Sunteți pe pagina 1din 5

In Distributed Cryptography, Multiple Key Refreshment Is Performed By Refreshment Protocol

Rashmi Singh1 and Satya Verma2


1

Department of Computer Engineering, Chhattisgarh Swami Vivekananda Technical University (Bhilai) Chhattisgarh
reshusingh.28@gmail.com satya.ritu@gmail.com

ABSTRACT
Share refreshing must tolerate missing sub shares and erroneous sub shares from compromised servers. A compromised server may not generate any sub shares. However, as long as correct servers agree on the set of sub shares to use, they can generate new shares. Proactive security system allows refreshing all shares. Refreshment protocol allows refreshing all shares by using AES, DES and blowfish cryptography function which is available on the server. To keep a protocol consistency, all share holders must cooperative with its procedure. Threshold cryptography is a novel approach for distribution of trust. Firstly we generate trust by using threshold cryptography and then apply refreshment protocol on its for refreshing key. In this paper we have developed refreshment protocol within each node to refresh all sub share which is distributed by threshold cryptography and also threshold value is decided for each and every node because refreshment of key is depend on it.

KEYWORDS
Refreshment protocol, Proactive secret sharing (PSS), Threshold cryptography (TC), Cryptography function (DES, AES and Blowfish).

1. INTRODUCTION
Refreshment protocol scheme protect secrets by distributing them over different locations (share holders). Security is assured throughout the entire life-time of the secret. For long-lived and sensitive secrets this protection scheme is powerful. We propose an efficient protocol in proactive secret sharing scheme for refreshing shares, where shares are periodically renewed using different cryptography function which is available on the each server. A proactive signature scheme involves three phases: the key generation phase, the joint signature-generation phase and finally a special proactive key refreshment phase of the servers' key shares which is done periodically. The signature is generated in a distributed fashion from the shares of the key. Moreover, it has to hold that despite proactivization of the signing key, the signature on a message m, computed under any of the representations of the key is the same. The scheme withstands attackers that eventually break into all servers, as long as only a limited number of the servers are broken into between two consecutive invocations of the refreshment protocol.

2. DISTRIBUTED CRYPTOGRAPHY
Distributed cryptography spreads the operation of a cryptosystem among a group of servers (or parties) in a fault-tolerant way [Des94]. We consider the threshold failure model with n servers,

of which up to t are faulty; such distributed cryptosystems are called threshold cryptosystems. Distributed cryptosystems are based on secret sharing and are typically known only for publickey cryptosystems because of their nice algebraic properties. Here we consider a public-key cryptosystem and a digital signature scheme. Distributed cryptography, introduced in 1987, makes it possible to design cryptographic systems in which some operations require the collaboration of several users. Concretely, a distributed cryptosystem is a public key cryptosystem in which the secret key is shared among a set of users[1]. Only some qualified subsets of users will be able to perform the operation related to the secret key (decrypting or signing). In this way, the security of the system is increased, because the loss or theft of several shares of the secret key does not necessarily break the systems security.

3. PROBLEM WITH KEY REFRESHMENT


In the existing paper, key refreshment is depending on other nodes[1][2]. Each share holder tries to refresh its own share using some concurrent scheme, where all share holders just perform communication and computation in parallel, inconsistency may happen, and a new node may receive inconsistent shares and then cannot generate the secret key. If a new node requests to get shares during PSS, share holders should make the node wait for their PSS[4] and give their new shares afterward. Or, if a new node tries to get shares just before PSS is started, each share holder should put the PSS on hold until the node successfully get current shares. These matters imply that a share holder (master node) needs to know when a new share can be used as own share and when the new share can be given to a new node. As well as such timing issue, there is another concern related to untraceable sub-share transmission. The considerable matter is, while a share holder can understand whether it has gotten sub-shares generated by other share holders successfully, it does not know other share holders also have gotten necessary sub-shares successfully. Or, if a share holder does not get sub-shares from corresponding share holders due to loss of connectivity with them, it should not keep waiting for the reply from the share holders for a long span of time [4]. This situation will be especially happened in a distributed environment.

Figure 1. Share Refreshment process

4. SOLUTION APPROACH
In this paper, we have to developed refreshment protocol for refreshing multiple shares, after distribution the private key by threshold cryptography. Refreshment protocol is a technique to refresh shares but condition is that each node refresh own share by using different cryptography function (such as DES, AES and Blowfish) which is available on the server.

4.1 OUR CONTRIBUTION


Threshold cryptography can indeed enhance the security against break-in attacks in many scenarios. However, it is also limited: Given sufficient amount of time, an attacker can break into the servers one by one, thus eventually compromise the security of the system. This danger is particularly eminent in systems that must remain secure for long periods of time (such as certification authorities) or where secure recovery may be difficult. Proactive security is a mechanism for protecting against such long-term attacks. The approach calling for distribution of trust with the one of periodic refreshment: Refreshment protocol will allow servers to automatically recover from possible, undetected break-ins, and in particular will provide the servers with new shares of the sensitive data while keeping the sensitive data unmodified. Very importantly, information gathered by an attacker before a refreshment period becomes useless to attack the system in the future. The security of the system will be guaranteed as long as not too many of the servers are broken into between two consecutive executions of the refreshment protocol. Notice that in this approach, security is preserved even if, over a long span of time, every server can be broken into at some time or another. In other words, a proactively secure system does not wait until a break-in is detected. Instead, it invokes the refreshment protocol periodically in order to maintain uninterrupted security.

