LEGALITY OF THE USE BY A.

STATE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ARMED CONFLICT Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996 The: Court found, by 11 votes to 3, that it was not able to give the advisory opinion requested by the World Health Organization on the question of the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons. in Armed Conflict. The: Court considered that there are three conditions which must be satisfied in order to found the jurisdiction of the Court when a request for an advisory opinion is submittedi to it by a specialized agency: the agency requesting the opinion must be duly authorized, under the Charter of the United Nations, to request opinions from the Court; the opinion requested must be on a legal question; and this question must be one arising; within the scope of'the activities of' the requesting agency. The first two conditions had been met. With regard to the third, however, the Court found that although according to its Constitution the: World Health Organization (WHO) is authorized to deal with the effects 01.1 health of the use of nuclear weapons, or of any other hazardous activity, and to take preventive measures aimed al: protecting the health of populations in the event of such weapons being used or such activities engaged in, the question put to the Court in the present case relates not to the edbcts of the use of' nuclear weapons on health, but to the legality of the use of' such weapons in view of their health and environmental effects. And the Court pointed out tha~: whatever those cffects might be, the competence of WHO to deal with them is not dependent on the legality of the acts that caused them. The Court further pointed out that international organizations do not, unlike States, possess a general competence, but are governed by the "principle of speciality", that is to say, they are invested by the States which create them with powers, the limits of which are a fundon of the common interests whose promotion those States entrust to them. Besides, the World Health Organization is an international organization of a particular kind-+ "specialized agency" forming part of a system based in the Charter of the United Nations, which is designed to organize international cooperation in a coherent fashion by bringing the United Nations, invested with powers of general scope, into relationship with various autonomous and complementary organizations, invested with sectorial powers. The Court therefore concluded that the responsibilities of WHO are necessarily restricted to the sphere of public "health" and cannot encroach on the responsibilities of other parts

of the United Nations system, and that there is no doubt that questions concerning the use of force, the regulation of armaments and disarmament are within the competence of the United Nations and lie outside that of the specialized agencies. The request for an advisory opinion submitted by WHO thus does not relate to a question which arises "within the scope of [the] activities" of that Organization. The Court was composed as follows: President Bedjaoui, Vice-President Schwebel; Judges Oda, Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Ferrari Bravo, Higgins; Registrar Valencia-Ospina. Judges Ranjeva and Ferrari Bravo appended declarations to the advisory opinion of the Court; Judge Oda appended a separate opinion; Judges Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry and Koroma appended dissenting opinions. Submission of the request and subsequent procedure (paras. 1-9) The Court begins by recalling that by a letter dated 27 August 1993, filed in the Registry on 3 September 1993, the Director-General of the World Health Organization officially communicated to the Registrar a decision taken by the World Health Assembly to submit a question to the Continued on next page Summaries of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders of the International Court of Justice Not an official document Court for an advisory opinion. The question set forth in resolution WHA46.40, adopted by the Assembly on 14 May 1993, reads as follows: "In view of the health and environmental effects, would the use of nuclear weapons by a State in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations under international law including the WHO Constitution?" The Court then recapitulates the various stages of the proceedings. Jurisdiction of the Court (paras. 10-3 1) The Court begins by observing that, in view of Article 65, paragraph 1, of its Statute and of Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter, three conditions must be satisfied in order to found the jurisdiction of the Court when a request for an advisory opinion is submitted to it by a specialized agency: the agency requesting the opinion must be duly authorized, under the Charter, to request opinions from the Court; the opinion requested must be on a legal question;

and this question must be one arising within the scope of the activities of the requesting agency. Authorization of WHO to request advisory opinions (paras. 1 1 - 12) Where WHO is concerned, the above-mentioned texts are reflected in article 76 of that Organization's Constitution, and in paragraph 2 of-article X of the agreement of 10 July 1948 between the United Nations and WHO, which the Court finds leave no doubt that WHO has been duly authorized, in accordance with Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter, to request advisory opinions of the Court. 'Zegal question " (paras. 13-1 7) The Court observes that it has already had occasion to indicate that questions "framed in terms of law and rais[ing] problems of international law . . . are by their very nature susceptible of a reply based on law . . . [and] appear. . . to be questions of a legal character" (Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 18, para. 15). It finds that the question put to the Court by the World Health Assembly does in fact constitute a legal question, as in order to rule on the question submitted to it the Court must identify the obligations of States under the rules of law invoked, and assess whether the behaviour in question conforms to those obligations, thus giving an answer to the question posed based on law. The fact that this question also has political aspects, as, in the nature of things, is the case with so many questions which arise in international life, does not suffice to deprive it of its character as a "legal question" and to "deprive the Court of a competence expressly conferred on it by its Statute". Nor are the political nature of the motives which may be said to have inspired the request or the political implications that the opinion given might have of relevance in the establishment of the Court's jurisdiction to give such an opinion. Question arising "within the scope of the activities " of WhTO (paras. 18-3 1) The Court observes that in order to delineate the field of activity or the area of competence of an international organization, one must refer to the relevant rules of the organization and, in the first place, to its constitution. From a formal standpoint, the constituent instruments of international organizations are multilateral treaties, to which the

well-established rules of treaty interpretation apply. But they are also treaties of a particular type; their object is to create new subjects of law endowed with a certain autonomy, to which the parties entrust the task of realizing common goals. Such treaties can raise specific problems of interpretation owing, inter alia, to their character which is conventional and at the same time institutional; the very nature of the organization created, the objectives which have been assigned to it by its founders and the imperatives associated with the effective performance of its functions, as well as its own practice, are all elements which may deserve special attention when the time comes to interpret these constituent treaties. According to the customary rule of interpretation as expressed in article 3 1 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the terms of a treaty must be interpreted "in their context and in the light of its object and purpose" and there shall be "taken into account, together with the context: (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement. of the parties regarding its interpretation". The Court has had occasion to apply this rule of interpretation several times and will also apply it in this case. Interpretation of the WHO Constitution (paras. 20-26) The: Court points out that the functions attributed to WHO are listed in 22 subparagraphs (subparagraphs (a) to (v)) in article 2 of its Constitution. None of these subparagraphs expressly refers to the legality of any activity hazardous to health; and none of the functions of WHO is dependent upon the legality of the situations upon which it must act. Moreover, it is stated in the introductory sentence of article 2 that the Organization discharges its functions "in order to achieve its objective". The objective of the Organization is dei'lned in article 1 as being "the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health". Also referring to the preamble to the Constitution, the Court concludes that, interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning, in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the WHO Constitution, as well as of the practice followed by the Organization, the provisions of its article 2 may be read as authorizing the Organization to deal with the effects on health of the use of nuclear weapons, or of any other hazardous activity, and to take preventive measures aimed at protecting the health of

populations in the event of such weapons being used or such activities engaged in. It goes on to observe that the question put to the Court in the present case relates, however, not to the effects of the use of nuclear weapons on health, but to the legality of the use of such weapons in view of their health and environrrtentul effects. And the Court points out t!?at, whatever those effects might be, the competence of WHO to deal with them is not dependent on the legality of the acts that caused them. Accordingly, it does not seem to the Court that the provisions of article 2 of the WHO Constitution, interpreted in accordance with the criteria referred to above, can be understoocl as conferring upon the Organization a competence to address the legality of the use of nuclear weapons, and thus in turn a competerlce to ask the Court about that. I11 the view of the Court, none of the func1:ions referred to in the resolution by which the Court has been seised of this request for an opiniorl has a sufficient corinection with the question before it for that question to be capable of being considered as arising "within the scope of [the] activities" of WHO. The causes of the deterioration of human health are numerous and varied; and the legal or illegal character of thcse causes is essentially immaterial to the measures which WHO must in any case take in an attempt to remedy their effects. In particular, the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weilpons in no way determines the specific measures, regarding health or otherwise (studies, plans, procedures, etc.), which could be necesary in order to scek to prcvent or cure some of their effects. 'The reference in the question put to the Court to the health and environmer~ tal effects, which according to WHO the use of a nuc'lear weapon will always occasion, does not make the question one that falls within WHO'S functions. The Court goes on to point out that international organizations are subjects of international law which do not, unlike States, possess a general competence. International organizations are governed by the "principle of speciality", that is to say, they are invested by the States which create them with powers, t.he limits of which are a function of the common interests whose promotion those States entrust to them. The powers conferred on international organizations are nonnally the subject of an express statement in their constitu. ent instruments. Nevertheless, the necessi.ties of international life may point to the need for organizations, in

order to achieve their objectives, to possess subsidiary powers which are not expressly provided for in the basic instruments that govern their activities. It is generally accepted that international organizations can exercise such powers, known as "implied" powers. The Court is of the opinion, however, that to ascribe to WHO the competence to address the legality of the use of nuclear weapons-even in view of their health and environmental effects-would be tantamount to disregarding the principle of speciality;, for such competence could not be deemed a necessary in~plication of the Constitution of the Organization in the light of the purposes assigned to it by i-ts member States. WHO is, moreover, an international orgar~ization of a particular kind. As indicated in the preamble and confirmed by article 69 of its Constitution, "the Organization shall be brought into relation with the Uniteti Nations as one of the specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 of the Charter of the United Nations". As its Articles 57, 58 and 63 demonstrate, the Charter laid the basis of a "system" designed to organize international cooperation in a coherent fashion by bringing the United Nations, invested with powers of general scope, into relationship with various autonomous and complementary organ:izations, invested with sectorial powers. If, according to the rules on which that system is based, WHO has, by virtue of Article 57 of the Charter, "wide international responsibilities", those responsibilities are necessarily restricted to the sphere of public "health" and cannot encroach on the responsibilities of other parts of the United Nations system. And there is no doubt that questions concerning the use of force, the regulation of armaments and disarmament are within the competence of the United Nations and lie outside that of the specialized agencies. For all these reasons, the Court considers that the question raised in the request for an advisory opinion submitted to it by WHO does not arise "within the scope of [the] activities" of that Organization as defined by its Constitution. WHO'S practice (para. 27) A consideration of the practice of WHO bears out these conclusions. None of the reports and resolutions referred to in the preamble to World Health Assembly resolution WHA46.40, nor resolution WHA46.40 itself, could be taken to express, or to amount on its own to, a practice

establishing an agreement between the members of the Organization to interpret its Constitution as empowering it to address the question of the legality of the use of nuclear weapons, nor can, in the view of the Court, such a practice be inferred from isolated passages of certain resolutions of the World Health Assembly cited during the present proceedings. The Court further considers that the insertion.of the words "including the WHO Constitution" in the question put to the Court does not change the fact that WHO is not empowered to seek an opinion on the interpretation of its Constitution in relation to matters outside the scope of its functions. Other argunrents (paras. 29-30) The Court finally considered that other arguments put forward in the proceedings to found the jurisdiction of the Court--concerning the way in which World Health Assembly resolution WHA46.40 had been adopted and concerning the reference to that resolution in General Assembly resolution 49/75 K-did not affect the conclusions reached by the Court concerning the competence of WHO to request an opinion on the question raised. Having arrived at the view that the request for an advisory opinion submitted by WHO does not relate to a question which arises "within the scope of [the] activities" of that Organization in accordance with Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter, the Court finds that an essential condition of founding its jurisdiction in the present case is absent and that it cannot, accordingly, give the opinion requested. The final paragraph reads as follows: "32. For these reasons, THE COURT, i3y eleven votes to three, Finds that it is not able to give the advisory opinion which was requested of it under World Health Assembly resolution WHA46.40 dated 14 May 1993. IN FAVOUR: President Bedjaoui; Vice-President Schwebel; Judges Oda, Guillaume, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin, Ferrari Bravo, Higgins; AGAINST: Judges Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Koroma. " Declaration of Judge Ranjeva Judge Ranjeva voted in favour of the decision of the Court as he considers that it accords with the relevant law. He would none the less have preferred the Court to be more

explicit with respect to the problem of its advisory jurisdiction, by stressing the fact that the structure of the question put by the World Health Assembly had not been such as to enable it to exercise the jurisdiction that it did, in any case, possess. Declaration of Judge Ferrari Bravo Judge Ferrari Bravo regrets that the Court should have arbitrarily divided into two categories the long line of General Assembly resolutions that deal with nuclear weapons. Those resolutions are fundamental. This is the case of resolution 1 (I) of 24 January 1946, which clearly points to the existence of a truly solemn undertaking to eliminate all forms of nuclear weapons, whose presence in military arsenals was declared unlawful. The cold war, which intervened shortly afterwards, prevented the development of this concept of illegality, while giving rise to the concept of nuclear deterrence which has no legal value. The theory of deterrence, while it has occasioned a practice of the nuclear-weapon States and their allies, has not been able to create a legal practice serving as a basis for the incipient creation of an international custom. It has, moreover, helped to widen the gap between Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter and Article 5 1. The Court should have proceeded to a constructive analysis of the role of the General Assembly resolutions. These have, from the outset, contributed to the formation of a rule prohibiting nuclear weapons. The theory of deterrence has arrested the development of that rule and, while it has prevented the implementation of the prohibition of nuclear weapons, it is none the less still the case that that "bare" prohibition has remained unchanged and continues to produce its effects, at least with regard to the burden of proof, by making it more difficult for the nuclear Powers to vindicate their policies within the framework of the theory of deterrence. Separate opinion of Judge Oda Judge Oda, while being in agreement with the Court's decision that the request should be dismissed as well as with the reasoning leading to that decision, nevertheless wishes to make clear his view that the Court should have taken more note of the fact that it was asked not only whether the use of nuclear weapons would be a breach of the obligations of States under international law but whether it would also be a breach of the obligations of States under the WHO Constitution. Judge Oda is very concerned that the Court may be

seised of more requests for advisory opinion which may in essence be unnecessary and oversimplistic. He stressed that the advisory function should only be used in cases of conflict or dispute and not merely to discuss general matters of international law. He also pointed out that advisory opinions had been requested by specialized agencies in three previous cases in the history of the Court, but strictly in order to solve one or more legal questions arising within the scope of their activities. This precedent has not been followed in the present case. Judge Oda points out that the request of WHO was drafted without there being any real agreement among the delegates in the World Health Assembly and, in particular, that it was brought to the Court contrary to the repeated admonitions of the Legal Counsel of WHO, who contended that the Organization was not competent to bring this matter to the Court under Article 96 (2) of the Charter of the United Nations. Dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen Thc: main reason for Judge Shahabuddeen's dissent is that, in his respectful view, the Court has mistaken the meaning of WHO'S question. Contrary to the Court's impression, WHO is not asking whether the use of nuclear weapons by one of its members is lawful under international law as a general matter; a more reasonable interpretation of the question is that WHO is asking whether such use would be a breach of a member's obligations under international law but only in so far as it would also be a breach of its obligations under the Constitution of WHO. WHO would have to deal with the health and environmental effects produced by the action of a member even if that action is in breach of the member's obligations under that Constitution; but it nevertheless remains competent for WHO to concern itself with the question whether, in producing a situation demanding action by WHO, a member may have breached its obligations under that Constitution. Dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry Judge Weeramantry, in his dissenting opinion, stated that the question asked by the World Health Organization related to obligations in three particular areas: (a) State obligations in regard to health; (b) State obligations in regard to the environment; and (c) State obligations under the WHO Constitution. The question asked by WHO was substantially different from the general question of legality of use or threat of use

of nuclear weapons, asked by the General Assembly. However, the Court had treated it as a question of general illegality, and had not examined State obligations in the three areas mentioned. Had the Court inquired into these three areas, it would have found that each of them was intimately linked with the legitimate concerns of WHO and that, in each of these areas, State obligations were violated by nuclear weapons. Judge Weeramantry, in his opinion, examines the healthrelated and environmentally related effects of nuclear weapons to show the diametrical contrast between those effects and the obligations of States, both as members of the international community, in general, and as subscribing parties to the WHO Constitution. Judge Weeramantry strongly disagreed with the majority of the Court, who had held that WHO3 question was outside the scope of its legitimate sphere of interest. His view, on the other hand, was that the question asked by WHO was entirely within its legitimate and constitutional sphere of interest. WHO was in fact to be commended for having given its attention to the question of the legality of the nuclear weapon, which was the greatest man-made threat to human health thus far devised. WHO was the only health authority to which the world would have to turn for international assistance if a country were stricken with a nuclear attack, for its own health services would have collapsed. !vloreover, even neutral countries nor involved in the dispute, which would be affected by the radiation and other effect.s of nuclear weapons, would need to turn to WHO for assistance in such a:n eventuality. Global health was central to the question, just as global health was central to the concerns of WHO. :planning and prevention were essential ports of the activities of all health authorities, and this general principle unquestionably applied to WHO, which needs the legal information requested, for precisely this purpose. 'The Court's decision was based on restricted principles of treaty interpretation and should rather have interpreted W1-10's Constitution in the light of its object and purpose-" to promote and protect the health 01' all peoples". Judge Weeramantry disagreed with the view that United Nations agencies conducted their affairs within a strictly coinpartmentalized sche~me of division of functions. He disagreed with the Cou~t's rigid application of the "principle of speciality" to \YHO, so as to take the question of legality out of its area of concern, merely because peace

ant1 security fell withiin the concerns of the Security Council. 'The effects of nuclea~rw eapons on health showed the futility of awaiting a nuclear catastrophe for INHO to move into action in providing medical services. The nuclear weapon was, inter alia, the greatest cancer-inducing instrumentality yet devised. WHO was just as mu.ch entitled to corlcern itself with the legality of this agency of ill health as it was to inquire into the legality of a cancer-inducing pharmaceutical product. Depending on the answer to that question, it would have to adopt different strategies to deal with the problem. lvloreover, this was the first case ever in which the Co.urt had refused to consider the request of' a specialized agency of the United Nations for an advi:;ory opinion. Such a refusal should only be for compelling reasons. No such reason has been shown to exist in the present case. Juclge Weeramantry's view was that international law joined with the imperatives of global health in requiring the Court to answer WHO'S request. Dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma In his dissenting opinion, Judge Koroma stated that the Court's finding that it lacked jurisdiction to respond to the request by WHO was not only unprecedented but also inconsistent with its own jurisprudence. He also disputed the Court's finding that the question posed by the Organization was outside its competence and scope of activities. To reach that conclusion, Judge Koroma maintained that the Court had misconstrued the question put by WHO as relating to the legality of the -use by a State of nuclear weapons in a.rmed conflict. In his view, that question related to the health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons and to the problem of whether those effects wollld be in breach of the obligations of Stiites, a matter whiich falls eminently within the competence and scope of the agency's activities. He recalled that WHO is the specialized agency responsible for the protection and the safeguarding of the health of all peoples at the international level and its responsibilities include the taking of measures to prevent health problems like those which are bound to arise following the use of nuclear weapons. In this connection, he pointed out that the Organization dealt primarily with preventive medicine. Accordingly, in his view, a request to the Court seeking legal clarification about the health and environmental effects of the use of nuclear weapons not only is a matter

which is within the competence of the Organization but is one which should have led the Court to render an advisory opinion. Judge Koroma recalled that the Court had previously stated that it would: "give an opinion based on law, once it has come to the conclusion that the questions put to it are relevant and have a practical and contemporary effect, and consequently . . . not devoid of object and purpose". He maintained that the request for an advisory opinion by WHO related to an issue which not only was of direct relevance to the Organization, but had practical and contemporary effect as well, and is not devoid of object and purpose. Having analysed the evidence presented by delegations including those of Japan and the Marshall Islands, and the study carried out under the auspices of WHO on the Effects of Nuclear War on Health and Health Services, he came to the conclusion that should a nuclear weapon be used in an armed conflict the number of dead would vary from one million to one thousand million, to which the same number of people injured was to be added. If a larger number of such weapons were to be used, they would have catastrophic effects, including the destruction of transport, food delivery, fuel and basic medical supplies, resulting in possible famine and mass starvation on a global scale. He concluded that nuclear weapons when used are incapable of discriminating between civilians and non-civilians, nor would such weapons spare the hospitals or reservoirs of drinking water that are indispensable for survival after a nuclear attack. He was therefore convinced that nuclear weapons caused superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering to their victims, going so far as to prevent the treatment of those wounded. Such effects, he maintained, would be patently contrary to international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular international humanitarian law, as well as constituting a breach of the health and environmental obligations of States under international law, including the WHO Constitution. The Court's findings that such matters were not within the competence or scope of activities of the Organization were therefore incoherent and incomprehensible. Judge Koroma regretted that, in order to reach those findings, the Court not only had misinterpreted the questiona misinterpretation which both distorted the intention of the questioa and proved fatal for the request-but

had also had to depart from its jurisprudence according to which it would only decline to render an advisory opinion for "compelling reasons". In his view, no such compelling reasons existed or had been established in this case. He was therefore left wondering whether the finding of the Court that it lacked jurisdiction was not the kind of solution resorted to in cases where the need to give a decision on the merits would involve unusual difficulty or embarrassment for the Court. On the other hand, the Court had always responded positively to requests for advisory opinions and regarded its role as a form of participation in the activities of the Organization, while at the same time protecting its judicial character. By declining to render an opinion in this case the Court had, in his view, chosen to vacate its positive record in this sphere, particularly on an issue of such vital importance that embraced not only a legal but a moral and humanitarian dimension as well. He concluded by recall.ing that "medicine is one of the pillars of peace", but that it can equally be said that health is a pillar of peaceor, as is stated in the WHO Constitution, "the health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security".

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS, ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS CERTAIN EXPENSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS (ARTICLE 17, PARAGRAPH 2, OF THE CHARTER) ADVISORY OPINION OF 20 JULY 1962 COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE RECUEIL DES ARRETS, AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES CERTAINES DPENSES DES NATIONS UNIES (ARTICLE 17, PARAGRAPHE 2, DE LA CHARTE) AVIS CONSULTATIF DU 20 JUILLET 1962

This Opinion should be cited as follows: "Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962 : I.C. J . Reports 1962, p. I~I." Le prsent avis doit tre cit comme suit: (( Certaines dpenses des Nations Unies (article 17, paragraphe 2, de la Charte), Avis consultatif du 20 juillet 1962 : C. I. J . Recueil 1962, p. I ~ I . Sdee npmber NO de vente: 262 1 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 1962 20 July General List No. 49 YEAR 1962 20 July 1962 CERTAIN EXPENSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS (ARTICLE 17, PARAGRAPH 2, OF THE CHARTER) Resolution I73I (XVI) of General Assembly requesting advisory opinion.-bjections to giving opinion based on proceedings in General Assemb1y.-Interpretation of meaning of "expenses of the Organization".-Article 17, paragraphs I and 2, of Charter.-Lack of jzcstification for limiting terms "budget" and "exPenses".-Article 17 i n context of Charter.-Respective functions of Security Council and General Assemb1y.-Article II, fiaragraph 2, in relation to budgetary powers of General Assemb1y.-Role of General Assembly in mailztenance of international peace and security.-Agreements under Article 43.Expenses incurred for purposes of United Nations.-Obligations incurred by Secretary-General acting under authority of Security Council or General Assemb1y.-Nature of operations of UNEF and 0NUC.-Financing of UNEF and ONUC based on Article 17, paragraph 2.-Implementation by Secretary-General of Security Council reso1utions.-Expenditures for UNEF and ONUC and Article 17, $aragraPh 2, of Charter. ADVISORY O P I N I O N Presczt : President WINIARSK; I Vice-President ALFARO; Judges BASDEVANT, BADAWI, MORENO QUINTANA, WELLINGTON K o o , SPIROPOULOSiSr ,P ercy SPENDER, Sir Gerald FITZMAURICE, KORETSKYT, ANAKAB,U STAMANYT ER IVERO, JESSUP, MORELLI ; Registrar GARNIER-COIGNET. COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE ANNE 1962 20 juillet 1962

1962 Le 20 juillet Rle gnral na 49 CERTAINES DPENSES DES NATIONS UNIES (ARTICLE 17, PARAGRAPHE 2, DE LA CHARTE) Rsolution de l'Assemble gnrale 1731 ( X V I ) demandant un nvis consultatif. - Objections au prononc d'un avis fondes sziv les travaux de l'Assemble gnrale. - Interprtation de l'expression (( dpenses de L'Organisation 1). - Article 17, paragraphes I et 2, de la Charte. - Limitation non justifie des mots (( budget )) et (( dpenses a. - Article 17 dans le contexte de la Charte. - Fonctions respectives du Conseil de Scurit et de l'Assemble gnrale. - L'article Ir, paragraphe 2, et les fiouvoirs budgtaires de l'Assemble gnrale. R61e de L'Assemble gnrale dans le maintien de la paix et de la scurit internationales. - Accords en vertu de l'article 43. - Dpenses encourues pour les buts des Nations Unies. - Obligations encoztrues par le Secrtaire gnral agi s sa~st ous l'autorit du Conseil de Scurit ou de l'Assemble gnrale. - Caractre des oprations de la FG.lTU et de I'ONUC. - Financement de la FUNU et de 1'ONUC folzd sur l'article 17, paragraphe 2. - Application par le Secrtaire gnral des rsolutions du Conseil de Scurit. - Dpenses de la F CSC et de Z'ONUC et article 17, paragraphe 2, de la Charte. AVIS CONSLLTATIF Pr s ~ n t:s Ji. WINIARSKIP,r sident ; M. ALFAROV, ice-P~sideiz;t MM. BASDEVANBTX, DAWIM, ORENO QCISTANA ,E LLINGTON KOO, SPIROPOCLOsSir, Percy SPENDERs,i r Gerald FITZJIAPRICMEb, I. KORETSKYT,A SAKAB, r-sraMANTE Y RIVEROJ,E SSUPM, ORELLJIz, iqes; FI. GARSIERCOIGNETG, r efiev. 4 152 CERTAIN EXPENSES OF U.N. (OPINION OF 20 VI1 62) Concerning the question whether certain expenditures authorized by the General Assembly "constitute 'expenses of the Organization' within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations", composed as above, gives the following Advisory Opinion: The request which laid the matter before the Court was formulated in a letter dated 21 December 1961 from the Acting SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations to the President of the Court, received in the Registry on 27 December. In that letter the Acting Secretary-General informed the President of the Court that the General Assembly, by a resolution adopted on 20 December 1961, had decided to request the International Court of Justice to give

an advisory opiniotl on the following question : "Do the expenditures authorized in General Assembly resolutions 1583 (XV) and 1590 (XV) of 20 December 1960, 1595 (XV) of 3 April 1961, 1619 (XV) of 21 April 1961 and 1633 (XVI) of 30 October 1961 relating to the United Nations operations in the Congo undertaken in pursuance of the Security Council resolutions of 14 July, 22 July and 9 August 1960, and 21 February and 24 November 1961, and General Assembly resolutions 1474 (ES-IV) of 20 September 1960 and 1599 (XV), 1600 (XV) and 1601 (XV) of 15 April1961, and the expenditures authorized in General Assembly resolutions 1122 (XI) of 26 November 1956, 1089 (XI) of 21 December 1956, 1090 (XI) of 27 February 1957, 1151 (XII) of 22 November 1957, 1204 (XII) of 13 December 1957, 1337 (XIII) of 13 December 1958, 14.41 (XIV) of 5 December 1959 and 1575 (XV) of 20 December 1960 relating to the operations of the United Nations Emergency Force undertaken in pursuance of General Assembly resolutions 997 (ES-1) of 2 November 1956, 998 (ES-1) and 999 (ES-1) of 4 November 1956, 1000 (ES-1) of 5 November 1956, 1001 (ES-1) of 7 November 1956, 1121 (XI) of 24 November 1956 and 1263 (XIII) of 14 November 1958, constitue 'expenses of the Organization' within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations?" In the Acting Secretary-General's letter was enclosed a certified copy of the aforementioned resolution of the General Assembly. At the same time the Acting Secretary-General announced that he would transmit to the Court, in accordance with Article 65 of the Statute, al1 documents likely to throw light upon the question. Resolution 1731 (XVI) by which the General Assembly decided to request an advisory opinion from the Court reads as follows: "The General Assembly, Recognizing its need for authoritative legal guidance as to obligations of Member States under the Charter of the United Nations 5 CERTAINES DPENSES DES N. U. (AVIS DU 20 VII 62) 152 Sur la question de savoir si certaines dpenses autorises par l'Assemble gnrale constituent des dpenses de l'organisation )) au sens du paragraphe 2 de l'article 17 de la Charte des Nations Unies , LA COUR, ainsi compose, donne l'avis consultatif suivant : La requte qui a saisi la Cour a t formule dans une lettre adresse le 21 dcembre 1961 par le Secrtaire gnral par intrim des Nations Unies au Prsident de la Cour et reue au Greffe le 27 dcembre. Par cette lettre le Secrtaire gnral par intrim porte la connaissance du Prsident de la Cour que, par une rsolution

adopte le 20 dcembre 1961, l'Assemble gnrale a dcid de demander la Cour internationale de Justice un avis consultatif sur la question suivante : Les dpenses autorises par les rsolutions de l'Assemble gnrale 1583 (XV) et 1590 (XV) du 20 dcembre 1960, 1595 (XV) du 3 avril 1961, 1619 (XV) du 21 avril 1961 et 1633 (XVI) du 30 octobre 1961, relatives aux oprations des Nations Unies au Congo entreprises en excution des rsolutions du Conseil de Scurit en date des 14 juillet, 22 juillet et g aot 1960 et des 21 fvrier et 24 novembre 1961 ainsi que des rsolutions de l'Assemble gnrale 1474 (ES-IV) du 20 septembre 1960, 1599 (XV), 1600 (XV) et 1601 (XV) du 15 avril 1961, et les dpenses autorises par les rsolutions de l'Assemble gnrale: 1122 (XI) du 26 novembre 1956, 1089 (XI) du 21 dcembre 1956, 1090 (XI) du 27 fvrier 1957, 1151 (XII) du 22 novembre 1957, 1204 (XII) du 13 dcembre 1957, 1337 (XIII) du 13 dcembre 1958, 1441 (XIV) du 5 dcembre 1959 et 1575 (XV) du 20 dcembre 1960, relatives aux opration:; de la Force d'urgence des Nations Unies entreprises en excution des rsolutions de l'Assemble gnrale: 997 (ES-1) du 2 novembre 1956, 998 (ES-1) et 999 (ES-1) du 4 novembre 1956, 1000 (ES-1) du 5 novembre 1956, 1001 (ES-1) du 7 novembre 1956, 1121 (XI) du 24 novembre 1956 et 1263 (XIII) du 14 novembre 1958, constituentelles des dpenses de l'organisation au sens du paragraphe 2 de l'article 17 de la Charte des Nations Unies? )) A cette lettre du Secrtaire gnral par intrim est joint un exemplaire certifi conforme de la rsolution ci-dessus mentionne de l'Assemble gnrale. Le Secrtaire gnral par intrim annonce en mme temps qu'il transmettra la Cour, conformment l'article 65 du Statut, tous documents pouvant servir lucider la question. La rsolution 1731 (XVI) par laquelle l'Assemble gnrale a dcid de demander la Cour un avis consultatif est ainsi conue: (( L'Assemble gnrde, Reconnaissant qu'elle a besoin d'un avis juridique autoris quant aux obligations des Etats Membres en vertu de la Charte 5 I j3 CERTAIN EXPENSES OF U.X. (OPIXIOS OF 20 VII 62) in the matter of financing the United Nations operations in the Congo and in the Middle East, I. Decides to submit the following question to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion: "Do the expenditure' authorized in General Assembly resolutions 1583 (XV) and 1590 (XV) of 20 December 1960, 1595 (XV) of 3 April 1961, 1619 (XV) of 21 April I ~ G I and 1633 (XVI) of 30 October 1961 relating to the United Nations operations in the Congo undertaken in pursuance of the Security Council

resolutions of 14 July, 22 July and 9 August 1960, and 21 February and 24 November 1961, and General Assembly resolutions 1474 (ES-IV) of 20 September 1960 and 1599 (XV), 1600 (XV) and 1601 (XV) of 15 April 1961, and the expenditures authorized in General Assembly resolutions 1122 (XI) of 26 November 1956, 1089 (XI) of 21 December 1956, 1090 (XI) of 27 February 1957, II51 (XII) of 22 November 1957, 1204 (XII) of 13 December 1957, 1337 (XIII) of 13 December 1958, 1441 (XIV) of 5 December 1959 and 1575 (XV) of 20 December 1960 relating to the operations of the United Nations Emergency Force undertalten in pursuance of General Assemhly resolutions 997 (ES-1) of 2 Kovember 1956, 998 (ES-1) and 999 (ES-1) of 4 Noveniber 1956, 1000 (ES-1) of 5 November 1956, 1001 (ES-1) of 7 November 1956, 1121 (XI) of 24 November 1956 and 1263 (XIII) of 14 November 1958, constitute 'expenses of the Organization' within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations? " 2. Reqz~ests the Secretary-General, in accordance with Article 65 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, to transmit the present resolution to the Court, accompanied by ail documents likely to throw light upon the question." On 27 December 1961, the day the letter from the Acting Secretarj7General of the Cnited Nations reached the Registry, the President, in pursuance of Article 66, paragraph 2, of the Statute, considered that the States Members of the Vnited Nations urere likelj- to be able to furnish information on the question and made an Order fixing 20 February 1962 as the time-limit within nihich the Court tvould be prepared to receive written statements from them and the Registrar sent to them the special and direct communication provided for in that Article, recalling that resolution 1731 (XVI) and those referred to in the question submitted for opinion tvere already in their possession. The notice to al1 States entitled to appear before the Court of the letter from the Acting Secretary-General and of the resolution therein enclosed, prescribed by Article 66, paragraph 1, of the Statute, was given by lette; of 4 January 1962. The foilowing Members of the Cnited Yations submitted statements, notes or letters setting forth their views: Australia, Bulgaria, 6 CERTAINES DPENSES DES N. U. (AVIS DU 20 VII 62) 153 des Nations Unies en ce qui concerne le financement des oprations des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) et au Moyen-Orient (UNEF), I. Dcide de soumettre la question ci-aprs la Cour internationale de Justice pour qu'elle donne un avis consultatif: Les dpenses autorises par les rsolutions de l'Assemble gnrale 1583 (XV) et 1590 (XV) du 20 dcembre 1960, 1595

(XV) du 3 avril 1961, 1619 (XV) du 21 avril 1961 et 1633 (XVI) du 30 octobre 1961, relatives aux oprations des Nations Unies au Congo entreprises en excution des rsolutions du Conseil de Scurit en date des 14 juillet, 22 juillet et 9 aot 1960 et des 21 fvrier et 24 novembre 1961 ainsi que des rsolutions de l'Assemble gnrale 1474 (ES-IV) du 20 septembre 1960, 1599 (XV), 1600 (XV) et 1601 (XV) du 15 avril 1961, et les dtpenses autorises par les rsolutions de l'Assemble gnrale: 1122 (XI) du 26 novembre 1956, 1089 (XI) du 21 dcembre 1956, 1090 (XI) du 27 fvrier 1957, 1151 (XII) du 22 novembre 1957, '204 (XII) du 13 dcembre 1957, 1337 (XIII) du 13 dcembre 1958, 1441 (XIV) du 5 dcembre 1959 et 1575 (XV) du 20 dcembre 1960, relatives aux oprations de la Force d'urgence des Nations Unies entreprises en excution des rsolutions de l'Assemble gnrale: 997 (ES-1) du 2 novembre 1956, 998 (ES-1) et 999 (ES-1) du 4 novembre 1956, 1000 (ES-1) du 5 novembre 1956, 1001 (ES-1) du 7 novembre 1956, 1121 (XI) du 24 novembre 1956 et 1263 (XIII) du 14 novembre 1958, constituent-elles des dpenses de l'Organisation )) au sens du paragraphe 2 de l'article 17 de la Charte des Nations Unies? )) 2. Prie le Secrtaire gnral, conformment l'article 65 du Statut de la Cour internationale de Justice, de transmettre la prsente rsolution la Cour et d'y joindre tout document pouvant servir lucider la question. Le 27 dcembre 1961, jour o la lettre du Secrtaire gnral par intrim des Nations Unies est parvenue au Greffe, le PrCtsident, par application de l'article 66, paragraphe 2, du Statut, a jug que les Membres des Nations Unies taient susceptibles de fournir des renseignements sur la question et a rendu une ordonnance fixant au 20 fvrier 1962 la date d'expiration du dlai dans lequel la Cour serait dispose recevoir d'eux des exposs crits; et le Greffier leur a adress la communication spciale et directe prvue cet article, en rappelant que la rsolution 1731 (XVI), comme celles qui sont mentionnes dans la question soumise pour avis, tait dj en leur possession. La notification tous les tats admis ester en justice devant la Cour de la lettre du Secrtaire gnral par intrim et de la rsolution qui y tait jointe, notification prescrite par l'article 66, paragraphe 1, du Statut, a t effectue par lettre du 4 janvier 1962. Les Membres des Nations Vnies dont les noms suivent ont prsent des exposs, notes ou lettres nonant leurs vues: Afrique du 6 154 CERTAIN EXPENSES OF U.N. (OPINION OF 20 VI1 62) Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, Spain, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,

Union of Soviet Sociaiist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Upper Volta. Copies of these communications were transmitted to al1 Members of the United Nations and to the Acting SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations. Mexico, the Philippines and Poland referred in letters to the views expressed on their behalf during the session of the General Assembly. The Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, in pursuance of Article 65, paragraph 2, of the Statute, transmitted to the Court a dossier of documents likely to throw light upon the question, together with an Introductory Note and a note by the Controller on the budgetary and financial practices of the United Nations; these documents reached the Registry on 21 February and I March 1962. The Members of the United Nations were informed on 23 March 1962 that the oral proceedings in this case would open towards the beginning of May. On 16 April 1962 they were notified that 14 May had been fixed as the opening date. Hearings were held from 14 to 19 May and on 21 May, the Court being addressed by the following : for Canada : M. Marcel Cadieux, Deputy UnderSecretary and Legal Adviser for the Department of Extemal Affairs; for the Netherlands: Professor W. Riphagen, Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; for Italy: M. Riccardo Monaco, Professor at the Univosity of Rome, Head of Department for Contentious Diplomatic Questions, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; for the United Kingdom The Rt. Hon. Sir Reginald Manningof Great Britain and ham-Buller, Q.C., Attorney-General; Northern Ireland : for Nonvay : Mr. Jens Evensen, Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; for Australia: Sir Kenneth Bailey, Solicitor-General; for Ireland: Mr. Aindrias O' Caoimh, S.C., AttorneyGeneral ; for the Union of Soviet Professor G. 1. Tunkin, Director of the Socialist Republics : Juridical-Treaty Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; for the United States The Honorable Abram Chayes, Legal of America : Adviser, Department of State. 7 Sud, Australie, Bulgarie, Canada, Danemark, Espagne, tatsUnis d'Amrique, France, Haute-Volta, Irlande, Italie, Japon,

