12 Metaphilosophical reflections on theism and atheism in the current debate

Paolo Diego Bubbio

I. New atheism and new theism

In the last few years, philosophy of religion has increasingly become a subject of dispute. Two positions seem to be the most popular. On the one hand, outspoken atheists reject religion in the name of reason and science. On the other hand, we witness an increase of scholarship sympathetic with evangelical movements, especially in the United States. For the purpose of this paper, I will use the term new atheists for referring to the former approach, and the term new theists for referring to the latter approach.1 New atheists is a label that has become usual for identifying some thinkers such as Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris and Quentin Smith.
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A previous version of this paper has been presented as a response to Graham Oppys paper New atheism and Christian evangelicalism, notes in progress at the Philosophy of Religion Research Seminar (University of Sydney). I wish to thank Graham for having shared with me his comments on my response: in the current version of the paper I try to answer some of his objections. An improved version of the paper has been presented at the Australian Catholic University School of Philosophy Seminar and I am grateful to the seminar participants for helpful discussions. I wish also to thank Paul Crittenden, Paul Redding and Luca Moretti for their close reading of this paper and for their insightful comments. Thanks are also due to Philip Quadrio, who also commented on some of my ideas on philosophy of religion, for his amicable assistance by joining in the proof-readings.

Metaphilosophical reflections on theism and atheism 355 Atheism being a general term, a more detailed specification is necessary. The distinguishing feature of the new atheism seems to be a kind of scientific atheism. To borrow the philosopher Thomas Dixons definition (2002: 33759), scientific atheism involves belief in three central doctrines. The first is anti-theism. The second is scientism, conceived as the belief that science, especially natural science, is much the most valuable part of human learning because it is much the most authoritative, or serious, or beneficial (Sorrell 1991: 1, quoted in Dixon 2002: 342). Thirdly, scientific atheists recognise the need to develop an alternative worldview to replace supernaturalism and theism, in which to ground their interpretation of the results of natural science, their understanding of the origins and meaning of human life, and their ethical discourse (Dixon 2002: 342).2 Mainstream scientific atheism is different from evolutionary humanism. The term, coined by Julian Huxley, is used by Dixon to identify a subspecies of scientific atheism, such as that of John C. Avise (1998), which is characterised, in comparison with mainstream scientific atheism, by its more sympathetic attitude to traditional religious believers, religious language and theology (Dixon 2002: 349). Providing a precise account of the new theism is much more difficult. If it is true that some scholars explicitly profess evangelicalism, or at least some of its characteristics as identified by David Bebbington (1989)including: conversionism, biblicism, activism, cruicentrism and hence are often referred to as Evangelic Christians, the term is only partly accurate, both because not all of them profess all these beliefs, and because the movement embraces a wider range of philosophical expressions. Sometimes they are referred to as Christian
As Dixon stresses, This corresponds roughly to the fifth of Stenmarks five sorts of scientism, which he calls redemptive scientism, that is, the view that science alone is sufficient for dealing with our existential questions or for creating a world view by which he could live cf. (Stenmark 1997: 31).
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356 Politics and religion in the new century nationalists, but this label is even less accurate, because it implies an emphasis on the political dimension of their philosophical activity which, even assuming this as their ultimate goal, does not represent the philosophical justification of their reasoning. Rather, the distinguishing feature of what I call new theism seems to be a revived natural philosophy that welcomes rational proofs for the existence of a personal God and supernatural/religious explanations for scientific phenomena. This philosophical attitude is exemplified by (but not limited to) the theory of intelligent design. Intelligent design is the claim that certain features of the universe and of living things are best explained by an intelligent cause, not an undirected process such as natural selection (Discovery Institute 2007: Top Questions section). Thinkers such as William Lane Craig and Robert Koons seem to be committed to this notion.3

II. Should they be considered as philosophies of religion?

The works of the new atheists and of the new theists are usually considered as belonging to (the discipline of) philosophy of religion for they express a (positive or negative) relation between religion and philosophy. However, from a normative point of view, this belonging seems to me disputable. In other words, what I am wondering is whether they should normatively be considered as philosophies of religion.4 Moreover it has to be noted that a descriptive criterion implies a normative criterion, for it is thanks to a generally shared normative
The Center for Science and Culture 2007: Top Questions section (retrieved on September 23, 2007). The website includes both William Lane Craig and Robert Koons as Fellows.
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Questioning the disciplinary belonging of various theses and publications could seem just a problem of linguistic idiosyncrasy, but when we focus on philosophy of religion it is not. I hope it will be made clear before the end of this paper.

