Repressed memories are a figment of the imagination. Critically discuss this statement.

Student number: 601687

The concept of repression which is the bone of contention between those who believe in the mission of recovery therapy and those who denounce it presumes a peculiar power of the mind (Loftus and Ketchum, 1994). The current dispute regarding the existence of repression has mainly focused on whether people remember or forget trauma. Repression, however, is a multidimensional construct, which, in addition to the memory aspect, consists of pathogenic effects on adjustment and the unconscious (Rofe, 2008). The challenges of memory recovery have not escaped judicial attention. Courts have increasingly found repressed memory testimony to be challenging in terms of its admissibility as valid and reliable evidence (Lipton, 1999). Sigmund Freud (1914) viewed repression as the foundation stone on which the whole structure of psychoanalysis rests (p. 297). It is therefore no wonder that Hundreds of psychoanalytic investigations have been interpreted as either propping up or tearing down this cornerstone (Gur and Sackeim, 1979, p. 167). However, despite research efforts, the psychology community is polarized regarding the validity of this concept. On the one hand, in line with harsh criticism against psychoanalysis in general, numerous investigators question the validity of repression, claiming that it needs to be abandoned (Bonanno and Keuler, 1998; Court and Court, 2001; Pendergrast, 1997; Piper, Pope, and Borowiecki, 2000; Pope, Oliva, and Hudson, 1999). On the other hand, psychoanalysis continues to be one of the central theories of psychopathology, and many investigators believe that repression is a valid concept (Bowers and Farvolden, 1996; Brown, Scheflin, and Whitfield, 1999; Cheit, 1998; Eagle, 2000a, 2000b; Talvitie and Ihanus, 2003; Westen, 1998a, 1999). The debate has focused mainly on clarifying whether people remember or forget trauma. However, repression as portrayed in psychoanalytic literature is a multidimensional concept, which comprises of memory, pathogenic effect, and the existence of an autonomous unconscious entity. Additionally, because psychoanalytic repression plays a central role in accounting for both the development and treatment of neurotic disorders (Breuer and Freud, 1895), an evaluation of repression necessitates examining clinical evidence that assesses the utility of this concept in the understanding of neurosis.

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In the ensuing essay, the above-mentioned concepts will be evaluated and critically discussed in order to arrive at a more acute understanding of the existence/non-existence of repression. Thereafter, these findings with respect to their impact and significance on interviewing and testimony and implications in the legal frameworks will be discussed.

According to the psychoanalytic doctrine of repression, people have a tendency to forget trauma, and these traumatic experiences can be authentically retrieved by special means (Breuer and Freud, 1895). Some researchers claim that studies that examine the memory component are irrelevant in evaluating the psychoanalytic component of repression, as Freud (1915a) altered the focus of repression from memory to the inhibition of instinct (Boag, 2006a). This is important, as the debate around the existence of repression has almost entirely been focused on the motivation to forget trauma (Brown et al., 1999; Court and Court, 2001; Erdelyi, 2006; Piper et al., 2000; Pope et al., 1999; Wilson and Dunn, 2004). Studies have shown that trauma can enhance memory (McNally, 2003; Piper et al., 2000; Pope et al., 1999). Studies have also shown that partial or temporal amnesia may be a result of deliberate forgetting, rather than repression (Epstein and Bottoms, 2002; Pope et al., 1999; Porter and Birt, 2001). Anderson and Green (2001) indicate that intentional forgetting (consciously forcing something out of ones mind) is extremely strong. Loftus, Polonsky, and Fullilove (1994) add to this by stating that forgetting of trauma does not necessarily involve a repression mechanism. Psychoanalytic theory maintains that repressed memories are preserved for an indefinite period of time, and can be recovered in their original form through hypnosis and psychoanalytic therapy (McNally, 2003). This concept has been challenged, particularly around the manner in which retrieval happens. Ferracuti, Cannoni, De-Carolis, Gonella, and Lazzari (2002) argue that retrieval through hypnosis can yield confabulations (such as memories from previous lives). Gardner (2004) argues that psychodynamic therapists can place patients at risk for developing false memories. The notion of false memory has gained some clinical validation (Kaplan and Manicavasagar, 2001), increasing skepticism regarding the authenticity of recovered repressed memories. Ganaway (1989) proposed that if memories are not authentic, they could be due to fantasy, illusion, or hallucination-mediated screen memories, internally derived as a defense mechanism. Furthermore, memories combine a mixture of borrowed