Pays-Bas, Portugal, Rpublique socialiste sovitique de Bilorussie, Rpublique socialiste sovitique d'Ukraine, Roumanie, RoyaumeUni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Tchcoslovaquie, Union des Rpubliques socialistes sovitiques. Copie de ces communications a t transmise tous les Membres des Nations Unies ainsi qu'au Secrtaire gnral par intrim des Nations Unies. Par lettre, le Mexique, les Philippines et la Pologne se sont rfrs aux vues qui avaient t exprimes en leurs noms respectifs lors de la session de l'Assemble gnrale. Le Secrtaire gnral par intrim des Nations Unies a transmis la Cour, par application de l'article 65, paragraphe 2, du Statut, un dossier de documents pouvant servir lucider la question; il y a joint une Introduction ainsi qu'une note du contrleur sur les pratiques budgtaires et financires de l'organisation des Nations Unies. Ces documents sont parvenus au Greffe les 21 fvrier et I~~ mars 1962. Le 23 mars 1962, les Membres des Nations Unies ont t informs que la procdure orale en cette affaire s'ouvrirait vers le dbut du mois de mai. Le 16 avril 1962, il leur a t notifi que la date d'ouverture tait fixe au 14 mai. Des audiences se sont tenues du 14 au 19 mai et le 21 mai, au cours desquelles ont pris la parole: pour le Canada: pour les Pays-Bas : pour l'Italie : pour le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord: pour la Norvge : pour l'Australie : pour l'Irlande : pour l'Union des Rpubliques socialistes sovitiques : pour les tats-unis d'Amrique : M. Marcel Cadieux, sous-secrtaire adjoint et conseiller juridique du ministre des Affaires extrieures; M. W. Riphagen, jurisconsulte du ministre des Affaires trangres; hl. Riccardo Monaco, professeur l'universit de Rome, chef du contentieux diplomatique au ministre des Affaires trangres ; le trs honorable sir Reginald ManninghamBuller, Q. C., Attorney-General

; M. Jens Evensen, directeur gnral, ministre des Affaires trangres; sir Kenneth Bailey, Solicitor-General; M. Aindrias O' Caoimh, S. C., AttorneyGeneral ; M. G. 1. Tunkin, professeur, directeur du service juridique et des traits du ministre des Affaires trangres; l'honorable Abram Chayes, conseiller juridique du dpartement d'tat. 7 155 CERTAIN EXPENSES OF U.N. (OPINION OF 20 SrII 62) Before prcceeding to give its opinion on the question put to it, the Court considers it necessary to make the following preliminary remarks : The power of the Court to give an advisory opinion is derived from Article 65 of the Statute. The power granted is of a discretionary character. In exercising its discretion, the International Court of Justice, like the Permanent Court of International Justice, has always been guided by the pnnciple which the Permanent Court stated in the case concerning the Status of Eastern Carelia on 23 July 1923: "The Court, being a Court of Justice, cannot, even in giving advisory opinions, depart from the essential rules guiding their activity as a Court" (P.C.I. J., Series B, No. 5, p. 29). Therefore, and in accordance with Article 65 of its Statute, the Court can give an advisory opinion only on a legal question. If a question is no1 a legal one, the Court has no discretion in the matter; it must decline to'give the opinion requested. But even if the question is a legal one, which the Court is undoubtedly competent to answer, it may nonetheless decline to do so. As this Court said in its Opinion of 30 March 1950, the permissive character of Article 65 "gives the Court the power to examine whether the circumstances of the case are of such a character as should lead it to decline to answer the Request" (Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (First Phase), I.C. J. Reports 1950, p. 72). But, as the Court also said in the same Opinion, "the reply of the Court, itself an 'organ of the United Nations', represents its participation in the activities of the Organization, and, in principle, should not be refused" (ibid., p. 71). Still more emphatically, in its Opinion of 23 October 1956, the Court said that only "compelling reasons" should lead it to refuse to give a requested advisory opinion (Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the I.L.O. upon complaints made against the Unesco, I.C. J. Reports 1956, p. 86). The Court finds no "compelling reason" why.it should not give the advisory opinion which the General Assembly requested by its

resolution 1731 (XVI). It has been argued that the question put to the Court is intertwined with political questions, and that for this reason the Court should refuse to give an opinion. It is tme that most interpretations of the Charter of the United Nations will have political significance, great or small. In the nature of things it could not be othenvise. The Court, however, cannot attribute a political character to a request which invites it to undertake an essentially judicial task, namely, the interpretation of a treaty provision. In the preamble to the resolution requesting this opinion, the General Assembly expressed its recognition of "its need for authori8 Avant de donner son avis sur la question qui lui est pose, la Cour juge ncessaire de faire les observations prliminaires suivantes : Le pouvoir qu'a la Cour de donner un avis consultatif procde de l'article 65 du Statut. Le pouvoir ainsi attribu a un caractre discrtionnaire. Dans l'exercice de son pouvoir discrtionnaire, la Cour internationale de Justice, de mme que la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, a toujours suivi le principe nonc le 23 juillet 1923 par la Cour permanente en l'affaire du Statut de la Carlie orientale : (( La Cour, tant une Cour de Justice, ne peut pas se dpartir des rgles essentielles qui dirigent son activit de tribunal, mme lorsqu'elle donne des avis consultatifs )) (C. P. J. I., srie B, no 5, p. 29). En consquence, et conformment l'article 65 du Statut, la Cour ne peut donner un avis consultatif que sur une question juridique. Si une question n'est pas juridique, la Cour n'a pas de pouvoir discrtionnaire en la matire: elle doit refuser de donner l'avis qui lui est demand. Mais, mme s'il s'agit d'une question juridique, laquelle la Cour a indubitablement comptence de rpondre, elle peut nanmoins refuser de le faire. Ainsi que la Cour l'a dclar dans son avis du 30 mars 1950, le caractre permissif de l'article 65 (( donne la Cour le pouvoir d'apprcier si les circonstances de l'espce sont telles qu'elles doivent la dterminer ne pas rpondre une demande d'avis )) (Interprtation des traits de paix conclus avec la Bulgarie, la Hongrie et la Roumanie (premire phase), C. I . J. Recueil 1950, p. 72). Mais, comme la Cour l'a galement dit dans le mme avis, (( la rponse constitue une participation de la Cour, elle-mme organe des Nations Unies s, l'action de l'Organisation et, en principe, elle ne devrait pas tre refuse )) (ibid., p. 71). La Cour a indiqu encore plus nettement dans son avis du 23 octobre 1956 qu'il faudrait ((des raisons dcisives )) pour l'amener opposer un refus une demande d'avis consultatif (Jugements du tribunal administratif de l'O. 1. T. sur requtes contre L'Unesco, C. I. J. Recueil 1956, p. 86). La Cour ne voit aucune (( raison dcisive )) de ne pas donner l'avis consultatif que l'Assemble gnrale lui a demand par sa rsolution

1731 (XVI). On a fait valoir que la question pose la Cour touche des questions d'ordre politique et que, pour ce motif, la Cour doit se refuser donner un avis. Certes, la plupart des interprtations de la Charte des Nations Unies prsentent une importance politique plus ou moins grande. Par la nature des choses, il ne saurait en tre autrement. Mais la Cour ne saurait attribuer un caractre politique une requte qui l'invite s'acquitter d'une tche essentiellement judiciaire, savoir l'interprtation d'une disposition conventionnelle. Dans le prambule de la rsolution par laquelle elle a demand le prsent avis, l'Assemble gnrale a reconnu qu'elle avait (( be8 tative legal guidance". In its search for such guidance it has put to the Court a legal question-a question of the interpretation of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations. In its Opinion of 28 May 1948, the Court made it clear that as "the principal judicial organ of the United Nations", it was entitled to exercise in regard to an article of the Charter, "a multilateral treaty, an interpretative function which falls within the normal exercise of its judicial powers" (Conditions of Adlnission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), I.C. J. Reports 1947-1948, p. 61). The Court, therefore, having been asked to give an advisory opinion upon a concrete legal question, will proceed to give its opinion. The question on which the Court is asked to give its opinion is whether certain expenditures which were authorized by the General Assembly to cover the costs of the United Nations operations in the Congo (hereinafter referred to as ONUC) and of the operations of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East (hereinafter referred to as UNEF), "constitute 'expenses of the Organization' within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations". Before entering upon the detailed aspects of this question, the Court will examine the view that it should take into consideration the circumstance that at the 1086th Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly on 20 December 1961, an amendment was proposed, by the representative of France, to the draft resolution requesting the advisory opinion, and that this amendment was rejected. The amendment would have asked the Court to give an opinion on the question whether the expenditures relating to the indicated operations were "decided on in conformity with the provisions of the Charter"; if that question were answered in the affirmative, the Court would have been asked to proceed to answer the question which the resolution as adopted actually poses. If the amendment had been adopted, the Court would have been

asked to consider whether the resolutions authorizing the expenditures were decided on in conformity with the Charter; the French amendment did not propose to ask the Court whether the resolutions in pursuance of which the operations in the Middle East and in the Congo were undertaken, were adopted in conformity with the Charter. The Court does not find it necessary to expound the extent to which the proceedings of the General Assembly, antecedent to the adoption of a resolution, should be taken into account in interpreting that resolution, but it makes the following comments on the argument based upon the rejection of the French amendment. 9 soin d'un avis juridique autoris 1). Recherchant un tel avis, elle a pos la Cour une question juridique - une question ayant trait l'interprtation de l'article 17, paragraphe 2, de la Charte des Nations Unies. Dans son avis du 28 mai 1948, la Cour a soulign qu'a en tant qu'organe judiciaire principal des Nations Unies elle est fonde exercer l'gard d'un article de la Charte, (( trait multilatral, une fonction d'interprtation qui relve de l'exercice normal de ses attributions judiciaires s (Conditions de l'admission d'un tat comme Membre des Nations Unies (article 4 de la Charte), C. I. J. Recueil 1947-1948, p. 61). La Cour, ayant donc t saisie d'une demande d'avis consultatif sur une question juridique concrte, donnera maintenant son avis. Il est demand la Cour de dterminer si certaines dpenses qui ont t autorises par l'Assemble gnrale pour couvrir les frais des oprations des Nations Unies au Congo (ci-aprs dsignes par l'abrviation ONUC) et des oprations de la Force d'urgence des Nations Unies au Moyen-Orient (ci-aprs dsignes par l'abrviation FUNU) (( constituent . . . (( des dpenses de l'organisation a au sens du paragraphe 2 de l'article 17 de la Charte des Nations Unies D. Avant d'examiner la question dans tous ses dtails, la Cour prendra en considration l'opinion selon laquelle il faut tenir compte du fait qu' la 1086me sance plnire de l'Assemble gnrale, tenue le 20 dcembre 1961, un amendement au projet de rsolution soumettant une demande d'avis consultatif a t propos par le dlgu de la France, et que cet amendement a t rejet; cet amendement tendait ce que la Cour donnt un avis sur le point de savoir si les dpenses relatives aux oprations en questlon ont t (( dcides conformment aux dispositions de la Charte ; en cas de rponse affirmative, la Cour aurait t prie de rpondre ensuite la question qui est pose dans la rsolution telle qu'elle a t adopte. Si I'amendement avait t adopt la Cour aurait t invite rechercher si les rsolutions autorisant les dpenses ont t prises conformment la Charte; I'amendement franais ne proposait pas

de demander la Cour si les rsolutions en excution desquelles des op. rations ont t entreprises au Moyen-Orient et au Congo ont t adoptes conformment la Charte. La Cour ne juge pas ncessaire d'exposer dans quelle mesure les travaux de l'Assemble gnrale antrieurs l'adoption d'une rsolution doivent entrer en ligne de compte pour l'interprtation de cette rsolution, mais elle fait les observations suivantes quant l'argument fond sur le rejet de l'amendement franais. 157 CERTAIN EXPENSES OF U.N. (OPISION OF 20 VI1 62) The rejection of the French amendment does not constitute a directive to the Court to exclude from its consideration the question whether certain expenditures were "decided on in conformity with the Charter", if the Court finds such consideration appropriate. It is not to be assumed that the General Assembly would thus seek to fetter or hamper the Court in.the discharge of its judicial functions; the Court must have full liberty to consider al1 relevant data available to it in forming an opinion on a question posed to it for an advisory opinion. Nor can the Court agree that the rejection of the French amendment has any bearing upon the question whether the General Assembly sought to preclude the Court from interpreting Article 17 in the light of other articles of the Charter, that is, in the whole context of the treaty. If any deduction is to be made from the debates on this point, the opposite conclusion would be drawn from the clear statements of sponsoring delegations that they took it for granted the Court would consider the Charter as a whole. Turning to the question which has been posed, the Court observes that it involves an interpretation of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter. On the previous occasions when the Court has had to interpret the Charter of the United Nations, it has followed the principles and rules applicable in general to the interpretation of treaties, since it has recognized that the Charter is a multilateral treaty, albeit a treaty having certain special characteristics. In interpreting Article 4 of the Charter, the Court was led to consider "the structure of the Charter" and "the relations established by it between the General Assembly and the Security Council" ; a comparable problem confronts the Court in the instant matter. The Court sustained its interpretation of Article 4 by considering the manner in which the organs concerned "have consistently interpreted the text" in their practice (Competence of the General dssembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, I.C. J. Reports 1950, PP- 8-91. The text of Article 17 is in part as follows: "1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization. 2. The expenses of the Organization shali be borne by the

Members as apportioned by the General Assembly." Although the Court will examine Article 17 in itself and in its relation to the rest of the Charter, it should be noted that at least three separate questions might arise in the interpretation of paragraph 2 of this Article. One question is that of identifying what are "the expenses of the Organization"; a second question might IO Le rejet de I'amendement franais ne constitue pas une injonction pour la Cour d'avoir carter l'examen de la question de savoir si certaines dpenses ont t dcides conformment aux dispositions de la Charte , si la Cour croit opportun de l'aborder. On ne doit pas supposer que l'Assemble gnrale ait ainsi entendu lier ou gner la Cour dans l'exercice de ses fonctions judiciaires; la Cour doit avoir la pleine libert d'examiner tous les lments pertinents dont elle dispose pour se faire une opinion sur une question qui lui est pose en vue d'un avis consultatif. La Cour ne saurait non plus admettre que le rejet de I'amendement franais ait aucune influence sur le point de savoir si l'Assemble gnrale a voulu empcher la Cour d'interprter l'article 17 la lumire des autres articles de la Charte, c'est--dire dans le contexte de l'ensemble du trait. Si l'on voulait tirer des conclusions des dbats tenus sur ce point, une conclusion en sens contraire ressortirait des dclarations trs claires d'aprs lesquelles les dlgations qui ont prsent le projet de rsolution considraient comme acquis que la Cour examinerait la Charte dans son ensemble. Pour en venir la question qui a t pose, la Cour observe qu'elle comporte une interprtation du paragraphe 2 de l'article 17 de la Charte. Dans les affaires prcdentes o la Cour a d interprter la Charte des Nations Unies, elle a suivi les principes et les rgles applicables en gnral l'interprtation des traits, tant donn qu'elle a reconnu que la Charte est un trait multilatral, bien qu'elle prsente certaines caractristiques spciales. Dans son interprtation de l'article 4 de 12 Charte, la Cour a t amene prendre en considration cc l'conomie de la Charte et les rapports que celleci a tablis entre l'Assemble gnrale et le Conseil de Scurit ; c'est un problme du mme ordre qui se pose aujourd'hui devant la Cour. Pour appuyer son interprtation de l'article 4, la Cour a pris en considration la manire suivant laquelle les organes intresss (( ont constamment interprt ce texte dans leur prati ue (Comptence de l'Assemble gnrde pour lJadmission d'un jtat aux Nations Unies, C. I. J. Recueil 1950, pp. 8-9). Le texte de l'article 17 se lit en partie comme suit : I. L'Assemble gnrale examine et approuve le budget de l'Organisation. 2. Les dpenses de l'Organisation sont supportes par les Membres selon la rpartition fixe par l'Assemble gnrale. ))

La Cour se propose d'examiner l'article 17 en lui-mme et dans ses relations avec le reste de la Charte, mais il convient de noter qu'au moins trois questions distinctes pourraient se poser en ce qui concerne l'interprtation du paragraphe 2 de cet article. La premire question est celle de l'identification des ((dpenses de concern apportionment by the General Assembly; while a third question might involve the interpretation of the phrase "shall be borne by the Members". It is the second and third questions which directly involve "the financial obligations of the Members", but it is only the first question which is posed by the request for the advisory opinion. The question put to the Court has to do with a moment logically anterior to apportionment, just as a question of apportionment would be anterior to a question of Members' obligation to pay. It is true that, as already noted, the preamble of the resolution containing the request refers to the General Assembly's "need for authoritative legal guidance as to obligations of Member States", but it is to be assumed that in the understanding of the General Assembly, it would find such guidance in the advisory opinion which the Court would give on the question whether certain identified expenditures "constitute 'expenses of the Organization' within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter". If the Court finds that the indicated expenditures are such "expenses", it is not called upon to consider the manner in which, or the scale by which, they may be apportioned. The amount of what are unquestionably "expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2" is not in its entirety apportioned by the General Assembly and paid for by the contributions of Member States, since the Organization has other sources of income. A Member State, accordingly, is under no obligation to pay more than the amount apportioned to it; the expenses of the Organization and the total amount in money of the obligations of the Member States may not, in practice, necessarily be identical. The text of Article 17, paragraph 2, refers to "the expenses of the Organization" without any further explicit definition of such expenses. It would be possible to begin with a general proposition to the effect that the "expenses" of any organization are the amounts paid out to defray the costs of carrying out its purposes, in this case, the political, economic, social, humanitarian and other purposes of the United Nations. The next step would be to examine, as the Court will, whether the resolutions authorizing the operations here in question were intended to carry out the purposes of the United Nations and whether the expenditures were incurred in furthering these operations. Or, it might simply be said that the "expenses" of an organization are those which are provided for in its budget. But the Court has not been asked to give an abstract definition of

the words "expenses of the Organization". It has been asked to answer a specific question related to certain identified expenditures which have actually been made, but the Court would not adequately discharge the obligation incumbent on it unless it examined in some detail vanous problems raised by the question which the General Assembly has asked. II l'organisation n; une seconde question aurait trait la rpartition des dpenses par l'Assemble gnrale; et une troisime porterait sur l'interprtation des mots (( sont supportes par les Membres 1). Les deuxime et troisime questions visent directement les (( obligations financires des Membres JI, mais c'est uniquement la premire qui est souleve par la demande d'avis consultatif. La question soumise la Cour se rfre au moment qui prcde logiquement la rpartition des dpenses, de mme qu'une question relative cette rpartjtion serait antrieure une question touchant l'obligation des Etats Membres de payer. Certes, ainsi qu'il a dj t not, le prambule de la rsolution contenant la requte se rfre au (( besoin [qu'a l'Assemble gnrale] d'un avis juridique autoris quant aux obligations des tats Membres , mais on doit supposer que l'Assemble gnrale entend trouver une indication de cet ordre dans l'avis consultatif que la Cour donnera sur la question de savoir si certaines dpenses donnes (( constituent . . . (( des dpenses de l'organisation )) au sens du paragraphe 2 de l'article 17 de la Charte . Si la Cour juge que les dpenses indiques sont des (( dpenses de l'Organisation , elle n'aura pas examiner la mthode ni le barme suivant lesquels elles peuvent tre rparties. Le montant des dpenses qui constituent indubitablement des dpenses de l'organisation au sens du paragraphe 2 de l'article 17 )) n'est pas totalement $parti par l'Assemble gnrale et pay par les contributions des Etats Membres, car l'organisation a d'autres recettes. Un Etat Membre n'est donc pas tenu de payer plus que la quote-part qui lui est attribue; les dpenses de l'organisation et le montant des obligations des Membres peuvent dans la pratique ne pas tre ncessairement identiques. Le texte du paragraphe 2 de l'article 17 mentionne (( les dpenses de l'organisation )) sans donner de dfinition plus prcise de ces dpenses. II serait possible de poser tout d'abord la proposition gnrale portant que les (( dpenses )) d'une organisation quelconque sont les sommes payes pour couvrir les frais relatifs la ralisation de ses buts, en l'occurrence les buts politiques, conomiques, sociaux, humanitaires et autres des Nations Unies. Il faudrait ensuite considrer, comme le fera la Cour, si les rsolutions autorisant les oprations en cause visaient la ralisation des buts des Nations Unies et si lesdites dpenses ont t engages dans

l'accomplissement de ces oprations. Ou bien, on pourrait simplement dire que les (( dpenses )) d'une organisation sont celles qui sont prvues dans son budget. Mais on n'a pas demand la Cour de donner une dfinition abstraite des mots (( dpenses de lJOrganisation . On lui a demand de rpondre une question prcise qui a trait certaines dpenses dtermines qui ont t effectivement faites, mais la Cour n'exercerait pas de faon adquate l'obligation qui lui incombe si elle n'examinait en dtail les diffrents problmes soulevs par la question que l'Assemble gnrale lui a pose. II 159 CERTAIN EXPENSES OF U.N. (OPINION OF 20 VI1 62) It is perhaps the simple identification of "expenses" with the items included in a budget, which has led certain arguments to link the interpretation of the word "expenses" in paragraph 2 of Article 17, with the word "budget" in paragraph I of that drticle; in both cases, it is contended, the qualifying adjective "regular" or "administrative" should be understood to be implied. Since no such qualification is expressed in the text of the Charter, it could be read in, only if such qualification must necessarily be implied from the provisions of the Charter considered as a whole, or from some particular provision thereof which makes it unavoidable to do so in order to give effect to the Charter. In the first place, concemifi;. the word "budget" in paragraph I of Article 17, it is clear that the existence of the distinction between "administrative budgets" and "operational budgets" was not absent from the minds of the drafters of the Charter, nor from the consciousness of the Organization even in the early days of its history. In drafting Article 17, the drafters found it suitable to provide in paragraph I that "The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization". But in dealing with the function of the General Assembly in relation to the specialized agencies, they provided in paragraph 3 that the General Assembly "shall examine the administrative budgets of such specialized agencies". If it had been intended that paragraph I should be limited to the administrative budget of the United Nations organization itself, the word "administrative" would have been inserted in paragraph I as it was in paragraph 3. Moreover, had it been contemplated that the Organization would also have had another budget, different from the one which was to be approved by the General Assembly, the Charter would have includcd some reference to such other budget and to the organ which was to approve it. Similarly, at its first session, the General Assembly in drawing up and approving the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, provided that the budget of that Organization was to be divided under the headings "administrative", "operational"

and "large-scale resettlement"; but no such distinctions were introduced into the Financial Regulations of the United Nations which were adopted by unanimous vote in 1950, and which, in this respect, remain unchanged. These regulations speak only of "the budget" and do not provide any distinction be tween ."administrativeJ' and "operational". In subsequent sessions of the General Assembly, including the sixteenth, there have been numerous references to the idea of distinguishing an "operational" budget ; some speakers have advocated such a distinction as a useful book-keeping device; some considered it in connection with the possibility of differing scales of assessment or apportionment ; others believed it should mark a differentiation of activities to be financed by voluntary contribu12 C'est peut-tre simplement l'identification du mot (( dpenses 1) avec les postes inclus dans un budget qui a conduit certains arguments rattacher l'interprtation du mot (( dpenses 1) au paragraphe 2 de l'article 17, au mot ((budget )) au paragraphe I de cet article; on a soutenu que dans les deux cas l'adjectif qualificatif (( ordinaire )) ou administratif )) devrait tre sous-entendu. tant donn que ce qualificatif ne figure aucunement dans le texte de la Charte, on ne pourrait l'y sous-entendre que si cette qualification devait dcouler ncessairement des dispositions de la Charte considre dans son ensemble, ou d'une disposition particulire de celle-ci qui obligerait l'y introduire pour donner effet la Charte. En premier lieu, en ce qui concerne le mot ((budget 1) au paragraphe I de l'article 17, il est clair que l'existence d'une distinction entre les (( budgets administratifs )) et les (( budgets oprationnels )) n'a pas chapp aux rdacteurs de la Charte et qu'elle n'tait pas trangre aux conceptions de l'Organisation, mme au dbut de son histoire. En rdigeant l'article 17, les rdacteurs ont jug bon de prvoir au paragraphe I que (( L'Assemble gnrale examine et approuve le bz~dget de l'Organisation 1). Mais en traitant des fonctions de l'Assemble gnrale au regard des institutions spcialises, les rdacteurs ont prvu au paragraphe 3 que l'Assemble gnrale (( examine les Oztdgets administratifs desdites institutions n. Si leur intention avait t de limiter l'application du paragraphe I au budget administratif des Nations Unies elles-mmes, le mot administratif )) aurait t inclus au paragraphe I aussi bien qu'au paragraphe 3. De plus, s'il avait t envisag que l'organisation ait aussi un autre budget, diffrent de celui qui devait tre approuv par l'Assemble gnrale, il aurait t fait mention de cet autre budget dans la Charte, ainsi que de l'organe par lequel il devait tre approuv. De mme, sa premire session, l'Assemble gnrale, en rdigeant et en approuvant la constitution de l'Organisation internationale

pour les rfugis, a prvu que le budget de cette organisation serait divis en trois rubriques: (( administration )), excution et (c projets de rtablissement en grand 1); mais aucune distinction analogue n'a t introduite dans le rglement financier des Nations Unies qui a t adopt l'unanimit en 1950 et qui reste sans changement sur ce point. Ce rglement vise seulement le (( budget )) et ne fait aucune distinction entre (( administration et (( excution . Dans les sessions ultrieures de l'Assemble gnrale, y compris la seizime, on a parl plusieurs reprises d'tablir une distinction en ce qui concerne le budget oprationnel: certains orateurs recommandaient d'adopter cette distinction titre de mthode comptable pratique; certains y voyaient un moyen de diffrencier les barmes de quotes-parts ou de rpartition; d'autres pensaient qu'on diffrencierait ainsi les activits financer par des contributions. But these discussions have not resulted in the adoption of two separate budgets based upon such a distinction. Actually, the practice of the Organization is entirely consistent with the plain meaning of the text. The budget of the Organization has from the outset included items which would not fa11 within any of the definitions of "administrative budget'' which have been advanced in this connection. Thus, for example, prior to the establishment of, and now in addition to, the "Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance" and the "Special Fund", both of which are nourished by voluntary contributions, the annual budget of the Organization contains provision for funds for technical assistance ; in the budget for the financial year 1962, the sum of $6,4oo,ooo is included for the technical programmes of economic development, social activities, human rights activities, public administration and narcotic drugs control. Although dunng the Fifth Committee discussions there was a suggestion that al1 technical assistance costs should be excluded from the regular budget, the items under these heads were al1 adopted on second reading in the Fifth Committee without a dissenting vote. The "operational" nature of such activities so budgeted is indicated by the explanations in the budget estimates, e.g. the requests "for the continuation of the operational programme in the field of economic development contemplated in General Assembly resolutions zoo (III) of 4 December 1948 and 304 (IV) of 16 November 1949"; and "for the continuation of the operational programme in the field of advisory social welfare services as contemplated in General Assembly resolution 418 (V) of I December 1950". It is a consistent practice of the General Assembly to include in the annual budget resolutions, provision for expenses relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. Annually, since 1947, the General Assembly has made anticipatory provision

for "unforeseen and extraordinary expenses" arising in relation to the "maintenance of peace and secunty". In a Note submitted to the Court by the Controller on the budgetary and financial practices of the United Nations, "extraordinary expenses" are defined as "obligations and expenditures arising as a result of the approval by a council, commission or other competent United Nations body of new programmes and activities not contemplated when the budget appropriations were approved". The annual resolution designed to provide for extraordinary expenses authonzes the Secretary-General to enter into commitments to meet such expenses with the pnor concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, except that such concurrence is not necessary if the SecretaryCERTAINES DPENSES DES N. U. (AVIS DU 20 VII 62) 160 tions volontaires. Mais ces discussions n'ont pas entran l'adoption de deux budgets spars suivant la distinction envisage. En fait, la pratique de l'Organisation est entirement conforme au sens ordinaire de ces termes. Ds l'origine, le budget de l'Organisation a compris des rubriques qui ne relevaient d'aucune des dfinitions du (( budget administratif )) proposes en la circonstance. C'est ainsi, par exemple, qu'avant la cration du ((Programme largi d'assistance technique )) et du cc Fonds spcial , l'un et l'autre aliments par des contributions volontaires, le budget annuel de l'organisation prvoyait des crdits pour l'assistance technique, lesquels s'ajoutent prsent aux fonds susmentionns; au budget de l'exercice 1962 figure une somme de 6.400.000 dollars pour les programmes techniques de dveloppement conomique, d'activits sociales, d'activits dans le domaine des droits de l'homme, d'administration publique et de contrle des stupfiants. S'il est vrai qu'au cours des dbats de la Cinquime Commission on a propos de supprimer du budget ordinaire toutes les dpenses entranes par l'assistance technique, tous les postes relevant de ces rubriques ont t adopts en seconde lecture par la Cinquime Commission, sans vote contraire. La nature ((oprationnelle )) des activits ainsi inscrites au budget ressort des explications touchant les prvisions budgtaires, comme par exemple les demandes visant ce que soit poursuivie ((l'excution du programme d'action en matire de dveloppement conomique que l'Assemble gnrale a envisag dans ses rsolutions 200 (III) du 4 dcembre 1948 et 304 (IV) du 16 novembre 1949 )); ainsi que ((l'excution du programme d'action relatif aux fonctions consultatives en matire de service social, tel que l'Assemble gnrale l'a envisag dans sa rsolution 418 (V) du I~~d cembre 1950 1). La pratique constante de l'Assemble gnrale est d'inclure dans les rsolutions concernant le budget annuel des dispositions touchant les dpenses qui dcoulent du maintien de la paix et de la

scurit internationales. Tous les ans, depuis 1947, l'Assemble a pris par anticipation des dispositions touchant des dpenses imprvues et extraordinaires )) entranes par les actions visant au ((maintien de la paix et de la scurit JI. Dans une note sur les pratiques budgtaires et financires de l'Organisation des Nations Unies soumise la Cour par le contrleur financier, les (( dpenses extraordinaires )) sont dfinies comme (( les engagements de dpenses et les dpenses dcoulant de l'approbation par un conseil, une commission ou un autre organe comptent des Nations Unies de nouveaux programmes ou activits qui n'avaient pas t envisags au moment o les crdits budgtaires ont t ouverts . La rsolution annuelle sur l'ouverture de crdits destins couvrir des dpenses extraordinaires autorise le Secrtaire gnral engager des dpenses ce titre avec l'assentiment pralable du Comit consultatif pour les questions administratives et budgtaires, mais cet assentiment n'est pas ncessaire si le Secrtaire 13 General certifies that such commitments relate to the subjects mentioned .and the amount does not exceed $2 million, At its fifteenth and sixteenth sessions, the General Assembly resolved "that if, as a result of a decision of the Security Council, commitments relating to the maintenance of peace and security should arise in an estimated total exceeding $IO million" before the General Assembly was due to meet again, a special session should be convened by the Secretary-General to consider the matter. The SecretaryGeneral is regularly authorized to draw on the Working Capital Fund for such expenses but is required to submit supplementary budget estimates to cover amounts so advanced. These annual resolutions on unforeseen and extraordinary expenses were adopted without a dissenting vote in every year from 1947 through 1959, except for 1952, 1953 and 1954, when the adverse votes are attnbutable to the fact that the resolution included the specification of a controversial item-United Nations Korean war decorations. It is notable that the 1961 Report of the Working Group of Fifteen on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations, while revealing wide differences of opinion on a variety of propositions, records that the following statement was adopted without opposition: "22. Investigations and observation operations undertaken by the Organization to prevent possible aggression should be financed as +a. of the regular budget of the United Nations." In the light of what has been stated, the Court concludes that there is no justification for reading into the text of Article 17, paragraph I, any limiting or qualifying word before the word "budget" Turning to paragraph 2 of Article 17, the Court observes that,

on its face, the term "expenses of the Organization" means al1 the expenses and not just certain types of expenses which might be referred to as "regular expenses". An examination of other parts of the Charter shows the variety of expenses which must inevitably be included within the "expenses of the Organization" just as much as the salaries of staff or the maintenance of buildings. For example, the text of Chapters IX and X of the Charter with reference to international economic and social cooperation, especially the wording of those articles which specify the functions and powers of the Economic and Social Council, anticipated the numerous and varied circumstances under which expenses of the Organignral certifie que ces engagements ont trait aux sujets mentionns et que le montant n'en dpasse pas 2 millions de dollars. A ses quinzime et seizime sessions, l'Assemble gnrale a dcid (( qu'au cas o il faudrait, la suite d'une dcision du Conseil de Scurit, engager, pour le maintien de la paix et de la scurit, des dpenses dont le total estimatif dpasserait IO millions de dollars )) avant que l'Assemble gnrale ne se runisse nouveau, une session extraordinaire serait convoque par le Secrtaire gnral pour examiner la question. Le Secrtaire gnral est rgulirement autoris prlever sur le Fonds de roulement les sommes ncessaires ces d~enses. mais il doit rs enter des rvisions budgtaires supplmentaires pour couvrir les sommes qui auront t ainsi avances. Ces rsolutions annuelles concernant les dpenses imprvues et extraordinaires ont t adoptes tous les ans, de 1947 1959, sans vote contraire, sauf pour 1952, 1953 et 1954, les votes contraires venant de ce que la rsolution comprenait un point sujet controverse - les dcorations pour les combattants des Nations Unies en Core. Il est noter que le rapport en 1961 par le Groupe de travail des Quinze pour l'examen des procdures administratives et budgtaires de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, tout en rvlant des divergences d'opinion trs tendues touchant un grand nombre de propositions varies, constate que la dclaration suivante a t adopte sans opposition: 22. Les enqutes et les oprations d'observation que l'Organisation entreprend pour empcher une agression ventuelle devraient tre finances azr moyen du budget ordinaire de l'ONU. A la lumire de ce qui a t dit, la Cour conclut que rien ne permet de sous-entendre dans le paragraphe I de l'article 17 un mot limitant ou qualifiant le mot (( budget . Passant au paragraphe 2 de l'article 17, la Cour remarque qu' premire vue le terme (( dpenses de l'organisation )) signifie toutes les dpenses et non pas seulement un certain type de dpenses qui pourraient s'appeler dpenses ordinaires N. L'tude d'autres sections de la Charte montre la varit des dpenses qui doivent

invitablement rentrer dans la catgorie des (( dpenses de I'Organisation )) tout aussi bien que les traitements des fonctionnaires et l'entretien des btiments. Par exemple, le texte des chapitres IX et X de la Charte qui ont trait la coopration conomique et sociale internationale, et particulirement celui des articles qui prcisent les fonctions et les pouvoirs du Conseil conomique et social, a prvu les circonstances nombreuses et varies dans lesquelles l'organisation pou14 zation could be incurred and which have indeed eventuated in practice. Furthermore, by Article 98 of the Charter, the Secretary-General is obligated to perform such functions as are entrusted to him by the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council. Whether or not expenses incurred in his discharge of this obligation become "expenses of the Organization" cannot depend on whether they be administrative or some other kind of expenses. The Court does not perceive any basis for challenging the legality of the settled practice of including such expenses as these in the budgetary amounts which the General Assembly apportions among the Members in accordance with the authority which is given to it by Article 17, paragraph 2. Passing from the text of Article 17 to its place in the general stmcture and scheme of the Charter, the Court will consider whether in that broad context one finds any basis for implying a limitation upon the budgetary authority of the General Assembly which in turn might limit the meaning of "expenses" in paragraph 2 of that Article. The general purposes of Article 17 are the vesting of control over the finances of the Organization, and the levying of apportioned amounts of the expenses of the Organization in order to enable it to carry out the functions of the Organization as a whole actiyg through its principal organs and such subsidiary organs as may be established under the authority of Article 22 or Article 29. Article 17 is the only article in the Charter which refers to budgetary authority or to the power to apportion expenses, or othenvise to raise revenue, except for Articles 33 and 35, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the Court which have no bearing on the point here under discussion. Nevertheless, it has been argued before the Court that one type of expenses, namely those resulting from operations for the maintenance of international peace and security, are not "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter, inasmuch as they fa11 to be dealt with exclusively by the Security Council, and more especially through agreements negotiated in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter.

The argument rests in part upon the view that when the maintenance of international peace and security is involved, it is only the Security Council which is authonzed to decide on any action relative thereto. It is argued further that since the General Assembly's power is limited to discussing, considering, studying and recommending, it cannot impose an obligation to pay the expenses which result from the implementation of its recommendations. This 15 vait encourir des dpenses, prvisions qui se sont effectivement trouves ralises dans la pratique. En outre, le Secrtaire gnral, en vertu de l'article 98 de la Charte, est tenu de remplir toutes fonctions dont il est charg par l'Assemble gnrale, le Conseil de Scurit, le Conseil conomique et social et le Conseil de Tutelle. Le point de savoir si les dpenses engages pour remplir cette obligation deviennent ou non des dpenses de l'organisation )) ne peut pas dpendre du fait que ces dpenses sont de caractre administratif ou de toute autre sorte. La Cour ne voit aucune base sur laquelle on puisse contester la lgalit de la pratique constante qui consiste inclure de telles dpenses dans les sommes inscrites au budget que l'Assemble gnrale rpartit parmi les Membres, conformment l'autorit qu'elle dtient de l'article 17, paragraphe 2. Aprs avoir tudi le texte de l'article 17 et passant l'examen de la place qu'il occupe dans la structure gnrale et l'conomie de la Charte, la Cour recherchera si, dans ce large contexte, il se trouve une base quelconque qui permettrait d'admettre une limite implicite l'autorit budgtaire de l'Assemble gnrale qui, son tour, pourrait limiter la signification du mot (( dpenses dans le paragraphe 2 de cet article. Le but gnral de l'article 17 est l'attribution du pouvoir de contrle sur les finances de l'organisation et la rpartition des quotes-parts des dpenses de celle-ci pour lui permettre d'accomplir les fonctions de l'organisation dans son ensemble en agissant par l'intermdiaire de ses organes principaux et des organes subsidiaires crs en vertu de l'article 22 OU de l'article 29. A part les articles 33 et 35, paragraphe 3, du Statut de la Cour qui n'ont aucun rapport avec la question discute ici, l'article 17 est le seul article de la Charte qui fasse mention de l'autorit budgtaire ou du pouvoir de rpartir les dpenses ou de percevoir des recettes par tous autres moyens. On a pourtant soutenu devant la Cour qu'un type de dpenses, notamment celles qui rsultent des oprations pour le maintien de la paix et de la scurit internationales, ne sont pas des dpenses de l'Organisation au sens de l'article 17, paragraphe 2, de la Charte, puisqu'elles relvent exclusivement du Conseil de Scurit et plus particulirement d'accords ngocis en vertu de l'article 43 de la Charte.

