Rethinking Used Fuel Management

Paper Ref. IAEA-CN-209-026.

Mustapha CHIGUER
AREVA 1, Place Jean Millier 92082 Paris-La-Defense mustapha.chiguer@areva.com

International Experts Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident of Fukushima Vienna, March 19th -22nd , 2012

Background and issues at stake Before Fukushima

Used Fuel was perceived as one of the crucial unresolved issues when referring to nuclear energy
Several Opinion Surveys launched by Governments, National and international institutions, Industry,.. Critics often leveled against nuclear is the large accumulation of stored used fuel [1] Stakeholders poor awareness of solutions despite the importance of the stake Recycling used fuel is the preferred route for a large majority of polled people in the US and Europe [2] & [3].

Used Fuel Management was something of an afterthought in many National Fuel Cycle Policies
Wait and See strategy spreading Implementation of DGRs, the crucial pillar of Once-through strategy, faded away in many countries Short-term solutions, such as SFP densification, were the preferred solution in many countries Leading to much larger used fuel inventories in SFP
[1] Eurombarometer 2005 & 2008 [2] US DOE/NEI nationwide Opinion Survey conducted by Bisconti Research Inc 2009 & 2010 [3] Tns-Sofres Nuclear Energy and Recycling opportunities: the perceptions in Europe & the US 2010

IAEA International Experts Meeting Rethinking Used Fuel Management - Vienna, March 19-22, 2012 M. Chiguer

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Background and issues at stake After Fukushima

Shock and surprise among public and relayed by the media
SFP turned out to be far more vulnerable than initially assumed and could lead to concerns of radioactive release Apparent inadequacy of contingency plan and preparedness at the plant

Months later, Operator still facing a difficult situation to restore normal condition in the SFPs

All pre-Fukushima critics and weakness underlined by Stakeholders are rushing back and regaining stakeholders/public confidence will be a long road Used Fuel Management options at reactor are likely to be re-evaluated, if not reconsidered following safety margins re-assessment

Choosing an outcome to the Used Fuels stored currently in SFPs involves a large combination of technological, financial, political and licensing parameters
IAEA International Experts Meeting Rethinking Used Fuel Management - Vienna, March 19-22, 2012 M. Chiguer

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Originally, a shared view among Nuclear Safety Regulators No used fuel storage at reactor pool
Higher density racking to accommodate Early Accident Risks Assessment in NPP the larger used fuel inventory in SFP [2] Comments Butunavailability of off-site routes due to
Postponement of Back-end strategy implementation Wait & See strategy

Used Fuel stored in SFP rather than shipped for Recycling or DGR[1] To help NPP continue their operations, Industry has applied best practices and Safety Regulators have allowed Storage and high density racking in SFPs
Resulting in increasingly large inventories as much as 5 times those of reactor cores
Leading to pool densities close to reactor core Trend continued with reactor lifespan extensions

Risk analyses and best practices impacted further

Widely spaced Open frame structures Tightly packed Closed frame structures

Outage duration reduction

Increase in discharged fuel burnup Degradation of neutron absorbing capability of permanently installed neutron absorbers [3]

[1] DGR stands for Deep Geologic Repository [2] NUREG/CR-0649 Spent Fuel Heatup Following Loss of Water During Storage [3] US/NRC On Site Spent Fuel Criticality Analyses, NRR Action Plan TAC n ME0372 May 2010

For decades, SFP requirements have remained contingent on the timely opening of DGR[1] or other Disposition
IAEA International Experts Meeting Rethinking Used Fuel Management - Vienna, March 19-22, 2012 M. Chiguer

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SFP was an aggravating factor in the difficult emergency situation faced by the operator at Fukushima
Comments
Spraying water into buildings (helicopter, fire trucks, water pumps ) for cooling reactor and pools

Loss of power and damage to cooling capabilities in the aftermath of the natural disaster [1] While cooling reactor core has been the first priority Early challenges faced by operators have also been to: Adequately cool used fuel Keep the pools filled with water With the following potential issues at stake Heat up and steam build up in SFP building Loss of shielding from the loss of water Loss of fuel structural integrity Hydrogen accumulation [2] Fuel fires [3] Radionuclide releases

