Goal Setting and Goal Striving in Consumer Behavior Author(s): Richard P.

Bagozzi and Utpal Dholakia Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Marketing, Vol. 63, Fundamental Issues and Directions for Marketing (1999), pp. 19-32 Published by: American Marketing Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1252098 . Accessed: 12/03/2012 05:34
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RichardP. Bagozzi & Utpal Dholakia

Goal

Striving and Goal Setting Consumer Behavior

in

Goals play an essential role in the purposive behavior of consumers, but scholars only recently have begun to examine the motivation for goals, their selection and modification, and their pursuit and attainment. One purpose of this article is to outline a conceptual framework for thinking about how goals emerge, influence decision making, and guide consumer choice and action. Another purpose is to integrate classic ideas proposed by consumer researchers with emerging concepts and models proposed by cognitive psychologists, social psychologists, and other social scientists. Finally, the authors' aim is to present several new ideas on goal setting and goal striving and point out how they can enrich the study and practice of consumer behavior.

uch of consumerbehavioris goal-directed.This can be found in the marketingof durables(e.g., buying a computerfor the purposeof managingfinances), nondurables(e.g., searchingfor a detergentthatwill be gentle, easy to use, and effective), services (e.g., joining a health club to keep body weight undercontrol), and ideas or persons (e.g., deciding to vote for a candidatewho will promote the voter's personal welfare). Even buyers in organizations pursuespecific goals in their activities, such as when hospital pharmacy and therapeutics committees search for, choose, and prescribe drugs that will be safe, efficacious, and inexpensive. All these goals share a focus on a specific outcome (or outcomes) that consumption can produce. A desired outcome (e.g., ease of use) entersthe mind of the decision maker and can be defined as a specific type of goal, namely, "a mental image or other end point representationassociated with affect toward which action may be directed"(Pervin 1989, p. 474, emphasis added;see also Austin and Vancouver 1996*, p. 338). Consumersmake purchasesto produce or yield one or more end-stategoals. Consumptiongoals are not limited to end states but also encompass experiences, sequences of interconnectedhappenings, and ongoing processes.For example, a person'svalocation and cation goal might not be limited to a particular time period per se but rathermight reside in anticipatededucational,recreational,and interpersonal experiences.A trip down the Amazon, an archeologicalexcursion,or a religious pilgrimageall constituteexperientialgoals of one sort or another. Note, too, that goals need not be closed-ended (e.g., taking a white-water rafting trip next summer) but can be M

open-ended and loosely defined (e.g., maintaining a comfortable, long-termrelationshipwith a bank). Despite the relevance and prevalence of goals in consumption,little scholarlyresearchexists (cf. Bettman 1979; Howard and Sheth 1969*; Huffman and Houston 1993; Lawson 1997; Ratneshwar,Pechmann, and Shocker 1996; Sjoberg, Bagozzi, and Ingvar 1998). We know little about what consumption goals are, how they are represented in memory,how they come about and change, or how they are pursuedand achieved. We begin with an organizingmodel for goal concepts in consumptionto providea frameworkfor thinkingaboutcurrent knowledge and what areas are in need of further research.Next, we examine researchon how goals are chosen and represented.Then, we turnto an analysis of how goals, when chosen, are implemented. Although consumer researchers have begun to address goals, the contributions have been fragmented.We attemptto bring together this research and integrate new ideas on goal-directed behavior from work performedon humanmemory and the psychology of action. Finally, we close with examples and suggested researchagendas.

The Role of Goals in Consumption: An Organizing Model

The formationof goal concepts and the enactmentof purposive action in relationto goals take place complexly and at various stages in decision making and consumer behavior. Multiple mental activities and actions occur en route to goal achievement. To provide an organizing model for thinking about key researchissues, we begin with the distinction between goal setting and goal striving (e.g., Bagozzi 1992; Heckhausenand Gollwitzer 1987). In Figure 1, we summaof rize the stages characteristic goal-directeddecision makand goal pursuitfor many consumptionproblems in this ing regard. We can conceive of goal-directedconsumerbehavior as beginning with goal setting. Goal setting involves decisionmaking processes in which, figuratively,the consumer addresses two broadquestions:"Whatare the goals I can pursue, and why do I want or not want to pursuethem?"As we ConsumerBehavior/19

*Authorswere limited in the numberof referencesused in text, therefore,those referencesmarkedwith an * are availableat www. and ama.org/pubs/jm at www.msi.org. Sciof P. F. Richard Bagozziis the Dwight BentonProfessor Behavioral is Dholakia an execuof ence in Management, Utpal University Michigan. The New BankCorporation, tive associateat M&T Buffalo, York. authors for thankthe editorsandthreeanonymous SpecialIssue reviewers their on comments thisarticle. andconstructive insightful

Journalof Marketing
Vol. 63 (Special Issue 1999), 19-32

FIGURE 1 Goal Setting and Goal Pursuit in Consumer Behavior

Feedback reactions

"Howdo I feel about achieving achieving/not my goal?" Action initiation andcontrol "What the are goals I can pursue,and why do I wantto pursuethem?" is "What it for whichI strive?" "Howcan I achievemy goal?" where, ("When, andhow how, long shouldI act?") "Howwell have I enactedmy plans?" "AmI making toward progress my goal?" "Arethereadjustmentsthatneedto be made?" "Isthe goal still important to me?" Goal * attainment/ failure "Towhatdegree have I achieved/ failedto achieve my goal?"

demonstratein the next section, goals are activated either externally,such as when the context presents opportunities or imposes imperatives,or internally,such as when the consumer constructs a goal schema or chooses from among self-generatedalternatives. Given a sufficiently strongdesire to pursuea goal, actual goal pursuit will commence in one of three conditions. Sometimes for frequentlyperformedconsumptionactivities goal pursuit is activated more or less automaticallyby responses to learned cues, and little conscious processing is involved (e.g., runninga credit card throughthe scannerat the supermarketcheckout counter). This might be labeled "habitualgoal-directed consumer behavior."Habitual behavior must begin somewhere, of course. In general, its origins reside in prior deliberative processing or learning shapedby eitherclassical or operantconditioningor in some combination of deliberative processing and conditioning. When acquired,however, habitualbehavioris initiatedand performedwith little conscious self-regulationof the sort on which we focus herein. Another way that goal pursuit occurs, at least in a minimal way, is with impulsive acts. By definition, impulsive acts do not entail priordeliberationor planning,but they do involve some awakeningof a need or 20 / Journalof Marketing, Special Issue 1999

desire that quickly becomes a goal to be achieved through minimal goal-directedactivities. The final class of actual goal-pursuitactivities, and the ones we emphasize in this article, are those that are clearly volitional in nature.As we show in Figure 1, goal pursuitis initiated volitionally with the formationof a goal intention, which answersthe question, "Whatis it for which I strive?" Goal intentionsare targetedat either specific acts as end performances (e.g., "I intend to buy a Sony DVD player outcomes to be achieved throughthe tonight")or particular execution of instrumentalacts (e.g., "I intend to lose two poundsby exercising vigorously with my ProFormtreadmill duringthe next week"). Goal intentionsdirectedat end performances have been studied extensively in consumer behavior with the theory of reasonedaction, in which they are termed"behavioralintentions"because the targetsof the intentions are actions. Goal intentions directed at outcomes sometimes have been studiedwith the theoryof reasonedaction, but as the authorsof that theory have emphasized,the theoryis not applicableto outcome or end-stategoals (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980, pp. 29-30, 111).The presentframework is designed in part to apply to such decision-making contexts, as well as contexts in which actions are goals.

