Kripke on Identity and Necessity Author(s): David Bostock Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 27, No.

109 (Oct., 1977), pp. 313-324 Published by: Blackwell Publishing for The Philosophical Quarterly Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2218951 . Accessed: 27/02/2011 19:01
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I Kripke- holds both that proper names are rigid designators, and that in identity-statements which both terms are rigid designators are necessarily true if they are true at all. My purpose in this paper is to examine his arguments for these theses, particularly the second of them, and to show that they are inconclusive. Kripke's main argument for the second thesis is most clearly expounded in his article "Identity and Necessity", and is most easily stated in the idiom of possible worlds. In this terminology a rigid designator is defined as one that designates the same thing in all possible worlds in which it designates. Suppose, then, that 'a' and 'b' are two rigid designators, and that 'a-b' is true. Then 'a' and 'b' each designate the same thing in one possible world, viz., the actual one. So, since they are rigid, they each designate the same thing in all possible worlds in which they both designate. That is to say that 'a=b' is true in all possible worlds in which 'a' and 'b' both designate, and hence that 'a exists & b exists -- a=b' is true in all possible worlds whatever, and is thereforea necessary truth. This, says Kripke, is all he really means when he claims, speaking loosely, that 'a=b' is a necessary truth. First, it is worth noting that this formal argument contains a flaw. For surely when Kripke claims (speaking loosely) that 'a=b' is a necessary truth, we are to understand him as intendingto rule out the possibility of a existing while b does not (and vice versa). But this does not follow simply from the stated definition of a rigid designator. That definition does not by itself rule out the possibility that 'a' and 'b' are both rigid designators, that 'a=b' is true (in the actual world), and that there are possible worlds in which 'a' designates while 'b' does not. Maybe something does prevent this situation arising, but if so it is not just the definitionof a rigid designator. What else might it be? To answer that we shall need a more informativeaccount of rigid designators than is given by the definitionin termsof possible worlds. We shall need some way of telling whether an expression is a rigid designator, some way of telling what an expression does designate in various possible worlds. Now Kripke does give us an account of what he means by a possible world, namely that it is what we may call a "counterfactual situation",
1See "Identity and Necessity", in Identity and Individuation, ed. Munitz (1971), pp. 135-64 (hereafter IN); also "Naming and Necessity", in Semantics of Natural Language, edd. Davidson and Harman (1972), pp. 253-355 (hereafter NN).

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conceivedas a situationof this,the actual, world(IN, p. 148). To use his oun example,whenwe say 'If Nixon had bribedsuch and such a Senator, Nixon would have got Carswellthrough',we are speakingof Nixon and Carswell(who are, of course,inhabitants the actual world),and saying of what wouldhave happenedin this,the actual, worldif a certain"counterfactualsituation"of the worldhad been actual. To say, then,that a designatordesignates thisor that in a certain possibleworldis to say that it has a certaincounterfactual that designation in situation,and I thinkthis in mustbe taken to mean that it has that designation turn whenit occursin the sentence sentential whichwe use to specify situation. the (or that-clause) For the point whichKripke mainlyinsistsupon is that when we say 'If of Nixon counterpart Nixon. That is, the word'Nixon' is used to designate it occursin counterfactual and this is Kripke's main way whien sentences; of illustrating whathe meansby the claimthat 'Nixon' is a rigiddesignator. if So this yieldsthe following is criterion: expression a rigiddesignator an the bothin ordinary and onlyifit is used to designate same thing ("factual") assertions assertions.Moreexplicitly, has to desigit and in counterfactual nate the same thing when it occurs in any counterfactual,2 in any i.e., of has and what it theredesignates situation, specification a counterfactual to be the same thingas it ordinarily asserin ordinary, factual, designates tions. Two comments this criterion worthmakingat once. are on First,on thisaccountof the matterthereis no need forany extracaveat about possibleworldsin whichthe designator does not designateanything, is whichindeed is a whollymisleading of talking. For the designator way of in not itselfthought as occurring this or that possibleworld;what is in is in questionthroughout our actual uses of the designator, thisworld,the worldbeingas it is. Kripkehimself at pains to pointout that he is not is how the word would be used by people in a counterfactual considering situation(a different withhow we actually possibleworld);he is concerned do use the word to describethat counterfactual situation (that possible if a world)(IN, p. 145). To illustrate, I specify situationas one in which a Nixon neverexisted,thenI specify situationsuch that,if it wereactual, the word 'Nixon' (used as we use it) would designatenothing. But in fact is the situation not actual, so in factthe worddoes designate, and indeedit Nixon even as it occursin the specification the situationas of designates is there no Nixon. For it is theactual Nixon (and not,ofcourse, one in which ofhim)thatwe are excluding from situation question. the in any counterpart In a word,'Nixon' designates Nixon both the factualassertion'Nixon is in still alive' and in the counterfactual assertion'if Nixon had never lived,
then . . .' (cf. NN, p. 290).
20f course there will be counter-examplesthat are not allowed to count, forexample when the designator occurs in quotation marks or in reported speech. Besides, I may name my dog 'Nixon'. For simplicityI foregoany more exact statementof the criterion.