Cet argument s'appuie en partie sur l'ide que, dans les circonstances o il s'agit du maintien de la paix et de la scurit internationales, seul le Conseil de Scurit est autoris prendre une dcision prescrivant une action. On a soutenu aussi que, le pouvoir de l'Assemble gnrale se bornant discuter, examiner, tudier et recommander, celle-ci ne peut pas imposer l'obligation de couvrir des dpenses qui rsultent de la mise en oeuvre de ses propres argument leads to an examination of the respective functions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council under the Charter, particularly with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 24 of the Charter provides "In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Secunty Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and secunty ..." The responsibility conferred is "primary", not exclusive. This primary responsibility is conferred upon the Security Council, as stated in Article 24, "in order to ensure prompt and effective action". To this end, it is the Security Council which is given a power to impose an explicit obligation of compliance if for example it issues an order or command to an aggressor under Chapter VII. It is only the Security Council which can require enforcement by coercive action against an aggressor. The Charter makes it abundantly clear, however, that the General Assembly is also to be concerned with international peace and security. Article 14 authorizes the General Assembly to "recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the purposes and principles of the United Nations". The word "measures" implies some kind of action, and the only limitation which Article 14 imposes on the General Assembly is the restriction found in Article 12, namely, that the Assembly should not recommend measures while the Security Council is dealing with the same matter unless the Council requests it to do so. Thus while it is the Security Council which, exclusively, may order coercive action, the functions and powers conferred by the Charter on the General Assembly are not confined to discussion, consideration, the initiation of studies and the making of recommendations; they are not merely hortatory. Article 18 deals with "decisions" of the General Assembly "on important questions". These "decisions" do indeed include certain recommendations, but others have dispositive force and effect. Among these latter decisions, Article 18 includes suspension of rjghts and privileges of membership, expulsion.

of Members, "and budgetary questions". In connection with the suspension of rights and privileges of membership and expulsion from membership under Articles 5 and 6, it is the Security Council which has only the power to recommend and it is the General Assembly which decides and whose decision determines status; but there is a close collaboration between the two organs. Moreover, these powers of decision of the General Assembly under Arti16 recommandations. Cet argument conduit l'tude des fonctions respectives de l'Assemble gnrale et du Conseil de Scurit selon la Charte, en particulier en ce qui concerne le maintien de la paix et de la scurit internationales. L'article 24 de la Charte dispose: Afin d'assurer l'action rapide et efficace de l'organisation, ses Membres confrent au Conseil de Scurit la responsabilit principale du maintien de la paix et de la scurit internationales... La responsabilit ainsi confre est (( principale )) et non exclusive. Selon l'article 24, cette responsabilit principale est confre au Conseil de Scurit ((afin d'assurer l'action rapide et efficace de l'organisation. C'est donc au Conseil de Scurit qu'est dvolu le pouvoir d'imposer l'obligation explicite de se conformer aux ordres qu'il peut mettre au titre du chapitre VII, par exemple contre un agresseur. Seul le Conseil de Scurit peut prescrire des mesures d'excution par une action coercitive contre un agresseur. La Charte indique cependant trs clairement que l'Assemble gnrale doit aussi s'occuper de la paix et de la scurit internationales. L'article 14 autorise l'Assemble gnrale (( recommander les mesures propres assurer l'ajustement pacifique de toute situation, quelle qu'en soit l'origine, qui lui semble de nature nuire au bien gnral ou compromettre les relations amicales entre nations, y compris les situations rsultant d'une infraction aux dispositions de la prsente Charte o sont noncs les buts et les principes des Nations Unies . Le mot (t mesures )) suppose une forme quelconque d'action et la seule restriction que l'article 14 impose l'Assemble gnrale est celle qui figure l'article 12, c'est--dire que l'Assemble ne peut recommander de mesures tant que le Conseil de Scurit traite de la mme question, moins que le Conseil de Scurit ne le lui demande. Ainsi, tandis que c'est le Conseil de Scurit qui possde le droit exclusif d'ordonner une action coercitive, les fonctions et pouvoirs de l'Assemble gnrale selon la Charte ne sont pas limits la discussion, l'examen, l'tude et la recommandation; ses attributions ne sont pas simplement de caractre exhortatif. L'article 18 traite des (( dcisions de l'Assemble gnrale sur les questions importantes . Ces cc dcisions comprennent en effet certaines recommandations, mais d'autres ont une valeur et un effet de caractre impratif.

Parmi ces dernires dcisions l'article 18 comprend la suspension des droits et privilges de Membres, l'exclusion de Membres et les questions budgtaires . En ce qui concerne la suspension des droits et privilges de Membres et l'exclusion de Membres dans le cadre des articles 5 et 6, c'est le Conseil de Scurit dont le pouvoir se borne faire des recommandations et c'est l'Assemble gnrale qui dcide et dont la dcision fixe le statut des tats en 16 cles 5 and 6 are specifically related to preventive or enforcement measures. By Article 17, paragraph 1, the General Assembly is given the power not only to "consider" the budget of the Organization, but also to "approve" it. The decision to "approve" the budget has a close connection with paragraph 2 of Article 17, since thereunder the General Assembly is also given the power to apportion the expenses among the Members and the exercise of the power of apportionment creates the obligation, specifically stated in Article 17, paragraph 2, of each Member to bear that part of the expenses which is apportioned to it by the General Assembly. When those expenses include expenditures for the maintenance of peace and secunty, which are not otherwise provided for, it is the General Assembly which has the authonty to apportion the latter amounts among the Members. The provisions of the Charter which distribute functions and powers to the Secunty Council and to the General Assembly give no support to the view that such distribution excludes from the powers of the General Assembly the power to provide for the financing of measures designed to maintain peace and security . The argument supporting a limitation on the budgetary authority of the General Assembly with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security relies especially on the reference to "action" in the last sentence of Article II, paragraph 2. This paragraph reads as follows: "The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a State which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recomrnendations with regard to any such question to the State or States concerned or to the Security Council, or to both. Any such question on which action is necessary shali be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion." The Court considers that the kind of action referred to in Article II, paragraph 2, is coercive or enforcement action. This paragraph, which applies not merely to general questions relating to

peace and security, but also to specific cases brought before the General Assembly by a State under Article 35, in its first sentence empowers the General Assembly, by means of recommendations to States or to the Secunty Council, or to both, to organize peacekeeping operations, at the request, or with the consent, of the States concerned. This power of the General Assembly is a special power which in no way derogates from its general powers under Article IO 17 question, mais il y a une troite collaboration entre ces deux organes. De plus, ce pouvoir de dcision que les articles 5 et 6 attribuent l'Assemble gnrale se rattache expressment aux mesures prventives ou coercitives. Le paragraphe I de l'article 17 donne l'Assemble gnrale le pouvoir non seulement d'((examiner )) le budget de l'Organisation mais aussi de l'cc approuver )). La dcision d'c( approuver )) le budget est troitement lie au paragraphe 2 de l'article 17 car, en vertu de ce paragraphe, l'Assemble gnrale a galement le pouvoir de rpartir les dpenses entre les Membres et l'exercice du pouvoir de rpartition cre pour tous les Membres l'obligation expressment nonce l'article 17, paragraphe 2, de supporter la quote-part des dpenses qui leur incombe selon la rpartition fixe par l'Assemble gnrale. Lorsque ces dpenses comprennent des frais pour le maintien de la paix et de la scurit qui ne sont pas couverts par d'autres ressources, c'est l'Assemble gnrale qui a l'autorit pour rpartir ces frais entre les Membres. On ne trouve dans les dispositions de la Charte qui rpartissent les fonctions et pouvoirs entre le Conseil de Scurit et l'Assemble gnrale aucune justification de l'ide que cette rpartition exclut des pouvoirs de l'Assemble gnrale celui de prvoir le financement des mesures destines au maintien de la paix et de la scurit. L'argument qui soutient que le pouvoir budgtaire de 1'Assemble gnrale est limit en ce qui concerne le maintien de la paix et de la scurit internationales se fonde spcialement sur la rfrence faite une (( action )) dans la dernire phrase du paragraphe 2 de l'article II. Ce paragraphe s'exprime ainsi: (( L'Assemble gnrale peut discuter toutes questions se rattachant au maintien de la paix et de la scurit internationales, dont elle aura t saisie par l'une quelcoqque des Nations Unies, ou par le Conseil de Scurit, ou par un Etat qui n'est pas Membre de l'organisation, conformment aux dispositions de l'article 35, paragraphe 2, et, sous rserve de l'article 12, faire sur toutes questions de ce genre des recommandations soit l'Et$ ou aux tats intresss, soit au Conseil de Scurit, soit aux Etats et au Conseil de Scurit. Toute question de ce genre qui appelle une action est renvoye au Conseil de Scurit par l'Assemble gnrale, avant ou aprs discussion. ))

La Cour estime que la sorte d'action dont il est question l'article II, paragraphe 2, est une action coercitive. Ce paragraphe, qui ne concerne pas seulement les questions d'ordre gnral touchant la paix et la scurit, mais encore les cas particuliers soumis en vertu de l'article 35 l'Assemble par les tats, habilite, par sa premire phrase, l'Assemble gnrale organiser, par des recommandations adresses aux Membres, au Conseil de Scurit, ou aux deux, .et la demande ou avec le consentement des pays intresss, des oprations visant au maintien de la paix. Ce pouvoir, confr l'Assemble gnrale, est un pouvoir spcial qui ne or Article 14, except as limited by the last sentence of Article II, paragraph 2. This last sentence says that when "action" is necessary the General Assembly shall refer the question to the Secunty Council. The word "action" must mean such action as is solely within the province of the Secunty Council. It cannot refer to recommendations which the Secunty Council might make, as for instance under Article 38, because the General Assembly under Article II has a comparable power. The "action" which is solely within the province of the Secunty Council is that which is indicated by the title of Chapter VI1 of the Charter, namely "Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression". If the word "action" in Article II, paragraph 2, were interpreted to mean that the General Assembly could make recommendations only of a general character affecting peace and secunty in the abstract, and not in relation to specific cases, the paragraph would not have provided that the General Assembly may make recommendations on questions brought before it by States or by the Secunty Council. Accordingly, the last sentence of Article II, paragraph 2, has no application where the necessary action is not enforcement action. The practice of the Organization throughout its history bears out the foregoing elucidation of the term "action" in the last sentence of Article II, paragraph 2. Whether the General Assembly proceeds under Article II or under Article 14, the implementation of its recommendations for setting up commissions or other bodies involves organizational activity-action-in connection with the maintenance of international peace and security. Such implementation is a normal feature of the functioning of the United Nations. Such committees, commissions or other bodies or individuals, constitute, in some cases, subsidiary organs established under the authonty of Article 22 of the Charter. The functions of the General Assembly for which it may establish such subsidiary organs include, for example, investigation, observation and supervision, but the way in which such subsidiary organs are utilized depends on the consent of the State or States concerned. The Court accordingly finds that the argument which seeks, by

reference to Article II, paragraph 2, to limit the budgetary authority of the General Assembly in respect of the maintenance of international peace and security, is unfounded. It has further been argued before the Court that Article 43 of the Charter constitutes a particular rule, a lex specialis, which derogates 18 diminue aucunement ses pouvoirs gnraux selon l'article IO ou l'article 14, part la restriction indique dans la dernire phrase du paragraphe 2 de l'article II. Cette dernire phrase nonce que quand une cc action est ncessaire l'Assemble gnrale doit renvoyer la question au Conseil de Scurit. Le mot cc action )) doit signifier une action qui est uniquement de la comptence du Conseil de Scurit. Il ne peut pas avoir trait des recommandations que le Conseil de Scurit pourrait faire, comme, par exemple, aux termes de l'article 38, parce que l'Assemble gnrale possde le mme pouvoir en vertu de l'article II. L'cc action 1) qui est uniquement de la comptence du Conseil de Securit est celle dont il est fait mention dans le titre du chapitre VI1 de la Charte, savoir, ((Action en cas de menace contre la paix, de rupture de la paix et d'acte d'agression . Si l'on interprtait le mot cc action 1) au paragraphe 2 de l'article II comme voulant dire que l'Assemble gnrale ne peut faire que des recommandations de caractre gnral concernant, dans l'abstrait, la paix et la scurit, et non pas relatives des cas particuliers, ce paragraphe n'aurait pas prvu que l'Assemble gnrale puisse faire des recommandations sur des questions dont elle aurait t saisie par un Etat ou par le Conseil de Scurit. En consquence la dernire phrase du. paragraphe 2 de l'article II n'est pas applicable quand l'action en question n'est pas une action coercitive. La pratique de l'Organisation au cours de son histoire confirme les claircissements qui viennent d'tre donns sur le terme (( action )) qui figure la dernire phrase du paragraphe 2 de l'article II. Que l'Assemble gnrale procde en vertu de l'article II ou de l'article 14, l'excution de ses recommandations concernant la cration de commissions ou d'autres organismes entrane une activit de l'Organisation - une action - en relation avec le maintien de la paix et de la skcurit internationales. L'excution de ces recommandations reprsente un aspect normal du fonctionnement des Nations Unies. Ces comits. commissions ou autres organismes ou individus constituent, dans certains cas, des organes subsidiaires crs en vertu de l'article 22 de la Charte. Les fonctions de l'Assemble gnrale pour lesquelles elle peut crer des organes subsidiaires comprennent par exemple les enqutes, l'observation et le contrle, mais la faon dont ces organes subsidiaires sont utiliss dpend du consentement de l'tat ou des Etats intresss. Par consquent, la Cour estime que l'argument qui cherche, en

se rfrant au paragragk- 2 de l'article II, limiter l'autorit budgtaire de l'Assemble gt..'--le l'gard du maintien de la paix et de la scurit internationales, n'est pas'fond. On a galement soutenu devant la Cour que l'article 43 de la Charte constitue une rgle particulire, une lex specialis, qui droge from the general rule in Article 17, whenever an expenditure for the maintenance of international peace and security is involved. Article 43 provides that Members shall negotiate agreements with the Security Council on its initiative, stipulating what "armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security", the Member State will make available to the Security Council on its call. According to paragraph 2 of the Article: "Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided." The argument is that such agreements were intended to include specifications concerning the allocation of costs of such enforcement actions as might be taken by direction of the Secunty Council, and that it is only the Security Council which has the authority to arrange for meeting such costs. With reference to this argument, the Court will state at the outset that, for reasons fully expounded later in this Opinion, the operations known as UNEF and ONUC were not enforcement actions within the compass of Chapter VI1 of the Charter and that therefore Article 43 could not have any applicability to the cases with which the Court is here concerned. However, even if Article 43 were applicable, the Court could not accept this interpretation of its text for the following reasons. There is nothing in the text of Article 43 which would limit the discretion of the Security Council in negotiating such agreements. It cannot be assumed that in every such agreement the Security Council would insist, or that any Member State would be bound to agree, that such State would bear the entire cost of the "assistance" which it would make available including, for example, transport of forces to the point of operation, complete logistical maintenance in the field, supplies, arms and ammunition, etc. If, during negotiations under the terms of Article 43, a Member State would be entitled (as it would be) to insist, and the Security Council would be entitled (as it would be) to agree, that some part of the expense should be borne by the Organization, then such expense would form part of the expenses of the Organization and would fall to be apportioned by the General Assembly under Article 17. It is difficult to see how it could have been contemplated that all potential expenses could be envisaged in such agreements concluded perhaps long in advance. Indeed, the difficulty or impossibility of anticipating the

entire financial impact of enforcement measures on Member States is brought out by the terms of Article 50 which provides that a State, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, "which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those [preventive or enforcement] measures, shall have la rgle gnrale de l'article 17 chaque fois qu'il s'agit de dpenses pour le maintien de la paix et de la scurit internationales. L'article 43 prvoit que les Membres ngocieront des accords avec le Conseil de Scurit sur l'initiative de ce dernier, en stipulant quels seront cc les forces armes, l'assistance et les facilits, y compris le droit de passage, ncessajres au maintien de la paix et de la scurit internationales que 1'Etat Membre mettra la disposition du Conseilude Scurit sur l'invitation de ce dernier. Selon le paragraphe 2 de cet article: ((L'accord ou les accords susviss fixeront les effectifs et la nature de ces forces, leur degr de prparation et leur emplacement gnral, ainsi que la nature des facilits et de l'assistance fournir. a On en tire l'argument que ces accords avaient pour objet d'noncer des prcisions concernant la rpartition des frais des actions coercitives que le Conseil de Scurit pourrait prescrire et que seul le Conseil de Scurit a le pouvoir de prendre des mesures en vue de financer ces dpenses. En ce qui concerne cet argument, la Cour dclare ds maintenant que, pour des raisons qui seront pleinement exposes par la suite dans cet avis, les oprations de la FUNU et de I'ONUC ne sont pas des actions coercitives rentrant dans le cadre du chapitre VI1 de la Charte et que par consquent l'article 43 ne peut s'appliquer aux cas prsentement soumis la Cour. Toutefois, mme si l'article 43 s'appliquait, la Cour ne pourrait pas en accepter une telle interprtation pour les raisons suivantes. Rien dans le texte de l'article 43 ne restreint le pouvoir discrtionnaire du Conseil de Scurit pour ngocier de tels accords. On ne saurait prsumer que, dans tous ces accords, le Conseil de Scurit exigera qu'un tat Membre supporte la totalit des frais de 1' assistance qu'il fournira, y compris par exemple le transport des troupes sur le lieu de l'opration, leur entire subsistance logistique sur place, l'approvisionnement, les armes et les munitions, etc., ou que cet tat sera oblig d'y consentir. Si, au cours de ngociations effectues en vertu de l'article 43, un Etat Membre avait le droit (comme il l'aurait) d'exiger qu'une certaine partie des dpenses soit supporte par l'organisation, et si le Conseil de Scurit avait le droit (comme il l'aurait) d'y consentir, alors cette partie des dpenses entrerait dans les dpenses de l'organisation et devrait tre rpartie par l'Assemble gnrale selon l'article 17. Il est difficile de voir comment on aurait pu envisager que toutes les dpenses ventuelles puissent tre prvues dans des accords de

ce genre, conclus peut-tre longtemps l'avance. La difficult ou l'impossibilit de prvoir toutes les consquences financires pour les tats Membres des mesures coercitives est mme indique par les termes de l'article 50 qui prvoit qu'un Etat, qu'il soit Membre des Nations Unies ou non, s'il se trouve en prsence de difficults conomiques particulires dues l'excution desdites mesures 19 the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems". Presumably in such a case the Security Council might determine that the overburdened State was entitled to some financial assistance; such financial assistance, if afforded by the Organization, as it might be, would clearly constitute part of the "expenses of the Organization". The economic problems could not have been covered in advance by a negotiated agreement since they would be unknown until after the event and in the case of nonMember States, which are also included in Article 50, no agreement at al1 would have been negotiated under Article 43. Moreover, an argument which insists that al1 measures taken for the maintenance of international peace and secunty must be fnanced through agreements concluded under Article 43, would seem to exclude the possibility that the Secunty Council might act under some other Article of the Charter. The Court cannot accept so limited a view of the powers of the Security Council under the Charter. It cannot be said that the Charter has left the Secunty Council impotent in the face oi an emergency situation when agreements under Article 43 have not been concluded. Articles of Chapter VI1 of the Charter speak of "situations" as weil as disputes, and it must lie within the power of the Security Council to police a situation even though it does not resort to enforcement action against a State. The costs of actions which the Security Council is authorized to take constitute "expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2". The Court has considered the general problem of the interpretation of Article 17, paragraph 2, in the light of the general structure of the Charter and of the respective functions assigned by the Charter to the General Assembly and to the Security Council, with a view to determining the meaning of the phrase "the expenses of the Organization". The Court does not find it necessary to go further in giving a more detailed definition of such expenses. The Court will, therefore, proceed to examine the expenditures enumerated in the request for the advisory opinion. In determining whether the actuai expenditure authonzed constitute "expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article n7, paragraph 2, of the Charter", the Court agrees that such expenditures must be tested by their relationship to the purposes of the United Nations in the sense that if an expenditure were made for a purpose which is not

one of the purposes of the United Nations, it could not be considered an "expense of the Organization". The purposes of the United Nations are set forth in Article I of the Charter. The first two purposes as stated in paragraphs I 20 [prventives ou coercitives], a le droit de consulter le Conseil de Scurit au sujet de la solution de ces difficults 1). Il semble donc que dans un cas pareil, le Conseil de Scurit pourrait dcider que l'tat ayant faire face des dpenses trop lourdes aurait droit une assistance financire; cette assistance financire, si elle est supporte par l'organisation, comme ce pourrait tre le cas, constituerait clairement une partie des (( dpenses de l'organisation n. Les problmes conomiques n'auraient pas pu faire l'objet l'avance d'un accord ngoci puisqu'ils ne seront connus qu'aprs l'vnement et dans le cas d'tats non membres, qui sont galement viss l'article 50, aucun accord n'aurait pu tre ngoci en vertu de l'article 43. De plus, un argument insistant sur le fait que toutes les mesures prises pour le maintien de la paix et de la scurit internationales devraient tre finances par des accords conclus en vertu de l'article 43 semblerait ter au Conseil de Scurit la possibilit d'agir suivant un autre article de la Charte. La Cour ne peut pas accepter une vue aussi limite des pouvoirs que le Conseil de Scurit dtient de la Charte. On ne peut pas dire que la Charte ait laiss le Conseil de Scurit impuissant en face d'une situation d'urgence, en l'absence d'accords conclus en vertu de l'article 43. Les articles du chapitre VI1 parlent de (( situations aussi bien que de diffrends et il doit rentrer dans la comptence du Conseil de Scurit de prendre en main une s i t ~ t i o nm, me s'il ne recourt pas une action coercitive contre un Etat. Les frais des mesures que le Conseil de Scurit est autoris prendre constituent des dpenses de l'organisation au sens du paragraphe 2 de l'article 17 . La Cour a examin le problme gnral de l'interprtation de l'article 17, paragraphe 2, la lumire de la structure d'ensemble de la Charte et des fonctions respectives assignes par elle l'Assemble gnrale et au Conseil de Scurit en vue de dterminer le sens de la phrase les dpenses de l'organisation D. La Cour n'estime pas ncessaire d'aller plus loin dans la dfinition plus dtaille de ces dpenses. Elle passe donc l'examen des dpenses numres dans la requte pour avis consultatif. En dterminant si les dpenses effectivement autorises constituent cc des dpenses de l'organisation au sens du paragraphe 2 de l'article 17 de la Charte )), la Cour admet que ces dpenses doivent tre apprcies d'aprs leur rapport avec les buts des Nations Unies, en ce sens que si une dpense a t faite dans un but qui n'tait pas l'un des buts des Nations

Unies, elle ne saurait tre considre comme une u dpense de l'organisation . Les buts des .Nations Unies sont noncs l'article I de la Charte. Les deux premiers, tels qu'ils figurent aux paragraphes I et 2, and 2, may be summarily described as pointing to the goal of international peace and secunty and friendly relations. The third purpose is the achievement of economic, social, cultural and humanitarian goals and respect for human rights. The fourth and last purpose is: "To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends." The pnmary place ascribed to international peace and security is natural, since the fulfilment of the other purposes will be dependent upon the attainment of that basic condition. These purposes are broad indeed, but neither they nor the powers conferred to effectuate them are unlimited. Save as they have entrusted the Organization with the attainment of these common ends, the Member States retain their freedom of action. But when the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organization. If it is agreed that the action in question is within the scope of the functions of the Organization but it is alleged that it has been initiated or carried out in a manner not in conformity with the division of functions among the several organs which the Charter prescribes, one moves to the internal plane, to the internal structure of the Organization. If the action was taken by the wrong organ, it was irregular as a matter of that internal structure, but this would not necessarily mean that the expense incurred was not an expense of the Organization. Both national and international law contemplate cases in which the body corporate or politic may be bound, as to third parties, by an ultra vires act of an agent. In the legal systems of States, there is often some procedure for deterrnining the validity of even a legislative or governmental act, but no analogous procedure is to be found in the structure of the United Nations. Proposals made during the drafting of the Charter to place the ultimate authority to interpret the Charter in the International Court of Justice were not accepted; the opinion which the Court is in course of rendering is an advisory opinion. As anticipated in 1945, therefore, each organ must, in the first place at least, determine its own jurisdiction. If the Security Council, for example, adopts a resolution purportedly for the maintenance of international peace and security and if, in accordance with a mandate or authorization in such resolution, the Secretary-General incurs financial obligations, these amounts must be presumed to constitute "expenses of the Organization". The Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations,

adopted by the General Assembly, provide: "Regulation 4.1: The appropriations voted by the General Assembly shall constitute an authorization to the Secretary2 1 peuvent tre dcrits sommairement comme tant d'tablir la paix et la scurit internationales et de dvelopper des relations amicales entre les nations. Le troisime est de rsoudre les ~roblmesin ternationaux d'ordre conomique, social, intellectuel ou humanitaire et de dvelopper le respect des droits de l'homme. Le quatrime et dernier est d' tre un centre o s'harmonisent les efforts des nations vers ces fins communes . Il est naturel d'accorder le premier rang la paix et la scurit internationales, car les autres buts ne peuvent tre atteints que si cette condition fondamentale est acquise. Certes, ces buts sont trs vastes, mais ils ne sont pas illimits, non plus que les pouvoirs confrs pour les atteindre. Sauf dans la mesure o ils ont confi l'Organisation la mission d'atteindre ces buts communs, les tats Membres conservent leur libert d'action. Mais, lorsque l'organisation prend des mesures dont on peut dire juste titre qu'elles sont appropries l'accomplissement des buts dclars des Nations Unies, il est prsumer que cette action ne dpasse pas les pouvoirs de l'organisation. S'il est admis que l'action en question relve des fonctions de l'organisation, mais qu'on allgue qu'elle a t entreprise ou mene d'une manire non conforme la rpartition des fonctions entre les divers organes, telle que la Charte l'a prescrite, on aborde le plan interne, l'conomie interne de l'organisation. Si l'action a t entreprise par un organe qui n'y tait pas habilit, il s'agit d'une irrgularit concernant cette conomie interne, mais il n'en ressort pas ncessairement que la dpense encourue n'tait pas une dpense de l'organisation. Le droit national comme le droit international envisagent des cas o une personne morale, ou un corps politique, peut tre li envers les tiers par l'acte ztltra vires d'un agent. Dans les systmes juridiques des Etats, on trouve souvent Urie procdure pour dterminer la validit d'un acte mme lgislatif ou gouvernemental, mais on ne rencontre dans la structure des Nations Unies aucune procdure analogue. Certaines propositions prsentes pendant la rdaction de la Charte et qui visaient remettre la Cour internationale de Justice l'autorit suprme d'interprter la Charte, n'ont pas t adoptes; l'avis que la Cour s'apprte donner ici est un avis consultatif. Comme il a t prvu en 1945, chaque organe doit donc, tout au moins en premier lieu, dterminer sa propre comptence. Si le Conseil de Scurit par exemple adopte une rsolution visant au maintien de la paix et de la scurit internationales et si, conformment un mandat ou une autorisation inscrite dans cette rsolution, le Secrtaire gnral contracte des

obligations financires, il est prsumer que les montants en question constituent des dpenses de l'organisation 1). Le rglement financier des Nations Unies adopt par l'Assemble gnrale dispose : ((Article 4.1. - Par le vote des crdits, l'Assemble gnrale autorise le Secrtaire gnral, dans la limite des crdits ouverts, 2 1 General to incur obligations and make payments for the purposes for which the appropriations were voted and up to the amounts so voted." Thus, for example, when-the General Assembly in resolution 1619 (XV)in cluded a paragraph reading : "3. Decides to appropriate an amount of $100 million for the operations of the United Nations in the Congo from I January to 31 October 1961", this constituted an authorization to the Secretary-General to incur certain obligations of the United Nations just as clearly as when in resolution 1590 (XV) the General Assembly used this language: "3. Authorizes the Secretary-General ... to incur commitments in 1961 for the United Nations operations in the Congo up to the total of $24 million.. ." On the previous occasion when the Court was called upon to consider Article 17 of the Charter, the Court found that an av~ardo f the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations created an obligation of the Organization and with relation thereto the Court said t hat : "the function of approving the budget does not mean that the General Assembly has an absolute power to approve or disapprove the expenditure proposed to it; for some part of that expenditure arises out of obligations already incurred by the Organization, and to this extent the General Assembly has no alternative but to honour these engagements". (Eflects of awards of comfiensation made by the United Nations Administrative Tribufial, I.C. J. Reports 1954, P 59.) Similarly, obligations of the Organization rnay be incurred by the Secretary-General, acting on the authority of the Security Council or of the General Assembly, and the General Assembly "has no alternative but to honour these engagements". The obligation is one thing: the way in which the obligation is met-that is from what source the funds are secured-is another. The General Assembly rnay follow any one of several alternatives: it rnay apportion the cost of the item according to the ordinary scale of assessment; it rnay apportion the cost according to some special scale of assessment; it rnay utilize funds which are voluntarily contributed to the Organization; or it rnay find some other method or combination of methods for providing the necessary

funds. In this context, it is of no legal significance whether, as a matter of book-keeping or accounting, the General Assembly chooses to have the item in question included under one of the standard' established sections of the "regular" budget or whether it is separately listed in some special account or fund. The significant fact is that the item is an expense of the Organization and under engager des dpenses et effectuer des paiements aux fins pour lesquelles ces crdits ont t ouverts. Ainsi, par exemple, quand l'Assemble gnrale, dans la rsolution 1619 (XV), a insr le paragraphe suivant: 3. Dcide d'ouvrir un crdit de IOO millions de douars pour les oprations des Nations Unies au Congo pendant la priode allant du rer janvier au 31 octobre 1961 , elle a, ce faisant, autoris le Secrtaire gnral contracter certaines obligations pour le compte des Nations Unies tout aussi clairement que quand, dans la rsolution 1590 (XV), elle a dit : (( 3. Autorise le Secrtaire gnral ... engager des dpenses en 1961 au titre des oprations des Nations Unies au Congo a concurrence d'un total de 24 millions de dollars ... Lorsque la Cour a t, une fois dans le pass, appele examiner l'article 17 de la Charte, elle a, dit qu'un jugement du tribunal administratif des Nations Unies crait une obligation pour l'Organisation et a dclar ce sujet: la fonction d'approuver le budget ne signifie pas que l'Assemble gnrale ait un pouvoir absolu d'approuver ou de ne pas approuver les dpenses qui lui sont proposes; car certains lments de ces dpenses rsultent d'obligations dj encourues par l'organisation et, dans cette mesure, l'Assemble gnrale n'a pas d'autre alternative que de faire honneur ces engagements . (Egetde jugements du tribunal administratif des Nations Unies accordant indemnit, C. I. J. Recueil I954, p. 59.) De mme, certaines obligations de l'Organisation peuvent tre contractes par le Secrtaire gnral agissant sous l'autorit du Conseil de Scurit ou de l'Assemble gnrale et l'Assemble gnrale ((n'a pas d'autre alternative que de faire honneur ces engagements n. L'obligation est une' chose: la faon dont cette obligation est remplie - c'est--dire la source d'o proviennent les fonds - en est une autre. L'Assemble gnrale peut choisir entre diffrentes solutions : elle peut rpartir les dpenses encourues suivant le barme normal de rpartition; elle peut rpartir ce cot d'aprs un barme spcial de rpartition; elle peut utiliser des fonds fournis titre volontaire l'organisation; ou encore elle peut trouver une autre mthode ou combinaison de mthodes pour runir les fonds ncessaires. Dans ce contexte, peu importe juridiquement si, pour des raisons de tenue de livres ou de comptabilit, l'Assemble gnrale

choisit d'inclure les dpenses en question dans l'une des sections normales et tablies du budget ((ordinaire ou si elle prfre l'imputer sparment un compte ou un fonds spcial. Ce qui importe, c'est qu'il s'agit d'une dpense de l'organisation et qu'aux 22 Article 17, paragraph 2, the General Assembly therefore has authority to apportion it. The reasoning which has just been developed, applied to the resolutions mentioned in the request for the advisory opinion, might suffice as a basis for the opinion of the Court. The Court finds it appropriate, however, to take into consideration other arguments which have been advanced. The expenditures enumerated in the request for an advisory opinion may conveniently be examined first with reference to UNEF and then to ONUC. In each case, attention will be paid first to the operations and then to the financing of the operations. In considering the operations in the Middle East, the Court must analyze the functions of UNEF as set forth in resolutions of the General Assembly. Resolution 998 (ES-1) of 4 November 1956 requested the Secretary-General to submit a plan "for the setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international United Nations Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with al1 the terms of" the General Assembly's previous resolution 997 (ES-1) of 2 November 1956. The verb "secure" as applied to such matters as halting the movement of military forces and arms into the area and the conclusion of a cease-fire, might suggest measures of enforcement, were it not that the Force was to be set up "with the consent of the nations concerned". In his first report on the plan for an emergency international Force the Secretary-General used the language of resolution 998 (ES-1) in submitting his proposals. The same terms are used in General Assembly reso!ution 1000 (ES-1) of 5 November in which operative paragraph I reads : "Establishes a United Nations Command for an emergency international Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with al1 the terms of General Assembly resolution 997 (ES-1) of 2 November 1956." This resolution was adopted without a dissenting vote. In his second and final report on the plan for an emergency international Force of 6 November, te Secretary-General, in paragraphs g and IO, stated: "While the General Assembly is enabled to establish the Force with the consent of those parties which contribute units to the Force, it could not request the Force to be stationed or operate on the territory of a given country without the consent of the Governtermes

du paragraphe z de l'article 17 l'Assemble gnrale a donc autorit pour la rpartir. Le raisonnement qui vient d'tre dvelopp, appliqu aux rsolutions mentionnes dans la requte pour avis consultatif, suffirait fonder l'avis de la Cour. Elle estime nanmoins qu'il convient de prendre en considration d'autres arguments qui ont t avancs. Pour faciliter l'examen des dpenses numres dans la requte pour avis consultatif, la Cour considrera d'abord celles qui concernent la FUNU et ensuite celles qui concernent I'ONUC. Dans chaque cas, on s'occupera d'abord des oprations et ensuite du financement de ces oprations. En examinant les oprations au Moyen-Orient, la Cour doit analyser les fonctions de la FUNU, telles qu'elles sont dfinies dans les rsolutions de l'Assemble gnrale. La rsolution 998 (ES-1) du 4 novembre 1956 demandait au Secrtaire gnral de soumettre un plan (( en vue de constituer, avec l'assentiment des nations intresses, une Force internationale d'urgence des Nations Unies charge d'assurer et de surveiller la cessation des hostilits conformment toutes les dispositions de 1) la prcdente rsolution de l'Assemble gnrale 997 (ES-1) du 2 novembre 1956. Le verbe ct assurer )) s'appliquant des questions telles que l'arrt de l'entre de forces militaires et d'armes dans la rgion et la conclusion d'un accord de cessez-le-feu pourrait laisser penser qu'il s'agit de mesures coercitives, si la Force ne devait pas tre cre (( avec l'assentiment des nations intresses 1). Dans son premier rapport concernant le plan pour une Force internationale d'urgence, le Secrtaire gnral a soumis ses propositions dans les termes de la rsolution 998 (ES-1). Les mmes termes sont employs dans la rsolution de l'Assemble gnrale 1000 (ES-1) du 5 novembre dont le dispositif, au paragraphe 1, nonce : Cre un Commandement des Nations Unies pour une Force internationale d'urgence charge d'assurer et de surveiller la cessation des hostilits conformment toutes les dispositions de la rsolution 997 (ES-1) de l'Assemble gnrale, en date du 2 novembre 1956. s Cette rsolution a t adopte sans vote contraire. Dans son deuxime et dernier rapport du 6 novembre concernant le plan pour une Force internationale d'urgence, le Secrtaire gnral a dit, aux paragraphes 9 et IO : Bien que l'Assemble gnrale soit habilite constituer la Force avec l'assentiment des parties qui fourniraient des units, elie ne pourrait pas demander que la Force soit stationne ou qu'elle opre sur le territoire d'un pays donn sans l'assentiment du goument of that country. This does not exclude the possibility that the

Security Council could use such a Force within the wider margins provided under Chapter VI1 of the United Nations Charter. 1 would not for the present consider it necessary to elaborate this point further, since no use of the Force under Chapter VII, with the rights in relation to Member States that this would entail, has been envisaged. IO. The point just made permits the conclusion that the setting up of the Force should not be guided by the needs which would have existed had the measure been considered as part of an enforcement action directed against a Member country. There is an obvious difference between establishing the Force in order to secure the cessation of hostilities, with a withdrawal of forces, and establishing such a Force with a view to enforcing a withdrawal of forces." Paragraph 12 of the Report is particularly important because in resolution 1001 (ES-1) the General Assembly, again without a dissenting vote, "Concurs in the definition of the functions of the Force as stated in paragraph 12 of the Secretary-General's report". Paragraph 12 reads in part as follows: "the functions of the United Nations Force would be, when a ceasefire is being established, to enter Egyptian territory with the consent of the Egyptian Government, in order to help maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops, and to secure compliance with the other terms established in the resolution of 2 November 1956. The Force obviously should have no rights other than those necessary for the execution of its functions, in CO-operation with local authorities. It would be more than an observers' corps, but in no way a military force temporarily controlling the territory in which it is stationed; nor, moreover, should the Force have military functions exceeding those necessary to secure peaceful conditions on the assumption that the parties to the conflict take al1 necessary steps for compliance with the recommendations of the General Assembly." It is not possible to find in this description of the functions of UNEF, as outlined by the Secretary-General and concurred in by the General Assembly without a dissenting vote, any evidence that the Force was to be used for purposes of enforcement. Nor can such evidence be found in the subsequent operations of the Force, operations which did not exceed the scope of the functions ascribed to it. It could not therefore have been patent on the face of the resolution that the establishment of UNEF was in effect "enforcement action" under Chapter VI1 which, in accordance with the Charter, could be authqrized only by the Security Council. On the other hand, it is apparent that the operations were undertaken to fulfil a prime purpose of the United Nations, that is, to

vernement de ce pays. Cela n'exclut pas la possibilit que le Conseil de Scurit puisse utiliser cette force dans les limites plus tendues prvues au chapitre VI1 de la Charte des Nations Unies. Je ne crois pas ncessaire pour le moment de dvelopper davantage cette ide puisqu'on n'a pas envisag d'utiliser cette force en vertu du chapitre VII, avec les droits l'gard des Etats Membres que cela entranerait. IO. Cette dernire observation permet de conclure que la constitution de la Force ne devrait pas tre dtermine pas les besoins qui auraient exist si la mesure avait t considre comme faisant partie d'une action coercitive dirige contre un tat Membre. Il y a une diffrence manifeste entre la cration de la Force en vue d'assurer la cessation des hostilits, accompagne d'un retrait des forces armes, et la cration de cette force en vue d'imposer un retrait des forces armes. Le paragraphe 12 du rapport est particulirement important du fait que, dans la rsolution 1001 (ES-1), l'Assemble gnrale, une fois de plus sans vote contraire, a ccSouscrit la dfinition des fonctions de la Force nonce au paragraphe 12 du rapport du Secrtaire gnral D. Le paragraphe 12 est, en partie, rdig comme suit : les fonctions de la Force des Nations Unies seraient, lorsqu'il y aura un cessez-le-feu, d'entrer en territoire gyptien avec le consentement du Gouvernement gyptien afin d'aider maintenir le calme pendant et aprs le retrait des troupes non gyptiennes et d'assurer le respect des autres dispositions de la rsolution du 2 novembre 1956. La Force ne devrait manifestement pas avoir d'autres droits que ceux qui seraient ncessaires l'excution de ses fonctions en coopration avec Ies autorits locales. Ce serait plus qu'un corps d'observateurs, mais ce ne serait en aucune faon une force militaire contrlant temporairement le territoire o elle est stationne; encore moins devrait-elle avoir des fonctions militaires excdant celles aui seraient ncessaires Dour assurer des conditions pacifiques auA cas o les parties au c8nflit prendraient toutes les mesures ncessaires Dour donner suite aux recommandations de I'Assemble gnrale: n Dans cet expos des fonctions de la FUNU prsent par le Secrtaire gnral et approuv par l'Assemble gnrale sans vote contraire, on ne trouve aucune preuve que la Force ait t utilise aux fins de coercition. Aucune preuve du mme ordre ne ressort non plus des oprations ultrieures de la Force, oprations qui n'ont pas dpass la porte des fonctions attribues celle-ci. Il n'apparaissait donc pas premire vue que la cration de la FUKU constitut en fait une (( action coercitive )) selon le chapitre l'II qui, conformment la Charte, ne pouvait tre autorise que par le Conseil de Scurit.