Metaphilosophical reflections on theism and atheism 357 criterion that, for instance, we describe the book we are reading as a book of philosophy of religion, of religious philosophy or of theologyor, simply, of literature. What is a normative criterion grounded on? Possible answers are: a) reason; b) a typical standard or model. The latter answer is obviously weaker than the former, as it entails a higher degree of arbitrariness. Let the former option be considered. Unless a notion of objective reason is adopted (which is difficult when focusing on normative criteria), the formulation of the former option should be modified as follows: reasonat least by ordinary standards of reasonableness. In both cases,5 it is implied that a normative criterion depends on a tradition, conceiving this term in the (general) sense of a set of beliefs, customs or practices taught by one generation to the next. The thoughts, theories and publications of the new theists are descriptively considered as belonging to (the discipline of) philosophy of religion. So are the thoughts, theories and publications of the new atheists, insofar as they are considered, as Quentin Smith critically stresses, as a subfield of the philosophy of religion.6 If the descriptive criterion according to which all these thoughts, theories and publications are considered as belonging to (the discipline of) philosophy of religion implies a normative criterion, and if a normative criterion always depends (partially at least) on a tradition, it follows that this

Most of the times these two options do not exclude each other, but they partially overlapfor instance, a normative criterion often (but not always) is grounded on a typical standard or model that has been adopted also because of a reasonat least by ordinary standards of reasonableness. As a subfield of the philosophy of religion, atheism is usually classified as a body of counter-arguments against the cosmological, teleological and ontological arguments, and counter-arguments against the arguments from religious experience and (alleged) miracles (Smith 2001: 195215).

358 Politics and religion in the new century normative criterion has to be found in the broad philosophical tradition these thoughts, theories and publications belong to. The emergence of a normative criterion within a specific tradition thus derives from both a degree of arbitrariness and a reasonat least by ordinary standards of reasonableness (cf. Hobsbawm & Ranger 1992). It seems to me that the reason why the thoughts, theories and publications of the new theists and of the new atheists are considered as belonging to the (discipline of) philosophy of religion lies on the following argument: any philosophical questions that arise in connection with religion properly belong to philosophy of religion. One of the philosophical questions thrown up by reflection on religion is the question whether God exists. Therefore, arguments defining or denying religious explanations for scientific phenomena, and arguments advancing or rejecting rational proofs for the existence of God belong to the (discipline of) philosophy of religion. This normative criterion (which I will refer to as the inclusive criterion) seems to have a high degree of reasonableness. This view can be challenged only by another normative criterion with a higher degree of reasonableness. What I am going to do is to examine a different normative criterion usually adopted in the so-called continental philosophical tradition in order to question whether that criterion is more reasonable than the inclusive criterion. The brief historical account I am going to present is thus motivated not by an attempt to historically circumscribe what could be studied under the label philosophy of religion, but by the aim of showing the motives for the adoption of this criterion, including both a degree of arbitrariness and (what counts more for the purpose of this essay) a degree of reasonableness (at least by ordinary standards of reasonableness).

Metaphilosophical reflections on theism and atheism 359

III. Philosophy, theology and religious philosophy

Philosophy of religion, as a specific discipline, was born relatively late, not before the 18th century, when modern philosophy stopped focusing on the whole, and started focusing on the human being and on her relationship to the world and to God. Only with the Enlightenment is a philosophy of religion developed that is distinct from the ways that medieval philosophy (and also early modern philosophy) had dealt with religion. The universal questions about the being of God are not set aside with this anthropocentric conversion. But the question is not anymore to know the essence of God. Rather, the question is to know how the human being can relate herself to transcendence. A fundamental step in this process is Kants Copernican turn placing the human cognitive activities at the centre of philosophy. With the transcendental move, rational arguments on religion become objects of self-critical reason. Hence, Kant concludes that it is mistaken to take the ideas of the soul, the world, and God as constitutivethey are not cognitive objects, but regulative principles which serve to guide the understanding through reason in respect of experience by using to their greatest perfection the rules of reason (Kant 1998: A320/B376). Kants Religion within the boundaries of mere reason pursues this goal by removing religious claims from the realm of theoretical reason and referencing their significance to regulative and symbolic meaning (Rossi & Wreen 1991). The whole history of German Idealism from Kant onward can be read, as Paul Redding has suggested, as the history of perspectivism (Redding 2009). Perspectivism means first of all the renunciation of the idea that the world can be examined by the subject objectively, that is, from a Gods-eye point of view. When the subject knows an object, she does not know the object in itself, but the object as far as it is

360 Politics and religion in the new century known by the knower. It follows that in the process of knowledge the subject knows her self by knowing the object. It is true that the classic proofs of the existence of God sometimes reappear in different formfor instance, the new formulations of the ontological proof by Schelling and Hegel. However, these proofs appear in a very different context. For example, when Hegel refuses Kants confutation of the ontological proof as nave and barbarian, he is perfectly aware that he is not presenting, properly speaking, an argument. In fact, Hegel preliminarily assumes that an infinite, that is, the Absolute, exists. According to Hegel, the ontological proof seems to make sense only from a particular point of view, only, so to say, in a particular hermeneutic horizonthe one opened by Kants transcendental move. It is not the content of the religious claims that is disputed, but its significance for the human being. Using a different philosophical language, it could be said that there is no epistemology of God. That is, claims about God (existence as well as non-existence claims) are truth-apt: they can be true or false because they have a factual meaning. However, there is no evidence to support one thesis or the otherthat is, claims on God are not epistemologically cognitive: their truth-values are unknowable to us, as there is no way to increase the degree of rational belief in such claims. Therefore, a clear distinction between philosophy and theology is introduced by Kant. Theology bases itself on a revelation, which is presupposed a priori and which theology develops argumentatively by focusing on the content of that revelation. Conversely, philosophy cannot presuppose any revelation. Even if philosophy of religion focused on a particular revelation, it is not its content that it is questioned, but its significance for the human being. Furthermore, philosophy of religion is different from religious philosophy. Philosophy of religion assumes religion as an object of investigation. In doing so, it remains philosophy and does not become