Nixon had . . .' it is Nixon wme are talking of, and not (e.g.) some possible

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Second, it should be noticed that the present criterionfor being a rigid designator does not anywhere introduce the notion of possibility. Now we might take it to be an essential feature of Kripke's definition of a rigid designator that it confines attention to what the designator designates in possible worlds. Perhaps Kripke should be interpretedas allowing that even a rigid designator may designate different things in impossibleworlds. If so, we rewrite Kripke's definitionin terms of the behaviour of the desigwhen nator in counterfactuals,it will be important to add a restrictionto counterfactuals with possible antecedents. I do not myselfthink that this would be true to Kripke's intention,but anyway it is easily seen that if the restriction is essential then we cannot hope to finda non-circularargumentfromrigidity of designation to the necessity of identity. For in order to determinewhether 'a' and 'b' are both rigid designators we should then have to determine first which counterfactuals containing them had possible antecedents, and this would involve (inter alia) determining whether the antecedent of 'if a had not been b, then .. .' was a possible one. But a verdict on that point was precisely what the argument was hoping to establish. Clearly the project must collapse into circularityif we have to reach the correct verdict before the argument can get started. Hence, if the argumentis to achieve anything, it must at least be possible to carry it through by starting with the supposition that the antecedent is possible. (We should then conclude, ifKripke's argument works, that the initial supposition was mistaken and that the antecedent is after all impossible. But wleshould now reach the result as a consequence of argument,and not as a preconditionforgettingthe argument started.) But this is to grant that Kripke's argument must, if it is to achieve anything, be capable of being conducted without the restrictionto possible antecedents in the definitionof 'rigid designator'. Hence I deliberately do not include that restriction. Now let us try out this criterion on a test case. Let us take over the usual (inaccurate) story about 'Everest' and 'Gaurisanker', viz., that Everest was named "Everest" when seen from India and "Gaurisanker" when seen from Tibet. And for vividness let us add to the story that there was once a border dispute between India and Tibet, each claiming possession of the mountain. Now, presupposing this background, consider the counterfactual If Everest and Gaurisanker had turned out to be different mountains, there would have been no border dispute between India and Tibet. I take it to be uncontroversial that this counterfactual is intelligible, and for the reasons given above I take it that nothing, in this initial stage of the argument, can be made to depend upon the question whether the situation envisaged in the antecedent is a possible one. (Notice, incidentally, that we can and do quite intelligiblyuse counterfactualswith impossible antecedents, for example in reductioad absurdum arguments.) No doubt in Kripke's view the antecedent is not possible, for if it is possible that Everest and Gaurisanker should have turned out to be different, then it is also possible that

