Philosophical Review

Nietzsche's Contribution to the Theory of Language Author(s): Roger Hazelton Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Jan., 1943), pp. 47-60 Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2180560 . Accessed: 14/01/2011 03:12
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that the problemof language has begun to receivethe which sustainedand systematic attention fromphilosophers it deserves, becomesespeciallyinteresting reviewthethinking it to to some contributions of earlier men with an eye to discovering this criticalmatter.Not infrequently new perspectiveupon a a its familiarphilosophicallandscape has the meritof rearranging essentialdata, and occasionallythe still greateradvantage of realways vealingnew connections between them.There is, moreover, the possibility positivebenethatsuch re-examination may afford of fitby way of insight thinkers the intothe problemconfronting present. to Among those who have such a contribution make to the presentdiscussionof theproblem language,FriedrichNietzsche of is preeminent. was not only himselfa scholar and teacherin He the fieldof classical philology;he was a consciousliterary artist, far more tellingly of aware than manyof his fellow-thinkers the power and purposesof the written and spokenword. More than these,he was throughout active life concernedwith language his explicitly a philosophicalproblem,so much so that this probas lem may justly be called one of the major areas in which his thinking moved. The importanceof Nietzsche's commentson the problem of statement languagedoes notconsist, is true,either a systematic it in of theproblem in a cogentdeclaration its solution.These are or of which is not the sort of benefits conferred a typeof thinking by or suggestive and evocativeratherthan systematic declarative.It and estimatconsistsrather, we shallattempt show,in locating as to ing a certaintensionwithinlanguage itself.Nietzsche'sthinking on this subject may conveniently traced in termsof its actual be development;followingthis we may attemptto relate his stateand more mentsabout language to otheraspects of his thought, to about languageis consistently particularly show how his theory we relatedto his own use of it; and finally may seek to evaluate * Expandedfrom paperreadbefore Western Division, The American a the Philosophical Association, April25, I94I.

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his contribution from the standpointof present philosophical controversy the field,with the hope that our studymay yield in some clarification contemporary of issues. I In hisearlierwritings Nietzschestillspeaksas a scholarunderthe and Ritschl, influence such academicphilologists Burckhardt of as doctrines of thoughthe influence the metaphysical of and esthetic in is Schopenhauer prominent. is primarily He interested theproblem of the originsof language,whichhe approachesby discussing to the relations betweenlanguageand music.According himmusic as is, so to speak, a "universallanguage", functioning a "cosmic conrelationto the primordial symbolism". "stands in symbolic It Unity, tradiction primordial and pain in theheartof theprimordial and therefore symbolizesa spherewhich is above all appearance and beyondall phenomena".Music is the "language of the Will", whichlanguage in the verbal sense strainsto imitatebut "cannot at all disclose".' This is clearly Schopenhauerover again, and with which makes no sense apart fromthe thought-background he providedNietzsche. by The meaningof such statements further is clarified the distinction Nietzschemakes betweenthe originof music and its object. The objectof musicis theWill or "Nature in its mostgeneral lying form"; its origin,however,is not the Will but "something all individuation"2 which is unfathomable. therefore He beyond rejects all efforts trace the originof music to more specialized to phenomenasuch as feelings,images or ideas. A musician who writes a melody for a poem, for example, is not moved by the coming images or emotionsin the poem; "a musical inspiration fromquite a different as source chooses for itselfthatsong-text" and ideas, Tones can producemetaphors its allegoricalexpression. but thesecannotproducetones.Nor can feelings such as love, fear and hope be portrayed, only evoked,by music. The function but of these feelings,like that of metaphorsand ideas, is ratherto the symbolize music.3 of Tones, The symbolism music,then,is a primary symbolism.
2

'Complete Works (Eng. tr.,edit.Levy) I I2I, 55, i26. ibid. 11 35, 36. 'Ibid. II 37,34.

