The Psychology of Perpetrators and Bystanders Author(s): Ervin Staub Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Mar.

, 1985), pp. 61-85 Published by: International Society of Political Psychology Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791271 . Accessed: 12/10/2011 08:26
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Political Psychology, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1985

The Psychology of Perpetratorsand Bystanders1

Ervin Staub2

Why do governments or powerful groups in a society foster genocide, mass murder, and other organized acts of violence against a subgroup? This article explores psychological sources, social (life) conditions, and cultural preconditions that contribute to such actions. Difficult life conditions, a common precursor of mistreatment of a group, createfrustration, threat to, and attack on life, ways of life, and self-concept. In their need to deal with the psychological effects of difficult life conditions, people often will scapegoat, and turn to ideologies which offer hope but identify some group as an enemy. These and other ways of dealing with the psychological effects of difficult life conditions frequently give rise to violence. Certain characteristics of a culture - such as a belief in cultural superiority (which is threatened by conditions of life), devaluation of, and discrimination against, a group, obedience to authority, and others-make this more likely. Once mistreatment has started, participation or passivity by many members of society makes its continuation more likely. Reasons for frequent passivity by bystanders, who have great potential influence, are discussed. The psychology of direct perpetrators is explored, including reversal of morality due to ideology and

'The major ideas in this article were presented and further developed in a number of talks: at Harvard University in October, 1981; at a conference on Torture organized by Amnesty International and the Institute for the Advanced Studies in the Humanities at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst in October, 1981; at an International Conference on Morality and Moral Development in Miami, Florida, December 1981; at the Meetings of the International Association of Political Psychology in Washington, D.C., June 1982, and at a presentation at the University of Winnipeg, December 1982. I am grateful to Seymour Epstein and Edward Tronick for helpful comments. The preparation of this article was facilitated by NIMH Grant 23886 to the author. 2Department of Psychology, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts 01003. 61
0162-895X/85/0300-0061$04.50/1 ? 1985 International Society of Political Psychology

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the assumption of responsibility by leaders. As the conception is presented it is applied to an examination of the Holocaust in Nazi Germany. The possibility of diminishing such cruelty in the world is also discussed.
KEY WORDS: mistreatment of groups; genocide-mass killing; Holocaust; cultural influence; historical (life) conditions and their psychological effects.

INTRODUCTION Why do human beings mistreat, torture, and exterminate others? What world conditions and what psychological conditions of individuals or groups lead to acts of great cruelty-as in the Holocaust, the killing of millions of Cambodians by their own people, the many millions killed under Stalin in the Soviet Union, the disappearances in Argentina, and murders in Guatemala? The Holocaust, the extermination of about 6 million Jews by Nazi Germany during World War II, is a horrifying example of human cruelty. The Nazis also killed millions of other people including Poles and Russians, mentally retarded, mentally ill, and homosexual Germans, and persons they considered enemies of their system. The Holocaust is especially horrifying because of the numbers killed, because the Nazis meant to exterminate a whole people, because of the impersonal, technological processes by which the majority of the Jews were killed, and because of the great brutality. The majority were herded into and transported to camps in overcrowded cattle cars, many dying on the way. Those who were not immediately sent upon arrival to gas chambers were used as slave labor, given food rations inadequate for survival, deprived of minimally adequate hygiene, and brutally treated. A conception will be presented here of how subgroups within a society come to be mistreated by a more powerful group, by the majority, or by the government. This conception will be applied to an examination of how the Holocaust came about: its psychological bases and cultural-societal origins. The degree and methods of mistreatmentand the motivation can greatly differ. Even the criteriaby which a collection of individuals, sometimes naturally constituting a group but at other times relativelyheterogeneous, are made into a group by outsiders bent on their mistreatment, can greatly vary. In extreme cases, the killing of all members of a whole racial, religious, or ethnic group - what is commonly referredto as genocide - is intended.3 In other
3There is no complete agreement in the definition of genocide. The term does refer to the killing of a whole group of people. The American Heritage Dictionary defines it as "The systematic, planned annihilation of a racial, political or cultural group." This definition, relatively broad in including cultural and political groups, is consistent with much current use of the term.

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cases, individuals are grouped together and mistreated due to their political views, or when for other reasons they are perceived as a threat to the majority or those in power. In addition to tremendous differences in the degree and manner of mistreatment of groups, conditions, such as life circumstances and societal organization, differ in each country and time. The conception to be presented here was initially developed, and in this article will be applied, to help examine and understand how the Holocaust came about. I assume, however, that in spite of the substantial differences, when groups of people are severely mistreated and at least some are killed, there is frequently a degree of communality in the psychological bases of mistreatment, in the conditions of life that give rise to psychological reactions which contribute to mistreatment, and in aspects of the culture than make such psychological reactions and ways of dealing with life problems more or less probable. First, psychological bases of mistreatment that are frequently present include differentiation between ingroup and outgroup (us and them) and devaluation of the latter; scapegoating, the blaming of the outgroup for problems or difficulties of life; and ideologies that propagate new (and "higher") ideals and promise a better way of life while also identifying a group as a hindrance to the fulfillment of the ideology. Second, difficult, stressful life conditions that a society faces frequently give rise to psychological reactions that are potential bases of antagonism toward and mistreatment of outgroups. The nature and degree of the life difficulties will, of course, vary. Third, elements of a culture will make it more or less likely that modes of dealing with difficult life conditions arise that lead to mistreatment of a devalugroup. A numberof elementsrepresentpreconditionsfor mistreatment; ation of and discriminationagainst a group; the natureof culturalself-concept; and others. Not necessarily the same ones will be present in every case. Difficult life conditions combine with aspects of the culture to create psychological reactions which give rise to initial actions taken against a group. These actions are starting points, each resulting in psychological changes that make further steps along a continuum of destruction more likely. The social, cultural, and psychological conditions represent potentials that can give rise to mistreatment differing in nature, magnitude, and moral meaning. There can be accidental and unique components as well. For example, as most writers agree, without Hitler, the Holocaust most likely would not have occurred (see Kren and Rappoport, 1980). However, Hitler came to power as a result of both very difficult life conditions in Germany and aspects of the culture that led to support for him even though the ideology he propagated included violent antisemitism and other components that presaged future Nazi atrocities.