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(an inferenceKripke himselfendorses, NN, they should have been different p. 332). I lave chosen to write "turnedout to be different" only because this is the more normal way of putting the counterfactual: it is the supposed discoveryof the differencethat would have prevented the border dispute. But any reader who supposes that something might hang on this point may substitute a counterfactual which begins 'if Everest and Gaurisanker had been differentmountains'-say one that continues '. . . that fact would have been discovered in the course of the border dispute between India and Tibet'. Anyway, our question is: do the words 'Everest' and 'Gaurisanker', as they occur in this counterfactual,designate the same thing as they ordinarily designate, viz., Mount Everest? It is, I hope, fairly clear that neither of them is being used to designate any othermountain, so the alternative to consider is that one or both of them is not being used to designate at all. And in view of the symmetryin their occurrence, it seems rather odd to have one of them designating and the other not, so the relevant alternative seems to be that neither of them designates. But how could that be? How, one might ask, are we supposed to know what mountain or mountains are being talked of-what situation the counterfactual situation is-if neither of those expressions designates a mountain? Well, the obvious suggestion is that the proper names are in this context standing in fordefinitedescriptions,since definitedescriptionsare well knonil to be capable of introducing a topic of discourse without thereby referring to anything. Furthermore,in the set-up I have described (which is presumed to knowxn the speaker) it is evidently quite in order to say that the speaker is bearing in mind how Everest came to be named "Everest" and how it came to be named "Gaurisanker", and that he would not have expressed himselfas he did if he had not had these facts in mind. So I have no strong objection to the view that he is here using 'Everest' more or less as shorthand for the definitedescription 'the mountain named "Everest" when seen from India', and similarly for 'Gaurisanker'. The counterfactual could thus be re-expressed as If the mountain called "Everest" when seen from India and the mountain called "Gaurisanker" when seen from Tibet had turned out to be differentmountains, there would have been no border dispute between India and Tibet. But unfortunatelyit is not at all clear that the availability of this paraphrase yields the solution to our problem. That problem still remains as the problem whether, in the paraphrase, the two definitedescriptions do each designate a mountain. And how could we settle this issue? The only really strong ground that I know of for saying that a nonempty definite description does not designate (in a certain occurrence) is when we cannot plausibly take that description as having major scope. This may be tested for by applying the Russellian expansion. Of course it is

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debatable whether we should regard the Russellian expansion as preserving the sense quite unchanged, or as providing only a rough and ready paraphrase, but I think we need not enter that issue here. It will be enough if, when we apply differentRussellian expansions corresponding to different ways of assigning the scope, one is clearly a much better paraphrase than the others. But on this test the descriptions in our example can, and indeed must, be assigned major scope. Obviously it would be quite wrong to apply the Russellian expansion within the subjunctive construction, to get If there had been just one mountain called "Everest" when seen from India, and . . . The speaker knows that there in fact is just one mountain which was called "Everest" when seen from India, and he is not taking this to be a merely counterfactual supposition. In fact he is not taking this fact to be governed by his opening 'if' at all, and the only plausible Russellian expansion is one that corresponds to major scope for the two descriptions,viz.: There is just one mountain which was called "Everest" when seen from India, and there is just one mountain which was called "Gaurisanker" when seen from Tibet, and if those mountains had turned out to be different mountains there would have been no border dispute between India and Tibet. So far as this test is concerned, then, the definitedescriptions may perfectly well be taken as referring. Of course this does not settle the matter. I would not wish to say that if a description can always be taken as referring it has major scope. For the description 'the sole teacher of Aristotle' obviously has major example scope in the sentence 'Socrates was the sole teacher of Aristotle', but it is (to hardly natural to take the description as there referring Plato). On the other hand, I would not wish to say either that a description can never be taken as referring,and on this point at least Kripke and I seem to be in agreement. Kripke is perfectlyhappy to call a definitedescription a designator-indeed, he thinks that some definitedescriptions are rigid designators (e.g., 'the square root of 25', NN, p. 145). So the discussion so far is entirely inconclusive. No doubt there are further considerations that could be advanced on either side, but I do not see any way of settling the matter conclusively, so I now abandon the attempt. Instead, let us consider the consequences of settling the question one way or the other. On one view we say that in our original counterfactualthe names 'Everest' and 'Gaurisanker' do not designate, and we explain how this can be by saying that in this particular context they are merely abbreviating definitedescriptions which do not (here) designate. This, of course, involves abandoning the claim that those names are rigid designators according to our counterfactual criterion. This view would be consistent with Kripke's position, if we take Kripke's position to be that rigid designators do not have to designate as usual in counterfactuals with impossible antecedents, for I have already mentioned that Kripke does think that the antecedent here is impossible.

