities. They are, of course, denying the truth of that doctrine as Vasubandhu interprets it. The Vtsputryas, we may assume, have a their own interpretation of the Buddhas doctrine of the two realities. Indeed, the Vaibhsika interpretation, which is accepted by Vasuhandhu, a. is rejected by scholars belonging to all of the other Indian Buddhist philosophical schools except the school based on Vasubandhus Treasury itself. The Vtsputryas, I suggest, would interpret the Buddhas doctrine a in such a way that the inexplicability of persons is their ultimate reality, while such persons, as conceived, are deceptive conventional realities insofar as the conceiving of them makes them appear to be entities of a certain sort. Analysis would then show the falsity of our appearance of being entities of a certain sort, and thereby, enable us to free our perception of ourselves of the conceptual overlay which causes us to  see ourselves as selves (atmadrs.ti).15 ..

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THE ATTRIBUTES OF THE AGGREGATES IN RELIANCE UPON WHICH WE ARE CONCEIVED

Let us now discuss the attributes the Vtsputryas assign to the aggrea gates in reliance upon which they believe we are conceived. They say    that these aggregates are those which pertain to ourselves (adhyatmikan),     are appropriated (upattan), and exist in the present (varttamanan). The aggregates which pertain to ourselves are our organs of perception and mental states, and perhaps even our so-called bodily properties.16 The aggregates are appropriated, the Vtsputryas seem to believe, in the a sense that they are clung to as possessions of the self which we falsely appear to be because we form a concept of ourselves in dependence upon the presence of these aggregates. The self we falsely appear to be, they claim, is a permanent and partless substance.17 The effect produced by the aggregates being appropriated in this sense would seem to be the continued existence of their causal continuum from one lifetime to the next.18 As causes of the continued existence of this continuum, we are not selves, since we separately exist without being separate substances. Vasubandhu verbally agrees with the Vtsputryas that the aggregates a in reliance upon which we are conceived are those which pertain to ourselves and are appropriated. But he believes, rst of all, that we are conceived in reliance upon these aggregates in the way in which milk is conceived in dependence upon its constituents, not in the special way the Vtsputryas claim we are conceived. Secondly, he seems to a think that the inexplicable person the Vtsputryas believe to be the a appropriator of the aggregates is itself the self. For he does not, as the Vtsputryas do, believe that we suffer by reason of assuming that a we are permanent and partless substances which exist apart from our aggregates, yet does believe that we suffer by reason of assuming that we exist without being reducible in existence to our aggregates. Thirdly, he thinks that the appropriator of the aggregates is real in the way a mental construction is, not in the way an inexplicable phenomenon is. In truth, he insists, there is no appropriator of the aggregates which exists apart from them. When the Vtsputryas say that the aggregates in reliance upon which a we are conceived exist in the present, what they must mean by the present is the time we are actually being conceived. The Vtsputryas a are implying that past and future aggregates, which are those not present at the time when we are conceiving ourselves, are not phenomena in reliance upon which we are conceived.19 It might be objected that we conceive ourselves in reliance upon past aggregates when we remember something we did or experienced in the past and that we

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conceive ourselves in reliance upon future aggregates when we foresee or imagine what we shall do or experience in the future. In these cases, would we not be conceiving ourselves in reliance upon past and future aggregates? The Vtsputryas would surely reply that, if we conceive a ourselves on the basis of past and future aggregates, we would not be conceiving ourselves from the rst-person singular perspective, since past and future aggregates are the phenomena on basis of which we would conceive ourselves from the third-person singular perspective. The concept of ourselves is the concept of ourselves as it is used from the rst-person singular perspective, for example, as it is used in the thoughts that I am feeling pleasure now, that I felt pleasure yesterday, and that I shall feel pleasure tomorrow. It should be clear that in each of these cases, I am conceiving myself in reliance upon thinking these thoughts, not in reliance upon the content of these thoughts.
VASUBANDHUS CAUSAL OBJECTION TO THE AGGREGATE-RELIANCE REPLY

Vasubandhu objects, on the assumption that the cause of a concept must be the object of the concept, that it cannot be true, as the Vtsputryas a claim, that if we are conceived in reliance upon the aggregates, we are neither ultimate realities nor deceptive conventional realities.
If we are to understand this obscure statement [of how a person exists without being either real in the way a substance is or real in the way a mental construction is], its meaning must be disclosed. What is meant by [saying that a person is conceived] in reliance upon [the aggregates]? If it means [that a person is conceived] on the condition that the aggregates have been perceived, then the concept [of a person] is applied only to them, just as when visible forms and other such things [that comprise milk] have been perceived, the concept of milk is applied only to them. If [saying that a person is conceived in reliance upon the aggregates means that it is conceived] in dependence upon the aggregates being present, then [once again, the concept of a person is applied only to them], because the aggregates themselves will cause it to be conceived. [Therefore,] the difculty is the same.

