REPUBLIC ACT NO.

6735
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AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR.

I General Provisions Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as "The Initiative and Referendum Act."chan robles virtual law library Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean: (a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose. There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely: a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution; chan a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action. (c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely: c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and

c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies. chan robles virtual law library (d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters. (e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the people. (f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing the proposition and the required number of signatories. It shall be in a form to be determined by and submitted to the Commission on Elections, hereinafter referred to as the Commission. (g) "Local government units" refers to provinces , cities, municipalities and barangays. (h) "Local legislative bodies" refers to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, Sangguniang Bayan, and Sangguniang Nayon. chan robles virtual law library (i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial Governors, City or Municipal Mayors and Punong Barangay, as the case may be. Sec. 4. Who may exercise. The power of initiative and referendum may be exercised by all registered voters of the country, autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. Sec. 5. Requirements. (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least ten per centum (10%) of the total number of the registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the same with the Commission. (b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter. chan robles virtual law library (c) The petition shall state the following: c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be; c.2. the proposition;

c.3. the reason or reasons therefor; c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein; chan robles virtual
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c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition. (d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance passed by the legislative assembly of an autonomous region, province or city is deemed validly initiated if the petition thereof is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the province or city, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein; Provided, however, That if the province or city is composed only of one (1) legislative district, then at least each municipality in a province or each barangay in a city should be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. (e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality shall be deemed validly initiated if the petition therefor is signed by at least tenper centum (10%) of the registered voters in the municipality, of which every barangay is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. (f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is deemed validly initiated if signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in said barangay. Sec. 6. Special Registration. The Commission on Election shall set a special registration day at least three (3) weeks before a scheduled initiative or referendum. Sec. 7. Verification of Signatures. The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election. chan robles virtual law library II National Initiative and Referendum

Sec. 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. The Commission shall call and supervise the conduct of initiative or referendum. chan robles
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Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the Commission shall, upon determining the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation and set the date of the initiative or referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days but not later than ninety (90) days from the determination by the Commission of the sufficiency of the petition. Sec. 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition. (a) The Proposition of the enactment, approval, amendment or rejection of a national law shall be submitted to and approved by a majority of the votes cast by all the registered voters of the Philippines. If, as certified to by the Commission, the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast, the national law proposed for enactment, approval, or amendment shall become effective fifteen (15) days following completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. If, as certified by the Commission, the proposition to reject a national law is approved by a majority of the votes cast, the said national law shall be deemed repealed and the repeal shall become effective fifteen (15) days following the completion of publication of the proposition and the certification by the Commission in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. chan robles virtual law library However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law sought to be rejected or amended shall remain in full force and effect. (b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite. (c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation by the Commission. Sec. 10. Prohibited Measures. The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum petition: (a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; and chan robles virtual law library

(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after its effectivity. Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies. The petition shall contain a summary of the chief purposes and contents of the bill that the organization proposes to be enacted into law by the legislature. The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the same as the enactment of any legislative measure before the House of Representatives except that the said initiative bill shall have precedence over the pending legislative measures on the committee. Sec. 12. Appeal. The decision of the Commission on the findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice thereof. chan robles virtual law library III Local Initiative and Referendum Sec. 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. (a) Not less than two thousand (2,000) registered voters in case of autonomous regions, one thousand (1,000) in case of provinces and cities, one hundred (100) in case of municipalities, and fifty (50) in case of barangays, may file a petition with the Regional Assembly or local legislative body, respectively, proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment, of any law, ordinance or resolution. (b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body within (30) days from its presentation, the proponents through their duly authorized and registered representative may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned. chan robles virtual law library (c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from one (1). The Secretary of Local Government or his designated representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition. (d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative. chan robles
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(e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in case of autonomous regions, ninety (90) days in case of provinces and cities, sixty (60) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of

barangays, from notice mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the required number of signatures. (f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his designated representative, in the presence of a representative of the proponent, and a representative of the regional assemblies and local legislative bodies concerned in a public place in the autonomous region or local government unit, as the case may be. Signature stations may be established in as many places as may be warranted. (g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Commission on Elections, through its office in the local government unit concerned shall certify as to whether or not the required number of signatures has been obtained. Failure to obtain the required number is a defeat of the proposition. (h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained, the Commission shall then set a date for the initiative at which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit concerned for their approval within ninety (90) days from the date of certification by the Commission, as provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case of autonomous regions, sixty (60) days in case of the provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The initiative shall then be held on the date set, after which the results thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the Commission on Elections. chan robles virtual law library Sec. 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. If the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast, it shall take effect fifteen (15) days after certification by the Commission as if affirmative action thereon had been made by the local legislative body and local executive concerned. If it fails to obtain said number of votes, the proposition is considered defeated.chan robles virtual law library Sec. 15. Limitations on Local Initiatives. (a) The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year. (b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the local legislative bodies to enact. (c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in toto the proposition presented, the initiative shall be cancelled. However, those against such action may, if they so desire, apply for initiative in the manner herein provided.