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B1utthen, as I also pointed out, on this view Kripke's argumentcollapses into circularity: the antecedent is impossible because the designators are rigid, and the designators are rigid, despite the fact that in this example they do not designate as usual, because in this example the antecedent is impossible. But the other view, which seems to me equally (and perhaps more) defensible, is that our names do designate as usual even in the present example. Of course they also bring to mind the associated descriptions,and that is what makes the counterfactual intelligible,but it seems perfectlyall right to ma,intain that they can do this as well as designating. We may perhaps compare Frege's doctrineabout ordinaryfactual identity-statements, which is that the two names involved do referto whatever they ordinarily refer to, but what makes the statement interesting (if it is interesting) is that they also have differentsenses. Without necessarily accepting all of Frege's views on the sense of a proper name, we call say much the same about our counterfactual: the two names do designate as usual, but what makes the counterfactual intelligible and what gives it its point is that the definite descriptwo names are also associated in some way with different and that (at any rate in this context) they do bring those descriptions tions, to mind. In this way we keep to the letter (though possibly not the spirit) of the doctrine that names are rigid designators, according to our original and unrestricted counterfactual criterion. To prevent the collapse into circularity,let us persevere with this second view. So we now grant that 'Everest' and 'Gaurisanker' do designate as usual in our counterfactual, and (for the sake of argument) in all others; they are rigid designators. From this premise we are supposed to be able to argue that the statement 'Everest and Gaurisanker are the same (mountain)' is a necessary truth, because it is true "in" all possible worlds, i.e. all possible (counterfactual) situations. How is this argument supposed to proceed? The only route that I can see runs something like this. Our premise is (i) that the expressions 'Everest' and 'Gaurisanker' designate the same mountain when they are used in the specificationof any counterfactual situation. From this I think we are asked to infer (ii) that the mountains Everest and

situation. will be the same mountainin any counterfactual Gaurisanker Grantedthis, we can add (iii) that any possible situationis (or may be willbe and therefore thosemountains viewedas) a counterfactual situation, in whichseems to be the result the same mouantain any possiblesituation, we are after. But, as our own example very clearlyshows, (ii) does not
follow from (i). From the premise that the expressionsare used to designate the same mountain in our specification the situation, it by no means follows of

in are thatthemountains the same mountain the situation.On the contrary, as in our examplethe situationis specified one in whichtheyare different
mountains. Perhaps it will help if I put the objection more generally in this way:

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the number entities of to a referred whenspecifying counterfactual situation of in so need not be the same as the number entities the situation specified. One simpleillustration thisprinciple where, of is a whenspecifying situation, I refer an entity to whichis not in the situationat all. For example,I may a specify situationas one in whichNixon does not exist,or (say) as one in had no children.In eithercase I refer Nixonwhen whichNixon's mother to but I the situation, Nixon is not in the situation specify.Another specifying is a to illustration wherein specifying situationI refer two distinct things, but in the situationso specified are one. For example,considerthe they 'If counterfactual the East Indies and the West Indies had been the same worldwould have been much of islands (as Columbussupposed),thie group smallerthan it in fact is'. Here it would be veryreasonableto say that in I to the specifying situation refer two groupsof islands,but in the situation so specified thereis only one group. Our originalexample with 'Everest' is and 'Gaurisanker' the reverseof this,forit is a case wherein specifying and in the situationspecified the situationI refer (twice)to one mountain, amiss withthis suggestion, and thereare two. There seemsto me nothing from ifI am right thenit seemsquite clearthat thereis no inference rigidity to of designation defined our counterfactual (as by criterion) what can cobe situations.And withthis herently supposedto happen in counterfactual statements for main argument the necessityof identity collapses. Kripke's II that we have been and in supportof this "main" argument Alongside also employsa challenge whichis worthsome consideradiscussing, Kripke that the identity maintains betweenEverestand Gaurition. His opponent and (perhaps) betweenCicero sanker,betweenHesperus and Phosphorus, one. In his opinion, couldhave and Tullyis in each case a contingent things in him to specify moredetail a situation been otherwise.Kripke challenges the in whichtheywouldhave been otherwise.He asks (changing example underwhichHesperuswouldnot have "Are therereallycircumstances now) and goes on to maintainthat no such situationis been Phosphorus?",3 we Let us see whether can meetthis challenge. imaginable. It seems obvious that the orbitof Hesperusmighthave been different whatit nowis,yetmight facthave beensuchthattheevening in from appearfrom what ances of Hesperus(whenseen from earth)wereindistinguishable the have been such that are now. Similarly orbitof Phosphorus might they fromwhat the morning appearancesof Phosphoruswere indistinguishable that are now. I take it to be uncontroversial eitherof thesesituations they taken singlyis a possibleone. The next step is to claim that both together is then Kripke's challenge met,because a are possible. If this is admitted, situationin whichHesperushas one orbit and Phosphorusanotheris eviin dentlya situation whichtheyare different planets.
3NN, p. 306; IN, p. 153.