Vasubandhu here argues that insofar as the rst premise of the Vtsputryas reply from aggregate-reliance is true, it cannot be used a in a sound inference to prove that its conclusion is true. The sense in which that premise is true, he claims, is that the concept of ourselves is formed because the aggregates have been perceived or because the aggregates are present. The distinction Vasubandhu is drawing between the perception of the aggregates being a condition for the concept of ourselves being formed and the presence of the aggregates being the condition for the concept being formed does not mark a real difference in his view about the cause of the concept of ourselves, since the

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aggregates which are present, he thinks, are present to consciousness as objects of perception. He is arguing that if the aggregates cause the concept of ourselves, the concept is applied only to the aggregates, and hence, that the aggregates are the object of the concept of ourselves. He can draw this conclusion, however, only if he assumes that the phenomena which cause a concept must be the object of that concept. This assumption, I have already noted, is contradicted by premise (vii) of my reconstruction of the Vtsputryas aggregatea reliance reply. Vasubandhu supports his use of this assumption with the example of how milk is conceived. Since milk is conceived in reliance upon the collection of its constituents, he argues, the collection of the constituents of milk is the object of the concept of milk; likewise, if we are conceived in reliance upon aggregates, our aggregates are the object of the concept of ourselves. Finally, Vasubandhu concludes his objection with the statement that the difculty is the same. The difculty to which I believe he alludes is that the Vtsputryas cannot a say that we exist unless they accept the view that we are either ultimate realities or deceptive conventional realities. Vasubandhus objection, which I call the causal objection to the aggregate-reliance reply, may now be reconstructed. Let us assume, with the Vtsputryas, that a (i) (ii) Therefore, (iii) But (iv) Therefore, (v) But (vi) Therefore, (vii) We are reducible in existence to our aggregates. If the aggregates are the object of the concept of ourselves, we are reducible in existence to our aggregates. The aggregates are the object of the concept of ourselves. What causes a concept is the object of the concept. The aggregates cause the concept of ourselves. We are conceived in reliance upon the aggregates. If we are conceived in reliance upon the aggregates, the aggregates cause the concept of ourselves.

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If we are reducible in existence to our aggregates, then we are deceptive conventional realities.

We are deceptive conventional realities.

It follows from (ix), by the rule of logic called addition, that (x) We are either ultimate realities or deceptive conventional realities.

a Hence, from (i), which is the rst premise of the Vtsputryas reply from aggregate-reliance, Vasubandhu has derived the alternatives he rst posed to the Vtsputryas. So the reason they give for rejecting a these alternatives, he is arguing, provides a reason for accepting them. The theory of cause-dependent objects of concepts, as well as its use to reject the content of our actual concept of ourselves, has its analogue in the philosophy of David Hume, whose own phenomenalistic version of the theory is that ideas are copies of impressions. He, like Vasubandhu, uses a version of the theory to argue for the falsity of our actual concept or idea of ourselves as a phenomenon irreducible in existence to the phenomena in dependence upon which we are conceived. Like Vasubandhu, moreover, he in effect argues that if we exist at all, we must be reducible in existence to the phenomena in dependence upon which we are conceived, since, if we exist, we must be either clearly and distinctly separable in existence from, or reducible in existence to, the phenomena in dependence upon which we are conceived, and we know that we are not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from these phenomena, since we are not clearly and distinctly perceived. This parallel helps us to see what is at stake in Vasubandhus use of the theory of cause-dependent objects of concepts to reject the Vtsputryas theory a of persons. Vasubandhus acceptance of the theory of cause-dependent objects of concepts is surely motivated by the same fundamental concern that motivates Humes theory of concept formation, which is to provide a way to verify claims about what exists.
 IPUTR VATS IYAS REPLY FROM FIRE AND FUEL

The crux of the dispute at this point between Vasubandhu and the Vtsputryas concerns whether or not what causes a concept to be a formed must be the object of the concept. So what the Vtsputryas a

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now need to do, and indeed, do, is to nd a way to reject the theory of cause-dependent objects of concepts. Their rejection of this theory is built into their attempt to provide an example of a phenomenon other than a person which is conceived in dependence upon a collection of substances of different sorts and is neither clearly and distinctly separable in existence from, nor reducible in existence to, that collection of substances. The Vtsputryas reply is as follows: a
A person is not conceived in this way, but rather in the way [in which] re is conceived in reliance upon fuel. Fire is conceived in reliance upon fuel, [they claim, in the sense that] it is not conceived unless fuel is present, and it cannot be conceived if it either is or is not other than fuel. If re were other than fuel, fuel [which is burning] would not be hot. And if re were not other than fuel, what burns would be the same as the cause of its burning.