Metaphilosophical reflections on theism and atheism 361 religion. Its approach can be critical, analytical, hermeneutical or whatever, but it cannot be abandonment to religion or a fusion with it. The definition philosophy of religion expresses a relationship, that between philosophy and religion. When there is a fusion between philosophy and religion, this relationship is not possible anymore. This is what happens in religious philosophy, a kind of knowledge in which the philosophical element receives its validity and its fundamental meaning exclusively from its object, that is, the divine. The paradigm of religious philosophy can be found in the neoplatonic tradition. For instance, in Plotinus the content and the object of philosophy have a clear sacral dimension. The doctrine of knowledge is a doctrine of salvation, for the dialectical steps of the return of the soul to the One, although presented in a rational form, constitute an upward movement through the various phases of the emanationistic process, up to the grasp of the supreme truth and to the fusion with it. In philosophical approaches like this, philosophy loses its specificity: there is no distinction between rational process and longing for God.7 According to this normative criterion (which I will refer to as the post-Kantian criterion), philosophy of religion is that discipline which focuses on possible relationships between philosophy and religion broadly conceived (not a specific revealed religion), in the same way in which philosophy of law focuses on the relation between philosophy and the notion of law (not the Australian law or the Italian law), and philosophy of history focuses on the relation between philosophy and the meaning of history (if any), not American history or French history. To emphasise the broadness of the term religion, the discipline could also be defined as the relation between philosophy and religious experience. That is, philosophy of religion should take into consideration not only the meaning of actual and organised sysFor an in-depth explanation of the distinction between philosophy of religion, theology and religious philosophy see (Ravera 1995).
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362 Politics and religion in the new century tems of beliefs and doctrines, but also all those (practical or intellectual) experiences of transcendence coming from outside organised systems. Moreover, the term religious experience stresses once again that religion is not primarily considered by philosophy as a propositional knowledge. The analytic-anglophone tradition has adopted the normative criterion according to which any philosophical questions that arise in connection with religion properly belong to philosophy of religion (inclusive criterion). The continental tradition has instead adopted the normative criterion according to which only the questions that arise in connection with the regulative and symbolic meaning of religion properly belong to philosophy of religion, whereas questions that arise in connection with the theoretical content of religion do not belong to it (post-Kantian criterion).8 The main reason why, I think, the analytic-anglophone tradition has not assumed the criterion adopted by the continental tradition is because it has rejected Kantian and postKantian perspectivism. Therefore Koons and Craigs arguments for the existence of God9 and reasoning about the nature of divine attributes, together with Dawkins and Smiths arguments against the existence of God, can be considered philosophies of religion according to the inclusive crite-

Of course I am generalising. Doubtless it is possible to find some philosophies which belong (geographically and/or methodologically) to the analyticanglophone tradition which adopt the post-Kantian criterion, as well as it is possible to find some philosophies which belong (geographically and/or methodologically) to the continental tradition which adopt the inclusive criterion. However, these can be considered exceptions within a general trend that usually shares the same criterion.

On Craigs Kalam cosmological argument, see Oppy (2006: 13754); on Koons contingency-based cosmological argument, see Oppy (2006: 12530).

Metaphilosophical reflections on theism and atheism 363 rion;10 but cannot be considered philosophies of religion according to the post-Kantian criterion. In fact, the new theists take for granted a form of theism based on Christian revelation, on which they develop a revived natural philosophy. The new atheists often refuse to engage with the theist philosophers arguments because they take for granted that religion itself is nothing more than superstition. As a consequence of this general picture, if one takes a superficial look at the current debate, one could get the feeling that it is necessary to side with either one group or the other. It could even seem that a philosopher should not deal with religion and should stigmatise it as a childish form of superstition or, in case she wants to deal with religion, she should commit herself to the demonstration of the existence of God, to the definition of the divine attributes or, as the new theists do, to the clarification of the scientific validity of the theory of intelligent design. Of course there are other possibilities between these extremes in philosophy of religion (and there are many positions that are actually occupied). There are, for example, many importantly different varieties of atheism as well as many importantly different varieties of theism. However, if one looks at the current debate in the English-speaking world, it still seems that philosophy of religion has to be approached from a theistic or from an atheistic standpoint.11

This is the reason why books on arguments about the existence of God are classified in the philosophy of religion section of the catalogues of the major anglophone scholarly publishers (Cambridge University Press, Oxford University Press, Routledge, Blackwell, etc.). The cataloguers are not making a linguistic or conceptual mistake in so classifying these books. They are simply applying a normative criterion commonly adopted within the tradition they belong to.
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To be more precise, the agnostic standpoint should be added. In fact, those who hold an agnostic standpoint are by definition less predisposed to engage a debate on religion. I will elaborate on this point later on.