Another type of volition that has not been studied systematically by consumer behavior researchers is the socalled implementationintention,which is a person's intention to perform a goal-directedbehavior (e.g., execute an instrumentalact) given that future contingencies occur: "I intendto do X when situationY is encountered" (Gollwitzer 1996, p. 292). For example, an implementationintentionto perform a future act in the service of goal achievement might read: "I intend to withdraw$60 from an automated teller machine (ATM)every time my cash on handis $10 or less."An example of an implementation intentionto achieve a future goal might read: "I intend to balance my portfolio of investments next year by adding new growth stocks in high-techAsian industriesas they become available." The thirdstage shown in Figure 1, action planning,is also volitional and elaborates furtheron implementationintentions. Here, focus is on the generalquestion, "How can I achieve my goal?" and the specific amplificationsaddressing "when,where, how, and how long should I act in this regard?"(Gollwitzer 1996). The choice of means is an important partof planning(Bagozzi 1992). Following planning, actual implementation steps are taken in a fourth stage, labeled "action initiation and control" in Figure 1. Here, delayed intentionsare enacted, and goal-directedbehaviors are guided. Four questions are addressed: "Am I making progress toward my goal?" "How well have I enacted my plans?""Are there adjustmentsthat need to be made?"and "Is the goal still importantto me?" intentionsare realized in this stage. Implementation The fifth stage, goal attainment/failure, involves a final or comparisonof the outcome achieved with a standard reference value and determination whetherto maintainor inof crease efforts at goal pursuitor disengage from furtherefforts (e.g., Carver and Scheier 1996). Figuratively, the consumer asks: "To what degree have I achieved/failed to achieve my ends, and should I continueon with or terminate goal striving?" Finally, for feedback reactions,the discrepancybetween a person's goal and its achievementis appraised,and emotional responses are generated,including reactionsof satisfaction or dissatisfaction,among others. The question considered here is: "How do I feel about achieving/not achieving my goal?" Emotional and rational reactions to goal attainment/failure ultimately update the person's knowledge structure about goals, motivation to pursue goals, and other learning with regard to planning, means, and implementation(Bagozzi, Gopinath,and Nyer 1999*). We turn now to a detailed analysis of goal setting and goal
striving.

Goal Setting
How do consumers form or arrive at their goals? How do they realize that they have a goal, and how are the motivational aspects of a goal representedin the mind or language of the consumer? Can consumers have goals and not be aware of them? We focus primarilyon conscious aspects of goal setting and goal striving.But before we considerhow goals arise in this sense, we acknowledgethatgoal-directedbehaviorscan

occur unconsciously. Bargh's (1990) auto-motive model maintainsthatgoals can be activatedby environmentalstimuli, and cognitive and behavioralprocesses operate to initiate and guide action automaticallyand unconsciously.This can be found in such habituated actions as driving a car, typing, or playing tennis and, perhaps, occurs in some routinized purchase situations. Bargh and Barndollar (1996) summarize experimental research that supports the automotive model (see also Wyer 1997*). Conscious goals seem to arise in one of three ways. First, goals can be forced on people, throughcoercion or rewardpower or, more subtly,by virtueof their position in an organization,family, or other social unit, whereby they are obligated to work towardpredefinedends. For example, the buyer in a firm must follow certainstandardsor procedures; the birthof a child opens new consumptionimperativesfor parentsin the areasof special foods, medicine, and clothing. Second, people often simply "have"a goal, in the sense that it arises automaticallybecause of biological, emotional, moral, or ethical forces (e.g., Le Doux 1996*). These goals are nonconscious, but unlike Bargh's (1990) auto-motives, they are not necessarily producedby habituallylearned responses to environmentalstimuli. Rather,they are activated unconsciously by internalcriteriabut pursued consciously. When people feel ill, for example, their goal is to get better, and they purchaseproductsor services to accomplishthis, as well as engage in other healing activities. When people experience an unexpectedreward,they seek to share the good news with others, perhapsby celebratingwith a dinner in an expensive restaurant. Third, the goal on which we concentrateherein is the type that arises from reasoned reactions to either external stimuli (e.g., the presentationof a new product,an alluring package, a provocative advertisement,a persuasive appeal by a salesperson) or internal stimuli (e.g., a conclusion drawn at the end of problemsolving; the mere thought that the person has a need). Huffman, Ratneshwar,and Mick (1997*) present a similar consideration of goal activation and attributeit to contextualfactors in the socioculturalenvironment, usage situation, and immediate choice context. Exposure to possible goals in these senses leads to evaluations of their personalrelevance. Goals are either objects to acquire,own, or display (i.e., products,brands)or targetactions directedat objects or outcomes (e.g., service adoption, productchoice). Perhapsthe simplest and most frequentlyused approach to capturingconsumer evaluations of products or services has been the use of constructsdesigned to measureeither atantecedentsor attititudesand their specific product/service tudes and their general antecedent value orientations. In both Howardand Sheth's (1969*, p. 30) and Engel, Blackwell, and Miniard's(1986*, p. 35) models, for example, attitude toward a particularbrand is regardedas a direct determinantof purchaseintention.Attitude in turnis modeled as a function of specific beliefs and other reactionsto product/service attributesor consequences of purchase.In contrast, other researchershave focused not on evaluations of but productor service attributes, ratheron general life goals as antecedentsto purchaseintentionor choice. For example, the values and lifestyles (VALS) model attemptsto predict ConsumerBehavior/ 21

consumer behavior as a function of 34 or more proprietary lifestyle values (e.g., Novak, de Leeuw, and MacEvoy 1992), whereas the list of values (LOV) approachrelies on 9 social values (e.g., excitement, self-fulfillment, security) to explain consumer attitudes (e.g., Beatty, Kahle, and Homer 1991*; Homer and Kahle 1988*) or segment marand kets (e.g., Kamakura Novak 1992*). Attitude models such as the theory of reasoned action (e.g., Ajzen and Fishbein 1980) and value approachessuch as the VALS or LOV models provide implicit representations of goal setting. Theiradvantageslie in theirsimplicity, ease of operationalization,and usefulness in prediction. Theirprimarydisadvantagerests in the limited way they accomplish explanation and understandingof consumer behavior. Other than postulatingthat beliefs and evaluations combine as multiplicativesums in the theoryof reasonedaction and values function as additivepredictorsin the VALS and LOV models, the approachesare silent about how informationis processed and organized.Relatedto this is their neglect of the underlying structure of information and whether beliefs or values are related in hierarchical,functional, or inferentialmanners. It is useful to distinguishbetween goal setting following a decision to pursue a goal and goal setting conducted before a decision has been made to pursuea goal. The former is exemplified in brandchoice when the consumer has decided to make a purchase from a productclass. The latter pertains to the motivation to make a purchase in the first place. Howardand Sheth (1969*) were pioneers in the considerationof goals, thoughthey provideonly a limited treatment of goal hierarchies.They consider the use of plans, however, in that they conceive of an intention as the uncompleted portion of a plan. Subsequently,Howard(1989*, pp. 55-59) elaboratedon the stages in consumer behavior, for particularly what he termed"extensiveproblem-solving" situations, and presented the process as a "two-level choice":choice of productclass followed by choice of brand within the productclass. Choice of productclass is believed to be initiatedby terminalvalues (e.g., "acomfortablelife"), which provide choice criteria for a product class. Beliefs about each of a set of productclasses then are evaluatedto arriveat attitudestowardthe productclasses, which lead to a decision to make a purchase from a particularproduct class. The actual choice of a brand in the chosen product class is hypothesized to be determinedby attitudestoward the known brands;these attitudesare, in turn, functions of beliefs about the brandsaccordingto criteriathat are based on instrumentalvalues (e.g., "ambition"). Despite featuring terminal and instrumentalvalues as initial motivations for product and brand choice, respectively, Howard (1989*) does not specify how these values are organized and how they function to influence attitudes,decisions, and choice. Bettman(1979) providesthe first extensive treatmentof goals in consumer choice. A centralconcept in his theory is the notion of a goal hierarchyand its instrumentalrole in achieving an end state. For example, he shows that the goal to purchase a washing machine can be broken down into three subgoals: determinationof which product attributes are important,evaluationof alternativebrandson the attributes, and choice of the best brand (Bettman 1979, p. 21). 22 / Journalof Marketing, Special Issue 1999