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In the following, the conception suggested above will be applied to an examination of how the Holocaust came about. Some psychological tendencies in human beings that predispose to mistreatment of others, the psychological consequences of certain historical-life conditions, and the characteristics of cultures that serve to make aggression or cruelty more likely will be discussed. The psychology of direct perpetratorswho personally inflict harm, and the role of bystanders, who by remaining passive or taking action against destructive behavior can greatly influence events, will also be considered. Certain things that can be done to make the mistreatment of individuals and groups less likely will become apparent. Although a full discussion is not possible here, the analysis that will be presented also seems to apply to other mass killings, for example, Cambodia in the late 1970s, and the genocide of the Armenians in Turkey during World War I. A number of the influences discussed were present in Turkey: difficult life conditions and frustration and threat arising from the progressive collapse of an empire and an ongoing war; devaluation of Armenians by Turks partly on a religious basis and partly as a minority, long subjugated, the object of discrimination and mistreatment; threat to Turkish self-concept from the loss of empire and military defeat associated with this; an ideology of PanTurkism, the idea of a new empire to the East to which the intransigent Armenians were a physical barrier; and others (see Boyajian, 1972). On the other hand, this analysis seems less applicable to certain events, such as the purges in the Soviet Union in the 1930s. Although life conditions were very difficult earlier, with much starvation, they greatly improved by the time the purges started. Moreover, high ranking members of the party were killed in large numbers. Although ideological factors were involved, the main reason for the purges was apparently paranoid concern about power by Stalin (Beck and Godin, 1951).

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL BASES OF THE MISTREATMENT OF GROUPS Recent research in psychology has shown that human beings have an ever-present tendency to divide the world into ingroups and outgroups, into us and them. People will use trivial information to create such groupings and then proceed to discriminate against the members of the outgroup. Henry Tajfel of the University of Bristol, England (Tajfel et al., 1971; Tajfel, 1982) originated a procedure in which participants took what is described as an aesthetic preference test. Each participant was told that, according to the test, he or she preferred the modern painter Klee. Other (fictional) participants were described as preferring either Klee or another

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modern painter, Kandinsky. When the supposed Klee lovers were to distribute goods or evaluate other participants, they favored those who also liked Klee and discriminated against those who liked Kandinsky. In another study, participants estimated the number of dots in clusters and were told they were either over- or under-estimators (Tajfel et al., 1971). In distributing money, they gave more to others who were categorized as they themselves were. Many others studies with such "minimal"social categorization show a bias in favor the ingroup (Brewer, 1979; Hornstein, 1976; Tajfel, 1982). Seemingly, people use any available information to establish groupings, favoring the ingroup even if the division was created on a superficial basis. Obviously, people can group themselves in many ways, and can define those who belong to their nation, political party, religion, profession, neighborhood, or local PTA as us, and consider others as them, as different and frequently as less worthy. What are the origins of this tendency? Although unlikely to be directly genetically controlled, it may in part arise out of genetically based human characteristics. For example, the capacity to form attachment to caretakers is part of our genetic makeup. Although the quality of attachment varies (Ainsworth, 1979), only under extreme conditions of lack of caretaking and stimulation will infants form no attachment to caretakers (Thompson and Grusec, 1970). The process of attachment begins at birth, and, as object constancy develops, infants reach the phase of clear-cut attachment to caretakers. Around this time, stranger anxiety-fear and/or avoidance of unfamiliar individuals - also appears. This tendency to differentiate between objects of attachment and other people may be a rudimentary source of ingroup-outgroup differentiation. Socialization can result in very early differences in the extent of such differentiations. Infants who are exposed to a wider variety of people, or who develop a secure attachment to caretakers, show less stranger anxiety (Shaffer, 1979). Another (related) source of ingroup-outgroup differentiation is the response of humans with fear and concern to what is highly unusual, unknown, and different (Hebb, 1946; Hunt, 1965). A further source is the working of the human mind by categorization; we see and remember objects and people as green or red, tall or short, beautiful or ugly-us or them. In addition to genetically based sources of us/them differentiation, socialization plays a powerful role. Children learn to differentiate between their primary group, the family, and the rest of the world, and are frequently taught not to trust those outside the family. Moreover, there is often specific indoctrination against outgroups, be they religious, ethnic, national, or political. At a very early age children evaluate their nation, for example, in a positive way, while expressing stereotypic and negative views of

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other nations (Piaget and Weil, 1951). Having learned to make differentiations between ingroups and outgroups, people will naturally create them under novel circumstances. A separation into us and them has many functions. By defining certain people as them, we create us, which can result in feelings of harmony and togetherness. In difficult times, this can be an essential gratification. Leaders frequently use a real or imaginary threat to create antagonism toward an "enemy," hoping thereby to increase internal cohesion and decrease dissatisfaction with themselves (Becker, 1975; Hornstein, 1976). Differentiation of us and them usually gives rise to some devaluation of them (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1982). In addition, social conditions may embody stable devaluations: of slaves by slaveowners, of the uneducated by the educated, or one religion by another. Whatever the source, images or beliefs that devalue a group often develop and become part of a culture, its literature, and other products, thereby acquiring substantial stability. They come to be taken for granted, as self-evident truths, e.g., that blacks are less intelligent, that Jews are money-hungry, that women are illogical. Devaluation does not necessarily lead to aggression or mistreatment. However, under certain conditions, already existing devaluation makes actions against a group or its members more likely. Bandura et al. (1975) conducted an experiment in which each participant was to be a teacher and administer electric shocks to a learner who made mistakes on a task. Teachers, who overheard a conversation in which the learner was described as one of a rotten bunch of people, administered much stronger electric shocks than those who overheard no comments. Learners who were described positively received the weakest shocks. Even though massacres of human beings represent a very different level of cruelty from the administration of moderately painful electric shocks, derogation, devaluation, and dehumanization of victims appear to contribute to both. Derogatory labels are often used to create antagonism and prepare people for action against those so labeled. One writer described the psychological conditions for guilt-free massacre in the following way:
The most general condition for guilt-free massacre is the denial of humanity to the victim. You call the victims names like gooks, dinks, niggers, pinkos, and japs. The more you can get high officials in government to use these names and others like yellow dwarfs with daggers and rotten apples, the more your success. In addition you allow no human contact. You prevent travel or you oversee the nature of the contact where travel is allowed. You prevent citizens from going to places like China, Cuba, and North Vietnam, so that men cannot confront other men. Or on the homefront, if contact is allowed, or if it cannot be prevented, you indicate that the contact is not between equals; you talk about the disadvantaged,the deprived. (Duster, 1971, p. 27)

