A Salt on the Land: A Narrative Analysis of the Controversy over Irrigation-Related Salinity and Toxicity in California's San Joaquin

Valley Author(s): Janne Hukkinen, Emery Roe, Gene I. Rochlin Reviewed work(s): Source: Policy Sciences, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Nov., 1990), pp. 307-329 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4532205 . Accessed: 14/01/2012 07:01
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308 ley's agriculturaldrainage, local, state and federal irrigationagencies are by caughtin a systemwidedilemmalittle recognizedor articulated irrigation officials.On the one hand, despite considerablesocial and politicalpressure to solve or mitigatethe problemsof toxicityand salinityin agricultural drainwater, persistent uncertainty about the risks and efficacy of competing methods has preventedprogressin rectifyingthese problems.On the other hand, solutions that allow irrigationto continue unabatedin the Valley will over the provisionof subsidizedwaterfor exacerbatean ongoing controversy the subsidizedcrops of a few highlysubsidizedagribusiness firms. In short, irrigationagencies face the need to reduce uncertaintyabout treatmentmethods,while reductionin this uncertainty increasesthe potential for further polarizing the irrigationcontroversy.Identifyingthis dilemma helps us understandwhy policy-makersare very reluctantto move in any action-forcingdirection that increases their political costs and have instead continued to requestlittle but additionalstudy in the face of a manifestand growingproblem. In this article,we demonstratehow a narrative approachcan identifysuch blocks to effectivepolicy-makingand sketch out those areas of conimplicit tention that must be addressedbefore conventionalpolicy-analytic tools can be effectivelyused. We also describeour experiencein presentingsuchresults to the irrigationofficials concerned and their response to the dilemma disclosed by the narrative approach. on toxics and salts in the San JoaquinValley Background irrigation Thesetting According to estimates published in the early 1980s, approximatelyeight million of the eleven million crop-producingacres in Californiaare under The irrigation.1 SanJoaquinValleyhas accountedfor overhalf of the irrigated acreagein the recentpast2 and well over half of the state's$15 billion annual gross agricultural production.3Moreover,five of the ten highest producing countiesof agricultural commoditiesin the U.S. are located in the Valley.4 The State WaterProjectand the federalCentralValleyProject,which are the Valwater,accountfor over a quarterof the water ley'smainsuppliersof irrigation used annuallyin California. In additionto the problemof salinization,potentiallytoxic trace elements have been found in the drainagewater.Soils in some partsof the San Joaquin Valley (and in particularalong the western slopes) have relativelyhigh concentrationsof selenium (a naturallyoccurringtrace element that washes out of farmsoils) as well as other potentiallytoxic elements.The Valley'ssalinization problemis due to an underlyinglayerof clay,which restrictsthe proper drainageof irrigationwater.As a consequence,widespreadand continuous irrigationhas led to high water tables and heavy salt accumulation.These

309

problems currentlyafflict some 500,000 acres of irrigatedland, and it has been estimatedthat between 1 million and 3.6 million acres of Valleyfarmland could eventuallybe affectedby salt build-upand inadequatedrainage.5 In an attemptto resolve the salinizationproblem, subsurfacedrainshave been constructedto remove the drainagewater from beneath the fields. For more than thirtyyears,a masterdrain,either to the San FranciscoBay-Delta or directlyvia pipeline to the Pacific Ocean, was considered to be the best way to dispose of the drainageout of the Valley.As neither has been constructed,drainagehas been dischargedprimarilyinto the San JoaquinRiver or into evaporationponds located in the Valley.This disposal,in turn,has led to the toxicityproblemassociatedwithValleyagricultural drainage. For reasons discussed below, the canal originallyintended to carrydrainage from the CentralValley Project out of the Valley ended up being constructedonly as far as KestersonReservoirin the northernpart of the Valley. numberof bird deaths and deformities,most likeUnexpectedly,an alarming ly caused by abnormallyhigh levels of seleniumin the pond water and food chain, were found at Kestersonin the early 1980s.6 Unusuallyhigh levels of seleniumand other potentiallytoxic trace elements also have been observed elsewherein the Valley,most notablyin the evaporationponds that serve as drainagedisposal sites in the southernpart of the Valley,an area servicedby the State WaterProject.7 The clean-upcost of Kestersonalone has been estimatedto be anywherebetween$12 and $145 million.8 Public awarenessof the risks of selenium and other toxics found in the Valley considerablyincreased conflict and uncertaintyover the disposal of agricultural drainage.Out-of-Valley options such as a master drain or pipecontentious even when only saline flow was envisioned, became politline, ically unacceptableto virtuallyall interestedparties,includingagribusiness. Moreover,in-Valleydisposal options now include the managementof minerals and other potential toxics whose propertiesand health impacts are little understood.Attention has thereforeshiftedto analyzingand assessingshortterm and often techno-economically uncertainalternatives, such as improved on-farmmanagementpractices,land retirement,and various biological and treatment physical-chemical processesand facilities. to Policyanalysisefforts date Over the last forty years, considerablepolicy analysis,researchand design efforts have been devoted to finding better ways to dispose of agricultural drainageand managingits associatedproblems.Roughlythreeperiodscan be observed in this history.Between 1950 and 1975, state and federal interest focused on establishing techno-economicfeasibilityof a masterdraindisthe In charginginto the San FranciscoBay-Deltaand servingthe entire Valley.9 the end, local, state and federal officials could neither resolve their differences over how to finance and implement the master drain that had been