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ideas, characters, myths, and accounts from exogenous sources with idiosyncratic internal beliefs. These inauthentic memories could be externally derived as a result of unintentional implantation of suggestion by a therapist. Advocates of repression used clinical cases indicating that child abuse victims may become amnesic of their trauma and that therapeutic interventions may generate a genuine recollection of their repressed trauma (Brenneis, 2000; Cheit, 1998; Kluft, 1995; Martinez-Taboas, 1996). Critics, however, discredit the scientific value of this evidence, claiming that it suffers from fundamental methodological flaws (McNally, 2003; Piper, 1999; Pope and Hudson, 1995). Although in some cases the authenticity of recovered memories was corroborated by other sources, this does not necessarily prove the existence of repression (Pope, 1997). The most comprehensive attempt to defend repression was made by Brown et al. (1999). Reevaluating 63 studies that Pope, Hudson, and Oliva (1998) employed to negate the existence of repression, Brown et al. claimed that these studies were misinterpreted and that at least 9 of them support the existence of repression. However, Piper et al. (2000) demonstrated that it was Brown et al. who inaccurately reviewed the studies, and pointed out that the studies that Brown et al. employed were actually a consequence of deliberate forgetting (rather than involuntary unconscious processes). Erdelyi (2006) claimed that Freud viewed repression as a conscious and deliberate process, and maintained that deliberate forgetting may cause progressive degradation of accessible memory for the target material. Erdelyi has been criticized for lack of empirical evidence (Bonanno, 2006), and, moreover McNally (2006, p. 526) notes that by restricting repression to deliberate forgetting, Erdelyi deprives it of its distinctive psychoanalytic character. According to psychoanalysis, repression has a negative impact on the individuals adjustment, resulting in psycho physiological illnesses or neurotic disorders, because of two damaging consequences that the elimination of trauma or impulse from the conscious may cause (Freud, 1915a, 1926, 1936). First, repression induces reality distortion (preventing effective problem solving), and, second, repression increases harmful tension that, if not discharged in a socially acceptable manner, may facilitate the development of psycho physiological diseases or behavioural dysfunctions.

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Although psychoanalysis promoted the idea that, as a rule, distortion of reality is undesirable, studies question the validity of this claim (Colvin and Block, 1994; Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, and McDowell, 2003). Psychoanalysis assumes that the restraint of negative emotions and impulses, especially anger and aggression, may produce harmful tension that not only facilitates subsequent hostile behaviors, but also increases the risk of various mental and physiological illnesses (Alexander, 1950; Eagle, 2000a; Fenichel, 1946). However, research shows that expressing anger actually increases the potential for subsequent episodes of aggressiveness (Bushman, 2002; Bushman, Baumeister, and Stack, 1999). An additional area of research relating to discharge of tension demonstrated that verbal or written emotional disclosure of stressful, disturbing, and traumatic events has significant positive impacts on the individuals physical health (Lepore and Smyth, 2002; Pennebaker, 1997). These findings were interpreted as consistent with the concept of repression (Eagle, 2000b; Lepore and Smyth, 2002). However, meta-analyses conducted by Frisina and his colleagues showed a small effect size of expressive writing on physical health but not on psychological health (Frisina, Borod, and Lepore, 2004; Frisina, Lepore, and Borod, 2005). It is doubtful whether these findings can support repression, both because subjects in these studies were aware of their trauma and the underlying mechanism of this phenomenon was not yet known (Sloan and Marx, 2004). The traditional claim that repression is an unconscious mechanism, according to both Freud and his followers continues to dominate mainstream psychoanalysis (Cramer, 2001; Wilson and Dunn, 2004). Even if repression is a conscious and deliberate process, it is indisputable that Freud viewed the unconscious as an integral part of repression. This means that regardless of whether the initial act of repression is conscious or unconscious, this concept becomes meaningless in its Freudian sense if no proof is found for the unconscious. In order to verify the Freudian unconscious, advocates must prove the existence of a dynamic unconscious that has unique sensitivity to anxiety-provoking stimuli. Most importantly, it is necessary to demonstrate that such a mechanism is endowed with powerful and sophisticated abilities to control and manipulate the individuals behavior, such as the production of a large variety of neurotic symptoms and the ability to prevent the conscious effort of resuming normal behavioural functioning. Experiments on repression by Zeller