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Another relevant human characteristic that has been examined by psychologists in the last decade may be called just world thinking. Originally proposed by Melvin Lerner (Lerner, 1980; Lerner and Simmons, 1966), it is supported by much psychological research. According to this conception, it is important for people to believe that the world is just. When they suffer, it must be due either to their conduct or their character. In some way they are seen as blameworthy. If they didn't believe that there were good reasons for the suffering they see, observers would fear that they themselves might become random victims of circumstance. As a result of this belief, however, innocent people who are mistreated are devalued. This can make their later mistreatment more likely. While there is substantial evidence that people devalue innocent victims-for example, tending to believe even nowadays that rape victims are somehow at fault (Smith et al., 1976)-not everybody does so, and most people do not devalue victims whose innocence is clearly established (Staub, 1978). Unfortunately, often establishing innocence is not possible. When blacks were mistreated, accused of morally objectionable character faults or rumored misdeeds, who could establish that they were really innocent, particularly in an existing climate of prejudice? The research findings (Lerner, 1980; Staub, 1978) suggest, however, that it is important to counteract derogation, to give information that attempts to establish the innocence of victims. This will make it more difficult for people to assume that the victims deserved their fate, and to remain passive bystanders.

SOCIETAL (LIFE) CONDITIONS AS SOURCES OF AGGRESSION AND CRUELTY The human characteristics and tendencies I have described make it easier or create inclinations to hurt or mistreat others. In addition, psychological theory and research identify several direct sources of aggression: frustration (usually defined as interference with goal-directed behavior or with the fulfillment of goals), and attack on or threat to one's physical safety and survival, property, psychological well-being, or conception of oneself (Baron, 1977; Berkowitz, 1962; Buss, 1961). These conditions can give rise to feelings of hostility toward others and a desire to hurt them. They can also result in aggression motivated by self-defense, a defense of the physical self, and of the psychological self (self-esteem, values, way of life, and conception of the world). Hostility and self-defense frequently join in motivating aggression.

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Difficult conditions of life can create frustration, the experience of threat, or attack, or both. For example, in Germany after World War I, inflation, revolution, depression, and joblessness, moral and political chaos, and a pervasive sense of political violence as Communists and Nazis fought each other at political meetings and in the streets threatened both physical survival and the Germans' conception of themselves as individuals and as a people. Just as with experimentally produced frustration, threat or attack in the laboratory, so difficult life conditions can relatively directly give rise to aggression, in the form of riots, group violence, and mob action (Allport, 1954; Milgram and Toch, 1968). The impact of external conditions can be modified by the characteristics of individuals, cultures, or existing political organizations. Individuals sometimes respond to chronic inability to fulfill important goals with progressive hopelessness and depression (Klinger, 1975); groups and societies may also do so. Individuals and groups, however, will seek ways to generate hope. Moreover, the need of human beings to maintain their self-concept (Epstein, 1973, 1980), or when necessary to revise their self-concept and their conception of the world in a way that enables them to maintain self-esteem, is profound. Individuals and groups will search for such renewed comprehension of the world.

IDEOLOGY When difficult life conditions endure for extended periods of time and threaten existence and self-worth, people often turn to ideologies for solutions or hope. The ideologies, which may arise in response to life conditions or may already exist, come to be adopted as a result of the motivation arising from the difficult life conditions. By ideology I mean a system of beliefs about what the world is like and what ideally it could and should be. Ideologies usually offer conceptions for how to lead a better life. At a time when traditional ways stop working, an ideology can offer a renewed comprehension of the world (Platt, 1980), ideals to live by and hope for, a better future as well as a chance for personal significance. An ideology can give meaning and direction to life. There is much psychological research showing that attitudes relate to behavior, particularly when a summary index of behavior is used (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980). There is also evidence that value orientations that embody concern about, and a feeling of personal responsibility for, other people's welfare are associated with helpful responses to both physical distress (Staub, 1974, 1978) and psychological distress (Staub, 1978; Feinberg, 1977; Grodman, 1979). In general, ways of seeing events, and beliefs and values