311

More important,even when a numberof intervieweesdid state the same problem, their perceptions of causality often differed widely: What was a cause or an initialproblemfromone expert'sviewpointprovedto be an effect or a terminalproblemfrom the perspectiveof some other expert.Only nine problemswere classifiedas just one type of problem(e.g., as an initialor terminal problem) by all who mentioned it and none of them were included mentioned. amongthe eightmost frequently could more clearly illustratethe failure of four decades of atNothing tempted policy-makingthan this inability of major actors in the drainage By controversyto convergeeven on causalrelationships. and large,the problem is not clearly defined, the objectives to be achieved in terms of water qualityare not agreedupon, the technicalsolutionsin lieu of the masterdrain or ocean pipeline are uncertain,and little agreementexists on the criteriato assess the effectivenessof the technicalsolutions.The inabilityto agreeupon in causal relationships,particularly problem definition,is made all the more salientand difficultby the one commonthemethatdid emergefromthe interviews:Althoughno Valley-widemasterdrainor pipelineis feasible,now or in the foreseeablefuture,it is absolutelyimperativethat the Valley'sagricultural drainagebe managed effectively,somehow.Twenty-oneof the twenty-three intervieweesmade this point in one fashionor another.14 The San JoaquinValleyDrainageProgramis expected to end in 1990 and its managerhas alreadypredictedthat a fourth phase of researchand planning will be needed.15The following analyticexercise was developed in response to our initialattemptto use conventionalpolicy analysisin analyzing the drainageproblemfor the SJVDP.This approachtakes as its centraltask the analysisof the controversy's fundamentallack of convergenceover how problems and their causal relationshipsare defined. By understandingthe underlyingfactors giving rise to this lack of convergence,the new phase of research,we argue,will be in a betterposition to analyzethe drainageissue in ways making it more amenable to conventional policy analysis than has hithertobeen the case. The analyticexercise Our startingpoint was the assumptionthat the third phase of intergovernmentalresearchand analysiswould in all likelihoodachieveas little as did its We predecessorsin resolvingthe drainagecontroversy. also assumed that a limitedbudget would exist to implementany proposed solution to the drainon age problem,but that there would be no restrictions the kinds of solutions to be reviewed and analyzed.We were not, for example, limited to recommendingbuildinga new programon what the SJVDP may in the end recommend as 'promisingareas of futureresearch'nor the expectationthat such a programwould be funded at anywherenear the level of past efforts.Not surnature of the controversy,the single prisinglygiven the intergovernmental

312 most importantconstraintwe imposedon our analysiswas the need to ensure that the often differingperspectivesof the majorlocal, state and federal irriwere takeninto account. gationofficialsin the drainagecontroversy Faced with an inabilityto apply more traditionalpolicy-analytictools to and options, we decided to analyzethe stories comparedrainagealternatives and scenarios of the intervieweesas a way of identifyingthe controversy's underlyingset of actor beliefs and premises about drainageproblems and their causal relationships. Ratherthan treatingeach actor interviewas a test of some externallyconstructedmodel of causalitysaid to be operatingin a controversythat is taken as a given, each story and scenariois treatedas an fromwhich'reality' this case, the (in equallyvalidelementof a largernarrative systemwide drainage controversy)is constructed.While such attention to stories and narrativesis not new to policy-makingand policy analysis,'6an integrativeanalysisof causalitybased on the inter-relationships among actor has narratives to our knowledgerarelybeen made the centralfocus of a specific policy analysissuch as thatreportedin this paper. Networkanalysis Given the difficultyof identifyingany set of expressed causal relationships held in common by any importantsubsetof policy actorsand affectedparties, the questionwe then asked was what were the 'problemsand causalrelationSince the intervieweewas also ships'specificallyrecountedin each interview. a memberof an interestgroupand since the controversy revolvesaroundsuch interestgroups,we also set out to determinewhat 'problemsand causal relationships' could be discerned within and among the interest groups concerned. Networkanalysishelps us to make rudimentary distinctionsbetween these three levels and has severaldistinctadvantagesfor the purpose of our analyticexercise. In its simplestform, networkanalysisproceeded as follows.If individualX arguedthat problem statement 1 led to problemstatement2 (1 - 2), while individual Y felt that problem statement 2 led to problem statement 3 (2 - 3), then the aggregated'network'(in this case a simple chain) would

Y). More generally,statement2, whichis the terminalproblemfor individual X is the initial problem for individualY and becomes the transferproblem after aggregation.When the problem networks of several intervieweesare aggregatedin this fashion, each reportedcausal relationship(-) is explicit, i.e., has been stated by at least one of the interviewees.The resultingaggregated networksare implicit,in the sense that no one person need actuallyto havedescribedor perceivedthe completechainof problems. The advantagesof this procedureare several.First,it allowsus to examine better to what extent, if at all, the lack of convergenceover problems and or causalityin the controversyis due to contradictory circularargumentation

become 1 - 2 - 3 (assuming the only interviewees were individuals X and

313 at the individual or intra-grouplevel, rather than due to well-argued,but conflicting,values and perceptionsbetweeninterestgroups.Second, aggregation to the inter-grouplevel might identify 'causalrelationships' which only are considered become clear when the views of the controversy's participants togetherand which are robustenough to affordpossible points of departure for futurefollow-up.Third,potentialsourcesof futureconflictbetweeninterest groups might well become clearer,since the aggregationexercise is our of best approximation the lines of reasoningand debate that could be diswere all the controversy's majorparticipantsto come arounda table played and argue the points they raised individuallyin the interviews.(Obviously, exercisecannot 'potential'has to be underscored,since a simple aggregation capture the interactioneffect of people modifyingin public positions they hold in private.)Fourth,and in waysthatwill become clearerbelow, aggregation to the inter-group level allowsus to representthe drainagecontroversy as a combinationof individualand groupperceptionsthat imposes systemwide problems and dilemmas across these individuals and groups: By treating individual problem statements as elements of a complex, multi-actorand multi-group'network' the resultingassemblage of connected (or isolated) problem networks comes to representa systemic, if implicit, expression of causal beliefs from which the drainagecontroversyhas in large part been constitutedand throughwhichit has been perceivedby actorsand the groups to whichthey belong.17 The results of the network analysisshow that linear causal pathwaysare rare at the inter-grouplevel. Indeed, the emergenceof multiplecircularnetworks in which there is no unique initialor terminalproblemdominatesthe aggregationexercise.In the simplestcircularnetwork,statement1 is said to lead to statement2, but statement2 is also said to lead back to statement1 (1 2). A more complex circular network could have the structure
1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 1. Only two interviewees were found to have made such

circularargumentation theirinterviews.The relativedearthof circularnetin works also holds at the group level (when excludingthese two individuals): None can be constructedfor the agricultural community, planners,regulators, or environmental when the problemnetworksof intervieweesare community, aggregatedwithin each interest group. This lack of within-groupcircular thus increasesour confidence that the four groups identified argumentation are in fact fairlydistinctand homogeneous. However,at the inter-grouplevel, where the problem statementsof more than one group are consideredtogether,the numberand complexityof constructedcircularnetworksincreasesdramatically. The five, relativelysimple intra-groupnetworks give way to 34 more elaboratelylinked circularnetworks in a pairwise comparisonof the groups, while aggregationacross all four interestgroupsyields 244 circularnetworks.18 Indeed,the most striking, unheralded feature of the San Joaquin Valley drainage controversyis the tell multiplecircularity impliedin the storiesthat its key participants as a way of articulating drainageissue. the