Sec. 16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies. Any proposition or ordinance or resolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended, by the local legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date therefrom, and may be amended, modified or repealed by the local legislative body within three (3) years thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members: Provided, however, that in case of barangays, the period shall be one (1) year after the expiration of the first six (6) months. Sec. 17. Local Referendum. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4 hereof, any local legislative body may submit to the registered voters of autonomous region, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays for the approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution duly enacted or approved. Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Commission within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities, fortyfive (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays.chan robles virtual law library The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum. Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure. chan robles
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IV Final Provisions Sec. 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. The Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to all initiatives and referenda. Sec. 20. Rules and Regulations. The Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.chan robles virtual law library Sec. 21. Appropriations. The amount necessary to defray the cost of the initial implementation of this Act shall be charged against the Contingent Fund in the General Appropriations Act of the current year. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the full implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

Sec. 22. Separability Clause. If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective. chan robles virtual law library Sec. 23. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. chan robles virtual law
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Approved: August 4, 1989

Abakada Guro v. Ermita G.R. No. 168056, July 5, 2005 J. Puno En Banc Facts: Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, ABAKADA Guro party List Officer and et al., insist that the bicameral conference committee should not even have acted on the no pass-on provisions since there is no disagreement between House Bill Nos. 3705 and 3555 on the one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950 on the other, with regard to the no pass-on provision for the sale of service for power generation because both the Senate and the House were in agreement that the VAT burden for the sale of such service shall not be passed on to the end-consumer. As to the no pass-on provision for sale of petroleum products, petitioners argue that the fact that the presence of such a no passon provision in the House version and the absence thereof in the Senate Bill means there is no conflict because a House provision cannot be in conflict with something that does not exist. Escudero, et. al., also contend that Republic Act No. 9337 grossly violates the constitutional imperative on exclusive origination of revenue bills under Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution when the Senate introduced amendments not connected with VAT. Petitioners Escudero, et al., also reiterate that R.A. No. 9337s stand- by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. They submit that the recommendatory power given to the Secretary of Finance in regard to the occurrence of either of two events using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a benchmark necessarily and inherently required extended analysis and evaluation, as well as policy making. Petitioners also reiterate their argument that the input tax is a property or a property right. Petitioners also contend that even if the right to credit the input VAT is merely a statutory privilege, it has already evolved into a vested right that the State cannot remove. Issue: Whether or not the R.A. No. 9337 or the Vat Reform Act is constitutional? Held: The Court is not persuaded. Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution provides that All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

The Court reiterates that in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present. In the same breath, the Court reiterates its finding that it is not a property or a property right, and a VAT-registered persons entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere statutory privilege. As the Court stated in its Decision, the right to credit the input tax is a mere creation of law. More importantly, the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9337 already involve legislative policy and wisdom. So long as there is a public end for which R.A. No. 9337 was passed, the means through which such end shall be accomplished is for the legislature to choose so long as it is within constitutional bounds. The Motions for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court is LIFTED.

Valmonte vs Belmonte
Subject: case digest, Political Law 2

11
Jan

G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989

FACTS: Petitioner Ricardo Valmonte wrote a letter to Hon. Feliciano Belmonte, GSIS General Manager, requesting that he be furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan. Belmonte replied through the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS whose opinion is that is that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts.

ISSUE: Whether or not they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information

HELD: The information sought by petitioners is the truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS. The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. The public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.

The Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings. However, although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern

Province of North Cotabato, et al. vs. GRP, et al.

Province of North Cotabato vs. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP) G.R. No. 183591 CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Facts: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 (MOA) is assailed on its constitutionality. This document prepared by the joint efforts of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) Peace Panel and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace Panel, was merely a codification of consensus points reached between both parties and the aspirations of the MILF to have a Bangsamoro homeland. Issue: When the Executive Department pronounced to abandon the MOA, is the issue of its constitutionality merely moot and academic and therefore no longer justiciable by the Court? Held: Yes. Since the MOA has not been signed, its provisions will not at all come into effect. The MOA will forever remain a draft that has never been finalized. It is now nothing more than a piece of paper, with no legal force or binding effect. It cannot be the source of, nor be capable of violating, any right. The instant Petitions, therefore, and all other oppositions to the MOA, have no more leg to stand on.