Each subgoal can be brokendown furtherinto action steps, and so on. Notice that this conceptualizationof a goal hierarchy starts with a goal and then specifies steps needed to accomplishthe goal. Although Bettman(1979, p. 45) develops a comprehensivetheory of consumerchoice, defined as "a process of moving from some initial state to a desired state," his emphasis is primarily on the complex decision processes thatlead up to productor brandchoice ratherthan on the goal or motivationto make a choice per se. How might the motivational foundation for a consumer's goal be ascertained?One way this has been approached is with the laddering technique, in which a consumer is asked to identify concrete attributesof a product and then, in sequence for each concrete attribute,link concrete attributesto abstract attributes,abstractattributesto functional consequences, functional consequences to psychosocial consequences, psychosocial consequences to invalues to termistrumental values, and, finally, instrumental nal values (e.g., Reynolds and Gutman 1988*). The means-ends chains derived from qualitativeladderingprocedures have been found to yield intuitive descriptions of the hierarchicalvalue structuresbelieved to motivate consumers to seek a product/serviceor brandand have provided guidance in managerial decisions such as advertising copy and strategic advertising design decisions (e.g., Reynolds and Craddock1988*). The main disadvantagewith the ladderingprocedureand the means-ends chains it produces is twofold. First, the approachhas been limited to a descriptionof what purportedly occurs in goal setting, but the way that value hierarchies functionin consumerchoice has not been specified or tested to a great extent. Second, the theoreticalfoundationfor and validity of measures in a means-ends chain, from the point of view of cognitive psychology, can be challenged. The linkages among values in the hierarchyare especially open to question if we accept the argument that (1) mental processes (e.g., the presumedpersonalinferencesunderlying means-ends connections) are not open to self-explication (e.g., Nisbett andWilson 1977*) or (2) self-knowledge is incomplete (e.g., Quattrone1985*) but instead that the linkof ages constitutesubjective, post hoc interpretations previDennett 1987*). ously generatedresponses (e.g., New Approaches to Goal Setting There are at least two fundamentallydifferentapproachesto the problem of representing a consumer's motivation for choosing a goal: one from cognitive psychology and one from discursive psychology and related perspectives in anthropology.We brieflydescribe these points of view because they might apply to consumer goal-directedbehavior. A useful startingpoint is how goals are representedin memory. Barsalou (1991) argues that knowledge in the cognitive system is representedin categories, and there are two fundamentalways categories originate:throughexemplarlearningor conceptualcombination.Exemplarlearning is central to acquiring taxonomic knowledge about the world as it exists and is a relatively passive, bottom-up,and automaticprocess. Goal-derivedcategories, in contrast,are believed to arise through conceptual combination by manipulation of existing knowledge in memory. Barsalou

(1991, p. 4) summarizes aspects of categorization in this sense as follows: combination to conceptual active, appears be relatively top-down,and effortful.By deliberately manipulating new cateknowledge through reasoning, peopleproduce combination ofgoriesthatservetheirgoals... conceptual ten produces idealizedknowledge abouthow the world
should be ... ratherthan ... about how it is.

Barsalou (1991, p. 27) furtherproposes that goals and their attributesare representedin frames, which he defines as "flexible, loosely organized bodies of knowledge." For example, the frame for a vacation goal might consist of the vacation category and its connections to five attributes: locations, temporalparameters, activities, objects, and actors. Each attribute,in turn, might be connected to clusters of more specific attributes;for example, departure,duration, return,and schedule are types of temporalparameters, and preparations,travel, and entertainmentare types of activities. The specific attributesfurthermight be composed of subtypes;for example, majortravel(flying transcontinentally), minor travel (taxi from airportto hotel), and arrangements at location (reserving a seat on a tour bus) are subtypes of travel. Barsalou(1991) shows how such framesare useful in planninggoals and how othergoals and constraints promoteplanning.For example, in planninga vacation,such backgroundgoals as "maximizerelaxationand educational value"guide the selection of exemplarsfor a frameinstantiation. Within a particularframe, certain attributesalso constrain the range of other attributes;for example, a needed departureof July for a snow-skiing vacation requiresa ski resortin the southernhemisphere.Much remainsto be done in the study of the representation consumergoals, but reof cent researchand insights in memory for brandsand attributes promises to deepen our understandingof goals (e.g., Alba, Hutchinson,and Lynch 1991; Luce 1998). Given a particulargoal, the next issue in goal setting pertainsto how the goal is related to reasons for acting. To addressthis issue, we considergoals as organizedin a threetiered hierarchy.The focal goal can be located at the center of the hierarchyand answers the question: "What is it for which I strive?"Subordinategoals constitute the means of achieving the focal goal and answer the question:"How can I achieve that for which I strive?"At the top of the hierarchy are superordinate goals, which answer the question: "Why do I want to achieve that for which I strive?"Psychologists and consumer researchersrecently have proposed similar frameworksfor the hierarchicalrepresentation goals and of instrumentalacts in the self-regulation of behavior (e.g., Carverand Scheier 1996; Pieters 1993; Vallacherand Wegner 1987*). Lawson (1997) shows how brandchoice can be conceived of as a functionof a hierarchyof goals, beginning with abstractvalues that influence programgoals targeted towardproductcategories. In Figure 2, we summarizeour generalrepresentation of goal hierarchiesand provide an abbreviatedexample of the hierarchyappliedto the focal goal of weight control.The focal goal can be representedin a cognitive frame; losing weight might be represented throughits connectionsto such attributesas amount of weight, location on body, and time periodfor removal.Each of the subordinate goals also might