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(1950a, 1950b, 1951) and others (Holmes, 1974) were shown to be consistent with Freuds theory. More controlled studies, however, showed that these earlier findings had been misinterpreted, and can more adequately be accounted for by the concept of conscious distraction (DZurilla, 1965; Holmes and Schallow, 1969). Greenwald (1988, 1997) acknowledged the existence of an unconscious, but he suggested that it merely has crude analytic capabilities that allow subjects to quickly identify certain prominent components of stimuli. This theoretical account is incompatible with psychoanalysis, because, it is contrary to the sophisticated nature of the unconscious, which is capable of fully identifying threatening stimuli, Greenwalds unconscious has poor analytic abilities that allow only a partial identification of threat (Greenwald, 1992). The search for neurological correlates to Freudian concepts has been a rapidly growing line of research, particularly with regard to the unconscious (Mancia, 2006; Westen, 1998a, 1998b, 1999). However, none of these studies necessitate the Freudian unconscious assumption. According to classic psychoanalysis, repression is the underlying cause of neuroses (Eagle, 2000a, 2000b; Fenichel, 1946; Fonagy and Target, 2003; Freud, 1915a). The high rate of child abuse among dissociative identity disorder (DID) patients is often mentioned in support of the psychoanalytic theory that repression of such traumatic events causes the development of DID (Kluft, 1998; Martinez-Taboas, 1996). However, the underlying psychoanalytic assumption is that the nature of repressed traumas determines the specific type of neurosis (Fenichel, 1946; Freud, 1914, 1915a, 1915b). Many studies have shown that this correlation is not necessarily true (Bushnell, Wells, and Oakley-Browne, 1992; Yama, Tovey, and Fogas, 1993; Friedman et al., 2002; Romans, Gendall, Martin, and Mullen, 2001; Meadows and Kaslow, 2002; Read, Agar, Barker-Collo, Davies, and Moskowitz, 2001; Favaro and Santonastaso, 2000; Walsh, Macmillan, and Jamieson, 2002). Another measure for evaluating the existence of repression is the examination of the Breuer and Freuds (1895) claim that lifting repression is crucial for therapeutic success. This idea is a central component of classic psychoanalysis (Eagle, 2000b). Although some evidence supports the efficacy of psychoanalysis, there seems to be no empirical evidence that this positive effect is the consequence of lifting of repression. It is true that short-term

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psychodynamic therapy yields more consistent results (Fonagy, Roth, and Higgit, 2005), but here too there is no evidence that this efficacy stems from lifting of repression.

Contrary to psychoanalysis, most studies show that people remember their traumatic experiences and that rare cases of amnesia can be attributed to factors other than Freudian repression. Some investigators defend repression by claiming that Freud altered its meaning from forgetting of trauma to the inhibition of impulse, or that repression can be viewed as deliberate forgetting. In light of the difficulties that the Freudian repression has encountered, the notion of dissociation as an alternative concept has been suggested (Bonanno and Keuler, 1998; Underwager and Wakefield, 1998). Dissociation is used to account for cases where patients failed to remember or had partial recollection of trauma, as well as for deviant behaviors such as depersonalization, amnesia, and identity confusion (Bonanno and Keuler, 1998; Lynn et al., 2004). Bowers and Farvolden (1996) stated that repression and dissociation are sometimes used interchangeably, and even when this is not the case, the differences between them are often unclear (p. 358). Loftus and Ketchams research has shown that it is possible to induce completely false memories of emotionally traumatic events, and there seems to be no way to tell these induced memories from the real thing (Loftus and Ketcham, 1994).