They no longer present an actual case or a justiciable controversy for resolution by this Court. An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that the former involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. The Court should not feel constrained to rule on the Petitions at bar just because of the great public interest these cases have generated. We are, after all, a court of law, and not of public opinion. The power of judicial review of this Court is for settling real and existent dispute, it is not for allaying fears or addressing public clamor. In acting on supposed abuses by other branches of government, the Court must be careful that it is not committing abuse itself by ignoring the fundamental principles of constitutional law.

ECHEGARAY v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE FACTS: T h e D O J , t h r o u g h t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f J u s t i c e , f i l e d a n U r g e n t M o t i o n f o r Reconsideration on the January 4, 1999 issuance of the Supreme Court of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray. T h e D O J , r e p r e s e n t e d b y t h e S o l i c i t o r G e n e r a l , a r g u e d t h a t t h e C o u r t n o longer has the authority to grant the TRO because:1.That the Court lost its jurisdiction the moment it rendered its judgmentthat is already final and executory;2 . T h a t i t i s e n c r o a c h i n g o n t h e p o w e r s s p e c i f i c a l l y v e s t e d b y t h e Supreme Court to the executive department in granting the TRO;3.That the purpose sought to be achieved by the TRO is nil due to certainsupervening events that transpired.ISSUE:W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e c o u r t a b u s e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n g r a n t i n g a T e m p o r a r y Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact thatthe finality of judgment has already been rendered.RULING:No, the Court was within its authority when it granted the TRO despite thefinal and executory judgment having been rendered already.1 . T h e C o u r t d i d n o t l o s e i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n w h e n i t granted the TRO. In itsdecision, it categorically answered the contention of the plaintiff ins u c h t h a t i t i s n o t c h a n g i n g i t s j u d g m e n t . T h e C o u r t i s m e r e l y suspending its execution temporarily.I t w a s e m p h a s i z e d t h t t h e C o u r t , i n r e n d e r i n g t h e j u d g m e n t l o s t i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n t o a m e n d , m o d i f y o r a l t e r t h e s a m e , b u t i t r e t a i n e d i t s power to execute and enforce it. It was further stated that the power toc o n t r o l t h e e x e c u t i o n o f i t s d e c i s i o n i s a n e s s e n t i a l a s p e c t o f jurisdiction. T h e 1 9 8 7 C o n s t i t u t i o n , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e C o u r t , s t r e n g t h e n e d a n d broadened the power of the Court in matters like these. It gave the C o u r t t h e p o w e r t o p r o m u l g a t e r u l e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e p r o t e c t i o n a n d enforcement of constitutional rights, i.e. the right to life.On a final note regarding the first contention of the respondent, theDOJ acknowledged this Courts jurisdiction when it filed a Manifestationand Urgent Motion to Compel the trial judge to disclose the Warrant of Execution containing the date of Echegarays execution to the public. The jurisdiction of the Court, it emphasizes, does not depend on theconvenience of the litigants.2.The respondents contention that the issuance of the TRO encroacheson the power of the executive is also rejected. Section 19 Article VII of the Constitution cannot be interpreted as denying the powers of theCourt to Control the