be representedin frames. For example, a partial frame for and exercising might consist of two attributes corresponding types as possible means for weight loss: individualexercising (aerobics, calisthenics,jogging, weight lifting) and participation in sports (tennis, basketball, handball, racquetball). A partial frame for dieting might consist of such means as avoiding snacks between meals, cutting down on fatty or starchy foods, eating lighter meals, and taking diet medications. The primary motivation for engaging in a focal goal comes about through the superordinategoals it serves. To take an example, Figure 3 representsa hierarchyof superordinate goals for the focal goal "losing or maintainingmy body weight" as expressed by a sample of 125 women (Bagozzi and Edwards 1998). We can imagine these superordinategoals as ends or standardsby which the focal goal is rationalized.The superordinate goals are arrangedby level of abstractnessfrom the lowest ("fit into my clothes") to the highest ("enjoy life") and are shown as interconnected through inferencelike relationships. For example, a consumer might believe or conclude that losing body weight will help him or her fit better into a desired wardrobe,and this in turnwould make him or her look and feel good, save money, and increase self-esteem and social acceptance (see Figure 3). Likewise, losing weight would lead to better health, longevity, enjoymentof life, and so on. The hierarchicalrepresentationof superordinategoals shown in Figure 3 was generatedby an interview method designed to circumventcertainproblemsinherentin the traditional ladderingprocedure.It can be arguedthat the standard ladderingtechniqueis too directive and narrow,in that it imposes on respondentsa specific structureand the sequence of responses it attemptsto elicit from them. That is, respondents are asked to generate product attributesfirst, then psychosocial consequences of the attributes,and finally values coming from the psychosocial consequences. However, the patternand sequence of relationshipsmay not reflect how consumersactually set goals or how these goals are organizedin memory. Instead of being based on the laddering procedure,the structureof hierarchicalgoals shown in Figure 3 was elicited throughuse of a proceduregroundedin the philosopher Toulmin's (1958*) ideas on argumentationand rhetoric. Briefly, Toulminconceives of argumentsas a series of personal claims thatan arguerprovidesin theirdefense. Any argument can be supporteddirectly by multiple claims as evidence. Each claim, in turn,can be challenged on the bases of its justification.The justifications offered in supportrest on evidence and also can be challenged or explained. A particularargumenttypically will rely on some finite sequence of claims, dependingon the reasoningof the arguer.Antaki (1989*) uses similarideas to generatenetworksof causal attributions,and a somewhat similar approachhas been taken and by Pieters, Baumgartner, Allen (1995) in their study of goal hierarchies(see also Antaki 1988*). In a parallelmanner, the superordinate goal structureshown in Figure 3 was generated by asking respondents to provide reasons they chose the focal goal and then providea justificationfor each reason and an explanationfor each justification. Next, principles from networkanalysis were used to map the reasons, ConsumerBehavior/ 23

FIGURE 2 The Three-Tiered Goal Hierarchy

General Representation of Goal Hierarchy

Exampleof GoalHierarchy (abbreviated)

"Whydo I wantto achievethatfor whichI strive?"

"Whatis it for which I strive?"

"Howcan I achievethatfor which I strive?"

This justifications, and explanationsinto the goal hierarchy. procedure avoids the a priori imposition of the structure characteristicof the ladderingtechniqueand is less subject to demandcharacteristics. Unlike Barsalou's (1991) approachand other points of view peculiarto cognitive psychology, the hierarchicalgoal structuredepicted in Figure 3 need not rest on the assumption that it represents internal mental processes (Bagozzi and Dabholkar2000). To the contrary,it is possible to think of the goal structureas an expression of a person's reasons for choosing a goal in terms of how the reasons reflect and conform to the shared language and larger social conventions within which people unconsciously function. In this as sense, the hierarchical might be interpreted goal structure a cognitive structurefrom the perspectiveof Wittgenstein's (1953*) philosophy of psychology. That is, Wittgenstein conceives of cognition as a discursive process rooted in the use of a grammar,either in actual or imagined conversations, and contingenton standardsof usage and correctness peculiar to a particularsocial context. From this point of view, mental processes are not intrapsychicper se but rather are manifest in the use or practiceof language and in relation to justifying a person's actions or evaluations.Psychologists following the discursive paradigmconstrue mental processes in the following way: 24 / Journalof Marketing, Special Issue 1999

Mental states, according to this point of view, are produced ad hoc in the course of people acting, and are nothing but attributesof the stream of action. There are no mental entities other than the public and private actions people engage in (Harre 1998, p. 3).

The method used to generatethe hierarchicalgoal structure shown in Figure 3 is compatible with discursive psyand chology, to the extent thatthe argumentation rhetoricoffered by respondents expresses their self-concept and the public self to which they wish to conform or with which they wish to influence others.We can imagine the hierarchical goal structureas a joint productof a person'scognitions (in Wittgenstein's1953 sense of cognition) and his or her intent to manage his or her presentationof self. These ideas find furtherdevelopment in cultural(Cole 1996*) and cognitive (D'Andrade 1995*) anthropology.Zaltman's (1997) metaphorelicitation techniqueseems to follow a similar rationale (see also Bagozzi, Bergami, and Leone 1999). It is not our purpose here to argue the merits of the intrapsychic versus discursive paradigms or to express our personal preferences for one or the other. Both are recognized, if fundamentallyincompatible,approachesin philosophy and psychology. Rather, we wish to make the point that goal setting can be approachedfrom two fundamentally different points of view: one rooted in traditionalcogni-

FIGURE 3 Hierarchical Goal Structure for Reasons for Losing or Maintaining Body Weight

withpermissionfromRichardP.Bagozzi and ElizabethA. Edwards(1998), "GoalSettingand Goal Pursuitin the Regulationof Body Reprinted Weight," Psychologyand Health,13, 613.

tive psychology and claiming to representmental processes (e.g., Barsalou 1991) and one based on discursive psychology and claiming to representthe grammarof intentional practicesand its relationto self (e.g., Harre1998;McAdams 1996*). Whateverthe ontological and metaphysicalassumptions we make with regardto hierarchical it goal structures, is imof portantnot to stop with the representation goals. As we noted previously, a weakness with the ladderingprocedure is that it stops with a descriptionof values and does not relate these formally to decisions or choice. To go beyond description,it is necessary to relate goal hierarchiesto preferences, choices, and behavior.Bettman(1979) was a pioneer in this regard.He showed how a desired end state is related to goals and subgoals and how these, in turn,interfacewith decision processes throughtheir linkage with attentionand choice processes. To show the influence of goal setting on decision making, we attemptedto ascertainthe dependenceof attitudes, felt normativepressure,intentions,and other summarypsychological reactions on the superordinategoal structure shown in Figure 3 (Bagozzi and Edwards 1998). By use of hierarchical multiple regression,attitudesand othersummary reactionswere regressedon both individualsuperordinate goals and linkages between goals as espoused by a sample of consumers.To take one dependentvariableas an example, felt normativepressureto lose or maintainbody weight

was found to be a functionof one goal ("social acceptance") and I 1 linkagesbetweengoals ("look good" -> "happiness," "achievement" -> "health," "energy" -> "social acceptance," "energy"-> "endurance," "energy"-> "feel good," "fit in clothes" -> "social ac"energy" -> "achievement," ceptance,""fit in clothes" -> "save money,""fit in clothes" -> "look good," "fit in clothes" -> "self-esteem,"and "feel good" -> "achievement").By identifying which goals and linkages actuallypredictsuch dependentvariablesas preferences or intentions,managerscan learn which goals or inferences to emphasize in advertisingcopy or personal selling. Expectancy value models do not provide such diagnostic information,in that they fail to model the structureand interdependencies among beliefs. At the same time, expectancy value models pose statistical limitations based in on indeterminancies the analysis of productterms when the constituents of the terms are not ratio-scaled (Evans 1991*). Goal Setting, Prefactuals, and the Activation of Intentions Analogous to value hierarchies, superordinategoals and their organizationprovide a basis for decision making, but something more is needed to activate intentions.Emotional or affective processes can perform this role when coupled with decision making with regard to anticipatedoutcomes that are contingenton alternativecourses of action. ConsumerBehavior/ 25