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realmof emodo as its components, notdependon thephenomenal tions,imagesor ideas,and stillless upon words.They are original, and "cosmic", both independent all such phenomenalcontent, of in theiroriginand theirobject. on Linguistic symbolism, the other hand, is secondary.Even illustrates lyricpoetry, whichis mostsimilarto music in its form, this dependenceof word upon tone. The "only possible relation", Nietzschetells us, of the poeticword,image or conceptis one of of dependenceupon the "absolute sovereignty music", and this contactachieved throughimitadependenceis one of superficial tion ratherthan being essentiallyrelated to it by revelationor Unlike music,language dependson picturesand genuineinsight.4 them. to conceptsand the like, arising in the effort communicate It owes a curious dual allegiance,to its source in tone and to its objects in the phenomenalrealm. Hence there arises a basic inand even tensionwithinlanguage itself.This stability, ambiguity of in tensionNietzschefindsillustrated the history the formation of the Greek language, as its two main currents:language may seek to imitate"eitherthe world of phenomenaand of pictures, or the world of music".5 explored in termsof the familiar This tensionis still further contrastbetweenthe Apollonian and the Dionysian. Underlying responses all discourseis a "tonal subsoil"of organicpleasure-pain however indi(Lust- und Unlust-Grade) which does symbolize, to rectly and weakly,theWill common all menand to theuniverse. This is expressedin the tone of the speaker,whichis a not-to-befactorin his verbalexpression.On thisas a foundation forgotten develops the more arbitraryand wholly phenomenal "gesturewhich includesall those alterations physicalposiof symbolism", vowels and consonants well as tionwithinthe organismproducing and other as the more obvious muscular,manual, respiratory, This lattergesture-symbolismbut is changesof thetotalorganism. "a strophictext to that primal melodyof the pleasure and displeasure-language.
. .

. As our whole corporeality stands in rela--

the tion to that originalphenomenon, Will, so the word built up out of its consonantsand vowels stands in relationto its tonal the basis."6 In Nietzscheanterms, tonal subsoilof all speech is its
' Ibid. I 52, 55. "Ibid. I 52. 'Ibid. II 3Y.

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Dionysianorigin, rootedin theWill as thedeep,innermost "primal with cause" commonto all living things; the gesture-symbolism, its gradual proliferation into the confusingmultiplicity arbiand trariness languages,is Apollonian,for it seeks to communicate of the clearerbutmoresuperficial realmof feelings, ideas and images whichare its objectivereferents. The secondarysymbolism that is language may thus be consideredeitheras representational imitative and with respectto its objects, or as expressiveand evocativewith respectto its origin. This tensionbetweenmetaphysical originand phenomenal objects gives rise in turnto the diversity functioning of withinlanguage itself. Turning in the writingsof his middle period more especially towarda discussionof the functions language,Nietzschetakes of up the important notionsof consciousness and communication. In and doing so he forsakesin part the Schopenhauerian framework makes some new and distinctive contributions social thinking. to In Die frahlicheWissenschaft developswithsome care the idea he that consciousness,far frombeing purely individual,is actually "only a connecting network betweenman and man" whichgrows up "under the pressureof the necessityfor communication". A is of theart and powerof communication acquired "where surplus necessity and need have long compelledmen to communicate with their fellows and understandone another rapidly and subtly".7 features of this view are the Brieflyput, the two noteworthy renderingof consciousnessin social terms,which antedatesthe workof Mead and others, and theimportant idea thatcommunicathe tionby verbalexchangeof signs precedesand even conditions in growthof consciousness the individual.The forceat workhere is productiveof both consciousness and communication what Nietzsche calls "social utility". Language, functioning themedium communication as of between consciousbeings,can properlycommunicate only the contentsof consciousness.And since consciousnessis finely developed "only in relationto communaland gregariousutility"language necesand symbolic sarily findsits proper sphere to be "a superficial and vulgarizedworld".8 world,a generalized
I

Ibid. X 297.

8 Ibid. X

298-9.