D'autre part, il apparat que les oprations taient entreprises pour atteindre l'un des buts principaux des Nations Unies, c'est-24 promote and to maintain a peaceful settlement of the situation. This being true, the Secretary-General properly exercised the authority given him to incur financial obligations of the Organization and expenses resulting form such obligations must be considered "expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2". Apropos what has already been said about the meaning of the word "action" in Article II of the Charter, attention may be called to the fact that resolution 997 (ES-1), which is chronologically the first of the resolutions concerning the operations in the Middle East mentioned in the request for the advisory opinion, provides in paragraph 5 : "Requests the Secretary-General to observe and report promptly on the compliance with the present resolution to the Security Council and to the General Assembly, for such further action as they may deem appropriate in accordance with the Chavter." The italicized words reveal an understanding that either of the two organs might take "action" in the premises. Actually, as one knows, the "action" was taken by the General Assembly in adopting two days later without a dissenting vote, resolution 998 (ES-1) and, also without a dissenting vote, within another three days, resolutions 1000 (ES-1) and 1001 (ES-1), al1 providing for UNEF. The Court notes that these "actions" may be considered "measures" recommended under Article 14, rather than "action" recommended under Article II. The powers of the General Assembly stated in Article 14 are not made subject to the provisions of Article II, but only of Article 12. Furthermore, as the Court has already noted, the word "measures" implies some kind of action. So far as concerns the nature of the situations in the Middle East in 1956, they could be described as "likely to impair ... friendly relations among nations", just as well as they could be considered to involve "the maintenance of international peace and security". Since the resolutions of the General Assembly in question do not mention upon which article they are based, and since the language used in most of them might imply reference to either Article 14 or Article II, it cannot be excluded that they were based upon the former rather than the latter article. The financing of UNEF presented perplexing problems and the debates on these problems have even led to the view that the General Assembly never, either directly or indirectly, regarded the 25 dire favoriser et assurer le rglement pacifique de la situation. Cela tant, le Secrtaire gnral a dment exerc l'autorit dont il est

investi pour contracter certaines obligations financires de l'organisation et les dpenses rsultant de ces obligations doivent tre considres comme des dpenses de l'organisation au sens du paragraphe 2 de l'article 17. Au sujet de ce qui a t dj dit sur le sens du mot (( action dans l'article II de la Charte, il convient de ne pas ngliger le fait que la rsolution 997 (ES-1), la premire, chronologiquement, des rsolutions concernant les oprations dans le Moyen-Orient mentionnes dans la requte pour avis consultatif, nonce dans son paragraphe 5 qu'elle : ((Charge le Secrtaire gnral de surveiller l'application de la prsente rsolution et d'en rendre compte sans dlai au Conseil de Scurit et l'Assemble gnrale, en vue des mesures ultrieures que ces organes pourraient juger opportun de prendre conformment la Charte. )) Les mots en italiques montrent qu'il est entendu que, dans ces circonstances, l'un ou l'autre des deux organes peut dcider d'une (( action 1). En fait, on le sait, 1'(( action a t dcide par l'Assemble gnrale lorsqu'elle a adopt, deux jours plus tard, sans vote contraire, la rsolution 998 (ES-1) et, toujours sans vote contraire, dans les trois jours suivants, les rsolutions 1000 (ES-1) et 1001 (ES-1) concernant toutes la FUNU. La Cour note que ces actions peuvent tre considres comme des mesures recommandes en application de l'article 14, plutt que comme une (( action recommande en vertu de l'article II. Les pouvoirs de l'Assemble gnrale noncs dans l'article 14 ne sont pas limits par les dispositions de l'article II mais seulement par celles de l'article 12. De plus, ainsi que la Cour l'a dj constat, le mot mesures implique quelque forme d'action. Quant aux situations qui se sont manifestes au Moyen-Orient en 1956, on peut tout aussi bien les dcrire comme tant de nature (( compromettre les relations amicales entre nations , que comme des situations concernant cc le maintien de la paix et de la scurit internationales . Puisque les rsolutions en question de l'Assemble gnrale ne mentionnent pas l'article sur lequel elles se fondent et puisque les termes figurant dans la plupart d'entre elles peuvent aussi bien impliquer une rfrence l'article 14 qu' l'article II, on ne peut exclure qu'elles se fondent s u le premier plutt que sur le second de ces articles. Le financement de la FUNU soulevait des problmes dlicats et dans les dbats sur ce point il a mme t dit que l'Assemble gnrale n'a jamais, que ce soit directement ou indirectement, considr les 25 173 CERTAIN EXPENSES OF U.N. (OPINION OF 20 VI1 62) expenses of UNEF as "expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter". With this

interpretation the Court cannot agree. In paragraph 15 of his second and final report on the plan for an emergency international Force of 6 November 1956, the Secretary-General said that this problem required further study. Provisionally, certain costs might be absorbed by a nation providing a unit, "while al1 other costs should be financed outside the normal budget of the United Nations". Since it was "obviously impossible to make any estimate of the costs without a knowledge of the size of the corps and the length of its assignment", the "only practical course ... would be for the General Assembly to vote a general authonzation for the cost of the Force on the basis of general principles such as those here suggested". Paragraph 5 of resolution 1001 (ES-1) of 7 November 1956 states that the General Assembly "Approves Provisionally the basic rule concerning the financing of the Force laid down in paragraph 15 of the Secretary-General's report". In an oral statement to the plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 26 November 1956, the Secretary-General said: " ... 1 wish to make it equaliy clear that whiie funds received and payments made with respect to the Force are to be considered as coming outside the regular budget of the Organization, the operation is essentially a United Nations responsibility, and the Special Account to be established must, therefore, be construed as coming lvithin the meaning of Article 17 of the Charter". At this same meeting, after hearing this statement, the General Assembly in resolution 1122 (XI) noted that it had "provisio.ltally approved the recommendations made by the Secretary-General concerning the financing of the Force". It then authorized the Secretary-General "to establish a United Nations Emergency Force Special Account to which funds received by the United Nations, outside the regular budget, for the purpose of meeting the expenses of the Force shall be credited and from which payrnents for this purpose shall be made". The resolution then provided that the initial amount in the Special Account should be $IO million and authonzed the Secretary-General "pending the receipt of funds for the Special Account, to advance from the Working Capital Fund such sums as the Special Account may require to meet any expenses chargeable to it". The establishment of a Special Account does not necessanly mean that the funds in it are not to be derived from contributions of Members as apportioned by the General Assembly. dpenses de la FUNU comme des dpenses de l'organisation au sens du paragraphe 2 de l'article 17 de la Charte . La Cour ne saurait adopter cette manire de voir. Au paragraphe 15 de son deuxime et dernier rapport du 6 novembre 1956 concernant le plan pour une force internationale d'urgence, le Secrtaire gnral dclarait que ce problme tait tudier plus fond. A titre provisoire,

certaines dpenses pourraient tre assumes par toute nation fournissant une unit, tandis que toutes les autres dpenses seront couvertes sur des ressources autres que celles du budget ordinaire de l'organisation des Nations Unies . Comme il tait ((manifestement impossible de faire une estimation des dpenses prvoir avant de connatre l'importance numrique du corps et la dure de la mission qu'il aura remplir , la seule solution pratique serait . . . que l'Assemble gnrale vote une autorisation gnrale permettant de couvrir les dpenses de la Force selon des principes gnraux comme ceux qui sont suggrs ci-dessus . Le paragraphe 5 de la rsolution 1001 (ES-1) du 7 novembre 1956 dclarait que l'Assemble gnrale Approuve, titre provisoire, la rgle fondamentale concernant le financement de la Force, telle qu'elle est nonce au paragraphe 15 du rapport du Secrtaire gnral 1). Dans son expos oral en sance plnire de l'Assemble gnrale, le 26 novembre 1956, le Secrtaire gnral dclarait: (( ... je dsire prciser galement que, si les fonds reus et les paiements effectus au titre de la Force doivent tre considrs comme n'tant pas ports au budget ordinaire de l'organisation, le fonctionnement de la Force relve essentiellement de la responsabilit des Nations Unies, et le compte spcial qui sera cr doit, en consquence, tre considr comme tant rgi par les dispositions de l'article 17 de la Charte . A la mme sance, aprs avoir entendu cette dclaration, l'Assemble gnrale, par sa rsolution 1122 (XI), a not qu'elle avait (( provisoirement approuv les recommandations faites par le Secrtaire gnral au sujet du financement de la Force . Elle a ensuite autoris le Secrtaire gnral (( crer un Compte spcial pour la Force d'urgence des Nations Unies, qui sera crdit des fonds reus par l'Organisation des Nations Unies, hors du budget ordinaire, pour rgler les dpenses de la Force et dbit des paiements faits cette fin . Cette rsolution prvoyait ensuite que le montant initial du Compte spcial serait de IO miilions de dollars et autorisait le Secrtaire gnral, (( en attendant le versement de fonds au Compte spcial, virer titre d'avance, du Fonds de roulement au Compte spcial, les sommes qui pourront tre ncessaires pour rgler les dpenses imputables sur ce Compte 1). La cration d'un Compte spcial ne signifie pas ncessairement que les fonds qui y sont inscrits ne puissent provenir des contributions des Membres, selon la rpartition fixe par l'Assemble gnrale. 26 174 CERTAIN EXPENSES OF U.N. (OPINION OF 20 VI1 62) The next of the resolutions of the General Assembly to be considered is 1089 (XI) of 21 December 1956, which reflects the uncertainties and the conflicting views about financing UNEF. The

divergencies are duly noted and there is ample reservation concerning possible future action, but operative paragraph I follows the recommendation of the Secretary-General "that the expenses relating to the Force should be apportioned in the same manner as the expenses of the Organization". The language of this paragraph is clearly drawn from Article 17: "1. Decides that the expenses of the United Nations Emergency Force, other than for such pay, equipment, supplies and services as may be furnished without charge by Governments of Member States, shall be borne by the United Nations and shall be apportioned among the Member States, to the extent of $IO million, in accordance with the scale of assessments adopted by the General Assembly for contributions to the annual budget of the Organization for the financial year 1957;" This resolution, which was adopted by the requisite two-thirds majority, must have rested upon the conclusion that the expenses of UNEF were "expenses of the Organization" since otherwise the General Assembly would have had no authority to decide that they "shall be borne by the United Nations" or to apportion them among the Members. It is further significant that paragraph 3 of this resolution, which established a study committee, charges this committee with the task of examining "the question of the apportionment of the expenses of the Force in excess of $IO million ... and the principle or the formulation of scales of contributions dieerent from the scale of contributions by Member States to the ordinary budget for 1957". The italicized words show that it was not contemplated that the Committee would consider any method of meeting these expenses except through some form of apportionment although it was understood that a different scale might be suggested. The report of this study committee again records differences of opinion but the draft resolution which it recommended authorized further expenditures and authorized the Secretary-General to advance funds from the Working Capital Fund and to borrow from other funds if necessary; it was adopted as resolution 1090 (XI) by the requisite two-thirds majority on 27 February 1957. In paragraph 4 of that resolution, the General Assembly decided that it would at its twelfth session "consider the basis for financing any costs of the Force in excess of $IO million not covered by voluntary contributions". Resolution 1x51 (XII) of 22 November 1957, while contemplating the receipt of more voluntary contributions, decided in paragraph 4 that the expenses authorized "hall be borne by the Members of the United Nations in accordance with the scales of assessments CERTAINES DPELYSES DES N. U. (AVIS DU 20 VII 62) 174 La rsolution de l'Assemble gnrale qu'il convient d'examiner ensuite est la rsolution 1089 (XI) du 21 dcembre 1956, qui reflte

certaines incertitudes et certaines opinions contradictoires touchant le financement de la FUNU. Ces divergences sont dment indiques et toutes rserves sont faites concernant une ventuelle action future, mais le paragraphe I du dispositif se conforme la recommandation du Secrtaire gnral demandant que les dpenses relatives la Force soient rparties de la mme manire que les dpenses de l'organisation n. Les termes de ce paragraphe sont tirs de toute vidence de l'article 17: I . Dcide que, sauf en ce qui concerne la rmunration, le matriel, les approvisionnements et les services que des Etats Membres prendront leur charge ou fourniront gratuitement, les dpenses de la Force d'urgence des Nations Unies seront supgortes par l'organisation des Nations Unies et rparties entre les Etats Membres, concurrence de IO millions de dollars, conformment au barme des contributions que l'Assemble gnrale a adopt en ce qui concerne le budget annuel de l'Organisation pour l'exercice 1957. " Cette rsolution, adopte par la majorit requise des deux tiers, se fondait sans aucun doute sur la conclusion que les dpenses de la FUNU taient des cc dpenses de l'organisation , faute de quoi l'Assemble gnrale n'aurait pas eu autorit pour dcider qu'elles seraient cc supportes par l'organisation des Nations Unies ni pour les rpartir entre les hlembres. Il est significatif, d'ailleurs, que le paragraphe 3 de cette rsolution, crant un comit d'tude, charge ce comit cc d'examiner la question de la rpartition des dpenses de la Force en sus de IO millions de dollars ... et le principe ou la dtermination de barmes de contributions difirents du barme des contribzttions des Etats Membres au budget ordinaire de 1957 n. Les mots souligns montrent qu'il n'tait pas prvu que le comit pourrait envisager pour couvrir ces dpenses d'autre mthode que la rpartition, sous une forme ou sous une autre, tout en admettant qu'un barme diffrent pourrait tre propos. Le rapport de ce comit d'tude fait tat, lui aussi, de certaines divergences d'opinions, mais le projet de rsolution qu'il recommandait autorisait de nouvelles dpenses et habilitait le Secrtaire gnral prlever certaines sommes sur le Fonds de roulement et, au besoin, en emprunter sur d'autres fonds; c'est la rsolution 1090 (XI), adopte le 27 fvrier 1957 par la majorit requise des deux tiers. Au paragraphe 4 de cette rsolution l'Assemble gnrale dcidait qu'elle tudierait sa douzime session (c un systme visant couvrir les dpenses de la Force, en sus de IO millions de dollars, qui ne seraient pas couvertes par des contributions volontaires . La rsolution 1151 (XII) du 22 novembre 1957, tout en envisageant de nouvelles contributions volontaires, dcidait en son paragraphe 4 que les dpenses autorises seraient supportes par les tats Membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies conformment

27 175 CERTAIN EXPENSES OF U.N. (OPINION OF 20 VI1 62) adopted by the General Assembly for the financial years 1957 and 1958 respectively". Almost a year later, on 14 November 1958, in resolution 1263 (XIII) the General Assembly, while "Noting with satisfaction the effective way in which the Force continues to carry out its function", requested the Fifth Committee "to recommend such action as may be necessary to finance this continuing operation of the United Nations Emergency Force". After further study, the provision contained in paragraph 4 of the resolution of 22 November 1957 was adopted in paragraph 4 of resolution 1337 (XIII) of 13 December 1958. Paragraph 5 of that resolution requested "the Secretary-General to consult with the Governments of Member States with respect to their views concerning the manner of financing the Force in the future, and to submit a report together with the replies to the General Assembly at its fourteenth session". Thereafter a new plan was worked out for the utilization of any voluntary contributions, but resolution 1441 (XIV) of 5 December 1959, in paragraph 2 : "Decides to assess the amount of $20 million against al1 Members of the United Nations on the basis of the regular scale of assessments" subject to the use of credits drawn from voluntary contributions. Resolution 1575 (XV) of 20 December 1960 is practically identical. The Court concludes that, from year to year, the expenses of UNEF have been treated by the General Assembly as expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter. The operations in the Congo were initially authorized by the Security Council in the resolution of 14 July 1960 which was adopted without a dissenting vote. The resolution, in the light of the appeal from the Government of the Congo, the report of the SecretaryGeneral and the debate in the Security Council, was clearly adopted with a view to maintaining international peace and security. However, it is argued that that resolution has been implemented, in , violation of provisions of the Charter inasmuch as under the Charter it is the Security Council that determines which States are to participate in carrying out decisions involving the maintenance of international peace and security, whereas in the case of the Congo the Secretary-General himself determined which States were to participate with their armed forces or othenvise. By paragraph 2 of the resolution of 14 July 1960 the Security Council "Decides to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary". Paragraph 3 requested the

28 aux barmes des quotes-parts adopts par l'Assemble gnrale pour les exercices 1957 et 1958 respectivement . Prs d'un an plus tard, dans sa rsolution 1263 (XIII) du 14 novembre 1958, l'Assemble gnrale, tout en (( Notant avec satisjaction la faon efficace dont la Force continue d'accomplir sa mission , priait la Cinquime Commission de recommander les mesures voulues pour couvrir les dpenses ncessaires au maintien en fonctions de la Force d'urgence des Nations Unies . Aprs un nouvel examen, la disposition figurant au paragraphe 4 de la rsolution du 22 novembre 1957 a t adopte au paragraphe 4 de la rsolution 1337 (XIII) du 13 dcembre 1958. Le paragraphe 5 de cette rsolution priait ((le Secrtaire gnral de prendre l'avis des gouvernements des Etats Membres sur le mode de financement futur de la Force et de prsenter l'Assemble gnrale, lors de sa quatorzime session, un rapport acconipagn de leurs rponses N. A la suite de quoi, un nouveau plan a t tabli pour l'utilisation de toute contribution volontaire, mais la rsolution 1441 (XIV) du 5 dcembre 1959, paragraphe 2, (( Dcide de mettre en recouvrement la somme de 20 millions de dollars entre tous les tats Ptlembres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, sur la base du barme ordinaire des quotes-parts , sous rserve de l'emploi des crdits provenant de contributions volontaires. La rsolution 1575 (XV) du 20 dcembre 1960 est peu prs identique. La Cour conclut que, d'anne en anne, les dpenses de la FcSU ont t traites par l'Assemble gnrale comme des dpenses de l'organisation au sens du paragraphe 2 de l'article 17 de la Charte. Les oprations au Congo ont t autorises l'origine par le Conseil de Scurit dans sa rsolution du 14 juillet 1960, adopte sans vote contraire. Cette rsolution, compte tenu de l'appel adress par le Gouvernement du Congo, du rapport du Secrtaire . gnral et des dbats au Conseil de Scurit, a t videmment adopte en vue du maintien de la paix et de la scurit internationales. On a soutenu pourtant qu'elle a t applique en violation des dispositions de la Charte, parce qu'aux termes de la Charte c'est au Conseil de Scurit qu'il appartient de choisir les Etats qui participeront la mise en oeuvre des dcisions ayant trait au maintien de la paix et de la scurit internationales, alors que dans le cas du Congo c'est le 'Secrtaire gnral qui a dcid lui-mme quels Etats participeraient l'opration, soit en fournissant des contingents arms, soit autrement. Selon le paragraphe 2 de la rsolution du 14 juillet 1960, le Conseil de Scurit (( Dcide d'autoriser le Secrtaire gnral prendre, en consultation avec le Gouvernement de la Rpublique du Congo, les mesures ncessaires en vue de fournir ce gouvernement l'assistance militaire dont il a besoin . Le paragraphe 3 priait le Secr-

2s Secretary-General "to report to the Security Council as appropriate". The Secretary-General made his first report on 18 July and in it informed the Secunty Council which States he had asked to contribute forces or matriel, which ones had complied, the size of the units which had already amved in the Congo (a total of some 3,500 troops), and some detail about further units expected. On 22 July the Security Council by unanimous vote adopted a further resolution in which the preamble States that it had considered this report of the Secretary-General and appreciated "the work of the Secretary-General and the support so readily and so speedily given to him by al1 Member States invited by him to give assistance". In operative paragraph 3, the Secunty Council "Commends the Secretary-General for the prompt action he has taken to carry out resolution SI4387 of the Security Council, and for his first report". On g August the Security Council adopted a further resolution without a dissenting vote in which it took note of the second report and of an oral statement of the Secretary-General and in operative paragraph 1: "Confirms the authonty given to the SecretaryGeneral by the Security Council resolutions of 14 July and 22 July 1960 and requests him to continue to carry out the responsibility placed on him thereby". This emphatic ratification is further supported by operative paragraphs 5 and 6 by which al1 Member States were called upon "to afford mutual assistance" and the Secretary-General was requested "to implement this resolution and to report further to the Council as appropriate". The Secunty Council resolutions of 14 July, 22 July and g August 1960 were noted by the General Assembly in its resolution 1474 (ES-IV) of 20 September, adopted without a dissenting vote, in which it "fully supports" these resolutions. Again without a dissenting vote, on 21 February 1961 the Secunty Council reaffirmed its three previous resolutions "and the General Assembly resolution 1474 (ES-IV) of 20 September 1960" and reminded "all States of their obligations under these resolutions". Again without a dissenting vote on 24 November 1961 the Security Council, once more recalling the previous resolutions, reaffirmed "the policies and purposes of the United Nations with respect to the Congo (Leopoldville) as set out" in those resolutions. Operative paragraphs 4 and 5 of this resolution renew the authonty to the Secretary-General to continue the activities in the Congo. In the light of such a record of reiterated consideration, confirmation, approval and ratification by the Security Council and by the General' Assembly of the actions of the Secretary-General in taire gnral de ((faire rapport au Conseil de Scurit lorsqu'il y aura lieu . Le Secrtaire gnral a prsent le 18 juillet son premier

rapport, dans lequel il indique au Conseil de Scurit quels sont les tats auxquels il a demand de fournir des contingents ou du matriel, quels sont ceux qui ont rpondu cet appel, l'importance des units dj arrives au Congo (au total 3.500 hommes environ) et ajoute quelques dtails relatifs aux autres contingents attendus. Le 22 juillet le Conseil de Scurit a adopt l'unanimit une nouvelle rsolution, au prambule de laquelle il est dit qu'ayant considr le rapport du Secrtaire gnral, le Conseil de Scurit exprime son apprciation du travail accompli par le Secrtaire gnral et de l'appui que tous les tats Membres qu'il avait invits lui prter leur concours lui ont apport si diligemment et si rapidement . Au paragraphe 3 du dispositif, le Conseil de Scurit a Flicite le Secrtaire gnral de la promptitude avec laquelle il a donn suite la rsolution SI4387 du Conseil de Scurit, et de son premier rapport . Le 9 aot, le Conseil de Scurit a adopt sans vote contraire une autre rsolution dans laquelle, ayant pris note du deuxime rapport et de l'expos oral du Secrtaire gnral, le Conseil, au paragraphe I du dispositif, (( Confirme l'autorit donne au Secrtaire gnral par les rsolutions du Conseil de Scurit en date des 14 et 22 juillet 1960 et le prie de continuer s'acquitter de la responsabilit qui lui a t ainsi confre . Cette ratification catgorique est encore appuye par les paragraphes 5 et 6 du dispositif par lesquels tous les Etats Membres sont invits s'offrir mutuellement assistance et le Secrtaire general est pri (( de mettre en application la prsente rsolution et de faire un nouveau rapport au Conseil lorsqu'il y aura lieu D. L'Assemble gnrale a pris note des rsolutions du Conseil de Scurit des 14 et 22 juillet et du 9 aot 1960 dans sa rsolution 1474 (ES-IV) du 20 septembre, adopte sans vote contraire dans laquelle elle appuie pleinement)) lesdites rsolutions. Le 21 fvrier 1961 le Conseil de Scurit a raffirm, de nouveau sans vote contraire, ses trois rsolutions prcdentes (( et la rsolution 1474 (ESIV) de l'Assemble gnrale en date du 20 septembre 1960 )) et a rappel (( tous les tats leurs obligations aux termes de ces rsolutions . Le 24 novembre 1961, le Conseil de Scurit, rappelant nouveau les rsolutions prcdentes, a raffirm, encore une fois sans vote contraire, cc les principes et les buts de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en ce qui concerne le Congo (Lopoldville), tels qu'ils sont noncs )) dans ces rsolutions. Les paragraphes 4 et 5 du dispositif de la rsolution renouvellent les pouvoirs donns au Secrtaire gnral pour la poursuite des activits au Congo. A la lumire d'un tel dossier contenant tant d'examens, de confirmations, d'approbations et de ratifications par le Conseil de Scurit et l'Assemble gnrale de l'action du Secrtaire gnral

29 implementing the resolution of 14 July 1960, it is impossible to reach the conclusion that the operations in question usurped or impinged upon the prerogatives conferred by the Charter on the Secunty Council. The Charter does not forbid the Secunty Council to act through instruments oT its own choice: under Article 29 it "may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions"; under Article 98 it may entrust "other functions" to the Secretary-General. It is not necessary for the Court to express an opinion as to which article or articles of the Charter were the basis for the resolutions of the Security Council, but it can be said that the operations of OWGC did not include a use of armed force against a State which the Security Council, under Article 39, determined to have committed an act of aggression or to have breached the peace. The armed forces which were utilized in the Congo were not authorized to take military action against any State. The operation did not involve "preventive or enforcement measures" against any State under Chapter VI1 and therefore did not constitute "action" as that term is used in Article II. For the reasons stated, financial obligations which, in accordance with the clear and reiterated authonty of both the Secunty Council and the General Assembly, the Secretary-General incurred on behalf of the United Nations, constitute obligations of the Organization for which the General Assembly was entitled to make provision under the authority of Article 17. In relation to ONUC, the first action concerning the financing of the operation u7as taken by the General Assembly on 20 December 1960, after the Secunty Council had adopted its resolutions of 14 July, 22 July and 9 August, and the General Assembly had adopted its supporting resolution of 20 September. This resolution 1583 (XV) of 20 December referred to the report of the SecretaryGeneral on the estimated cost of the Congo operations from 14 July to 31 December 1960, and to the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. It decided to establish an ad hoc account for the expenses of the United Nations in the Congo. It also took note of certain waivers of cost claims and then decided to apportion the sum of $48.5 million among the Member States "on the basis of the regular scale of assessment" subject to certain exceptions. It made this decision because in the preamble it had already recognized : "that the expenses involved in the United Nations operations in the Congo for 1960 constitute 'expenses of the Organization' within 30 relative la mise en oeuvre de la rsolution du 14 juillet 1960, on ne saurait conclure que les oprations en question empitaient sur

les prrogatives confres au Conseil de Scurit par la Charte ou les usurpaient. La Charte ne dfend pas au Conseil de Scurit d'agir au moyen des instruments de son choix: aux termes de l'article 29 il peut crer les organes subsidiaires qu'il juge ncessaires l'exercice de ses fonctions ; en vertu de l'article 98 il peut charger le Secrtaire gnral d'cc autres fonctions . Il n'est pas ncessaire que la Cour indique sur quel article ou quels articles de la Charte reposent les rsolutions du Conseil de Scurit, mais onpeut affirmer que les oprations de 1'ONUC n'impliquaient pas l'emploi de la force arme contre un tat dont le Conseil de Scurit, en vertu de l'article 39, aurait dcid qu'il s'tait rendu coupable d'un acte d'agression ou qu'il aurait attent la paix. Les forces armes employes au Congo n'ont pas t aptorises prendre des mesures de caractre militaire contre un Etat quelconque. Cette opration ne comportait pas de mesures prventives ou coercitives ,> contre un tat, comme il est prvu au chapitre VII; elle ne constituait donc pas une cc action , au sens o le mot est employ l'article II. Pour les raisons indiques, les obligations financires qui ont t encourues par le Secrtaire gnral au nom des Nations Unies avec le consentement rpt et clairement exprim du Conseil de Scurit et de l'Assemble gnrale constituent des obligations de l'Organisation auxquelles l'Assemble gnrale tait fonde pourvoir selon l'article 17. En ce qui concerne l'ONUC, la premire action ayant trait au financement de l'opration a t prise par l'Assemble gnrale le 20 dcembre 1960, aprs que le Conseil de Scurit et adopt ses rsolutions du 14 et du 22 juillet et du 9 aot et que l'Assemble gnrale et adopt une rsolution dans le mme sens le 20 septembre. Cette rsolution 193 (XV) du 20 dcembre se rfrait au rapport du Secrtaire gnral sur les dpenses prvues au titre des oprations des Nations Unies au Congo du 14 juillet au 31 dcembre 1960 et aux recommandations du Comit consultatif pour les questions administratives et budgtaires. Elle dcidait de crer un compte ad hoc pour les dpenses de l'organisation des Nations Unies au Congo. Elle prenait galement note que des gouvernements avaient renonc au remboursement de certains frais et dcidait de rpartir le montant de 483 millions de dollars entre les tats Membres cc sur la base du barme ordinaire des quotes-parts , sous rserve de certaines exceptions. L'Assemble gnrale prenait cette dcision parce qu'elle 'avait dj reconnu dans le prambule: que les dpenses entranes par les oprations des Nations Unies au Congo pour 1960 constituent des ((dpenses de l'organisation )) 30 the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessment thereof against Member

States creates binding legal obligations on such States to pay their assessed shares". By its further resolution I ~ ~ O ~ Xof Vth)e same day, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General "to incur commitments in 1961 for the United Nations operations in the Congo up to the total of $24 million for the penod from I January to 31 March 1961". On 3 April 1961, the General Assembly authorized the SecretaryGeneral to continue until 21 April "to incur commitments for the United Nations operations in the Congo at a level not to exceed $8 million per month". Importance has been attached to the statement included in the preamble of General Assembly resolution 1619 (XV) of 21 April1961 which reads : "Bearing in mind that the extraordinary expenses for the United Nations operations in the ,Congo are essentially different in nature from the expenses of the Organization under the regular budget and that therefore a procedure different from that applied in the case of the regular budget is required for meeting these extraordinary expenses." However, the same resolution in operative paragraph 4: "Decides further to apportion as expenses of the Organization the amount of $100 million among the Member States in accordance with the scale of assessment for the regular budget subject to the provisions of paragraph 8 below [paragraph 8 makes certain adjustments for Member States assessed at the lowest rates or who receive certain designated technical assistance], pending the establishment of a different scale of assessment to defray the extraordinary expenses of the Organization resulting from these operations." Although it is not mentioned in the resolution requesting the advisory opinion, because it was adopted at the same meeting of the General Assembly, it may be noted that the further resolution 1732 (XVI) of 20 December 1961 contains an identical paragraph in the preamble and a comparable operative paragraph 4 on apportioning $80 million. 'The conclusion to be drawn from these paragraphs is that the General Assembly has twice decided that even though certain expenses are "extraordinary" and "essentially different" from those under the "regular budget", they are none the less "expenses of the Organization" to be apportioned in accordance with the power granted to the General Assembly by Article 17, paragraph 2. This conclusion is strengthened by the concluding clause of paragraph 4 of the two resolutions just cited which states that the decision therein to use the scale of assessment already adopted for the 31 au sens du paragraphe 2 de l'article 17 de la Charte des Nations Unies et que la rpartition de ces dpenses entre les Etats Membres

impose auxdits tats l'obligation juridique de payer leur quotepart . Dans son autre rsolution 1590 (XV) du mme jour, l'Assemble gnrale autorisait le Secrtaire gnral engager des dpenses en 1961 au titre des oprations des Nations Unies au Congo concurrence d'un total de 24 millions de dollars pour la priode allant du I~~ja nvier au 31 mars 1961 )). Le 3 avril 1961, l'Assemble gnrale autorisait le Secrtaire gnral continuer jusqu'au 21 avril d'engager des dpenses au titre des oprations des Nations Unies au Congo concurrence de 8 millions de dollars par mois . On a attach de l'importance la dclaration figurant dans le prambule de la rsolution 1619 (XV) du 21 avril 1961 de 1'Assemble gnrale, rdig comme suit: Tenant compte du fait que la nature des dpenses extraordinaires affrentes aux oprations des Nations Unies au Congo est essentiellement distincte de celle des dpenses de l'organisation inscrites au budget ordinaire, si bien qu'il faut appliquer, pour les couvrir, une procdure diffrente de celle qui est applique dans le cas dudit budget. )) Toutefois, au paragraphe 4 du dispositif, la mme rsolution: Dcide en owtre que le montant de roo millions de dollars sera rparti entre les tats Membres en tant que dpense de l'organisation, sur la base du barme des quotes-parts adopt pour le budget ordinaire, sous rserve des dispositions du paragraphe 8 ci-dessous [le paragraphe 8 fait certains ajustements pour les Etats Membres dont les quotes-parts sont les moins leves ou pour ceux qui reoivent certaines formes d'assistance technique], en attendant l'tablissement d'un barme des quotes-parts diffrent pour faire face aux dpenses extraordinaires de l'organisation rsultant de ces oprations. )) Bien qu'elle ne soit pas mentionne dans la rsolution demandant l'avis consultatif parce qu'elle a t adopte lors de la mme sance de l'Assemble gnrale, on peut noter que la rsolution 1732 (XVI) du 20 dcembre 1961 contient un paragraphe identique dans son prambule et un paragraphe 4 analogue dans son dispositif, concernant la rpartition de 80 millions de dollars. La conclusion que l'on peut tirer de ces paragraphes est que l'Assemble gnrale a dcid, deux reprises, que, mme si certaines dpenses sont extraordinaires 1) et essentiellement distinctes de celles qui rentrent dans le cc budget ordinaire )), elles sont nanmoins des c( dpenses de l'Organisation qui doivent tre rparties conformment aux pouvoirs que le paragraphe 2 de l'article 17 octroie l'Assemble gnrale. Cette conclusion est renforce par la clause finale du paragraphe 4 des deux rsolutions qui viennent d'tre mentionnes, d'aprs laquelle la dcision firegular budget is made "pending the establishment of a diferent

scale of assessment to defray the extraordinary expenses". The only alternative-and that means the "different procedure"-contemplated was another scale of assessment and not some method other than assessment. "Apportionment" and "assessment" are terms which relate only to the General Assembly's authority under Article 17. *** At the outset of this opinion, the Court pointed out that the text of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter could lead to the simple conclusion that "the expenses of the Organization" are the amounts paid out to defray the costs of canying out the purposes of the Organization. It was further indicated that the Court would examine the resolutions authorizing the expenditures referred to in the request for the advisory opinion in order to ascertain whether they were incurred with that end in view. The Court has made such an examination and finds that they were so incurred. The Court has also analyzed the principal arguments which have been advanced against the conclusion that the expenditures in question should be considered as "expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations", and has found that these arguments are unfounded. Consequently, the Court amves at the conclusion that the question submitted to it in General Assembly resolution 1731 (XVI) must be answered in the affirmative. For these reasons, by nine votes to five, that the expenditures authorized in General Assembly resolutions 1583 (XV) and 1590 (XV) of 20 December 1960, 1595 (XV) of 3 April1961, 1619 (XV) of 21 April 1961 and 1633 (XVI) of 30 October 1961 relating to the United Nations operations in the Congo undertaken in pursuance of the Security Council resolutions of 14 July, 22 July and 9 August 1960 and 21 February and 24 November 1961, and General Assembly resolutions 1474 (ES-IV) of 20 September 1960 and 1599 (XV), 1600 (XV) and 1601 (XV) of 15 April1961, and the expenditures authorized in General Assembly resolutions 1122 (XI) of 26 November 1956,1089 (XI) of 21 December 1956,1090 (XI) of 27 February 1957,1151 (XII) of 22 November 1957, 1204 (XII) of 13 December 1957, 1337 (XIII) of 13 December 1958,1441 (XIV) of 5 December 1959 and 1575 (XV) of 20 December 1960 relating to the operations of the United Nations Emergency gurant dans ce paragraphe d'utiliser le barme des quotes-parts dj adopt pour le budget ordinaire est prise cc en attendant l'tablissement d'un barme des quotes-parts diQrent pour faire face aux dpenses extraordinaires 1). La seule autre solution envisage - et cela signifie une procdure diffrente - tait un autre barme des quotes-parts et non une mthode autre que la

rpartition. cc Rpartition et mise en recouvrement )) sont des termes qui concernent seulement la comptence de l'Assemble gnrale au sens de l'article 17. *** Au dbut du prsent avis, la Cour a soulign que le texte du paragraphe 2 de l'article 17 de la Charte pouvait amener la simple conclusion que n les dpenses de l'organisation sont les sommes payes pour couvrir les frais relatifs la ralisation des buts de l'organisation. Puis il a t indiqu que la Cour examinerait les rsolutions autorisant les dpenses mentionnes dans la requte d'avis consultatif pour s'assurer qu'elles ont t faites cette fin. La Cour a procd cet examen et a constat que tel tait le cas. La Cour a analys les principaux arguments qui ont t avancs contre la conclusion que les dpenses en question doivent tre considres comme des dpenses de l'organisation au sens du paragraphe 2 de l'article 17 de la Charte des Nations Unies et a trouv que ces arguments n'taient pas fonds. La Cour en arrive donc la conclusion qu'elle doit rpondre par l'affirmative la question qui lui est soumise par la rsolution 1731 (XVI) de l'Assemble gnrale. Par ces motifs, par neuf voix contre cinq, que les dpenses autorises par les rsolutions de l'Assemble gnrale 1583 (XV) et 1590 (XV) du 20 dcembre 1960, 1595 (XV) du 3 avril 1961, 1619 (XV) du 21 avril 1961 et 1633 (XVI) du 30 octobre 1961, relatives aux oprations des Nations Unies au Congo entreprises en excution des rsolutions du Conseil de Scurit en date des 14 juillet, 22 juillet et 9 aot 1960 et des 21 fvrier et 24 novembre 1961 ainsi que des rsolutions de l'Assemble gnrale 1474 (ES-IV) du 20 septembre 1960, 1599 (XV), 1600 (XV) et 1601 (XV) du 15 avril 1961, et les dpenses autorises par les rsolutions de l'Assemble gnrale: 1122 (XI) du 26 novembre 1956, 1089 (XI) du 21 dcembre 1956, 1090 (XI) du 27 fvrier 1957, 1151 (XII) du 22 novembre 1957, 1204 (XII) du 13 dcembre 1957, 1337 (XIII) du 13 dcembre 1958,1441 (XIV) du 5 dcembre 1959 et 1575 (XV) du 20 dcembre 1960, relatives aux oprations de la Force d'urForce undertaken in pursuance of General Assembly resolutions 997 (ES-1) of 2 November 1956, 998 (ES-1) and 999 (ES-1) of 4 November 1956, 1000 (ES-1) of 5 November 1956, 1001 (ES-1) of 7 November 1956, 1121 (XI) of 24 November 1956 and 1263 (XIII) of 14 November 1958, constitute "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations. Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twentieth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-two, in two copies, one of which

will be placed in the archives of the Court and the other transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. (Signed) B. WINIARSKI, President . (Signed) GARNER-COIGNET, Registrar. Judge SPIROPOULOmSak es the following declaration : While accepting the Court's conclusion, 1 cannot agree with al1 the views put forward in the Advisory Opinion. In particular, 1 consider that the affirmative reply to the request for an opinion is justified by the argument that the resolutions of the General Assembly authorizing the financing of the United Nations operations in the Congo and the Middele East, being resolutions designed to meet expenditure concerned with the fulfilment of the purposes of the United Nations, which were adopted by two-thirds of the Members of the General Assembly present and voting, create obligations for the Members of the United Nations. 1 express no opinion as to the cocformity with the Charter of the resolutions relating to the United Nations operations in the Congo and the Middle East, for the following reasons: The French delegation had proposed to the General Assembly the acceptance of an amendment to the text, finally adopted by it, according to which amendment the question put to the Court would have become: "Were the expenditures authorized, etc. ... decided on in conformity with the provisions of the Charter and, if so, do they constitute 'expenses of the Organization' within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations ?" On 20 December 1961, in the course of the meeting of the General Assembly, this amendment was accompanied by a statement by the 33 gence des Nations Unies entreprises en excution des rsolutkns de l'Assemble gnrale: 997 (ES-1) du 2 novembre 1956, 998 (ES-1) et 999 (ES-1) du 4 novembre 1956, 1000 (ES-1) du 5 novembre 1956, 1001 (ES-1) du 7 novembre 1956, 1121 (XI) du 24 novembre 1956 ct 1263 (XIII) du 14 novembre 1958, constituent des cc dpenses de l'organisation au sens du paragraphe 2 de l'article 17 de la Charte des Nations Unies. Fait en anglais et en franais, le texte anglais faisant foi, au Palais de la Paix, La Haye, le vingt juillet mil neuf cent soixantedeux, en deux exemplaires, dont l'un restera dpos aux archives de la Cour et dont l'autre sera transmis au Secrtaire gnral de l'organisation des Nations Unies. Le Prsident, (Sign) B. WINIARSKI. Le Greffier,