314 At firstglance the emergenceof so manycircularnetworkswould seem to do nothingmore thanconfirmour earlierfindingthatthe drainagecontroversy is not localized to a set of commonly perceived problems and solutions. The discoveryof circularnetworks,however,was useful to us on two counts. First and as will be seen shortly,these networksproved to be potentiallydeThey are what the literaturecalls 'positive'feedbackloops, where stabilizing: ones.'9 equilibrating problemsget worse and worse, in contrastto 'negative,' Not only do the networksrepresentpotential sources of futureconflict, but they single out a complex of problems whose mutuallyreinforcingnature to could makethem even more problematic the policy-maker. the discovery of circularnetworks served both to support our Second, terms and to earlierdecision to analyzethe drainagecontroversyin narrative in whichthe narrative indicatethe direction analysisshouldproceed.A recent approachesto policy analysishas developmentin the applicationof narrative found been to focus on a comparisonof two very differenttypes of narratives in public issues of high uncertaintyand complexity,where the only 'facts'left issue uncerfor the analystto examineare the stories people tell to articulate tainty.The analyststartswith the conventionaldefinitionof storiesand identiif fies those narratives that dominatethe issue and conformto this definition: they are stories, they have beginnings,middles and ends; if arguments,they havepremisesand conclusions.The next step is to identifythose majornarratives in the issue that do not conform to this definition,e.g., the circularnetworksjust discussed.The analystthen comparesthese two sets of narratives to see if the comparisontells another story, the assumptionhere being the elementaryone from semiotics and gestaltpsychologythat the meaningof a like it narrative, any thing,is best definedby contrasting with whatit is not. In our present analyticexercise, this means a comparisonof the circularnetworkswith the largernetworksof initialand terminalproblemsin whichthey are embedded. Once the narrativeshave been compared,the policy analyst then determinesif or how that comparisonre-definesthe problemin such a way as to make it more amenableto the conventionalpolicy analyticaltools, which in our exercise was organizationtheory. This narrativeprocedure, which has been applied to other public policy issues, provides the focus for the followinganalysisof majorproblemnetworksin the irrigation agencies.20 as networks Uncertainty a sourceof polarization Majorcircular Since the views of local, state and federal irrigationofficials are of major concern in the analyticexercise, the following analysisof circularnetworks centers on the eighteen interviewsinvolvingthe agricultural communityand the planners:The two groups together are what can be termed California's i.e., 'irrigationbureaucracy,' the intervieweesrepresentthe operationaland research staff associated with the local district, state and federal irrigation agenciesoperatingin the San JoaquinValley.This focus reducesconsiderably

315 the numberof circularnetworksto be examined.When the problemnetworks identified by the agriculturalcommunity and planners are considered together,we find three interconnectedcircularnetworks- an 'initialloop' that leads to a 'terminalloop' both directly and via a 'transferloop.' The initial loop revolvesaroundthe perceivedbreachingof state and federalwatercontractsthat were said to have guaranteeddrainagedisposal for farmersin the Valley,which in turn leads to a transferloop centeringaroundproblems of waterqualitystandardsand costs said to ariseas a resultof the now-uncertain drainagedisposal. The three circularnetworksand the terminalproblem to whichthey lead are shownin Figure1. The terminalloop best illustratesthe specifics of the circularityand its important implications for exacerbatingpolitical polarization. The interviewees from the agricultural communitysaid that the necessity of takingirrigated land out of production(because of severe drainageproblems)raisesin theirview the need to compensatethe affectedirrigators. This, in turn,raises other questionsin theirmindsaboutthe equityof compensating these farmers for such losses and not others who remainin irrigatedproductionand whose productioncosts also are risingdue to drainage-related problems. According to planners, the agriculturalcommunity's recognition that costs are risingfor all farmers,but thatgovernment drainage-related compensation is not being distributedto all who deserve it, only induces further competitionamong the farmersfor what remainingprofitsare to had in irrigation. Increased competition in the view of planners pits large corporate farms against smaller farms, inevitablyleading to some farms going out of land to go out of productionwill be that sufferproduction.The firstirrigated from the severest drainageproblems.And thus the circle is completed: ing Land is said to be driven out of production,if not because of competition between farms in the presence of compensation, then because of severe drainageproblemsand associatedlosses that would persistin the absence of compensation. If each of the stated causal connections actuallyheld, then the impact of takingout of productionthose farmswith severedrainageproblemswouldbe considerable;anywherefrom 20 to 70 percent of the land currentlyunder irrigation productionin the Valleycould be affected.Marketforces might,of forestallthe worst-casescenario to the extent that the decliningsupcourse, ply of irrigableland and the growingdemandfor its productionled to rising land and agricultural prices, therebyencouragingthe developmentof better waysto handlethe problemsafflictingthe remaining, poorly drainedirrigated land.But that solutioncould come much too late and at too greata cost from the perspective of those decision-makerswho are charged with having to worry about the considerabledislocation likely to result from the loss of a millionor more acresfromirrigated production. This potentialcost to decision-makers evident from the majorproblem is produced by the three circularnetworks.The terminalloop just described was found to lead to only one terminal problem statement:'Agricultural

316

INITIAL
LOOP

/ TRANSFER
1 LOOP

Land mustgo out of production.

Largefarmsvs. smallfarms.

iness competition in agricultural

community.

i]Z.

1111

TERMINALLOOP Need for farmersgoing out of businessdue to drainageproblems.

compensation for

Equityproblems createdby costsharing arrangements

rageme of drainagemanagement solutions:who benefits,who pays?

Agricultural drainage problemsmay take farmersout of which production, meansno payersfor the Federaland State waterprojects.

Fig. 1. Circular networks of the irrigation bureaucracy.

