Juntilla v.

Fontanar Facts: Roberto Juntilla was a passenger of a jeepney driven by Berfol Camoro, which was registered under the franchise of Clemente Fontanar and owned by Fernando Banzon. The right rear tire exploded causing the vehicle to turn turtle. Juntilla was seatedin the front and he was thrown out of the vehicle and lost consciousness. When he came to his senses, he found that he had a lacerated wound on his right palm, injuries on his left arm, right thigh and back, and his Omega wristwatch was lost. He filed a case with the City Court of Cebu where judgment was rendered in favor of Juntilla, ordering defendants to pay him damages and reimbursement. The CFI reversed the decision, finding the accident a fortuitous incident and pronouncing them without liability. Issue: W/N the Court committed GAD in failing to take cognizance of the fact that defendants failed to exercise utmost and/or extraordinary diligence required of common carriers contemplated under Art. 1755. Held: There are specific acts of negligence on the part of the respondents. The passenger jeepney turned turtle and jumped into a ditch immediately after its rear tire exploded which shows that the jeepney was running at a very fast speed. It was also overloaded at the time of the accident. The sudden blow-up of the tire could have been caused by too much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that it was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident. The accident was caused either through the negligence of the driver or because of the mechanical defects of the tire. The rationale of the carriers liability is the fact that the passenger has neither choice nor control over the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and appliances in use by the carrier. Having no privity whatever with the manufacturer or vendor of the defective equipment, the passenger has no remedy against him, while the carrier usually has. It is but logical, therefore, that the carrier, while not an insurer of the safety of his passengers, should nevertheless be held to answer for the flaws of his equipment if such flaws were at all discoverable. The source of a common carriers legal liability is the contract of carriage, and by entering into said contract, it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with a due regard for all circumstances. A caso fortuito: (1)The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will. (2)It must be impossible to foresee the event constituting the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid. (3)The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. (4)The obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. Necessito, et al. v. Paras, et al. Facts: In the morning of January 28, 1964, Severina Garces and her one-year old son, Precillano Necesito, carrying vegetables, boarded passenger auto truck or bus No. 199 of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines at Agno, Pangasinan. The passenger truck, driven by Francisco Bandonell, then proceeded on its regular run from Agno to Manila. After passing Mangatarem, Pangasinan truck No. 199 entered a wooden bridge, but the front wheels swerved to the right; the driver lost control, and after wrecking the bridge's wooden rails, the truck fell on its right side into a creek where water was breast deep. The mother, Severina Garces, was drowned; the son, Precillano Necesito, was injured, suffering abrasions and fracture of the left femur. He was brought to the Provincial Hospital at Dagupan, where the fracture was set but with fragments one centimeter out of line. The money, wrist watch and cargo of vegetables were lost. Two actions for damages and attorney's fees having been filed in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac against the carrier, the latter pleaded that the accident was due to "engine or mechanical trouble" independent or beyond the control of the defendants or of the driver Bandonell. After joint trial, the Court of First Instance found that the bus was proceeding slowly due to the bad condition of the road; that the accident was caused by the fracture of the right steering knuckle, which was defective in that its center or core was not compact but "bubbled and cellulous", a condition that could not be known or ascertained by the carrier despite the fact that regular thirty-day inspections were made of the steering knuckle, since the steel

