Process Safety Planning 2010

-----------
12 Jan 2010

bp
EXHIBIT# ;)9 / J
WIT: K Lacy
1
BP-HZN-2179MDL011 09076
EXHIBIT TREX-02919

--------------- -- --- - ---...,
Meeting Agenda
Safety Moment Albino
Objectives and context Steve and Neil
2009 Look- back C!ls1u
2010 Frame Steve
Asset M!l.llllger Expectations Doug and Jayne
Base Pr ocess SP.fet y Activi ty Plans Chris, Randall, DMny
Major Hazard Gap Cl osure Planning Steve
- Process Safety Incident Review Megan
Kext Steps and Close Steve nnd Neil
O
bp
2
BP-HZN-2179MDLO 1109077
2010 Objectives
Build on 2008/09 tools, processes, policy, etc
Minimize development of new tools
Tncrease front. 1 ine eng?gement
Utilize Continuous Imp1ovement methodology
Develop and agree 2010 themes
Form teruns to develop theme action plans

bp
0
3
BP-HZN-2179MDL011 09078

bp
0
2009 Process Safety Activities
Asset Process Snfoty support plans CPol icy conformnnce)
ETf> review and COllllllents
Risk register updates
Performance Management: scorocard, T2/3 KPis, incident tracking
RBI harmon i zEl Cr i sk assessruen
Lessons Lean1ed process
CI roll.out and training
RCFA trai ning
Process safety incident data trending and CI recommendations
Asset specific support MOC risk assessment, hazard studies, etc
Hazard and Risk lhaluation plan dcvelopllent
ORl
Hazard H.unt checklist
Others.
How can we use these tool s and processes to advance process
safety in 2010?
4
BP-HZN-2179MDL011 09079
------ -- ---;
0
Process Safety and Risk Activities j
I
j
'
'"'
.. . .
'"
' h . . . . .............. . .. ..... .. .. . .........
TYl>O or Act!vltio< 2011> Unsti AetlvJtJet:t
&:.c Act! viti""
Y.OC risk
(Yunr on Yonr)
f.t1?;,,rd Md Hiok Bva.lul'ltiW\ Plant)! fuzld, J.OPh, Oi'&'. ote)
thtt
F.:s;:;atnt lu.l:J RlHk r&gi st.or l.lpclatut. ll!')d mttign:Jon pln.n tlove) (){>fler. t.
I JOS t he
R l' k Y.orm.J:(>nttont Pol icy updn.tao$ :nnd conf<ltlnt\nco
F.ngln.or1ne 110d MI'!T"fno 'RPI'>Ol"'t.A
Por.t'ot1c-oncc :.;corota.rd. Lior 3 Ill KP.l ' o,
lnsn KI'J'
QPR
lncldcnt Jnvotl,;ntlon 111\d l o.ooM l urncd
Gon\.lru'l Su.r11Ly :sutJXJrl.
Cl otto utui ll {'/ndJnc::s
f>ruJcct.o/l'"ci(Talll:'l 2010 Jncrcnmtol hctivl Lies
I ill' RO'{Utl'JOont.>
1
Proouas SoJ:ot)' end onh!10C<:1rtcnt.:J nmf
I.II!S i!.'"ontiol s Riuk P.l.-ocotUI
GnJ" (201.0 I)
GOP 2. 1 ecmfOt"l!WU'Ico
lllla.ior IU.k
lliUir.\t ion
I
I I
' lr!1ruv 1s th"

I
I
5

BP-HZN-2179MDL011 09080

---- - --- ---------:---
A
v
Approach
Incremental Base Activities
For Base Improvement activities assign "owners" to drive consi stency across
SPU
Risk Management
- OPRA
HAZOP CoordinaLion
Define project owner role;
Chris
Randall
Danny
Coordinate across PSRE teem to ensure consistent usa of' tools, development
and del ivery of messages, simplify interface issues (OPRA).
- Tugged PSRE will remain first point of contact with assets.
6
BP-HZN-2179MDL011 09081