In the translation I have taken the Vtsputryas to be providing an a account of what it is for re to be conceived in reliance upon fuel and have added to that account the qualication that fuel is burning, since it is clear that fuel which is not burning is not hot and it is being assumed that the fuel to which the Vtsputryas are referring is in fact hot. a The Vtsputryas reply is more than a simple counter-example on a the basis of which they would have us reject the assumption upon which Vasubandhus causal objection is based, since it includes, as I have interpreted it, a denition of conceived in reliance upon. For if what I am calling their denition of this phrase is substituted for the phrase in the original aggregate-reliance reply, that reply will then take the form, A person is neither real in the way a substance is nor real in the way a mental construction is, since it [is conceived, but] is not conceived unless aggregates are present and it cannot be conceived if it either is or is not other than aggregates. This denition in fact supplies us with premises (iv) and (ix) of the reconstruction I made above of the aggregate-reliance reply. In my reconstruction, however, I have supplied the premises upon which (iv) and (ix) are derived, and then supplied the further premises from which the conclusion of the aggregate-reliance reply is derived. A logically perspicuous reconstruction of the Vtsputryas reply to a Vasubandhus causal objection will include arguments for the premises (a) that re is not conceived unless fuel is present, (b) that re is not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel, and (c) that re is not reducible in existence to fuel, and it will end with the conclusion (d) that that in dependence upon which a phenomenon is conceived need not be what is conceived. Both Vasubandhu and the Vtsputryas agree, a of course, that re is conceived and that it is conceived in the sense that a concept of re is formed. Both also agree that re is the object of

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this concept, but Vasubandhu believes re to be a mental construction reducible in existence to the elements of which it is composed and the Vtsputryas believe it to be an inexplicable phenomenon conceived a in dependence upon fuel. When it is said that re is not conceived unless fuel is present, this means for both that re is conceived in dependence upon fuel. But they do not agree, as I shall explain in the next article, that re is in fact conceived in dependence upon fuel. Since the Vtsputryas do not present an argument for this premise, a we shall need to reconstruct an argument for it on their behalf if we are to identify the cause of their disagreement. Their reason for believing that re is conceived in dependence upon fuel is surely that they dene re by reference to fuel. Our rst clue to uncovering their denition is to note that they most likely believe that re is known to exist by perception, since re is used as the analogue of a person, whose perception, we have seen, is the basis upon which they claim that a person exists. But re is not always perceived when fuel is present. It is perceived only when fuel burns (dahyate). Because re is perceived only when fuel burns, the Vtsputryas surely reason, re a may be dened by reference to the burning of the fuel. It should be no surprise, therefore, that the Vtsputryas are in fact later represented by a Vasubandhu as dening re as what causes fuel to burn. So dened, re cannot be conceived without reference to fuel, and in this sense, re is conceived in dependence upon fuel. We can be sure that their denition of re is not a statement of what it is according to its own nature, since they must believe that we cannot know what re is according to its own nature. They must believe that we cannot know this because they are presenting re as the analogue of ourselves and they believe that we cannot know what we are according to our own natures. If we are to understand the Vtsputryas denition of re and a the role it plays in their reply to Vasubandhus causal objection, we need to contrast their denition of re to that given in the Treasury  account of the elements (bhuta-s) of which all bodies are comprised. According to the Treasury account, bodies are mental constructions reducible in existence to collections of substances of different sorts,   including four primary elements (mahabhuta-s), known to exist by sound inference, and various secondary elements (bhautika-s), known to exist by clear and distinct perception. The four primary elements are called re (tejas), earth (prthiv), air (rana), and water (ap), which are . . substances all of which are present in every body in equal proportions and which in combination must be present if the body is to possess the secondary elements, which are the special objects of the ve senses.20

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Each of these elements has by itself just one nature which is called its dening property (laksana) and which cannot be present in any of . . the other elements. The dening property of the re-element is heat (usnata).21 As the dening property of the re-element, heat cannot be ..  present in any of the other three primary elements. In addition to the re-element, which is an ultimate reality, there is the re which is a deceptive conventional reality and is reducible in existence to the special collection of substances of different sorts of which it is composed. In the Refutation itself Vasubandhu so analyzes re, as conventionally conceived, and claims that fuel, which is similarly analyzed, is the cause of the arising of re in the way that milk is a cause of the arising of curds. Since the four primary elements exist in every body in equal proportions, a body would seem to be called a re not because it contains more re-elements than the elements of earth, air and water, but because of the greater intensity of the heat of the re-elements it contains.22 It should be clear that when the Vtsputryas dene re as the a cause of the burning of fuel they are offering an alternative to the Treasury accounts of re as an ultimate reality and as a deceptive conventional reality. In the Refutation, when Vasubandhu requests from the Vtsputryas more specic accounts of re and fuel, they a identify re with the heat (ausnyam) which is present in burning fuel .. (pradpta), and claim that fuel is comprised of the earth-, air- and water-elements. It is likely that the Vtsputryas hold the view that a fuel is a collection of elemental substances, as they are dened in the Treasury, since they seem to hold the view that the aggregates, the analogue of fuel in their analogy, is a collection of substances of different sorts. But we can be sure that the re-element, as dened in the Treasury, is not what the Vtsputryas call re, because (a) the a re-element is not the cause of the burning of fuel, (b) the re-element is not present in fuel if fuel is comprised solely of the earth-, air- and water-elements, and (c) the re-element is not perceived, as re is, but inferred to exist on the basis of a clear and distinct perception of its dening property, heat. Nor can re, which the Vtsputryas also call a heat, be the heat which denes the re-element, since the heat with which the Vtsputryas identify re is present in fuel, while the heat a which denes the re-element cannot be present in fuel. Fire, according to the Vtsputryas, is the heat present in burning fuel which causes a the fuel to burn. This cause of the burning of fuel, we may suppose, the Vtsputryas call heat because the heat present in fuel is generally a considered to be the cause of its burning. Moreover, this re or heat