exterior was smooth and shiny to the depth of 3/16 of an inch all around; that the knuckles are designed and manufactured for heavy duty and may last up to ten years; that the knuckle of bus No. 199 that broke on January 28, 1954, was last inspected on January 5, 1954, and was due to be inspected again on February 5th. Hence, the trial court, holding that the accident was exclusively due to fortuitous event, dismissed both actions. Plaintiffs appealed directly to this Court in view of the amount in controversy. Issue: Whether or not the carrier is liable for the manufacturing defect of the steering knuckle, and whether the evidence discloses that in regard thereto the carrier exercised the diligence required by law (Art. 1755, new Civil Code) Held: Yes. While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers, the manufacturer of the defective appliance is considered in law the agent of the carrier, and the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. The rationale of the carriers liability is the fact that the passengers has no privity with the manufacturer of the defective equipment; hence, he has no remedy against him, while the carrier has. We find that the defect could be detected. The periodical, usual inspection of the steering knuckle did not measure up to the utmost diligence of a very cautious person as far as human care and foresight can provide and therefore the knuckles failure cannot be considered a fortuitous event that exempts the carrier from responsibility. Eastern Shipping Lines vs. IAC (GR L-69044, 29 May 1987) Eastern Shipping Lines vs. Nisshin Fire and Marine Insurance Co. (GR L-71478) Facts: In GR 69044, sometime in or prior to June 1977, the M/S ASIATICA, a vessel operated by Eastern Shipping Lines loaded at Kobe, Japan for transportation to Manila, 5,000 pieces of calorized lance pipes in 28 packages valued at P256,039.00 consigned to Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and 7 cases of spare parts valued at P92,361.75, consigned to Central Textile Mills, Inc. Both sets of goods were insured against marine risk for their stated value with Development Insurance and Surety Corporation. In GR 71478, during the same period, the same vessel took on board 128 cartons of garment fabrics and accessories, in 2 containers, consigned to Mariveles Apparel Corporation, and two cases of surveying instruments consigned to Aman Enterprises and General Merchandise. The 128 cartons were insured for their stated value by Nisshin Fire & Marine Insurance Co., for US$46,583.00, and the 2 cases by Dowa Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd., for US$11,385.00. Enroute for Kobe, Japan, to Manila, the vessel caught fire and sank, resulting in the total loss of ship and cargo. The respective Insurers paid the corresponding marine insurance values to the consignees concerned and were thus subrogated unto the rights of the latter as the insured. [GR 69044] Development Insurance, having been subrogated unto the rights of the two insured companies, filed suit against Eastern Shipping for the recovery of the amounts it had paid to the insured before the then Court of First Instance of Manila. Eastern Shipping denied liability mainly on the ground that the loss was due to an extraordinary fortuitous event, hence, it is not liable under the law. The Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of Development Insurance. Eastern Shipping took an appeal to the then Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court. Eastern Shipping filed a petition for review on certiorari. [GR 71478] Nisshin, and Dowa, as subrogees of the insured, filed suit against Eastern Shipping for the recovery of the insured value of the cargo lost with the then Court of First Instance of Manila, imputing unseaworthiness of the ship and non-observance of extraordinary diligence by Eastern Shipping. Eastern Shipping denied liability on the principal grounds that the fire which caused the sinking of the ship is an exempting circumstance under Section 4(2) (b) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA); and that when the loss of fire is established, the burden of proving negligence of the vessel is shifted to the cargo shipper. The Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of Nisshin and Dowa. On appeal by Eastern Shipping, the Court of Appeals, affirmed with modification the Trial Courts judgment by decreasing the amount recoverable by Dowa to US$1,000.00 because of $500 per package limitation of liability under the COGSA. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari by Eastern Shipping. Issues: (1) Law applicable and (2) Burden of Proof Held: (1) The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or deterioration. As the cargoes in question were transported from Japan to the Philippines, the liability of Petitioner Carrier is governed primarily by the Civil Code. However, in all matters not regulated by said Code, the rights and obligations of common carrier shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws. Thus, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a special law, is suppletory to the provisions of the Civil Code.

