Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Maritime and Naval Science and Engineering

Too much self confidence - a high contributing human factor in maritime accidents
Lecturer Ph.D. ALINA LUCIA BOSTINA Department of Navigation Constantza Maritime University Mircea cel Batrin street no.104 ROMANIA alina_bostina@yahoo.com
Abstract: - Is definitely good to have your knowledge. Ideally you can successfully apply experience gained over time correlated with good theoretical background knowledge. But sometimes, factors involved third parties which you can remove their own theories. A second, a decision can change everything: credibility, career and sometimes even life. Incorrect attitudes are suspected to have contributed to many of the major accidents. Key-Words: attitude, decision, limited conditions, human error, collision

1. Introduction
Various statistics show, in shipping, when vessel comes to grounding, 71% of accident is caused by management errors, and only 10% of lack of skills.

What is an attitude ? What is a behaviour ? Are these terms representing the same thing? Of course not. Attitude: It is a way of thinking about somebody or something. Behaviour: Your behaviour towards somebody or something depends on your attitudes.

100 90 80 70

Technology, equipment
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

A decision making and action in a certain situation depends on attitude. Incorrect attitudes can lead to a wrong decision making and consequently occurrence of accidents.

Human performance Organisation

Fig.1 Trends in attributed accident causes (by The Swedish Club) Fig.2 Negative attitude = negative &hazardous thoughts

ISSN: 1792-4707

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ISBN: 978-960-474-222-6

Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Maritime and Naval Science and Engineering

To improve safety it is needed to take into account the Human factor. Contributing Human factors in accidents: Lack of communication Excess fatigue Too much self confidence Lack of motivation/ money Loss of situation awareness Lack of teamwork Not challenged decisions/ mistakes Not complying with rules Complacency Risk assessment Leadership

And five years later, on April 14th 1912, the Olympic Class passenger liner, owned by British shipping company White Star Line, RMS Titanic sank with a loss of 1500 lives..... one of which was the Master, Captain E. J. Smith.

2. Such experiences old and current

About Titanic have been written a lot. Do we know exactly why did occur this accident? What was the main factor? See bellow a statement from a presentation by E. J. Smith in 1907: Of course there have been winter gales and storms and fog and the like in the forty years I have been on the seas, but I have never been in an accident worth speaking of. In all my years at sea I have seen but one vessel in distress. I never saw a wreck. I have never been wrecked. I have never been in a predicament that threatened to end in disaster of any sort.

Titanic sinking
The master was one of the best and experienced of those years. He knew the danger of sailing area. He also received warnings from other vessel about presence of icebergs. Too much self confidence on this? An incorrect attitude? May be he thought: It wont happen to me. I can do it! Do something quickly to get the Blue Ribbon. Obviously it seems so! Sometimes the best people make the worst mistakes.

Back to our days

On March 08th 2010 in Port of Constanta Sud Agigea a Very Large Container Ship (VLCS) in lenght of 299 meters during her departure maneuver, collided with a assisting tug and a bulk carrier alongside. The conditions at the sailing time were the following: - NEly wind 35 kts in squall; - Moderate visibility, slight snowing; - Shallow waters in the basin (less than 5 meters Under Keel Clearance); - Narrow turning area (400 meters); - 3 tugs used for maneuvring (approx. bollard pull: 1 x 30 t, 2 x 22 t);

Cpt. E.J.Smith

12,6 meters deepest draft.

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Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Maritime and Naval Science and Engineering

3. Interaction of the effects

Effect of wind force on maneuvering self explanatory in the bellow drawing:

Length 280 m, Freeboard 25 m, Total Area = (280x25) = 7000 sq metres If we know the predicted wind speed for the intended movement it is now possible to establish a rough idea as to the force in tonnes that the ship is likely to experience.

Example: Wind speed = 30 knots Wind speed in metres per second (V): knots/2 = 30/2 = 15 m/s Wind force in Tonnes per 1000 sq. m: V2/18 = 2 15 /18 = 225/18 =12.5t/sq.m

Total Wind Force 12.5 x 7 = 88 tonnes

Fig.3 Effect of wind force Magnitude and direction of the wind force depends on the relative wind direction. Pivot Point is pushed forward if wind blows from fwd sector and is pushed aft if the wind blows abaft the beam. Fig.4 Container ship Shallow Water effect experienced when Under Keel Clearance (UKC) is less then the draft itself. Turn sometimes 2 times larger than in deep water! Rudder Force is less effective, Pivot Point is pushed aft, rudder/steering lever is reduced. Ship lists to the side opposite of the rudder, sinks at that side (draft increase!) Tug Bollard Pull versus Wind Force It is important to have a broad idea as to what wind force in tonnes is being exerted upon the ship, in comparison to the total bollard pull which is available from the tugs. This can help, for example, in establishing the wind limits for certain vessels. With an approximate knowledge of the ship's length overall and freeboard, plus the length and height of the superstructure, including any deck cargo such as containers, it is possible to calculate roughly how many square metres of area the ship is presenting to a beam wind. The container ship in fig.4, for example, has the following approximate overall dimensions and area of windage: To hold this ship steady with a beam wind of 30 knots would require, at the very least, a combination of tugs that offer a total bollard pull of at least 88 tonnes. However, it must also be remembered that the wind force varies as the square of the wind speed, and a gusty wind, or squall, may take the wind force well beyond that of the tugs, thereby placing considerable strain on the tug's wires. This particular ship would, for example, experience the following increases in wind force if the wind gusts to: 35 knots - 119 t 40 knots - 156 t

With an approximate knowledge of the wind force and knowing the type and size of tugs to be used, it is now possible to take a closer look at a movement involving several tugs. The master experienced and well trained in shiphandling simulator decided to un-berth the vessel knowing all the existing conditions: weather and basin

ISSN: 1792-4707

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ISBN: 978-960-474-222-6

Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Maritime and Naval Science and Engineering

limits. In the bellow drawing sequences of ships manoeuvre.

Fig. 6 b Collision of vessels

4. Conclusion
Fig.5 Ships manoeuvre The shallow water and the pivot point pushed forward due the strong wind made very difficult to turn safe the vessel requiring more time and more space of stern. The bollard pull of the tugs were not enough to hold the vessel in the basin and she drifted southerly, hitting one vessel alongside and colliding with one of the tug. Could this accident be prevented? It was a cumulative of factors: weather conditions, ports limits, infrastructure, services & management, but what was the main factor? For sure it was a wrong decision of the Master. He should hold the vessel alongside and wait until the weather conditions are proper for safe maneuvring. Why a wrong decision making? An incorrect attitude? Too much self confidence? May be the Master thought: It wont happen to me. I can do it! Do something quickly to maintain the ships schedule Obviously it seems so!

References: [1] *** - Maritime Resource Management 2009 The Swedish Club. [2] *** - Ship-Handling Training Course 2009 ENMM Simulator. [3] http://www.shipsandoil.com/ [4] -Own sources Fig.6 a Collision of vessels

ISSN: 1792-4707

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ISBN: 978-960-474-222-6