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Kripke is hardlylikelyto agree that this meetshis challenge. He will grant,no doubt,that a situationin whichthereare two such planetswith but different synchronized betweenthem the orbits,exactly reproducing appearancesof Venus as seen fromearth,is a possible one. He will also thenthe referenceagree (cf.NN, p. 155) that ifthishad been the situation whichwe in fact used to fixthe references 'Hesperus' of fixing procedures wouldhave fixedtwodifferent of and 'Phosphorus' planetsas the references thoseexpressions.But he willgo on to say that in factthe worldis not like refer the same planet. We are not to that, and in factthe two expressions to be considering how those expressions would have been used if supposed but the worldhad been different, rather how the wordsare in factused, the worldbeingas it is. And the questionis: could we, now,properly describe as a situationin which Hesperus and Phosphorus that possible situation were different planets?What,he mightsay, would makethe one planet in our imaginedsituationthe same planet as Phosphorus, and the otherthe same planetas Hesperus? But herewe can surely replyto Kripkein his own coin.4 Whichentities is thathas to be discerned situation not something in a counterfactual figure a telescope, to thusbringing lightthe similarities dissimilarities and by using betweenthat situationand the actual one, so that we can assess whether we have counterparts.Rather, we stipulatewhich entitiesfigurein the the situationin the first situationwhen we specify place. So our replyis to stipulate that the situationis one in whichPhosphorushas the simply it one orbitand Hesperusthe other. By our stipulation, is Phosphorus and that we are talkingabout. Hesperus reachesa stalemate. For Kripke's only And here,I thinkthe argument seems to be that we cannotstipulatethat-or rather,if we do, the reply is we situation specify not afterall a possibleone. Whynot? Because, says it is not possiblethat Hesperusand Phosphorusshouldhave been Kripke, of different the planets. But that, course,is precisely questionat issue. So, as I say, stalemate. III I do not believe that Kripke offers any further us on arguments this The two arguments discussedare fairlyclearlythe only argujust topic. mentsto be foundin the article"Identityand Necessity",and these arguwithoutrelianceon any positivetheoryof how mentsare therepresented namesrefer.In the laterseries,"Namingand Necessity", Kripkedoes begin with a detailed discussionof the questionhow names refer, but again his views on the necessityof identity-statements then independently are prebetweenthe two. sented (pp. 303-8),and thereis no veryclose connection His "causal theory"of names could be taken to be an explanationof how namessucceedin beingrigiddesignators-unlike (most)definite descriptions -but clearlyit is not the only possible explanation,and the only claim
I4N, pp. 146-7; NN, pp. 266 ff.