(2) Under the Civil Code, common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over goods, according to all the circumstances of each case. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods unless the same is due to flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or calamity. Petitioner Carrier claims that the loss of the vessel by fire exempts it from liability under the phrase "natural disaster or calamity." However, the court is of the opinion that fire may not be considered a natural disaster or calamity since it arises almost invariably from some act of man or by human means. It does not fall within the category of an act of God unless caused by lightning or by other natural disaster or calamity. It may even be caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier. As the peril of the fire is not comprehended within the exception in Article 1734, Article 1735 of the Civil Code provides that all cases than those mention in Article 1734, the common carrier shall be presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it has observed the extraordinary deligence required by law. The respective Insurers, as subrogees of the cargo shippers, have proven that the transported goods have been lost. Petitioner Carrier has also proved that the loss was caused by fire. The burden then is upon Petitioner Carrier to prove that it has exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. Having failed to discharge the burden of proving that it had exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law, Petitioner Carrier cannot escape liability for the loss of the cargo. Ganzon v. CA Facts: On November 28, 1956, Gelacio Tumambing contracted the services of Mauro B. Ganzon to haul 305 tons of scrap iron from Mariveles, Bataan, to the port of Manila on board the lighter LCT Batman. Pursuant to that agreement, Mauro B. Ganzon sent his lighter Batman to Mariveles where it docked in three feet of water. Gelacio Tumambing delivered the scrap iron to defendant Filomeno Niza, captain of the lighter, for loading which was actually begun on the same date by the crew of the lighter under the captain's supervision. When about half of the scrap iron was already loaded, Mayor Jose Advincula of Mariveles, Bataan, arrived and demanded P5,000.00 from Gelacio Tumambing. The latter resisted the shakedown and after a heated argument between them, Mayor Jose Advincula drew his gun and fired at Gelacio Tumambing who sustained injuries. After sometime, the loading of the scrap iron was resumed. But on December 4, 1956, Acting Mayor Basilio Rub, accompanied by three policemen, ordered captain Filomeno Niza and his crew to dump the scrap iron where the lighter was docked. The rest was brought to the compound of NASSCO. Later on Acting Mayor Rub issued a receipt stating that the Municipality of Mariveles had taken custody of the scrap iron. Tumabing sued Ganzon; the latter alleged that the goods have not been unconditionally placed under his custody and control to make him liable. The trial court dismissed the case but on appeal, respondent Court rendered a decision reversing the decision of the trial court and ordering Ganzon to pay damages. Issue: Whether or not a contract of carriage has been perfected Held: Yes. By the said act of delivery, the scraps were unconditionally placed in the possession and control of the common carrier, and upon their receipt by the carrier for transportation, the contract of carriage was deemed perfected. Consequently, the petitioner-carrier's extraordinary responsibility for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods commenced. Pursuant to Art. 1736, such extraordinary responsibility would cease only upon the delivery, actual or constructive, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them. The fact that part of the shipment had not been loaded on board the lighter did not impair the said contract of transportation as the goods remained in the custody and control of the carrier, albeit still unloaded. Before Ganzon could be absolved from responsibility on the ground that he was ordered by competent public authority to unload the scrap iron, it must be shown that Acting Mayor Basilio Rub had the power to issue the disputed order, or that it was lawful, or that it was issued under legal process of authority. The appellee failed to establish this. Indeed, no authority or power of the acting mayor to issue such an order was given in evidence. Neither has it been shown that the cargo of scrap iron belonged to the Municipality of Mariveles. What the court had in the record is the stipulation of the parties that the cargo of scrap iron was accumulated by the appellant through separate purchases here and there from private individuals. The fact remains that the order given by the