1----- -- --------------------- -----
Process Safety
20t0 Plan (Major Hazard Awareness)
Major Hazard A!t'areness OMS Cap
Improve llajor haz.ard awareness reduce both number and
severity of process safety incidents.
Problem Statement: As we have started to more deeply investigate process
safety incidents, it' s become apparent that process safety m<ljor hazards
and risks are not fully understood by engineering or line
personnel. Insufficient awareness i s leading to missed signals that
precede incidents, and resrxmse after incidents: both of which increases
tho potential for, and severity of, process safety related incidents.
Pilot Assets
- Atlantis <Lon Lowe)
- Ho 1 si:ei n (Rick Oneto)
7
BP-HZN-2179MDL011 09082

Process Safety
2010 Plan (Major Hazard Awareness)
Description: A good deal of has been put on develolll!lent of process and t ools
through of the lll Staodru:d. llistoriu.lly BP has had a ohorp focus on
oocupationul Gafcty; wo no" neod n similnr focus oo Uno procoss
sufety baxard recognition. GoM process safety STPs and 1>rocessos hnvo boon
n)Jild ng llajnr llttznrd Ri MATS, bmrt: i ProtR.c.ti Overri rle
aml Byp!ISs Procedure. und the Risl< l.hlnugl!lllertt Policy. HowijVBr, the identification
Md liUU"'8CIRCUt of is rtot being podoraod consist ently well tl>roughout the
SPU.
Tite rol<> individuals' play to idont.if y llllMrds and m.aint:rin protective s:;steuiS is
not well uod'crstoo::t. Go!! has expcdenced e number of serious lllld potentially serious
.safety 'inciden;s as a result of insufficient identification and wmasement of
major hazard risks. This lack of hos led to:
Tbe distl.bling of protective devices,
Insufficient knowledge of thG importance of mnintalolng protective devices "nd
verifying their r eliability.
t:onsidoring loss of contaiMent incidonts ns minor environmonW events and
overlooking the potentlnlly serious process safety conse<t"nces,
Fa.iluro to vlbratl on DS a process safety threat and not just a roech<mical
reliabili.ty i<su.e,
Inappropriate eDJorgoncr response by individuals entering hazardous cnvironmonts to
protect equipment or 1111intain production.
InadeQuate undorstWJdilll! of vent nnd sysoom t:erfornaancs expoctntions; i. e.
design bosis for pressure relief valves.
TIe "Stop the Job" appr.Ollch is effcctiYo f.ur !ntorvltiug v;ith ovewtin{!' nnd
but i t is not used for intervenin& "to correct
oporatins conditions, in port staff do not fully l'<X)ognizo potential process
Human Factors?
bp
8
BP-HZN-2179MDL011 09083
1------------------ .. -----------------------,
Process Safety Incidents - GoM
2009 vs. 2008
GoM Procer.:& Saf6f.ylnaldents200B vr.: 2009
1S11D201l6 -2009 ' ToiI06 -T.,t.109
25
'B20
.;!.