enforcement of their decision after their finality. Itis not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve, although ithas he same effect.It must be noted that the powers of the Executive, the Legislative, andthe Judiciary to save the life of a death convict does not exclude eachother for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the rightto life.3.The Court made it a point to clarify the rationale behind the issuance of t h e T R O . T h e C o u r t h a d t o d e c i d e o n t h e p e t i t i o n e r s V e r y U r g e n t M o tion for the Issuance of a TRO with a mere (5) hours prior to t h e e x e c u t i o n o f E c h e g a r a y . T h e y h a d b e e n p l a c e d i n a v e r y d i f f i c u l t pos ition because it was such a short period to ascertain the validityand substance of the allegation contained in the Very Urgent Motion. They also had no way of checking and verifying with Congress becausei t w a s i n r e c e s s a t t h a t t i m e . T h e C o u r t t o o k a n e x t r e m e l y cautiouss t a n c e b y t e m p o r a r i l y r e s t r a i n i n g t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e p e t i t i o n erbe c au s e of fe ar t ha t an y e r r or o f t he Co u rt i n n o t st o p pi n g t h e e x e c u t i o n w i l l p r e c l u d e a n y f u r t h e r r e l i e f f o r a l l r i g h t s s t o p a t t h e graveyard.At the end of the day, the TRO had achieved its purpose. It crystallized theissue on whether the Congeress is disposed to review capital punishment orn o t . S u p e r v e n i n g e v e n t s l i k e t h e ( 1 ) p r o n o u n c e m e n t o f t h e n P r e s i d e n t Estrada that it will veto any law repealing death penalty; (2) the resolkutionof the Congressmen that they are against the repeal of the law; and (3) thatcurrent actions undertaken by Senators Roco and Pimentel are futile. EC 8 RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATIONSSSS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS CA FACTS: SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act onthe union's demands. SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaintagainst petitioners for staging an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSSBuilding, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS membersfrom transacting business with the SSS. ISSUE:WON employees of the Social Security System(SSS) have the right to strike. HELD:Yes. While there is no question that the Constitutionrecognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether suchrecognition also includes the right to strike. The commissioners intended to limit the rightto the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No. 875), which was repealed by theLabor Code , expressly banned strikes by employees in the Government, includinginstrumentalities exercising governmental functions, but excluding entities entrusted with proprietary functions No similar provision is found in the Labor Code. To implement the constitutionalguarantee of the right of government employees to organize, the President issued E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of governmentemployees. In the absence of any legislation allowing government employees to strike,recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from striking.The SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, itsemployees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission'smemorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employeesof the SSS was illegal.

Victoriano v Elizalde Rope Workers Union 59 SCRA 54 (1974)

Facts: Plaintiff is a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers Union who later resigned from his affiliation to the said union by reason of the prohibition of his religion for its members to become affiliated with any labor organization. The union has subsisting closed shop agreement in their collective bargaining agreement with their employer that all permanent employees of the company must be a member of the union and later was amended byRepublic Act No. 3350 with the provision stating "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".. By his resignation, the union wrote a letter to the company to separate the plaintiff from the service after which he was informed by the company that unless he makes a satisfactory arrangement with the union he will be dismissed from the service. The union contends that RA 3350 impairs obligation of contract stipulated in their CBA and discriminatorily favors religious sects in providing exemption to be affiliated with any labor unions. Issue: WON RA 3350 impairs the right to form association. Held: The court held that what the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations which involves two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an employee may join or refrain from joining an association. Therefore the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union. The exceptions provided by the assailed Republic Act is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. Thus this exception does not infringe upon the constitutional provision on freedom of association but instead reinforces it. The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines Philippine government in action and the Philippine constitution The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines explained Cases on constitutional law (Philippine casebook series)

Philippine Judges Association et al vs DOTC Secretary Pete Prado et al

6112010

1 Vote

Equal Protection Franking Privilege of the Judiciary

A report came in showing that available data from the Postal Service Office show that from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00. of this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming from the Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The postmasters conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it. Acting from this, Prado implemented Circ. No. 9228 as the IRR for the said law. PJA assailed the said law complaining that the law would adversely impair the communication within the judiciary as it may impair the sending of judicial notices. PJA averred that the law is discriminatory as it disallowed the franking privilege of the Judiciary but has not disallowed the franking privilege of others such as the executive, former executives and their widows among others. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection before the law. HELD: The SC ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is the high expense allotted to the judiciarys franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by removing the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should have removed the franking privilege all at once from all the other departments. If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution. The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars. In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.

People v Pinlac 165 SCRA 675 (1988)

Facts: The accused was convicted for two separate criminal cases for robbery and robbery with homicide. He assailed his conviction on the contention that the court erred in admitting his extrajudicial confession as evidence which was taken by force, violence, torture, and intimidation without having appraised of his constitutional rights and without the assistance of counsel. Issue: Whether or not due process was observed during the custodial investigation of the accused. Held: The court find it meritorious to declare that the constitutional rights of the accused was violated in the failure of the authorities in making the accused understand the nature of the charges against him without appraising him of his constitutional right to have a counsel during custodial investigation. Moreover the prosecution merely presented the extrajudicial confession of the accused which is inadmissible as evidence and the other evidences provided therein are merely circumstantial and subject for rebuttal. The court acquitted the accused.

In re Edilion

16072010
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978 Facts: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the IBP since the latters constitution notwithstanding due notice. Edilion contends that the provision providing for the IBP dues constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP ByLaws are void and of no legal force and effect. Issue: WON the payment of IBP dues suffers constitutional infirmity? NO Held: All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession.

