1. THE COGNITIVIST VIEW ON METAPHOR 1.1.

The traditional view on metaphor The definition in Halliday (1985: 319-320) illustrates the traditional approach to metaphor: Metaphor. A word is used for something resembling that which it usually refers to; for example, flood poured in, [] in A flood of protests poured in following the announcement (a large quantity came in). [] If the fact of resemblance is explicitly signalled by a word such as like, as in protests came in like a flood, this is considered to be not metaphor, but simile. The traditional view saw metaphor as only a matter of language, in no way constitutive of peoples concepts or thought processes. Moreover, metaphor was assumed to be nothing more than a transfer of words from one domain to describe something similar in another domain: a particular set of linguistic processes whereby aspects of one object are carried over or transferred to another object, so that the second object is spoken of as it if were the first (Hawkes 1989: 1). Metaphors were believed to express similarities, i.e., it was assumed that there were preexisting similarities between what words normally designate and what they designate when they are used metaphorically. Metaphorical language was thought to be deviant (i.e., in metaphors, words are not used in their proper senses). What the tradition also assumed was that metaphor was characteristic only of poetry or rhetorical attempts at persuasion and not of everyday discourse; as such, it was though to be novel, not conventional. Any metaphorical expressions in ordinary everyday language were said to be dead metaphors, that is, expressions that were once metaphorical, but have become frozen. There is what might be called the classical view, which sees metaphor as detachable from language; a device that may be imported into language in order to achieve specific, pre-judged effects (Hawkes 1989: 90). 1.2. Lakoff and Johnsons proposal On the basis of empirical research on categorization by prototype theorists as Eleanor Rosch, and of cognitive model theory (Fauconnier 1985), George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980) propose a view of metaphor that clashes not only with these assumptions, but also with objectivist semantics, as it is termed in Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1987. 1.3. Objectivist semantics: an overview According to objectivists, linguistic expressions get their meaning only via their capacity to correspond, or failure to correspond, to the real world or some possible world; that is, they are capable of referring correctly (in the case of noun phrases) or of being true or false (in the case of sentences) (Lakoff 1987: 167). Objectivists recognize brute facts, those that are true regardless of any human institution. Many objectivists also recognize institutional fcats those that are true by virtue of some human institution. But the objectivist account of cognition, meaning, and rationality makes no mention of the nature of who or what is doing the thinking. The nature of the human organism and the way it functions is irrelevant to the objectivist account of meaningful thought and reason. thought is characterized as symbolmanipulation. Concepts are characterized as symbols in a system bearing a fixed correspondence to things and categories in the world, and these symbols are made meaningful only via symbol-to-world correspondences. Correct reason is viewed as symbol-manipulation that accurately mirrors the rational structure of the world. meaning and rationality are transcendental, in that they transcend the limitations of any particular kind of being. Rational beings merely partake of transcendental rationality. Thus, in the characterization of what concepts, meaning and rationality are, there can be no mention of the nature of the human organism.

On the objectivist account, the human body does not add anything essential to cocnepts that does not correspond to what is objectively present in the structure of the world. The body does not play an essesntial role in giving concepts meaning, as that would introduce a non-objective aspect to meaning. The body plays no role in characterizing the nature of reason. (Lakoff 1987: 174). True knowledge of the external world can only be achieved if the system of symbols we use in thinking can accurately represent the external world. The objectivist conception of mind rules out things such as perception, which can fool us; the body, which has its frailties; society, which has its pressures and special interests; memories, which can fade; mental images, which can differ from one person to another; and imagination especially metaphor and metonymy which cannot fit the objectively given external world. 1.4. Lakoff and Johnsons position What Lakoff and Johnson propose is a realist experientialist semantics in which meaning is understood via real experiences in a real world with real bodies experiences which in objectivist accounts are simply absent. The experientialist approach attempts to characterize meaning in terms of the nature and experience of the organisms doing the thinking (not only the nature and experience of individuals, but the nature and experience of the species and of communities). Human categorization is deemed to be essentially a matter of both human experience and imagination of perception, motor activity, and culture on the one hand, and of metaphor, metonymy, and mental imagery, on the other hand. People organize knowledge by means of structures called idealized cognitive models, and category structures and prototype effects are the by-products of that organisation. Each idealized cognitive model is a complex structured whole, which uses four kinds of structuring principles: propositional structure image-schematic structure metaphoric mappings metonymic mappings (stands-for relations, i.e. a part of a category can stand for the category as a whole for some purpose, usually reasoning).