To demonstrate this, we begin with the notion of a

counterfactual. A counterfactual is a conditional state-

ment that contains both an antecedent expressed as a hypothetical (e.g., "if X happens") and a consequence expressed as an implication ("then Y will occur"). The most commonly researched counterfactual addresses a previously experienced negative outcome and speculates on how the outcomes could have been less negative or even better; for example, "If only I had invested in bonds, I would not have lost as much money as I did through stock purchases." An emotional consequence of such counterfactuals is regret (e.g., Landman 1987*). Although less commonly researched, there can be counterfactuals with positive emotional consequences that are phrased somewhat differently; for example, "I am disappointed by my losses in the stock market, but they would have been even worse if I had, as originally planned, invested in futures." Here, a positive emotion of relief or even enhancement of self-esteem could occur (e.g., Roese and Olson 1995*). For decision makingwith regardto a futureevent, anticipatedoutcomes are central,and the notion of a counterfactual must be reworked. Gleicher and colleagues (1995*) propose that counterfactualscan be phrased in relation to imagined events and their alternatives, and the thought processes then produce affective responses that influence subsequentattitudesand intentions.They suggest the use of the term "prefactuals" to differentiate these thinking processes from those involved in counterfactualthinking, which refer to priorhappenings. Similar to researchersin counterfactualthinking, Gleicher and colleagues (1995*, p. 294) focus on imaginedalternatives that run counter to an anticipated undesirable event: "whena person generatesa counterfactual[prefactual] that reverses a negative outcome, he or she is likely to make the attribution[that] there is an effective action that can be taken in the future."Considerationof the negative consequences of acting one way and the possibility of a more satisfying alternativeprovides the impetus for the effects of prefactual thinking on decision making, that is, "when an individual thinks about a counterfactualin advance, the motivation to avoid this negative affect influences behavioralchoices" (Gleicheret al. 1995*, p. 295; see also Roese and Olson 1995*, p. 21). Two studies supportthe functioningof prefactualsin decision making.Boningerand colleagues (1994) find that prefactuals,with regardto the game, influencedsubpurchaseof insurancein a laboratory sequent action to take insurance. Likewise, Gleicher and colleagues (1995*) find that prefactualsregardingcondom use affected positive attitudes;however, intentions to use condoms were not influencedby prefactuals,thoughthe difference in means between experimentaland control groups were in the predicteddirection. For many consumption decisions, it seems plausible that prefactualsshould not be limited to anticipatednegative consequences of a possible act and its more favorable alternativebut rather,or in addition, might pertain to appraisals of the contingent positive affect if the decision maker were to make a purchase plus the contingent negative affect that would result if he or she were not to make

the purchase. The greater the felt positive affect from the former appraisal and the greater the negative affect from the latter, the stronger is the motivation to make the purchase. Bagozzi and Warshaw's(1990) so-called theory of trying could be reinterpreted as a prefactual decision process if we think of attitudetowardsuccess (weighted by expectations of success) and attitude toward failure (weighted by expectations of failure) as prefactualjudgments, which they did not. Insteadof attitudesper se, it may carry more explanatory force to specify multiple positive and negative emotions as instigatorsof decisions or choices in prefactualjudgments. Analogous to regret as a motivational mechanism for the effect of prefactualson choices (e.g., Johnson 1986*), we might posit that certain positive and negative emotions motivate decisions, depending on the appraisalconditions and fit of the emotions to the context at hand. For example, the decision to engage in a commercial weight-controlprogrammight be a function of the integrationof the following prefactualjudgments and their emotional consequences:anticipatedregretfrom not spendalternative(e.g., Johnson ing money on a "noncomparable" and happiness about engaging 1984*); imaginedjoy, pride, in and experiencing the success of weight loss; and envisaged shame, guilt, and frustrationshould the person fail to lose weight. Researchersonly recently have begun to study the role of anticipated emotions in decision making. Parker, Manstead, and Stradling(1995) find that anticipatednegative affect (measuredwith two regret items) influenced the intention to commit driving violations. Richard, van der Pligt, and de Vries (1995) find that anticipatedreactionstoward performance of safe sexual behaviors significantly predictedintentionsto performthese practices.Their study was limited to negative emotions measuredwith only three items: worried/not worried, regret/no regret, and tense/relaxed. A fuller study of the effects of anticipatedemotions shows that positive and negative emotions influenced volitions (intentions, plans, and anticipatedeffort) to exercise and diet, as well as subsequentachievementof body weight and Pieters 1998). The posigoals (Bagozzi, Baumgartner, tive emotions include excitement, delight, happiness, gladness, satisfaction, pride, and self-assurance as a consequence of prefactual judgments; the complementary judgments ennegative emotions stemming from prefactual sadness, disapcompass frustration,guilt, shame, anger, pointment,depressive thoughts,worry,discomfort, and fear (see also Luce 1998; Peruginiand Bagozzi 1999*). In summary,goal setting can be thoughtto consist of (1) the formationof subgoals needed to achieve an end state or initiateand guide experientialaims (e.g., Bettman 1979); (2) of the representation goals throughconceptual combination and their organizationin frames (e.g., Barsalou 1991) or, alends they serve in the ternatively,throughthe superordinate expression of self, which are organizedhierarchically(e.g., Bagozzi and Edwards1998); and (3) the thinking(e.g., prefactual thought) and motivational(e.g., anticipatedemotion) processes that translategoal frames or hierarchicallyorganized superordinate goals into intentions,decisions, or plans (e.g., Bagozzi, Baumgartner,and Pieters 1998). We turn now to goal implementationprocesses.

26 / Journalof Marketing, Special Issue 1999

Goal Striving
Intentions are much more than uncompleted portions of (predecision) plans whose execution has begun. They provide the psychological mechanism or bridge between goal setting and goal striving,as well as serve control and executive functionsin goal pursuit.In this section, we begin with a discussion of new researchon intentionsand then consider such issues as the choice of means needed to pursue a goal, planning,monitoring,guidance,and self-regulationof instrumental actions necessary for goal attainment.Less attention has been devoted to goal striving in consumer research, and researchin psychology in this regardis still in its early stages and in need of integration. Intentions and Memory Intentionsare formed at multiple stages of decision making (i.e., during goal setting and goal pursuit),exist in different forms, and have different functions.As we mentioned previously, when goal setting results in the decision to pursuea goal, the intention is referredto as a goal intention.A consumer with a goal intentionis committedin principleto the execution of actions needed to achieve the goal. The personal commitment inherent in the intention is one of the defining qualities that differentiate it from other mental states or processes such as beliefs, attitudes, or emotions. The commitmententailed by a goal intentionis made to the goal as an end and to the self-realizationthatactions will be requiredto achieve the goal. But the particularactions required for goal achievementare not specified in or referred to by the goal intention.Additionalinformationprocessing and decision making are needed to transforma goal intention into action and action into goal attainment.Implementation intentions also imply a commitment,but unlike goal intentions, they have specific actions as their referents (Gollwitzer and Schaal 1998*). Both goal and implementationintentionsare stored abstractlyin declarativememory and must be retrievedbefore further progress in goal pursuit can occur (Goschke and Kuhl 1996). To realize a goal intention,theremust be enactment of a choice of means to pursuethe goal and otherplanning activities. To realize an implementation intention, recognitionof execution conditionsmust occur.The memory processes for both types of intentionsinvolve internalized verbal instructions(e.g., Diaz and Berk 1992*). Because many consumptiondecisions are fulfilled at a time quite remote from the point when an intention first was formed, two basic memory processes come into play with delayed intentions.One refers to rememberingto perform an action at a futurepoint in time and has come to be known as "prospective memory" (Brandimonte,Einstein, and McDaniel 1996*). The other requiresrememberingthe content of the action to performand the conditions for its execution. This is sometimes called "retrospectivememory" in the literature. Before we consider prospectiveand retrospectivememory in the functioning of intentions,let us consider an example to describethe natureof the processes:On awakening this morning,I find thatI am out of breakfastcereal and decide to replenish my supplies, as well as purchase ingredi-