317 drainage problems may take farmers out of production, which means no payersfor the federal and state water projects.'The irrigationbureaucracy indeed, the very depends on the politicaland financialresourcesof irrigators; legitimacy of the bureaucracyderives from the need to irrigateCalifornia farmland.Taking land out of production strikes directly,at the irrigation bureaucracy'sautonomy, authority,and influence. Heated comments exis pressedin the interviewsindicatethatland retirement an incomprehensible 'Landwill NOT go proposal for many irrigatorsand irrigationbureaucrats: out of production'and 'Takingland out of productionis an infeasibleproposal,'as some of them put it. is On the other hand,land retirement no problemat all for segmentsof the environmentalcommunity.In fact, it is the preferred solution for many, especially those who have fought for decades againstwhat is perceived as a federal water subsidy for agribusiness.'Concretely [the drainageproblem] as means that some land will have to come out of production,' one environmentalistargued.In other words,even to raisethe questionof land retirement is correctlyperceivedby the irrigationbureaucracy furtherpolarizingthe as drainagecontroversy. Summary The circularargumentation implicitin the beliefs held by those in the irrigation bureaucracy helps identify severaluncertaintiesover the drainageissue which increase the potential for even greater political conflict in the conOne uncertaintyarisesbecause the empiricalmeritsof the bureauctroversy. racy'sexpert opinions about problemsand their relationshipshave yet to be confirmedand are sufficientlyinconsistentas to give rise to some circularity at the aggregatelevel. If, however,the problem statementsand causal relationshipsare provento be as specifiedin the circularnetworks,then the certaintiesand uncertainties professedby expertsbecome locked into a positive feedbackloop thatis mutuallyreinforcing all the more persisting: the and For this irrigationbureaucracy, means that the problemsof land retirementand decliningsupportwilljust get worse and worse,unless somethingunexpected (the market?government?)intervenes.Moreover,to undertakethe verification exercise necessary to ascertainreal cause and effect empiricallywould requirenot only considerableadditionalresources,but also corroboration by those very 'experts'whose statementsgave rise to the circularargumentation in the firstplace. In the absence of verification,the irrigationbureaucracyis left with the very real fears about what effect polarizationover the land retirementissue can have on the bureaucracy's operations and legitimacy.A scenario about how 'uncertaintycan lead to polarization,'of course, does not necessarily denote a potentiallyintractable problem,but it does suggestthatthe drainage will have to be reconceivedin terms that deal directlywith the controversy can politicalpolarizationbefore uncertainties be reduced.However,a second of our analysisled us to the complementary conclusion that attemptsto part

318 resolve the present polarization are most likely to increase, rather than reduce,presentuncertainties. the as Polarization a sourceof uncertainty: implicationsof the master drainassumption Having explored the major drainagemanagementproblems in the last secand political implication, we now turn in more detail to the organizational of tions for the irrigationbureaucracy the widely-heldno-drainassumption. As noted earlier,the majorpartiesto the drainagecontroversyagree on two basic points: It is absolutelyimperativethat the Valley'sdrainagebe better managedand that this not be done throughconstructionof a master drain. What then does this assumption really mean to the controversy'smajor participants? Our startingpoint was to see if narrative analysiscould help us in answerfor ing this questionas well. Fortunately our purposes,the field of semiotics contains an analogueto the reciprocalcausal link, *, found in the circular networks.Moreover,the analogue'slink, which is one of mutualdefinition, not mutual causation,is especially pertinent since the question of concern revolves around defining just what the no-drain assumptionmeans to the parties concerned. The basic notion underlyingthe semiotic square is the earlierone that a term is best defined by what it is not.21Withinthe framework of the semiotic square,the no-drainassumptiondrawsits meaningfrom threepossible counter-positions At concerningthe drainor drainage. its most obvious level, the no-drainassumptionis simplythe rejectionof the position that there should be a Valley-widedrain. At a more general level, each of these two positionscould opposed by those who differnot over the drain,but over whetherdrainagewill take place at all in the Valley.For everyonewho maintainsa no-drain position as their startingpoint, there are those who could assert that drainagewill be maintainedthroughoutthe Valley,even if this requiresthe (unmentionable) masterdrain.In contrast,for everyonewho that there will be a drain, there are those who could claim that the argues startingposition is not merelyno drain,but no drainagefacilitieswhatsoever in the Valley.These four positions define each other reciprocally, we call and this networkof mutuallydefiningpositions'theimpliednetwork.' If all four positionswere manifest,the debate over the San JoaquinValley's to agricultural drainagecould be demonstrated be polarizedover fairlyclearcut divisions on which the policy analyst could then focus attention and analysis. But full-blown polarization is precisely what has not happened. Opposing operating assumptions have yet to be fully realized or acted. Indeed, the lack of widespreadpolarizationand open controversyover the masterdraingreatlysurprisedus. Whatfactorsaccountfor this attenuation? Some of the polarizationhas been internalizedto the bureaucracy. Instead of being espoused by opposing groups, two of the opposing positions have

319
Particular proposals drainage No valley-wide dradrain < 4 Valley-wide drain

No valley-wide drainage

4_ at or Drainage no drainage all Fig. 2. The implied network.

Valley-wide drainage

own simultaneouslybecome an integralpart of the irrigationbureaucracy's scenario.Many officialsin the relevantfederal,state, regionaland local agencies say that there will be no drain,yet ferventlyarguethat drainagewill continue in the Valley.They do so by formallyrejectinga masterdrain,while still The believing in it when arguingthat Valley-widedrainageis imperative.22 for cognitivedissonanceis manifest. potential Balancingthese internalcosts, however,is the fact that the bureaucracy's in a dualposition has been 'functional' preventing more polarizeddebate over the drainageissue. What or whom could the environmentalists argueagainst, and bureaucrats when both the irrigators the irrigation openly say thatneither a drain to the Delta nor a pipeline to the Ocean will be constructed?By holding what seem on appearancesto be two mutuallyopposing positions, the i.e., 'therewill be no drain'and 'drainageis required,' irrigationbureaucracy has reduced the potential for the two other opposing positions to be of realized,the most threatening whichis the assumptionthat therewill be no Valley-widedrainage whatsoever.Instead of four mutually opposing positions, the currentrealitypresentsa truncatedversionof the 'impliednetwork' in which real debate is frustratedby an irrigationbureaucracywhich preservesthe notion of Valley-widedrainageat the cost of conceding,ratherthan accepting,thattherewill be no masterdrain. and irrigationbureacratshave good reason for wantingto avoid Irrigators furtherpolarization.The Kesterson selenium finds transformeda primarily toxics one. To quote agricultural drainageprobleminto urgentenvironmental a planner,'Toxicsin agricultural drainagewaterhave shiftedthe natureof the problemfroma "harmless" salinityproblemto one requiring policingpowers.' Kesterson,the 'local solution to the salinityproblem,'became Kesterson,the 'local toxics problem' threateningValley-widedrainage and irrigationas a whole.