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peoples language has a more vital function. Among primitive Since among themstrongfeelingscomprisethe true provinceof of becomes the correcting feelingthrough language, its function develops,Nietzscheholds, As civilization its being communicated. language strainsmore and more to expressthe reverseof feeling, its losing thereby power to meet the real needs namely thought, its over theiractionsand in time of menwhile increasing tyranny so even theirfeelings, thatmen becomethe "slaves of words"., This contrastbetweenthoughtand feeling,which may reveal in Nietzsche'sRomantic bias, assumesgreatimportance his discussion. According to him, every thought,idea, concept, is the and simand hence is "obscurer,emptier "shadow" of a feeling, pler" than the feelingto whichit is thus related.It is not even a and "even good shadow,for "passions do not speak in sentences", in we our thoughts are unable to rendercompletely words".10If of civilized language is thus inadequate to the communication how much greateris the estheticviolenceaccompanying thought, of communication feelings!Nietzscheexpresses his its attempted of doubtthatit can be the function such languageto communicate feelingsat all, for,as he pointsout, "all simplemen are ashamed ",1 to seek for words to express their deeper feelings a shame which is denied to poets and rhetoricians(under which latter group he also seems to include philosophers).The resultof this situationis that
arms becomea forcein itselfwhichwith spectral languagehas gradually coerces and driveshumanity where it least wants to go. As soon as they would fain understand one anotherand unite for a commoncause, the and crazinessof modernconcepts, even of the ringof modernwords,lays withone another to hold of them.The resultof thisinability communicate is thateveryproduct theircooperative actionbears the stampof discord, of not onlybecause it fails to meettheirreal needs,but because of the very of wordsand notions....' emptiness thoseall-powerful

and language is revealed betweenthought This naturalaffinity in still other ways. There is the fact that,althoughwords, like ideas, are assumed in practicallife to express charactersof the of theyactuallyexpress only relations thingsto whichtheyrefer, thesethingsto the speakerand hearer.A word is "the expression
12Ibid.

IlIbid. IV IV

I34. I33.

10 Ibid. IV I76; X

204.

'1

Ibid. VII 57-8.

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in of a nerve-stimulus sounds". To say "the stoneis hard" characto of terizesnotthestonebuttherelation thisstimulus its assumed source. Again, the same words, like the same ideas, have to fit cases whichare only more or less similarin certain innumerable arbitrarilyisolated respects. Anticipatinga dogma of General Semantics,Nietzschewrites,"the unityof theword is no security is like a wordmaker, one for the unityof the thing".'3A thinker, than they are"." who "knows how to take thingsmore simply thoughts: wordseven condition Furthermore,
with those words which lie nearestto We always express our thoughts we at if hand. Or rather, I may reveal my full suspicion, everymoment in for thought thewordsthatare present our minds.1' haveonlytheparticular

and an idea is "the residuum Once again, words are metaphors, processof "equating in the linguistic originating of a metaphor","6 the unequal":
presume, as Everywordbecomesat once an idea not by having, one might but happening once and experience for to serve as a reminder the original to individualized, which experiencesuch word owes its origin, absolutely more or less similar to no, but by having simultaneously fitinnumerable, unequal) cases." altogether (whichreallymeansneverequal,therefore

of is Thus it is thatlanguage in its development "the history a recurring in of abbreviation" which the more frequently process sensationsand groups of sensationsget the upper hand over the rarerones. Since the having of average and commonexperiences itselfbecomes incommunication is afterall most communicable, of creasinglyindependent those deeper feelingswhich it cannot adequatelytranslateinto speech, so that in time the relationbethe functionof language tween speaker and hearer determines The esthetic word and thing. between relation moresurelythanthe and language in its consideration gives way to the utilitarian, falsification, bringswithit "a greatradicalperversion, development and superficialization generalization".'18 the The historyof language is therefore historyof a function as(the arousal of commonfeelings) and a function forgotten of sumed (the communication commonideas). As an instrument it and clarification loses its real power in conceptualformulation
13

Ibid. VI 6Ibid. II

27. i82.