Having highlighted the various schools of thought around repression, one needs to ask the question: how does this influence or have bearing on interviewing and testimony and, how does this have bearing on the admissibility of recalled/recovered memory in legal testimony?

If one subscribes to psychoanalysis, and repression, then one would believe in the authenticity of any recovered memories. Testimony around these memories would be believed to be true and accurate; as the belief is that repressed memories can be preserved for an indefinite period of time and can be recovered in their original form. Psychoanalysts maintain that memory recovery is accomplished through special means (hypnosis and psychotherapy). They do not account fo r the possible therapists influence on the memory itself, i.e. unintentional implanting, guiding, confabulations and the like.

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If one rejects the notion of repression, then one would support research illustrating that trauma can enhance memory and people remember their traumatic events; amnesia may be a result of intentional forgetting and can be attributed to factors other than repression; memories can be inauthentic as a result of implantation of suggestion; conscious distraction and dissociation can be offered as alternatives to repression; and, false memories can be induced. This school of thinking would typically question the validity and reliability of recovered memory as admissible testimony in a court of law.

The issue of repressed memory has arisen in courts of law in four different types of legal actions: 1. Patients (recanters and retractors) suing therapists 2. Third party (non - client) lawsuits against therapists 3. Accusers suing alleged perpetrators for past abuse 4. Repressed memories as evidence in criminal cases

Central to all of these cases is the question of whether repressed memories are real, or whether they are false memory reports probably created by a suggestive influence. The issue of repressed memory has raised discussion with respect to statutes of limitation and the discovery rule. If repression and memory recovery is considered as valid and reliable then the statute of limitations and discovery would come into play only when the memory of the alleged event comes to the fore. The Court of Appeals of Maryland (1996) decided that the critical question to the determination of the applicability of the discovery rule to lost memory cases is whether there is a difference between forgetting and repression. It is clear that in a suit in which a plaintiff forgot and later remembered the existence of a cause of action beyond the 3-year limitations period, that suit would be time-barred. The courts views and decisions about the ad missibility of recovered memory as valid and reliable testimony have been divided. However, the numbers of repressed memory claims in the USA that have been allowed into testimony have decreased significantly from 1995

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(Lipton, 1999). The number of claims peaked in 1992/1993/1994, with civil lawsuits representing 86% of all repressed memory cases. In 1992, 41% of the civil repressed memory cases went to trial. Since the beginning of 1995, only 8% were resolved at trial. During the same year, 70% of repressed memory lawsuits were either dropped by the complainant or dismissed by the court (Lipton, 1999). Many courts have allowed, and are still allowing repressed memories as evidence in court case. Marion Superior Court Judge David Dreyer decided that expert testimony on repressed memory is reliable enough to let a jury decide its credibility (AP 1/22/10 INDIANAPOLIS, 2010). Duval County Circuit Judge John Skinner allowed a sexual abuse case involving repressed memory to proceed (Allen, 2008). In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court Judge Neel allowed repressed memories as testimony in the conviction of Paul Shanley (Wypijewski, 2010). In a US District Court case, Judge Edward Harrington ruled in favour of the validity of recovered memory, citing the following (as presented by Hopper, 1996): After considering factors when deciding if proffered testimony is valid scientific knowledge (and therefore reliable), the court found that the reliability of the phenomenon of repressed memory has been established. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV, 1994) also recognizes the concept of repressed memories. In considering the admissibility of repressed memory evidence, it is not the role of the Court to rule on the credibility of the plaintiffs memories, but rather on the validity of the theory itself. For the law to reject a diagnostic category generally accepted by those who practice the art of science of psychiatry would be folly. Rules of law are not petrified in the past but flow with the current of expanding knowledge (Hopper, 1996, p. 9). As there are many cases citing the admissibility of repressed and recovered memory into evidence, this applies in the same manner to Court decisions not to admit repressed and recovered memory into evidence. In 1999, the 3rd Circuit Court (in Hollister v. McGrath) Hollisters repressed memory testimony was not admissible (the Judge citing the case of