364 Politics and religion in the new century

IV. Theist and atheist metaphilosophy of naturalism

The mirror-like positions of the new theists and of new atheists could remind one of the enemy twins referred to by the cultural theorist Ren Girard (1986: 125ff). The enemy twins fight each other vigorously, but they need each other, as both of them build their identity in opposition to their adversary. Despite the frontal opposition that could lead one to think that these two positions have nothing in common, the standpoint of new theists and the standpoint of the new atheists mirror each other. They have something in common. They both assume that religion is a theory. They assume that philosophy can and/or should consider religion as a system of theoretical propositionsso that it is possible, for instance, to increase the rationality of a specific claim regarding the existence of God. The assumption that religion is a theory seems to be based on a kind of meta-naturalism.12 Atheist philosophers profess a methodological naturalismwhich, according to the new theists, entails metaphysical naturalism (cf. Forrest 2000: 729)13conceived as that approach which considers supernatural phenomena as nonexistent or not inherently different from natural hypothesis. On the other hand, the new theists profess a natural philosophy that welcomes supernatural
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The adoption of a naturalistic perspective also explains the rejection of the post Kantian tradition, as Sebastian Gardner recently pointed out: the kinds of philosophical positions most intensively worked on and argued about in nonhistorical, systematic analytic philosophy are predominantly naturalisticand thus, on the face of it, not in any immediate and obvious sense receptive to the central ideas of German idealism (Gardner 2007: 19).

Forrest examines the question of whether methodological naturalism entails philosophical (ontological or metaphysical) naturalism. She concludes that the relationship between methodological and philosophical naturalism, while not one of logical entailment, is the only reasonable metaphysical conclusion.

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Metaphilosophical reflections on theism and atheism 365 explanations of natural phenomena. In both cases, religion is considered as a theory, whose propositional content is then rejected (for it expresses something which does not exist, or which can be explained naturally) or assumed (for it is taken as the ground of natural phenomena). A good (although inevitably partial) account of this approach to religion can be found in Quentin Smiths paper The metaphilosophy of naturalism (2001). Smith complains about the consideration of atheism as a subfield of the philosophy of religion: atheism is usually classified as a body of counter-arguments against the cosmological, teleological and ontological arguments, and counter-arguments against the arguments from religious experience. Conversely, Smith argues, Atheism should be considered as a defence of naturalism against skeptical attacks, and thereby to play a foundational role in justifying the presuppositions of positive naturalist philosophy. On this account theism should be considered as a subfield of naturalism, namely, as a skepticism about the basic principles of naturalism. As the final consequence of this reclassification move, [Philosophy of religion] disappears, to be replaced by a new subfield of naturalism, namely, [skepticism about naturalism], with skeptical arguments being put forth and argued against, with the aim in mind of further developing the argumentative foundations of the naturalist worldview. The position of the new theists could be expressed by the same words, by just inverting the term atheism and theism: theism should be considered as a defence of natural philosophy (expressing supernatural explanations of natural phenomena) against skeptical attacks. Even in this case, philosophy of religion ultimately disappears, to be re-

366 Politics and religion in the new century placed by a subfield of theology, namely, apologetics (defence of theistic positions against atheist attacks), (cf. Cottingham 2005).14 In the post-Kantian view, religion cannot be considered as a theory. The arguments that can be offered in support of claims to know that there is a God or of claims to know that there is no God are not adequate to justify the commitment required by the extreme positions (new theism and new atheism).15 The rational arguments supporting religion are not adequate to justify the required commitment. The lack of rational or empirical proofs is compensated by the believers with faith, a non-rational component that provides the believer with the required degree of commitment. Faith is thus considered by religion as a merit, or a gift, or both (according to the different theological conceptions). The attempts of the new theists to compensate this lack with new rational or empirical proofs paradoxically aim to dismiss faith. If one day our microscopes discovered the words made by God in every cell (provided that they have not been genetically engineered by a race of super-intelligent aliens), the existence of God would become a mere fact, and not a merit or a gift anymore. Once it is accepted that no rational or empirical evidence is sufficient to claim the existence or the non-existence of God, and that this lack of rational and empirical proofs is compensated by the believers with faith in order to reach the required degree of commitment, the quesIn this recent and interesting book, Cottingham rejects the view of religion as a theory. A religious outlook he writes, is never, or at any rate not typically, adopted on the basis of an inference to the best explanation (22). Later on, he stresses that theistic commitments are not derived as a conclusion from the preponderance of philosophical arguments, or put forward as a scientific hypothesis providing the best explanation for certain empirical data (131). This objection does not apply to a belief in God (or non-belief) marked by a degree of caution.
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Metaphilosophical reflections on theism and atheism 367 tion arises: what is compensating the same lack for the atheists, so that they can reach the required degree of commitment? In order to answer this question, it is useful to consider the work of some philosophers of the post-Kantian tradition: Gabriel Marcel and Paul Ricoeur. This exposition will also try to make clear what philosophy of religion should be according to the post-Kantian criterion.