(Sign) GARNIER-COIGNET. M. SPIROPOULOjuSg, e, fait. la dclaration suivante : Tout en acceptant la conclusion de la Cour, nous ne saurions partager toutes les opinions mises dans l'avis consultatif. En particulier, nous estimons que la rponse affirmative la demande d'avis se justifie par le raisonnement que les rsolutions de l'Assemble gnrale qui autorisent le financement des oprations des Nations Unies au Congo et au Moyen-Orient, tant des rsolutions qui visent couvrir les frais relatifs la ralisation des buts des Nations Unies et qui ont t adoptes par les deux tiers des Membres prsents et votants de l'Assemble gnrale, crent des obligations pour les Membres des Nations Unies. Nous n'exprimons aucune opinion quant la conformit la Charte des rsolutions concernant les oprations des Nations Unies au Congo et au Moyen-Orient et cela pour' les raisons suivantes: La dlgation franaise avait propos l'Assemble gnrale l'acceptation d'un amendement au texte finalement adopt par elle, d'aprs lequel la question pose la Cour devenait: cc Les dpenses autorises, etc., ont-elles t dcides conformment aux dispositions de la Charte, et dans l'affirmative constituent-elles ((des dpenses de l'Organisation au sens du paragraphe 2 de l'article 17 de la Charte des Nations Unies? 1) Cet amendement fut accompagn le 20 dcembre 1961 au cours de la sance de l'Assemble gnrale d'une dclaration de la dlga33 181 CERTAIN EXPENSES OF U.N. (OPINION OF 20 VI1 62) French delegation justifying the submission of the French amendment and which, among other things, said: "In the opinion of the French delegation, the question put to the Court does not enable the latter to give a clear-cut opinion on the juridical basis for the financial obligations of Member States. The Court cannot, in fact, appraise the scope of those resolutions without determining what obligations they may create for Member States under the Charter. It is for this reason that the French delegation is submitting to the Assembly an amendment [AIL. 3781 the adoption of which would enable the Court to determine whether or not the Assembly resolutions concerning the financial implications of the United Nations operations in the Congo and the Middle East are in conformity with the Charter. Only thus, if the matter is referred to the Court, will it be done in such a way as to take into account the scope and nature of the problems raised in the proposal to request an opinion." The French amendment was rejected. The rejection of the French amendment by the General Assembly seems to me to show the desire of the Assembly that the conformity

or non-conformity of the decisions of the Assembly and of the Security Council concerning the United Nations operations in the Congo and the Middle East should not be examined by the Court. It seems natural, indeed, that the General Assembly should not have wished that the Court should pronounce on the validity of resolutions which have been applied for several years. In these circumstances, 1 have felt bound to refrain from pronouncing on the conformity with the Charter of the resolutions relating to the United Nations operations in the Congo and the Middle East. Judges Sir Percy SPENDERS,i r Gerald FITZMAURICaEnd MORELLI append to the Opinion of the Court statements of their Separate Opinions. President WINIARSKIa nd Judges BASDEVANTM, ORENOQ UINTANAK, ORETSKYan d BUSTAMANTYE R IVEROa ppend to the Opinion of the Court statements of their Dissenting Opinions. (Initialled) B. W. (Initialled) G.-C. tion franaise justifiant le dpt de l'amendement franais o il tait dit entre autres : (( De l'avis de la dlgation franaise, la question pose la Cour ne permet pas celle-ci de se prononcer en toute clart sur la source juridique des obligations financires des Etats Membres. La Cour, en effet, ne peut pas apprcier la porte de ces rsolutions sans dterminer quelles obligations celles-ci peuvent faire natre pour les Etats Membres d'aprs la Charte. C'est pour cette raison que la dlgation franaise soumet l'Assemble l'amendement contenu dans le document AIL. 378, dont l'adoption permettrait la Cour de dterminer si les rsolutions de l'Assemble ayant trait aux consquences financires des oprations des Nations Unies au Congo et au Moyen-Orient sont ou non conformes la Charte. Ce n'est que dans ces conditions que si la Cour devait tre saisie, elle le serait d'une manire qui tienne compte de l'tendue et de la nature des problmes voqus dans la proposition de demande d'avis. )) L'amendement franais fut rejet. Le rejet de l'amendement franais par l'Assemble gnrale nous semble manifester le dsir de l'Assemble gnrale que la conformit ou non-conformit des dcisions de l'Assemble gnrale et du Conseil de Scurit concernant les oprations de l'organisation des Nations Unies au Congo et au Moyen-Orient ne soient pas examines par la Cour. En effet, il semble naturel que 1'Assemble gnrale n'ait pas voulu que la Cour se prononce sur la validit des rsolutions qui ont t appliques depuis plusieurs annes. Dans ces conditions, nous avons estim devoir nous abstenir de nous prononcer sur la conformit la Charte des rsolutions concernant les oprations des Nations Unies au Congo et au Moyen-

Orient. Sir Percy SPENDER,s ir Gerald FITZMAURICeEt M. MORELLI, juges, joignent l'avis de la Cour les exposs de leur opinion individuelle. MM. WINIARSKIP, rsident, BASDEVANTM, ORENOQ UINTANA, KORETSKYe t BUSTAMANTYE RIVERO,j uges, joignent l'avis de la Cour les exposs de leur opinion dissidente. (Paraph) B. W. (Paraph) G.-C.

PUBLICATIONS DE LA COUR PERMANENTE DE JUSTICE INTERNATIONALE SERIE A - NO I7 Le 13 septembre 1928 RECUEIL DES ARRTS No 13 AFFAIRE RELATIVE A L'USINE DE CHORZOW (DEMANDE EN INDEMNIT) (FOND) PUBLICATIONS OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE SERIES A.-No. 17 September 13th, 1928 COLLECTION OF JUDGMENTS No. 13 CASE CONCERNING THE FACTORY AT CHORZOW (CLAIM FOR JNDEMNITY) (MERITS) LEYDE LEYDEN SOC~T D'DITIONS A. W. SIJTHOFF'S

A. W. SIJTHOFF PUBLISHING COMPANY 1928 1928 COUR PERMANENTE DE JUSTICE INTERNATIONALE Le 13 septembre. Dossier E. c. XIII. R61e XIV: 1. QUATORZIME SESSION (ORDINAIRE) Prsents : MM. ANZILOTTIP, rksident, HUBER, ancien Prsident, Lord FINLAY, MM. LODER, NYHOLM, ALTAMIRA, ODA, DE BUSTAMANTE, PESSA, M. BEICHMANN, Jage supplant, MM. RABEL, EHRLICH, 1 Juges nationazrz. ! AFFAIRE RELATIVE A L'USINE DE CHORZOIV (DEMANDE EN INDEMNIT) (FOND) Entre le Gouvernement d'Allemagne, reprsent par M. le Dr Erich Kaufmann, professeur Berlin, Demandeur, et le Gouvernement de Pologne, reprsent par M. le Dr Thade Sobolewski, agent du Gouvernement polonais auprks du Tribunal arbitral mixte polono-allemand, Dfendeur. FOURTEENTH (ORDINARY) SESSION. Before : MM. ANZILOTTIP, resident, HUBER, forme^ President, Lord FINLAY, MM. LODER, NYHOLM, ALTAMIRA, ODA, I DE BUSTAMANTE, Judges, PESSA, 1 MM. RABEL, EHRLICH, t -National Judges. 1928. September 13th.

File E. c. XIII. Docket XIV: 1. JUDGMENT No. 13. CASE CONCERNING THE FACTORY AT CHORZOW (CLAIM FOR INDEMNITY) (THE MERITS). The Govemment of Germany, represented by Dr. Erich Kaufmann, Professor at Berlin, A pplicnnt, versus The Government of the Polish Republic, represented by Dr. Thadeus Sobolewski, Agent for the Polish Govemment before the Polish-Gennan Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, Respondent . compose ainsi qu'il est dit ci-dessus, aprs avoir entendu les Parties en leurs observations et conclusions, a rendu l'arrt suivant : Par Requte introductive d'instance, dpose au Greffe de la Cour le 8 fvrier 1927, en conformit de l'article 40 du Statut et de l'article 35 du Rglement, le Gouvernement du Reich a introduit devant la Cour permanente de Justice internationale une instance relative la rparation qui serait due par le Gouvernement polonais du chef du prjudice so~ffert par les Socits anonymes Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke A.-G. (ciaprs dnomme 1'Oberschlesische) et Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.-G. (ci-aprs dnomme la Bayerische) la suite de l'attitude adopte par ce Gouvernement, lors de la prise de po'ssession par lui de l'usine d'azote sise ChorzOw, vis--vis de ces Socits, attitude que la Cour avait dclare, dans son Arrt no 7 du 25 mai 1926, comme n'tant pas conforme aux dispositions des articles 6 et suivants de la Convention relative la Haute-Silsie, conclue Genve, le 15 mai 1922, entre l'Allemagne et la Pologne (et dsigne ci-aprs sous le nom de Convention de Genve). Au reu, le 3 mars 1927, du Mmoire du Gouvernement allemand en l'affaire, le Gouvernement polonais souleva, le 14 avril 1927, une exception prliminaire qui, contestant la comptence de la Cour pour connatre de l'instance introduite devant elle, concluait ce qu'il plaise la Cour, cc sans entrer dans le fond, se dclarer incomptente . Sur ce moyen, la Cour se pronona par son Arrt no 8 du 26 juillet 1927, par lequel elle dcida de rejeter l'exception prliminaire souleve par le Gouvernement de Pologne et de retenir, pour statuer au fond, l'instance introduite le 8 fvrier

1927 par le Gouvernement d'Allemagne. Cet arrt chargeait, en outre, le Prsident de fixer les dlais pour le dpt des Contre-Mmoire, Rplique et Duplique sur le fond. Ces dlais, fixs d'abord aux 30 septembre, 15 novembre et 30 dcembre 1927, furent par la suite tendus, en vertu JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~W FAC,TORY (MERITS) 5 THE COURT, composed as above, having heard the observations and conclusions of the Parties, delivers the following judgment : The Government of the German Reich, by an Application instituting proceedings filed with the Registry of the Court on February 8th, 1927, in conformity with Article 40 of the Statute and Article 35 of the Rules of Court, has submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice a suit concerning the reparation which, in the contention of the Government of the Reich, is due by the Polish Government for the darnage suffered by the Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke A.-G. (hereinafter designated as the Oberschlesische) and the Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.-G. (hereinafter designated as the Bayerische) in consequence of the attitude adopted by that Government towards those Companies in taking possession of the nitrate factory situated at Chorzow, which attitude has been declared by the Court in Judgment No. 7 (May 25th, 1926) not to have been in conformity with the provisions of Article 6 and the following articles of the Convention concerning Upper Silesia concluded at Geneva on May 15th, 1922, between Germany and Poland (hereinafter described as the Geneva Convention). On receipt of the German Government's Case in the suit, on March 3rd, 1927, the Polish Government, on April 14th, 1927, raised a preliminary objection denying the Court's jurisdiction to hear the suit brought before it and submitting that the Court should, "without entering into the merits, declare that it had no jurisdiction". The Court dealt with this plea in its Judgment No. 8 given on July 26th, 1927, by which it overruled the preliminary objection raised. by the Polish Government and reserved for judgment on the merits the suit brought on February 8th, 1927, by the German Government. Furthermore, under the terms of this judgment, the President was instructed to fix the times for the filing of the Counter-Case, Reply and Rejoinder on the merits. These times, which were in the first place fixed to expire on de dcisions successives, aux 30 novembre 1927, 20 fvrier et 7 mai 1928 respectivement. Les pices de la procdure crite furent dment dposes au

Greffe dans les dlais dfinitivement fixs, et firent l'objet des communications prvues l'article 43 du Statut. Au cours des audiences tenues les 21, 22, 25, 27 et 29 juin 1928, la Cour a entendu, en leurs plaidoiries, rplique et duplique, les agents des Parties, indiqus ci-dessus. Les conclusions formules dans la Requte du 8 fvrier 1927 du Gouvernement allemand taient ainsi conues : Plaise la Cour, Dire et juger, IO que, en raison de son attitude vis--vis des Socits anonymes Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke et Bayerische Stickstoffwerke, constate par la Cour comme n'tant pas conforme aux dispositions des articles 6 et suivants de la Convention de Genve, le Gouvernement polonais est tenu la rparation du prjudice subi de ce chef par lesdites Socits partir du 3 juillet 1922 jusqu' la date de l'arrt demand ; 2" que le montant' des indemnits payer par le Gouvernement polonais est de 5g.40o.000 Reichsmarks pour le dommage caus I'Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke A.-G. et de 16.775.200 Reichsmarks pour le dommage caus la Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.-G. ; 3" en ce qui concerne le mode de paiement : a) que le Gouvernement polonais devra payer, pendant le dlai d'un mois dater de l'arrt, les indemnits dues I'Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke A.-G. pour la reprise de son capital d'exploitation (matires premires, produits finis et demi-finis, matriel emmagasin, etc.) et les indemnits dues la Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.-G. pour la priode d'exploitation du 3 juillet 1922 jusqu' l'arrt ; b) que le Gouvernement polonais devra payer les sommes restantes, au plus tard, le 15 avril 1928 ; JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~W FACTORY (MERITS) 6 September goth, November 15th and December 3oth, 1927, were subsequently extended by successive decisions until November 3oth, 1gz7, February 20th and May 7th, 1928, respectively. The documents of the written proceedings were duly filed with the Registrar of the Court within the times finally fhed and were communicated to those concemed as provided in Article 43 of the Statute. In the course of hearings held on June z ~ s t , zand, 25th, 27th and zgth, 1928, the Court has heard the oral statements, reply and rejoinder submitted by the above-mentioned Agents for the Parties. * * * The submissions made in the German Government's Application of February 8th, 1927, were as follows :

It is submitted : [Translation.] (1) that by reason of its attitude in respect of the bersc ch lesische Stickstofhverke and Bayerische Stickstofhverke Companies, which attitude has been declared by the Court not to have been in confomity with the provisions of Article 6 and the following articles of the Geneva Convention, the Polish Government is under an obligation to make good the consequent damage sustained by the aforesaid Companies from July 3rd, 1922, until the date of the judgment sought ; ,(2) that the amount of the compensation to be paid by the Polish Government is 5g,4oo,ooo Reichsmarks for the damage caused to the Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke Company and 16,775,200 Reichsmarks for the damage caused to the Bayerische Stickstoffwerke Company ; (3) in regard to the method of payment : (a) that the Polish Government should pay within one month from the date of judgment, the compensation due to the Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke Company for the taking possession of the working capital (raw material, finished and half-manufactured products, stores, etc.) and the compensation due to the Bayerische Stickstoffwerke Company for the period of exploitation from July 3rd, 1922, to the date of judgment; (b) that the Polish Government should pay the sums remaining unpaid by April 15th, 1928, at latest; c) que, partir de l'arrt, des intrts raison de 6 % l'an seront pays par le Gouvernement polonais ; d) que les paiements viss sous a) - c) seront effectus sans aucune dduction au compte des deux Socits prs la Deutsche Bank Berlin; e) que, jusqu'au 30 juin 1931, aucune exportation de chaux azote et de nitrate d'ammoniaque n'aura lieu en Allemagne, dans les tats-unis d'Amrique, en France et en Italie. )) Ces conclusions ont, au cours de la procdure soit crite, soit orale, subi des modifications dont il sera rendu compte ci-aprs. La Cour ne s'tant pas prvalue, dans la prsente espce, du droit elle confr par l'article 48 du Statut, de dterminer par voie d'ordonnance les ((formes et alais dans lesquels chaque Partie doit finalement conclure , elle admet, aux fins de cette instance, la facult pour les Parties de modifier, conformment aux prcdents tablis, leurs conclusions primitives, non seulement dans les mmoire et contre-mmoire (article 40 du Rglement), mais aussi tant dans les pices

ultrieures de la procdure crite que dans les dclarations qu'elles peuvent faire au cours des dbats oraux (article 55 du Rglement), sous rserve, seulement, que l'autre Partie soit toujours en mesure de se prononcer sur les conclusions amendes. La conclusion no I de la Requte n'a pas t modifie par la suite. En ce qui concerne, par contre, la conclusion no 2, des modifications importantes sont intervenues. Dans le Mmoire, cette conclusion se trouve libelle de la manire suivante : cc Dire et juger. . . . 2) que le montant des indemnits payer par le Gouvernement polonais est de 75.gz0.000 Reichsmarks, plus la valeur actuelle du capital d'exploitation (matires premires, produits finis et demi-finis, matires emmagasines, etc.), saisi le 3 juillet 1922, pour le dommage caus 1'Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke A.-G., et de zo.17g.000 Reichsmarks pour le dommage caus la Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.-G. En comparant la conclusion 2) du Mmoire avec la conclusion 2) de la Requte, il convient de tenir compte des faits suivants rsultant du Mmoire, savoir : JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~W FACTORY (MERITS) 7 (c) that, from the date of judgment, interest at 6 % per annum should be paid by the Polish Government ; (d) that the payments mentioned under (a)-(c) should be made without deduction to the account of the two Companies with the Deutsche Bank at Berlin ; (e) that, until June 3oth, 1931, no nitrated lime and no nitrate of ammonia should be exported to Germany, to the United States of America, to France or to Italy. These submissions have, in the course of the written or oral proceedings, undergone modifications which will be indicated below. As the Court has not in the present suit availed itself of the right conferred upon it under Article 48 of the Statute to make orders as to "the form and time in which each Party must conclude its arguments", it, in this case, allows the Parties, in accordance with established precedent, to amend their original submissions, not only in the Case and Counter-Case (Article 40 of the Rules), but also both in the subsequent documents of the written proceedings and in declarations made by them in the course of the hearings (Article 55 of the Rules), subject only to the condition that the other Party must always have an opportunity of commenting on the amended submissions. Submission No. I of the Application has not been subsequently amended.

On the other hand, with regard to submission No. 2, important amendments have been made. In the Case this submission is worded as follows : It is submitted : . . : . [Tralzslation.] (2) that the amount of the compensation to be paid by the Polish Government is 75,g~o,ooo Reichsmarks, plus the present value of the working capital (raw materials, finished and half-manufactured products, stores, etc.) taken over on July 3rd, 1922, for the damage caused to the Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke Company, and 20,179,ooo Reichsmarks for the damage caused to the Bayerische Stickstoffwerke Company. In comparing submission (2) of the Case with submission (2) of the Application, regard must be had to the following facts rhsulting from the Case : a) que le montant de 5g.40o.000 indiqu dans la Requte comme le donimage de lJOberschlesische est calcul au 3 juillet 1922 ; b) que ce montant comprend la somme d'un million pour matires premires, produits finis et demi-finis, matires emmqasines, etc. ; c) que la somme de 75.g20.000 indique dans le Mmoire titre de dommage pour 1'Oberschlesische se dcompose en 58.40o.000 de dommages au 3 juillet 1922, et 17.520.000 d'intrts 6 % sur 58.40o.000 pour la priode 3 juillet 1922 - 2 juillet 1927 ; d) que cette somme ne comprend pas de montant pour le capital d'exploitation s, une indemnit pour ce capital (( valeur actuelle 1) tant dans le Mmoire demande en termes gnraux ; e) que la somme de 16.775.200 indique dans la Requte comme montant du dommage de la Bayerische est calcule au 3 juillet 1922 ; et f ) que la somme de zo.17g.000 indique dans le Mmoire pour le dommage de la Bayerische est calcule au 2 (ou 3) juillet 1927 un taux d'intrt de 6 % ; le montant pour la Bayerische fourni dans la Requte serait entach d'une erreur de calcul. En dernier lieu, la conclusion 2) de la Requte a t modifie dans la rplique orale de l'agent du Gouvernement allemand, savoir, en ce qui concerne l'indemnit rclame pour le dommage caus I'Oberschlesische. Ladite conclusion se trouve, en effet, dans les conclusions lues par l'agent ?l'ii ssue de sa rplique orale, libelle comme suit : ((Dire et juger que le montant des indemnits payer au

Gouvernement allemand est de 58.400 .ooo Reichsmarks, plus 1.656.000 Reichsmarks, plus les intrts 6 % de cette somme partir du 3 juillet 1922 jusqu' la date de l'arrt (pour le dommage caus 1'Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke A.-G.) ; que le montant des indemnits payer au Gouvernement allemand est de 20.17g.000 Reichsmarks pour le dommage caus la Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.-G. Il s'ensuit que, pour l'Oberschlesische, le Gouvernement allemand a) revient la somme de 58.40o.000 au 3 juillet 1922 ; JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~W FACTORY (MERITS) 8 (a) that the total of 5g,4oo,ooo mentioned in the Application as the figure representing the damage suffered by the Oberschlesische is calculated as on July 3rd, 1922 ; (b) that this surn includes the surn of I million for raw materials, finished and half-manufactured products, stores, etc. ; (c) that the surn of 75,g~o,ooo mentioned in the Case as the figure representing the damage suffered by the Oberschlesische is made up of 58,400,ooo for damages as on July 3rd, 1922, and 17,520,000 for interest at 6 % on 58,400,mo for the period July 3rd, 1922, to July znd, 1927; (d) that this surn does not include an amount for "working capital", compensation for the "present value" of this capital being in the Case sought in general terms ; (e) that the surn of 16,775,200 mentioned in the Application as the figure representing the damage suffered by the Bayerische is calculated as on July 3rd, 1922 ; (f) that the surn of zo,17g,ooo mentioned in the Case as representing the damage suffered by the Bayerische is calculated as on July 2nd (or 3rd), 1927, at a rate of interest of 6 % ; the amount for the Bayerische indicated in the Application is said to contain an error of calculation. Lastly, submission (2) of the Application has been amended in the German Agent's oral reply as concerns the compensation claimed for the damage suffered by the Oberschlesische. This submission runs as follows in the submissions read by the Agent at the conclusion of his oral Reply : It is submitted : [Translation.] . that the total of the compensation to be paid to the German Government is 58,400,ooo Reichsmarks, plus 1,656,000 Reichsmarks, plus interest at 6 ''6 on this surn as from July 3rd, 1922, until the date of judgrnent (for the damage done to the Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke A.-G.) ; that the total of the compensation to be paid to the German Government is 20,17g,ooo Reichsmarks for the damage done to the Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.-G.

It follows that, as regards the Oberschlesische, the German Government (a) reverts to the surn of 58,400,ooo as on b) fixe 1.656.000 la valeur du capital d'exploitation cette date ; c) demande sur ces deux sommes les intrts 6 % jusqu' la date de l'arrt, en renoncant au calciil forfaitaire avanc dans le Mmoire. Er1 ce qui concerne la conclusion 3) de la Requte du Gouvernement allemand, il y a noter, dans la suite de la procdure, des modifications tant de forme que de fond. Pour ce qui est de la forme, l'alina e) de la conclusion 3 de la Requte constitue, dans le Mmoire, elle seule une nouvelle conclusion 3, tandis que la substance des alinas a) d) de la conclusion 3 de la Requte a t verse dans une nouvelle conclusion 4 a) - d) du Mmoire. Dans ces conditions, il est prfrable de retracer les modifications survenues chacun des alinas de la conclusion 3 primitive. L'alina 3 a) est ainsi libell dans le Mmoire (o il porte le no 4 a) : ((Dire et juger, en ce qui concerne le mode de paiement, que le Gouvernement polonais devra payer, pendant le dlai d'un mois dater de l'arrt, les indemnits dues I'Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke A.-G., pour la reprise de son capital d'exploitation et les indemnits dues la Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.-G., pour la priode d'exploitation du 3 juillet 1922 jusqu' l'arrt. )) Par rapport la Requte, cet alina n'a, par consquent, subi qu'une modification de pure forme (suppression d'une parenthse explicative) ; elle n'a plus t amende par la suite. L'alina 3 b) est libell de la manire suivante dans le Mmoire (o il porte le no 4 b) : ((Dire et juger que le Gouvernement polonais devra payer les sommes restantes, au plus tard le 15 avril 1928 ; subsidiairement que, pour autant que le paiement serait effectu par tranches, le Gouvernement polonais dlivre, pendant le dlai d'un mois dater de l'arrt, des lettres de change aux montants des tranches, y compris les intrts, payer aux dates d'chance respectives l'Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke A.-G. et la Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.-G. )) JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~W FACTORY (MERITS) 9 July 3rd, 1922 ; (b). fixes as 1,656,000 the value of the working capital on that date ; (c) claims on these two sums interest at 6 % until the date of judgment, thus abandoning the claim for a lump sum made in the Case. As regards submission (3) of the German Government's Application, amendments both of form and of substance are to be noted in the course of the subsequent procedure.

As regards form, paragraph , (e) of submission (3) of the Application constitutes by itself a new third submission in the Case, whilst the substance of paragraphs (a)-(d) of submission No. 3 of the Application has been embodied in a new submission No. 4 (a)-(d) in the Case. In these circumstances, it is preferable to trace back the modifications made to each of the paragraphs of the original third submission. Paragraph 3 (a) is worded as follows in the Case (where it is numbered 4 (a)) : [T~anslation.] that the Polish Government should pay, within one month from the date of judgment, the compensation due to the Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke Conipany for the taking possession of the working capital and the compensation due to the Bayerische Stickstoffwerke Company for the period of exploitation from July 3rd, 1922, to the date of judgrnent. As compared with the Application, therefore, this paragraph has undergone a purely superficial modification (deletion of an explanatory remark in parenthesis), and it has not subsequently been amended. Paragraph 3 (b) is worded as follows in the Case (where it is numbered 4 (b)) : [Translation.] that the Polish Government should pay the remaining sums by April 15th, 1928, at latest ; in the alternative, that, in so far as pajment may be effected in instalments, the Polish Governrnent shall deliver, within one month from the date of judgment, bills of exchange for the amounts of the instalments, including interest, payable on the respective dates on which they fa11 due to the Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke Company and to the Bayerische Stickstoffwerke Company. Ainsi, la conclusion principale primitive a t ajoute une conclusion subsidiaire visant l'ventualit d'un paiement par tranches. Le mme alina est formul comme suit dans la Rplique orale : ((Dire et juger que le Gouvernement polonais doit payer les sommes restantes au plus tard dans un dlai de quinze jours dater du commencement de l'anne budgtaire qui suit l'arrt ; subsidiairement, que, pour autant que le paiement serait effectu par tranches, le Gouvernement polonais dlivre, pendant le dlai d'un mois dater de l'arrt, des lettres de change aux montants des tranches, y compris les intrts payer aux dates d'chance respectives 1'Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke 'A.-G. et la Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.-G.

La modification par rapport la version prcdente consiste en la substitution la date du 15 avril 1928, dj coule, d'un dlai calcul en rapport avec l'ouverture de l'anne budgtaire polonaise. L'alina 3 c) des conclusions de la Requte (4 c) du Mmoire) n'a pas subi de changements par la suite. Par contre, l'alina 3 d) de la Requte figure dans le . Mmoire sous la forme suivante (no 4 d) du Mmoire) : ((Dire et juger que le Gouvernement polonais n'est pas autoris compenser contre la crance susdite du Gouvernement allemand d'tre indemnis sa crance rsultant des assurances sociales en Haute-Silsie ; qu'il ne peut se prvaloir d'aucune autre compensation contre ladite crance d'indemnit ; et que les paiements viss sous a) - c) seront effectus sans aucune dduction au compte des deux Socits prs la Deutsche Bank Berlin. La conclusion primitive se trouve dans le dernier membre de phrase de cette formule, dont la partie principale demande maintenant une dclaration excluant toute possibilit de compensation extra-judiciaire. La formule du Mmoire a t maintenue tant dans la Rplique crite que dans la rplique orale, sauf addition d'une nouvelle conclusion subsidiaire, relative la question de l'interdiction &une compensation extra-judiciaire, et ainsi conue : JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~W FACTORY (MERITS) IO Thus to the main original submission has been added an alternative contemplating the possibility of payment by instalments. The same paragraph is couched in the following terms in the oral reply : [Translation.] It is submitted that the Polish Government should pay the remaining sums at latest within fifteen days after the beginning of the financial year following the judgment; in the alternative that, in so far as payment rnay be effected by instalments, the Polish Government should, within one month from the date of judgment, give bills of exchange for the amounts of the instalments, including interest, payable on maturity to the Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke A.-G. and to the Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.-G. The modification as compared with the previous version consists in the substitution for the date April 15th, 1928, which had already passed, a time-limit fixed in relation to the beginning of the Polish financial year. Paragraph 3 (c) of the submissions of the Application (4 (c) of the Case) has undergone no subsequent modification. On the other hand, paragraph 3 (d) of the Application

appears in the Case in the following form (No. 4 (d) of the Case) : [~ranslat~olz.] that the Polish Government is not entitled to set 'off, against the above-mentioned claim for indemnity of the German Government, its claim in respect of social insurances in Upper Silesia ; that it may not make use of any other set-off against the above-mentioned claim for indemnity ; and that the payments mentioned under (a)-(c) should be made without any deduction to the account of the two Companies with the Deutsche Bank at Berlin. The original submission is contained in the last part of this paragraph, the principal clause of which now seeks a declaration excluding any possibility of extra-judicial set-off. The wording of the Case is retained both in the written and in the oral reply, except that a new alternative submission is added in regard to the question of the prohibition of extrajudicial set-off. This addition runs as follows : Dire et juger, subsidiairement, qu'une compensation n'est autorise que lorsque le Gouvernement polonais invoque cette fin une crance reconnue par le Gouvernement allemand ou constate par un arrt rendu entre les deux Gouvernements. )) Venant, enfin, l'alina 3 e) des conclusions de la Requte, il y a lieu de constater que ce dernier se retrouve sans aucun changement dans la conclusion 3 du Mmoire. Par contre, la Rplique crite, tout en reproduisant galement la formiile de la Requte, y ajoute la conclusion subsidiaire suivante : Juger et dcider que le Gouvernement polonais est oblig de cesser l'exploitation de l'usine, respectivement des installations chimiques pour transformer l'azote de chaux en nitrate d'ammoniaque, etc. )) Ainsi complte, la conclusion dont il s'agit figure galement dans la rplique orale, savoir dans la forme suivante : subsidiairement, pour le cas o la Cour n'adopterait pas les points de vue dvelopps aux paragraphes 55 et 57 de la Rplique, dire et juger que le Gouvernement polonais est oblig de cesser l'exploitation de l'usine, respectivement des installations chimiques pour produire le nitrate d'ammoniaque, etc. )) A l'occasion de certaines conclusions prsentes par le Gouvernement polonais et relatives l'indemnisation de l'Oberschlesische, le Gouvernement allemand a non seulement demand la Cour de les rejeter, mais a encore formul deux autres conclusions, savoir': Dire et juger IO que le Gouvernement polonais n'est pas autoris refuser

le paiement au Gouvernement allemand des indemnits en raison d'arguments tirs de l'article 256 et en raison d'gards vis--vis de la Commission des Rparations et d'autres tierces personnes ; 2' que l'obligation du Gouvernement polonais de payer l'indemnit alloue par la Cour n'est nullement carte par un jugement rendu ou rendre par un tribunal interne polonais dans un procs ayant pour objet la question de la proprit de l'usine sise ChorzOw. JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHOKZ~WFA CTORY (MERITS) , II [Translation.] In the alternative it is submitted that set-off is only permissible if the Polish Government puts fonvard for this purpose a claim in respect of a debt recognized by the German Government or established by a judgrnent given between the two Governments. Turning lastly to paragraph 3 (e) of the submissions in the Application, it is to be observed that this reappears unchanged in submission 3 of the Case. On the other hand, in the written Reply, whilst the submission of the Application is repeated, the following alternative is added : [Translation. j It is submitted that the Polish Government should be obliged to cease the exploitation of the factory and of the chemical equipment for the transformation of nitrate of lime into ammonium nitrate, etc. With this addition, this submission also appears in the oral reply in the following fonn : [Translation.] in the alternative. should the Court not adopt the points of view set out in paragraphs 55 and 57 of the Reply, it is submitted that the Polish Government should be obliged to cease the exploitation of the factory or of the chemical equipment for the production of ammonium nitrate, etc. In connection with certain submissions made by the Polish Government in regard to the compensation of the Oberschlesische, the German Government has not merely asked the Court to reject these submissions but has also formulated two other submissions, namely : [Translation.] (1) that the Polish Government is not entitled to refuse to pay compensation to the German Governrnent on the basis of arguments drawn from Article 256 and for motives of respect for the rights of the Reparation Commission and other third parties ; (2) that the Polish Governrnent's obligation to pay the

indemnity awarded by the Court is in no way set aside by a judgrnent given or to be given by a Polish municipal court in a suit concerning the question of the ownership of the factory at Chorz6w. 2 Ces conclusions, formules soit dans la Rplique crite soit dans la premire plaidoirie de l'agent allemand, ont t maintenues sans changement dans la rplique orale. Abstraction faite de ces deux demandes complmentaires, les conclusions finales du Goiivernement allemand sont donc les suivantes : 1) que, en raison de son attitude vis--vis des Socits anonymes Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke et Bayerische Stickstoffwerke constate par la Cour comme n'tant pas conforme aux dispositions des articles 6 et suivants de la Convention de Genve, le Gouvernement polonais est tenu la rparation du prjudice subi de ce chef par lesdites Socits partir du 3 juillet 1922 jusqu' la date de l'arrt demand ; 2) a) que le montant des indemnits payer au Gouvernement allemand est de 58.400 .ooo Reichsmarks, plus I .656.000 Reichsmarks, plus les intrts 6 % de cette somme partir du 3 juillet 1922 jusqu' la date de l'arrt (pour le dommage caus lJObersch1esische Stickstoffwerke A.-G.) ; b) que le montant des indemnits payer au Gouvernement allemand est de zo.17g.000 Reichsmarks pour le dommage caus la Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.-G. ; 3) que, jusqu'au 30 juin 1931, aucune exportation de chaux azote et de nitrate d'ammoniaque n'aura lieu en Allemagne, dans les tats-unis d'Amrique, en France et en Italie; subsidiairement, que le Gouvernement polonais est oblig de cesser l'exploitation de l'usine, respectivement des installations chimiques pour produire le nitrate d'ammoniaque, etc. ; 4) a) que le Gouvernement polonais devra payer, pendant le dlai d'un mois dater de l'arrt, les indemnits dues 1'Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke A.-G. pour la reprise de son capital d'exploitation, et les indemnits dues la Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.-G. pour la priode d'exploitation du 3 juillet 1922 jusqu' l'arrt ; b) que le Gouvernement polonais doit payer les sommes restantes au plus tard pendant un dlai de quinze jours dater du commencement de l'anne budgtaire qui suit l'arrt ; subsidiairement, que, pour autant que le paiement serait effectu par tranches, le Gouvernement polonais dlivre, pendant le dlai d'un mois dater de l'arrt, des lettres de change aux montants des tranches, y compris les intrts payer aux dates d'chance respectives 1'0berschlesische Stickstoffwerke