Idealized cognitive models are used for understanding the world and for creating theories about it. The most important fact about cognitive models is that they are embodied, either directly or indirectly, by way of systematic links to embodied concepts. A concept is embodied when its content or other properties are motivated by bodily or social experience. (Lakoff 1987: 154, emphasis mine, I.C.) The view of the mind as embodied holds that: conceptual structure arises from our sensorimotor experience and the neural structures that give rise to it. The very notion of structure in our conceptual system is characterized by such things as image-schemas and motor programs. Mental representations are intrinsically meaningful by virtue of their connection to our bodies and our embodied experience. They cannot be characterized adequately by meaningless symbols. There is a basic level of concepts that arises in part from our motor programs and our capacity to form complex images. Our brains are structured so as to project activation patterns from sensorimotor areas to higher cortical areas. Projections of this kind allow us to conceptualize abstract concepts on the basis of inferential patterns used in sensorimotor processes that are directly tied to the body. Such projections are called conceptual metaphors and map from domains of more concrete experience to abstract conceptual domains. The structure of concepts includes prototypes of various sorts: typical cases, ideal cases, social stereotypes, salient exemplars, cognitive reference points, endpoints of graded

scales, and so on. Each type of prototype is the basis for a distinct form of reasoning. Most concepts are therefore not characterized by necessary and sufficient conditions. Reason is embodied in that our fundamental forms of inference arise from sensorimotor and other body-based forms of inference. Reason is imaginative in that bodily inference-forms are mapped onto abstract modes of inference by metaphor. Conceptual systems are pluralistic, not monolithic. Typically, abstract concepts are defined by multiple conceptual metaphors, which are often inconsistent with each other. (Lakoff 1999)

1.4.1. Levels of embodiment There are at least three levels to what Lakoff and Johnson call the embodiment of concepts: the neural level, phenomenological conscious experience, and the cognitive unconscious. 1. Neural embodiment concerns neural structures that characterize concepts and cognitive operations at the neural level. This level is arrived at through scientific investigation. 2. The phenomenological level is conscious or accessible to consciousness. It consists of everything we can be aware of, especially our own mental states, our bodies, our environment, and our physical and social interactions. 3. The cognitive unconscious is the massive iceberg that lies below the tip of consciousness. It consists of all those mental structures and operations that structure and make possible all conscious experience, including the understanding and use of language. The cognitive unconscious makes use of and guides the perceptual and motor aspects of our bodies, especially those that enter into basic-level concepts and spatial relations concepts. It includes all our conscious knowledge and thought processes. Therefore, it includes all aspects of linguistic processing: phonetics, phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, pragmatics, and discourse. These three levels are not independent of one another and explanations at all of them are necessary for an adequate account of the human mind. The cognitive unconscious is described by Lakoff and Johnson as being intentional, representational, propositional, having a semantic contribution to the meanings of words and sentences, imaginative, and particularly as being causally effective, especially through the system of conceptual metaphors. For example, a metaphorical conception of marriage (e.g., Marriage is a Partnership versus Marriage is a Parent-Child Relationship) can causally affect how one behaves in a marriage. 1.4.2. Metaphoric vs metonymic models The existence of two different domains is one of the elements that distinguish metaphoric models from metonymic models: a metaphoric domain involves a source domain, which is assumed to be structured by a propositional or image-schematic model, and a target domain. The mapping is typically partial; it maps the structure of the imageschematic model in the source domain onto a corresponding structure in the target domain. The source and target domains are represented structurally by CONTAINER schemas, and the mapping is represented by a SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema. Unlike metaphoric mappings, metonymic mappings obtain within one single conceptual domain, which is structured by an idealized cognitive model. Given two elements, A and B, in the ICM, A may stand for B, where the stands for relationship is represented by a SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema. If B is a category and A is a member, or subcategory, of B, the result is a metonymic category structure. (Lakoff and Johnson 1987: 288).