ents for makingmy lunches for the rest of the week. I intend to do this later in the afternoon.For this decision to be transformed into action, I must rememberat the appropriate time that (as I drive home after work and pass the supermarket) I had formed an intentionearlierin the day. This is the recall of my goal intentionand is an example of prospectivememory. Next, I must recall the content of my decision; that is, I must rememberwhere in the store to go (dairy section, produce area,canned goods shelves, and so forth), what to buy (breakfast cereal, sourdough bread, canned tuna, mayonnaise, fresh fruit),and so on. This is my retrospectivememory and, among other things, involves the execution of implementation intentions.

My prospectivememory requiresthat my intentionpersists, that I am vigilant for externalcues, such as the supermarketmarquee,or that the intentionbecomes activatedby unplannedstimuli or spontaneously.My retrospectivememory requiresdeliberativeand directive cognitive processing or automaticretrievalof plans or executive functions when the prospectivememory becomes activated. Psychologists have begun to uncover importantaspects of prospective memory. Goschke and Kuhl (1996), for example, find in their experiments that the contents of prospectivememory have strongerand more sustainedlevels of activation than other nonintentionmemory content (see also Marsh, Hicks, and Bink 1998*). They also show that intentionsfacilitate subsequentprocessing of intentionrelated information,even when the episodic representation of the intention is not consciously recollected. Finally, Goschke and Kuhl (1996) find that state- versus actionorientedsubjects showed strongerpersistence of intentions. Ruminationsby the former(e.g., intrusionsinto memory of previous goal failures) contributed to the persistence, whereasthe latter,who tend to act automaticallyand not become distractedor dwell on failures, deactivated intentionrelatedmaterialto a greaterextent. Kvavilashviliand Ellis (1996) discuss the distinctionbetween prospective memory failures and absentmindederrors. The former is the inability to retrieve an intended action, whereas the latteraddresses failures that occur during of the performance an intendedaction. In additionto failing to rememberto act, errorsin delayed intentionsinclude partial or complete loss of the content of the intentionand failures in outputmonitoring.Likewise, errorscan result even for intentions a person begins to fulfill immediately after formingthem. Kvavilashviliand Ellis (1996) discuss substitutionerrors,loss of intention,errorsin repetition,and omisintentions. sions for such "immediate" Research shows that several retrieval contexts prompt delayed intentions: events, activities, times, persons, objects, and locations (e.g., Einstein and McDaniel 1990*, 1996*; Marsh and Hicks 1998*). Kvavilashvili and Ellis (1996) develop a frameworkfor observing how retrievalof delayed intentionsoccurs and the researchto date conducted in the area. One distinction they make is between event-, time-, and activity-based intentions. Kvavilashvili and Ellis show that these intentionsdiffer to the extent that externalcues are absent (time-based)or present(event- and activity-based)and to the extent that ongoing behavior re(event- and time-based)or not (activityquires interruption

ConsumerBehavior/ 27

based). With regard to encoding, activity-based intentions are likely to be the easiest to rememberbecause of theircontingency on cues and theirdecoupling from ongoing behavior. Kvavilashviliand Ellis furtherpoint out that intentions thatcombine event-, time-, and/oractivity-basedcontingencies (e.g., "I intendto place an orderfor a productadvertised during a television programat 9:00 P.M.after the program ends") may be rememberedmore easily laterbecause of the multiple retrievalcues that occur at the plannedoccasion. Appraisal of Means After a goal has been chosen and a goal intentionformed, the next task that the consumerfaces is the problemof how to reachthe goal. For a goal that has been pursuedfrequently in the past, a decision makermight activate a storedrule or script such as "use the means that I used last time," similar to Howard's(1989*) routinizedproblem-solvingmodel. For a chosen goal that is low in salience or simple to achieve, the person might apply a stored rule such as "use the easiest means" or "use the means that comes to mind first." However, for new goals or goals that are high in salience or difficult to achieve, the next step in the goalattainmentprocess is the evaluation of alternativemeans to determinethe best course of action. Bagozzi (1992) isolates threedistinct appraisaltasks thatare performedto select the best means. These processes involve self-reactions and judgments about the possible means needed to realize a goal. The first appraisalprocess involves assessments of the person's capabilities to exercise control over the means needed to achieve a goal. Bandura(1997) terms this selfefficacy and defines it as the belief or self-confidence a person has that he or she can perform a particularbehavior. way to Self-efficacy can be extended in a straightforward the possible means availdecision making with respect to act able for goal pursuit,such that each instrumental under consideration can be appraised in terms of the person's judged self-efficacy to perform it. Self-efficacy appraisals are importantespecially for difficult-to-use product categories such as new software packages or home gyms or for such effortful consumptiontasks as finding a new doctor or purchasing a car. Among other effects, recent research shows that self-efficacy influences goal setting, goal perseverance, intentions, and behavioral implementation(Bandura 1997; Locke and Latham 1990). The second appraisal process consists of actionoutcome expectancies. Whereas self-efficacies addresspersonal appraisalsof a person's internalcapabilities with relation to performanceof an act, action-outcome expectancies refer to assessments of the likelihood that the initiation of goal-directed behaviors as means to an end will lead to goal achievement.To take an example, imagine a consumer who desires to lose weight and is consideringone of two alternatives:an all-purpose exercise machine that the advertiser claims requires only 15 minutes use a day to lead to weight loss versus a year's membership in a local health club, including sign-up with the daily aerobicsclass. A consumer can judge the subjective likelihood thateach alternative, if adopted, would produce weight loss and might, for

example, opt for the health club and aerobics class option because he or she believes that it is much more likely to lead to weight loss for him or her personally. In general, consumers will not select a course of action as a means for achieving their goals unless a positive connection is perceived between performance of the means and goal achievement. Some goal-directedbehaviors have affective or evaluative consequences that are independentof the value of the goal per se but that neverthelesscan inhibit or promote the decision to use them in goal pursuit.We term this thirdtype of appraisalaffect toward means. Some instrumentalacts will be intrinsically enjoyable or lead to pleasant consequences. Othersmay be so noxious or unpleasantas to lead to avoidance. In a sense, this third type of appraisalrepresents a motivational component of volition. Whereas selfefficacies and action-outcome expectancies are primarily cognitive appraisalsof linkages between the self as decision acts and between these inmakerand possible instrumental strumentalacts and goal attainment,respectively, affect toward means supplies informationabout the emotional consequences of engaging in goal pursuititself. Depending on the polarityandmagnitudeof these reactions,the decision to use one means or anotherwill be perceived favorablyor unfavorablyin and of itself. A choice among means is likely to involve an integration of a person's self-efficacies and instrumentalbeliefs with evaluationsof the affective significance of each means to an end. In a study of coupon usage, women appraisedeach of six sources of coupons as means to fulfill their shopping goals: direct mail, newspapers, magazines, in or on packages, store displays or fliers, and from relatives or friends and Yi 1992a). The findings show (Bagozzi, Baumgartner, that the extent of actual coupon usage was a function of a three-way interaction among self-efficacies, actionoutcome expectancies, and affect towardmeans. More generally, it has been argued and found in a study of body weight maintenance that the integration of the three appraisalsof means will be additiveor multiplicative,depending on the degree of task difficulty (Bagozzi and Edwards 1999). For relatively easy tasks, for which internalor external impedimentswere weak, the three appraisalsof means functionedadditivelyas main effects to influence the choice of goal-directed behaviors. For more difficult tasks, for which internal and external impediments were strong, the three appraisalsof means combined multiplicativelyto influence choice. Froma managerialstandpoint,a relatedissue is the abilnot only to influence the choice of means (e.g., making a ity customer use an ATM to withdrawcash instead of walking to the teller window) at one point in time, but also to develop cumulative, sustained affinities for particularcombinations of means in customers(e.g., using electronic channels such as ATMs, personal computers, and automated telephone response units to make financial transactionsrather than using more expensive service personnel,in the case of a retail bank). In some cases, the task for the business may be to reduce the frequencyof using any means at all (transacting fewer times a month using any channel) without