4.2 ALGORITHM FOR REFRESHMENT PROTOCOL


1. Randomly choose two prime no. p & q Compute a(n) = (p-1)*(q-1) Determine servers private key (d) as d = e-1 mod a(n) where d is servers public key. 2. Evaluate the Shares Share generation is based on Shamirs Scheme. Secret is a value S in the set of integers [0.p-1] where p is prime number. Server (who is sharing the secret) generates t random numbers (a1 at) and put these values into given the polynomial. f (X) = (S + a1X +.+ atXt) 3. If f(X) is calculated for different nodes i.e. node 1, node 2, node . Where X = 1, 2, 3respectively. 4. Each node receives own share or part of private key which is known as share. 5. After that each node generates threshold and compare with the random number. If random number is equal or less than threshold then share is not refreshed otherwise it will be refreshed. 6. Then we apply refreshment protocol on partial private key and generate new sub shares for every node which is participated in the network. 6.1 Node 1 has DES cryptography function for refreshing key. 6.2 Node 2 has AES cryptography function for refreshment of shares. 6.3 Node 3 has Blowfish cryptography function.

5. CONCLUSION
Refreshment protocol provides a method for maintaining the overall security of a system, even when individual components are repeatedly broken into and controlled by an attacker. In particular it provides for automated recovery of the security of individual components, avoiding the use of expensive and inconvenient manual processes. The technique calls for the distribution of trust among several servers, together with refreshments of the share held by the servers. This way, the refreshment approach guarantees uninterrupted security as long as not too many servers are broken into at the same time. Proactive security shows how to maintain the overall security of a system even under such conditions. The technique combines two well-known approaches to enhance the security of the system: distributed (or threshold) cryptograph, which ensures security as long as a threshold (say half) of the servers are not corrupted; and refresh or update of the sensitive data (e.g. keys) using different cryptography function which is held by the servers.

REFERENCES
[1]. Rajkumari Retoliya. A Novel Approach Share Key Refreshing for Long Term Protection in Distribute Cryptography by Protective Security. IJCSET | July 2011,Vol 1,Issue 6,290-295. [2] L. Ertaul and N. Chavan, Security of Ad Hoc Networks and Threshold MOBIWAC 2006. cryptography, in Crypto 97, pp.

[3]. D. Boneh and M. Franklin. Efficient generation of shared RSA keys. In Proc. 425-539.

[4]. R. Canetti, R. Gennaro, A. Herzberg and D. Naor, Proactive Security: Long-term protection against break-ins. CryptoBytes: the technical newsletter of RSA Labs,Vol. 3, number 1 Spring, 1997. [5]. Y. Frankel, P. Gemmell, P. Mackenzie, and M. Yung. Optimal resilience proactive public-key cryptosystems. In Proc. 38th Annual Symp. on Foundations of Computer Science. IEEE, 1997. [6]. Y. Frankel, P. Gemmell, P. Mackenzie, and M. Yung. Proactive RSA. In Proc. of Crypto97. 12. P. Gemmell. An introduction to threshold cryptography. In Cryptobytes, Winter 97, pp. 7-12, 2000. [7] D. Boneh, Ed Felten, Bill Aiello, and Matt Franklin. http://gump.bellcore.com:7700. [8] D. Chaum, C. Crepeau, and I. Damgard. Multiparty Unconditionally Secure Protocols. In Proc. 20th Annual Symp. on the Theory of Computing, pages11{19. CM, 1988. [9] R. Canetti and A. Herzberg. Maintaining security in the presence of transient faults. In Y. Desmedt, editor, Advances in Cryptology | Crypto '94, pages 425{438,1994. SpringerVerlag. Lecture Notes in Computer Science No. 839. [10]. R. Gennaro, S. Jarecki, H. Krawczyk and T. Rabin, Robust threshold DSS signature. In Ueli Maurer, editor, Advances in Cryptology - Eurocrypt '96, pp. 354-371, 1996. Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes in Computer Science No. 1070. [11].A. Herzberg, S. Jarecki, H. Krawczyk, and M. Yung, Proactive secret sharing, or: How to cope with perpetual leakage. In D. Coopersmith, editor, Advances in Cryptology Crypto '95, pp. 339-352, 1995. Lecture Notes in Computer Science No. 963.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I take this opportunity to express my deep sense of gratitude and respect to my guide Ms. Satya Verma (Reader, Department of CSE) without her constant encouragement and key tips, it would not have been possible to complete this work with the present quality. I am really indebted to Mrs. Sipi Dubey M.Tech. project coordinator for helping me in each aspect of my

academics activities. I would also like to thanks my Sister and Father Ms.Shweta Singh and Mr. T.P.Singh for his immense patience in understanding me during my work. Last, but not the least, I thank all those people, who have helped me directly or indirectly in accomplishing this work.

AUTHOR PROFILE:

RASHMI SINGH received her B.Sc. degree in Computer Science from Kalyan College, Bhilai in 2006 Affiliated to Pt. Ravishankar University, Raipur(C.G.), the M.Sc. degree in Computer Science from Shankaracharya College, Affiliated to Pt. Ravishankar University, Raipur(C.G.) in 2008, M.Phil. degree in Computer Science from C.V.Raman,Bilaspur (C.G.) 2009 and the M.Tech. degree pursuing in Software Engineering from Chhattisgarh Swami Vivekananda Technical University (Bhilai) Chhattisgarh, in 20102012. I am currently working as an assistant professor, with Department of Computer Science from Bhilai School of Engineering (C.S.V.T.U.).

S-ar putea să vă placă și