1.5. Conceptual metaphors Running counter to traditionalist accounts, Lakoff and Johnson propose a novel perspective on what had formerly been called dead metaphors. Lakoff and Johnsons acceptation of dead metaphor differs significantly from the traditional one. What tradition deemed to be dead metaphors actually referred to conventional metaphorical expressions like at a crossroads in The relationship is at a crossroads, which are very much alive and cognitively real. Conceptual metaphors permeate thought, and are quite the opposite of dead. The Concise Oxford Companion to the English Language defines dead metaphors as follows: Whether such a status is recognized or not, metaphors and models tend to have a time of vigour, after which they may fade and die. Traditionally, those that have lost their force have been called dead metaphors; as such, they may still continue in service as clichs and hackneyed expressions. Many venerable metaphors have been literalized into everyday items of language: a clock has a face (unlike human or animal face), and on that face are hands (unlike biological hands); only in terms of clocks can hands be located on a face. Again, decide began as a metaphor, where Latin decidere meant to cut through something in order to achieve a conclusion or a solution. In their turn, conclusion and solution were once metaphorical (Latin concludere to shut up, and solvere to unfasten). The deadness of a metaphor and its status as a clich are relative matters. Hearing for the first time that life is no bed of roses, someone might be quite swept away by its aptness and vigour. (Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press). Real cases of dead metaphors, Lakoff and Johnson (1999) point out, are linguistic expressions that came into the language long ago as a product of live conceptual metaphors. The conceptual mapping has long since ceased to exist, and the expression now has only its original target domain meaning. The example given by Lakoff and Johnson is the word pedigree, coming from the French ped de gris, meaning foot of a grouse. It was based on a metaphor in which the image of a grouses foot was mapped onto a family-tree diagram, which had the same general shape. Nowadays, this image has ceased to exist as a living part of our conceptual system, and English speakers no longer call a grouses foot a ped de gris. Both the conceptual and the linguistic aspects of the mapping are dead. In Lakoff and Johnsons view, each metaphor like at a crossroads above - has a source domain, a target domain, and a source-to-target mapping. Take the following example (Lakoff 1987: 276): MORE IS UP; LESS IS DOWN The crime rate keeps rising. The number of books published every year keeps going up. The stock has fallen again. Our sales dropped last year. Youll get a higher interest rate with them. Our financial reserves couldnt be any lower. The source domain is VERTICALITY, and the target domain is QUANTITY. There is a structural correlation in our daily experience that motivates the metaphorical mapping from one onto the other: whenever we add more of a substance, the level goes up, and whenever we remove a quantity, the level goes down. 1.5.1. Idioms Lakoff and Johnson hold that the meaning of idioms is motivated by the metaphorical mapping and certain conventional mental images. Metaphorical idioms are important for a number of reasons:

they show that words can designate portions of conventional mental images they show that mental issues do not necessarily vary wildly from person to person, but there are conventional mental images that are shared across a large proportion of the speakers of a language they show that a significant part of cultural knowledge exists in the form of conventional images and knowledge about those images, stored by each individual as long-term memory they open the possibility that a significant part of the lexical differences across languages may have to do with differences in conventional imagery. they show that the meaning of the whole is not a simple function of the meanings of the parts. Instead, the relationship between the meaning of the parts and the meaning of the whole is complex: the words evoke an image, which comes with knowledge. Conventional metaphors map appropriate parts of the knowledge onto the target domain, the result being the meaning of the idiom. 1.5.2. Orientational and ontological metaphors The MORE IS UP; LESS IS DOWN example mentioned above is an orientational metaphor, i.e. one that is based in our physical and cultural experience and gives concepts spatial orientation. The orientational metaphors discussed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 14-17) are listed below. Only one example of each is given where the authors listed several: HAPPY IS UP; SAD IS DOWN Im feeling up. CONSCIOUSNESS IS UP; UNCONSCIOUSNESS IS DOWN He rises early in the morning. HEALTH AND LIFE ARE UP; SICKNESS AND DEATH ARE DOWN Lazarus rose from the dead. HAVING CONTROL OR FORCE IS UP; BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL OR FORCE IS DOWN Hes at the height of his power. MORE IS UP; LESS IS DOWN My income rose last year. FORESEEABLE FUTURE EVENTS ARE UP (AND AHEAD) All upcoming events are listed in this paper. HIGH STATUS IS UP; LOW STATUS IS DOWN He has a lofty position. GOOD IS UP; BAD IS DOWN Things are looking up. VIRTUE IS UP; DEPRAVITY IS DOWN I wouldnt stoop to that. RATIONAL IS UP; EMOTIONAL IS DOWN The discussion fell to the emotional level, but I raised it back up to the rational plane.