14 Ibid. X I94. "7 Ibid. II I79.

"3Ibid. IX 247. "8Ibid. XII 243; X 298.

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to evoke feelingand spur action. In namingwhat is commonit Its also makes commonwhat is at bottomuncommon. Apollonian over theDionysian; demandsof social utility aspecthas triumphed its wrenchit from organicmatrixand its dimmetaphysical origins; it becomes a coercive and tyrannicalforce,perhaps "the most potent of all forces which have hithertooperated upon mankind".'9

In his later writingsNietzsche became preoccupiedwith the questionof thetruth-value language.We mustbe preparedhere, of as elsewherein the studyof Nietzsche,for the shock of internal contradiction overstatement; the presenceof these habits and but of expressionshould keep us fromadoptingan oversimple view of his conclusions. He has been labelled both naturalistand Romantic; yet a careful readingmakes eitherof such simplified to positionsdifficult sustainin his case. There are of course many passages emphasizing naturalistic a evaluationof language.He consistently regardsit as conventional, and presumptive(vermeintlich).So for example he arbitrary, reduced the philosophicaldistinction betweensubject and object to "no more than semiotics".20 say as he does thatlanguage is To and through leads to the honestconclusion through metaphorical to that words never correspond things:
different Betweentwo utterly spheres, between as subjectand object,there is no causality, accuracy, expression, at most . . . a suggestive no no but a metamorphosis, stammering translation . . for whichpurposehowever . thereis neededat any rate an intermediate sphere, intermediate an force, freely composing and freely inventing.'

This sphere and forceis language. Men suppose that when they have put down a word theyhave made a discovery, theyhave but only come upon a problem,and instead of solving it theyhave thereby a new obstaclein the way of its solution.22 words put The a we use are masks for preconceived judgments23 reflecting "hidden philosophicalmythology" grammaris but "popular meta;24 physics".25 The "tremendouserror" of correspondence between word and thing26 infectslanguage,as in fact it infectsmorality,
22

25Ibid. X 300.

"9Ibid.XII 243. Ibid. IX 53.

26Ibid. VI

' Ibid. XV ii8. 'Ibid. VII 225.

2I-2.

2'Ibid. II 184. 24Ibid. VII i92.

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else in the "all-toologic, mathematics, and indeed everything human" realm. particularly the fragmentary in Yet also in theselater writings, philoDer Wille zur Macht whichwas to have been his complete thereis an evidentstressupon languageas an sophical statement, of interpretive functioning the Will to Power which seriously repudiate, scepticalevaluation his qualifies, it does not altogether if of language. For example,thereis this declaration:
has (an The Will to Power interprets organin processof formation to be of gradations, differences power. interpreted) it defines,it determines : of Mere differences power could not be aware of each other as such: all must be therewhichwill grow,and whichinterprets other something thatwould do the same,according the value of the latter. . . all to things is interpretation buta means in itselfto becomethe masterof something. of is principle the organicprocess.)27 (Continual interpretation the first

This passage clearlymarks a returnto Nietzsche's earlier insistence upon the origin of language in organic responsiveness. in of of More thanthis,it suggestsa definition truth terms esthetic rather of thanas representation an alreadyexisting expressiveness reality.By and large, Nietzsche discussed the language-problem context. in termsof the estheticratherthan the epistemological Recognition this factmakes it apparentthatthoughhe did not of idealist,he have the implicit trustin language of the rationalistic even while arraigning as it did nevertheless regardit as creative, imitative and representational. This leaves us with conventional, to and whichwe whichwe mustattempt clarify, a basic opposition of as can do onlyin termsof the widercontexts his thought, these about language. and were affected the statements affected by II W. M. Urban holds thatthewholestoryof Westernphilosophy may be describedin termsof the high or low evaluationof language.28 Grantingfor presentpurposesthatthis is true,in which camp does Nietzsche belong? The answer to this question can come onlyaftertheproblemof language has been studiedin relaof tion to othermain currents his thought. an interesting suggestionthat Nietzsche's It is, for example,
2"Ibid.XV
I24.