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relevantto our problemis the claim that theyare rigid. As we have seen, is whenrigidity defined our counterfactual it criterion may be disputed by whether this claimis correct, even if it is the conclusion but Kripke desires will not follow. I shall now concludewith a briefdiscussionof a different for to whichhas some similarity Kripke's,and which argument a conclusion beginsfromone of the thingshe says about rigiddesignators.But I think is the argument itself not to be foundin Kripke'sown writings. In "Identity and Necessity" Kripke does not explicitlypresent our criterion rigiddesignators, insteadproposes for but counterfactual thistest: a 'a' designator is rigidif and onlyif the sentence'a mightnot have been a' has no readingin whichit can be seen as sayingsomething true (pp. 148-9). Where'a' is takenas a definite it description is quite clearthat thissentence has (at least) two distinct on readings, depending the scope assignedto the first of occurrence 'a'. For example,taking'a' as 'the highestmountainin the world'we may read the first of occurrence 'a' as havingmajor scope,so that the wholesentence be paraphrased may the Concerning highestmountainin the world: it mightnot have been the highest mountain the world. in So taken,the sentenceis presumably true,on the groundthat therecould have been othermountains we than Everest. But alternatively may higher read the sentencein a way that gives the modal operatormajor scope, so that the appropriate paraphraseis rather It mightnot have been that: the highestmountainin the worldis the highest mountain the world. in So read, the sentenceis presumably false,since the highestmountainmust be self-identical, it whichever mountain is. (But the sentence could certainly be taken as true on this reading,on the groundthat theremightnot have been a highestmountainat all. The convention, discussing in this matter, is to ignore that ofcounting true.) Anyway, thefirst it on way way ofreading it the sentence is true,and therefore highest 'the mountain the world'is in not a rigiddesignator.But Kripke claims,veryplausibly, that where'a' is taken as a name thereis no truereadingof our sentence; example,there for is no way of reading Everestmight have been Everest not underwhichit can be seen as expressing truth;and similarly a where'a' is a rigiddefinite description. is One possibleexplanationforthisdivergence that in the case of names thereis no distinction scope to be made. But the line of argument of we will not adopt thisexplanation;it will say ratherthat we can make require the same scope-distinction withnames, but that withnames each reading has the same truth-value.That is, we can distinguish between Everest: it might not have been Everest Concerning and It might have been that: Everestis Everest. not

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But both false. (Indeed, we mightattemptto distinguish are betweenthem on the groundthat the second can be countedas true,but in the way we said was not allowed to count: we mightregardthe second as true on the groundthat there mightnot have been such a thingas Everest. But I claim confessI do not findthis altogether convincing.)Anyway,the first we make is that our sentencecan be read in the first so read it is way, and false. That is, we may assert It is not the case that: concerning Everest: it mightnot have been Everest. Since Everestdoes exist,thisis equivalentto Everest: it is not the case that it mightnot have been Concerning Everest abbreviate to whichwe may conveniently Everest: it is a necessary truththat it is Everest. Concerning The next claim is that whenthese sentencesare read in the first way, of with the first occurrence the name (or description) havingmajor scope, for identitydoes licensesubstitution that occurrence.We could argue for out that thereare many other(intensional) this first pointing locutions by seems relevant,and in all of in whichthe scope of a name or description these identitydoes licensesubstitution has when the name or description For example, major scope. Ortcutt:Ralph believesthat he is a spy Concerning as has the same truth-value the onlyman he knowswho is not a spy: Ralph believes Concerning that he is a spy providedthat Ortcuttis in fact the only man Ralph knowswho is not a the instancesof by spy. Next we could strengthen argument considering our sentence-form might 'a not have been a' in whichthereis a description of whichhas major scope. Most sentences the form'Concerning so-andthe so: it mightnot have been the so-and-so'are true,and they remaintrue for of upon substituting the firstoccurrence the definite any description with the same reference.On the otherhand, if we take otherexpression one that is false,say the not have been the square Concerning square root of 25: it might rootof 25 thenthis remainsfalseunderany such substitution.One mightat first be to inclined say that if we replacethe openingphrasewith,e.g., 'Concerning odd number',thenthe truth-value not be preserved will even my favourite be. But thisinclination the reference mustbe dismissed due as though may to a confusion with the other readingof the sentence,where indeed the substitution wouldnotpreserve So we truth-value. finally applythisprinciple to our presentcase, and we deduce that since truththat it is Everest Everest,it is a necessary Concerning