The stock of metaphorical imagery is very rich in any language. While all of the above examples are based on the relation UP-DOWN, other spatial metaphors are based on FRONTBACK, ON-OFF, CENTER-PERIPHERY, and NEAR-FAR. In addition to orientational metaphors, there are ontological metaphors, which equate activities, emotions, and ideas to entities and substances. Her ego is very fragile is an example of the ontological metaphor THE MIND IS AN ENTITY. In this instance, it is a brittle object (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 27-28). Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 8-9) also show that metaphors have different levels and entailments between levels. For example, the metaphor TIME IS MONEY entails TIME IS A

LIMITED RESOURCE, which entails TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY. The metaphors identified in the English and Romanian corpora discussed in this paper will be analysed from the point of view of such entailments, too. One single image schema can be used to structure various abstract domains. As illustrated above, the UP-DOWN schema is commonly used to conceive of abstract quantities, social hierarchy, mental states, morality and so on. Conversely, one single experiential domain can be conceived of in terms of different image schemata. Time, for instance, is commonly conceived as PATH (e.g., Leave the past behind you) or as OBJECT (that moves, e.g., Time flies, or that is valuable, e.g., Time is money). The inference patterns and value judgements that are associated with the image schema are generally preserved in the metaphorical mapping onto the abstract target domain. Economic developments fall under the latter category, i.e., economy as presented in the financial reporting language employed by The Economist and Capital is a case of metaphorical pluralism: economy is conceived of as a mechanism, a substance, a person and so on, as will be shown in Section 3. 1.5.3. Model of analysis The model of analysis adopted in this paper is in line with the Invariance Hypothesis, which claims that metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (i.e. the imageschematic structure) of the source domain. (Lakoff 1990: 54). The structural aspect of a conceptual metaphor consists of a set of correspondences between a source domain and a target domain. These correspondences can be categorized into two types: ontological and epistemic. Ontological correspondences are correspondences between the entities in the source domain and the corresponding entities in the target domain. For example, the container in the source domain corresponds to the body in the target domain. Epistemic correspondences are correspondences between knowledge about the source domain and corresponding knowledge about the target domain. These correspondences between the FLUID domain and the ANGER domain were schematized (Lakoff and Kvecses, in Holland&Quinn 1987: 201) as follows: Source: HEAT OR FLUID IN CONTAINER Target: ANGER Ontological correspondences: The container is the body. The heat of fluid is the anger. The heat scale is the anger scale, with end points zero and limit. Container heat is body heat. Pressure in the container is internal pressure in the body. Agitation of fluid and container is physical agitation. The limit of the containers capacity to withstand pressure caused by heat is the limit on the anger scale. Explosion is loss of control. Danger of explosion is danger of loss of control. Coolness in the fluid is lack of anger. Calmness of the fluid is lack of agitation. Epistemic correspondences: Source: The effect of intense fluid heat is container heat, internal pressure, and agitation. Target: The effect of intense anger is body heat, internal pressure, and agitation. Similar accounts will be given of the metaphors identified in the English and Romanian corpora analysed (see Section 3 below), but the number of ontological correspondences will be kept to a minimum (i.e., there will be no quasi-redundancy of the