A.-G. et la Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.-G. ; c) que, partir de l'arrt, des intrts raison de 6 % l'an seront pays par le Gouvernement polonais; JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~W FACTORY (MERITS) 12 ..* These submissions, which were made in the written Reply and in the first oral statement of the German Agent respectively, have been maintained unaltered in the oral reply. Apart from the two additional claims just referred to, the final submissions of the German Government are therefore as follows : [ Translalion.] (1) that by reason of its attitude in respect of Ohe Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke and Bayerische Stickstoffwerke Companies, which attitude has been declared by the Court not to have been in conformity with the provisions of Article 6 and the following articles of the Geneva Convention, the Polish Government is under an obligation to make good the consequent injury sustained by the aforesaid Companies from July 3rd, 1922, until the date of the judgment sought ; (2) (a) that the amount of the compensation to be paid to the German Government is 58,400,ooo Reichsmarks, plus 1,656,000 Reichsmarks, plus interest at 6 % on this sum as from July yd, 1922, until the date of judgrnent (for the damage caused to the Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke A.-G.) ; (b) that the amount of the compensation to be paid to the German Goverment is zo,17g,ooo Reichsmarks for the damage caused to the Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.-G. ; (3) that until June 3oth, 1931, no ni;rated lime and no nitrate of ammonia should be exported to Germany, to the United States of America, to France or to Italy ; in the alternative, that the Polish Government should be obliged to cease from exploiting the factory or the chemical equipment for the production of nitrate of ammonia, etc. ; (4) (a) that the Polish Government should pay, within one month from the date of judgment, the compensation due to the Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke A.-G. for the taking possession of the working capital and the compensation due to the Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.-G. for the period of exploitation from July 3rd, 1922, to the date of judgment ; (b) that the Polish Government should pay the remaining sums at latest within fifteen days after the beginning of the financial year following the judgment ; in the alternative, that, in so far as payment may be effected by instalments, the Polish Government should within one month from the date of judgment, give bills of exchange for the amounts of the instalments, including interest, payable on maturity to the

Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke A.-G. and to the Bayerische Stickstoffwerke A.-G. ; (c) that from the date of judgment, interest at 6 % per annum should be paid by the Polish Goverment; d) que le Gouvernement polonais n'est pas autoris com' penser contre la crance susdite du Gouvernement allemand d'tre indemnis sa crance rsultant des assurances sociales en Haute-Silsie ; qu'il ne peut se prvaloir d'aucune autre compensation contre ladite crance d'indemnit ; et que les paiements viss sous a) , c) seront effectus sans aucune dduction au compte des deux Socits prs la Deutsche Bank Berlin ; subsidiairement, qu'une compensation n'est autorise que lorsque le Gouvernement polonais invoque cette fin une crance reconnue par le Gouvernement allemand ou constate par un arrt rendu entre les deux Gouvernements. )) Le Gouvernement polonais n'a pas soulev d'objection en la forme contre les modifications apportes successivement aux conclusions primitives du Gouvernement allemand. Les conclusions que le Gouvernement polonais a formules en rponse celles qui se trouvent exprimes dans la Requte et dans le Mmoire allemand sont libelles de la manire suivante dans le Contre-Mmoire : c( Plaise la Cour : A. Pour ce qui concerne 1'Oberschlesische : 1) dbouter le Gouvernement requrant de sa demande ; 2) subsidiairement, surseoir provisoirement sur la demande en indemnit ; 3) trs subsidiairement, pour le cas o la Cour serait amene allouer une indemnit quelconque, dire et juger que celleci ne sera payable que: a) aprs le retrait pralable par ladite Socit de sa requte pendante au Tribunal arbitral mixte germano-polonais relative l'usine de ChorzOw et aprs sa renonciation en bonne et due forme toute prtention contre le Gouvernement polonais, du chef de la prise en possession et de l'exploitation de l'usine de ChorzOw ; b) lorsque le procs civil intent contre ladite Socit par le Gouvernement polonais et ayant pour objet la validit de l'inscription de son titre de proprit au registre foncier sera dfinitivement jug en faveur de la Socit Oberschlesische. 4) En tout cas, dire et juger que le Gouvernement allemand doit, en premier ilieu, livrer au Gouvernement polonais la totalit des actions de la Socit anonyme Oberschlesische JUDGMENT No. I ~ . -CHORZ~FAWCT ORY (MERITS) 13 (d) that the Polish Government is not entitled to sett off against the above-mentioned claim for indemnity of the German

Government, its claim in respect of social insurances in Upper Silesia ; that it may not make use of any other set-off against the said claim for indemnity ; and that the payments mentioned under (a) to (c) should be made without any deduction to the account of the two Companies with the Deutsche Bank at Berlin ; in the alternative, that set-off is only permissible if the Polish Government puts fonvard for this purpose a claim in respect of a debt recognized by the German Government or established by a judgment given between the two Governments. The Polish Government has made no forma1 objection to the amendments successively made in the original submissions of the German Govemment. The submissions formulated by the Polish Government in reply to those set out in the Application and Case of the German Govemment are worded as follows in the Counter-Case : It is submitted : JTranslation.] A. In regard to the Oberschlesische : (1) that the applicant Government's claim should be dismissed ;. (2) in the alternative, that the claim for indemnity should be provisionally suspended ; (3) as a further alternative, in the event of the Court awarding some compensation, that such compensation should only be payable: (a) after the previous withdrawal by the said Company of the action brought by it and pending before the German-Polish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal in regard to the Chorzow factory and after the forma1 abandonment by it of any claim against the Polish Government in respect of the latter's taking possession and exploitation of the Chorzow factory; (b) when the civil action brought against the said Company by the Polish Government in respect of the validity of the entry of its title to ownership in the land register has been finally decided in favour of the Oberschlesische. (4) In any case, it is submitted that the German Government should, in the first place, hand over to the Polish Government the whole of the shares of the Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke, de la valeur nominale de IIO .ooo .ooo de marks dont il dispose en vertu du contrat du 24 dcembre 1919. B. Pour ce qui concerne la Bayerische 1) a) dbouter le Gouvernement requrant de sa demande en indemnit pour le pass, pour autant qu'elle dpasse la somme de ~.ooo.ooo de Reichsmarks;

b) allouer pro Jzttztro une rente annuelle de 250.000 Reichsmarks payable partir du ~ e rja nvier 1928 jusqu'au 31 maPs 1941 ; c) dire et juger que ces indemnits ne seront payables qu'aprs le retrait pralable par ladite Socit de sa requte pendante au Tribunal arbitral mixte germanopolonais relative l'usine de Chorzow, et aprs sa renonciation, en bonne et due forme, toute prtention contre le Gouvernement polonais du chef de la prise en possession et de l'exploitation de l'usine de Chorzow ; 2) dbouter le Gouvernement requrant de sa conclusion no 3, tendant ce qu'il soit dit et jug que, jusqu'au 30 juin 1931, aucune exportation de chaux azote et de nitrate d'ammoniaque n'aura lieu en Allemagne, dans les tatsUnis d'Amrique, en France et en Italie. C. Pour ce qui concerne I'Ober~hlesische et la Bayerische en commun: rejeter la conclusion no 4 tendant ce qu'il soit dit et jug que le Gouvernement polonais n'est pas autoris compenser, contre la crance susdite du Gouvernement allemand d'tre indemnis, sa crance rsultant des assurances sociales en Haute-Silsie ; qu'il ne peut se prvaloir d'aucune autre compensation contre ladite crance d'indemnit, et que les paiements viss sous 4 a) - c) seront effectus sans aucune dduction au compte des deux Socits prs la Deutsche Bank Berlin. )) Ces conclusions n'ont, par la suite, subi d'autres modifications que le retrait, opr au moyen d'une dclaration insre dans la Duplique crite, de la conclusion A, 3 b). Le Gouvernement allemand ayant contest le droit pour le Gouvernement polonais de retirer cette conclusion, laquelle le Gouvernement allemand avait oppos une demande de dbout, dans le stade de la procdure o ce retrait avait eu lieu, le Gouvernement polonais a dclar maintenir le retrait. Pour les motifs dvelopps ci-dessus, la Cour estime qu'il n'y a rien qui puisse empcher le Gouvernement polonais de JUDGMENT No. 1 3 . 4 ~ 0 F~AC~TOR6Y ~(M ERITS) I4 Stickstoffwerke Company, of the nominal value of ~~o,ooo,ooo Marks, which are in its hands under the contract of December 24th) 1919. B. In regard to the Bayerische: (1) (a) that the applicant Goverment's claim for compensation in respect of the past, in excess of ~,ooo,ooo Reichsmarks, should be dismissed ; (b) that, firo Juturo, an annual rent of 250,000 Reichsmarks, payable as from January ~ s t ,1 928, until March 31st,

1941, should be awarded ; (c) that these indemnities should only be payable after previous withdrawal by the said Company of the claim pending before the Geman-Polish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal in respect of the Chorzow factory and after the forma1 abandoment by it of any claim against the Polish Goverment in respect of the latter's taking possession and exploitation of the Chorzow factory ; (2) that the applicant Goverment's third submission to the effect that until June 3oth, 1931, no exportation of nitrated lime or nitrate of ammonia should take place to Germany, the United States of America, France or Italy, should be dismissed. C. In regard to the Oberschlesische and Bayerische jointly : that submission No. 4-to the effect that it is not permissible for the Polish Government to set off, against the abovementioned claim for indemnity of the German Goverment, its claim in respect of social insurances in Upper Silesia, that it may not make use of any other set-off against the abovementioned claim for indemnity, and that the payments mentioned under 4 (a)-(c) should be made without any deduction to the account of the two Companies with the Deutsche Bank at Berlin-should be rejected. These submissions have not subsequently been amended except that submission A, 3 (b), was withdrawn by means of a declaration contained in the written Rejoinder. The German Government having disputed the right of the Polish Government to withdraw this submission (the rejection of which had been demanded by the former) at the stage of the proceedings reached when the withdrawal took place, the latter Government maintained its withdrawal. For the reasons given above, the Court holds that there is nothing to prevent the Polish Government for its part from modifier, quant lui, ses conclusion primitives, d'autant moins que cette modification s'est produite encore au cours de la phase crite de la procdure et a pris la forme d'un abandon d'une partie des conclusions. De l'avis de la Cour, la seconde des a demandes complmentaires di1 Goiivernement allemand, mentionne ci-dessus, se dirigeait sans doute contre la conclusion polonaise qiii a t abandonne. La Cour considre, par consquent, qu'elle se trouve en prsence de conclusions finales polonaises ainsi libelles : (( Plaise la Cour : A. pour ce qui concerne 1'Oberschlesische : 1) dbouter le Gouvernement requrant de sa demande ; 2) subsidiairement, surseoir provisoirement sur la demande en

indemnit ; 3) trs subsidiairement, pour le cas o la Cour serait amene allouer une indemnit quelconque, dire et juger que celle-ci ne sera payable qu'aprs le retrait pralable par ladite Socit de sa requte pendante au Tribunal arbitral mixte germano-polonais relative l'usine de ChorzOw et aprs sa renonciation en bonne et due fonne toute prtention contre le Gouvernement polonais, du chef de la prise en possession et de l'exploitation de l'usine de Chorzow. 4) En tout cas, dire et juger que le Gouvernement allemand doit, en premier lieu, livrer au Gouvernement polonais la totalit des actions de la Socit anonyme Oberschlesische Stickstofierke, de la valeur nominale de ~~o.ooo.ooode marks, dont il dispose en vertu du contrat du 24 dcembre 1919. B. Pour ce qui concerne la Bayerische : I) a) dbouter le Gouvernement requrant de sa demande en indemnit pour le pass, pour autant qu'elle dpasse la somme de r.ooo.ooo de Reichsmarks ; b) allouer pro fatm;o une rente annuelle de 250.000 Reichsmarks payable partir du ~ e rja nvier 1928 jusqu'au 31 mars 1941 ; c) dire et juger que ces indemnits ne seront payables qu'aprs le retrait pralable par ladite Socit de sa requte pendante au Tribunal arbitral mixte germanoJUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~W FACTORY (MERITS) I.5 amending its original submissions, especially seeing that this amendment occurred while the written proceedings were still in progress and took the fonn of the abandonment of a part of its submissions. In the Court's opinion, the second of the "additional claims" of the German Government mentioned above, was doubtless designed to meet the Polish submission which has been thus abandoned. The Court therefore considers that the final submissions of the Polish. Government may be set down as under : "It is submitted : A. As regards the Oberschlesische : (1) that the claim of the applicant Government should be dismissed ; (2) in the alternative, that the claim for indemnity should be provisionally suspended ; (3) as a further alternative, in the event of the Court awarding some compensation, that such compensation should only be payable after the previous withdrawal by the said Company of the action brought by it and pending before the German-Polish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal in regard

to the Chorzow factory, and after the forma1 abandonment by it of any claim against the Polish Government in respect of the latter's taking possession and exploitation of the Chorz6w factory. (4) In any case, it is submitted that the German Government should, in the first place, hand over to the Polish Government the whole of the shares of the Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke Company, of the nominal value of ~~o,ooo,ooo Marks, which are in its hands under the contract of December 24th, 1919. B. As regards the Bayerische : (1) (a) that the applicant Government's claim for compensation in respect of the past, in excess of ~,ooo,ooo Reichsmarks, should be dismissed ; (6) that, pro futu~o, an annual rent of 250,000 Reichsmarks, payable as from January rst, 1928, until March 31st, 1941, should be awarded ; (c) that these indemnities should only be payable after previous withdrawal by the said Company of the claim pending before the German-Polish Mixed Arbitral polonais relative l'usine de ChorzOw, et aprs sa renonciation, en bonne et due forme, toute prtention contre le Gouvernement polonais du chef de la prise en possession et de l'exploitation de I'usine de Chorz6w ; 2) dbouter le Gouvernement requrant de sa conclusion no 3 tendant ce qu'il soit dit et jug que, jusqu'au 30 juin 1931, aucune exportation de chaux azote et de nitrate d'ammoniaque n'aura lieu en Allemagne, dans les tatsUnis d'Amrique, en France et en Italie. C. Pour ce qui concerne 1'Oberschlesische et la Bayerische en commun : rejeter la conclusion no 4 tendant ce qu'il soit dit et jug que le Gouvernement polonais n'est pas autoris compenser contre la crance susdite du Gouvernement allemand d'tre indemnis, sa crance rsultant des assurances sociales en Haute-Silsie ; qu'il ne peut se prvaloir d'aucune autre compensation contre ladite crance d'indemnit, et que les paiements viss sous 4 a) - c) seront effectus sans aucune dduction au compte des deux Socits prs la Deutsche Bank Berlin. D'une comparaison entre les conclusions finales allemandes et polonaises qui ont t ainsi tablies, il ressort : 1. - A) en ce qui concerne la conclusion allemande no I : qu'il y a dsaccord entre les Parties, sauf pour ce qui est de la rparation du dommage subi par la Bayerische ;

B) en ce qui concerne la conclusion allemande no 2 a : que le Gouvernement polonais demande que le Gouvernement allemand soit dbout ; et, subsidiairement, qu'il soit sursis provisoirement la demande en indemnit; c'est sans doute contre la demande subsidiaire oppose ainsi par le Gouvernement polonais la conclusion no 2 a du Gouvernement allemand que se dirige la premire des (1 demandes complmentaires )) de ce Gouvernement, mentionnes plus haut ; C) en ce qui concerne la conclusion allemande no 2 b : que le Gouvernement polonais demande que le Gouvernement allemand en soit dbout, sauf pour ce JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~W FACTORY (MERITS) 16 Tribunal in respect of the Chorz6w factory and after the forma1 abandonment by it of any claim against the Polish Governrnent in respect of the latter's taking possession and exploitation of the Chorz6w factory; (2) that the applicant Government's third submission to the effect that until June 3oth, 1931, no exportation of nitrate of lime or nitrate of ammonia should take place to Germany, the United States of America, France or Italy. C. As regards the Oberschlesische and Bayerische jointly : that submission No. 4-to the effect that it is not perrnissible for the Polish Governrnent to set off against the abovementioned claim for indemnity of the German Government its claim in respect of social insurances in Upper Silesia, that it may not make use of any other set-off against the abovementioned claim for indemnity, and that the payrnents mentioned under 4 (a)-(c) should be made without any deduction to the account of the two Companies with the Deutsche Bank at Berlin-should be rejected. A cornparison between the German and Polish final submissions as thus set out leads to the following results : 1.-(A) as regards the first German submission : that the Parties are at variance except in regard to the reparation of the damage sustained by the Bayerische ; (B) as regards submission No. 2 a of the German Government : that the Polish Government asks that it should be dismissed ; and, in the alternative, that the claim for indemnity should be provisionally suspended ; it is doubtless the alternative claim thus put forward by Poland in reply to subrnission No. 2 a of the German Government that the first of the "additional claims" of the latter Government mentioned above is intended to meet ; (C) as regards submission No. 2 b of the German Government :

that the Polish Government asks that it should be dismissed except as regards the award, in respect of qui est de l'allocation, pour le .pass, d'une somme ne dpassant pas ~.ooo.ooo de Reichsmarks et, pour l'avenir, d'une rente annuelle de z50.000 Reichsmarks payable du I ~ 'ja nvier 1928 au 31 mars 1941 ; D) en ce qui concerne la conclusion allemande no 3 : que le Gouvernement polonais demande que le Gouvernement ailemand soit dbout de la conclusion princifiale, mais ne se prononce pas en forme de conclusion sur la conclusion subsidiaire inscrite sous ce numro ; E) en ce qui concerne les conclusions allemandes no 4 a) - c) : que le Gouvernement polonais ne se prononce pas spcifiquement sur ces conclusions, sauf en formulant sa conclusion A 3, relative au sursis de paiement ; F) en ce qui concerne la conclusion allemande no 4 d) : que le Gouvernement polonais conclut au rejet de la conclusion $ri.ncipale portant ce numro, mais ne se prononce pas en forme de conclusion sur la conclusion subsidiaire allemande. II. - En ce qui concerne les conclusions polonaises : que la conclusion A 4, dpassant le cadre des conclusions allemandes, a provoqu de la part du Gouvernement allemand une demande en rejet, formule au cours de la phase orale de la procdure. C'est donc exclusivement sur les points de divergence ainsi constats qu'il appartient la Cour de statuer dans l'arrt qu'elle va rendre. Il est vrai que les Parties ont formul, au cours de la procdure tant crite qu'orale, encore d'autres demandes. Pour autant, cependant, que ces demandes ne ' constituent pas des dveloppements des conclusions primitives, ou des demandes subsidiaires ces conclusions, la Cour ne saurait les regarder autrement que, suivant l'expression de l'agent du Gouvernement allemand, comme des motivations titre subsidiaire , ou bien comme de simples suggestions quant , la procdure suivre ; cela est certainement le cas en ce qui concerne les nombreuses demandes tendant obtenir la consulJUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~W FACTORY (MERITS) =7 the past, of a sum not exceeding ~,ooo,ooo Reichsmarks for the future, of an annual rent of z50,ooo Reichs- , marks payable as from January ~ s t , 1928, until March p s t , 1941 ; (D) as regards the Geman submission No. 3 : that the Polish Govemment asks that the German Government's principal submission should be dismissed but does not

formulate a definite submission with regard to the alternative submission under this number ; (E) as regards the German submissions Nos. 4 (a)-(c) : that the Polish Govemment does not Say anything specific conceming these submissions except in so far as it formulates its submission A 3, regarding the suspension of payrnent ; (F) as regards the German Government's subrnission No. 4 (d) : that the Polish Government submits that the principal submission under this number should be rejected, but does not formulate any definite submission regarding the alternative German submission. II.- As regards the Polish submissions : that submission A 4, which goes beyond the scope of the German submissions, has given rise to a claim for its rejection on the part of the German Government, formulated during the oral proceedings. It is therefore solely with the points of divergence as set out above that the Court has to deal in the judgment which it is about to deliver. It is true that the Parties have, both in the written and oral proceedings, formulated yet other claims. In so far, however, as these claims do not constitute developments of the original submissions, or alternatives to them, the Court cannot regard them otherwise than-to use the expression of the Agent of the German Government-as "subsidiary arguments" or as mere suggestions as to the procedure to be adopted ; this is certainly the case as regards the numerous requests with a view to the consultation of experts or the hearing of witnesses. There is no occasion for the Court tation d'experts ou l'audition de tmoins. Sur toutes ces demandes, la Cour n'a pas besoin de statuer ; elle peut donc se borner en tenir compte, dans la mesure o cela convient, au cours de la discussion, aux fins de l'expos des motifs de l'arrt des arguments avancs par les Parties l'appui de leurs conclusions. Les Parties ont soumis la Cour de nombreux documents, suit comme annexes aux pices de la procdure crite, soit au cours des dbats oraux, soit, enfin, i la suite de demandes formules ou de questions poses par la Cour. (Annexe.) EL:, LA POINT DE FAIT. Les faits qui se trouvent la base de la prsente affaire ont dj t succinctement exposs ou rappels dans les Arrts nos 6, .7, 8 et II rendus par la Cour les 25 aot 1925, 25 mai 1926, 26 juillet 1927, et 16 dcembre 1927. Le prsent arrt, cependant, doit s'occuper de l'affaire dite de l'usine de ChorzOw un point de vue o la Cour n'a pas

eu se placer antrieurement, savoir, celui de la nature et, le cas chant, du montant ainsi que des modalits de paiement - de la rparation due ventuellement par la Pologne pour avoir, ainsi que l'a constat6 la Cour par son Arrt no 7, adopt une attitude qui n'tait pas conforme la Convention de Genve du 15 mai 1922. Il y a donc lieu, avant d'aborder le point de droit soulev par la Requte allemande du 8 fvrier 1927, de retracer brivement les faits pertinents ce point de vue particulier. Le 5 mars 1915 avait t conclu entre le chancelier de 1'Empire allemand, pour le Reich et la Bayerische, un contrat aux termes duquel la Socit s'engageait ((installer pour le Reich et commencer immdiatement construire , entre autres, une usine d'azote de chaux ChorzOw en Haute-Silsie. Les terrains ncessaires seraient acquis pour le compte du Reich JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~WFA CTORY (MERITS) 18 to pass upon al1 these requests ; it may therefore confine itself to taking them into account, in so far as may be necessary during the discussion of the arguments advanced by the Parties in support of their submissions, for the purposes of stating the reasons of the judgment. The Parties have presented to the Court numerous documents either as annexes to the documents of the written proceedings or in the course of the hearings, or, lastly, in response to requests made or questions put by the Court. (Annex.) THE FACTS. The facts underlying the present suit have already been succinctly stated or referred to in Judgments Nos. 6, 7, 8 and II, given by the Court on August z5th, 1925, May zgth, 1926, July z6th, 1927, and December 16th, 1927. The present judgment, however, must deal with the so-called case of the factory at Chorz6w from a point of view with which the Court has not hitherto had to concern itself, namely, that of the nature-and, if necessary, the amount and method of payment-of the reparation which may be due by Poland in consequence of her having, as established by the Court in Judgment No. 7, adopted an attitude not in conformity with the Geneva Convention of May 15th, 1922. Accordingly, it is necessary, before approaching the point of law raised by the German Application of February 8th, 1927, briefly to trace out the relevant facts from this particular standpoint. On March 5th, 1915, a contract was concluded between the Chancellor of the German Empire, on behalf of the Reich, and the Bayerische, according to which that Company undertook "to establish for the Reich and forthwith to begin the construction of", amongst other things, a nitrate factory at Chorzow

in Upper Silesia. The necessary lands were to be acquired on et inscrits son nom dans le livre foncier. Les installations mcaniques devaient tre tablies conformment aux brevets et licences ainsi qu'aux expriences de la Socit, qui s'engageait diriger, jusqu'au 31 mars 1941, l'exploitation de l'usine, en utilisant l'ensemble des brevets, licences, expriences et innovations, amliorations et perfectionnements, ainsi que tous contrats de fournitures et de livraisons qui lui revenaient. Dans ce but, une section spciale de la Socit devait tre tablie ; elle serait soumise, dans une certaine mesure, au contrle du Reich, qui avait le droit de participer, pour chaque adne financire, l'excdent rsultant de l'exploitation. Le Reich avait le droit de rsilier au 31 mars de chaque anne partir du 3r mars 1926, aprs pravis de quinze mois, la direction de l'usine par la Socit. Cette rsiliation pouvait avoir lieu dj partir du 31 mars 1921, toujours aprs pravis de quinze mois, si la participation du Reich l'excdent n'atteignait pas un niveau dtermin. Ce contrat fut plus tard complt par une srie de sept contrats additionnels, dont, cependant, seuls les deuxime et septime, conclus les 16 novenibre 1916 et 22 novembre 1918 respectivement, ont trait l'usine de ChorzOw. Le 14 mai 1919, la Bayerische intenta un procs contre le Reich, demandant que celui-ci ft tenu ddommager la Socit pour le prjudice qu'elle aurait souffert la suite de certains nanquements allgus l'excution du contrat du 5 mars 1915 et des contrats additionnels. Cette affaire, toutefois, fut liquide l'amiable par une transaction conclue le 24 octobre Igrg entre le Reich et la Bayerische, transaction qui, remplaant le cinquime contrat additionnel, n'avait pas trait l'usine de Chorzow. Le 24 dcembre 1919 furent passs Berlin divers actes juridiques notaris ayant pour but la cration d'une nouvelle Socit, l'Oberschlesische, au capital social de 2jo.000 marks, augment plus tard ~~o.ooo.oodoe marks, et la vente par le Reich cette Socit de l'usine de Chorzow, c'est--dire de l'ensemble des terrains, btiments et installations y appartenant, avec tous accessoires, rserves, matires premires et matriaux d'exploitation, ainsi que les stocks. La direction et l'exploitaJUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~WFA CTORY (MERITS) I9 behalf of the Reich and entered in its name in the land register. The machinery and equipment were to be in accordance with the patents and licences of the Company and the experience gained by it, and the Company undertook to manage the factory until March pst, 1941, making use of al1 patents, licences, experience gained, innovations and improvements,

as also of al1 supply and delivery contracts of which it had the benefit. For this purpose, a special section of the Company was to be formed which was, to a certain extent, to be subject to the supervision of the Reich, which had the right to a share of the profits resulting from the working of the factory during each financial year. The Reich had the right, commencing on March 31st, 1926, to terminate the contract for the management of the factory by the Company on March 31st of any year upon giving fifteen months' notice. The contract could be determined as early as March p s t , 1921, always on condition of fifteen months' notice being given, if the Reich's share of the surplus did not reach a fixed level. This contract was subsequently supplemented by a series of seven additional contracts, of which, however, only the second and seventh, concluded on November 16th, 1916, and November mnd, 1918, respectively, relate to the Chorzow factory. On May 14th, 1919, the Bayerische brought an action against the Reich, claiming that the latter was bound to compensate the Company for the damage said to have been suffered by it, owing to certain alleged shortcomings with respect to the fulfilment of the contract of March 5th, 1915, and the additional contracts. This matter was, however, settled out of court by an arrangement concluded on October 24th, 1919, between the Reich and the Bayerische, an arrangement which replaced the fifth additional contract and did not relate to the Chorzow f actory. On December 24th, 1919, a series of legal instruments were signed and legalized at Berlin with a view to the formation of a new Company, the Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke A.-G., with a share capital of 250,000 marks, increased subsequently to IIO millions of marks, and the sale by the Reich to this Company of the factory at Chorzow, that is to say, the whole of the land, buildings and installations belonging thereto, with al1 accessories, reserves, raw material, equipment and stocks. The tion de l'usine devaient rester entre les mains de la Bayerische, qui utiliserait dans ce but ses brevets, licences, expriences et contrats. Ces rapports entre les deux Socits furent confirms au moyen de lettres changes entre elles, dates des 24 et 28 dcembre 1919. L'Oberschlesische fut dment inscrite, le 29 janvier 1920, 19Amtsgericht de Konigshtte, dans le livre foncier de Chorzow, comme propritaire des biens-fonds qui constituaient l'usine d'azote de Chorzow. Le sige sociaI de llOberschlesische qui, aux termes de l'acte de fondation, tait 6tabli Chorzow, fut, dans la suite, par acte du 14 janvier 1920, transfr Berlin. Dans le contrat du 24 dcembre 1919 entre le Reich et

l'oberschlesische nouvellement cre, intervint galement une deuxime Socit, responsabilit limite, cre le mme jour, et appele Stickstog Treuhand Gesellschaft m. b. H. (ci-aprs dnomme la Treuhand ), Socit dont le capital social tait de 300.000 marks, augment plus tard ~.ooo.ooo de marks. Aux termes du contrat, l'ensemble de l'usine pour la production de l'azote chaux avec installations accessoires, sise Chorzow, fut cd par le Reich 1'Oberschlesische au prix de ~~o.ooo.oodoe marks environ, prix calcul sur certaines donnes indiques dans le contrat mme, - la Treuhand reprenant aux lieu et place de l'Oberschlesische, comme dbiteur unique et indpendant, toutes les obligations que le contrat imposait cette Socit l'gard du Reich et obtenant, comme contre-prestation sans payement, des actions de lJOberschlesische de la valeur nominale de 1og.750.000 marks. Plus tard, la Treuhand a acquis galement les actions restantes de I'Oberschlesische et est ainsi devenue l'actionnaire unique de cette Socit. En garantie des crances appartenant au Reich en vertu du contrat, la Treuhand s'engageait procurer au Reich le droit de gage sur toutes les actions de 1'Oberschlesische. La Treuhand amortirait le prix d'achat exclusivement en versant au Reich des dividendes sur les actions de l1Oberschlesische. Nanmoins, la Treuhand tait autorise payer, tout moment, en tout ou en partie, le prix d'achat, ce qui aurait pour effet de librer du gage les actions dont le capital nominaL correspondrait au versement ainsi effectu. Le Reich tait autaJUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~WF ACTORY (MERITS) 2 O management and working of the factory were to remain in the hands of the Bayerische, which, for this purpose, was to utilize its patents, licences, experience gained and contracts. These relations between the two Companies were confirmed by means of letters dated December 24th and 28th, 1919, exchanged between them. The Oberschlesische was duly , entered, on January zgth, 1920, at the Amtsgericht of Konigshtte, in the Chorzow land register, as owner of the landed property constituting the nitrate factory at Chorzow. The registered office of the Oberschlesische which, under the memorandum of association, was established at Chorzow, was subsequently, by an amendment executed on January 14th, 1920, transferred to Berlin. In the contract of December zqth, 1919, between the Reich and the newly created Oberschlesische, a second limited liability Company, founded the same day and known as the Stickstol'f Treuhand Gesellschaft m. b. H. (hereinafter called the "Treuhand") was also concerned. This Company had a share capital of 300,ooo marks, subsequently increased to ~,ooo,ooo

marks. Under the contract, the whole of the factory for the production of nitrated lime, with the accessory installations, situated at Chorzow, was ceded by the Reich to the Oberschlesische at the price of approximately IIO million marks,-which price was calculated according to certain data indicated in the contract itself,-the Treuhand taking over, in the place of the Oberschlesische, as sole and independent debtor, al1 the obligations imposed by the contract upon the latter in regard to the Reich, and obtaining in consideration thereof, without payment, shares of the Oberschlesische-to the nominal value of 1og,75o,ooo marks. Later, the Treuhand also acquired the rest of the shares of the Oberschlesische, thus becoming the sole shareholder of that Company. As guarantee for the sums due to the Reich under the contract, the Treuhand undertook to obtain for the Reich a lien on al1 the shares of the Oberschlesische. The Treuhand was to liquidate the purchase price exclusively by paying to the Reich the dividends on the shares of the Oberschlesische. Nevertheless, the Treuhand was authorized to pay at any time the whole or a part of the purchase price ; this would have the effect of removing the lien on shares of a nominal value corresponding to the payment ris exercer lui-mme tous les droits dcoulant de la possession des actions et en particulier le droit de vote l'assemble gnrale, mais se dclarait d'accord pour maintenir la direction de l'exploitation de l'Oberschlesische entre les mains de la Bayerische. Une alination des actions engages ne serait autorise, mme aprs l'expiration du droit de gage, qu'avec l'assentiment du Reich. En garantie de l'excution de cette obligation, le Reich conserverait, mme aprs cette expiration, la possession des actions et l'exercice de tous les droits dcoulant de cette possession. Le prix ralis lors d'une vente ventuelle des actions servirait en premier lieu amortir le solde de la crance du Reich. De tout excdent, le Reich toucherait, le cas chant, soit les 85 % - si la vente tait faite par la Treuhand -, soit les go % - si elle tait faite par le Reich ; dans les deux cas, le solde seulement reviendrait la Treuhand, qui, cependant, dans la seconde ventualit, obtenait le droit d'acqurir les actions au prix auquel le Reich dsirait les raliser. Le 15 mai 1922 fut signe Genve entre l'Allemagne et la Pologne la Convention relative la Haute-Silsie. Aprs la signature de cette Convention, mais avant la cession effective de la Haute-Silsie polonaise la Pologne, la Treuhand offrit, par lettre du 26 mai 1922, une socit suisse, la Compagnie d'azote et de fertilisants S. A. Genve, une option jusqu' la fin de l'anne pour l'achat, au prix de

cinq millions de francs suisses verser au plus tard le 2 janvier 1923, de la moiti (55 millions de marks) des actions de l'Oberschlesische, -moyennant quoi la socit genevoise obtiendrait, entre autres, le droit de participer aux ngociations avec le Gouvernement polonais. Cette offre n'aboutit pas. Le I~~ juillet 1922, le Tribunal polonais de Huta Krolewska, qui avait succd I'Arntsgevicht de Konigshtte, rendit une dcision suivant laquelle l'enregistrement prs ce Tribunal de 1'Oberschlesische comme propritaire de l'usine en question, dclar nul, devait tre ray, la situation antrieure rtablie, et le droit de proprit sur les biens-fonds dont il s'agit enregistr ail profit du Fisc de l'tat polonais. Cette dcision, qui JUDGMENT NO. 13.-CHORZ~W FACTORY (MERITS) 21 made. The Reich was authorized itself to exercise al1 the rights resulting from the possession of the shares, and in particular the right to vote at the general meeting of shareholders, but agreed that the management of the exploitation of the Oberschlesische should be left in the hands of the Bayerische. An alienation of the shares so pledged would be authorized only with the approval of the Reich, even after the lien had expired. As a guarantee for the fulfilment of this obligation, the Reich would, even after expiration of the lien, retain possession of the shares and the exercise of al1 rights resulting from such possession. The price realized in the event of a sale of the shares was in the first place to be devoted to the liquidation of the balance of the Reich's claim. Of any surplus, the Reich was to receive either 85%-if the sale were effected by the Treuhand-or go %-if it were effected by the Reich; in both cases, the balance only would fa11 to the Treuhand which, however, in the second case, would obtain a right to acquire the shares at the price at which the Reich wished that they should be disposed of. On May 15th, 1922, was signed at Geneva between Germany and Poland the Convention conceming Upper Silesia. After the signature of this Convention, but before the actual cession of Polish Upper Silesia to Poland, the Treuhand, by a letter dated May z6th, 1922, offered to a Swiss Company, the Compagnie d'azote et de fertilisants S. A. at Geneva, an option until the end of the year for the purchase, at a price of five million Swiss francs, to be paid by January znd, 1923, at latest, of one half (55 million marks) of the shares of the Obers~hlesische, in consideration of which the Genevese Company would, amongst other things, acquire the right to take part in the negotiations with the Polish Government. This offer came to nothing.