28 Languageand Reality 23.

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and was reachedlargelywiththe epistemological ethicalscepticism aid of his denial of correspondence betweenwords and things.A late epigramhintsat this connection:"I am noughtbut a wordmaker. What matterwords? What matterI?" At any rate, the of the upshotof his lineof thought regarding functioning language is not as conditioned social utility a thoroughgoing by scepticism of onlyas to the truth-value language but as to "truth"itself.He asks:
anWhat therefore truth?A noble army of metaphors, is metonymies, in a which becomepoeticalthropomorphisms: short sumof humanrelations ly and rhetorically intensified, metamorphosed, adorned, and after long canonicand binding;truths are illusionsof usage seem to a nationfixed, that theyare illusions.' whichone has forgotten

This is not said in disparagement metaphysical moral of or "truths"on behalf of science, for scientific "truths"are in the same case:
of The mechanicalconceptof "movement" already a translation the is originalprocess into the language of symbolsof the eye and touch.The between"the seat of the motiveforceand concept"atom",the distinction is the force itself"', a language of symbols derivedfromour logical and psychological world.30

With these and similar passages as proof-texts, Vaihinger claimed Nietzscheas an exponentof the "useful fiction'".31 be To sure, Nietzsche recognizedthe fictional characterof all human in even criticizing a way quite novel forhis day,and formulations, anticipating views of an Eddington, conceptsof scienceas the the Der Wille zur merely symbolic. in thelightof thepassage from Yet Macht already quoted, and in that of all the passages where the of esthetictreatment language is to the fore,it is clear that for Nietzschethe "impulseto metaphor", "myth-making the instinct", is whichunderliesall such activity creativein the esthetic, rather in sense. It belongsto the natureof than inventive the utilitarian, of organicbeing as such. Even man's supposition objects and the externalworldexpressesat the level of humanconsciousness such estheticcreativity. This capacity,which seems to a fundamental of Vaihinger simply the "conscious, intentionalencouragement
29Complete WorksII i8o.
31

'Ibid. VI 2I-2. The Philosophy 'As If' (Eng. tr.) 34I-62. of Hans Vaihinger,

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illusion"32 seems to be betterunderstoodas the strivingof the Will to Power, Nietzsche'sexpressionfor the basic metaphysical reality. Returning to the question of epistemologicalscepticism,on it can whichbasis alone sucha fictionalism have meaning, is worth in thathuman formulations morals,art, science,or remembering only on the basis of a possible correpractical life, are fictional spondencebetweenword and thing,subjectiveconceptand objecdenies; Nietzscheclearlyand repeatedly tive fact.This supposition of yethis interpreters Vaihinger'spersuasionhave been singularly withlife,thenerror unaware of his denial. If erroris coextensive meaning.And if there is no ceases to have genuine connotative betweentrue and false, or of the subject and essentialantithesis thentheverynotionof correspondence, objecton whichit depends, whichalone can give rise to the doctrineof language as fictional, as loses its logical or or for thatmatter representational imitative, foundation. he Nietzschegoes further thanto denycorrespondence; assumes quite as "presumptive" Now thisis obviously non-correspondence. in which he denies. His scepticism, as to assume correspondence, his so far as it affects theoryof language, is possible only on a of as basis whichhis earlystatements to the dependence linguistic of as upon cosmicsymbolism, well as his late enunciation the Will clearlydeny. The fact that the expresto Power as interpretive, aspects of lansive-evocativeand the imitative-communicative of by unity thought resolvedintoa systematic guage are not finally Nietzschemay indeed permitthe accusationof a certaininternal but does not justifya hasty verdictof inconsistency, it certainly fictionalism scepticismagainst him. In the lightof the whole or and it development bearingof his thought seemsthemoreadequate to view, as we have already maintained, regard these aspects as elements a fundamental of tensionwithinlanguage itself. is of Our contention borne out by a consideration Nietzsche's he his use of words. Not infrequently tries to communicate own of meaningby patientanalysis of termsand repetition proposiSo, to tions.He wants,a bit desperately, be understood. forexama of ple, ho attempts refutation Locke's theoryof the origin of ' Vaihinger, cit.342. op.