type Explosion is loss of control. Danger of explosion is danger of loss of control. Coolness in the fluid is lack of anger. Calmness of the fluid is lack of agitation). 1.5.4. The issue of productivity There are two ways in which a conceptual metaphor can be productive. The first is lexical. The words and fixed expressions of a language can code, that is, be used to express aspects of a given conceptual metaphor to a greater or lesser extent. The number of conventional linguistic expressions that code a given conceptual metaphor is one measure of the productivity of the metaphor. In addition, the words and fixed expressions of a language can elaborate the conceptual metaphor for example, stew is a special case of a hot fluid in a container, which is a metaphor illustrating anger. The special case can be used to elaborate the central metaphor (Lakoff and Kvecses, in Holland&Quinn 1987: 194). The analysis of the metaphors identified in the corpus will include indicators of productivity that is, the particular developments of a metaphor like, for instance, ECONOMY IS WAR will be investigated. 2. METAPHOR IN ECONOMICS 2.1. Types of evidence for conceptual metaphor Such evidence has been put forward from various domains of inquiry, discourse coherence studies included. Srini Narayanan, in a study of the uses of metaphor in new studies about international economics (Narayanan 1997), has observed that conceptual metaphor is necessary to make coherent sense of such examples of written discourse. Consider a simple discourse, such as France fell into a recession. Germany pulled it out. To make sense of the discourse requires reasoning about international economics in spatial terms. The recession is a hole. Falling is involuntary motion downward. Motion is the change of state (in the Even Structure metaphor). Down is bad. In other words, the economic state of France involuntarily changed for the worse. The sentence Germany pulled it out uses spatial reasoning. In spatial terms, Germany applied force to help France move upward out of the hole. Metaphorically, this translates into: Germany used its economic influence to help France move from a bad economic state to a good one. In this way, reasoning based on motion in space is used metaphorically to provide coherence to discourse on international economics (Lakoff 1999). Economic discourse contains numerous figurative expressions: tariffs and quota and trade barriers, money transfers constitute cashflow, employees are human capital or human resources, new small firms are fledgling companies, firms may collapse, banks may sink, stockmarkets may crash, economic forecasts may be gloomy, currencies may be weak, strong or stable, and so on. People understand economic processes through a variety of metaphors, and every metaphor highlights some aspects of the target, but leaves the other aspects in the dark. Moreover, the logic associated with the source is generally preserved in the metaphorical understanding of the target. As a result, metaphors can easily be exploited for reasons of persuasion: describing an economic recession as a tunnel, for example, may lead us to expect better times ahead (the light at the end of the tunnel), describing public debt as a burden may lead us to accept new taxes to reduce the weight, and so on (Boers et al. 1997a). Various figurative expressions encountered in economic discourse can often be traced back to a single source. As with other conceptual metaphors, each carries over its own logic. Each highlights some aspects of economic processes, but leaves other expects in the dark. Describing socio-economic processes in terms of machines and mechanisms, for example, may leave the impression that these are under control and fully predictable, unlike human behaviour. A conception of socio-economic processes in terms of health care and fitness can be used by employers to argue in favour of slimming their companies (i.e., reducing their workforce). Fighting and warfare metaphors can be used by employers to call for extra

sacrifices on the part of their employees or for protectionist measures on the part of the government. Experimental research has shown that exposure to certain metaphors can indeed have a profound effect on peoples reasoning about abstract phenomena (e.g., Gentner and Gentner, 1983). Also with respect to the socio-economic domain, it has been shown that subjects problem solving strategies are guided by the figurative language they are confronted with (Boers et al. 1997b). Describing economic competition in terms of racing, for example, nurtures different thought patterns than describing economic competition in terms of fighting. The pervasiveness of metaphor in economic discourse had been noticed by Lakoff, too; in discussing ontological metaphors, one of the examples he gives is INFLATION IS AN ENTITY: Inflation is lowering our standard of living. If theres much more inflation, well never survive. We need to combat inflation. Inflation is backing us into a corner. Inflation is taking its toll at the checkout corner and the gas pump. Buying land is the best way of dealing with inflation. Inflation makes me sick. Viewing inflation as an entity, Lakoff comments, allows us to refer to it, quantify it, identify a particular aspect of it, see it as a cause, act with respect to it, and perhaps even believe that we understand it. Ontological metaphors like this are necessary for even attempting to deal rationally with our experiences. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 26). 3.1.1. WEATHER AND NATURAL PHENOMENA Source: weather and natural phenomena Target: economy Sample contexts: The markets' mood reflects a poor outlook for America's economy (Jun 22nd 2002) Uncertain prospects. Their financial crises may have abated. But for many emerging economies, the outlook remains cloudy (Apr 24th 1999) Clouds over Argentina. As the economic outlook darkens, can Latin Americas fastest-growing economy slow, without crashing? Maybeif its politicians do the right things. (Jul 4th 1998) Gordon Brown thinks that Britain will dance through the global economic downpour. (Nov 7th 1998) Into the whirlwind. The worlds two biggest economies are caught in a spiral of borrowing (Jan 22nd 2000) East Asias whirlwind hits the Middle Kingdom (Feb 14th 1998) Many now fear that the world economy is being sucked into a deflationary spiral. (Oct 10th 1998) After three decades of whirlwind growth, many of East Asias tiger economies are in the doldrums. (Mar 7th 1998) The Economist's new global house-price index confirms that spring is in the air. (Mar 30th 2002) The slide in the greenback against the yen and the euro suggests that foreign investors may be starting to worry about Americas economy (Jan 9th 1999) Ontological correspondences: The weather is unpredictable; therefore, economy is unpredictable. Lack of control over the weather is lack of control over economy. Bad weather (on a scale ranging from clouds to downpour to tornado) is detrimental. A landslide is a massive undesired change. Good weather is a time of economic prosperity. Absence of weather phenomena is absence of economic activity.