320 Quick to learn by example, the irrigationbureaucracyhas become very reluctantto implementfurther'remedies'when Californianstake the major lesson of Kesterson Reservoir to be the need for constant vigilance:Who knows what new drainage'solution'will lead to even more terribledrainage problems?Moreover,even if the 'solution'actuallyworked,oppositionwould and others to the extent that the drainage ,still arise from environmentalists solution increasedthe long-termviabilityof irrigatedagriculture it is curas in the Valley.As a result,the bureaucracy has rentlypracticedby agribusiness accommodateditself to uncertainty: Better to try coping with the manifold uncertaintiescaused by not discussingobvious problems associatedwith inValley 'solutions'than to run the risk of havingthese problemspublicly discussed in a way that makes the issues just as contentiousas the out-of-Valley solutionsof the masterdrainand ocean pipeline.Uncertaintyover land going out of productionin the absence of a remedyto the drainageproblemhas to be weighed againstthe potentialfor furtherpolarizingenvironmentalists and otherswhen puttingforwarda 'solution'to forestallland retirement. Thus,the of the no-drain assumption engenders in the end the seeming certainty for persistenceof uncertainty the irrigation bureaucracy.23 Summary Comparison of the implied and truncatednetworks tells its own scenario about how 'polarization lead to uncertainty' the drainagecontroversy. can in In particular, potentialfor the controversy's the polarizationhas led to a situation of increased uncertaintyfor the irrigationbureaucracy.In functional terms, the bureaucracyseems to hold conflictualpositions as a way of reducing the potential for polarization,at least in the short run. Efforts to rationalizethe conflictingbeliefs, or to rank order possible solutions to the drainageproblemwithoutaddressingthe underlyingconflict, are likely to be activelyopposed ratherthan accepted.Takentogetherwith the earlieranalysis of the circularnetworks,narrative policy analysiscan in this case identify why it was that efforts to clarifycausalityand options proved so difficult.As long as the issue of drain versus no drain cannot be openly debated at the policy level, uncertaintywill persist. Yet, this uncertainty as to drainage options cannot be directly addressed for fear that furtherpolarizationwill occur over the matterof takingland out of production. In contrastto the all-powerful our bureaucracy paintedby some authors,24 narrative uncoversa fundamentally whose analysis disablingpolicy dilemma, dimensionsand structureare not articulated(and perhapsnot perceived)by participantsto the policy process; indeed, their suppressionis part of the policy problem. The drainagedilemmaas a policy problem Irrigationagencies have little choice but to maintainthe appearanceof seek-

321 ing resolution of the prevailingand potential uncertaintiesin the drainage firstbecause agricultural drainageis perceivedto be an environcontroversy, mental toxics problem requiringimmediate remedies, and second because and salinityprobwithin the next severaldecades the physicalwater-logging of lems could well lead to the forced retirement a greatdeal of irrigatedland. If the irrigationbureaucracydoes not better manage these problems, its raisond'tre is threatened. organizational On the other hand, currentlyproposed efforts to reduce the unknownsin the drainagecontroversyrun the risk of eliciting opposition not just to the itself.Politicalopposition to the proposed solution,but to Valleyagribusiness masterdrain and the ocean pipeline,voter rejectionof new large-scalewater Canal,recenteffortsto restrictany new diverprojects,such as the Peripheral over sions fromthe San FranciscoBay-Deltasystem,and now the controversy the proposed Kesterson clean-up plans are all remindersof how irrigationrelated'solutions'quicklycome under attackin California.A fully polarized debate on irrigationin general and on toxics in particularis an unpalatable prospect for the irrigationbureaucracy,since it might ultimately lead to versusthe masterdrain;the first posing the issue directlyas land withdrawals is incompatible with its goals and purposes, the second with its political environment. will Thus, reducinguncertainty potentiallyincreasepolarizationand political interference;reducing polarizationby letting uncertaintypersist or increase could ultimatelyforce unwantedchange of organizationalgoals and charter.Threatenedfrom both sides, irrigationagencies are pressed to manand polarization.This age conflict by walkinga fine line between uncertainty dilemmais found to persistfor each of the currentlyproposed technicalsolutions of the drainageproblemin the Valley.25 Irrigationagencies are attemptingto resolve their dilemma in two ways. Agencies havebegun to distancethemselvesfrom each other,arguingthatthe dilemmais more of a problem for some than for others. For example,there are those who say that the CaliforniaDepartmentof WaterResources really does not have to walk such a fine line between uncertaintyand polarization, since agricultural drainageis more of a problemfor U.S. Bureauof Reclamation, which is responsible for the Kesterson clean-up. A second tactic has been to try to create more uncertaintythan polarization by not funding research on out-of-Valley solutions while at the same time conducting researchon in-Valleysolutions.For example, the San JoaquinValley Drainavoidanceof controversial researchon out-of-Valley solutions age Program's has kept alive the uncertaintyover the techno-economicfeasibilityof such solutions,should they become politicallyand legallyfeasible at a later date.26 Similarly,the Program'sresearch efforts on in-Valley solutions have debunkedconventionalwisdom about the drainageproblemand producednew In findingsin areas unfamiliarto the water managersand users.27 so doing, such as the Program,put themselvesin a position where irrigationagencies, they alwayshavemore questionsto ask thancan be answered.

322 On closer inspection, these two tactics reproducethe components of the original dilemma in a new guise. The advantageirrigationagencies gain by arguingthat the drainageproblem is not their problem is only a short-run expedient,since the agenciesend up confrontinga differentset of uncertainties. For example,the StateWaterProjectis in a betterlegal position than the CentralValley Projectto reallocatewater 'givenup' by agricultural contractors to meet the growingneeds of urban contractors.But the unknownsof such a shift in allocationare considerable,and it is highly probablethat the Departmentof WaterResources would exercise as much caution in making this reallocationas it is now exercisingin the agricultural drainagecontroverThe second approach to 'resolving'the dilemma - calling for more sy. researchwhile avoidingfundingtopics that should be researched- is also a short-run expedient. Using research uncertaintiesto reduce the threat of furtherpolarizationwill not forestallthe highlypolarizedpoliticaldebate that will ultimatelysurfacewhen salinityproblemshavereacheda scale endangerIn but ing wide tractsof irrigatedagriculture. short,tacticallyunderstandable strategicallyunhelpful, inter-agencypolarization and progressive research uncertainties not in the end avoidthe bureaucracy's do basic dilemma. Recommendations: uncouplingdrainageand irrigation The findingsof our narrative longanalysisilluminatehow the bureaucracy's term goal of better Valley-wide drainage and its more immediate goal of ensuring irrigated production in the Valley are irreconcilable when the acts as if its own self-interestprecludesfacingup to the political bureaucracy of open, polarized conflict over irrigationor of persisting,unrechallenge solved uncertaintiesover drainage.The findingsexpose the degree to which the internalizedbureaucratic conflict derivesfrom and is reinforcednot only the inabilityof agenciesto decide whetherirrigation and by (theirtraditional, or drainagemanagement relatively new goal) shouldhave role) legitimating (a higherpriority,but also by their consequent(and often implicit)rejectionof the notion that the choice must be made at all. Indeed, the rejectioncan be explicit at times, as discussed in the following section on the agencies' responseto our researchfindings. In writingup the findings of our researchfor the sponsoringagency,we focused on the conflict over bureaucratic goals as the ultimatesource of the and its resolution as a prior condition for developing agencies' dilemma, implementable drainage programs and policies. In particular,we asked whetherdrainageand irrigation could be administratively uncoupledas a way of resolving this goal conflict. Our narrativeanalysis proved helpful again. Going back over the results of the network analysis, we noted that while mention is made both of irrigation-related factors and of drainage-specific problemsin the circularnetworks,the sole terminalproblemstatementconcerns the threat that drainageproblems in particularpose to the long-term