The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the administration of justice as an officer of the court. When the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6 Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. Why? The right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC October 16, 2007

.

THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO.

(Amended Section 9 & 11) RESOLUTION

Pursuant to the action of the Court en banc in its session held on October 16, 2007, Sections 9 and 11 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo are hereby AMENDED to read as follows:

Sec. 9. Return; Contents. - Within FIVE (5) WORKING DAYS after service of the writ, the respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits which shall, among other things, contain the following: (a) The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or threaten with violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through any act or omission; (b) The steps or actions taken by the possession to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or omission; (c) All relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to the threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party; and (d) If the respondent is a public official or employee, the return shall further state the actions that have been or will still be taken: (i) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party; (ii) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible; (iii) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance; (iv) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance; (v) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and (vi) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court. THE PERIOD TO FILE A RETURN CANNOT BE EXTENDED EXCEPT ON HIGHLY MERITORIOUS GROUND.

The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, its resolution and the prosecution of the case. A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed: Sec. 11. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions.- The following pleadings and motion are prohibited: (a) Motion to dismiss; (b) Motion for extension of time to file opposition, affidavit, position paper and other pleadings; (c) Dilatory motion for postponement; (d) Motion for a bill of particulars; (e) Counterclaim or cross-claim; (f) Third-party complaint; (g) Reply; (h) Motion to declare respondent in default; (i) Intervention; (j) Memorandum; (k) Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders; and (l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order. The amendments to the Rule shall take effect on October 24, 2007 following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation.

THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA [A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC dated 22 January 2008. This Resolution shall take effect on February 2, 2008 following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation.] SECTION 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. SEC. 2. Who May File. -Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by: (a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children and parents; degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph. SEC. 3. Where to File. The petition may be filed with the Regional Trial Court where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner. The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan when the action concerns public data files of government offices. SEC. 4. Where Returnable; Enforceable. When the writ is issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, it shall be returnable before such court or judge. When issued by the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored. When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such Court or any justice thereof, or before the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored. The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. SEC. 5. Docket Fees. No docket and other lawful fees shall be required from an indigent petitioner. The petition of the indigent shall be docketed and acted upon immediately, without prejudice to subsequent submission of proof of indigency not later than fifteen (15) days from the filing of the petition. SEC. 6. Petition. A verified written petition for a writ of habeas data should contain: (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent; or (b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil

(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party; (c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information; (d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known; (e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent. In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and (f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable. SEC. 7. Issuance of the Writ. Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court and cause it to be served within three (3) days from its issuance; or, in case of urgent necessity, the justice or judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person to serve it. The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than ten (10) work days from the date of its issuance. SEC. 8. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. A clerk of court who refuses to issue the writ after its allowance, or a deputized person who refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the court, justice or judge for contempt without prejudice to other disciplinary actions. SEC. 9. How the Writ Is Served. The writ shall be served upon the respondent by the officer or person deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall retain a copy on which to make a return of service. In case the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent, the rules on substituted service shall apply. SEC. 10. Return; Contents. The respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits within five (5) work days from service of the writ, which period may be reasonably extended by the Court for justifiable reasons. The return shall, among other things, contain the following: (a) The lawful defenses such as national security, state secrets, privileged communication, confidentiality of the source of information of media and others; (b) In case of respondent in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information subject of the petition: (i) a disclosure of the data or information about the petitioner, the nature of such data or information, and the purpose for its collection;

(ii) the steps or actions taken by the respondent to ensure the security and confidentiality of the data or information; and (iii) the currency and accuracy of the data or information held; and (c) Other allegations relevant to the resolution of the proceeding. A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed. SEC. 11. Contempt. The court, justice or judge may punish with imprisonment or fine a respondent who commits contempt by making a false return, or refusing to make a return; or any person who otherwise disobeys or resists a lawful process or order of the court. SEC. 12. When Defenses May Be Heard in Chambers. A hearing in chambers may be conducted where the respondent invokes the defense that the release of the data or information in question shall compromise national security or state secrets, or when the data or information cannot be divulged to the public due to its nature or privileged character. SEC. 13. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. The following pleadings and motions are prohibited: (a) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief (l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order. SEC. 14. Return; Filing. In case the respondent fails to file a return, the court, justice or judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte, granting the petitioner such relief as the petition may warrant unless the court in its discretion requires the petitioner to submit evidence. SEC. 15. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties. SEC. 16. Judgment. The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall enjoin the act complained of, or order the deletion, destruction, or rectification of the erroneous data or information and grant other relevant reliefs as may be just and equitable; otherwise, the privilege of the writ shall be denied. Upon its finality, the judgment shall be enforced by the sheriff or any lawful officer as may be designated by the court, justice or judge within five (5) work days. Motion to declare respondent in Dilatory Motion for Counterclaim Third-party Motion motion a bill or to for of dismiss; postponement; particulars; cross-claim; complaint; Reply; default; Intervention; Memorandum; orders; and (b) Motion for extension of time to file opposition, affidavit, position paper and other pleadings;