Epistemic correspondences Source domain: unpredictable, uncontrollable weather is destructive. Target domain: unpredictable, uncontrollable economy is (self)destructive. (R1) un fluviu de dolari negri (Jan 6th 2000) [a river of black dollars] a river of illegal (black market) dollars (R2) Avalana de facilit i a distrus sistemul fiscal din Romnia i credibilitatea acestei ri (Jan 6th 2000) the avalanche of facilities has destroyed the Romanian fiscal system and ruined the credibility (i.e., goodwill, creditworthiness) of this country (R3) o avalan de fuziuni i preluri (Jan 27th 2000) an avalanche of mergers and takeovers (R4) taifunul financiar din 1997-1998 (Dec 14th 2000) the financial typhoon of 1997-1998 (R5) norii negri s-au adunat asupra fabricii de mobil (Jan 13th 2000) black clouds gathered over the furniture factory (R6) turbulen e la Burs (May 9th 2002) turbulence at the stock exchange (R7) furtuna care a cuprins sistemul bancar turcesc (Dec 21st 2000) the storm that has come over Turkish banking (R8) Cutremurul bancar care a zgl it Turcia la nceputul lui decembrie a fost declanat de banca central. Epicentrul lui se afl ns la Istanbul, centrul marilor afaceri. (Dec 14th 2000) 3.1.2. GAMES AND GAMBLING Source: games and gambling Target: economy Sample contexts: The house-price bubble lengthens the odds against joining the euro (Nov 16th 2002) A global game of dominoes (title, Aug 25th 2001) recovering economies, especially if electronics exports also slow. But the ride will be rougher in some parts of the region than others. (Oct 21st 2000) The End of the Game (title, Mar 14th 1998) Could finance ministers learn a few tricks from central bankers? (Nov 27th 1999) How Australia won economic success (Sep 9th 2000) Lakoff and Johnson (1980) discuss the metaphor UNCERTAIN ACTION IS GAMBLING and provide numerous examples: Ill take my chances. The stakes are high. Hes got an ace up his sleeve. The odds are against me. Hes holding all the aces. Its a toss-up. If you play your cards right, you can do it. Where is he when the chips are down? Hes playing it close to his vest. Lets up the ante. Thats the luck of the draw.

Lakoff and Johnson conclude that this is our primary metaphor for action with uncertain knowledge. In this metaphor, any action that you have to take when you dont know all the relevant information is conceptualized as a gamble. Paul Pawels and Anne-Marie SimonVandenbergen (1995) suggest that the CONTROL schema be introduced as a refinement to Lakoff and Johnsons schematic framework: Presence and absence of control and the type of control indeed appear to be important variables determining the value judgement (in Louis Goossens et al., 1995: 67). Therefore, it is not unreasonable to say that one can detect the degree of control exerted over the economy of a country by analysing the relevant types of metaphors that occur in economic reporting. The ontological correspondences proposed are the following: Gambling is unpredictable; therefore, economy is unpredictable. Lack of control over the game is lack of control over economy. Everybody has equal chances in a game of fortune everyone has equal chances in economy. Cheating in gambling is cheating in economy. Winning in gambling is economic success. Being dealt a good hand is having an economic advantage. Epistemic correspondences Source domain: games and gambling are outside human control and subject to sudden twists of fortune. Target domain: economy is outside control and subject to sudden change. (R9) Miza pe exporturi (Jan 6th 2000) the exports stake (R10) Miza pentru Rompetrol rmne pe pia a romneasc. (Jan 6th 2000) The stake on Rompetrol stays on the Romanian market. (R11) Cacealmaua facilit ilor (July 12th 2001) the facility bluff (R12) Works avea destule cr i n buzunar pentru a accepta s intre n joc (Jan 6th 2000) [Works had enough cards in his pocket to agree to join the game] Works had enough cards up his sleeve to agree to join the game (and turn Rompetrol into a Western-type company, my note, I.C.) (R13) n momentul de fa , Works orchestreaz o infuzie de capital n Rompetrol prin intermediul unui fond strin de investi ii. (Jan 6th 2000) Works is currently orchestrating an infusion of capital into Rompetrol by a foreign investment firm. (R14) executivul n-a redus impozitul pe profit fr s jongleze cu veniturile luate n calcul pentru stabilirea lui (Jan 13th 2000) the government has not diminished the income tax without juggling the income taken into account for settling it (R15) Murean jongleaz cu privatizarea IAS (Jan 27th 2000) Murean (Minister of Agriculture) is juggling the privatisation of IAS. (R16) Dacia noastr este doar un pion n jocul pe bani grei cu concuren ii (Dec 14th 2000) Our Dacia (make of car, my note, I.C.) is just a pawn in the high-stake competition game. (R17) Riscul pariului asumat reprezint reversul medaliei. (Dec 14th 2000) the risk of the bet wagered is the other side of the coin (R18) cu toate acestea, jocurile sunt fcute (Feb 5th 2000) nevertheless, the bets are placed (R19) Grupul de firme din Cluj a mizat totul pe cartea expansiunii (Jan 27th 2000)