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ideas, by introducing words as the middle stage betweenimages and concepts("sensation and reflection", Locke's terminology) in and by tracingperception back to the more fundamental stage of He feeling.33 is quite competent join philosophical issues with to of full recognition the importance logical precisionand verbal of clarity. mustbe admitted, It however, thatthis striving aftercomis municative to clarity on thewholeless integral Nietzsche'sintention than thatafterexpressiveadequacy. He tells us in one place thathe writes"to get rid of his thoughts", because he must.Again he confesses that the words he uses are masks with which he fishesfor likeminded excitedpilingup of spirits.The breathless, whichare so characterand the staccatosuggestiveness metaphors isticof his stylecan onlybe interpreted the lightof the expresin of sive-evocative function language.At thisuse of wordsNietzsche a was undoubtedly master.He looked at themwith the eye of an artist:
I dearlylove the livingword, That fliesto you like a merrybird A dead word is a hateful thing, A barren,rattling ting-a-ling.34

More than this,he tells us that he distrusts systemmaking, even his own: it is too narrow,too cramping, the ceaseless variety for and fluxof life. But Nietzschedoes not set theseaspects up as antitheses alone. Though language as a means of communication only describe can relations(what we would call syntactic semantic and functioning), its rootagein feelingimpelsit, with whateverviolencenecessary, to express and evoke what we would call emotiveor "pragmatic" meaning.The dual functioning nota matter wordchoosing of is or but phrasemaking, goes back to thebasic difference alreadypointed out betweenthe tone in which words are uttered and the accompanyinggestures.Hence the "living word" is the spoken word, and this in turnis both feelingbecome articulateand idea symis the bolized.And, since thought at bottom crystallization feelof is ing, the emotive-pragmatic functioning even present,although withinit. Language therefore neither can dimly, escape thepull of its origin in feelingnor avoid the necessity characterizing of its
3

CompleteWorksXII 29; XV 25.

84Ibid. XVII i65.

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objects in termsof thought. Thus practiceand theory one illumine anotherin Nietzsche'sphilosophizing. A markedlove of paradox and antithesis anotherfeatureof is Nietzsche'swriting whichbears out his notionof linguistic tension. One of the main reasons for his persistently beingmisunderstood lies here.When, for instance, his zeal to combatthe effects a in of particularmorality(e.g., Judaeo-Christian morality) he adopts the term"antimoral"as descriptive his own stand,he lays himof His self open to seriousmisunderstanding. enthusiasm putting for revealsan artistic for unconcern unequivocalstatethingsstrongly ment.Yet here as always he is selfcritical: "Antithesis the naris row gate through whicherroris fondest sneaking thetruth."35 of to The blame is partlywithlanguageitself, whichtalks "of opposites wherethereare onlydegreesand manyrefinements gradation".36 of Few thinkers have been as definitely aware as Nietzsche of the difficulties ambiguitiesattendantupon the very use of lanand guage; the problemof languagewas forhim a verypractical, and by no means merelya theoretical, one, and it arises in just this tensionbetweenexpressiveadequacy and representational clarity to which his earliestreflections the point.The one is an esthetic, othera logical,task; both he consideredintegralto his lifework, of the revaluation formerly acceptedvalues. It will readilybe seen that his use of language is entirelyconsistentwith his theory about it. The centraland insistent problemfor contemporary theoryof language is the relationof language to reality.The discussionof this problemhas proceededlargelyon the basis of exclusive and divisivepostulates.Nietzsche'sthinking bears a definite relationto and logical positivism denying the viewpointof physicalism in to with its objects in the external language any workngconnection to world."Words relating values", he affirms, merely "are banners plantedon thosespotswherea new blessedness was discovered-a There is no structured new feeling."37 of hierarchy goods to which an words bear a revelatory, almost perceptual,relationship. But Nietzschemay be claimed as a supporterof this view's though denials he cannotbe supposedto agree in its affirmations. does He
35Ibid. VI I79.
36

Ibid. XII 35.