SEC. 17. Return of Service. The officer who executed the final judgment shall, within three (3) days from its enforcement, make a verified return to the court. The return shall contain a full statement of the proceedings under the writ and a complete inventory of the database or information, or documents and articles inspected, updated, rectified, or deleted, with copies served on the petitioner and the respondent. The officer shall state in the return how the judgment was enforced and complied with by the respondent, as well as all objections of the parties regarding the manner and regularity of the service of the writ. SEC. 18. Hearing on Officers Return. The court shall set the return for hearing with due notice to the parties and act accordingly. SEC. 19. Appeal. Any party may appeal from the judgment or final order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both. The period of appeal shall be five (5) work days from the date of notice of the judgment or final order. The appeal shall be given the same priority as habeas corpus and amparocases. SEC. 20. Institution of Separate Actions. The filing of a petition for the writ of habeas data shall not preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative actions. SEC. 21. Consolidation. When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the filing of a petition for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action. When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a petition for a writ of habeas data, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action. After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to govern the disposition of the reliefs in the petition. SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available to an aggrieved party by motion in the criminal case. The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of habeas data. SEC. 23. Substantive Rights. This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. SEC. 24. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with this Rule. SEC. 25. Effectivity. This Rule shall take effect on February 2, 2008 following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation

Republic Act No. 7438

April 27, 1992

AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:: Section 1. Statement of Policy. It is the policy of the Senate to value the dignity of every human being and guarantee full respect for human rights. Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public Officers. (a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel. (b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.
law phi 1

(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating officer, provided that before such report is signed, or thumbmarked if the person arrested or detained does not know how to read and write, it shall be read and adequately explained to him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by the investigating officer in the language or dialect known to such arrested or detained person, otherwise, such investigation report shall be null and void and of no effect whatsoever. (d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding. (e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and of no effect. (f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by or conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel, or by any national non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Commission on Human Rights of by any international non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Office of the President. The person's "immediate family" shall include his or her spouse, fianc or fiance, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward.

As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law. Section 3. Assisting Counsel. Assisting counsel is any lawyer, except those directly affected by the case, those charged with conducting preliminary investigation or those charged with the prosecution of crimes. The assisting counsel other than the government lawyers shall be entitled to the following fees; (a) The amount of One hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with light felonies;
lawphi 1 alf

(b) The amount of Two hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with less grave or grave felonies; (c) The amount of Three hundred fifty pesos (P350.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with a capital offense. The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid by the city or municipality where the custodial investigation is conducted, provided that if the municipality of city cannot pay such fee, the province comprising such municipality or city shall pay the fee: Provided, That the Municipal or City Treasurer must certify that no funds are available to pay the fees of assisting counsel before the province pays said fees. In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted and the suspected person can only be detained by the investigating officer in accordance with the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Section 4. Penalty Clause. (a) Any arresting public officer or employee, or any investigating officer, who fails to inform any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, shall suffer a fine of Six thousand pesos (P6,000.00) or a penalty of imprisonment of not less than eight (8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or both. The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification shall also be imposed upon the investigating officer who has been previously convicted of a similar offense. The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee, or anyone acting upon orders of such investigating officer or in his place, who fails to provide a competent and independent counsel to a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense if the latter cannot afford the services of his own counsel. (b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the immediate family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel, from visiting and conferring privately with him, or from examining and treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four thousand pesos (P4,000.00).
lawphi 1