28 / Journalof Marketing, Special Issue 1999

dropping the original goal (maintaininga profitable relationship with the bank). Action Planning After an intentionto seek a goal is formedand a decision to means is made,the means appraisalprocessuse a particular es culminatein the formationof an implementation plan of actionthatspecifies when, where,how, and how long each of will be carriedout. the actions necessaryfor goal attainment Such plans have a strong cognitive component (cf. Miller, and Galanter, Pribram1960) and are hierarchical representations thatcontrolthe orderin which the behaviorwill be seas quencedfor goal attainment, well as specify objects in the environmentas cues for initiatingaction. By linking situationalcues to goal-directedbehaviors,implementation plans, in a sense, pass on the controlof goal-directedbehaviorsto the environment(Gollwitzer 1996). Empiricalresearchhas of shown that the mental representation the situationalcues the planbecomeshighly activated,makingthese specified by cues easily accessible and facilitatingaction initiationat the time (Gollwitzerand Brandstatter 1997). appropriate Other research has shown that, even when people are highly absorbed in some ongoing activity, planning facilitates the disruptionof focused attention,which allows transtime. fer to behaviorspecified by the plan, at the appropriate Planning also facilitates the initiation of goal-directed bewhich haviors in the presence of the specified opportunity, enables people to respond to good opportunities,even if they present themselves for only a short moment. Finally, planning provides distinct volitional benefits by facilitating self-regulatoryprocesses when impedimentsto plan implearise (Gollwitzerand Schaal mentationoccur or temptations 1998*). Implementationplans for consumer tasks are likely to vary along several dimensions,dependingon the natureand difficulty of the task, as well as the effort anticipatedfor intention realization.We point out some of the importantdimensions, but because little is known aboutconsumerplans, furtherresearchmust addressthis issue of plan typologies in greaterdetail. In examining the influence of planningon social behavior, social psychologists make the distinction between the content of plans on the one hand and their structureon the other (e.g., Mischel and Patterson 1976). This provides a convenient distinction to begin to develop a plan typology for consumer tasks. Whereas content refers to the matter contained in the plan, structure pertainsto the level of hierarchical organization of the plan. Mischel and Patterson (1976) find thatthe efficacy of plans dependedon both their content and their structure. In their empirical study, plans, which were elaboratedin detail, temptation-inhibiting elaboratedplans were more successful thantask-facilitating in the accomplishmentof the goal of self-control. Furthermore,plan structurecan be viewed as having several subdimensions. One important subdimension of consumer plans is completeness,which refers to how fully each individuallink in the course of action is specified. We expect that for consumer tasks that are high in salience or difficult to achieve, more complete plans are likely to be

formed.A plan to buy a dress for an importantpartyshould be formed more completely than one to buy ordinarywork clothes. Closely related to completeness is the subdimensionof plan specificity, which pertains to the various anticipated situationalcontexts and the specificity of actions to be executed in each context. Specific plans are more likely to be formed in cases in which there is greatercertaintyabout the means to achieve goals, such as purchasingfrom a store. In cases in which the goal is more difficult and the means uncertain,as in the case of losing weight or quitting smoking, less specific plans are likely to be formed. Highly specific plans are more likely to facilitate intention realization by providing a mechanism to facilitate the retrieval of intentions from memory (Orbell,Hodgkins, and Sheeran 1997). dimension along which consumer Yet anotherimportant plans vary is novelty, which depends on whether the cues and sequences specified are well practiced,familiar,and reliable for the individual.Novel plans are likely to be especially useful for intentionrealization. plans set the stage for intermediaryacts Implementation needed to implement a contingent or noncontingent intention. When the instrumentalacts have been set in motion, they must be scrutinizedto ascertainwhetherthey begin and end when they are supposed to, whether they achieve their objectives, and whethernew contingencies, impediments,or into facilitatingfactorsmust be incorporated the goal-setting These processes are termed"monitoringactivities" process. (Bagozzi 1992). Maintenance and Protection of Intentions In many cases, especially when there is a time gap between intentionformationand action initiation,impedimentsto the enactmentof the actions necessary for goal attainmentmay occur after the implementationplan has been formed. For example, a store may be stocked out of a favorite brand, a more appealing movie may be discovered playing in the multiplextheaterafterthe arrivaland plan to attenda different movie, or other goal alternativesmay be perceived on the surface as more attractivein everyday shopping activities because of new information.In such cases, if the goal is to be achieved, the originally formedgoal intentionmust be maintainedand protectedfrom these competing goal alternatives, and implementationplans must be facilitated in a broaderprocess termed "guidanceand control."Of course, a decision may be made to abandonthe goal in favor of another. Processes of self-regulation (or what Kuhl [1984] termsthe "mechanismsof action control")play an important role in this intentionmaintenanceprocess (see also Kuhl and Beckmann 1994). Kuhl (1984) identifies seven volitional self-regulatory processes (i.e., those driven by willpower) that, through strategies such as inhibiting the processing of information that supports competing intentions, controlling emotional reactions,and maintaininghigh levels of motivation,protect the chosen intention and implementationplan from being abandonedduring the period between intention formation and action initiation.In addition,failureto achieve subgoals and actual or anticipated extraneous events that threaten

ConsumerBehavior/ 29

plans or goal commitmentmay result in volitional mechanisms of plan modification. These volitional strategies of self-regulationsupportand maintainthe level of activation of the goal and the plan elements in memory, facilitating time. In a study of subsequentretrieval at the appropriate coupon usage, the relative impact of attitudes on decision making became more importantas people became actionoriented,whereasthe relativeimpactof subjectivenormson decision making became more importantas people became and state-oriented(Bagozzi, Baumgartner, Yi 1992b). Other individualdifference variablesrecently found to affect persistence in goal pursuitinclude volitional competence (e.g., Kuhl and Beckmann 1994) and goal orientations (e.g., Dweck 1991). Initiation of Action If the elements of the implementationplan in memory are time (duringwhat is called the activated at the appropriate "performance interval"),action will be initiatedand executed as specified by the plan. As action unfolds, monitoring and control processes help retrieve plan elements from memory,compare them with progressand the reality of the situation, and make continuous corrections to the subsethem into action.This quentplanelements beforetranslating results in the dampeningof the motivationalprocesses that provide the impetus for action, or what has been called the "goal consummation point" in psychological literature.In contrast,if the execution is not terminatedsuccessfully, an attemptis made to abandonthe plan. If this is successful, the motivationalelements are dampened,leaving the consumer free to process anotherplan. If the attemptat plan abandonment fails, the plan remains activated in memory, which leads to processes such as ruminating.