[1] Source: IAEA , March 24, 2011 reported 17 March by Japans METI [2] Oxidation of the Zirconium cladding exposed to water vapor, resulting in hydrogen generation and risk of explosion [3] Zirconium fire: The cladding ignition point is about 800~900C compared to the fuel melting point of ~2880C [4] JAECs Chairman report to former Prime Minister of Japan on March 25th 2011 (2 weeks after the accident): "Contingency scenario outline of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear power plant, as reported on Feb. 28, 2012

The biggest risk to the plant was the SFP N4 , concluded[4] Mr. Kondo, Chairman of JAEC Reported [4] on March 25th, 2011 to former Prime Minister Mr. Naoto Kan

IAEA International Experts Meeting Rethinking Used Fuel Management - Vienna, March 19-22, 2012 M. Chiguer

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Facts and figures in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident

Sequence Events and Status of SFP #4
SFP Status and Fuel Inventory All assemblies, 1535, were in the pool on March, 11th the core had been off-loaded since Nov. 2010 1331 Used Fuel 204 Fresh Fuel SFP fuel Inventory, 1535, to compare to 548 FAs as total Reactor Core Fuel Capacity (more than twice!)
Pool water temperature in C

Fukushima Unit 4, SFP water level and temperature[1] & [3]

SFP Water Level

Worst-Case Scenario [3]

__ Estimated

Measured

SFP Water Temperature C

Measured

__
3/15, building damage confirmation

Estimated

The water level (Fuel rack top at 0m)

3/16 Water level checked by helicopter

Surface Temperature Inflow of the water from Well + DS pit after water level droping Transition to a the water level of SFP, DS Pit and Well Gate closed after recovery of the water level by pouring water

DS: stands for Dryer Separator Pit

Sequence Envents

Layout of BWR

[1]- TEPCO Report to NISA, Sep. 2011

[2]- Reports by JAIF (Japanese Atomic Industrial Forum at www.jaif.or.jp) [3] JAECs Chairman report to former Prime Minister of Japan on March 25th 2011 (2 weeks after the accident): "Contingency scenario outline of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear power plant, as reported on Feb. 28, 2012

Immediately after the earthquake & tsunami [2] March 14: water temperature in spent fuel pool at 84C Explosion in reactor building on March 15th Fires on March 15 & 16th (TEPCO could not confirm fire on the ground) Scenario by JAEC and presented on March 25th A challenging situation up to 5 months later [2] TEPCO judged that most fuels were not damaged [3] on May 31st (2.5 months later) 4.5 months later (July 28th) ,water temperature was still as high as 88C [2] Circulating cooling with thanks to a new Heat Exchanger erected on July 31st Water temperature cool down below 60C since August 3rd to reach as low as 42C on August 10th (5 months after the earthquake and tsunami!) Since then TEPCO reported that [2] Operation of desalting facility started Aug. 20th Temperature around 22C (update on Jan.19, 2012)
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IAEA International Experts Meeting Rethinking Used Fuel Management - Vienna, March 19-22, 2012 M. Chiguer

Safety Regulators require Post-Fukushima upgrades of SFP Safety

Fukushima accident clearly demonstrates the importance of defense-in-depth philosophy/approach [1] Although the radiological consequences from Fukushima due to airborne releases has so far been dominated by the releases from reactor cores [2] & [3] SFPs presented a considerable potential threat given that there was no containment to prevent releases[4] SFPs were an aggravating factor[5] in the difficult emergency situation faced by the operator
Based on the Saiakusinario (Worst-case Scenario) Mr. Kan, JAECs Chairman, concluded that the biggest risk to the plant was the SFP at the reactor N4 Contingency scenarios outlined[5] on March 25th, 2011 to Prime Minister

Confluence of various factors going along the defense-in-depth will cause SFPs requirements and risk assessment to become more complex
Complete changes will require time before being defined, reviewed and implemented Short-term with Complementary Safety Assessments, Stress Tests, Tier-1 Medium-term with Upgrade by Regulators and Stakeholders!