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that make certain outcomes or events valuable and desired, give rise to motivation which, when supporting conditions exist, will lead to action (Staub, 1978, 1980). Ideologies represent interconnected systems of beliefs and valuations which determine ways of seeing events and can be powerful sources of motivation to bring about desired outcomes such as a particular way of life or the general acceptance of the belief system. Historical examples show that ideologies, including religious ones, powerfully affect human conduct. People will sacrifice themselves in order to further ideologies. Unfortunately, followers of ideologies often identify some people as a hindrance-due to their actions, beliefs, or basic natureto the ideal state that the ideology embodies, and commit horrifying acts against these people in the name of creating the better world, of fulfilling the higher ideal that the ideology offers. Examples include the great bloodbath after the French Revolution, the Inquisition and other religious persecutions, the recent mass killings in Cambodia. The Nazi ideology is a clear example. Racial purity-and the right, even the obligation, to destroy anything that interfered with racial purity (and with the fulfillment of other aspects of the ideology) - was one of its basic tenets. The existence of the Jews was defined as a mortal danger to the purity of the race. These and other aspects of Hitler's ideology, such as the right of Aryans, superior by nature, to take Lebensraum or living space from other countries, were described in Mein Kampf written in 1923 and later faithfully expressed in the actions of the Third Reich during its existence from 1933 to 1945. While ideology is an important source of violence, it is often difficult for observers to accept that great cruelty can arise from a way of thinking about the world. Many people discounted the importance of the ideology described in Mein Kampf, believing that Hitler's antisemitic demagoguery was simply intended to gain the support of antisemites, without expressing his real beliefs and intentions. Gordon Allport, in his classic book The Nature of Prejudice, wrote in 1954:
Hitler created the Jewish menace not so much to demolish Jews as to cement the Nazi hold over Germany. (p. 40)

It is easier to see the generation of hatred and antagonism toward a group as "the Machiavellian trick of creating a common enemy in order to cement an ingroup" (Allport, 1954, p. 40)-to see it as having a pragmatic purpose that leads to commonly understood gain-than to see it as being done for its own sake, out of personal hate or on the basis of ideology. Although detailed analysis is not possible here, some sources of mistreatment discussed so far also seemed present in Argentina and contributed to the disappearances, the kidnapping, and the murder of 6,000-15,000 persons who

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were seen as politically dangerous by the ruling military. Although life conditions in Argentina were substantially less difficult than those in Germany, in the decade before the disappearances Argentina witnessed a great deal of turmoil. There had been increasing terrorism by left and right wing groups and by 1975 its level was great, with many people kidnapped and murdered. The insecurity that resulted, together with a declining economy and high level of inflation under Isabelle Peron, prepared conditions for the beginning of the continuum of destruction. The military took over with substantial support from the population. The views and actions of the military combined anticommunism, which clearly reached ideological proportions, with self-interest. Communism was seen as a danger to society, as a wrong, harmful, perhaps even evil way of life, from which the nation must be protected. The military also saw Communism as a direct threat to itself-since Castro had dissolved the Cuban army and executed many officers (Potash, 1980, 1981). To deal with the threat they turned against not only terrorist groups and against Communists but also any liberal element of society. In their minds they were all connected to the Communist threat (Amnesty International Report, 1980). They all become targets of kidnapping, torture, and murder. As in Germany, there was an ideological base. As with the German treatment of Communists and Social Democrats, a real conflict of both interest and ideology was the basis of the mistreatment, the ideology contributing to a tremendous generalization in the definition of "enemy."

SCAPEGOATING Difficult life conditions can also directly lead to scapegoating (Allport, 1954). Scapegoating can arise from displaced hostility, generated by frustration or threat and focused on identifiable targets (when the source of frustration is unclear) or acceptable targets of aggression (when the source of frustration is too powerful or for other reasons is an unacceptable target). The essence of scapegoating is to accuse certain people of having caused one's problems or difficulties. This can also diminish or eliminate one's own responsibility. Scapegoating can lead to economic gain (the property or jobs of the wrongdoers can be taken over), to psychological gain (improved self-esteem), and to political gain, when used by leaders. Devaluing and scapegoating members of another group allows people to feel more important, more worthwhile. Poor southern whites who themselves led impoverished, humiliating lives could elevate their self-esteem by a feeling of superiority over blacks; Germans could do the-same by their

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feeling of superiority over Jews. Those who scapegoat can become an ingroup, with a feeling of togetherness and a diminished sense of aloneness in facing problems. They can achieve a "positive group distinctiveness" which "serves to protect, enhance, preserve or achieve a positive social identity for members of the group" (Tajfel, 1982, p. 24). Scapegoats are usually selected on the basis of already existing devaluation. Some are chosen to fit specific occasions, but some are used frequently and repeatedly. In the third century A.D., the Roman Tertullian wrote:
They take the Christians to be the cause of every disaster to the state, of every misfortune to the people. If the Tiber reaches the wall, if the Nile does not reach the fields, if the sky does not move or if the earth does, if there is a famine, or if there is a plague, the cry is at once, "The Christians to the Lions."

SOCIETAL CONDITIONS AND CULTURAL PRECONDITIONS Difficult life conditions can be starting points for a continuum of destruction: actions taken against groups of individuals, arising out of anger, hostility, devaluation, scapegoating, or an ideology, which without counterreactions make further and more violent actions easier and thus more likely. War, threat of attack by another country, economic hardship, particularly a deterioration of economic conditions, political turmoil, inequality or deprivation and mistreatment of groups or classes, the existence of violence in a society and the experience of insecurity, all can start the continuum of destruction. A powerful ideology that is embedded in the political system or exerts strong influence on society can in itself be a starting point. Preexisting characteristics of a culture will influence initial responses to difficult life conditions. Together with the existing political organization, which affects freedom of expression and opposition, they will influence the probable course of subsequent events. A cultural self-conception is important. For example, the loss of World War I and the events following it resulted in very difficult life conditions in Germany, persisting over a long period of time, deeply threatening the Germans' conception of themselves. The Germans believed in the greatness of their nation and their specialness, even in their superiority over other peoples and their right to rule others (Girard, 1980). The loss of the war, the humiliation of the Versailles treaty, the occupation of the Ruhr by the French who were dissatisfied with reparation payments, the material difficulties of life and the general chaos, all strongly conflicted with the Germans' view of themselves as a powerful, competent, orderly people.