On July ~ s t ,1 922, the Polish Court of Huta Krolewska, which had replaced the Anztsgericht of Konigshtte, gave a decision to the effect that the registration with this Court of the Oberschlesische as owner of the factory, which was declared nul1 and void, was to be cancelled and the previously existing situation restored and that the right of ownership in the landed property in question was to be registered in the name of the invoquait l'article 256 du Trait de Versailles, ainsi que les lois polonaises des 14 juillet 1920 et 16 juin 1922, fut mise excution le mme jour. Le 3 juillet suivant, M. Ignacy Moscicki, nomm fond de pouvoirs gnral de l'usine de Chorzow, par un dcret ministriel polonais du 24 juin 1922, prit possession de l'usine et en assuma l'administration, conformment aux termes du dcret ; le Gouvernement allemand a allgu, et le Gouvernement polonais n'a pas contest, que ledit fond de pouvoirs, en entreprenant la gestion de l'exploitation de l'usine, se mit en mme temps en possession des biens meubles et des brevets, licences, etc. Aprs avoir saisi l'usine, le Gouvernement polonais l'inscrivit sur la liste des biens lui transfrs en vertu de l'article 256 du Trait de Versailies, liste qu'il a dment notifie la Commission des Rparations. Le Gouvernement polonais allgue qu' la suite de l'Arrt no 7 de la Cour, le Gouvernement allemand a demand la radiation de l'usine de la liste en question ; il n'a cependant pas t inform que cette radiation ait t effectue. Entre temps, I'Oberschlesische avait introduit, le 15 novembre 1922, devant le Tribunal arbitral mixte germano-polonais Paris, une requte concluant faire condamner le Gouvernement polonais notamment la restitution de l'usine. Cette requte, signifie au Gouvernement dfendeur le 17 janvier 1923, fut retire par 1'Oberschlesische en juin 1928, avant que le Tribunal et eu l'occasion de statuer. L'Oberschlesische intenta une action parallle concernant les biens meubles qui se trouvaient Chorz6w lors de la prise de l'usine, en ouvrant, le 24 novembre 1922, une procdure contre le Fisc polonais devant le Tribunal civil de Katowice, procdure dont le but tait d'obtenir soit la restitution l'Oberschlesische ou la Bayerische de ces biens, soit le remboursement de leur valeur ; ce procs n'aboutit cependant aucune dcision quant au fond. En ce qui la concerne, la Bayerische a, elle aussi, intent, le 25 mars 1925, devant le Tribunal arbitral mixte germano-poloJUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~WF ACTORY ' (MERITS) 22 Polish Treasury. This decision, which cited Article 256 of the

Treaty of Versailles and the Polish laws of July 14th, 1920, and June 16th, 1922, was carried into effect on the same day. On July 3rd, 1922, M. Ignacy Moscicki, who was delegated with full powers to take charge of the factory at Chorzow by a Polish ministerial decree of June 24th, 1922, took possession of the factory and took over the management in accordance with the terms of the decree. The German Government contended, and the Polish Government did not deny, that the said delegate, in undertaking the control of the working of the factory, at the same time took possession of the movable property, patents, licences, etc. After having taken over the factory, the Polish Government entered it in the list of property transferred to it under Article 256 of the Treaty of Versailles, which list was duly rcommunicated to the Reparation Commission. The Polish Government alleges that after the pronouncement of Judgment No. 7 by the Court, the German Government asked that the factory should be stmck out of the list in question; the former Government has not, however, been informed whether this has been done. In the meantime, the Oberschlesische, on November 15th, 1922, had brought an action before the German-Polish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal at Paris, claiming, amongst other things, that the Polish Government should be ordered to restore the factory. This action, notice of which was served upon the respondent Government on January 17th, 1923, was "thdrawn by the Oberschlesische in June 1928, before the Tribunal had been able to give a decision. The Oberschlesische, on November 24th, 1922, instituted a paralle1 action in regard to the movable property existing at Chordw at the time of the taking over of the factory, against the Polish Treasury before the Civil Court of Katowice, with a view to obtaining either the restitution to the Oberschlesische or the Bayerische of such property, or the payment of the equivalent value. This action however led to no decision on the merits. As regards the Bayerische, that Company also, on March 25th, 1925, brought an action before the German-Polish Mixed nais, une action contre le Fisc polonais, en vue d'obtenir une indemnit annuelle jusqu' la restitution de l'usine I'Oberschlesische et de se faire restituer la possession et la direction de l'usine. La requte introduisant cette instance fut signifie au Gouvernement dfendeur le 16 dcembre 1925 ; mais l'affaire fut retire en juin 1928, en mme temps que l'instance introduite par l'Oberschlesische, et dans les mmes conditions. L'Arrt no 7 de la Cour fut rendu le 25 mai 1926. Cet arrt

fut la source d'vnements qui se dvelopprent dans deux directions diffrentes. D'une part, en effet, sur l'initiative du Gouvernement allemand, il vint former le point de dpart pour des ngociations directes entre les deux Gouvernements intresss. De ces ngociations il y a lieu de retenir ici uniquement que, le 14 janvier 1927, le Gouvernement allemand avait reconnu que l'usine ne pouvait plus tre restitue en nature, et que, par consquent, la rparation due devait en principe prendre la forme du versement d'une indemnit, dclaration d'ailleurs formellement rpte dans le Mmoire. Les ngociations, par ailleurs, n'aboutirent pas, cause notamment du fait que, de l'avis du Gouvernement polonais, la ncessit d'une compensation entre l'indemnit allouer l'Allemagne et diffrents montants dont la Pologne serait crancire de l'Allemagne, s'imposerait. Leur insuccs eut pour rsultat la prsente instance. D'autre part, l'Arrt no 7 de la Cour provoqua de la part du Gouvernement polonais une requte adresse au Tribunal polonais de Katowice contre l'Oberschlesische et demandant qu'il ft dclar que celle-ci n'tait pas devenue propritaire des biens-fonds de Chorzow ; que l'inscription au registre foncier opre en sa faveur le 29 janvier 1922 tait dpourvue de validit ; et que - indpendamment des lois du 14 juillet 1920 et 16 juin 1922 - la proprit des biens-fonds en question revenait au Fisc de l'tat polonais. L'arrt du Tribunal sur cette requte - arrt qui, rendu par contumace, fut publi le 12 novembre 1927 et entra en force de chose juge le 2 janvier 1928 - fit droit toutes les conclusions du demandeur. JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~WF ACTORY (MERITS) 23 Arbitral Tribunal against the Polish Treasury with a view to obtaining an annual indemnity until the restitution of the factory to the Oberschlesische, and to causing the possession and management of the factory to be restored to it. Notice of this action was served on the respondent Government on December 16th, 1925 ; but the case was withdrawn in June 1928, at the sarne time as the action brought by the Oberschlesische and in the same circumstances. The Court's Judgment No. 7 was given Qn May 25th, 1926. This judgment was the source of developments tending in two different directions. On the one hand, at the initiative of the German Government, it formed the starting point for direct negotiations between the two Governments concerned. In regard to these negotiations, it is only necessary here to note that, on January 14th, 192.7, the German Government had recognized that the factory could no longer be restored in kind and that consequently

the reparation due must, in principle, take the form of the payment of compensation, a statement which is moreover formally repeated in the Case. The negotiations were unsuccessful owing, amongst other things, to the fact that, in the opinion of the Polish Government, certain claims which Poland was said to have against Germany, must be set off against the indemnity to be awarded to Germany. The failure of the negotiations resulted in the institution of the present proceedings. On the other hand, the Court's Judgment No. 7 gave rise on the part of the Polish Government to the bringing of an action before the Polish Court of Katowice against the Oberschlesische in order to obtain a declaration that that Company had not become owner of the landed property at Chorz6w; that the entry in the land register made in its favour on . January zgth, 1922, was not valid, and that-independently 'of the laws of July q t h , 1920, and June 16th, 1922,-the ownership of the landed property in question fell to the Polish Treasury. The judgment of the Court in this actionwhich was given by default-was published on November ~ z t h , 1927, and took effect on January znd, 1928 ; it admitted al1 the submissions of the claimant. Entre temps, la Cour avait t saisie, le 18 octobre 1927, d'une nouvelle requte, manant du Gouvernement allemand qui, se fondant sur les dispositions de l'article 60 du Statut et l'article 66 du Rglement de la Cour, demanda celle-ci de donner une interprtation de ses Arrts no 7, du 25 mai 1926, et no 8, du 26 juillet 1927, dont le sens et la porte seraient devenus litigieux entre les deux Gouvernements, savoir, sur le point qui avait servi d'origine la procdure devant le Tribunal de Katowice. La Cour rendit, le 16 dcembre 1927, son arrt, qui porte le no II, sur ladite requte. A teneur de cet arrt, la Cour avait entendu reconnatre, par son Arrt no 7, avec force obligatoire pour les Parties au litige et dans le cas dcid, entre autres choses, le droit de proprit de 1'0berschlesische sur l'usine de ChorzOw au point de vue du droit civil. Tandis que la procdure relative la demande en interprtation se poursuivait, le Gouvernement allemand, par Requte date du 14 octobre 1927 et dpose au Greffe le 15 novembre suivant, demanda la Cour d'indiquer au Gouvernement polonais qu'il devait payer au Gouvernement allemand, titre provisoire, la somme de trente millions de Reichsmarks. La Cour, statuant sur cette demande, qui tait prsente sur la base de l'article 41 du Statut, dcida par une ordoniance, rend'ue le 21 novembre 1927, qu'il n'y avait pas lieu d'y donner

suite, la demande du Gouvernement allemand devant tre considre comme visant non l'indication de mesures conservatoires, mais bien l'adjudication d'une partie des conclusions de la Requte du 8 fvrier 1927. JUDGMENT No. I~.-CHORZ~WFA CTORY (MERITS) 24 Meanwhile, on October 18th, 1927, the Court had received a fresh application from the German Government which, relying on the terms of Article 60 of the Statute and Article 66 of the Rules of Court, prayed the Court to give an interpretation of its Judgments Nos. 7, of May zsth, 1926, and 8, of July 26th, 1927, alleging that a divergence of opinion had arisen between the two Governments in regard to the meaning and scope of these two judgments in connectio~i with the point which had given rise to the proceedings before the Court of Katowice. The Court, on December 16th, 1927, delivered its judgment in this suit (No. II). According to this judgment the Court's intention in Judgment No. 7 had been to recognize, with binding effect between the Parties concerned and in respect of that particular case, amongst other things, the right of ownership of the Oberschlesische in the Chorzow factory under municipal law . Whilst the proceedings in connection with the request for an interpretation were in progress, the German Government, by means of a Request dated October 14th, 1927, and filed with the Registry on November 15th, besought the Court to indicate to the Polish Government that it should pay to the German Government, as a provisional measure, the sum of 30 million Reichsmarks. The Court gave its decision upon this request, which was submitted under the terms of Article 41 of the Statute, in the form of an Order made on November mst, 1927. It held that effect could not be given to the request of the German Government, since it was to be regarded as designed to obtain not the indication of measures of protection, but judgment in favour of a part of the claim formulated in the Application of February 8th, 1927. POINT DE DROIT. La Cour, avant d'aborder l'examen des conclusions des Parties, doit fixer le sens de la requte qui est la base de la procdure actuelle, afin d'en tablir la nature et la porte. C'est la lumire de ces constatations qu'elle devra apprcier ensuite les conclusions qui lui ont t soumises au cours de la procdure tant crite qu'orale. La requte demande la Cour : IO de constater l'obligation du Gouvernement polonais, en

raison de son attitude l'gard des Socits Oberschlesische et Bayerische, attitude que la Cour a dclare non conforme la Convention de Genve, de rparer le prjudice subi de ce chef par lesdites Socits ; 2' d'allouer des indemnits, dont le montant est indiqu dans la requte, pour le dommage caus respectivement l'une et l'autre desdites Socits ; 3' de fixer le mode de paiement, entre autres de dire que les paiements faire par le Gouvernement polonais devraient tre effectus au compte des deux Socits prs la Deutsche Bank Berlin. Au cours de la procdure orale, une divergence de vues s'est fait jour entre les Parties quant la nature et la porte de la requte. L'agent du Gouvernement allemand avait mis dans sa plaidoirie la thse selon laquelle un gouvernement peut accepter une rparation dans toute forme qu'il jugera convenable, et que la rparation ne doit pas ncessairement consister en un ddommagement des personnes lses. Il convient de retenir notamment le passage suivant : C'est, en effet, de son prol;re droit, du droit du Gouvernement allemand, qu'il s'agit. Le Gouvernement allemand n'intervient pas en qualit de reprsentant des individus qui ont ' souffert le dommage, mais il peut mesurer le dommage dont il rclame la rparation en son propre nom, d'aprs l'chelle des pertes subies par les socits pour lesquelles il a pris fait et JUDGMENT No. I~.-CHORZ~W FACTORY (MERITS) 25 *** THE LAW. The Court, before proceeding to consider the Parties' submissions, must determine the import of the application which has given rise to the present proceedings, in order to ascertain its nature and scope. In the light of the results of this investigation, it will then proceed to consider the submissions made in the course of the written and oral proceedings. In the application the Court is asked : (1) to declare that the Polish Government, by reason of its attitude in respect of the Oberschlesische and Bayerische Companies, which attitude the Court had declared not to be in conformity with the Geneva Convention, is under an obligation to make good the consequent damage sustained by those Companies ; (2) to award compensation, the amount of which is indicated in the application, for the damage caused to each of the respective Companies ; (3) to fix the method of payment, and amongst other things to order the payments to be made by the Polish Government

to be effected to the account of the two Companies with the Deutsche Bank at Berlin. In the course of the oral proceedings, a difference of opinion between the two Parties became apparent as to the nature and scope of the application. The Agent for the German Government argued in his address to the Court that a government may content itself with reparation in any form which it may consider proper, and that reparation need not necessarily consist in the compensation of the individuals concerned. The following passage should especially be noted : [Translation.] "It is in fact a question of the German Government's own rights. The German Governrnent has not brought this suit as representative of the individuals who have suffered injury, but it may estirnate the damage for which it claims reparation on its own behalf, according to the measure provided by the losses suffered by the companies whose case it has cause. Le Gouvernement allemand peut demander le paiement de cette indemnit tout locas solutionis qui lui semble utile en l'espce, que ce soit une caisse publique ou une caisse prive. Le litige actuel est donc un litige entre gouvernements, et rien qu'un litige entre gouvernements ; il se distingue trs nettement d'un procs ordinaire en dommages-intrts, intent par des particuliers par-devant un tribunal civil, comme le dit le Gouvernement polonais dans sa Duplique. L'agent du Gouvernement polonais, dans sa duplique, a dit estimer que cette manire de voir comportait une modification de l'objet du litige et, d'une certaine manire, aussi de la nature de la requte, car, selon la thse polonaise, le demandeur aurait dfini l'objet du litige comme tant l'obligation d'indemniser les deux Socits. Or, le dommage tant en corrlation avec l'indemnisation, la demande allemande se trouverait place sur un autre terrain, ds qu'il s'agirait de l'indemnisation non plus des Socits, mais de l'tat pour les torts par lui subis. L'agent du Gouvernement polonais a contest au Gouvernement allemand le droit de faire ce changement dans l'tat o se trouvait la procdure, et a refus d'y consentir. Mme si les termes de la requte, ainsi que des conclusions ultrieures de la Partie demanderesse, permettaient de les interprter comme visant une indemnisation due directement aux deux Socits pour les dommages subis par elles, et non une rparation due l'Allemagne pour une violation de la Convention de Genve, il rsulte toutefois des conditions dans lesquelles la Cour a t saisie de la prsente affaire, ainsi que des considrations pour lesquelles elle l'a retenue, par son

Arrt no 8, pour statuer quant au fond, que l'objet de la requte allemande ne peut viser que la rparation due pour un tort subi par l'Allemagne en sa qualit de Partie contractante de la Convention de Genve. La prsente requte se base explicitement et exclusivement sur l'Arrt no 7 qui a constat que l'attitude du Gouvernement polonais l'gard des deux Socits Oberschlesische et Bayerische n'tait pas conforme aux dispositions des articles 6 et suivants de ladite Convention. Dj dans l'Arrt no 6, qui a tabli la comptence de la Cour pour statuer sur la violation allgue de la Convention de Genve, il a t reconnu par la JUDGMENT No. 13.--CHORZ~FWAC TORY (MERITS) 26 taken up. The Geman Government may claim the payment of this compensation at any locus solutio.rzis which it may think fit in this case, whether it be a public or a private office. The present dispute is therefore a dispute between governments and nothing but a dispute between governrnents. It is very clearly differentiated from an ordinary action for damages, brought by private persons before a civil court, as the Polish Government has said in its Rejoinder." The Agent for the Polish Government in his Rejoinder submitted that this method of regarding the question involved a modification of the siibject of the' dispute and, in some sort also, of the nature of the application, for, according to Poland's view, the subject of the dispute had been defined by Germany as the obligation to compensate the two Companies. But damage and compensation being interdependent conceptions, the German claim assumed another aspect if it was no longer a question of compensating the Companies, but of compensating the State for the injury suffered by it. The Agent for the Polish Government disputed the German Govemment's right to inake this change at that stage of the proceedings and refused to accept it. Even should it be possible to construe the terms of the application and of the subsequent submissions of the Applicant as contemplating compensation due directly to the two Companies for damages suffered by them and not reparation due to Germany for a breach of the Geneva Convention, it follows from the conditions in which the Court has been seized of the present suit, and from the considerations which led the Court to reserve it by Judgment No. 8 for decision on the merits, that the object of the German application can only be to obtain reparation due for a wrong suffered by Germany in her capacity as a contracting Party to the Geneva Convention. The present application is explicitly and exclusively based on Judgment No. 7 which declared that the attitude of the

Polish Government in respect of the two Companies, the Oberschlesische and Bayerische, was not in conformity with Article 6 and the following articles of the said Convention. Already in Judgment No. 6, establishing the Court's jurisdiction ta deal with the alleged violation of the Geneva Convention, the Cour, conformment une thse de la Partie demanderesse, qu'il s'agissait exclusivement d'une contestation entre tats au sujet de l'interprtation et application d'une convention en vigueur entre eux. L'article 23 de la Convention de Genve ne vise que les divergences d'opinions rsultant de l'interprtation et application des articles 6 22 de la Convention de Genve, qui s'lveraie. entre les deux Gouvernements signataires. En effet, la Cour a affirm sa comptence pour statuer sur la rparation demande parce qu'elle considrait la rparation comme le corollaire de la violation des obligations rsultant d'un engagement entre tats. Cette manire de voir, conforme au caractre gnral d'une juridiction internationale qui, en principe, ne connat que des rapports d'tat tat, s'impose avec une force particulire en l'espce parce que la Convention de Genve, dans son systme trs dvelopp d'instances de recours, a prcisment cr ou maintenu pour certaines catgories de rclamations de particuliers des instances arbitrales d'un caractre international spcial, telles que le Tribunal arbitral haut-silsien et le Tribunal arbitral mixte germano-polonais. C'est en se basant, entre autres, sur le caractre purement intertatique de la contestation tranche par l'Arrt no 7 que la Cour avait retenu l'affaire, nonobstant le fait que des rclamations introduites par les deux Socits taient pendantes devant l'une des instances arbitrales mentionnes ci-dessus, rclamations relatives la mme dpossession qui a donn lieu la requte actuellement soumise la Cour par le Gouvernement allemand. La Cour ayant, par son Arrt no 8, retenu cette requte pour statuer au fond, n'a pu le faire que sur les mmes bases qu'elle a admises pour son Arrt no 7, arrt qui est le point de dpart pour la demande en rparation avance actuellement par l'Allemagne. C'est donc la lumire de cette conception qu'il convient d'interprter les dclarations de la Partie demanderesse dans la prsente procdure ; il y aurait galement lieu de suivre cette mthode mme si ladite Partie n'avait pas formul aussi explicitement sa thse dans sa plaidoirie. Il est un principe de droit international que la rparation d'un tort peut consister en une indemnit correspondant au dommage que les ressortissants de l'tat ls ont subi par JUUGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~WFA CTORY (MERITS) 27 Court recognized that-as had been maintained by the Applicant-

the matter was exclusively a dispute between States as to the interpretation and application of a convention in force between them. Article 23 of the Geneva Convention only contemplates differences of opinion respecting the interpretation and application of Articles 6 to 22 of the Geneva Convention arising between the two Govemments. The Court in fact declared itself competent to pass upon the claim for reparation because it regarded reparation as the corollary of the violation of the obligations resulting from an engagement between States. This view of the matter, which is in conformity with the general character of an international tribunal which, in principle, has cognizance only of interstate relations, is indicated with peculiar force in this case for the specific reason that the Geneva Convention, with its very elaborate system of legal remedies, has created or maintained for certain categories of private claims arbitral tribunals of a special international character, such as the Upper Silesian Arbitral Tribunal and the German-Polish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. It was on the basis, amongst other things, of the purely interstate character of the dispute decided by Judgment No. 7 that the Court reserved the case for judgment, notwithstanding the fact that actions brought by the two Companies were pending before one of the arbitral tribunals above mentioned, actions which related to the same act of dispossession which led to the filing with the Court of the ~erman Government's Application now before it. The Court, which by Judgrnent No. 8 reserved the present application for judgment on the merits, could only do so on the grounds on which it had already based its Judgrnent No. 7 which constitutes the starting point for the claim for compensation now put fonvard by Germany. Accordingly the declarations of the Applicant in the present proceedings must be construed in the light of this conception and this method must also have been followed even if that Party had not stated its contention as explicitly as it has done in the German Agent's address to the Court. It is a principle of international law that the reparation of a wrong may consist in an indemnity corresponding to the damage which the nationals of the injured State have suffered 4 suite de l'acte contraire au droit international. C'est mme la forme de rparation la plus usite ; l'Allemagne l'a choisie en l'espce, et son admissibilit n'est pas conteste. Mais la rparation due un tat par un autre tat ne change pas de nature par le fait qu'elle prend la forme d'une indemnit pour le montant de laquelle le dommage subi par un particulier

fournira la mesure. Les rgles de droit qui dterminent la rparation sont les rgles de droit international en vigueur entre les deux tats en question, et non pas le droit qui rgit les rapports entre l'tat qui aurait commis un tort et le particulier qui aurait subi le dommage. Les droits ou intrts dont la violation cause un dommage un particulier se trouvent toujours sur un autre plan que les droits de l'tat auxquels le mme acte peut galement porter atteinte. Le dommage subi . par le particulier n'est donc jamais identique en substance avec celui que l'tat subira ; il ne peut que fournir une mesure convenable de la rparation due l'tat. Le droit international n'exclut pas qu'un tat accorde un autre le droit de demander des instances arbitrales internationales d'allouer directement aux ressortissants de ce dernier des indemnits pour des dommages qu'ils ont subis la suite d'une violation du droit international par le premier tat. Mais rien - ni dans les termes de l'article 23, ni dans les rapports entre cette clause et certaines autres dispositions d'ordre juridictionnel insres dans la Convention de Genve ne porte croire que la juridiction tablie par l'article 23 s'tende des rparations autres que celles dues par une des Parties contractantes l'autre comme consquence d'une violation des articles 6 22 dment constate par la Cour. Cette manire de voir peut, d'ailleurs, trs bien se concilier avec les conclusions prsentes par la Partie demanderesse. La premire de ses conclusions vise, dans toutes les phases de la procdure, la constatation de l'obligation de rparer. Les indemnits payer au Gouvernement allemand, selon la conclusion finale no 2, constituent, aux termes de la conclusion 4 d, aussi bien du Mmoire que de la rplique orale, une crance de ce ouv verne ment. La demande formule dans la mme conclusion et tendant faire effectuer le paiement aux conlptes des deux JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~WFA CTORY (MERITS) 2 8 as a result of the act which is contrary to international law. This is even the most usual fonn of reparation ; it is the form selected by Gemany in this case and the admissibility of it has not been disputed. The reparation due by one State to another does not however change its character by reason of the fact that it takes the fom of an indemnity for the calculation of which the damage suffered by a private person is taken as the measure. The rules a of law governing the reparation are the rules of international law in force between the two States concerned, and not the law governing relations between the State which has committed a wrongful act and the individual who has suffered damage. Rights or interests of an individual the violation of which rights causes damage

are always in a different plane to rights belonging to a State, which rights may also be infringed by the same act. The damage suffered by an individual is nev,er therefore identical in kind with that which will be suffered by a State; it can only afford a convenient scale for the calculation of the reparation due to the State. International law does not prevent one State from granting to another the right to have recourse to international arbitral tribunals in order to 'obtain the direct award to nationals of the latter State of compensation for damage suffered by them as a result of infractions of international law by the first State. But there is nothing-either in the terms of Article 23 or in the relation between this provision and certain others of a jurisdictional character included in the Geneva Convention-which , tends to show that the jurisdiction established by Article 23 extends to reparation other than that due by one of the contracting Parties to the other in consequence of an infraction of Articles 6 to 22, duly recognized as such by the Court. This view is moreover readily reconcilable with the submissions of the Applicant. The first of its submissions, throughout all stages of the proceedings, aims at the establishment of an obligation to make reparation. The indemnities to be paid to the German Government, according to No. 2 of the final submissions, constitute, in the tenns of submission 4 d, as set out in both the Case and the oral reply, a debt due to that Government. The claim formulated in the same submission, to the effect that payment should be made to the account of the Socits prs la Deutsche Bank Berlin est interprte par l'agent du Gouvernement allemand comme visant seulement un locus solutionis. La Cour est donc d'avis que la Partie demanderesse n'a pas chang l'objet du litige au cours de la procdure. Il rsulte de ce qui vient d'tre expos que la requte tend obtenir, en faveur de l'Allemagne, une rparation dont le montant est dtermin par le dommage subi par les Socits Oberschlesische et Bayerische. Trois questions essent'elles se posent : IO L'existence de l'obligation de rparer. 2" L'existence des dommages qui doivent servir de base pour l'valuation du montant de l'indemnit. 3' L'tendue de ces dommages. Quant au premier point, la Cour constate que c'est un principe du droit international, voire une conception gnrale du droit, que toute violation d'un engagement comporte l'obliga, tion de rparer. Dj dans son Arrt no 8, la Cour, statuant sur la comptence qu'elle drivait de l'article 23 de la Convention

de Genve, a dit : la rparation est le complment indispensable d'un manquement l'application sans qu'il soit ncessaire que cela soit inscrit dans la convention mme. L'existence du principe tablissant l'obligation de rparer comme un lment du droit international positif n'a du reste jamais t . conteste au cours des procdures relatives aux affaires de ChorzOw. L'obligation de rparer tant reconnue en principe, il s'agit de savoir si une violation d'un engagement international a en effet eu lieu dans le cas d'espce. Or, cet gard, la Cour se trouve en prsence d'une chose juge. La non-conformite de l'attitude de la Pologne envers les deux Socits avec les articles 6 et suivants de la Convention de Genve est tablie par le point no 2 du dispositif de l'Arrt no 7. L'application du principe la prsente espce s'impose donc. JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~WFA CTORY (MERITS) 29 two Coapanies with the Deutsche Bank at Berlin, is interpreted by the Agent for the German Government as solely relating to the locus solutionis. The Court therefore is of opinion that the Applicant has not altered the subject of the dispute in the course of the proceedings. It follows from the foregoing that the application is designed -7 to obtain, in favour of Gemany, reparation the amount of which is determined by the damage suffered by the Oberschlesische and Bayerische. Three fundamental questions anse : (1) The existence of the obligation to make reparation. (2) The existence of the damage which must serve as a basis for the calculation of the amount of the indemnity. (3) The extent of this damage. As regards the first point, the Court observes that it is a principle of international law, and even a general conception of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation. In Judgment No. 8, when deciding on the junsdiction derived by it from Article 23 of the Geneva Convention, the Court has already said that reparation is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention, and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself. The existence of the principle establishing the obligation to make reparation, as an element of positive international law, has moreover never been disputed in the course of the proceedings in the vanous cases concerning the Chorz6w factory . The obligation to make reparation being in principle recognized, it remains to be ascertained whether a breach of an international engagement has in fact taken place in the case under

consideration. Now this point is res judicata. The nonconformity of Poland's attitude in respect of the two Companies with Article 6 and the following articles of the Geneva Convention is established by No. 2 of the operative provisions of Judgment No. 7. The application of the principle to the present case is therefore evident. 30 . ARRT No 13. - USINE DE CHORZOW (FOND) Pour ce qui est du deuxime point, la question de savoir si un dommage a rsult du tort qui est constant, n'est a.ucunement rsolue par les arrts antrieurs de la Cour relatifs l'affaire de ChorzOw. La Partie demanderesse ayant calcul le montant de la rparation qu'elle rclame sur la base du dommage subi par les deux Socits par suite de l'attitude du Gouvernement polonais, il est ncessaire, pour la Cour, de vrifier si ces Socits ont effectivement subi un dommage de ce chef. En ce qui concerne la Bayerische, la Pologne reconnat l'existence d'un dommage qui donne lieu rparation ; la divergence entre les Parties n'a trait qu' l'tendue de ce dommage et aux modalits de la rparation ; par contre, la Pologne conteste pour 1'Oberschlesische l'existence d'un dommage donnant lieu rparation et conclut, par consquent, dbouter l'Allemagne de sa demande. Le fait de la dpossession de 1'Oberschlesische n'est aucunement contest. Mais, selon le Gouvernement polonais, cette Socit n'aurait nonobstant pas subi de dommage ; il allgue, en effet, d'une part, que le droit de proprit revendiqu par 1'Oberschlesische aurait t entach de nullit ou d'annulabilit ; et, d'autre part, que le contrat du 24 dcembre 1919 attribuait au Reich des droits et avantages si considrables qu'en substance un dommage ventuel ne frapperait pas la Socit. Subsidiairement, le Gouvernement polonais fait valoir que ces mmes circonstances ont pour consquence au moins de rduire essentiellement le dommage pouvant entrer en ligne de compte en ce qui concerne ladite Socit. Abstraction faite de ces objections de nature pralable, il y a dsaccord entre les Parties sur le montant et les modalits de paiement d'une rparation ventuelle. Dans ces conditions, il incombe la Cour d'examiner tout d'abord s'il y a eu, non seulement pour la Bayerische, mais , aussi pour l'Oberschlesische, un dommage susceptible de donner lieu rparation. JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~W FACTORY (MERITS) . 30 As regards the second point, the question whether damage has resulted from the wrongful act which is common ground, is in no wise settled by the Court's previous decisions relating to the Chorz6w case. The Applicant having calcdated the

amount of the reparation claimed on the basis of the damage suffered by the two Companies as a result of the Polish Government's attitude, it is necessary for the Court to ascertain whether these Companies have in fact suffered damage as a consequence of that attitude. As regards the Bayerische, Poland admits the existence of a damage affording ground for reparation; the Parties only differ as to the extent of this damage and the mode of reparation ; on the other hand, Poland denies the existence of any damage calling for reparation in the case of the Oberschlesische and consequently submits that Germany's claim should be dismissed. The fact of the dispossession of the Oberschlesische is in no way disputed. But notwithstanding this, in the contention of the Polish Governrnent, that Company has suffered no damage : it argues, first, that the right of ownership claimed by the Oberschlesische was null and void or subject to annulment, and, secondly, that the contract of December zqth, 1919, attributed to the Reich rights and benefits so considerable that any possible damage would not materially affect the Company. In the alternative, the Polish Government contends that these same circumstances at all events have the effect of essentially diminishing the extent of the damage to be taken into account in so far as the said Company is concerned. Apart from these preliminary objections, the Parties are at issue as to the amount and method of payment of any compensation which may be awarded. In these circumstances, the Court must first of al1 consider whether damage affording ground for reparation has ensued as regards not only the Bayerische but also the Oberschlesische. II. Abordant cet examen, il convient de constater avant tout que, pour valuer le dommage caus par un acte illicite, il faut tenir compte exclusivement de la valeur des biens. droits et intrts qui ont t atteints et dont le titulaire est la personne au profit de laquelle l'indemnit est rclame ou le dommage de qui doit servir de mesure pour l'valuation de la rparation rclame. Ce principe, admis dans la jurisprudence arbitrale, a pour consquence, d'une part, d'exclure du prjudice valuer, les dommages causs aux tiers par l'acte illicite, et d'autre part de n'en pas exclure le montant des dettes et autres obligations la charge du ls. Le montant du prjudice caus 170berschlesische du fait de la dpossession de l'entreprise de Chorz6w est donc gal la valeur totale mais exclusivement la valeur totale - des biens, droits et intrts de cette Socit dans ladite entreprise, sans dduction

de passifs. Le Gouvernement polonais soutient en premier lieu que 1'Oberschlesische n'a pas subi de dommage la suite de la dpossession, parce qu'elle n'tait pas la propritaire lgitime, son droit de proprit n'ayant jamais t valable et, en tout cas, ayant cess de l'tre en vertu de l'arrt rendu le 12 novembre 1927 par le Tribunal de Katowice ; de sorte qu' partir de cette date tout au moins aucun dommage subi par ladite Socit ne pourrait donner lieu pour elle rparation. A cet gard, la Cour constate ce qui suit : la Cour a t dj appele, lors de la procdure termine par l'Arrt no 7, s'occuper, conime d'un point incident et pralable, de la question de la validit des transactions en vertu desquelles la proprit de l'usine de ChorzOw est passe du Reich l'oberschlesische. Elle est arrive la conclusion que les diverses transactions dont il s'agit taient des actes rels et de bonne foi; et c'est pourquoi elle a pu considrer l'usine de Chorz6w comme appartenant une socit contrle par des ressortissants allemands, savoir, l'Oberschlesische. Quel que soit l'effet de cette dcision incidente sur le droit de proprit du point de vue du droit civil, il est vident que le fait que l'usine JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~WF ACTORY (MERITS) 3I II. On approaching this question, it should first be observed that, in estimating the damage caused by an unlawful act, only the value of property, rights and interests which have been affected and the owner of which is the person on whose behalf compensation is claimed, or the damage done to whom is to serve as a means of gauging the reparation claimed, must be taken into account. This principle, which is accepted in the jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals, hs the effect, on the one hand, of excluding from the damage to be estimated, injury resulting for third parties from the unlawful act and, on the other hand, of not excluding from the damage the amount of debts and other obligations for which the injured party is responsible. The damage suffered by the Oberschlesische in respect of the Chorzow undertaking is therefore equivalent to the total value-but to that total only-of the property, rights and interests of this Company in 'that undertaking, without deducting liabilities. The Polish Government argues in the first place that the Oberschlesische has suffered no loss as a result of its dispossession, because it was not the lawful owner, its right of ownership having never been valid and having in any case ceased to be so in virtue of the judgment given on November ~ a t h , 1927, by the Court of Katowice ; so that from that date at al1

events no damage for which reparation should be made could ensue as regards that Company. In regard to this the Court observes as follows: the Court has already, in connection with Judgment No. 7, had to consider as an incidental and preliminary point, the question of the validity of the transactions in virtue of which the ownership of the Chorz6w factory passed from the Reich to the Oberschlesische. It then arrived at the conclusion that the vanous transactions in question were genuine and bona fide; that is why it was able to regard the Chorz6w factory as belonging to a Company controlled by German nationals, namely, the Oberschlesische. Whatever the effect of this incidental decision may be as regards the right of ownership under municipal law, it is evident that the fact that the de ChorzOw appartenait l'Oberschlesische tait la condition logique de la dcision de la Cour d'aprs laquelle l'attitude du Gouvernement polonais l'gard de l'Oberschlesische n'tait pas conforme aux articles 6 et suivants de la Convention de Genve. Car, si l'usine n'appartenait pas l'Oberschlesische, cette Socit non seulement n'aurait pu subir aucun dommage du fait de la dpossession, mais elle n'aurait pas mme pu tre l'objet d'une dpossession contraire la Convention de Genve ; or, par son Arrt no 7, la Cour a constat que tel tait le cas. Il y a lieu de faire observer que dans son Arrt no 7 la Cour ne s'est pas borne constater l'incompatibilit, avec ladite Convention, de l'application de la loi du 14 juillet 1920 aux proprits inscrites au registre foncier au nom de socits contrles par des ressortissants allemands, mais, en rpondant a.ux objections souleves par la Partie dfenderesse, a d s'occuper aussi de la question de savoir si cette inscription tait le rsultat de transactions fictives et frauduleuses ou bien relles et de bonne foi. C'est la Pologne elle-mme qui a allgu contre la deuxime conclusion de la Requte allemande du 15 mai 1925 que l'inscription de 1'Oberschlesische au registre foncier, tant base sur une transaction fictive et frauduleuse, n'tait en tout cas pas valable, et qui a ainsi amen la Cour se prononcer sur ce point. Or, la requte qui donne lieu au prsent arrt tant base sur le tort constat par l'Arrt no 7, il n'est pas possible que le droit de l'Oberschlesische l'usine de ChorzOw soit apprci d'une manire diffrente pour les besoins dudit Arrt no 7 et par rapport la demande en rparation base sur cet arrt. La Cour ayant t d'avis que le droit de 1'Oberschlesische sur l'usine de ChorzOw justifiait la conclusion que l'attitude du Gouvernement polonais l'gard de ladite Socit n'tait pas conforme aux articles 6 et suivants de la Convention de Genve,

elle ne saurait se dpartir de cet avis alors qu'il s'agit actuellement d'apprcier la mme situation juridique aux fins de statuer sur la demande en rparation fonde sur l'acte dont la non-conformit la Convention a t constate par la Cour. Le Gouvernement polonais fait maintenant observer qu'aprs le prononc de l'Arrt no 7, le Tribunal civil de Katowice, qui, JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~W FACTORY (MERITS) 32 Chorz6w factory belonged to the Oberschlesische was the necessary condition precedent to the Court's decision that the attitude of the Polish Government in respect of the Oberschlesische was not in conformity with Article 6 and the following articles of the Geneva Convention. For if the factory did not belong to the Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke, not only would that Company not have suffered damage as a result of dispossession, but furthermore it could not have been subjected to a dispossession contrary to the Geneva Convention, but the Court established by Judgment No. 7 that such was the case. It should be noted that the Court in Judgment No. 7 has not confined jtself to recording the inconipatibility with the Geneva Convention ol the application of the law of July ~qth, 1920, to properties entered in the land register in the name of companies controlled by Geman nationals, but has, in replying to the objections put fonvard by the Kepondent, also had to deal with the question whether such entry was the outcome of fictitious and fraudulent transactions or of genuine and bonafide transactions. Poland herself objected in connection with the second submission of the German Application of May 15th, 1925, that the entry of the Oberschlesische in the land register was in any case not valid as it was based on a fictitious and fraudulent transaction and thu caused the Court to deal with this point. As the application now under consideration is based on the damage established by Judgment No. 7, it is impossible that the Oberschlesische's right to the Chorz6w factory should be looked upon differently for the purposes of that judgment and in relation to the claim for reparation based on the same judgment. The Court, having been of opinion that the Oberschlesische's right to the Chorz6w factory justified the conclusion that the Polish Government's attitude in respect of that Company was not in conformity with Article 6 and the following articles of the Geneva Convention, must necessarily maintain that opinion when the same situation at law has to be considered for the purpose of giving judgment in regard to the reparation claimed as a result of the act which has been declared by the Court not to be in conformity with the Convention.