[1] US NRC, Recommendations for enhancing reactor safety in the 21st century, July 12, 2011, page 20, WENRA (Western European Nuclear Regulators Association) Task Force Stress tests specifications April 21, 2011, Report of Japanese Government to the IAEA, June 2011 at www.iaea.org [2] TEPCO Press Release on May 31st (reported also by JAIF at www.jaif.org.ja) based on detailed analysis of radioactive materials in the pools in Units 2 and 4 [3] High amounts of Iodine-131 Vs. Caesium-137 found at sampling points away from the Fukushima site, and reported by UK/HSE Sep. 2011 [4] UK-HSE Report on implications of Fukushima for the UK nuclear Industry Interim Report, p.27/106- May 2011 [5] JAECs Chairman report to former Prime Minister of Japan on March 25th 2011 (2 weeks after the accident): "Contingency scenario outline of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear power plant, as reported on Feb. 28, 2012

IAEA International Experts Meeting Rethinking Used Fuel Management - Vienna, March 19-22, 2012 M. Chiguer

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US: Pool Safety a Top NRC Priority[1] and the transfer of used fuel to dry cask storage is Now[3] under considerations
Spent Fuel Pool Safety a Top NRC Priority according its Policy issue Oct. 3, 2011 (SECY-11-0137) and briefing Oct. 11, 2011

Improving SFP safety is in the top-tier out of three tiers priority NTTF [1] recommendations Tier 1 include those NRC proposes be started without unnecessary delay Tier 2 & 3 consist of those that cannot be initiated in the near term Additional issues[3] under NRC considerations the early transfer of spent fuel into dry storage before it is operationally necessary How Fukusima Lessons Learned should apply to

independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSIs) Shutdown reactor that still maintain fuel in SFP
NRC Chairman confirmed on Nov. 4th , 2011 during STST [4] Regulatory conference that Everything is shaped by Fukushima which raised issues about spent fuel storage, and led the country to rethink how the US handles spent fuel Fukushima NTTF is still considering several additional recommendations, including addressing the transfer of spent fuel to dry cask storage Final BRC Report [5], issued on Jan. 2012, adds a new recommendation for prompt efforts to prepare for the eventual large transport of SF & HLW to consolidated storage The term storage, is understood to mean storage for an interim period prior to disposal or other disposition
ONR CSN

[1]: Recommendations of the Fukushima US-NRC Near-Term Task Force (NTTF), July 12, 2011 [2]: NRC NTTF recommendations dated July 12, 2011, monitor key SFP parameters (i.e. water level, temperature, and are of radiation levels) from the control room [3]: Although NRCs assessment of these issues is incomplete at this time (Oct, 3 2011), several of these issues have already been judged to warrant further consideration and potential prioritization based on relative safety significance NTTF recommendations, SECY-11-0137 [4] STST stands for Spent Fuel Storage & Transportation [5] BRC for Bleu Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future

IAEA International Experts Meeting Rethinking Used Fuel Management - Vienna, March 19-22, 2012 M. Chiguer

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Safe and Optimized Used Fuel Management Or, how to get back to basics
Harden pools to meet potential new safety guidance & requirements
Safety and risk Analysis Safety Upgrades (ex. Improving robustness of cooling capabilities, remote control, SFP make-up) Safety procedures (ex. Enhancing
Recycled Fuels
(MOX & ERU)

contingency arrangements and training)

1 to 2 years of cooling

Reduce used fuel and radionuclide inventories in reactor pools

Near term, by shipping used fuel for Recycling (1 to 2 years of cooling) Should Recycling not foreseen in the

Refueling/Defueling pool Used Fuel Recycling

Safe & Robust Volume / 5 Radiotoxicity / 10 No Safeguards
Constraints

near term, Transfer Used Fuel to Dry Storage (3 to 5years of cooling)

3 to 5 years of cooling

Enhance racking configurations as a consequence of density reduction

(On-site or Off-site) Interim Dry Storage

IAEA International Experts Meeting Rethinking Used Fuel Management - Vienna, March 19-22, 2012 M. Chiguer