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the Cluj-based group of companies has played everything on the enlargement card Compared to the GAMBLING metaphor in English, the Romanian one entails not only risk, but also various games of fortune (tossing the coin, roulette, cards), the importance of stakes, bluffing. One major difference concerns control: while the English metaphor entails the absence of human control, the Romanian one entails the very opposite, by highlighting skill and sleight-of-handedness. Players are masters of manipulation and chance is immaterial. 3.1.3. ECONOMY AS AN ORGANISM Source: biology Target: economy Sample contexts: The euro area's economies are wilting fast. When will they revive? (Aug 11th 2001) The French and German governments are looking at similar ways to revive their economies (Jul 5th 2003) A revival is under way in Europe, but nobody seems to have noticed (Sep 16th 2000) IT is making Americas productivity grow faster at last, but for how long? (Sep 23rd 2000) Its impact on economic growth is less obvious, but could be equally dramatic (Apr 1st 2000) So nothing is certain except death and taxes? Look at the growth of the underground economy and think again about taxes (May 3rd 1997) After a decade or more of liberalisation, democracy and the economy are thriving in some Latin American countries and struggling in others. Why? (Dec 2nd 2000) But capitalism needs nurturing, in poor and rich countries alike (May 18th 2002) This metaphor was discussed at length in White (2003). Below is a set of mappings: The wilting of a plant is a bad economic state. The revival of an organism is economic progress. The growth of an organism is the development of the economy. Dependence on the environment (in the case of an organism) is dependence on the business and political environment. Nurture, as a prerequisite for life, is an economic resource. Epistemic correspondences Source domain: the life of an organism is sustained by proper livelihood. Target domain: economy is sustained by proper resources. (R24) o afacere nfloritoare (Feb 5th 2000) a flourishing business (R25) n afar de creterea natural a re elelor sale, grupul a cumprat re ele de la alte companii (Jan 27th 2000) beside the natural growth of its networks, the group also bought networks from other companies (R26) concernul-mam se grbete s deschid un centru geamn tot n capital (Mar 9th 2000) [the mother-holding is in a hurry to open a twin-centre, also in the capital] the parent-company intends to open a similar centre located in the capital city (R26) Poate fi aceast simbioz re eta succesului? (Jan 6th 2000) Can this symbiosis be the recipe for success? (R27) Dobnzile mari reduc capacitatea de a se nate noi ntreprinderi viabile (Jan 6th 2000) High interest rates decrease the capacity of giving birth to new viable enterprises . (R28) sucursala a cedat n fa a firmei-mam (Jan 13th 2000)

