LEGAL ETHICS

Victoria Legarda vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 94457 March 18, 1991

Canon 15

Facts: Petitioner engaged the services of counsel to handle her case. Said counsel filed his appearance with an urgent motion for extension of time to file the answer within 10 days from February 26, 1985. However, said counsel failed to file the answer within the extended period prayed for. Counsel for private respondent, New Cathay House Inc. filed an ex-parte motion to declare petitioner in default. This was granted by the trial court on March 25, 1985 and private respondent was allowed to present evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, on March 25, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of private respondent. Copy of said decision was duly served on counsel for the petitioner but he did not take any action. Thus, the judgment became final and executory. On May 8, 1985, upon motion of private respondent, a writ of execution of the judgment was issued by the trial court. At public auction, the sheriff sold the aforestated property of petitioner to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. After the one year redemption period expired without the petitioner redeeming the property, ownership was consolidated in the name of Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. The sheriff issued a final deed of sale on July 8, 1986 in his favor. Upon learning of this, petitioner prevailed upon her counsel, to seek the appropriate relief. On November 6, 1986 said counsel filed in the CA a petition for annulment of judgment calling attention to the unjust enrichment of private respondent in securing the transfer in its name of the property valued at P 2.5 million without justification; that when the complaint was filed in court by private respondent against the petitioner, the parties came to an agreement to settle their differences, the private respondent assuring petitioner that the complaint it filed shall be withdrawn so petitioner advised her lawyer that there was no longer any need to file an answer to the complaint. On February 22, 1985, private respondent nevertheless filed an ex-parte motion to declare the petitioner in default. The documentary evidence presented by private respondent, which served as the basis of the decision, is falsified and tampered with, giving rise to a presumption of fraud. An amended petition was filed by counsel for petitioner in the Court of Appeals raising the additional issue that the decision is not supported by the allegations in the pleadings or by the evidence submitted. The CA rendered its decision and made the ff. observations: xxx Thus, it is our belief that this case is one of-pure and simple negligence on the part of defendant's counsel who simply failed to file the answer in behalf of defendant, But counsel's negligence does not stop here. For after it had been furnished with copy of the decision by default against defendant, it should then have appealed therefrom or file a petition from relief from the order declaring their client in default or from the judgment by default. [sic] Again, counsel negligently failed to do either. xxx. It was only in March 1990 when the secretary of counsel for petitioner informed the latter of the adverse decision against her only after persistent telephone inquiries of the petitioner. Issue: Whether counsel committed gross negligence. Held/Ruling: Petitioner's counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and dean of a law school. It is to be expected that he would extend the highest quality of service as a lawyer to the petitioner. Unfortunately, counsel appears to have abandoned the cause of petitioner. After agreeing to defend the petitioner in the civil case filed against her by private respondent, said counsel did nothing more than enter his appearance and seek for an extension of time to file the answer. Nevertheless, he failed to file the answer. Hence, petitioner was declared in default on motion of private respondent's counsel. After the evidence of private respondent was received ex-parte, a judgment was rendered by the trial court. Said counsel for petitioner received a copy of the judgment but took no steps to have the same set aside or to appeal therefrom. Thus, the judgment became final and executory. The property of petitioner was sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment in favor of private respondent. The property was sold to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., representative of private respondent, and a certificate of sale was issued in his favor. The redemption period expired after one year so a final deed of sale was issued by the sheriff in favor of Cabrera, who in turn appears to have transferred the same to private respondent. During all the time, the petitioner was abroad. When, upon her return, she learned, to her great shock, what happened to her case and property, she nevertheless did not lose faith in her counsel. She still asked Atty. Coronel to take such appropriate action possible under the circumstances. As above related, said counsel filed a petition for annulment of judgment and its amendment in the Court of Appeals. But that was all he did. After an adverse judgment was rendered against petitioner, of which counsel was duly notified, said counsel did not inform the petitioner about it. He did not even ask for a reconsideration thereof, or file a petition for review before this Court. Thus, the judgment became final. It was only upon repeated telephone inquiries of petitioner that she learned from the secretary of her counsel of the judgment that had unfortunately become final. A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing can be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with the law. He should present every remedy or defense authorized by the law in support of his client's cause, regardless of his own personal views. In the full discharge of his duties to his client, the lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility that he may displease the judge or the general public.

LEGAL ETHICS

Glorito V. Maturan vs. Atty. Conrado C. Gonzales A.C. No. 2597, 287 SCRA 443, March 12, 1998