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Thank you for your attention

Used Fuel Management at Fukusima background and status before the accident
Used Fuel inventories at reactor pools [1] Comments Used Fuel Strategy in Japan is Recycling
Used overseas recycling up to 90s Developing domestic recycling

Unit

Reactor Core FA capacity

Pool FA capacity

Used Fuel at reactor pool

Fresh FA at reactor pool

Most recent additions of used FAs

1 2 3 4 5 6

400 548 548 548 548 764

900 1240 1220 1590 1590 1770

292 587 514 1331 946 876

100 28 52 204 48 64

Mar. 2010 Sep. 2010 Jun. 2010 Nov. 2010 Jan. 2011 Aug. 2010

infrastructure Delays of domestic recycling have led to increase used fuel inventories at NPP At the time of natural disaster, Used Fuel is stored in a number of locations [1]
Six reactor pools (~40%) A common pool (~56%) On-site dry storage (< 4%)

4546 When the earthquake struck and tsunami hit, about an hour later, Japans east coast: Reactors Units 1, 2 and 3 were operating at power Reactor Units 4, 5 and 6 were already shutdown. Unit 4s core had been off-loaded to its pool

Reactor pools inventories are much higher than those of reactor cores
The total inventories, 4546 used FAs[2] ,

[1] Source: IAEA , March 24, 2011 reported 17 March by Japans METI and NEI World Nuclear Industry Handbook, 2010 [2] FA, stands for Fuel Assembly

is equivalent to 8 reactor cores

IAEA International Experts Meeting Rethinking Used Fuel Management - Vienna, March 19-22, 2012 M. Chiguer

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Appendix to Facts and figures in the aftermath of the accident

Transition of SFP water level to the water level equilibrium of SFP, Well and DS Pit

Reactor #4 - SFP make-up capability 1) 2) Status of SFP water inventory before the accident Decrease of water inventory after SBO (Station Black-Out) and consequential LOCA (Loss-OfCoolant-Accident) that followed the earthquake and the tsunami An opening of the moveable gate as soon as an unbalanced water pressure is detected as a matter of passive response to the loss of water inventory in the SFP The closing of the moveable gate due to water pressure balance, though a drop in the SFP water level (shielding and grace period reduction)

3)

4)

RPV: Reactor Pressure Vessel SFP: Spent Fuel Pool DS Pit: Dryer Separator Pit

IAEA International Experts Meeting Rethinking Used Fuel Management - Vienna, March 19-22, 2012 M. Chiguer

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Appendix to Facts and figures in the aftermath of the accident

Transition of SFP water level to the water level equilibrium of SFP, Well and DS Pit

Reactor #4- measurement of SFP parameters

1) Video camera for water level 2) Thermocouple

1

3 2

3) Container for sampling 4) Gamma dosimeter

RPV: Reactor Pressure Vessel SFP: Spent Fuel Pool DS Pit: Dryer Separator Pit

IAEA International Experts Meeting Rethinking Used Fuel Management - Vienna, March 19-22, 2012 M. Chiguer

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Generic BWR used fuel pool

Most BWR are designed for SFP within the secondary containment
In Mark I and Mark II, SFP is located at the operating level (30~45 m above grade) In Mark III, SFP is located on the ground level

The water in the pool is demineralized water Typically range from

9 to 18 m in length 6 to 12 m width ~12 m deep
2nd Containment building

Constructed of
Reinforced concrete

Sufficient thickness to

meet radiation shielding and structural requirements

* Layout of used fuel pool and transfer system for BWR reactor (source NUREG-1275, 1997) IAEA International Experts Meeting Rethinking Used Fuel Management - Vienna, March 19-22, 2012 M. Chiguer

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Generic PWR used fuel pool

Generic PWR used fuel pool
Located generally outside the containment

though adjacent to it in a separate auxiliary building (named BK in France)

Using Borated water

Typically range from

9 to 18 m in length 6 to 12 m width ~12 m deep
Auxiliary building

Containment building

Constructed of
Reinforced

concrete Sufficient thickness to meet radiation shielding and structural requirements