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[the subsidiary has given in to the mother-firm] the subsidiary has given in to the parent-company (R29) Bugetul triete din banii vicioilor (Jan 13th 2000) the budget lives out of the money of the dissolute (R32) cele mai puternice firme de cablu tv i-au nghi it concuren ii (Jan 27th 2000) the strongest cable TV companies have swallowed the competition (R33) i-au construit re ele n toat ara i au nceput s nghit i firme mai mici (Jan 27th 2000) they have built networks all over the country and now they are beginning to swallow smaller companies (R34) s dezvolte o industrie tot mai energofaga (Jan 3rd 2002) to develop an industry that feeds on more and more power (R35) ntreprinderi bugetivore (Dec 14th 2000) 3.1.4. THE HEALTH METAPHOR This particular metaphor is connected to the previous one and to the next (economy is a person in need of help/comfort/rescuing). Source: health. Target: economy. Sample texts: Even the majestic snow-capped Alps have failed to inspire a magic cure for ailing emerging economies (Feb 6th 1999) This week's American rate cut will not provide a magic cure that revives the ailing world economy (Jun 28th 2003) Central banks have reduced interest rates to their lowest levels for decades. But have they done enough to revive the sickly world economy? (Oct 6th 2001) The Feds latest rate cut may not stop a weak economy growing sicklier still (May 19th 2001) Prevention is much better than cure (Jan 30th 1999) Why have the economies of the euro area looked more sickly than America's since the stockmarket bubble burst? (Aug 16th 2003) Sterling's weakness spells an end to the feel-good economy (May 17th 2003) Economies almost everywhere are looking sick (Aug 18th 2001) China may be about to catch the Japanese disease. (Oct 24th 1998) America's ailing economy will make life hard for the Republicans (Nov 9th 2002) The meeting this week between Japans prime minister and Bill Clinton may mean that another boost is on its way for Japans comatose economy (May 8th 1999) Japan was once feared for its economic might. Today it is feared for its economic weaknessand the harm its ailing system might do to the rest of Asia and the world. Just how sick is Japan? (Jun20th1998) Chronic Sickness. After a decade of sluggish growth, what is the right medicine for Japan? (Jun 2nd 2001) Hurtling towards Paralysis. (Title, Mar 21st 1998) The oil-price rise will hurt many of East Asias recovering economies, especially if electronics exports also slow. (Oct 21st 2000) Five years after East Asia's financial crisis, much of the region seems to be doing fine. (Jul 6th 2002) A new strain of economic contagion is spreading through East Asia (Jul 7th 2001) A string of recent setbacks will not stall East Asias recovery. (article entitled On their Feet Again?) (Aug 21st 1999) Asia is now recovering from its financial crisis five years ago, but with bad debts of $2 trillion, it is still crying out for financial reform. (Feb 8th 2003)

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Japans problem banks present one of the greatest financial threats to the world economy. Half-hearted efforts to restore them to health have failed. It is time for more drastic measures (Jan 27th 2001) The biggest economy in the euro area, Germanys, is in a bad way. And its ills are a main cause of the euros own weakness (Jun 5th 1999) This years fall in American productivity might be seen as the death knell of the new economy. But its obituary would be premature (May 12th 2001) Obituaries for the business cycle were premature. (Sep 28th 2002) Poor economies are better placed to deal with rising American interest rates and a stronger dollar than they were in the 1990s. But they are not immune to trouble (Jun 3rd 2000) On March 22nd London's battered stockmarket reeled to its biggest one-day loss since 1987. The real economy will not be immune (Mar 24th 2001) The Feds interest-rate cut suggests that it is worried about a possible American recession. But if it arrives, does the rest of the world have to catch cold too? (Jan 6th 2001) These days people talk freely about financial contagion. (Oct 31st 1998) One characteristic of this metaphor is lexical variety: ailing, sick, sickly, disease. Another one is the complexity of the conceptual domain, as shown below: Disease is a bad economic state. Prevention of a disease is prevention of regress in economy. Catching diseases are trends that can be taken over from one economy to another. Immunity is avoidance of economic downturns. Strains of pathogens are negative economic factors. Incapacitating diseases are spells of economic inactivity. Medicine is a means for setting economy right. Physical recovery is economic recovery. Disease ends in death; bad economic states end in economic depression. Obituaries are pessimistic economic analyses. Boers (1999: 50) lists the instances of the HEALTH metaphor in the leaders (i.e., editorials) of all the weekly issues of The Economist over a ten-year period, from April 1986 to March 1996, in which the editors give their analysis of and opinion about a variety of political and economic topics. There is wide lexical variety: Thriving industries Vibrant enterprises Economic paralysis A crippling strike Sclerotic industries Arthritic markets A healthy economic climate Healthy companies Sickly firms Symptoms of a corporate disease A chronic deficit Diagnosing a shortage A financial haemorrhage Anaemic industries The right economic remedy Prescribing the best economic medicine The market cure A financial injection Surgery that costs jobs Amputating unprofitable departments Economic recovery

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