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Moreover, many Germans holding traditional values saw their inability to provide for their families as a great dishonor (Abel, 1938; Moore, 1978). Existing devaluation of a subgroup and/or institutionalized discrimination make it more likely that such a group will be mistreated when times are difficult. Real conflicts in self-interest can contribute to victimization but are not necessary. In Germany, as in some other European countries, there was a long history of antisemitism and persecution of Jews arising from Christian views of the Jews and further evoked by the Jews' different religious practices and culture. (Dawidowicz, 1975; Girard, 1980; Hilberg, 1961). This antisemitism was expanded by Martin Luther, extremely influential in Germany, who, after an initial period during which he believed he would be able to convert Jews, turned against them. He used images in describing Jews, such as pests, parasites and bloodsuckers, which the Nazis took over (not necessarily from Luther, but from the German culture which transmitted these images). During the Napoleonic rule over Germany, and under the influence of the Enlightenment, Jews were granted legal rights they did not enjoy before. However, a basic antisemitism among the masses remained strong (Craig, 1982), not surprising given the perpetuation by the culture of the negative images. In the late 19th century, political antisemitism evolved, with the formation of antisemitic political groups and parties, and agitation for anti-Jewish legislation (that was finally adopted by Hitler after he came to power). One example is the "Anti-Semites' Petition" presented to Bismarck in 1881 with 225,000 signatures, asking in the preamble for "the emancipation of the German people from a form of alien domination which it cannot endure for any length of time" and proposing legal steps to restrict the rights of Jews (Dawidowicz, 1975, p. 37). Thus, the consistency between Hitler's antisemitism and the existing culture made it possible for people to accept Hitler's views. The consistency between Hitler's concept of Lebensraum, or living space, which he was going to acquire for Germany, and the previously existing belief in German superiority, combined with militarism, nationalism, and the desire for expansion also contributed to Hitler's coming to power. A belief among Germans in the obligation of obedience to the authority of the state and to authority in general (Craig, 1982; Girard, 1980) contributed to Hitler's ability to lead the German people to war and genocide. In contrast to social differentiation, social cohesion diminishes the likelihood of a group's mistreatment. Fein (1979) found that the more solidarity there was in a country before the war among subgroups of the population, and the more the Jews were accepted and had equal rights, the less successful were the Germans in exterminating the Jewish population of the country. A high degree of SS control was also important, perhaps a

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decisive element. In occupied countries under tight SS control, most Jews were killed, while in countries not administered by the Germans, the other factors exerted strong influence (see also Kren and Rappoport, 1980). As individuals vary in their value orientations, so can societies. They can differ in the value they place on individual lives and rights, and on those of members of different subgroups. The institutions and laws can reflect this. For example, a state religion and religious fundamentalism usually embody inherent devaluation of people with a different religion. Consequences of the kind currently evidenced in Iran, for example, in the mistreatment of the Baha'i, are likely to follow.

UNIFORMITY OF VIEWS, LEARNING BY PARTICIPATION AND THE CONTINUUM OF DESTRUCTION In a pluralistic society, with varied values and views and the freedom to express them, counterreaction to initial steps along a continuum of destruction is probable. For example, in the United States, the repressive views of, and repressive measures proposed by, the Moral Majority gave rise to strong public reaction and organized opposition. Perhaps more directly relevant, it was the vehement opposition to the Vietman war that altered the course of events. In a totalitarian system counterreaction is much less likely. The government can mistreat and destroy some segment of the population not only because the fear that the government inspires inhibits opposition but also because of the uniformity of views to which the population is exposed. Adolf Eichmann, in charge of transporting Jews to extermination camps, noted at his trial-as described by Hannah Arendt (1963)-that there were no voices that raised questions about the exterminations, nothing to implant doubt. Bystander response was very limited to the progressively more repressive and harmful actions taken against Jews from 1933 on, when Hitler came to power. The earlier the bystander response in the continuum, the greater its impact might have been (see subsequent discussion). While the final solution, the extermination, was an official secret, Walter Laqueur's (1980) analysis is convincing that millions of Germans knew. There was a large official apparatus connected to it, and the information spread through persons in this apparatus, through soldiers, and others who somehow witnessed the killings. In a totalitarian system usually no dissenting opinions are publicly expressed, and any that are tend to come from discredited minorities or political groups. In addition, power tends to confirm the powerful in the rightness of their beliefs, even in a society where many views can be ex-

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pressed. One Nixon tape clearly shows Nixon taking it for granted that it was right to use just about any means to deal with war protestors. The selective use of information and the manipulation of public opinion to create uniform views is a danger in any society, and can greatly diminish the "selfcorrecting" potential that exists in societies characterized by freedom of expression and pluralistic views and values. In totalitarian systems, the whole society is induced to participate. In Germany, everybody was to use "Heil Hitler" as a form of greeting. There and in the Soviet Union, all members of society were called upon to contribute to the building of a "new" society: to participate in meetings, work programs, study groups. Everyone was expected to take steps against those who deviated or who were designated for mistreatment. But participation results in psychological changes (Bem, 1972; Bettelheim, 1979; Freedman and Fraser, 1966; Harris, 1972; see Staub, 1978). Human beings learn by doing, by actual participation, perhaps more than by any other way. My own research shows that children learn to be kinder by engaging in kind actions (Staub, 1975, 1979). People learn to become perpetrators of violence by engaging in violent acts or in acts that are not directly violent but are in the service of such violence and contribute to others' suffering or eventual murder. In the process they learn to overcome the initial resistance they may have to directly or indirectly harm others. A crucial turning point for Eichmann was when he was exposed to the bodies of massacred Jews: Seeing the outcome of his contributions, that of gathering Jewish populations and transporting them to the camps, he reacted with revulsion and distress (Arendt, 1963). But "higher"ideals-such as Nazi ideology and his loyalty to the Party and the Fuhrer- and the desire to advance his career all led him to ignore his distress and continue with his successful efforts to transport Jews to extermination camps. As a result of learning by doing, his distress declined. Wherever they occur, ideological movements, including religious cults, induce members to participate in rituals and in activities promoting the group or expressing its beliefs.