The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his safety and prevent his escape. Section 5. Repealing Clause. Republic Act No. No. 857, as amended, is hereby repealed. Other laws, presidential decrees, executive orders or rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly. Section 6. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in any daily newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. Approved: April 27, 1992.
BIENVENIDO MARQUEZ vs. COMELECFacts: It is averred that at the time respondent Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten counts of insurance fraud or grandtheft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of LosAngeles, USA. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet tobe served on private respondent on account of his alleged flight from thatcountry.Before the May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation of respondents certificateof candidacy on the ground of the candidates disqualification was filed bypetitioner, but COMELEC dismissed the petition.Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon. Petitioner institutedquo warranto proceedings against private respondent before the COMELEC but thelatter dismissed the petition. Issue: Whether private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evadinga warrant of arrest comes within the term fugitive from justice. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulationsimplementing the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:Article 73. Disqualifications The following persons shall be disqualified fromrunning for any elective local position:(a) xxxx(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad.Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment.It is clear from this provision that fugitives from justice refer only to persons whohas been convicted by final judgment.However, COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not privaterespondent is a fugitive from justice when it outrightly denied the petition for quowarranto. The Court opted to remand the case to COMELEC to resolve and proceedwith the case. The Oversight Committee evidently entertained serious apprehensions on thepossible constitutional infirmity of Section 40(e) of RA 7160 if the disqualificationtherein meant were to be so taken as to embrace those who merely were facingcriminal charges. A similar concern was expressed by Senator R. A. V. Saguisagwho, during the bicameral conference committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives, made this reservation: . . . de ipa-refine lang natin 'yung languageespecially 'yung, the scope of fugitive. Medyo bothered ako doon, a . The Oversight Committee finally came out with Article 73 of the Rules andRegulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. It provided:Art. 73. Disqualifications. The following persons shall be disqualified from runningfor any elective local position:(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitivefrom justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment . Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by theofficials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight . TheCourt certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity inan enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. Anadministrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it. The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with somepersonal reservations of the ponente , that Article 73 of the Rules and RegulationsImplementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines theterm "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has beenconvicted by final

judgment." is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether ornot, in fact, private respondent is a "fugitive from justice" as such term must beinterpreted and applied in the light of the Court's opinion. The omission isunderstandable since the COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quowarranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgatedby the Oversight Committee. The Court itself, not being a trier of facts, is thusconstrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of thisunresolved factual matter.Davide, Concurring The term "fugitive from justice" refers not only to those who flee afterconviction to avoid punishment but also to those who, after being charged, flee toavoid prosecution. In his ponencia , Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug finds the definition givento it by the Oversight Committee, i.e., "a person who has been convicted by final judgment," as appearing in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementingthe Local Government Code of 1991, as inordinate and as undue circumscription of the law. I agree.But this is only one side of the coin. I further submit that it also unreasonablyexpands the scope of the disqualification in the 1991 Local Government Codebecause it disqualifies all those who have been convicted by final judgment,regardless of the extent of the penalty imposed and of whether they have served orare serving their sentences or have evaded service of sentence by jumping bail orleaving for another country. The definition thus disregards the true and acceptedmeaning of the word fugitive . This new definition is unwarranted for nothing in thelegislative debates has been shown to sustain it and the clear language of the lawleaves no room for a re-examination of the meaning of the term.I do not share the doubt of Mr. Justice Vitug on the constitutionality of thedisqualification based on the presumption of innocence clause of the Bill of Rights. There are certain fundamental considerations which do not support the applicationsof the presumptionFirstly, Section 1, Article V of the Constitution recognizes the authority of Congress to determine who are disqualified from exercising the right of suffrage.Since the minimum requirement of a candidate for a public office is that he must bea qualified voter, it logically follows that Congress has the plenary power todetermine who are disqualified to seek election for a public office. Secondly, apublic office is a public trust. Thirdly, the disqualification in question does not, inreality, involve the issue of presumption of innocence. Elsewise stated, one is notdisqualified because he is presumed guilty by the filing of an information or criminalcomplaint against him. He is disqualified because he is a "fugitive from justice," i.e.,he was not brought within the jurisdiction of the court because he had successfullyevaded arrest; or if he was brought within the jurisdiction of the court and was triedand convicted, he has successfully evaded service of sentence because he had jumped bail or escaped. The disqualification then is based on his flight from justice .In the face of the settled doctrine that flight is an indication of guilt, it may even betruly said that it is not the challenged disqualifying provision which overcomes the presumption of innocence but rather the disqualified person himself who has provenhis guilt

People v Agbayani 284 SCRA 315 (1998)

Facts: The appellant was charged for raping his 14-year old daughter and was found guilty of the crime of rape. A motion for a new trial was filed before the court by the new counsel of the accused assailing the irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused invoking the failure of the court to inform the accused of his right to choose his own counsel and the violation of the appellants right for a 2 day preparation for trial. Issue: Whether or not the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of the right to have counsel is sufficient ground to reverse the judgment of conviction and to send the case back for a new trial.