V. Post-Kantian meta-philosophy of religion

In the late 1920s, Gabriel Marcel was one of the protagonists, and maybe the main character, of a heated debate with some atheist philosophers of that time, like Jean-Paul Sartre, Georges Bataille and Albert Camus. The historical context and the philosophical approach of these atheist philosophers were, of course, very different from the current context and the philosophical prospective of the new atheist philosophers. Instead of the scientific atheism (shared by Dawkins, Harris and Smith), Sartre, Bataille and Camus shared a nihilistic atheism based on Nietzsches notion of the death of God. There is no God, there are no metaphysical values of any kind: according to them, human beings have to accept this existential situation. According to Marcel,16 the point is that these nihilist philosophers present atheism as something evident or more rational than faith in God. Despite the difference of historical context and philosophical approach, the general assumption of these nihilist philosophers is the same assumption that can be reached in the statements of the new atheists. The judgment God does not exist is, they say, more evident and/or more rational than the judgement God exists. One of the most exemplary expositions of this argument is that expressed by Norwood Russell Hanson (1972) in What I do not believe: while there
Marcels arguments are taken from Homo viator: introduction to a metaphysic of hope (1951).
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368 Politics and religion in the new century are good reasons for believing that God does not exist, there are no good reasons for believing that God does exist. According to Marcel, atheism is neither evident nor more rational. The non-existence of God cannot be proved, in the same way that the existence of God cannot be proved. It is not the task of philosophy of religion to demonstrate the existence of God or the immortality of the soul. Following in Pascals footsteps, Marcel claims that the belief in the existence of God, as well as the belief in the non-existence of God, is the result of a wager. It is just as much an act of faith as the opposite choice. In other words, at the root of every philosophy (or, better, at the root of every human existence) there is always a wager. In this way, Marcel provides an answer to the question what is compensating the lack of rational and empirical proofs for the atheists, so that they can reach the required degree of commitment? According to Marcel, the answer is faitha non-rational component that provides the unbeliever with the required degree of commitment in the non-existence of God. It has to be noted that the wager argument, as it is reproposed by Marcel, does not claim to be a convincing argument for taking steps to become a believer in a specific revealed religion (such as Christianity for Pascal). As Diderot (1875: 167)17 pointed out, an imam could just as well reason the same way: Pascals argument cannot decide among different religions. Insofar as faith is a nonrational component, its content is not rationally determined.18 The conversion to a specific faith requires a higher degree of commitment than that required by the (simple) assertion of the existence of God

See Hacking (1994: 24) and Jordan (1994: 10113). I am grateful to Paul Crittenden for having called my attention on this point. Claiming that the content of faith does not need to be rationally determined does not imply the claim that reasonableness does not play any role in the choice of ones own faith. One could consider her own religion as more reasonable, but the judgement is, of course, culturally determined and highly subjective.
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Metaphilosophical reflections on theism and atheism 369 (regardless of the fact that it is then identified with a personal God, with a superior being pantheistically conceived or with anything else). Marcel does not try to defend this argument, not even by claiming it at least gets us to theism (the so-called generic theism answer).19 Insofar as Marcel belongs to the philosophical tradition opened by Kants transcendental move, he is not interested in the content of the religious claim here. His approach here is phenomenological20he is phenomenologically describing how believers and unbelievers compensate the lack of rational and empirical proofs. Marcel goes further. He wonders: what does determine our decision to bet on the existence or on the non-existence of God? Behind a wager, Marcel argues, there is a desire, if not even a will. Marcel writes: There is, then, an emotional element lurking beneath the apparently objective and rational assertion or claim made by the unbeliever; and what is more, deeper thought on the matter will show us that it could not be otherwise (Marcel 1949: 208). From this point of view, the whole nihilistic thought appears like a form of dogmatism generated by a will: I want reality to be of such sort that it gives me no grounds for expecting any salvation or cherishing any hope (Marcel 1951: 199). This is Nietzsches greatest lesson: once metaphysics has been definitely abandoned, we have to face the fact that at the roots of every taking of sides, both existentially and theoretically speaking, there is a will. When one commits herself to theism or atheism (or all the more so to a specific kind of theism or atheism), she is not primarily choosing according to the prior probabilities she assigns to the theoretical
See Jordan (1994: 10113) and Armour-Garb (1999: 11938). The generic theism answer runs into the Professors God objection: God could reward those who humbly remain sceptical in the absence of evidence, and not those who adopt theism. Cf. (Martin 1990: 22938; Mackie 1982: 20003).
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On Marcel and phenomenology, see Bubbio (2005: 5570).