:a 10
5
0
.bn Fob M3r Apr May Jun Jul Aug Stp Ott Nov Ooo
..... Col. A-D
"""'
& .. FII::It!itel 1:02Fftlllll OAA'IC
,.10Dm' &:JOkk)litl\$ ti0tlo6())1e
LOPC[Oml> ,.2DI)nm:l 20kt'20011Dd' 2\o:::OI.,d 0.2W2nlw:i
toooot. 10l100bbl 1tof0bbl 0.1t.'\.O'btl(
I.OPC J01Q00bel 1o:J-:o1000 bbl 110100bCII C;1to1.0bbl
180
140
1'20
100 >-
so
60 !
40 <.J
20
0
... w
<00 ..
'<O.ZrOf
-.0.1bbr
oiO., tlbl
4rr,t" &:ygrl ty lncldl.UlU
hLl.nll> - O<:L 8 (G)
,,0 Gill L')(lff ru W:<lll ralon.se:l ttl WS'L
frCJm ovorllow nr hulk mthtn'lcl tl\nk.
Th,ndo:r lloruo - Ocl 22 (C)
21 C:tll nf crudct I t f"rn.
ho!o jn dnUloiNor 1 ioo (\Q- \iP Trnh
hoado.r: oil contolne<l In dock
dmtn.
fin XlluJ - 8 IL)
oll roloo:.ao C'ru..L 'Opl)fl/unp lut;'go-J
l i2"' d.mill vnlvc 011 t::oJ) lar
lAunehor/raoo-J"IOl" Approdrotely
8: W(l.'l 'l'A,lOOAI!ti i tJ1 3..
"-'1JllltL" tJL-' <luJl.
1\od Coo - No 16 '(C)
Dufbl"err 11'1.11.1 hUrtd
nnd opon 2 ... tlrnh vnlvo an
jct(OtlPUlr \ ML 'l'hO fObmo oC dcC"oru:aor
tol.cn,o YD!I S n!tClwno
1n cbottlcl okld
lind J'Joc - Doc 17 (e)
BP-HZN-2179MDL011 09084

Process Safety Incidents - Asset
2009 vs. 2008
AssttT<>t.l H .. Process: Sarety Incidents 2009 vs 2008
<12008 =
110 H I ncidents 2008
114 H Incidents 2009
bp
BP-HZN-2179MDL011 09085

Process Safety G+ Incidents
2
00S-
09
Olrlc:klcnle -Root c.rmimproper repair or inslallaHcm
corrosion I erosion
ovibration
omlsc. equip failure (pump, PSV,
oontroller, soft goods)
inadequate procedural daviation
from procedurs
m incorrect torquing
Ill valve open I not plUgged
s unexpected materials in systom
Jack of focus I communication
11 isolaliM not v e r i ~ e d
bp
0
.
.
BP-HZN-2179MDL011 09086

Major Hazard Awareness OMS Gap
Root Causes
Site interviews and traction were used to identify several root
causes.
- Inadeql!ate/incomplete lessons learnt process
- Inadequate RCFA of lower safety incidents
- Inadnquate understanding of process safety hamrds
- Inadequate/incomplete Jllllintennnce procedures
bp
0
BP-HZN-2179MDL011 09087
-------------- ----------- .. -------------- ------
Major Hazard Awareness A-3
1----------.. ----'-
A. Problem Statement
Scope Process safety major hazards and risks
arc not fully understood by engineering or
eperat ing staff
Metric Numbtt of process safety related
incidents
Goal Reduce nualber or 2010 Drocess safety
telated inciuenLs byl5% measured aga.insL 2009
levels.
B. Gap Analysis
Current State: Ther e
were 129 process safety
rel&tcd incidents in
2008 and 49 May
2009.
Future State (Goal): Target for i11provement
is to reduce the nu111ber of 2010 incidents
by 15% v s 2009