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and since (as we are supposing)Everest is in fact the same mountainas it that Gaurisanker, follows it Gaurisanker: is a necessary truththat it is Everest. Concerning of the argument, it is onlythe first This is the first but stage stage. For so far we have used the premisethat 'Everest' is a rigiddesignator, not but is the premise that 'Gaurisanker' also. is The unusedpremise it truth thatit is Gaurisanker. Gaurisanker: is a necessary Concerning this together withour previousresultwe can evidently deduce Putting it that it is Everestand Gaurisanker: is a necessary truth Concerning it is a necessary truththat it is Gaurisanker. Fromthisit certainly seemsto follow that it thatit is bothEverest truth Gaurisanker: is a necessary Concerning and Gaurisanker. But here I thinkwe stick. It does notseem to followfrom thisthat is It is a necessary thatsomething bothEverestand Gaurisanker truth because it does not followthat it is a necessarytruththat something is Everest. Nor does it seemto follow that is It is a necessarytruththat if something Everest (or Gaurisanker) is thensomething both Everestand Gaurisanker. At any rate this inference certainlyfails for other intensionaloperators as 'Ralph believesthat') in place of 'it is a necessary truththat'. It (such seems that once our modal operatorhas been assignedthe narrower scope thereis no way of inferring conclusion whichit has major scope. So a in we mustrestcontent we withthe conclusion have, or perhapsroundoff the to concludewith existential argument applying by generalization Thereis something such that it is a necessary truththat it, Everest, are and Gaurisanker, all identical. from which Kripke mightbe contentwiththis conclusion.The premise our argument startedwas that where'a' is a rigiddesignator may assert we a: truth that it is a. Concerning it is a necessary be in Kripke mightwell claim that this premisecan properly expressed the idiomof possibleworldsas a: Concerning in everypossibleworldin whichit exists,it is a. And he mightgo on to say that this was precisely pointhe was trying the to expressin his formal if that 'a' is a rigiddesignator and only definition, ifit holdsthat 'a': in every possible world in which it designates,it Concerning designatesa. He might also go on to add that the difficulties whichwe foundearlier when to arose definition our counterfactual (via trying apply his formal criterion) onlybecause the step of "semanticascent" whichis hereinvolvedis in this case not so harmless usual. Further, we stickto the "materialmode" if as it version throughout, becomeseasierto see how the flawwhichI began by is pointingout (p. 313 above) is overcome. For the argument simplythis.

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Since Everest is Gaurisanker, everypossibleworldwhichcontainsEverest containsGaurisanker, viceversa. Further, and sincein everypossibleworld it whichcontainsEverest,it is both Everest and Gaurisanker, follows that in every possible world which containsEverest, Everest is Gaurisanker. out is whichI have just been spelling The somewhat longwinded reasoning a perfectly this train of thoughtwhile good way of paraphrasing perhaps avoidingthe idiomof possibleworlds. for But thereare advantagesin the longwinded version, withthatversion it is much easier to see the weak pointsof the argument.First,it clearly obscuredin Kripke'sown discussion, revealsa pointthat is noticeably viz., reliesupon our beingable to use the usual idioms that the wholeargument for "de re" modality,in which a modal operatoris applied to something and less than a wholesentence. In Kripke'sown terminology, not counting the phrase 'possible world', modal operatorsnearly always occur in trais his in ditionalde dictoconstructions; particular, conclusion stated in this for thereis no warrant this. So one lineof objecform, thoughif I am right are tion wouldbe to maintainthat thesede re locutions in generalmeaningthat the requiredway of readingthe crucialsentence'a less, and therefore mightnot have been a' is simplynot available.5 It is, however,rather the where'a' is a definite difficult to accept thisway of reading sentence not intuitions and might description, a positionwhichis closerto our ordinary but be to accept the de re readingfordescriptions, deny it fornames. Anwould be to admitthe de re readingfornames,but to say otherpossibility is that whenso read the crucialsentence true. We argue,that is, that it is not a necessarytruth, Everest,that it is Everest,forit might concerning else.6 And a thirdline of objectionwould be that have been something is of even whenan occurrence a name or description read withmajor scope, willlicensesubstitution that occurrence. for we cannotassumethat identity the argument which I sketchedfor this principlewas far from Certainly and we have alreadyhad occasion to notice that the principle conclusive, If discussedon pp. 315-7 fails for counterfactuals. in the counterfactual India' 'the mountaincalled "Everest" whenseen from above we substitute called "Gaurisanker" seen from the resultis for'the mountain when Tibet', But thesedescriptions mustbe to the evidently render wholeunintelligible. in that counterfactual. assignedmajor scope Merton College, Oxford

5Doubtless Quine would take this view. 6There are hints of this view in what Dummett says of St. Anne (Frege, Philosophy of Language, pp. 111-6. But see also pp. 131-2).