THE DIRECT PERPETRATORS Leaders, thinkers, the man on the street, all can create, help evolve the spirit for, and engage in the mistreatment of others. Mobs of varied composition can loot, burn, and even tear other human beings to pieces, as happened in the French Revolution. But who are those who, in a regular or systematic manner, become the direct perpetrators of violence? There has been little opportunity to directly study such individuals. Those tried at Nuremburg were studied, but they were primarily decision makers.

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Moreover, their psychological assessment was based on a hypothesis of their mental illness, resulting in a focus on clinical material such as Rohrschach patterns (Borofsky and Brand, 1980). Certain personal characteristics may enter into self-selection for the role of perpetrator. In addition, being in certain roles, and other influences, can help evolve the psychological possibility of inflicting extreme forms of cruelty. Perpetrators can be ordinary individuals who have long filled certain roles-prison guards, soldiers at war-in which devaluation of other people is inherent. If the definition of their role changes, if it comes to include acts of cruelty, most can adapt. In a simulated prison study by Zimbardo and his associates (Zimbardo et al., 1975), college students were randomly assigned to be either guards or prisoners. The individuals selected showed no pathology, were judged to be "normal-average." Some, given the role of guards, became extremely punitive and aggressive. Reacting to a "rebellion," they stripped prisoners naked, placed ringleaders in solitary confinement, harassed and intimidated prisoners. They made prisoners gather at any time of day or night for the "count," the "duration of which they increased from the original perfunctory ten minutes to seemingly interminable several hours" (Zimbardo et al., 1975, p. 65), recreating a practice used in both Russian labor and German concentration camps. The mistreatment became so severe that the experiment had to be discontinued. Guards who did not themselves engage in such conduct remained passive, not interfering with their more violent fellow guards. Roles which grant power can lead to us and them separation, devaluation-and cruelty. This is particularly so when the powerless are degraded, as they often are. As it is frequently the case in real life, in the prison study the prisoners were "stripped naked, skin searched, deloused," had to memorize and follow rules restricting their freedom of speech and movement, and ask permission for the simplest activities such as writing letters or going to the toilet. People so treated must seem inferior not only in power, but in their basic humanity. A tendency of people to obey authority also enters here. In the famous experiments of Stanley Milgram (1965, 1974), each participant acted as a teacher who punishes a learner's mistakes. College students at Yale as well as members of the general community in New Haven administered increasing levels of electric shocks, including extremely intense and dangerous ones, to the learner working on a task in an adjoining room. They did so simply in response to the demands of the person in charge of the experiment. A substantial portion of participants (62.5%0) administered the highest levels of shock even when they could hear, through an open door, the victim's distress and complaints. Many (30%o) so even when the vicdid tim was with them and they had to place his hand on the apparatus to administer each shock.

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Certain people, because of their background, experience, and resulting personality, seem especially inclined to both obedience to authority and punitiveness toward people not in authority. Some psychologists have identified individuals who have a constellation of these and certain other intrapsychic characteristics as authoritarian personalities (Adorno et al., 1950; Cherry and Byrne, 1977). Such individuals were more obedient in the Milgram studies (Elms and Milgram, 1966). Certain child-rearing practices give rise to submissiveness to authority, to the tendency to see authorities as right because they are the authorities and to devalue those who are powerless. These practices also result in people not accepting in themselves impulses or feelings that were defined by parents as negative, such as anger, hostility, or sexual desires. All human beings possess such feelings. People who do not see these impulses in themselves often see them in-project them onto-others even when they are not present. Regarding such impulses as unacceptable, they experience indignation and hostility which can lead to acts of cruelty. The child-rearing practices which have these effects include lack of expression of love and strict discipline imposed in an authoritarian fashion, which inhibit the child's own feelings and result in general feelings of hostility. Such practices can be limited to some families or may express cultural values and be widespread. There is evidence that such practices were widespread in Germany. Miller (1983) reviews the kind of child-rearing advice that German parents received in many publications, from the 17th up to the 20th century. Children were seen as willful. Their will had to be broken early; otherwise, the child would be uneducable and develop an evil character. Obedience to parents was the highest value. Any means could be used to exact obedience, including manipulation, threats and severe physical punishment. Miller believes that such treatment eliminates the psychological freedom necessary to experience feelings of one's own. Instead, the wishes and commands of others guide the child and, later, the adult. Research after the war suggests that German schools have promoted an orientation of obedience to authority, more so, for example, than American schools (Devereux, 1972). Studies of actual perpetrators offer further support. Dicks (1972) found in interviews in German prisons that SS officers and men serving time for their participation in mass killings had had unsatisfactory relations with authoritarian fathers who believed in and practiced corporal punishment. We can expect such practices, as Miller suggests, to limit inner life, the conscious awareness of feelings, while generating hostility, also unconscious. Hostility toward the parents cannot be recognized by the child, but can easily be turned to objects deemed appropriate by the social group or those in authority.

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Self-selection for the role of perpetrators is likely among individuals in whom feelings of hostility toward specific groups of "wrong-doers"exist or can be easily aroused, who like to exercise power over others and also tend to obey higher authority. In a study by John Steiner (1980) of former SS members, some of the apparent reasons for their joining the SS included (1) attraction to and enjoyment derived from (pseudo) military roles; (2) pragmatic or mercenary reasons: tangible benefits, to improve their existence; and (3) identification with the ideology presented to them as part of the SS. Subverting the feeling of responsibility for the welfare of other human beings is another important aspect of the psychology of direct perpetrators. To a greater or lesser extent, most human beings learn that they are responsible for the life and welfare of others. A feeling of responsibility is central to helping and not hurting others (Latane and Darley, 1970; Staub, 1978; Tilker, 1970). One way to subvert such feeling is to exclude certain people from the realm of humanity, to define them on various bases as subhuman, or as representing danger to oneself, to one's way of life and values. At the extreme, a complete reversal of morality may take place, so that the murder of some human beings becomes what's morally good, a service to humanity. This is well expressed in a conversation described in his testimony at Nuremburg by a Nazi who "worked" at Belzec, one of the extermination camps. When asked, "Wouldn't it be more prudent to burn the bodies instead of burying them? Another generation might take a different view of these things," he responded:
Gentlemen, if there is ever a generation after us so cowardly, so soft, that it would not understand our work as good and necessary, then, gentlemen, National Socialism will have been for nothing. On the contrary we should bury bronze tablets saying that it was we, we who had the courage to carry out this gigantic task! (Poliakov, 1978, pp. 12-13)