370 Politics and religion in the new century propositions constituting the standpoint she is taking. Although culture, social influences, existential experiences and the like can and do play a relevant role in the decision-making process, the decisive determinant is somehow a reflection of how one wants the world to be.21 Besides deciding to bet on the existence or on the non-existence of God, there is a third option. One could say that the matter is too unclear or uncertain to make a definite decision, and then she would chose not to bet (agnosticism). However, even this is a decision and, qua talis, it is moved importantly by desire and will (as well as the cultural, social and existential determinants mentioned above). This position is different from (scientific or nihilistic) atheism, and from rational theism because it seems less exposed to the risk of turning into a form of dogmatism. At a meta-philosophical level (the matter of religion is too unclear or uncertain to rationally make a definite decision), it can be considered as the standpoint of a post-Kantian philosophy of religion. Nevertheless, it can become dogmatic if the agnostic position is considered not meta-philosophically, but philosophically or existentially, that is, if the content of the agnostic proposition is considered more rational than that of the atheist or theist propositions (the matter of religion is too unclear or uncertain, so that the only rational decision is not to decide). The content of the agnostic proposition is not more rational, as it is equally moved by desire and will.

21 This outcome is similar to the weak faith proposed by the Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo in Belief (1999), whose original title is Credere di credere (which literally means I believe that I believe). Although this conception can be considered as a relativisation of faith, it is not so far from some theological interpretations of the Augustine doctrine of prevenient grace, insofar as it allows persons to engage their free will to choose the salvation offered by God (or to reject it).

Metaphilosophical reflections on theism and atheism 371 There are no successful arguments for the conclusion that God exists or does not exist. Therefore, if the post-Kantian normative criterion is applied, hypothesis and theories that insist in presenting arguments for the existence or for the non-existence of God do not belong to (the discipline of) philosophy of religion. It has been previously said that according to the post-Kantian criterion, philosophy of religion is that discipline which focuses on possible relations between philosophy and religion broadly conceived. It has also been said that philosophy of religion should not focus on the content of religious claims, but on their significance for the human being. Therefore, what does a philosophy of religion conceived in this way look like? One of the most representative philosophies of this tradition is the hermeneutics developed by Paul Ricoeur.22 According to Ricoeur, the passage from metaphysics to hermeneutics, that is, from a dogmatic thought that wants to reach absolute and objective truths to a thought which recognises that truth is not an object and can be partially reached only through interpretations, is not painless. A hermeneutics of the sacred must pass through the so-called school of suspicion: Marx, Nietzsche and Freud provide philosophy with the tools necessary for demystification. Only by learning not to confuse religion with the ideological superstructures of a particular form of society or with the psychological projections of consciousness, is it possible to establish a real dialogue between philosophy and religion.23

Paul Ricoeurs main mentor was, not by chance, Gabriel Marcel. See Blundell (2003: 89102). Cottingham not only supports a bare compatibility between philosophy, psychoanalysis and religion, that is, the mere possibility of co-existence between our three domains of thought. He also suggests that these three areas of human reflection can be seen as intimately intertwined (Cottingham 2005: 73).
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372 Politics and religion in the new century Ricoeur argues that an authentic philosophy of religion necessarily is a hermeneutics of symbols. According to Ricoeur, the symbol is a sign able to transmit a meaning. Ricoeur says that the main feature of a symbol is opacity: an opacity that can be penetratedbut never solved in perfect transparency. The rationalisation of the sacred and of the question of evil, which is always indissolubly bounded to religion, ended up dissolving the symbolic and regulative meaning of religious experience itself. Hence, Ricoeurs conclusion: that it is necessary to undo the concept, to pass through the defeat of knowledge to find that meaning in the symbols of religious experience. The meta-philosophical standpoint of a position such as that held by Ricoeur implies that religious experience is taken as an important part of the human experience (at least in the great majority of human cultures). Insofar as every person faces the problem, whether defining herself an agnostic, an atheist or a theist (and, more specifically, a Christian, a Muslim, a scientific or nihilistic atheist and so on), she somehow goes through a religious experience. This experience thus deserves to be considered by a philosopher qua philosopher (and not qua believer, unbeliever or agnostic).24 A philosophy of religion con-

To consider religion only as a social and psychological phenomenon, so that it should be studied only by human sciences such as anthropology, sociology and psychology, is quite reductive, as much so as ascribing the so-called religious conflicts and the phenomenon of terrorism exclusively or primarily to the religious element. Sam Harris (2004) writes: There are days when almost every headline in the morning papers attests to the social costs of religious faith, and the nightly news seems miraculously broadcast from the fourteenth century (236). I would ask of Harris whether the headlines in the morning papers really attest to the social costs of religious faith or they rather attest to the religious cost of the social and economic conflicts. It is a serious mistake to merely identify terrorism and religious fundamentalism. But if it is true that terrorism easily develops within religious fundamentalism, it is also true that the latter is often just an expression of deeper economic and social conflicts.