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which is present in fuel, if it is an analogue to persons as conceived by the Vtsputryas, will be separable in existence from the fuel it causes a to burn without being clearly and distinctly separable in existence from it, just as persons are separable in existence from the aggregates they cause to be appropriated, without being clearly and distinctly separable in existence from them. Whether or not the Vtsputryas believe that, in addition to re, as a they dene it, there is also a re-element, as dened in the Treasury, is not clear. If they do assert that both re and the re-element exist, they would certainly deny that the heat which is present in fuel is the dening property of the re-element, since it is present in fuel and the dening property of the re-element cannot be present in fuel. They would also be forced to claim that the re or heat present in fuel is separable in existence from the re-element without being clearly and distinctly separable in existence from it, since they believe (a) that it exists, (b) that it is not reducible in existence to the re-element, and (c) that it is not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from the re-element. They seem to think (a) that it exists, since it is perceived, (b) that it is not reducible in existence to the re-element, since it causes fuel to burn and the re-element does not, and (c) that it is not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from the re-element, since it is not a substance. The perception of heat present in burning fuel, we may also infer, would not be the same as the perception of the heat present in the re-element, since that heat, according to the Treasury account, is clearly and distinctly perceived, while the heat with which the Vtsputryas identify re cannot be so perceived if it a is a true analogue to a person. If the Vtsputryas do not accept, in addition to their own view that a re is inexplicable, the view that all bodies include re-elements of the sort explained in the Treasury, their analogy between persons and their aggregates and re and its fuel would seem to be more exact, since there is no mention of anything comparable to the re-element in the analogy. In this case, they would be rejecting the view that re is an elemental substance of the sort earth, air and water are and offer a quite different explanation of the presence of heat in bodies. Although the Vtsputryas dene re as what burns fuel, they do a not explain what they mean by the burning of fuel. The only account of . burning I have found in the Abhidharmakosabhasya is in the Refutation itself, where Vasubandhu reports what is commonly said about re and fuel so that he may then offer his own reductive analysis of what is said.23 He reports that it is commonly said that re burns fuel by

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     bringing about an alteration in its continuum (santati vikarapasanat). If we suppose that the Vtsputryas accept as true Vasubandhus report a about what is commonly said about how re burns fuel and that they believe that what is commonly said is correct, how would they explain this alteration? We may be sure that the Vtsputryas do not believe that an alteration a in the continuum of fuel is a change of some sort in a substance, since all Indian Buddhists reject the idea of a substance which undergoes change. However, there remains the following possibility. When re is present in fuel, which is conceived in dependence upon a collection of momentary substances of different sorts existing in a causal continuum, it causes the part of the collection in which it is actually present in one moment to cease, in the next moment, to be part of that collection; then in that next moment, without changing or having ceased to exist, it is present in another part of the collection, which it causes, in the next moment, to cease to exist, etc., until the collection of momentary substances in dependence upon which the fuel is conceived ceases to exist. In this case, there is no element which undergoes a change of any sort, but the continuum of the fuel is changed in the sense that the collection of substances in dependence upon which it is conceived as fuel is being reduced in number to the point where there are no more phenomena in dependence upon which fuel is conceived. The fuel, in this sense, is consumed by the re. The general idea is that the re or heat present in fuel continues to exist, without changing, in its continuum, until it gradually causes the continuum to cease to exist. The changelessness of re, of course, will be inexplicable in the sense that it is not that of a permanent and partless substance or that of a causal continuum of momentary substances of different sorts as a collection. The basic similarities to which the analogy between re and persons is meant to call attention, of course, are that both persons and re are not conceived on the basis of the single natures they possess by themselves, since they are not substances, and that they are not, respectively, reducible in existence to the phenomena in dependence upon which they are conceived. One crucial difference, however, is that re would seem to come into existence at the time its fuel begins to burn, while a person, according to the Vtsputryas, is a beginningless a phenomenon. Another difference is that re would seem to cease to exist once its fuel has been consumed, while a person, according to the Vtsputryas, would not seem to cease to exist once the continuum a of the aggregates it appropriates ceases to exist.24 Neither of these