The feeling of responsibility for other humans can also be subverted through the assumption of responsibility by leaders. Himmler told his SS executioners that all the responsibility for their actions was assumed by the Fuhrer and Himmler himself-and that they were carrying out a heroic duty requiring tremendous sacrifices for the improvement of mankind (Hilberg, 1961; Dawidowicz, 1975). In Milgram's research, the experimenter assumed full responsibility for the consequences of shocking the learner. When participants who had observer roles were told that they were responsible for the learner's welfare, in a variant of this research, they induced "teachers"to administer weaker shocks (Tilker, 1970). Notably, in Argentina, superior officers signed release forms for each kidnapping, relieving the direct perpetrators of responsibility (Amnesty International Report, 1980).

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THE ROLE OF BYSTANDERS The behavior of bystanders can have tremendous influence. Even the Nazis, when they faced substantial opposition, often did not proceed. They did not persist when Italy and Bulgaria (where the people protested in the streets) did not cooperate with their demand that they hand over their Jewish populations. As a result, a large percentage of Jews in those countries survived (Fein, 1979). Within Germany itself, the Nazis discontinued the eugenics program, the killing of mentally retarded or ill people, or others who would not contribute to a racially superior society, because the population and the churches protested. As noted earlier, public protest in the United States greatly affected the war in Vietnam, and reduced the influence of the Moral Majority. Amnesty International groups have freed political prisoners all over the world by writing letters to governments. In spite of great potential effectiveness, bystanders frequently remain passive, silent, both in countries where people are mistreated and in the rest of the world. Why? In countries with repressive governments, silence can be the result of fear, of the danger of dissent. Everywhere, however, people tend to accept a definition of reality provided by "experts,"their government, or common to their society. They develop a view of reality which justifies cruelty. Research in social psychology strikingly shows that even the perception of physical reality is affected by others' views (Asch, 1951). For example, people come to judge lines of dissimilar sizes as equal, if other people in their group do so. But even with a single dissident to follow, many are liberated from the influence of the group. Social reality is much less clear than physical reality, and we accept others' definition of it even more easily, particularly if cultural values or an ideology or devaluation of the persecuted support it. After actual harm is done to people, just-world thinking can lead bystanders to further devalue victims and consequently more easily accept the victims' further mistreatment. Moreover, in a repressive dictatorship or totalitarian system, or in a monolithic society with a uniformity of values, people are not exposed to divergent views. The existence of varied views that are publicly expressed can give rise to doubts and counterreactions. People's views of reality are further affected by their own actions. Even limited participation in cruelty - such as boycotting Jewish stores in Germany as demanded by the Nazis, or passivity in the face of cruelty, remaining silent when liberals labeled as "leftists" in anticommunist countries or dissidents in Russia are harmed-can lead to acceptance and justification of, and even direct participation in, the mistreatment of others.

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What happens in countries outside those where the mistreatment takes place? Why do people and governments respond so little? Often they are also affected by just-world thinking, and assume that the victims must be deserving of their fate. They are also affected by the propaganda or ideology that is used to justify mistreatment. Before World War II, for example, there was an increase in antisemitism in many countries (Wyman, 1968). The devaluation of victims and Hitler's propaganda joined with an existing antisemitic base, enabling people, deeply affected by economic woes, to blame Jews for their own problems. In addition, governments often do not express their views over events consider the "internal affairs" of other countries. Although exceptions they exist, governments pursue relations beneficial to their interests, and do not see themselves as moral agents who would endanger these relations to protect lives and liberty for the sake of human rights. With rare exceptions, they only protest when they see their self-interest endangered. Individuals and governments also suffer from ideological tilts, and see cruelty against some groups as more understandable or justifiable. Ideological conceptions and romantic notions of what is good can mislead us. Very few people, in retrospect, glorify the violence that took place during the "cultural revolution" in China. But, at the time it was occurring, there were voices in this country which celebrated the fact that the Chinese were rejuvenating their revolution. Lack of reaction by people at home and of protest by people in the outside world can confirm perpetrators'faith in what they are doing. Hitler took the limited response, both in Germany and in the outside world, to his persecution of the Jews as evidence that the whole world was in favor-though he was the only one who had the courage to act. Resistance- whether just silent refusal to cooperate or obey orders, or more loud and forceful, including strong protest by governments or individuals-can raise questions in the minds of perpetrators. According to Fein (1979), the resistance in Italy and Bulgaria to handing over Jews did raise doubts in the minds of Nazi functionaries in those countries. Resistance or protest can lead perpetratorsto question their ideology or theory, whether what they are doing is right, and also whether they will get away with it. One of the very important things that we can do, as individuals and as groups, is to make a response, to take a stand, to express ourselves to perpetratorsboth at home and in other countries, early along the "continuumof destruction."We can also demand that our government take a stance against the mistreatmentof human beings everywhere.The on freedom of our democraticsystem placesa specialresponsibility us. By makwe can raise the consciousness of bystandersand ing noise, by raising waves, affect the perpetrators themselves.