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Metaphilosophical reflections on theism and atheism 373 ceived as a hermeneutics of religious experience does not demand a demonstration of the truth, but is meant to be a dialogue between philosophy and religion, while recognising both of them as expressions of the human being. Ricoeurs philosophy is a good example of this hermeneutics of religious experience. However, it could be said that Ricoeurs approach has its limits. The irreducibility of symbols to non-symbolic concepts represents a serious problem for a philosophy of religion that aims to play a role in the establishment of a dialogue among different religious experiences. Our times, characterised by a loss of shared values and by the confrontation (if not conflict) between different cultures, seem to issue to philosophy the challenge of expressing itself on the possibility of a thought usable and able to be shared. A symbol is richer than a concept because of its opacity, which makes it inexhaustible. And its opacity can be penetrated because a symbol refers to a complex system of signs, references and other symbols as well. This system is what we name culture. Hence, a symbol is completely meaningful only within a particular culture. When our main demand becomes the goal to find a common cultural language that may be accepted and shared among different cultures, a symbol unfortunately loses the greater part of its richness and sometimes even its utility. Therefore, the great challenge for philosophy of religion today seems to be to maintain its own speculative vocation and delineate suitable limits for a space of possible sharing, while at the same time establishing a dialogue among different religious traditions. The point is that religion is, as Kant argued, the realm of regulative and symbolic meanings. However, the pursuance of that aim implies the use of concepts. In fact, concepts can (potentially) establish a relation with all the symbolic contexts. Of course this process of translation of a symbol into concept does not happen without a degree of impoverishment of the symbol.

374 Politics and religion in the new century A hint for dealing with this problem can be found in Kant. It has been said that Kant removed religious claims from the realm of theoretical reason and related their significance to regulative and symbolic meaning. Ricoeur (and most of the hermeneutic tradition together with him) emphasised the symbolic aspect of this move. Hegel emphasised the regulative aspect of it. In the light of recent revisionist readings (such as those of Robert B. Pippin, Terry Pinkard and Paul Redding), Hegels notion of God can be philosophically considered in a Kantian way, that is, as an idea playing a regulative role (rather than as a super-entity). Conceived in this way, Hegels account of God appears to be formed by symbolically expressed ideas. Philosophy does not dismiss religion, but preserves it (Pinkard 2000: 578). Concepts only partially succeed in translating symbolic content into rational content. Concepts fail because they do not exhaust the symbolbut, in so doing, they maintain the symbolic inexhaustibility. This failure is not philosophically useless. This kind of approach does not claim to exhaust the meaning of a religious symbol (rational dogmatism) and does not limit itself to expressing what a religious symbol is not (negative theology). It allows one to mark the border between what can be expressed theoretically and what is significant regulatively and symbolically, thus continuing the philosophical project started by Kant with Religion within the boundaries of mere reason. Further, it shows how religious symbols play a regulative role in the interaction among individuals and constitute their identities (cf. Redding 2007: 17599).25 Thus, religion can be viewed as something clearly personal but not exclusively subjective.26

25 26

See also Bielefeldt (2003). This point can be fruitfully expanded through further developments.

Metaphilosophical reflections on theism and atheism 375

VI. Conclusion
In conclusion, it is time to come back to the question which has been proposed for investigation, namely, whether the inclusive criterion (any philosophical questions that arise in connection with religion properly belong to philosophy of religion) can be challenged by another normative criterion with a higher degree of reasonableness. The alternative that has been examined is the post-Kantian criterion, which can be formulated as follows: any philosophical questions that arise in connection with the symbolic or regulative meaning of religion, and not with its propositional content, properly belong to philosophy of religion. Questioning the disciplinary belonging of some theses and publications (such as those of the new atheists and the new theists) is not just a problem of linguistic idiosyncrasy, as the answer to this question potentially sets the agenda for philosophy of religion itself. If the inclusive criterion is applied, philosophy of religion seems destined to remain trapped in a pros/cons discussion between theism and atheism. Theist philosophers will keep defending arguments for the existence of God (and will try to find new ones). Atheist philosophers will keep attacking arguments for the existence of God (and will try to find new arguments for the non-existence of God). Others will simply not engage the debate and/or will dismiss religion as superstition. In the long run, philosophy of religion is destined to disappear. It will be absorbed by two subfields: a subfield of atheist naturalism and a subfield of a theistic natural philosophy. Of course there are other possibilities between these extremes, and maybe a philosophy of religion not conceived only as a skeptical subfield is possible for both (reasonable) religious believers and non-believers. However, this is the point: the meta-philosophy of religion supporting the inclusive criterion conceives philosophy of religion as a set of theoretical propositions regarding the content of religion. Hence, one can: a) try