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differences, however, is pertinent to the point the Vtsputryas are a trying to make in the analogy. They do not claim that all inexplicable phenomena are, as persons are, beginningless and endless. The Vtsputryas denition of the re as what causes fuel to burn a supports my earlier suggestion that they dene a person by reference to effects it produces in the continuum of its aggregates. It would seem, if my analysis thus far is correct, that the Vtsputryas adopt the view a that just as a person is an inexplicable phenomenon which causes the continuum of the aggregates in which it is changelessly present to continue to exist, so re is an inexplicable phenomenon which causes the continuum of the fuel in which it is changelessly present to cease to exist. These inexplicable phenomena, we may say, are inexplicable causes in the sense that they are neither clearly and distinctly separable in existence from, nor reducible in existence to, the continua of phenomena in dependence upon which they are conceived to be causes of the continued or discontinued existence of these continua. Although the Vtsputryas would not be claiming that all causes are inexplicable, a they would be making a radical addition to the Treasury account of the causal relation, according to which all momentary phenomena, by their own natures, are effects produced by other momentary phenomena or causes which produce other momentary phenomena, yet are clearly and distinctly separable in existence from one another.25 Inexplicable causes, by contrast, (a) are not momentary, (b) are not, by their own natures, effects produced by momentary phenomena or causes which produce momentary phenomena, and (c) are not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from other phenomena, yet (d) are causes of effects in the continua of collections of substances of different sorts in dependence upon which the causes are conceived. Unfortunately, Vasubandhus text does not provide us with any clues by which we can elaborate on this picture of inexplicable causes. My interpretation of how the Vtsputryas believe re to cause fuel a to burn, as an inexplicable heat present in its continuum, enables us to understand the next part of their reply from re and fuel, which is their argument for the premise that re is not other than fuel. Their explicit argument consists simply in the statement that if re were other than  fuel, fuel would not be hot (yadi hy anyah syad, anusnam indhanam . .. .  syat). We can now take this argument to mean that if the re which burns fuel by its presence, as heat, in its continuum, were clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel, fuel which is burning would not, per impossible, be hot. The argument, in other words, turns on the account of re as the heat which causes fuel to burn by its presence in

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the continuum of fuel. If this account of re is correct, re cannot be clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel. For in that case re would be either (a) a permanent substance, which is impossible, since a permanent substance, all Indian Buddhists agree, cannot produce an effect of any sort, or (b) the impermanent substance called the reelement, which is impossible, since the re-element cannot be present in fuel, and the re or heat which causes fuel to burn is present in fuel until the fuel is consumed. Their argument for the theory that fuel which is burning would not be hot if re were clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel, can, for our purposes, take for its premises (a) that if re were clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel, it would not be present in fuel as the heat which causes it to burn, (b) that if it were not present in fuel as the heat which causes it to burn, fuel which is burning would not be hot, and (c) that fuel which is burning is hot. The next part of the Vtsputryas reply from re and fuel is the claim a that if re were not other than fuel (i.e. were reducible in existence to fuel), what burns and what causes it to burn would be the same      (athananyah syat, dahyam eva dahakam syat). Since they present this . . claim as part of an argument for the conclusion that re is not reducible in existence to fuel, we may assume that they take it for granted that what burns and what causes it to burn cannot be the same. But re, they have assumed, is what causes fuel to burn. So what they deem to be the impossible consequence of re being reducible in existence to fuel seems to be that fuel is what causes fuel to burn. The principle employed in this argument, therefore, is that nothing can produce an effect in itself.26 In other words, the Vtsputryas are assuming that a a cause of an effect must be separable in existence from that in which it produces its effect. The Vtsputryas reply from re and fuel, thus far, may be rendered a as follows: (i) (ii) Fire is what causes fuel to burn. If re is what causes fuel to burn, re is conceived in dependence upon fuel.

There, from (i) and (ii) we may infer (iii) Fire is conceived in dependence upon fuel.

The argument for re not being clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel may be reconstructed as follows:

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If re is clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel, the heat which burns fuel is not present in fuel. If the heat which burns fuel is not present in fuel, fuel which burns would not be hot. Fuel which burns is hot.

Therefore, from (iv), (v) and (vi) we may infer (vii) Fire is not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel.

The argument for the irreducible existence of re may be reconstructed as follows: (viii) (ix) If re is reducible in existence to fuel and re is what causes fuel to burn, fuel is what causes fuel to burn. Fuel is not what causes fuel to burn.

Therefore, from (i), (viii) and (ix) we may infer (x) Fire is not reducible in existence to fuel. We are now in a position to see how the Vtsputryas re-fuel reply a constitutes a rebutal of the theory of cause-dependent objects of concepts. Since re is not reducible in existence to fuel, fuel cannot be the object of the concept of re, and since re is conceived in dependence upon fuel, fuel is the cause of the concept of re. Therefore, the cause of the concept of re is not the object of the concept of re. Therefore, the theory of cause-dependent objects of concepts is false. In reconstructed form, the re-fuel reply is concluded as follows: (xi) If re is not reducible in existence to fuel, fuel is not the object of the concept of re.

Therefore, from (x) and (xi) we may infer (xii) Fuel is not the object of the concept of re.

From (iii) and (xii) we may infer (xiii) Fire is conceived in dependence upon fuel and fuel is not the object of the concept of re.

It is obvious that

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(Xiv)

If re is conceived in dependence upon fuel and fuel is not the object of the concept of re, then that in dependence upon which something is conceived need not be the object which is being conceived.

Therefore, from (xiii) and (xiv) we may infer (xv) That in dependence upon which something is conceived need not be the object which is being conceived.

I shall argue in the next article of this series that Vasubandhu, on question-begging grounds, rejects premises (i) and (vi) in his objection to the re-fuel reply, and fails to address the actual point of the reply, which is that the cause of the concept of ourselves need not be the object of the concept. The Vtsputryas, according to my interpretation of their re-fuel a reply, are attempting to introduce into the standard Buddhist theory of causality the idea of an inexplicable phenomenon which can cause the continuum of a collection of substances of different sorts in dependence upon which this cause is conceived to continue to exist or to cease to exist. To be possible, this inexplicable cause must be separable in existence, without being clearly and distinctly separable in existence, from the continuum of the collection of substances in which it produces its effect. Vasubandhu, we shall see, does not even attempt to show, on philosophical grounds, why a cause of this sort is not possible.

