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Major accidents that occurred world over, be it ‘Piper Alpha’, ‘BP Texas’ or ‘Mumbai
High’ have given the oil & gas operators enough lessons to make it one of the safest
industries in the world. Safety Case regime and the concept of Formal Safety
Assessment (FSA) initiated after the 1988 Piper Alpha accident as recommended by
Lord Cullen has significantly contributed to the improved safety performance of offshore
industry. 20 years later, the ongoing ‘Step Change in Safety’ campaign in UK is all
geared up to make UK oil & gas industry as the safest industry to work in by 2010.
In the ageing UKCS (UK Continental Shelf) offshore installations, predominantly the
North Sea platforms asset integrity management is a key concern. The KP (Key
Programme) 3 Asset Integrity Programme [8] by UK HSE has revealed several
interesting facts on the SCE (Safety Critical Elements) performance and some of the
typical hazardous conditions that exist in these offshore installations. This highlights the
fact that the offshore industry is yet to fully learn from the major accidents and there is
room for safety improvements or rather a shift of focus from HSE to Asset Integrity
Management (AIM).
Piper Alpha disaster that killed 167 provided plenty of valuable lessons that can make
the offshore industry as one of the safest industries in the world. Although several of the
Piper learning is being assessed as part of FSA studies before commissioning and the
safety case is updated every 5 years or based on various defined update triggers, the
real safety barrier or SCE performance is yet to be properly understood by the operators
in its right perspective. The UK HSE KP 3 inspection results clearly indicate this fact.
The author also had a chance to assess the safety barrier or SCE performance in a few
ageing offshore installations in South East Asia and found that the focus is still on HSE
and AIM is yet to receive the attention it deserves.
The risk levels on offshore installations logically depend on the SCE or safety barrier
performance for operating installations. Updating of brown field installation safety case
say, based on a major modification should logically start with the SCE performance
verification. The traffic light system used by UK HSE KP inspections is a simple and
practical way to assess the performance of SCEs. These assessment results could be
used to determine the new MAH (Major Accident Hazard) probabilities thereby arriving at
realistic risk levels.
The traffic light system used by NOPSA & UP HSE [3] [8] can be represented graphically
as shown below for the better understanding of readers:
Taking cues from the KP 3 inspection report and NOPSA guidelines [3] the following
guidelines could be used in order to calculate the ‘realistic’ risk levels in the brown field
QRA.
The changed (mostly increased) risk levels from the base case risk level could be used
to highlight the point that unless the SCEs or barriers performance is ensured, the risks
can go beyond the tolerable ALARP region. The author has successfully used this point
to communicate the message to the offshore personnel that ‘unless safety systems are
maintained, MAH can happen and the risk levels may not be in the ALARP region
anymore’.
The various risk levels can be represented on an ALARP triangle as shown below in the
brown field QRA report. This diagram clearly shows that the individual risk after
assessing the SCE Performance is more than the base case risk highlighting the need to
strengthen the AIM process.
The author feels that if the Bow Tie Assessment (BTA) technique [10] can be better
utilized in all the FSA studies that are required as part of Offshore Safety Case to clearly
demonstrate that all major hazards are assessed and managed to ALARP level.
Logically, for a brown field installation, if all SCEs or barriers are performing satisfactorily
(Green traffic light), then the risks of the installation can be considered to be in the
ALARP tolerable region.
If bow ties are constructed for each of the MAEs (Major Accident Events) or MAH (Major
Accident Hazards) based on the HAZID (Hazard Identification), these bow ties can be
modified for each of the FSA (Formal Safety Assessment) studies to demonstrate that
the assessments are in compliance in UK SCR (Safety Case Regulations), 2005. This
assessment process will ensure that all barriers are assessed in all the safety assessments
and this also becomes a clear demonstration that all barriers or safety systems or SCEs are
designed to prevent or control MAE/ MAHs.
The possible applications of bow ties in the safety case are included in the table below:
HSG 254 [2] clearly provides detailed steps to establish dual safety performance
indicators by utilizing Swiss Cheese model. If the MAH Bow Ties or Swiss Cheese
diagram can be used as reference to define the dual safety performance indicators, then
the logical link can be established from MAH to barriers or SCEs to the safety
performance.
For example, if we take the Swiss Cheese barrier diagram (shown below) for the MAE/
MAH Hydrocarbon Fires & Explosions, the dual process safety indicators are derived
from the specific barriers or SCEs. These performance indicators could then be
monitored through the HSE Management system to measure process safety
performance as part of MHM process.
cases have clearly proved the fact that it is nearly impossible to mitigate and recover
from major accidents.
Focus on the
left side of the
bow!
Verification scheme is a Safety Case Regulation, 2005 [1] requirement and is a critical
document that demonstrates the performance assurance of SCEs. The performance,
assurance and re-assurance details in the SCE performance standards should be
incorporated into the Centralized Maintenance Management System (CMMS) or AIM.
Generally the Critical Function Tests (CFTs) are defined and prioritized for all SCEs in
the CMMS.
8. Conclusion:
References:
Author:
Pillai Sreejith
pillai_sreejith@hotmail.com