acting mayor to dump the scrap iron into the sea was part of the pressure applied by Mayor Jose Advincula to shakedown Tumambing for P5,000.00. The order of the acting mayor did not constitute valid authority for Ganzon and his representatives to carry out. Quisumbing vs. CA (GR 50076, 14 September 1990) Facts: Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. and Gunther Loeffler were among the passengers of PALs Fokker Friendship PIC-536 plane in its flight of November 6, 1968 which left Mactan City at about 7:30 in the evening with Manila for its destination. After the plane had taken off, Florencio O. Villarin, a Senior NBI Agent who was also a passenger of the said plane, noticed a certain Zaldy, a suspect in the killing of Judge Valdez, seated at the front seat near the door leading to the cockpit of the plane. A check by Villarin with the passengers ticket in the possession of flight Stewardess Annie Bontigao, who was seated at the last seat right row revealed that Zaldy had used the name Cardente, one of his aliases known to Villarin. Villarin also came to know from the stewardess that Zaldy had three companions on board the plane. Villarin then scribbled a note addressed to the pilot of the plane requesting the latter to contact NBI duty agents in Manila for the said agents to ask the Director of the NBI to send about 6 NBI agents to meet the plane because the suspect in the killing of Judge Valdez was on board. The said note was handed by Villarin to the stewardess who in turn gave the same in the pilot. After receiving the note, which was about 15 minutes after take off, the pilot of the plane, Capt. Luis Bonnevie, Jr., came out of the cockpit and sat beside Villarin at the rear portion of the plane and explained that he could not send the message because it would be heard by all ground aircraft stations. Villarin, however, told the pilot of the danger of commission of violent acts on board the plane by the notorious Zaldy and his three companions. While the pilot and Villarin were talking, Zaldy and one of his companions walked to the rear and stood behind them. Capt. Bonnevie then stood up and went back to the cockpit. Zaldy and his companions returned to their seats, but after a few minutes they moved back to the rear throwing ugly looks at Villarin who, sensing danger, stood up and went back to his original seat across the aisle on the second to the last seat near the window. Zaldy and his companion likewise went back to their respective seats in front. Soon thereafter an exchange of gunshots ensued between Villarin and Zaldy and the latters companions. Zaldy announced to the passengers and the pilots in the cockpit that it was hold-up and ordered the pilot not to send any SOS. The hold-uppers divested the passengers of their belongings. Specifically, Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. was divested of jewelries and cash in the total amount of P18,650.00 out of which recoveries were made amounting to P4,550.00. Gunther Loeffler was divested of a wrist watch, cash and a wallet in the total amount of P1,700.00. As a result of the incident, Quisumbing, Sr. suffered shock, because a gun had been pointed at him by one of the hold-uppers. Upon landing at the Manila International Airport, Zaldy and his three companions succeeded in escaping. Demands were thereafter made on PAL by Quisumbing and Loeffler to indemnify them on their loss, but PAL refused averring that it is not liable to them in law or in fact. Quisumbing and Loeffler brought suit against PAL in the CFI of Rizal, to recover the value of the property lost by them to the robbers as well as moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation. After trial, the CFI rendered judgment dismissing Quisumbings and Loefflers complaint with costs against them. Quisumbing and Loeffler appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court affirmed the trial courts judgment. Insisting that the evidence demonstrates negligence on the part of the PAL crew occurring before and exposing them to hijacking, Quisumbing and Loeffler have come up to the Supreme Court praying that the judgments of the trial Court and the Court of Appeals be reversed and another rendered in their favor. Issue: Is PAL liable for damages? Held: No, it is illusive to assume that had these precautions been taken, the hijacking or the robbery would not have succeeded. The mandatory use of the most sophisticated electronic detection devices and magnetometers, the imposition of severe penalties, the development of screening procedures, the compilation of hijacker behavioral profiles, the assignment of sky marshals, and the weight of outraged world opinion may have minimized hijackings but all these have proved ineffective against truly determined hijackers. World experience shows that if a group of armed hijackers want to take over a plane in flight, they can elude the latest combined government and airline industry measures. And as the case in Zamboanga City illustrates, the use of force to overcome hijackers, results in the death and injury of innocent passengers and crew members. The Court is not in the least bit suggesting that the Philippine Airlines should not do everything humanly possible to protect passengers from