Canon 15

Facts: Sps. Antonio and Gloria Casquejo instituted their son-in-law, Glorito V. Maturan (herein petitioner), as their attorney-in-fact, through a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated November 6, 1981. Said SPA authorized Maturan to file ejectment cases against squatters occupying a lot in General Santos City, as well as criminal cases against the latter in connection with said lot. Respondent, Atty. Conrado Gonzales, prepared and notarized said SPA. Subsequently, Maturan engaged the services of respondent in ejecting several squatters occupying the lot. While said lot was registered in the name of Celestino Yokingco, Antonio Casquejo had, however, instituted a case for reconveyance of property and declaration of nullity against the former. As a consequence of his engagement by petitioner, respondent Gonzales filed a case for Forcible Entry and Damages against several individuals. On February 18, 1983, a judgment was rendered in favor of petitioner. Petitioner, through respondent, filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution on March 10, 1983. In the interim, the parties to the case for reconveyance entered into a compromise agreement, which was on March 28, 1983. On June 22, 1983, while the motion for issuance of a writ of execution was pending, and without withdrawing as counsel for petitioner, respondent filed, on behalf of Celestino Yokingco, et al., an action to annul the judgment rendered in the case for reconveyance against Yongkiko. The action was predicated on the lack of authority on the part of petitioner to represent Antonio and Gloria Casquejo, as no such authorization was shown to be on record in the case. On August 24, 1983, respondent, on behalf of Celestino Yokingco, et al., also filed Special Civil Case for injunction with a prayer for preliminary injunction, with damages, against petitioner. Aggrieved by respondent's acceptance of professional employment from their adversary in first civil case (reconveyance), and alleging that privileged matters relating to the land in question had been transmitted by petitioner to respondent in Civil Case, petitioner filed an administrative complaint against the former for immoral, unethical, and anomalous acts and asked for his disbarment. Issue: Whether respondent is huilty of representing conflicts of interests. Held/Ruling: The investigating commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in his report dated August 21, 1997, found respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests and recommended that he be suspended for three (3) years. The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the investigating commissioner but recommended that the suspension be reduced from three (3) years to one (1) year. This Court adopts the findings of the investigating commissioner finding respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests. It is improper for a lawyer to appear as counsel for one party against the adverse party who is his client in a related suit, as a lawyer is prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. He may not, without being guilty of professional 1 misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. That the representation of conflicting interest is in good faith and with honest intention on the part of the lawyer does not make the prohibition inoperative. The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given him to take advantage of the client's secrets. A lawyer must have the fullest confidence of his client. For if the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof. Moreover, respondent's justification for his actions reveal a patent ignorance of the fiduciary obligations which a lawyer owes to his client. A lawyer-client relationship is not terminated by the filing of a motion for a writ of execution. His acceptance of a case implies that he will prosecute the case to its conclusion. He may not be permitted to unilaterally terminate the same to the prejudice of his client.

LEGAL ETHICS

Nestor Perez vs. Atty. Danilo De La Torre A.C. No. 6160, March 30, 2006

Canon 15.03

Facts: Complainant Nestor Perez charged respondent Atty. Danilo de la Torre with misconduct or conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for representing conflicting interests. Perez is the barangay captain of Binanuaanan, Calabanga, Camarines Sur. On December 2001, several suspects for murder and kidnapping for ransom, among them Sonny Boy Ilo and Diego Avila, were apprehended and jailed by the police authorities; that respondent went to the municipal building of Calabanga where Ilo and Avila were being detained and made representations that he could secure their freedom if they sign the prepared extrajudicial confessions; that unknown to the two accused, respondent was representing the heirs of the murder victim; that on the strength of the extrajudicial confessions, cases were filed against them, including herein complainant who was implicated in the extrajudicial confessions as the mastermind in the criminal activities for which they were being charged. Respondent denied the accusations against him. He explained that while being detained at the Calabanga Municipal Police Jail, Avila sought his assistance in drafting an extrajudicial confession regarding his involvement in the crimes of kidnapping for ransom, murder and robbery. He advised Avila to inform his parents about his decision to make an extrajudicial confession, apprised him of his constitutional rights and of the possibility that he might be utilized as a state-witness. Respondent claimed that when Ilo sought his assistance in executing his extrajudicial confession, he conferred with Ilo in the presence of his parents; and only after he was convinced that Ilo was not under undue compulsion did he assist the accused in executing the extrajudicial confession. Issue: Whether De la Torre represented conflicting interests. Held/Ruling: There is conflict of interests when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. There is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on principles of public policy and good taste. In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the clients case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of impropriety and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. To negate any culpability, respondent explained that he did not offer his legal services to accused Avila and Ilo but it was the two accused who sought his assistance in executing their extrajudicial confessions. Nonetheless, he acceded to their request to act as counsel after apprising them of their constitutional rights and after being convinced that the accused were under no compulsion to give their confession. The excuse proferred by the respondent does not exonerate him from the clear violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits a lawyer from representing conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. As found by the IBP, at the time respondent was representing Avila and Ilo, two of the accused in the murder of the victim Resurreccion Barrios, he was representing the family of the murder victim. Clearly, his representation of opposing clients in the murder case invites suspicion of double-dealing and infidelity to his clients. What is unsettling is that respondent assisted in the execution by the two accused of their confessions whereby they admitted their participation in various serious criminal offenses knowing fully well that he was retained previously by the heirs of one of the victims. Respondent, who presumably knows the intricacies of the law, should have exercised his better judgment before conceding to accuseds choice of counsel. It did not cross his mind to inhibit himself from acting as their counsel and instead, he even assisted them in executing the extrajudicial confession.

LEGAL ETHICS

Ruthie Lim-Santiago vs. Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio A.C. No. 6705, March 31, 2006

Canon 15.03

Facts: Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber concessions from the government. The Presidential Commission on Good Government sequestered it sometime in 1986, and its operations ceased in 1997. Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat filed a criminal complaint entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie LimSantiago,". Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Respondent, conducted the preliminary investigation and resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651 Informations for violation of Article 288 in relation to Article 116 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the complaint. Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent received P10,000 as retainers fee for the months of January and February 1995, another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995, and P5,000 for the month of April 1996. Issue: Whether Atty. Sagucio violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Held/Ruling: The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code"). However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful conduct. Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Complainants evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented conflicting interests In Quiambao v. Bamba, the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests. One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment. In essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the clients confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him. In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992. In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any confidential information acquired through his previous employment. The only established participation respondent had with respect to the criminal complaint is that he was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. On that basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent used any confidential information from his previous employment with complainant or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint. The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests. A lawyers immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the clients interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated. Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations. Thus, respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.