" Ibid. XV

i82.

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not sharethe faithof thelogicalpositivist logical structures, in nor does he accept verification "pointing".His scepticism more by is radical.At the same timehis affirmations contradictory this are to whole position.It is not sciencebut music whichis the "universal language". Furthermore,although value-termsmark only the presenceof feelings, the feelingsthemselves have what can only be called a kind of truth, virtueof theirexpressiveness the by of Will to Power, the Nietzscheanultimatereality. We can thus utilize Nietzsche's theory to disparage logical positivism quite as muchas to supportit. Far fromdenying truth he truthof the feelings. to the language of the emotions, affirms Fundamentallyand seriously,for Nietzsche it is just feelings which are true. And the more sensitively words can capturethe states of feelingin which theyarise (even scientific description of beinga striving theWill to Power), themoretruetheybecome. Of course we are not to understand absolutisticin his anything in notionof truth;Nietzschewas the enemyof finality any form. But in spite of his radical scepticism came back in his latest he writingsto a theoryof language which is frankly metaphysical. In so far as language is expressiveand evocativeit is concerned and feelingsare the organicgradationsof the Will with feelings, to Power withinlivingthings. This way of thinking about language can be betterunderstood if we relate it ratherto the development exemplified Bergson by and Whitehead.Nietzschewas, like them, acutelyconsciousof the and natureof the linguistic stultifying simplifying process. Like them,he gave feelinga real status in the nature of things.He which would have eagerlyagreedwithWhiteheadthatany doctrine the autonomy physicalscience is not unof does not presuppose of intelligible.38 Positively, Whitehead'scharacterization life as a absolute individual selfenjoyment, process embodying creativity, of and aim, sounds almost like a description Nietzsche's Will to Nietzschewould likewisehave acceptedthe doctrine cenPower.39 that"the notionof mereknowof tralto thephilosophy organism The basis of experienceis emoledge is a high abstraction....
tional".40

" A. N. Whitehead, Natureand Life 6. 40Adventures Ideas 225-6. of

39 Ibid. 25-8.

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Viewed in thisway, Nietzsche'scontribution a theory lanto of guage assumes real and presentimportance. He stands athwart the gulf dividingthe "high" and "low" evaluationsof language. To thosenaturalists who acceptphysicalism thetruebasis foran as account of language his theoryoffers the soberingreflection that even physicalism an arbitrary is abstractionism, cognitionis for To basically emotional. those rationalists whose thinking implies, thoughit may not state,an implicittrustin the adequacy of language, it offersthe devastatingcriticismof a scepticismmore radical than that of their present adversaries. And since both groups continueto discuss the problemof language largelyin the context a sensationalistic idealisticepistemology, of or Nietzsche's a new context, to view offers them whichbothschoolshave hitherto ignored: the emotive-pragmatic functioning language considof eredin relation itstruth. to The notionof truth esthetic as adequacy which Nietzscheespoused opens up issues which lie quite outside theboundsof thispaper; but it is thisdoctrine whichis Nietzsche's chief bequest to contemporary discussion.When we add to these fact thatwhat for this discussionhave been mutually the further exclusive postulatesNietzschechose to regard as elementsof an is inherent tensionwithin the languageitself, possibility openedup a thattheeither-or disjunction may yetfindits place within "bothof and" framework thought.
ROGER HAZELTON
COLORADO COLLEGE