hijackers' acts. The Court merely states that where the defendant has faithfully complied with the requirements of government agencies and adhered to the established procedures and precautions of the airline industry at any particular time, its failure to take certain steps that a passenger in hindsight believes should have been taken is not the negligence or misconduct which mingles with force majeure as an active and cooperative cause. Under the circumstance of the instant case, the acts of the airline and its crew cannot be faulted as negligence. The hijackers had already shown their willingness to kill. One passenger was in fact killed and another survived gunshot wounds. The lives of the rest of the passengers and crew were more important than their properties. Cooperation with the hijackers until they released their hostages at the runway end near the South Superhighway was dictated by the circumstances. PanAm World Airways vs. Rapadas (GR 60673, 19 May 1992) Facts: On 16 January 1975, Jose K. Rapadas rode Pan American World Airways Inc.s (PanAm) Flight 841 with the route from Guam to Manila. While standing in line to board the flight at the Guam airport, Rapadas was ordered by PanAms handcarry control agent to check-in his Samsonite attache case. Rapadas protested pointing to the fact that other co-passengers were permitted to handcarry bulkier baggages. He stepped out of the line only to go back again at the end of it to try if he can get through without having to register his attache case. However, the same man in charge of handcarry control did not fail to notice him and ordered him again to register his baggage. For fear that he would miss the plane if he insisted and argued on personally taking the valise with him, he acceded to checking it in. He then gave his attache case to his brother who happened to be around and who checked it in for him, but without declaring its contents or the value of its contents. Upon arriving in Manila on the same date, Rapadas claimed and was given all his checked-in baggages except the attache case. PanAm exerted efforts to locate the luggage through the Pan American World Airways-Manila International Airport (PAN AM-MIA) Baggage Service. They required Rapadas to put the request in writing. Thereafter, Rapadas personally followed up his claim. For several times, he called up Mr. Panuelos, the head of the Baggage Section of PAN AM. He also sent letters demanding and reminding the petitioner of his claim. Rapadas received a letter from PanAms counsel offering to settle the claim for the sum of $160.00 representing PanAms alleged limit of liability for loss or damage to a passengers personal property under the contract of carriage between Rapadas and PANAM. Refusing to accept this kind of settlement, Rapadas filed the instant action for damages alleging that PanAm discriminated or singled him o ut in ordering that his luggage be checked in. He also alleged that PanAm neglected its duty in the handling and safekeeping of his attache case from the point of embarkation in Guam to his destination in Manila. He placed the value of the lost attache case and its contents at US$42,403.90. The lower court ruled in favor of complainant Rapadas after finding no stipulation giving notice to the baggage liability limitation. The court rejected the claim of PanAm that its liability under the terms of the passenger ticket is only up to $160.00. However, it scrutinized all the claims of Rapadas. It discredited insufficient evidence to show discriminatory acts or bad faith on the part of PanAm. The trial court ordered PanAm to pay Rapadas by way of actual damages the equivalent peso value of the amount of $5,228.90 and 100 paengs (Tongan money), nominal damages in the amount of P20,000.00 and attorneys fees of P5,000.00, and the costs of the suit. The trial court also dismissed PanAms counterclaim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision. Hence, the petition for review. Issue: Should PanAm be liable for the loss of the attach case? Held: The Warsaw Convention governs the availment of the liability limitations where the baggage check is combined with or incorporated in the passenger ticket which complies with the provisions of Article 3, par. 1(c). (Article 4, par. 2) Herein, the baggage check is combined with the passenger ticket in one document of carriage. The passenger ticket complies with Article 3, par. 1(c) which provides: (1) In respect of the carriage of passengers a ticket shall be delivered containing: xxx (c) a notice to the effect that, if the passengers journey involves an ultimate destination or stop in a country other than the country of departure, the Warsaw Convention may be applicable and that the Convention governs and in most cases limits the liability of carriers for death or personal injury and in respect of loss of or damage to baggage.