323 survivalof the state and federal water projects in California.Moreover,the impliednetworkanalysispertainsonly to relationsbetween drainageand the masterdrain.Nothingis impliedwith respectto irrigation se. Yet drainage per on is commonlytaken to threatenirrigation the assumptionthat the formeris an inseparablephysicaland organizational componentof the latter.While this is inherent,the organizational one, however,is not. Even physicalrelationship often does lead to problems of salinityand toxic buildup, though irrigation irrigationagencies not only can, but traditionallyhave, functioned without considering drainage.The question then becomes; Would the problems of drainagebecome more tractableif assignedto a specific agency not charged withconcern aboutthe futureof irrigation? With drainageresponsibilitiesseparatedout, irrigationagencies would be relativelyfree to continueto promote and arguefor solutionsmost appropriate to their constituenciesand historicalorganizational goals;it would be the task of the drainageagency (or agencies)to seek solutions for safe drainage. While the goal conflict would still exist, it would be externalized.Inner conflict and cognitivedissonanceover goals would become externalconflictwith This would clarifythe termsof the open politicaldebate aboutgoal priorities. debate, and allow the tradeoffs to be openly arguedby 'advocate'agencies instead of submerged or disguised by agencies trying to avoid difficult internalchoices. In suggestingthis solution, we had two objectives in mind. First, we did (and still do) believe that despite the known political and institutionalproblems of creatingnew agencies, the importanceof both irrigatedagriculture and safe managementof drainagewaterto Californiais such as to justifythis solution if we can demonstrate that it is the best alternative.Second, we and hoped by this meansto bringhome to the policy-makers agenciesfollowing our study the importance we attached to our findings concerning the policy dilemma they faced (and will continue to face) under the current institutional structure. We made it clear to irrigation officialsthat any proposalto separatedrainand irrigation and age organizationally to createan independent,autonomous the sole institutionalmandateof managingagricultural drainagency having would clearlyinvolve issues of authority, and staffing cost, age responsibility, which cannot be easily resolved and which, therefore,would have to be fully consideredat the outset.The most importantsingleissue will be assuringthat those inter-agencydifferenceswhich cannot be negotiatedbetween them on their own will have to be settled formally,if not in the courts,then by a statutory regulatoryboard having this authority(e.g., the State WaterResources ControlBoardin California). Despite these possible drawbacks,the potentialbenefits were clear.First, organizational decouplingwould greatlyreducethe stressplaced on an irrigation bureaucracy that does not have the staffing,the politicalmandate,or the to pay full attention to the drainageproblem. The tensions inpropensity herent in the internal goal conflict would thereby be reduced. Second, the

325 bution of water were unlikely agents for promotion of environmental objectives, particularlyif those meant reducing irrigationwater and/or takingland out production. That althoughwe recognizedthe highpoliticaland other costs of creatinga new agency, separatingdrainage and irrigationfunctions was the only course of action likely to provide an escape from the dilemma and allow to policy-making proceed towardssome resolution. When this was sent to agencies for review,the comments we received were generallysupportive,and tended to containsuggestionsor critiquesonly with a regardto specific points or sensitiveareasrequiring most delicatechoice of There were some amusingpoints, such as an expressed concern language. over our language about bureaucratic'survival'that disappearedwhen the and a denial manifestationsof survivalwere used in lieu of the terminology, thatagencieswere distancingthemselvesfromone anotherby the verypeople whose interviews supplied the data. Once we revised the draft to alter the 'provocative' language,the writtenreviewswereby and largequitepositive. when we sought to move to the schedulednext stage (a meeting However, between our group, our sponsor, and selected agency representatives), we receivedno supportwhatsoever. when we appliedfor the expected (and, And, we had thought,pre-agreedto) renewalfor a second full year of research- a year to be focused on more intensive and specific data collection - it was denied. We were told that prioritieshad shifted,that the agency was not primarily interested in setting an agenda for action, that further institutional work was to focus on legal aspects, and, politely, that there was simply no fundingto be had for work such as ours. Albeit a smallconsolation,our narrativeanalysisled us to understandbetter why our attemptsto continue explicatingthe underlyingand immediatedilemmaconfrontingirrigationagencies were met by irrigationofficials with the counter-argument we had that chosen the 'wrong'part of the problemto analyze,where the primary'problem'remainedin the field, not in the bureaucracy. Conclusion Many policy analysts alreadyknow that careful attentionto the arguments dominatingan issue of high uncertaintyand dissensus can tell them something useful about how the controversywill unfold. This case study demonstrates that 'non-traditional' procedures,such as networkanalysis,can be of use to the practicinganalystnot only for augmenting such conventional great as organizationtheory and considerations of policy analytical techniques those cases where there is a political feasibility,but also for understanding resistanceto theirapplication. seeming In particular, complexly causal and goal-conflictedsituationssuch as for this one, our study exposes the degree to which the inability to reconcile