Conclusion
Relation of Framework to Consumer Research Priorities Goal concepts and the role of goals in consumer behavior We have relevancefor many areasof marketing. discuss two here as examples: really new productsand the role of branding in consumerchoice decisions. Goal-setting processes are especially importantin the adoption of new products (Bagozzi and Lee 1999). The greaterthe degree of "newness,"the more difficult it is for a consumer to evaluate the productand relate it to his or her needs because, by definition,no priorexperienceexists with the product.To elicit consumer responses to new products, marketersoften presentconsumerswith concept statements or prototypesand ask them to provideevaluationsand other reactions.A shortcoming with this approachis that it may lead to ill- or partiallyformed psychological responses because consumers cannot relate the new products to their deeper needs and values easily. They may lack the personal and productinformationneeded to initiategoal-directeddecision making. When faced with a really new product,a consumerconfronts the problem of determiningwhetherthe productpotentiallysatisfies his or her needs and is worthyof furtherin30/ Journalof Marketing, Special Issue 1999

formation processing. Psychologists recently have given emphasis to the role of desires in initiating goal setting (Gollwitzer 1996, p. 289; Malle and Knobe 1997), but for really new products,many consumersmay find it difficult to uncover and express their real desires because their knowledge of the productis lacking.Also, desires may requireextensive and effortful processing to be ascertained(Bagozzi 1992). The cognitive structuresunderlyingconsumervalues and goals may be uncovered in focus groups or other new productdevelopmentresearchby eliciting goal-derivedcategories (Barsalou 1991), hierarchicalmaps of superordinate goals (Bagozzi and Dabholkar 2000), or consumer metaphors (Zaltman 1997) and relating these at multiple points in time in an interview to espoused desires, attitudes, inclinationsto try a product,and so forth as these reactions evolve and become well formed. Goal-striving processes seem particularlypertinent to brandloyalty. Much is known about loyalty and patternsof switching at aggregate levels, but less seems known about where and when, in the post-decision-makingperiod, loyalty must be sustained psychologically or breaks down. Knowledge here can provide guidance to managers about the timing and contentof persuasivecommunications,deals, pricing, and distributiondecisions. For example, a first step on the roadto loyalty begins with the stimulationof trial,but into action, trial is ununless a goal intentionis transformed likely to occur. Following a campaign to build desire, special marketingcommunicationsmay be needed to focus the consumer's attention on where to inspect the product, as well as to overcome resistance to undergoing the effort needed to plan comparisonshopping. Segments of the same potential market may require unique communications targeted at maintainingan intentionover time, because of the low involvement status of the productor forgetfulness,and at arousing implementation intentions when activities, events, or other timing issues must be anticipatedor orchestrated. Still other consumers loyal to a brand may require distinct marketing efforts to protect plans and intentions from threatsfrom competitors,bad word-of-mouthcommunication, or indifference.Exceptional defensive maneuvers may be called for in advertising, pricing, and couponing, say, because a loyal segment comes under attack. Unless they map the postdecision stages of goal striving and identify and measure market segments at each stage, marketers will not be able to addresseffectively the variousthreatsand opportunitiesthat occur differentially across the phases of goal pursuit. In other words, marketers must go beyond modeling intentionsor even recent considerationsof "consumer trying"(Bagozzi and Warshaw 1990; Mathur 1998) to treatpostdecision goal striving from the point of view of control process theory (Carver and Scheier 1996; Lawson 1997) or the models of action phases (Bagozzi 1992; Gollwitzer 1996). Basic Research Directions With regardto goal setting, we know a great deal, based on researchon attitudesand behavioraldecision making, about how goal desirability(labeled as "value"or "valence"by attitude researchers) and goal feasibility (labeled as "expectancy"by attituderesearchers)affect goal setting. How-

ever, we know much less about a third factor that plays an role in goal setting: goal relequally, if not more, important evance. Although desirabilityand feasibility pertainto the evaluationof a single goal, complete assessment of the goal requiresit to be regardedin relationto other competing and noncompeting goals. For example, a goal associated with many desirableand feasible consequencesmay suddenlyappear less attractive when scrutinized in the context of a competing goal. The goal of taking a Caribbeancruise, for example, though affordable and fun, may suddenly lose some of its luster when it is evaluated in light of the longterm goal of buying a new house and saving for a down payment to make such a purchasepossible. Goal-relevance processes examine each goal in the context of other competing and noncompeting goals of different levels of abstraction and incorporatesituational elements not directly relatedto the goal that may make it more or less feasible or desirable.Researchersmay benefit from paying attentionto the role of goal relevance in the goal-setting process and thanthe identifyingconditions in which it is more important other evaluative criteria.Research is needed, for example, into how one or more goals compete against other goals for attention,especially as commitmentsare made. With regard to goal striving, we discussed several dimensions of consumer plans, such as completeness, specificity, and novelty. Little researchhas been devoted to developing an exhaustive catalog of plan dimensions or examined conditions that accentuate the importance of a particularplan dimension.These gaps provide a naturalavenue to build on the frameworkwe have proposed. Moreover, examining the issue of persistenceis likely to be fruitful if problematicbehavior,in which smooth action toward goal attainmentis impeded in some manner,is considered explicitly. Both internal (such as perceived importanceof the goal, the degree of commitment,and the detail of planning) and external (such as difficulty of attainingthe goal and the numberand attractivenessof competing goal alternatives) factors are likely to play importantroles in determining whether the consumerpersists in pursuingthe goal when there are impedimentsto its attainment.Developing a

theoretical understandingof the psychological processes thataffect persistenceis likely to be beneficial, because few real-world consumer goals are attained without the occurrence of impediments, competitive advertising, or new brandor productalternativesarising. In addition, examining consumer goals in the manner discussed in this article is likely to serve as a bridge that links the study of predecisionalprocesses to postdecisional processes. Until now, these research streams have been largely divergent and have failed to recognize completely the linkages between the two stages of the decision enactment process. For example, the intensity of investment of cognitive resources in making the decision, in and of itself, may lead to greater commitment and plan making and, therefore,to greaterpersistencein the face of difficulties. A study of this and other such researchhypotheses provides a fruitful avenue for additionalresearch. Finally, though we focused on the conscious aspects of these processes, extending the ideas discussed herein to habitual, impulsive, and nonconsciousconsumerprocesses is likely to be fruitful.For example, an examinationof the differencesbetween rational and impulsive goal setting and goal pursuitis likely to provide several practicalinsights to marketers,such as optimal design of store displays and the formulationof successful promotionalstrategies. In summary, an understandingof the role played by goals in consumerbehavior,as well as the processes of goal setting and goal pursuit, is critical to the advancement of knowledge in the field. It is likely to be rewardingfor acadof emics to develop a theoreticalunderstanding more realistic and real-worldconsumptionprocesses, which, more often than not, are fraughtwith impedimentsof one form or another.This in turn is likely to provide insights to marketing practitioners in many ways, from developing richer, and more accuratemodels of purchase more representative, forecastingto designing optimalcommunicationstimuli and store displays and trainingof salespeople. We believe that the examinationof consumergoals representsa topic of immense potential for marketing researchers in the 21st century.

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