 IPUTR THE VATS IYAS MIDDLE-WAY ARGUMENT FOR THEIR THEORY OF PERSONS

We have seen how the Vtsputryas use the re-fuel reply to overturn a Vasubandhus causal objection to their aggregate-reliance reply to his two-realities objection to their theory of persons. Their reply is used to show that our aggregates need not be, as Vasubandhu assumes, what is conceived when we are conceived. Immediately after replying to Vasubandhus objection, they introduce premises analogous to those used in the reply to formulate their main argument for the view that we are in fact inexplicable phenomena. This is the argument I have called their middle-way argument.
Similarly, a person is not conceived unless the aggregates are present, [and] if it were other than the aggregates, the reicationist theory [that a person is a substance] would be held, and if it were not other than the aggregates, the nihilist theory [that a person does not exist at all] would be held.

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This argument takes the form of showing, on the assumption that persons, nonreductionistically conceived, exist, that the Vtsputryas a inexplicablist theory of persons is the middle-way between reicationist and nihilist theories. The implication is that since the Buddha propounded a middle-way theory of this sort, the theory of the Vtsputryas is a that held by the Buddha. Although the Vtsputryas in this argument a implicitly appeal to the Buddhas rejection of extreme theories of persons in order to argue that we are inexplicable phenomena, these extreme theories, within the Buddhist tradition, are typically rejected on independent philosophical grounds. For this reason, I shall assume, it is in fact an attempt to provide an independent philosophical argument for the Vtsputryas theory. a Since the conceiving of persons in dependence upon the aggregates is meant to be analogous to the conceiving of re in dependence upon fuel, it is reasonable to assume that the Vtsputryas middle-way a argument is predicated on a denition of persons as inexplicable causes of effects produced in the continuum of their aggregates, just as their re-fuel reply is predicated on the denition of re as an inexplicable cause of an effect produced in the continuum of its fuel. The denition they assume in their argument, I believe, is that a person is what causes the continuum of its aggregates to continue to exist from one lifetime to the next. Since the causal action by which this effect is produced they call appropriation, we may render their denition by saying that we are what appropriate aggregates. So dened, they can claim, we are conceived in dependence upon the aggregates we appropriate. Since we do not, by our own natures, appropriate the aggregates, they can reason, we can exist without appropriating them. It follows that when, at the time our cyclic existence ends, the continuum of our aggregates ceases to exist, there will be no phenomena in dependence upon which we can be conceived, but we can continue to exist. So the advantage of the Vtsputryas theory, unlike that of Vasubandhu, does not imply a that the goal of the practice of Buddhism, our noncyclic existence, is our extinction. It implies only our inconceivability when we achieve this goal. If the above denition of persons is adopted by the Vtsputryas, a the reconstruction of the middle-way argument begins as follows: (i) (ii) We are what appropriate aggregates. If we are what appropriate aggregates, we are conceived in dependence upon the aggregates we appropriate.

Therefore, from (i) and (ii) we may infer,

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(iii)

We are conceived in dependence upon the aggregates we appropriate.

A central belief of the Vtsputryas, not shared by Vasubandhu, a is that we are correctly conceived to be appropriators of aggregates. We have seen how they can hold this belief, in spite of also believing that we cannot be conceived on the basis of the natures we possess by ourselves. Their principal reason for accepting the correctness of this conception of ourselves, as can be shown by an analysis of their later objections to Vasubandhus reductionist theory, is their belief that we, as perceivers of objects, thinkers of thoughts, agents of actions and experiencers of the results of actions, inexplicably retain our identity through changes of the perceptions, thoughts, actions, feelings and bodies which we appropriate.27 If we do not inexplicably retain our identity through changes of our aggregates, they believe, we do not exist at all as we are actually conceived, and this is precisely the nihilism the Buddha warned his followers to avoid. Vasubandhus theory, they also seem to believe, is also a form of nihilism insofar as it makes us into mental constructions, which are not, pace Vasubandhu, reducible in existence to our aggregates, since our aggregates are not in fact the object of the concept of ourselves. We need not here rehearse all of the reasons the Vtsputryas may have for adopting their own minimalist a version of the nonreductionist theory of persons, since it would require an extensive consideration of the later exchanges between Vasubandhu and the Vtsputryas in the Refutation. For the purposes of the a reconstruction of their middle-way argument, I shall take their belief that we are correctly conceived in a nonreductionistic way as the basis of their belief in our separate existence. Our reconstruction, therefore, may continue as follows: (iv) (v) Therefore, (vi) We exist apart from the aggregates we appropriate. We are correctly conceived to be appropriators of aggregates. If we are correctly conceived to be appropriators of aggregates, we exist apart from the aggregates we appropriate.

The remainder of the middle-way argument will be comprised of arguments for the claims that we are neither clearly and distinctly separable in existence from the aggregates we appropriate nor reducible in existence to them.