376 Politics and religion in the new century to demonstrate that these propositions are true, b) try to demonstrate that these propositions are false, or c) stand aside, or show that none of these arguments are powerful enough to be convincing.27 The difference between the extremes of the new atheists and the new theists, on the one hand, and more moderate thinkers, on the other, concerns the degree of commitment to the factual contents of religious propositionsit does not concern the accepted metaphilosophical standpoint, which is basically the same. In both cases, religious propositions are thought of as provided with factual content, and the differences concern the degree of probability or plausibility ascribed to these propositions. In a few words, the new atheists and the new theists are more dogmatic than the more moderate philosophers. Yet both of them consider religion to be a theory. If this is philosophy of religion, then it does not seem to meet the contemporary need for dialogue between different religious traditions. Insofar as a theory is an explanation or a model of given phenomena, it can only be right or wrong (or improvable). I will not accept a dialogue with those who support a different theory, if I think their theory has been proved wrong. Thus the new theists will not accept a dialogue with believers of other faiths, likewise the new atheists will not accept a dialogue with any kind of religious believers, as they are both dogmatic. The more moderate philosophers are not exposed to the risk of dogmatism, so they will stand aside: a position that can promote tolerance among different faiths, but not a real dialogue. If the post-Kantian criterion is applied, then different consequences follow. To consider the religious fact as an important part of the human experience (not only as a psychological or social fact, but as a symbolic and regulative dimension of the human being) is not to claim a particular religion (or religious experience) as true or more

27

It seems to me that the latter is the position expressed by Graham Oppy (2006).

Metaphilosophical reflections on theism and atheism 377 authentic than others. The support of a specific religion (or of a specific atheist faith) cannot be considered as the outcome of a philosophy. A philosopher who does not (personally) believe in the existence of God is not automatically an atheist philosopher, insofar as she recognises the symbolic and regulative value of religion. In the same way, a philosopher who does (personally) believe in God is not necessarily a Christian, a theist or a religious philosopher, insofar as she recognises the non-rational component of her personal commitment and does not consider her faith as the premise or the outcome of her philosophy.28 The boundary between an analysis of regulative value and symbolic significance on the one hand, and a religious claim (like the affirmation of the existence of God) on the other, cannot be exceeded. For instance, Leslie Stevenson, commenting on John Cottinghams statement (2005: 80) that One is able to affirm that God exists as one apprehends depths of value and significance in the world asks: Is anyone who finds value and significance in the world thereby affirming the existence of God? (Stevenson 2006: 47476). If the post-Kantian criterion is adopted, the philosophical answer to this question is no. Of course it can be questioned whether the idea of a personal God is more consistent with the presence of value and significance in the world precisely because it is personalbut in doing so, we are exceeding the boundaries of philosophy (of religion) and we are trespassing in religious philosophy or in theology. It seems to me that there are several reasons why the post-Kantian criterion can be considered to be more reasonable than the inclusive criterion (at least by ordinary standards of reasonableness). First, it defines more accurately the boundaries that distinguish philosophy of religion, religious philosophy and theology. Second, it better defines the object of the discipline, namely, the possible relations between
From this point of view, there could be, so to say, a Christian who is a philosopher, but not a philosopher who is Christian.
28

378 Politics and religion in the new century philosophy and religion broadly conceived (not a specific revealed religion), so that the discipline can be considered on a par with other philosophical disciplines (such as philosophy of language or philosophy of law). Third, by conceiving the notion of religion as the set of all possible religious experiences, it includes in the field all those (practical or intellectual) experiences of transcendence which do not belong to a specific system of religious belief and which are devoid of a corresponding propositional knowledge (such as mysticism). Fourth, by accepting Nietzsches lesson that at the root of every sidetaking there is a will, it acknowledges the importance of emotional and voluntary components of religious beliefs. Fifth, the post-Kantian criterion thus firmly refuses any kind of dogmatism. Sixth, and most important, it allows philosophers to open a real dialogue between different religious traditions. Within a real dialogue between philosophy and religion, the religious element cannot be reduced to psychological intimacy or arbitrary subjectivity, insofar as a personal belief does not conflict with an acceptance of the function of philosophy as the norm or criterion of every judgment. Paraphrasing the Italian hermeneutic philosopher Luigi Pareyson, it could be said that when one commits a common work to demands of reason, she admits that everybody else do the same. If someone should demonstrate to me, on rational grounds, that I am wrong, I will withdraw as readily as I would speak in the name of reason, in case I discover someone in error and demonstrate to her the precise source of her error. And let it be noted that I do not permit myself to be convinced by the other as that particular person who holds a particular belief, but as one who induces me to listen to the voice of that reason I was unable to hear, and which now we both exercise, she in convincing me of my error and I in permitting myself to be convinced, (cf. Pareyson 1/1952: 8396; 1995: 6579).

Metaphilosophical reflections on theism and atheism 379 Philosophy of religion can really play a role in the contemporary world in so far as it remains philosophy. Put differently, philosophy of religion can speak every religious language in so far as it speaks a philosophical language, and not a religious one. Philosophy of religion is neither Christian or Islamic, atheist nor theist. This does not mean that it must necessarily be neutral, but that its outcome should be the result of a philosophical analysis that takes its object seriously; and not just the development of a thesis or a belief taken for granted or assumed a priori. In conclusion, I think that philosophy of religion can play a fundamental role in the contemporary society insofar as it is able to go beyond the meta-philosophical naturalistic view of religion as a theory. In this case, it will significantly contribute to the overcoming of all possible dogmatisms (either religious or atheist) and to building bridges between different religious traditions.

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