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OVERVIEW OF HOW VIOLENCE AGAINST GROUPS IS FOSTERED When life conditions are difficult, several motivations arise. People have a need to maintain their understanding of the world, or to create new understanding. They need to defend their values and ways of life, or to find acceptable substitutes. They need to defend their personal and societal selfconcepts, and under extreme conditions to defend their survival. Many of these needs can be satisfied by experiencing a sense of identity with a group of people, or by adopting a new world view, an ideology. Frequently, the two go together. Identifying with a group can diminish the threat to the individual self. Enhancing or elevating the group can further strengthen a positive personal identity. Adopting an ideology can provide a new understanding of the world, as well as hope for the future and a sense of personal significance in contributing to a better world. Finally, people frequently experience feelings of frustration and injustice, of hostility and rage, that result from their difficulties. Scapegoating, or identifying a group that interferes with the ideology, can diminish one's own responsibility, enhance a feeling of identity with an ingroup, and lead to expressing the hostility and rage in the form of violent action. Certain characteristics of a culture make violence as a way of satisfythese motivations more likely. They include ingroup-outgroup differening tiation, and the devaluation of and discrimination against some groups(s); a belief in cultural superiority that is threatened by life conditions; strong respect for and obedience to authority. Monolithic (in contrast to pluralistic) values, and repression which inhibits the expression of contrary values and views, also contribute to the initiation and continuation of violence. Propaganda that identifies the violence as the solution to difficult life conditions can contribute to passive acceptance of it by people desperate for solutions. Coming to see the destruction of a group as necessary or even right-a reversal of morality-and abandoning responsibility to leaders, can enable direct perpetrators to act and others to remain passive. The influence of intrapsychic elements on behavior on the individual level, of lack of self-acceptance, and the repression and projection of impulses onto other people have been noted. Denial of elements in a culture or of inherent contradictions in its organization or in ways of life can probably affect societal responses to difficult life conditions in ways yet to be specified. Participation in initial acts of violence or in lesser mistreatment, and even passivity, have psychological consequences which make later resistance less likely. One of them is the perception of victims as having deserved their suffering, and their further devaluation. Opposition and resistance have contrary effects. Opposition, important for those who oppose, also affects

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the perpetrators and can inhibit further violence. Once begun, unless counteractions are taken, each act of mistreatment will make other more violent acts easier, and a progression along a continuum of destruction more likely.

CAN WE DIMINISH CRUELTY IN THE WORLD? An important component of the mistreatment, torture, and murder of individuals because of their membership in some group is a denial of their humanity. With any people, we can enhance or deny their humanity in our minds. Obviously, we are capable of identifying with people who are at a great distance from us, as Irish Americans identify with the Irish in Ireland, American Jews with those in Israel, and as many Germans in America identified with Hitler's Germany. During the recent Solidarity movement, most of us identified with the Polish people. If such identification is possible, we are also capable of identifying with human beings anywhere. In the view presented in this article, violence against a subgroup of society has functional value. It can serve self-defense, or produce material gain, or promote or defend the power of a few. To an important degree, however, such violence is an outcome of ways of dealing with distress arising out of difficult, chaotic, or stressful conditions. Can its function be fulfilled in other ways? At times of difficulties and stress, the beneficial psychological effects of cooperation and mutual help can be great. They can also produce real, tangible solutions to problems. Even under extreme conditions as in extermination camps, reaching out to others had positive emotional benefits promoting survival (Des Pres, 1976). Can we promote perspectives on life, values and social organization that encourage the solution of human problems by cooperation and mutual help? Frustration, attack, or threat leads to aggression or cruelty-but not inevitably. Frustration can lead to renewed attempts to reach a goal and to try out new avenues constructively (Davitz, 1952). Groups of children who develop strong antagonism toward each other as a result of competitive activities in which one group always loses can establish positive ties by working together for common goals (Sherif, 1966). The strength of previously existing group identities and success or failure in achieving joint goals affect the extent to which intergroup cooperation reduces conflict and results in positive ties (Worchel, 1979). Nonetheless, when groups in conflict join to achieve joint (superordinate) goals, attitudes can change. Can we promote cultural values, social organization, and individual characteristics that diminish the likelihood that groups-social, religious, political or other kinds - will be mistreated? As already noted, in some societies the social organization has traditionally embodied less discrimination,

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or less division that provides the basis for discrimination, making future mistreatment of certain groups less likely (Fein, 1979). In addition, cultural values embody respect to a greater or lesser extent for the welfare and dignity of all. In most societies there are persons who have acquired an individual conscience and other characteristics-often one of them is courage-that are necessary for taking action. Can we promote the development of such characteristics? Interviews with rescuers, individuals who risked their lives to save Jews and others in Nazi Germany, suggest that they had three characteristics: moral concern (identification with parents who were concerned with right and wrong), courage (as shown by prior activities that involved risk taking), and social marginality (London, 1970). By not being completely immersed in the group, by being marginal in some way, it was possible for them to reject the explicit or implicit definition by society that the persecution of the Jews was right. A critical consciousness, a vigilance for and questioning of ideologies or conceptions in the name of which the mistreatment of people is justified, is necessary. We need not be blind to the danger some persons or groups might represent to society or its members, but we can be suspicious of a combination of ideology, devaluation of a group, and representation of it as a threat to society-a combination often used to justify persecution of innocent people. One of our tasks is to attend to the education of the young in the realm of human relations, so that while appreciating the differences among human beings, they come to recognize the full humanity of others. Parental socialization and children's experiences in their relationship to their parents, and in schools and in other realms of their lives, can contribute to a prosocial value orientation (Staub, 1978, 1979) that embodies concern about and a feeling of personal responsibility for the welfare of others. Persons characterized by such a value orientation respond more to others' distress (Staub, 1978); they might also be more resistant to harming others. If young people learn, in schools and universities, about differences in customs, rituals, ways of life in different cultures, while coming to appreciate commonalities in needs, hopes, desires, pain, and exultation, the boundaries of "us"- the range of people whose welfare is within the universe of concern and responsibility-can be extended. Inevitably, any brief discussion of how to diminish the mistreatment of groups of people is oversimplified. As the preceding analysis indicates, it is a configuration of life conditions, culture, and political organization that allows or leads to reactions that are the starting points for steps along a continuum of destruction. Rather than offering solutions, I have attempted to identify directions for our efforts to eliminate the existence of elements in this configuration or at least to diminish their influence.

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