326 inheres in objectives and resolve outstandingproblems and indeterminacies between and amongthe the structure the issue - thatis, in the relationships of many problemsidentifiedby the actors, given the actors'bureaucratic positions and self-definitions.In this case the analysiswas based on networksof problems and assumptionswhose dimensions and linkage elude the actors themselves.The networks provide a way of disclosing the structureof the issue, and our narrativearticulatesthe connectivity and assumptions that structure presentsto policy-makers. Acknowledgements We would like to thank WilliamAscher, Sally Fairfax,Steve Ford, Louise Fortmann,Ed Imhoff, David Jenkins,and several anonymousreviewersfor their comments on earlier versions of this paper. Hukkinen undertook the data collection, most of the network analysis,and contributedequally with Roe to the applicationof narrative policy analysisto the case study.Roe also was primarilyresponsible for the conceptual frameworkand Rochlin provided most of the organizational implicationsof the case study.This article drawsmaterialfrom Hukkinen's dissertation(in preparation) from Janne and and Gene I. Rochlin (1988). When WaterDoesn't Hukkinen, Emery Roe, Mean Power:How Government Can BetterHandle Uncertainty Polarizaand tion Relatedto Agricultural in the San Joaquin Valley, reportprea Drainage for the California of WaterResources,Sacramento. pared Department
Notes
1. B. DelworthGardner, RaymondH. Coppock,CurtisD. Lynn,D. WilliamRains,RobertS. Loomis,and J. HerbertSnyder(1982). Agriculture,' for ChapterII in Competition California Water: Alternative Resolutions(Eds., Ernest A. Engelbertwith Ann Foley Scheuring), of Press,Berkeley, 12. University California p. 2. California Department of Water Resources (1987). California Water: Looking to the DWRBulletin160-87, Sacramento, 9, 11. Future, pp. 3. CaliforniaDepartmentof WaterResources (1983). The CaliforniaWater Plan: Projected Use and Available Water Suppliesto 2010, Bulletin 160-83, Sacramento,pp. 117, 123. California of StatisticalAbstract Department Finance(1987), California 1987,Sacramento, contributed $62 billionof the stategrossprop. 110.It has been estimatedthat'agriculture duct of $593 billionin 1987,'when takinginto accountthe employment, processing,transin DuBois [1989]. portationand other activitygeneratedby agriculture California (William Letterto the Editorof Issuesin Scienceand Technology, V,No. 3, Spring,p. 7). Vol. 4. San JoaquinValleyDrainageProgram An (1987). DevelopingOptions: Overview Efforts of to Solve Agricultural Problemsin the San Joaquin Valley, Drainageand Drainage-Related Sacramento, 8. p. 5. SanJoaquinValleyDrainageProgram Drain(1987), p. 8. SanJoaquinValleyInteragency and in age Program(1979). Agricultural Drainage SaltManagement the SanJoaquinValley, Final Report, Fresno, p. 6-4. Assembly Office of Research (1987). California2000: Paradise Peril- Making in Issuesin Natural Resources, Sacramento, 14. p.

327 6. Harry M. Ohlendorf(1986). 'AquaticBirds and Seleniumin the San JoaquinValley,'in Seleniumand Agricultural Implications San Francisco Drainage: for Bay and the California Environment (Proceedingsof the Second SeleniumSymposium,March23, 1985, Berkeley, CA), Tiburon, p. 18. Kenneth Tanji, Andre Lauchli, and Jewell Meyer (1986). 'Seleniumin the San Joaquin Valley,'reprintfrom Environment, Vol. 28, No. 6, July/ August,pp. 6-7. 7. Roger Fujii (1988). Water-Quality Sediment-Chemistry and Data of Drain Waterand Pondsfrom TulareLake DrainageDistrict,Kings County,California,March Evaporation 1985 to March 1986, U.S. Geological Survey, Open-File Report 87-700, Sacramento. RoyA. Schroeder,Donald U. Palawski,and Joseph P. Skorupa(1988). Reconnaissance BottomSediment,and BiotaAssociatedwithIrrigation DraiInvestigation Water Quality, of Lake Bed Area, SouthernSan Joaquin Valley, 1986-87,U.S. nage in the Tulare California, Geological Survey, Water-ResourcesInvestigationsReport 88-4001, Sacramento.San FranciscoChronicle(May 11, 1988). 'HighLevels of Seleniumin NatureAreas,'San Francisco. 8. The Press-Enterprise San (November7, 1988). 'UCR Toxic CleanupMethod "Superior".' FranciscoChronicle(August 18, 1987). '$24.6 Million Plan:WaterBoardOKs Kesterson San Chronicle(May 17, 1988). 'U.S.KestersonCleanup Cleanup,' Francisco.San Francisco Plan- More Chemicals,' Francisco. San 9. Among the several reports on the masterdrain are U.S. Bureauof Reclamation(1949). CentralValleyBasin:A Comprehensive Departmental Reporton the Developmentof the and Water RelatedResourcesof the CentralValley Basin, and Comments from the Stateof and California Federal Agencies,U.S. SenateDocument 113, 81st Congress,First Session. CaliforniaLegislature(1957). DrainageProblemsof the San Joaquin Valley California: of TenthPartialReportby the Joint Committee Water on Problems,CaliforniaState Printing Office, Sacramento,CA. CaliforniaState WaterResourcesBoard (1957). The California WaterPlan, Bulletin No. 3, Sacramento,CA. San Joaquin Valley Drainage Advisory Group(1969). FinalReport,Fresno,CA. 10. SanJoaquinValleyInteragency (1979). DrainageProgram 11. SanJoaquinValleyDrainageProgram (1987). 12. StevenHall (1989). 'MyTurn' WestValley Journal, April,p. 3. 13. During the summer of 1987, interviewswere conducted with twenty-threeindividuals representingthe main interest groups in the San Joaquin Valley agriculturaldrainage The intervieweeswere classified into four groups:Twelve were associated controversy. with the agricultural community(local water,irrigation,and drainagedistrictmanagers); six were grouped as planners(staff from the San JoaquinValley DrainageProgram,the California Departmentof WaterResources,and the Departmentof Fish and Game);three were stateand federal regulators (stafffrom the StateWaterResourcesControlBoard,the CentralValleyRegionalWaterQualityControlBoard,andthe U.S. Environmental Protection Agency);and two were from the environmental community(the NaturalResources Defense Council and the San Francisco Bay Institute).The state's views on the Valley with staffin the California drainageproblemweresampledthroughinterviews Department of Water Resources, while interviewswith the San Joaquin Valley Drainage Program helped to capturesome of the Federalperspectiveson this problem,i.e., its staff includes from, among others, the U.S. Bureauof Reclamation.Lawyersas a group representatives werenot specificallyinterviewed, theirviewson the drainageproblemwere reflectedin but the interviewswith the various agency representatives, the particularly state and federal officialswhose offices relyon largelegalstaff. Overall,the 23 interviewsmost probablyidentifiedwhat are perceivedto be the major problemsassociatedwith the Valley'sagricultural drainagefrom the perspectivesof the The cumulativefrequencydistribution curve of partiesmost involvedin the controversy. problemsmentionedin the interviewsshows that the numberof new problemsadded by individualinterviewstapersoff considerablyafterthe 18th interview. more details on For the methodology, Hukkinen, see Roe and Rochlin(1988).