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In the text, the claim that we are not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from our aggregates is supported by the claim that if we should say that we are so related to them, we would be committed to the reicationist theory of persons rejected by the Buddha. The theory rejected here, of course, is that we are substances which exist apart from our aggregates. This theory, we have seen, is the same as the theory that we are clearly and distinctly separable in existence from our aggregates. Indian Buddhists offer a variety of arguments to show that this theory is false. The very simplest of these arguments we could use in this context is that we cannot be substances which exist apart from our aggregates, since we are conceived in dependence upon aggregates. We may represent this argument, which would also be accepted by Vasubandhu, as follows: (vii) If we are clearly and distinctly separable in existence from the aggregates we appropriate, we are not conceived in dependence upon the aggregates we appropriate.

Therefore, from (iii) and (vii) we may infer: (viii) We are not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from the aggregates we appropriate.

Since this part of the middle-way argument is acceptable to Vasubandhu, we need not discuss it further. In the text, the premise, that we are not reducible in existence to our aggregates, is supported by the claim that if we should say that we are reducible in existence to them, we would be committed to nihilism. The form of nihilism to which the Vtsputryas believe we would be a committed is the theory that we lack existence apart from the aggregates we appropriate. This is the nihilist view rejected in premise (vi) of my reconstruction of the middle-way argument. Hence, the reductionist theory of persons, they would have us conclude, implies that (vi) is false. In other words, (ix) If we are reducible in existence to the aggregates we appropriate, we do not exist apart from the aggregates we appropriate.

Therefore, from (vi), (ix) we may infer, (x) We are not reducible in existence to the aggregates we appropriate.

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Finally, on the basis of (viii) and (x), they conclude that their own theory of persons is the middle way between the extremes of asserting that we are separate substances and that we lack existence apart from our aggregates. Hence, (xi) We are neither clearly and distinctly separable in existence from the aggregates we appropriate nor reducible in existence to the aggregates we appropriate.

The Vtsputryas middle-way argument, so reconstructed, shows us that a the most basic disagreement between them and Vasubandhu concerns the truth or falsity of premise (iv), that we are correctly conceived to be appropriators of the aggregates. Unfortunately, in the Refutation Vasubandhu does not discuss the Vtsputryas middle-way argument, a and the Vtsputryas are, for the most part, made simply to assume a the truth of (iv) in their arguments against Vasubandhus own theory of persons, just as Vasubandhu assumes its falsity in his arguments against their theory. So what the middle-way argument accomplishes, in the end, is simply a reformulation of the Vtsputryas theory of a persons which ts with the Buddhas claim that his own theory is a middle way between extreme views. To support their theory they need to argue that we are in fact correctly conceived to be appropriators of aggregates. Consequently, their middle-way argument cannot be said to provide by itself a good reason to accept the truth of their theory that we are inexplicable phenomena. University of Iowa, Iowa City 52242

NOTES What is known about the Vts  a putryas theory is for the most part found in the polemical works of their Indian Buddhist critics, which include, besides the Refu  .  tation of Vasubandhu, Mogalputtatissas Kathavatthu, Asangas Sutralamkara and . a     Madhyantavibhan ga, Sntidevas Bodhicaryavatara, Candrakrtis Madhyamakavatara, . a ~ s and Kamalailas Tattvasamgraha, along with Sntaraksitas Panjika commentary on . . s a putr Kamalailas work. Of the texts of the Vts yas school, only the fth century  .  C. E. Sammityanikaya Sastra survives, and that only in a Chinese translation. An English translation of a Chinese translation of this text has been published, but  neither it nor the Kathavatthu, at least in their English translations, seems to me to a portray a clear statement of the Vtsputryas theory of persons. In any case, in this a putryas theory of persons as Vasubandhu study, I conne my discussion to the Vts  presents it. There are three translations of the Refutation in print. The most recent translation is based on the Sanskrit text which was discovered in Tibet in 1934. It was composed
1