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Dalrymple v. Brown, 1997, where a justice said that the ruling was motivated by its distrust of the entire theory behind repressed memory) (Rodier, 1999). The Ohio Supreme Court ruled against the theory of repressed memory in a sexual abuse case being a reason to lift the statute of limitations (Associated Press, 2010). After hearing evidence in arguments for and against theories of repression, the Court of Appeals in Maryland ruled in the Maskell case, citing the following (Robinson, 2001): The critical question to the determination of the applicability of the discovery rule to lost memory cases is whether there is a difference between forgetting and repression. In crafting a rule (legal) one must consider the apparently real dangers of iatrogenic memories of sexual child abuse. The Judge stated after reviewing the arguments on both sides of the issue, we are unconvinced that repression exists as a phenomenon separate and apart from the normal process of forgetting (Robinson, 2001, p. 4). With the advent of false memory syndrom e and many Courts acknowledgements that memories can be implanted, one has witnessed an emergence of lawsuits been filed (and many won) by 3rd parties and patients against the associated therapist (Ramona v. Ramona, 1994; Sullivan v. Cheshire, 1994; Everbach, 1994; Hungerford v. Jones, 1998; Sawyer v. Midelfort, 1999; Doe v. McKay, 1998; Althaus v. Cohen, 1998) (Appelbaum, 2001). This shift has placed a greater burden and public responsibility on psychologists, psychiatrists, and therapists. Although most courts have not ruled out the admissibility of repressed or recovered memories completely, literature indicates that greater emphasis has been placed on the methodology in which memories have been recovered, and the burden of proof in establishing the validity of this evidence (which now rests with the plaintiff). Grace (1997) when speaking of the admissibility of repressed memory evidence stated that the method of therapist intervention is likely to become a crucial factor whenever there is a challenge to such evidence. The Courts views on hypnosis as a recovery mechanism have become even more stringent as acceptable recovery methodology. The New Zealand Court of

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Appeal (in McFellin, 1985) held that there should be no inflexible rule that hypnotically induced testimony is inadmissible. The California Evidence Code places stringent

admission requirements for evidence brought to the fore through hypnosis (Grace, 1997). One of the reasons for exclusion of this evidence is the possibility of implied suggestion by the hypnotizing therapist. In Lipton (1999, p. 17) the Court stated that testimony that is dependent upon recovery of repressed memory through therapy cannot be logically dissociated from the underlying scientific concept or technique of recovery. The Court also concluded the studies cited in support of the theory of repression contained serious methodological problems that negate their conclusions. Courts have become increasingly skeptical of repressed memory claims and increasingly cautious in dealing with the troublesome evidentiary issues that these claims present. More and more courts are recognizing that a therapist owes a duty, not only to the patient, but to a third party who may be wrongfully accused on the basis of false memories. A growing number of courts have recognized that the problem of proof is compounded because many inferences are based on a speculative theory of memory and repression whose reliability has not yet been proven (Lipton, 1999). Literature would indicate that the shift away from the theory of repression seems likely. The question arises as to whether rival theories of psychopathology can replace psychoanalysis in addressing this issue. Alternate theories also suffer from fundamental empirical difficulties. The judicial system has appeared to try to find the middle ground to the ongoing debate. Their focus has shifted to a burden of proof approach, including the theoretical positioning, the methodology of recovery, and the expert testimony. The judiciary does not preclude or include repression and memory recovery as a matter of course, and in so doing, does not present a particular stance on either school of thought. We may need a new theory, some middle ground - perhaps a new concept of repression and memory recovery.

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