The provisions in the plane ticket sufficient to govern the limitations of liabilities of the airline for loss of luggage. The passenger, upon contracting with the airline and receiving the plane ticket, was expected to be vigilant insofar as his luggage is concerned. If the passenger fails to adduce evidence to overcome the stipulations, he cannot avoid the application of the liability limitations. Herein, Rapadas actually refused to register the attache case and chose to take it with him despite having been ordered by the PanAm agent to check it in. In attempting to avoid registering the luggage by going back to the line, Rapadas manifested a disregard of airline rules on allowable handcarried baggages. Prudence of a reasonably careful person also dictates that cash and jewelry should be removed from checked-in-luggage and placed in ones pockets or in a hand-carried Manila-paper or plastic envelope. Moreover, the alleged lack of enough time for him to make a declaration of a higher value and to pay the corresponding supplementary charges cannot justify his failure to comply with the requirement that will exclude the application of limited liability. Had he not wavered in his decision to register his luggage, he could have had enough time to disclose the true worth of the articles in it and to pay the extra charges or remove them from the checked-in-luggage. Moreover, an airplane will not depart meantime that its own employee is asking a passenger to comply with a safety regulation. By no means is it suggested that passengers are always bound to the stipulated amounts printed on a ticket, found in a contract of adhesion, or printed elsewhere but referred to in handouts or forms. The Court simply recognize that the reasons behind stipulations on liability limitations arise from the difficulty, if not impossibility, of establishing with a clear preponderance of evidence the contents of a lost valise or suitcase. Unless the contents are declared, it will always be the word of a passenger against that of the airline. If the loss of life or property is caused by the gross negligence or arbitrary acts of the airline or the contents of the lost luggage are proved by satisfactory evidence other than the self-serving declarations of one party, the Court will not hesitate to disregard the fine print in a contract of adhesion. (See Sweet Lines Inc. v. Teves, supra) Otherwise, the Court is constrained to rule that it has to enforce the contract as it is the only reasonable basis to arrive at a just award. The conclusion of the trial court does not arise from the facts. That the attache case was originally handcarried does not beg the conclusion that the amount of $4,750.00 in cash could have been placed inside. It may be noted that out of a claim for US$42,403.90 as the amount lost, the trial court found for only US$5,228.90 and 100 paengs. The court had doubts as to the total claim. The lost luggage was declared as weighing around 18 pounds or approximately 8 kilograms. At $20.00 per kilogram, Pan Am offered to pay $160.00 as a higher value was not declared in advance and additional charges were not paid. The Court notes, however, that an amount of $400.00 per passenger is allowed for unchecked luggage. Since the checking-in was against the will of Rapadas, the Court treats the lost bag as partaking of involuntarily and hurriedly checked-in luggage and continuing its earlier status as unchecked luggage. The fair liability under PanAms own printed terms is $400.00. China Airlines v. Chiok (GR 152122 30 July 2003) Facts: Daniel Chiok purchased a ticket from China Airlines Ltd. Covering Manila-Taipei-Hong Kong-Manila. The ticket was exclusively endorsable to Philippine Airlines. The trips covered by the ticket were pre-scheduled and confirmed. In Taipei, Chiok went to CAL office to confirm his Hong Kong-Manila flight. CAL attached a yellow sticker, indicating that flight was OK. In Hong Kong, Chiok went to PAL office to confirm his Manila flight. PAL confirmed and attached its own sticker. During the scheduled flight bound to Manila, it was cancelled due to a typhoon. All confirmed ticket holders were booked automatically for its next flight (next day). However on the following day, a PAL employee informed Chiok that his name did not appear in PALs computer list of passengers and therefore could not be permitted to board PAL flight no. PR 307. Chiok filed a complaint for damages. The Regional Trial Court held that CAL and PAL jointly and severely liable to correspondent, affirmed by Court of Appeals. Issue: Whether or not China Airline is liable as a principal carrier? Held: Yes, It is significant to note that the contract of air transportation was between petitioner and respondent, with the former endorsing to PAL the Hong Kong-to-Manila segment of the journey. Such contract of carriage has always been treated in this jurisdiction as a single operation. This jurisprudential rule is supported by the Warsaw Convention, to which the Philippines is a party, and by the existing practices of the International Air Transport Association (IATA).

In American Airlines v. Court of Appeals, the Court has noted that under a general pool partnership agreement, the ticket-issuing airline is the principal in a contract of carriage, while the endorsee-airline is the agent. Likewise, as the principal in the contract of carriage, the petitioner in British Airways v. Court of Appeals was held liable, even when the breach of contract had occurred, not on its own flight, but on that of another airline. The Decision followed our ruling in Lufthansa German Airlines v. Court of Appeals, in which we had held that the obligation of the ticket-issuing airline remained and did not cease, regardless of the fact that another airline had undertaken to carry the passengers to one of their destinations. In the instant case, following the jurisprudence cited above, PAL acted as the carrying agent of CAL. In the same way that we ruled against British Airways and Lufthansa in the aforementioned cases, we also rule that CAL cannot evade liability to respondent, even though it may have been only a ticket issuer for the Hong Kong-Manila sector.