Held: It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it has been held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or that it is positively proved that the trial court failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be presumed that the accused was informed by the court of such right. Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides that after a plea of not guilty, the accused is entitled to two (2) days to prepare for trial unless the court for good cause grants him further time. It must be pointed out that the right must be expressly demanded. Only when so demanded does denial thereof constitute reversible error and a ground for new trial. Further, such right may be waived, expressly or impliedly. In the instant case, appellant did not ask for time to prepare for trial, hence, he effectively waived such right. It is untenable to believe that the counsel who represented the appellant was not prepared during the trial as records showed he was able to cross-examine the complainant and there was no ground to claim he is incompetent to represent the appellant in court. The SC thereby affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Pecho v People 262 SCRA 518 (1996)

Facts: The decision of the Supreme Court for convicting the accused for the complex crime of attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document was assailed with the contention of the defense that the accused may not be convicted of the crime for double jeopardy. The charge against the accused was on violation of RA 3019 of which he was acquitted because it only penalizes consummated crime. In the absence of evidence that shows that the crime was consummated the accused was acquitted but the court held judgment of prosecuting his conviction for attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document which is necessarily included in the crime charged. Accused invokes the defense of double jeopardy since his acquittal from the charge involving RA 3019 is a bar for prosecution on the crime of attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document and that the accused was not informed of this charge against him in the filing of the information. Issue: Whether or not the accused was informed of the nature and cause of the crime to which he is convicted Held: The court presented the objectives of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the crime he is charged with as follows: To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; 2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; 3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.
1.

In order that this requirement may be satisfied facts must be stated: not conclusions of law. The complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime. What determines the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law. It follows then that an accused may be convicted of a crime which although not the one charged, is necessarily included in the latter. It has been shown that the information filed in court is considered as charging for two offenses which the counsel of the accused failed to object therefore he can be convicted for both or either of the charges. However by reviewing the case at bar the SC finds lack of sufficient evidence that would establish the guilt of the accused as conspirator to the crime of estafa beyond reasonable doubt, the prior decision of the SC was deemed to be based merely on circumstantial evidence, thus the accused was acquitted.

PEOPLE VS TEE
FACTS: Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a businessman, and a resident of Baguio City. A raid conducted by operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Philippine National Police Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM) at premises allegedly leased by appellant and at his residence yielded huge quantities of marijuana. Appellant moved to quash the search warrant on the ground that it was too general and that the NBI had not complied with the requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. The pendency of said motion, however, did not stop the filing of the appropriate charges against appellant. In an information dated July 24, 1998, the City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged Modesto Tee, alias Estoy Tee, with illegal possession of marijuana. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant's contention that the description on the serach warrant which says an undetermined amount of marijuana, was too general and hence makes the warrant void for vagueness. HELD: SC held that the appellants contention, has no leg to stand on. The constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things to be seized is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items; and (2) leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizures. What the Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad or general characterization or sweeping descriptions, which will authorize police officers to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to an offense. However, it is not required that technical precision of description be required, particularly, where by the nature of the goods to

be seized, their description must be rather general, since the requirement of a technical description would mean that no warrant could issue. 011 0 Comments
"On finality of decision" F: Leo Echegaray is a convict subject to lethal injection (RA 8177). The SC issued a temporary restraining order for the execution until it ensures that there will no longer be any repeal or modification as to the implementation of RA 8177. Such action by the court was questioned since it already rendered a final judgment on the case. I: WON the court loses its jurisdiction on a decided case with a final judgment. R: The SC does not lose its jurisdiction over a case with a final judgment rendered upon it. What it cannot do is modify or amend the final decision. The court held that by finality of judgment, the court loses its jurisdiction to amend the decision but retains its power to execute or enforce it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter a decision. The former continues for the purpose of enforcing the judgment while the latter terminates after the final judgment is rendered for after the judgment becomes final, facts and circumstances may transpire which may render the execution unjust or impossible.

Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of

petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

Issue: Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the case becomes final
and executory, still has jurisdiction over the case

Held: The
become final,

finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its

powers or the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the SC loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has the SC retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.

The power to control the execution of the SCs decision is an essential aspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for the Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one SC and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them comform to law and justice. The Court also rejected public respondents contention that by granting the TRO, the Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. The suspension of such a death sentence is indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects are the same as the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend the Death Penalty Law by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But the exercise of Congress of its plenary power to amend laws cannot be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. To contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the 3 branches of the government