C. Potential Root Causes
List of Causes Ranking
- Pmcess Sl:lfety inc:idents
nrc seen as envi ronmental
incident
- Risk of cocubustion not
fully understood
- Inadequate l ow severit y
RCFA l eading to repeut
i ncidents
D. Do /Check
Action
2
3
- Trnoli <>n DB Ru<>hl"
- l ntel'1'1.,. ol':f.,hor o Stuff l:lMur 'l'oar.
- lfn7.nrd Awurcnc:l:t Trni ni ns
3Q 200'J OEL
- Dcvolop J>J"OG05S .,ofoty hunt cl>ock1ist
2Q 2009 ll<mo
- l fy llpprnpri nto RCFA too I
4Q 2009 Dono
-Dovo!op trnining lluch.le
When
2Q 2009 llo110
2Q 2009 llono
Onoto
Ruehle
Rur.hle
IQ 2w.i 20LO
13
BP-HZN-2179MDLD11 09088
Loss of Primary Containment (LOPC)
A3 Project Form
J
l 0
-- - -------------------
A. Problem Statement
Scope: LOPC from hydrocarbon gas
systems
Metric:# of hydrocarbon gas LOPC events
Goal: 20%_ yearly reduction across SPU
lime Frame: 2 years
Stakeholders: Offshore personnel, onshore
Engineers, IM Group, M&R Group
B. Gap Analysis
Current State:
4 ll 10 l: 14 '".
"""""""'
Future State (Goal}: 20% reduction in year
1 and another 20% in year 2
---------------
c. Potential Root Causes
List of Causes Rank Tvpe
Loose Bolts 12 of 53 controllable
External Corrosion 8 of 53 controllable
Vibration/Fatigue 5 of 53 controllable
Gasket Leaks 2 of 53 controllable
Human Error 5 of 53 controllable
Defective Equipment 16 of 53 unclearw
Other 5 of 53 unclear
+l n.';uffiei.ont detail in Trncti on to dctormino tlto priMry c ~ u o c .
D. Do I Check .
Item Action Priority
1. Update the SPM to include Info on bolt torquing & lube
procedures & provide training A
2. Train on fitting make-up (pipe & tubing) A
3. Bolt replacement program on Cl schedules 8
4. Create procedure for small bore tubing/ pipe vibration
analysislcontributing factors 8
5. Perfomn annual vibration surveys of small bore tubing and
pipe (fikeAtlantls HVL) B
6. Use of STP 36-15-1 for tubing In GoM C
Project Team: Anfbal Dam, Jose Medina, Todd Hauser, Steve Ruehle
.. ..
- .

14
BP-HZN-2179MDL011 09089


-- __ :
Process Safety
A{ajor Hazard Awareness - Draft Plan
Activity themes:
.!Sortie doveloJ):Ilont, barrier heal th/strcngth assoss100nt ond rollout (Activity !?)
.!Tala) Sttfely Pror.1e01 ".ilh HSSE (Acli vi Ly 2?)
.I 01! HMard Training (Ar.tivity 3?)
lnfcrntion Qlld Communication;
.! Easy Card data <!Jia]yois and asset feedbeck.
-' OffslJo:re nr.tv.-ork en1ri\KP.".<1nt
OlM t>let..ork
MINT Network
Marine
Others?
lolotric
.!Reduce both nllllhcr Ot) and severi ty (PSII) of process s.'lfety i ncidents (All or
those lrith Operations Hlmmn !'actors M contribut ors)
-'Others?
l'cedMck
.I Process safety colture survey (year end)
DRAFT only For Discussion
15
BP-HZN-2179MDL011 09090
- -------
Next Steps and Close
Form 2010 gap closure teams
' [se input to develop 2010 gap closure plans
Review plans with extended team
Review plans rith assot leadership
Se t individual 2010 Objecti ves including base and gap closure
act ivities
BP-HZN-2179MDL011 09091

1---- -----------------
Process Safety
2010 Plan (Risk Assessment & Management)
Risk Assessment and J.le.nagement - OI.!S Gap
GOP 3. 1 Conformance
OMS Gap Closure
SPLI Risk Management Policy update
Problem Statement: A significant number of risk assessments are carried
out by multiple groups in the SPl which are not integrated or planned Wld
the outcomes and mitigation plarJs are not linked up or visible.
Description: Assets get requests from many teams causing n great deal of
ineffiCient work, and don' t always know the results of the assessments.
There is no link up of all of the a.<;sessments and outcomes. Mitigation
plans are not scheduled or prioritized with other activities.
Accountabilities are not clear or known to all regarding tbese
olssessments. '.!ul tiple risk matrices are used resulting in an inefficient.
process feecl up to the risk submi Lted Lo London. Major
hazard risk assessments arc not seen ns a high priority with Assets and
rrumy arc unfrunil with SPU requi rP.IIlant.s.
bp
17
BP-HZN-2179MDL011 09092