* Layout of used fuel pool and transfer system for PWR reactor (source NUREG-1275, 1997) IAEA International Experts Meeting Rethinking Used Fuel Management - Vienna, March 19-22, 2012 M. Chiguer

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Safety Regulators might require Post-Fukushima upgrades of used fuel Management Safety
Appendix to 1 /2 and 2/2 slides

Below is a collection of ongoing or potential/likely upcoming requirements:

Robustness Assessment of SFPs related to a set of graded criteria defined and/or approved

by National Safety Authorities (stress tests and Complementary Safety Assessments) Safety and Risk Assessment Methodology and Tools have likely to be adapted, if not developed Enhancing SFP (Evaluate, Upgrade and Harden) Remote Monitoring Instruments and Equipments Ventilation of SFP (containment, Hydrogen build-up & accumulation, building ventilation rate) Post-accident Spray and plug & play to Critical Systems (accident mitigation) Used fuel cooling, including ultimate Heat Sink and SFP make-up capability enhancement. Reducing Used Fuel density and Inventory in SFP (accident risk prevention and mitigation)

Differences are introduced further due to:

Existing Natural and Extensive Damage Mitigation Plans (Earthquake, flood, tornado, sea

shore or inland sitting, terrorist events) Structural integrity of the SFP (example: pool structures, fuel storage building, SFP racks) Reactor characteristics (PWR, BWR, Generation type or Mark) and core management (BU, outage duration, power up-rate consequences such as Fuel reactivity/enrichment, Regional fuel cycle services (Recycling facilities and services, interim storage, National back-end policy

IAEA International Experts Meeting Rethinking Used Fuel Management - Vienna, March 19-22, 2012 M. Chiguer

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UK: potential implications for the UK nuclear industry, including new reactors

2 reports posted by UK safety regulator

Office for Nuclear Regulation (HSE Agency) report on implications of Fukushima for the UK nuclear industry
Interim report on May 18, 2011 Final report in September 2011

Potential implication for the UK installed Base

Point 318: The configuration of the fuel assemblies

relative to its neighbours will affect the efficiency of heat transfer,

Point 325:The response to the interim report

recommendations and the European council Stress Tests being carried out in the UK should demonstrate whether the UK SFP are passively safe by design, and in some cases whether ALARP [1] to impose relatively straight forward minimum cooling times or racking configurations to ensure that with a total loss of active cooling (possibly even a catastrophic loss of water inventory) the fuel should remain substantially intact

Recommendations for new reactors

Point 319: Some racking arrangements are less

susceptible than others and may represent good practice in the future
[1] ALARP stands for As Low As Reasonably Practicable

IAEA International Experts Meeting Rethinking Used Fuel Management - Vienna, March 19-22, 2012 M. Chiguer

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Spain: Potential Implications foreseen by the CSN, the Spanish Nuclear Safety Council
CSN Preliminary report on Stress Tests and additional issue in connection of SFP used fuel inventory reduction

The Spanish Nuclear Safety Council :

Submit on Sep. 15, 2011 Preliminary Report on the

stress tests carried out by the Spanish NPP

The CSN approved on Oct. 13, 2011 a proposal

limiting cooling time at SFP

The Stress Test Preliminary report [3]

Presents the NPP Licensees proposal for

improvements to diversify the possibilities for water make-up and cooling of SFP to address important accident
The CSN considers the approach presented to be

adequate, although the information submitted should be completed in the final reports

As Post-Fukushima Lessons Learned, the CSN take a dramatic step towards

Questioning the limitation of used fuel cooling time

in SFP at all Spanish NPP

This issue has been put under considerations
On October 13th, 2011 milestone to CSN staff: 1 year time

[1] Report posted at www.csn.es [2] Ref. Acta del Pleno del CSN N1.208, Madrid Oct.13, 2011 other European Stress Tests reports available at www.ensreg.eu

IAEA International Experts Meeting Rethinking Used Fuel Management - Vienna, March 19-22, 2012 M. Chiguer

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