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by myself and published in The Journal of Indian Philosophy in 1988 (17: 137187) s On the basis of Yaomitras commentary and a Tibetan translation T. Stcherbatsky composed an English translation, entitled The Soul Theory of the Buddhists, published by the Bulletin de lAcademie des Science de Russie, 1919, pp. 823854, 937958 (reprinted in 1976 by the Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, Delhi). A French translation,  by L. De la Vallee Poussin, which is in the last volume of his LAbhidharmakosa de s Vasubandhu (Paris, 19231931), is based on Yaomitras commentary and a Chinese  translation by Hsuan-tsang. There is also a complete English translation of Poussins translation made by Leo Pruden in 1990 and published by the Asian Humanities Press in Berkeley, California. 2 Since Vasubandhus subsequent criticisms of their theory of persons are based primarily on scriptural quotations, they require a different sort of treatment which I hope to provide elsewhere in the context of a more comprehensive account of the a yas theory argumentation of Vasubandhus Refutation. Discussions of the Vtsputr of persons can be found in Nalinaksha Dutts Buddhist Sects in India (Delhi, 1978), ch. VIII, and Edward Conzes Buddhist Thought in India (Ann Arbor, 1967), pp. a putr 122134. In my 1982 paper, Vasubandhu on the Vts yas re-fuel analogy, in Philosophy East and West (32: 151158), I made an attempt to make sense of a yas use of the analogy to re and fuel to Vasubandhus critique of the Vtsputr support their theory, but I have, since its publication, radically changed my view. A completely new analysis is laid out in the second article of the three of which the present article is the rst. The discussions by Dutt and Conze do not carefully analyze a what I am here calling Vasubandhus philosophical objections to the Vtsputryas a putryas theory of persons. Nor do they, in my opinion, adequately represent the Vts  theory as it is set out in Vasubandhus Refutation. Claus Oetke, in Ich und das Ich (Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Stuttgart: 1988), presents a summary of Vasubandhus Refutation and a close analysis of his own reductionist theory of a putryas persons, but he does not carefully analyze Vasubandhus critique of the Vts  theory of persons. 3 Among the Indian Buddhist schools, only the Mdhyamikas deny that we possess a an existence apart from beign perceived or conceived. 4 Vasubandhu often uses is not other than in place of is the same as, thereby a putr creating the impression that the Vts yas theory violates a law of logic. That the theory does not in fact violate a law of logic I shall argue below. 5 Here and elsewhere when I use conceived by itself I mean conceived to be an entity of a certain sort. Similarly, an object of a concept is assumed to be an object conceived to be an entity of a certain sort, and to form a concept is assumed to be to conceive an object to be an entity of a certain sort. 6 We need not enumerate and explain the very complicated theory of the aggregates laid out in the Treasury in order to reconstruct and assess Vasubandhus philosophical a putryas theory of persons. objections to the Vts  7 Alternatively, inexplicable phenomena may be dened as those which are neither real in the way a substance is nor real in the way a mental construction is, or as those which are neither ultimate realities nor deceptive conventional realities. See below. 8 Yaomitra, in his commentary on the Refutation, makes it clear that the Trthika s a s . opponents Vasubandhu has in mind are primarily the Nyya-Vaiesikas. 9 A more detailed exposition of Vasubandhus argument can be found in James Duerlinger, Reductionist and Nonreductionist Theories of Persons in Indian Buddhist Philosophy. in Journal of Indian Philosophy (21: 79101), 1993. 10 Here and elsewhere I shall use the neuter pronoun and its correlates to refer to a person, since the gender of the phenomena to which we apply I is irrelevant to its analysis.

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~ Dravyasat and prajnaptisat are difcult terms to translate, an indication of which is the many different ways in which they have been translated. Part of the difculty is that their meanings are differently construed by different Indian Buddhist philosophers. I have chosen translations which I believe convey the sense they have for Vasubandhu. 12 In my translations of passages from the Refutation I place in brackets words, phrases, or sentences which I believe will help the reader to grasp unexpressed parts of theses and arguments presented in the text. So the reader can distinguish what Vasubandhu actually says from what I add in an effort to make it clearer, I have translated the text so that it can be read either with or without these additions. To make grammatical sense of the unembellished translation the reader needs to disregard punctuations required for the readability of the expanded translation. 13 In verse 4 of Bk. VI of the Treasury and in his commentary on the verse a. Vasubandhu presents, with approval, the Vaibhsika accounts of these two realities. The accounts are operational denitions in which we are given the means by which to determine whether a phenomenon known to exist is a deceptive conventional reality or an ultimate reality. A deceptive conventional reality is dened as a phenomenon which is no longer conceived if it is taken apart physically or is mentally analyzed into constituent parts and brought to consciousness in that form. An ultimate reality is dened as a phenomenon which continues to be conceived if it is been taken apart phycically or is mentally analyzed into constituent parts and brought to consciousness in that form, 14 See note 4. 15 See Conze, op. cit., p. 125. 16 We attribute to ourselves not only the possession of sense organs and mental states, but also physical properties such as height, weight, color, odor, etc. We need    not, as Stcherbatsky and Poussin do, take adhyatmikan in the technical sense of internal or subjective. 17 This claim is, among the Indian Buddhist schools, peculiar to the Vts  a putryas. 18 We must distinguish the effect produced by the false view of self from the effect produced by the false view of the aggregates. By reason of accepting as true our a putryas seem to appearance of being permanent and partless substances, the Vts  believe, we continue to appropriate our aggregates, and by reason of appropriating our aggregates, the continuum of our aggregates is perpetuated from one lifetime to the next. 19 We need not suppose, with Poussin, that the Vts yas deny that past and a putr future phenomena exist. 20  . Abhidharmakosabhasya, I, 12ab. 21 Ibid., I, 12d. 22 See Stcherbatskys The Central Conception of Buddhism (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi: 1970), p. 13. 23 Stcherbatsky and Poussin in fact attribute this account to the Vts  a putryas. I s follow Yaomitra in attributing it to Vasubandhu. 24 Dutt claims (op. cit., p. 185) that the Vts  a putryas believe that persons cease to exist when the continuum of their aggregates ceases to exist, but no such view is expressed in the Refutation itself. 25 This view is later deemed contradictory by the Buddhist philosophers of the a Mdhyamika school. 26 The standard Indian Buddhist example of this principle is that a knife cannot cut itself. 27 See Conze (op. cit., pp. 125126).