328 14. Some of those interviewedexpressedthis view forcefully: drainagewaterbypassto the 'A Delta is out of the question.This means not only that the [masterdrain]is unacceptable, but also that a bypassfor drainageinto the SanJoaquinRiveris out.'Othersmentionedthe 'no drain' assumption with something approachingregret:'On cestain farm areas the level must be lowereddown, out of the root zone. This watermust be taken groundwater out, and the questionis whereto put it ... PersonallyI still feel that the drainis the wayto do it in the long run.However,it will probablynot be builtwithinthe next 20 or 30 years.' The consensus howeverwas clear and common for the vast majorityof the interviewees: Therewill be no drain,but properdrainageis needed. 15. WestValley Journal(1989). 'ImhoffCites PossibleDrainageSolutions,' April,p. 3. See also Journal, StephenHall (1989). 'MyTurn,'WestValley April,p. 3. 16. For a samplingof this literature, MartinRein (1976). Social Scienceand PublicPolicy, see of PenguinEducation,England;Thomas Kaplan(1986). 'The NarrativeStructure Policy Vol. Analysis,'in Journalof PolicyAnalysisand Management, 5, No. 2; and MartinKrieger For (1981). Advice and Planning,TempleUniversityPress, Philadelphia. a recentdiscussion on the importanceof argumentation policy analysis,see GiandomenicoMajone in (1989). Evidence,Argumentand Persuasionin the PolicyProcess,Yale UniversityPress, New Haven. 17. As noted earlier,the twenty-threeinterviewsmost likely capturedthe prevailingmajor in drainage the Valley. problemsassociatedwith agricultural 18. The computerprogramdevelopedfor this researchidentifieda feedbackloop as the residual problemnetworkleft after initial and terminalproblemswere truncatedfrom the can largernetwork.As such, a circularargument be seen as a problemnetworkconsisting only of transfer problems. 19. For a discussion of the distinction between positive and negative feedback, see Erich Jantsch(1985). TheSelf-Organizing Universe, Press,Oxford,pp. 5-6. Pergamon 20. Narrativeanalyseshave been undertaken the 1980/82 Medfly controversy Califorfor in and nia, the CubanMissile Crisis, the animalrightscontroversy, the debate over nuclear reactorsnot built accordingto design specifications.See Emery Roe (1989). 'Narrative Analysis for the Policy Analyst:A Case Study of the 1980-82 CaliforniaMedfly Conin Vol. troversy,' Journalof PolicyAnalysisand Management, 8, No. 2. See also EmeryRoe (forthcoming).'AppliedNarrativeAnalysis: The Tangencyof LiteraryCriticism,Social Science and Policy Analysis,'in New Literary The Medfly controversy History. providesa short illustrationof how the narrativeprocedureworks.The story critiquedin that conwas troversy, particularly environmentalists, the scenarioproposedby state and federal by bureaucrats about how aerial sprayingof malathionwould lead to the eradicationof the Medfly infestation.The critiquecalled into doubt the aerial sprayingscenario without or to havinga story of its own that offered an alternative counter-proposal that spraying. Eventually,the public'scomparisonof the critique and the scenario generateda widespreadmeta-storyabout how the critiqueheightenedthe public'ssense of risk and uncerThe searchfor meta-storiesgeneratedby comparing taintyassociatedwith the infestation. the storiesand non-storiesthatdominatediscussionsof broadsocial,economic,andpolitical issues has been a major preoccupationof recent structuralist and post-structuralist criticism.See MichaelRiffaterre (1988). 'The Relevanceof Theory/Theoryof Relevance,' in The YaleJournalof Criticism, Vol. 1, No. 2, Spring,p. 165. Jean-Franqois Lyotardin discussesthe role of'metanarratives' his ThePostmodern in Condition: Report A particular on Knowledge (1984). 21. For an introduction the semioticsquare,see A. J. Greimas(1987). On Meaning: to Selected in Volume38 of Theory and Historyof Literature, Writing SemioticTheory, Universityof Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.Our applicationof the semiotic square follows Ronald Schleifer(1987). A. J. Greimasand the Natureof Meaning,Universityof NebraskaPress, Lincoln,pp. 25-28. 22. Some in the irrigationbureaucracy operate under the assumptionthat there will be no

329
Valley-widedrain in the foreseeable future, but at the same time think that the drain should be constructedduringthat time period. 'The main drain is politicallyout at the moment, but it would be the best solution,'as one irrigatorput it. Others,however,find nothing contradictoryin holding these two positions, since in-Valleysolutions and/or belief masterdrainmightbe found feasible beyondthe foreseeablefuture.Unfortunately, in eitheroption only exacerbatesthe drainagecontroversy. As such, the startingassumption,'therewill be no drain,'turnsout to be the real problem in the final analysis,a point that is underscoredby anotherexample.A similarpatternof interconnectedloops as was found in the irrigationbureaucracyis produced when the together, communityand regulatorsare aggregated problemnetworksof the agricultural only this time the single terminalproblemproduceddoes not relateto the loss of payers 'Need for agricultural for the waterprojects,but to the lackof the masterdrainspecifically: drainageoutlet and dischargepoint, which do not exist (such as master drain to BayDelta).' and See MarcReisner(1987). CadillacDesert:TheAmericanWest Its Disappearing Water, PenguinBooks, New York,p. 486. For more details on how the dilemmais replicatedin each of the specific technicalsolutions proposedfor the drainageproblem,see Chapter4 of JanneHukkinen,Emery Roe, and Gene I. Rochlin(1988). A recent letter from the National ResearchCouncil'sCommitteeon Irrigation-Induced Water Problems to the San JoaquinValley Drainage Programcriticizes the Program's for its feasible.'It management restricting scientiststo those options considered'politically will be interesting see whethertheiradvice,muchof whichis so congruentto our own, is to will heeded, or whether,as seems probable,the California irrigation bureaucracy continue to walk the line between uncertaintyand polarizationin neither mentioningthe unmento tionable,nor admitting theirown inabilityto set andhold priorities. Personalcommunication fromEd Imhoff,Manager, JoaquinValleyDrainageProgram San (1988). The focus on organizational management and approachesto handlingwhat in California seem to be technicaland politicalproblems,such as salinizationof irrigatedland, is consistentwith the literature irrigation on systemsand associatedproblemsin othercountries. See NormanUphoff with PrithiRamamurthy Roy Steiner(1988). Improving and Performance of Irrigation Bureaucracies: Suggestions Systematic for AnalysisandAgencyReorientaJohn Monttion, IrrigationStudies Group, Cornell University,Ithaca, NY, particularly See also Robert gomery, 'Chapter 9: BureaucraticCulture in IrrigationManagement.' Chambers (1988). Managing Canal Irrigation:Practical Analysis from South Asia, Press,Cambridge. University Cambridge

23.

24. 25. 26.

27. 28.