The Polish Governrnent now points out that, after Judgment No. 7 had been rendered, the Civil Court of Katowice selon les rgles du droit international, est sans doute comptent pour connatre des contestations civiles touchant les immeubles situs dans sa circonscription, a dclar non valable du point de vue du droit civil, et cela indpendamment des ' lois polonaises des 14 juillet 1920 et 16 juin 1922, l'inscription de 1'Oberschlesische au registre foncier comme propritaire ; il allgue galement que la Cour, en statuant maintenant sur la question de la rparation, devrait tenir compte de ce fait nouveau. La Cour n2a pas besoin de se prononcer sur la question de savoir quelle aurait t la situation juridique par rapport la Convention de Genve, si la dpossession avait t prcde d'un jugement rgulirement rendu par une instance comptente. Il suffit de rappeler que la Cour, dans son Arrt no 8, a dit que la violation de la Convention de Genve qui consistait dans la dpossession d'un propritaire protg par les articles 6 et suivants de la Convention de Genve ne pouvait tre efface par un jugement national qui, aprs coup, enlverait la base l'applicabilit de la Convention, base que la Cour avait admise dans son Arrt no 7. Le jugement du Tribunal de Katowice du 12 novembre 1927 - jugement rendu par dfaut vis--vis de l'Oberschlesische, et le Reich n'ayant pas t partie au procs - ne contient ?as, dans le texte qui est connu de la Cour, les motifs pour lesquels l'inscription de la proprit en faveur de l'Oberschlesische est dclare nulle ; mais il rsulte de la requte qui a donn lieu ce jugement que les motifs invoqus par le Fisc polonais sont essentiellement les mmes que ceux qui ont t dj dbattus sur la base des conclusions du Gouvernement polonais devant la Cour dans la procdure qui a abouti l'Arrt no 7, et qui, de l'avis de la Cour, n'ont pas suffi pour considrer 1'Oberschlesische comme ne tombant pas sous le coup des articles 6 et suivants de la Convention de Genve. Si, considrant que l'usine n'appartenait pas l'Oberschlesische, la Cour niait l'existence d'un dommage au dtriment de cette Socit, elle se mettrait en contradiction avec un des motifs sur lesquels elle a fond son Arrt no 7 et elle admettrait qu'un jugement national pt infirmer ind?rectement un arrt rendu par une instance internationale, ce qui est impossible. Quel que soit l'effet du jugement du Tribunal de Katowice, du 12 novembre 1927, du point de vue du JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~WFA CTORY (MERITS) 33 which, under International Law, doubtless has jurisdiction in disputes at civil law concerning irnmovable property situated

within its district, has declared the entry of the Oberschlesische in the land register as owner not to be valid under the municipal law applicable to the case, and this apart from the Polish laws of July rqth, 1920, and June 16th, 1922 ; it further contends that the Court, in now giving judgment on the question of damages, should bear in mind this new fact. There is no need for the Court to consider what would have been the situation at law as regards the Geneva Convention, if dispossession had been preceded by a judgment given by a competent tribunal. It will suffice to recall that the Court in Judgment No. 8 has sajd that the violation of the Geneva Convention consisting in the dispossession of an owner protected by Article 6 and following of the Geneva Convention could not be rendered non-existent by the judgment of a municipal court which, after dispossession had taken place, nullified the grounds rendering the Convention applicable, which grounds were relied upon by the Court in Judgment No. 7. The judgment of the Tribunal of Katowice given on November 12th, 1927,-which judgment was given by default as regards the Oberschlesische, the Reich not being a Party to the proceedings,does not contain in the text known to the Court the reasons for which the entry of the property in the name of the Oberschlesische was declared nul1 and void; but it appears from the application upon which this judgment was given that the reasons advanced by the Polish Treasury are essentially the same as those already discussed before the Court on the basis of the Polish Government's submissions in the proceedings leading up to Judgment No. 7, which reasons, in the opinion of the Court, did not suffice to show that the Oberschlesische did not fall within the scope of Article 6 and the following articles of the Geneva Convention. If the Cohrt were to deny the existence of a damage on the ground that the factory did not belong to the Oberschlesische, it would be contradicting one of the reasons on which it based its Judgment No. 7 and it would be attributing to a judgment of a municipal court power indirectly to invalidate a judgment of an international court, which is impossible. Whatever the droit interne, ce jugement ne saurait ni effacer la violation de la Convention de Genve cqnstate par la Cour dans son Arrt no 7, ni soustraire cet arrt une des bases sur lesquelles il est fond. C'est l'objection dont la Cour vient de s'occuper, ainsi qu' la conclusion y relative, formule par le Gouvernement polonais dans son Contre-Mmoire mais retire par lui plus tard, que se rfre la conclusion du Gouvernement allemand

l'effet que l'obligation du Gouvernement polonais de payer l'indemnit alloue par la Cour n'est nullement carte par un jugement rendu ou rendre par un tribunal interne polonais dans un procs ayant pour objet la question de la proprit de l'usine sise ChorzOw. Cette coricliision a t maintenue malgr le retrait de - ladite conclusion polonaise. La Cour, tant d'avis que cette dernire conclusion doit tre considre comme valablement retire, mais que, nonobstant, l'objection laquelle elle se rfrait subsiste, estime qu'il n'y a pas lieu de statuer en termes exprs sur la conclusion y relative formule par le Gouvernement allemand, autrement qu'en rejetant la thse du Gouvernement polonais fonde sur le jugement du Tribunal de Katowice. Le Gouvernement polonais ne s'est pas born contester l'existence d'un dommage en allguant que l'Oberschlesische ne serait pas ou aurait cess d'tre propritaire de l'usine de ChorzOw ; il soutient en outre, diffrents points de vue, que les droits que le Reich possde dans l'entreprise, tant passs la Pologne, ne pourraient entrer en ligne de compte pour l'valuation du dommage dont dpendra le montant de la rparation due par la Pologne l'Allemagne. Admettant, par hypothse, que le contrat du 24 dcembre 1919 ne soit pas nul, mais doive tre trait comme un acte juridique rel et valable, le Gouvernement polonais considre que, d'aprs ledit contrat, c'est le Gouvernement allemand qui JUDGMENT NO. 13.-CHORZ~W FACTORY (MERITS) 34 effect of the judgment of the Tribunal of Katowice of November 12th, 1927, may be at municipal law, this judgment can neither render inexistent the violation of the Geneva Convention recognized by the Court in Judgment No. 7 to have taken place, nor destroy one of the grounds on which that judgment is based. It is to the objection dealt with above and to a submission connected therewith which the Polish Government made in its Counter-Case but subsequently withdrew, that the following submission of the German Government relates: that the obligation of the Polish Government to pay the indemnity awarded by the Court is in no way set aside by a judgment given or to be given by a Polish municipal court in a suit concerning the question of the ownership of the factory situated at Chorz6w. This submission has been maintained notwithstanding the withdrawal of the Polish submission referred to. The Court, being of opinion that this latter submission is to be regarded as having been validly withdrawn, but that,

nevertheless, the objection to which it referred still subsists, considers that there is no need expressly to deal with the submission in regard thereto made by the Gennan Government, Save in order to dismiss the submission of the Polish Government based on the judgment of the Tribunal of Katowice. The Polish Government not only disputes the existence of a damage for the reason that the Oberschlesische is not or is no longer owner of the factory at Chorzow, but also contends from various points of view that the rights possessed by the Reich in the undertaking, having passed into the hands of Poland, cannot be included amongst the assets to be taken into account in the calculation of the damage sustained on which calculation will depend the amount of the reparation due by Poland to Germany. The Polish Government, admitting, for the sake of argument, that the contract of December 24th, 1919, was not null and void, but must be regarded as a genuine and valid legal instrument, holds that, according to that contract, the Gerest le propritaire de la totalit des actions de llOberschlesische lesquelles reprsentent l'unique bien de celle-ci, savoir l'usine. Il en tire la conclusion qu'il s'agit de la transformation d'une entreprise fiscale en une entreprise d'tat par actions, et comme il est d'avis que les biens d'une socit allemande, dont la totalit des actions appartient au Reich, rentrent dans la catgorie des ((biens et proprits appartenant l'Empire 1) qui seraient dvolus la Pologne en vertu de l'article 256 du Trait de Versailles, il estime qu'il est ((difficile de se rendre compte quels furent les droits de 1'Oberschlesische auxquels il a t port atteinte par le Gouvernement polonais 1). Il a dvelopp cette argumentation en insistant notamment sur ce que l'Oberschlesische serait en ralit une socit contrle par le Gouvernement allemand et non une socit contrle par des ressortissants allemands, non plus qu'une entreprise prive dans laquelle le Reich possderait seulement des intrts prpondrants. Mme s'il n'en tait pas ainsi et qu'on voult, par hypothse, traiter l'acte du 24 dcembre 1919 comme un contrat effectif et rel de vente de l'usine par le Reich l'Oberschlesische, on ne saurait, selon le Gouvernement polonais, omettre de tenir compte de la circonstance que l'tat allemand a conserv toute une srie d'intrts et droits dans l'entreprise. Comme l'indemnit demande par le Gouvernement allemand est calcule, entre autres, sur la mesure du dommage prsum de l'Oberschlesische, il ne serait pas fond logiquement de reconnatre cette Socit des indemnits pour les droits et intrts qui, dans l'entreprise de ChorzOw, appartenaient au Reich)).

Il faudrait donc liminer ces droits des droits de 1'Oberschlesische, lesquels, cette limination effectue, se rduiraient au seul n u d ~ r nju s dornini. Le Gouvernement polonais invoque, en outre, qu'en vertu de l'article 256 du Trait de Versailles, les droits et intrts du Gouvernement allemand dans l'entreprise de ChorzOw sont transfrs l'tat polonais, au plus tard partir du moment du transfert la Pologne de la souverainet sur la partie de la Haute-Silsie elle attribue, et que, supposer que le contrat du 24 dcembre 1919 ait donn l'tat allemand la JUDGMENT No. 1 3 . 4 ~ 0 F~AC~TOR6Y ~(M ERITS) 3 5 man Government is the owner of the whole of the shares of the Oberschlesische representing the sole property of that Company, namely the factory. It deduces from this that the transaction consists in the transformation of an ordinary State enterprise into a State enterprise with a share capital, and as it holds that the property of a German company, the whole of the shares of which belong to the Reich, falls within the category of "property and possessions belonging to the Empire" acquired by Poland under Article 256 of the Treaty of Versailles, it considers that it is "difficult to see what the rights of the Oberschlesische were which had ben infringed by the Polish Government". In developing this argument, it has laid special stress on the allegation that the Oberschlesische is in reality a company controlled by the German Government and not a company .controlled by German nationals, or even a private enterprise in which the Reich merely possesses preponderating interests. Even if this should not be the case and if the instrument ,of December 24th, 1919, were, for argument's sake, to be regarded as an effective and genuine contract for the sale of the factory by the Reich to the Oberschlesische, the Polish ,Goverment contends that it is impossible not to take into .account the circumstance that the Geman State retained a whole complex of rights and interests in the undertaking. As the indemnity claimed by the Gennan Government is calculated, amongst other things, on the extent of the damage presumed t o have been sustained by the Oberschlesische, it would not be "logically correct to award to that Company compensation for rights and interests in the Chorz6w undertaking which belonged to the Reich". These rights should therefore be .eliminated from the rights of the Oberschlesische, which, if this were done, would arnount simply to a nudam jus domini. The Polish Covernment also alleges that, under Article 256 .of the Treaty of Versailles, the rights and interests of the ~German Government in the Chorz6w undertaking are transferred

to the Polish State, at latest as from the date of the transfer to Poland of sovereignty over the part of Upper Silesia allotted to her, and that, on the supposition that the contract of December q t h , 1919, gave the German State 5 totalit des actions de l'Oberschlesische afin de garantir au Reich ses droits et de lui permettre d'en faire usage, ces actions, la possession desquelles sont attachs les droits du Reich, doivent tre livres la Pologne. Si l'acte du 24 dcembre 1919 doit tre trait comme rel et effectif, le Gouvernement polonais estime que pour dterminer l'indemnit ventuellement due l'Oberschlesische, il faudrait d'abord liminer les droits du Reich ; et comme il est d'avis que cette limination ne peut tre ralise que sous une seule forme, savoir la livraison par l'tat allemand la Pologne des actions de l'Oberschlesische d'une valeur nominale de IIO millions de marks, le Gouvernement polonais, ce sujet, a formul, dans son Contre-Mmoire, sous le no A 4, une conclusion ainsi conue : En tout cas, dire et juger que le Gouvernement allemand doit, en premier lieu, livrer au Gouvernement polonais la totalit des actions de la Socit anonyme Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke de la valeur nominale de ~~o.ooo.oodoe marks dont il dispose en vertu du contrat du 24 dcembre 1919.1) A l'gard de cette conclusion, le Gouvernement allemand a, dans sa Rplique, fait les observations suivantes : ((D'abord, le Gouvernement polonais n'invoque aucune disposition sur laquelle peut tre base la comptence de la Cour pour connatre de cette question, qui rsulte de l'interprtation de l'article 256. Dans les procdures antrieures, le Gouvernement polonais avait fortement soulign que l'interprtation de cet article ne serait pas mme admissible en tant que question incidente et pralable pour l'interprtation des articles 6 22 de la Convention de Genve. Le Gouvernement allemand ignore si le Gouvernement polonais pense au trait gnral d'arbitrage sign Locarno et d'aprs lequel toute contestation d'ordre juridique doit tre soumise l'arbitrage, et, faute d'entente sur un tribunal arbitral spcial, la Cour permanente de Justice internationale. Mais quoi qu'il en soit, le Gouvernement allemand, anim du dsir d'assurer au Trait de Locarno toute l'tendue qu'il comporte sans s'arrter aux questions des formes y prvues, et de voir vide dfinitivement l'affaire de ChorzOw, s'abstient dJentreprendre un examen dtaill sur les questions d'incomptence ou de prmaturit mme si ces questions entraient en considration pour la demande reconventionnelle que le Gouvernement

allemand veut voir dans la conclusion A 4 du Contre-Mmoire. Il se borne rappeler l'article 40, alina 2, chiffre 4, du JUDGMENT NO. 13.-CHORZ~WF ACTORY (MERITS) 36 the whole of the shares of .the ~berschlesische, as guarantee for its rights, and to enable it to exercise those rights, these shares, on the possession of which depend the rights of the Reich, should be transferred to Poland. If the contract of December zqth, 1919, is to be regarded as genuine and effective, the Polish Government holds that, in order to determine the indemnity which may be due to the Oberschlesische, the rights of the Reich must first be eliminated ; and as it is of opinion that this can only be done in one way, namely, by the handing over by Germany to Poland of the shares of the Oberschlesische to the nominal value of IIO million marks, the Polish Government has in regard to this point made the following submission (No. A 4) in its Counter-Case: [Translation.] "In any case, it is submitted that the German Government should, in the first place, hand over to the Polish Government the whole of the shares of the Oberschlesische Company of the nominal value of ~~o,ooo,oomoa rks, which are in its hands under the contract of December 24th, 1919.'' The German Government' in its Reply made the following observations in regard to this submission : [Translation.] "In the first place, the Polish Government cites no provision on which it is possible to base the Court's jurisdiction to take cognizance of this question, which arises from the interpretation of Article 256. In the previous proceedings, the Polish Government strongly maintained that the interpretation of this article would not be admissible even as a question incidental and preliminary to the interpretation of Articles 6 to 22 of the Geneva Convention. The German Government does not know whether the Polish Government has in mind the general treaty of arbitration signed at Locarno according to which any dispute of a legal nature must be submitted to arbitration, and, unless some special arbitral tribunal is agreed upon, to the Permanent Court of International Justice. But, however that may be, the German Government, being animated by a wish to ensure that full scope shall be given to the Treaty of Locarno, without pausing to debate questions as to the procedure therein provided for, and also to see the Chorz6w case settled once and for all, abstains from undertaking a detailed examination of the questions of lack of juridiction or prematurity, even though these questions might enter into account in connection

with the counter-claim which, in the German Government's Rglement de la Cour, en vertu. duquel la Cour peut statuer sur des demandes reconventionnelles pour autant que ces dernires rentrent dans la comptence de la Cour. Entre 1'Allemagne et la Pologne, ce cas est ralis pour toute question de droit litigieuse entre elles. On pourrait uniquement discuter le point de savoir si, pour le jeu dudit article du Rglement, aussi les conditions de forme et de dlais doivent tre rem. plies, ou s'il suffit que les conditions matrielles soient remplies. Mais ce point peut rester indcis puisque le Gouvernement allemand accepte la juridiction de la Cour pour la question souleve par le Contre-Mmoire. Lors des ngociations relatives l'affaire de ChorzOw, le plnipotentiaire allemand avait dj propos au plnipotentiaire polonais de soumettre cette question la Cour. )) Dans les dbats ultrieurs, le Gouvernement polonais ne s'est pas prononc sur la question de la comptence de la Cour. On ne saurait donc dire s'il accepte la manire de voir du Gouvernement allemand selon laquelle cette comptence pourrait tre dduite de la Convention entre l'Allemagne et la Pologne, paraphe Locarno le 16 octobre 1925, ou s'il revendique la comptence en vertu d'un autre titre. En tout cas, il est constant qu'il n'a pas retir sa demande et que, partant, il dsire que la Cour statue sur la conclusion en question. D'autre part, le Gouvernement allemand, tout en fondant la comptence sur la Convention de Locarno, parat avant tout dsireil c que la Cour statue sur cette conclusion au cours de la prsec te procdure. Il y a donc accord entre les Parties pour soumettre la dcision de la Cour la question souleve par ladite conclusion. Comme la Cour l'a dit dans son Arrt no 12, relatif certains droits de minorits en Haute-Silsie, l'article 36 du Statut consacre le principe suivant lequel la juridiction de la Cour dpend de la volont des Parties ; la Cour est donc toujours comptente du moment o celles-ci acceptent sa juridiction, car il n'y a aucun diffrend que les tats admis ester devant la Cour ne puissent lui soumettre, sauf dans les cas exceptionnels oh le diffrend serait de la comptence exclusive JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~WF ACTORY (MERITS) 37 contention, is formulated in submission A 4 of the CounterCase. It will simply refer to Article 40, paragraph 2, No. 4, of the Rules of Court, according to which the Court may give judgrnent on counter-claims in so far as the latter come within its jurisdiction. As between Germany and Poland this applies in respect of any question of law in di& pute between them. The only point which might be disputed

is the question whether, for the application of this article of the Rules, the conditions respecting forms and times must also be fulfilled, or whether it is enough that the material conditions should be fulfrlled. This point, however, may be left open, since the German Government accepts the jurisdiction of the Court in regard to the question raised in the Counter-Case. In the course of the negotiations in regard to the Chorz6w case, the German plenipotentiary had already proposed to the Polish plenipotentiary that this question should be referred to the Court." In the subsequent proceedings, the Polish Government has not made any statement in regard to the question of the Court's jurisdiction. It is impossible, therefore, to Say whether it accepts the view of the German Government according to which it may be inferred that such jurisdiction exists under the Convention between Germany and Poland initialled at Locarno on October 16tb, 1925, or whether it contends that the Court has jurisdiction on some other basis. In any case, 'it is certain that it has not withdrawn its claim and that, consequently, it wishes the Court to give judgrnent on the submission in question. For its part the German Government, though basing the Court's jurisdiction on the Locarno Convention, seems above al1 anxious that the Court should give judgment on this submission in the course of the present proceedings. The Parties therefore are agreed in submitting to the Court for decision the question raised by this submission. As the Court has said in Judgment No. 12, concerning certain rights of minorities in Upper Silesia, Article 36 of the Statute establishes the principle that the Court's jurisdiction depends on the will of the Parties ; the Court therefore 1s always competent once the latter have accepted its jurisdiction, since there is no dispute which States entitled to appear before the Court cannot refer to it, Save in exceptional cases where a dispute may be within the exclusive jurisdiction of some other body. , d'un autre organe. Or, tel n'est pas le cas en ce qui concerne la conclusion en question. La Cour constate, en outre, que la demande reconventionnelle est base sur l'article 256 du Trait de Versailles, qui cinstitue le fondement de l'exception souleve par la Partie dfenderesse, et que, partant, elle se trouve en rapport de connexit juridique avec la demande principale. D'autre part, l'article 40 du Rglement de la Cour que le Gouvernement allemand a invoqu, stipule, entre autres, que les contre-mmoires comprennent : ((4' des conclusions fondes sur les faits noncs. Ces conclusions peuvent comprendre des demandes reconventionnelles,

pour autant que ces dernires rentrent dans la comptence de la Cour. )) La demande ayant t formule dans le Contre-Mmoire, les conditions de forme exiges par le Rglement pour des demandes reconventionnelles se trouvent donc ralises en l'espce aussi bien que les conditions de fond. En ce qui concerne les rapports qui existent entre les demandes allemandes et la conclusion polonaise dont il s'agit, la Cour croit utile d'ajouter ce qui suit : Bien qu'tant formellement une demande reconventionnelle, car elle tend condamner la Partie demanderesse une prestation envers la dfenderesse - en ralit, si l'on tient compte des motifs sur lesquels elle se fonde, la conclusion contient un moyen oppos la demande de l'Allemagne tendant obtenir de la Pologne une indemnit dont le montant serait calcul, entre autres, sur la base du dommage subi par l'Oberschlesische. Il's'agit, en effet, d'liminer du montant de cette indemnit ce qui correspondrait la valeur des droits et intrts que le Reich possdait dans l'entreprise en vertu du contrat du 24 dcembre 1919, valeur qui, selon le Gouvernement polonais, ne constitue pas une perte pour l'Oberschlesische, parce que ces droits et intrts appartiendraient au Gouvernement polonais lui-mme en vertu de l'article 256 du Trait de Versailles. La Cour ayant, par son Arrt no 8, admis sa comptence en vertu de l'article 23 de la Convention de Genve pour connatre de la rparation due du chef du dommage caus aux deux Socits par l'attitude du Gouvernement polonais envers elles, elle ne saurait se soustraire l'examen des objections qui ont pour JUDGMENT NO. 13.--CHORZOW FACTORY (MERITS) 38 But this is not the case as regards the submission in question. The Court also observes that the counter-clairn is based on Article 256 of the Versailles Treaty, which article is the basis of the objection raised by the Respondent, and that, consequently, it is juridically connected with the principal claim. Again, Article 40 of the Rules of Court, which has been cited by the Geman Government, lays down amongst other things that counter-cases shall contain: "4' conclusions based on the facts stated ; these conclusions may include counter-claims, in so far as the latter come within the jurisdiction of the Court." The claim having been formulated in the Counter-Case, the formal conditions required by the Rules as regards counterclaims are fulfilled in this case, as well as the material conditions. As regards the relationship existing between the German claims and the Polish submission in question, the Court thinks

it well to add the following : Although in form a counter-claim, since its object is to obtain judgment against the Applicant for the delivery of certain things to the Respondent-in reality, having regard to the arguments on which it is based, the submission constitutes an objection to the German claim designed to obtain from Poland an indemnity the amount of which is to be calculated, amongst other things, on the basis of the damage suffered by the Oberschlesische. It is in fact a question of eliminating from the amount of this indemnity a surn corresponding to the value of the rights and interests which the Reich possessed in the enterprise under the contract of December 24th, 1919, which value, according to the Polish Government, does not constitute a loss to the Oberschlesische because these rights and interests are said to belong to the Polish Government itself under Article 256 of the Treaty of Versailles. The Court, having by Judgment No. 8 accepted jurisdiction, under Article 23 of the Geneva Convention, to decide as to the reparation due for the damage caused to the two Companies by the attitude of the Polish Government towards them, cannot dispense with an examination of the objections the but de dmontrer soit qu'un tel dommage n'existe pas, soit qu'il n'a pas l'tendue que prtend la Partie demanderesse. Cela tant, il semble naturel de reconnatre aussi, en vertu du mme titre, la comptence pour statuer sur les moyens allgus par le Gouvernement polonais afin d'obtenir que l'indemnit soit limite au montant correspondant au dommage effectivement subi. * Passant maintenant l'examen des objections susdites du Gouvernement polonais, la Cour estime utile, tout d'abord, de prciser quelle est, selon son avis, la nature des droits que le Gouvernement allemand possde l'gard de l'entreprise de Chorz6w en vertu du contrat du 24 dcembre 1919, dont le contenu essentiel se trouve expos plus haut. Renvoyant cet expos, la Cour constate que c'est la Treuhand et non le Reich allemand qui, en droit, est propritaire des actions de l'Oberschlesische. Le Reich est crancier de la Treuhand et a, en cette qualit, un droit de gage sur les actions. Il a aussi, ct de ce droit de gage, tous les droits dcoulant de la possession des actions, y compris le droit la plus grande partie du prix en cas de vente de celles-ci. Ce droit, qui peut tre considr comme prpondrant, est, au point de vue conomique, trs proche de la proprit, mais il n'est pas la proprit; et on ne peut, mme en se plaant au point de vue conomique, faire abstraction des droits de la Treuhand. Telle tant la situation en droit, vouloir maintenant identifier

1'Oberschlesische avec le Reich, ce qui aurait pour consquence que la proprit de l'usine serait dvolue la Pologne en vertu de l'article ,256 du Trait de Versailles, serait se mettre en opposition avec la manire de voir adopte par la Cour dans son Arrt no 7 et maintenue ci-dessus, manire de voir qui est le fondement de la dcision selon laquelle l'attitude de la Pologne, aussi bien vis--vis de l'Oberschlesische que vis--vis de la Bayerische, n'tait pas conforme aux dispositions de la Convention de Genve. Il en est de mme en ce qui concerne la thse suivant laquelle l'Oberschlesische serait une socit contrle non par des ressortissants allemands, mais par le Reich. Il est vrai. comme l'a rappel le Gouvernement polonais, que la Cour, dans JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~W FACTORY (MERITS) 39 aim of which is to show either that no such damage exists or that it is not so great as it is alleged to be by the Applic-, ant. This being so, it seems natural on the same grounds also to accept jurisdiction to pass judgment on the submissions which Poland has made with a view to obtaining the reduction of the indemnity to an arnount corresponding to the damage actually sustained. Proceeding now to consider the above-mentioned objections of the Polish Government, the Court thinks it well first of all to define what is, in its opinion, the nature of the rights which the German Government possesses in respect of the Chorz6w undertaking under the contract of December 24th, 1919, the main features of which have been described above. Referring to this description, the Court points out that the Treuhand, and not the Reich, is legally the owner of the shares of the Oberschlesische. The Reich is the creditor of the Treuhand and in this capacity has a lien on the shares. It also has, besides this lien, all rights resulting from possession of the shares, including the right to the greater portion of the price in the event of the sale of these shares. This right, which may be regarded as preponderating, is, from an economic standpoint, very closely akin to ownership, but it is not ownership ; and even from an economic point of view it is impossible to disregard the rights of the Treuhand. Such being the situation at law, to endeavour now to identify the Oberschlesische with the Reich-the effect of which would be that the ownership of the factory would have passed to Poland under Article 256 of the Treaty of Versailles-would be in conflict with the view taken by the Court in Judgrnent No. 7 and reaffirmed above, on which view is based the decision to the effect that Poland's attitude as regards both the Oberschlesische and Bayerische was not in conformity with the

provisions of the Geneva Convention. The same applies in regard to the contention that the Oberschlesische is a Company controlled not by German nationals but by the Reich. It is true, as the Polish Government has recalled, that the Court in Judgment No. 7 has declared son Arrt no 7, a dclar ne pas avoir besoin d'examiner la question de savoir si l'Oberschlesische, vu les droits que le contrat du 24 dcembre 1919 confre au Reich, doit tre considre comme contrle par ce dernier et, au cas o cette hypothse se trouverait ralise, quelles consquences pourraient en dcouler pour l'application de la Convention de Genve. Mais la raison en tait que la Cour tait d'avis que le Gouvernement polonais n'avait pas soulev cette question et que, abstraction faite de sa thse relative . la fictivit des actes du 24 dcembre 1919, il ne paraissait pas avoir contest que ladite Socit ft contrle par des ressortissants allemands. En tout cas, il est clair que c'est seulement en estimant que ladite Socit est, au point de vue de l'article 6 de la Convention de Genve, considrer comme une socit. contrle par des ressortissants allemands, que la Cour a pu constater que l'attitude du Gouvernement polonais vis--vis de cette Socit n'tait pas conforme aux dispositions des articles 6 et suivants de ladite Convention. . Mme si la question n'tait pas prjuge et si la Cour tait libre de l'examiner nouveau maintenant, elle devrait arriver la conclusion que 1'Oberschlesische tait contrle par la Bayerische. Car, vu que, d'aprs le contrat du 24 dcembre 1919, le Reich s'tait dclar d'accord pour maintenir la direction de l'entreprise de ChorzOw entre les mains de la Bayerische aux conditions antrieurement convenues avec le Reich, et que, par le contrat ultrieur, conclu entre la Bayerische et la Treuhand la date du 25 novembre 1920, il avait t stipul qu' cette fin la Bayerische dsignerait au moins deux membres de sa propre direction comme membres de la direction de l'Oberschlesische, c'est, de l'avis de la Cour, la Bayerische plutt que le Reich qui a le contrle sur 1'Oberschlesische. La Cour conclut donc que n'est. pas fonde la thse polonaise suivant laquelle l'Oberschlesische n'a pas subi de dommage parce que cette Socit doit tre considre comme s'identifiant avec le Reich, et suivant laquelle les biens dont ladite Socit a t prive par l'acte du Gouvernement polonais sont acquis la Pologne en vertu de l'article 256 du Trait de Versailles. JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~W FACTORY (MERITS) 4O that there was no need for it to consider the question whether the Oberschlesische, having regard to the rights conferred

by the contract of December 24th, 1919, on the Reich, should be considered as controlled by the Reich, and, should this be the case, what consequences would ensue as regards the application of the Geneva Convention. But the reason for this was that the Court held that the Polish Government had not raised this question, and that, apart from its contention as to the fictitious character of the instruments of December 24th, 1919, that Government did not seem to have disputed that the Company was controlled by German nationals. At alI events, it is clear that only by regarding the said Company as a Company controlled by German nationals within the meaning of Article 6 of the Geneva Convention, was the Court able to declare that the attitude of the Polish Government towards that Company was not in conformity with the tenns of Article 6 and the following articles of the said Convention. Even if the question were still open and the Court were now free once more to consider it, it wodd be bound to conclude that the Oberschlesische was controlled by the Bayensche. For seeing that, under the contract of December 24th, 1919, the Reich had declared that it agreed to leave the management of the Chorz6w undertaking in the hands of the Bayerische, under the conditions previously settled with the Reich, and that, under the subsequent contract concluded on November 2 jth, 1920, between the Bayerische and the Treuhand, it had been stipulated that for this purpose the Bayerische was to appoint at least two members of its own board as members of the board of the Oberschlesische, the Court considers that the Bayensche, rather than the Reich, controls the Oberschlesische. The Court, therefore, arrives at the conclusion that the Polish contention to the effect that the Oberschlesische has not suffered damage, because that Company is to be regarded as identifiable with the Reich, and that the property of which the said Company was deprived by the action of the Polish Government has passed to Poland under Article 256 of the Treaty of Versailles, is not well founded. A titre subsidiaire, le Gouvernement polonais a allgu que, mme si les droits que le Reich possde d'aprs le contrat du 24 dcembre 1919 dans l'entreprise de ChorzOw ne devaient pas tre considrs comme comportant la proprit des actions de l'Oberschlesische, la valeur de ces droits, qui tomberaient sous le coup de l'article 256 du Trait de Versailles, devrait nanmoins tre dduite de l'indemnit rclame du chef de 1'Oberschlesische. La Cour ne saurait davantage accepter cette thse. A ce sujet, il y a lieu de remarquer que l'article 256 pose

deux conditions, savoir qu'il s'agisse de biens et proprits appartenant l'Empire ou aux tats allemands, et que ces ((biens et proprits soient ((situs )) dans un territoire allemand cd en vertu du Trait. Il s'agit donc de savoir, entre autres, si les droits du Reich selon le contrat du 24 dcembre 1919 sont ((situs 1) dans la partie de la Haute-Silsie cde la Pologne. En tant que crance contre la Treuhand, il est clair que cette crance ne peut tre considre comme situe dans la Haute-Silsie polonaise, la Treuhand tant une socit dont le sige social st en Allemagne et dont les parts appartiennent des socits qui ont galement leur sige en Allemagne, et sur lesquelles le contrle appartient sans conteste des ressartissants allemands. Le fait que cette crance est garantie par un droit de gage sur les actions, dont les bnfices, de mme que le prix obtenu en cas de vente, serviront amortir la crance, ne peut, de l'avis de la Cour, justifier l'opinion suivant laquelle les droits du Reich seraient situs en Haute-Silsie polonaise o se trouve l'usine. Ce ne sont que des droits sur les actions, lesquels, si on ne veut pas les considrer comme situs l o se trouvent les actions, doivent tre regards comme tant localiss au sige de la socit, sige qui, en l'espce, est Berlin et non en Haute-Silsie polonaise. Le transfert du sige de 1'Oberschlesische de Chorz6w Berlin aprs l'entre en vigueur du Trait de Versailles ne peut tre considr comme illgal et nul ; les motifs pour lesquels la Cour, dans son Arrt no 7, JUDGMENT NO. 13.--CHORZ~W FACTORY (MERITS) 4I Alternatively, the Polish Government has contended that, even if the rights possessed by the Reich under the contract of December 24th, 1919, in the Chorz6w undertaking are not to be considered as involving ownership of the shares of the Oberschlesische, the value of these rights, which fall within the scope of Article 256 of the Treaty of Versailles, should nevertheless be deducted from the indemnity claimed as regards the Oberschlesische. The Court is likewise unable to admit this contention. In this respect, it should be noted that Article 256 contains two conditions, namely, that the "property and possessions" with which it deals must belong to the Empire or to the Gennan States, and that such "property and possessions" must be "situated in German territos. ceded under the Treaty . It must therefore be ascertained, amongst other things, whether the rights of the Reich under the contract of December 24th, 1919, are "situated" in the part of Upper Silesia ceded to Poland. In so far as these rights consist in a

claim against the Treuhand, it is clear that this claim cannot be regarded as situated in Polish Upper Silesia, since the Treuhand is a Company whose registered office is in Gennany and whose shares belong to companies which also have their registered office in Germany and which are undeniably controlled by German nationals. The fact that this daim is guaranteed by a lien on the shares on which the profit, as well as the price obtained in the event of sale, is to be devoted to the payment of this claim, does not, in the Court's opinion, justify the view that the rights of tge Reich are situated in Polish Upper Silesia where the factory is. These are only rights in respect of the shares; and these rights, if not regarded as situated where the shares are, must be considered as localized at the registered office of the Company which in this case in at Berlin and not in Polish Upper Silesia. The transfer of the registered office of the Oberschlesische from Chorz6w to Berlin after the coming into force of the Treaty of Versailles annot be regarded as illegal and null: a considr que des alinations de biens publics sis dans la zone soumise au plbiscite n'taient pas interdites par ledit Trait, s'appliquent plus forte raison l'acte par lequel une socit anonyme a transfr son sige de cette zone en Allemagne. C'est encore en vain que le Gouvernement polonais invoque le paragraphe IO de l'annexe aux articles 297 et 298 du Trait de Versailles, paragraphe qui tablit le devoir pour l'Allemagne de remettre (( chaque Puissance allie ou associe tous les contrats, certificats, actes et autres titres de proprit se trouvant entre les mains de ses ressortissants et se rapportant des biens, droits et intrts situs sur le territoire de ladite Puissance allie ou associe, y compris les actions, obligations ou autres valeurs mobilires de toutes socits autorises par la lgislation de cette Puissance 1). Mme abstraction faite de la circonstance que l'Oberschlesische a t constitue sous le rgime des lois allemandes 'et n'a pas t autorise par la lgislation polonaise, ladite disposition est trangre l'article 256 et se rfre seulement aux articles en annexe auxquels elle se trouve. L'expos qui prcde ayant tabli que, selon l'opinion de la Cour, l'article 256 du Trait de Versailles n'est pas applicable aux droits que le Reich possde en vertu du contrat du 24 dcembre 1919, il s'ensuit qu'il faut rejeter la thse polonaise base sur l'applicabilit dudit article, et selon laquelle il est ncessaire d'liminer du montant de l'indemnit allouer la valeur de ces droits. Il en est de mme en ce qui concerne la conclusion bu Gouvernement polonais demandant la remise la Pologne de la totalit des actions de I'Oberschlesische,

conclusion dont le but exprs est d'aboutir une telle limination. Car cette conclusion, elle aussi, a pour seul fondement la prtendue applicabilit dudit article du Trait de Versailles. JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~WFA CTORY (MERITS) 42 the reasons for which the Court, in Judgrnent No. 7, held that alienations of public property situated in the plebiscite zone were not prohibited by that Treaty, apply a fortiori in respect of the transfer by a company of its registered office from this zone to Gennany. It is also in vain that the Polish Govenunent cites paragraph IO of the Annex to Articles 297 and 298 of the Treaty of Versailles, which paragraph lays down that Germany shall deliver "to each Allied or Associated Power all securities, certificates, deeds, or other documents of title held by its nationals and relating to property, rights or interests situated in the territory of that Allied or Associated Power, including any shares, stock, debentures, debenture stock, or other obligations of any company incorporated in accordance with the laws of that Power". Even disregarding the circumstances that the Oberschlesische was constituted under German law and has not been "incorporated in accordance with the laws of Poland, the clause quoted has nothing to do with Article 256 and relates only to the articles to which it is annexed. Since, as has been shown above, Article 256 of the Treaty of Versailles is not, in the Court's opinion, applicable to the rights possessed by the Reich under the contract of December 24th, 1919, it follows that the Polish Government's contention-based on the applicability of that articleto the effect that the value of these rights should be elirninated from the amount of the indemnity to be awarded, must be rejected. The same is true as regards the Polish Government's submission that. the whole of the shares of the Oberschlesische should be handed over to Poland, a submission the aim of which is precisely to bring about the elimination referred to. For this submission is likewise based solely on the alleged applicability of the sarne article of the Treaty of Versailles. A titre subsidiaire, galement au sujet de la demande d'une indemnit fonde sur le prjudice subi par l'oberschlesische, le Gouvernement polonais a pri la Cour de surseoir provisoirement sur ladite demande en indemnit. Les raisons pour lesquelles il demande ce sursis paraissent tre les suivantes : Le Gouvernement polonais a notifi la Commission des Rparations la prise de possession, en vertu de l'article 256 du Trait de Versailles, de l'usine de Chorzow, en la portant sur

la liste des biens d'tat allemands acquis conformment audit article. 11 appartient la Commission des Rparations de fixer la valeur de ces biens, valeur qui doit tre paye la Commission par l'tat cessionnaire pour tre porte au crdit de l'Allemagne valoir sur les sommes dues au titre des rparations. Or, aprs que la Cour eut rendu son Arrt no 7, le Gouvernement allemand avait demand la Commission des Rparations de radier l'usine de Chorzow de la liste des biens transfrs la Pologne, sans que, cependant, la Commission et encore pris de dcision cet gard. Ida question de savoir si la Pologne doit tre dbite de la valeur de l'usine reste donc en suspens, et le Gouvernement polonais est d'avis que, tant que cette question n'est pas tranche et que la Commission des Rparations n'a pas radi l'usine de Chorzow de la liste, le Gouvernement polonais ne peut tre contraint un paiement en faveur de 1'Oberschlesische. A ct de ces considrations, le Gouvernement polonais invoque encore la Convention d'armistice et l'article 248 du Trait de Versailles. Ce dernier tablit que, sous rserve des drogations qui pourraient tre accordes par la Commission des Rparations, un privilge de premier rang est tabli sur tous les biens et ressources de l'Empire et des tats allemands, pour le rglement des rparations et autres charges rsultant du prsent Trait, ou de tous autres traits et conventions complmentaires, ou des arrangements conclus entre l'Allemagne et les Puissances allies ou associes pendant l'armistice et ses prorogations 1). Le Gouvernement polonais constate que, dans son Arrt no 7, la Cour a jug que la Pologne, n'ayant pas JUDGMENT No. 1 3 . 4 ~ 0 ~ 2FA6CT~OR Y (MERITS) 43 Altematively, and also in regard to the claim for an indemnity based on the damage sustained by the Oberschlesische, the Polish Govement has asked the Court "provisionally to suspend" its decision on the claim for indemnity. The reasons for which it seeks this suspension appear to ;be as follows : The Polish Government has notified the Reparation Commission of the taking over of the Chorzow factory, under Article 256 of the Treaty of Versailles, by entering it on the list of German State property acquired under that article. It is for the Reparation Commission to fix the value of such property, which value is to be paid to the Commission by the succession State and credited to Germany on account of the sums due for reparations. Now after the Court had .delivered Judgment No. 7, the German Governrnent asked the Reparation Commission to strike out the Chorzow factory from the list of property transferred to Poland, but the

Commission has not yet taken any decision in regard to this. The question whether Poland is to be debited with the value of the factory therefore remains undecided, and the Polish ~Governrnent considers that, until this question has been decided and the Reparation Commission has struck the Chorz6w factory off the list, it-the Polish Government-cannot be compelled to make a payrnent in favour of the Oberschlesische. In addition to these considerations, the Polish Government also cites the Armistice Convention and Article 248 of the Treaty of Versailles. The latter lays down that, "subject to such exceptions as the Reparation Commission may approve, a first charge upon al1 the assets and revenues of the German Empire and its constituent States shall be the cost of reparation and al1 other costs arising under the present Treaty or any treaties or agreements supplementary thereto or under arrangements concluded between Gemany and the Allied and . Associated Powers during the armistice or its extensions". The Polish Government says that in Judgment No. 7 the Court has decided first that Poland, not having been a party 6 pris part la Convention d'armistice, n'a pas le droit de se prvaloir des stipulations de celle-ci pour considrer nulle et non avenue l'alination de l'usine, et qu'elle ne peut se rclamer individuellement, dans le mme but, de l'article 248 du Trait de Versailles. Mais il semble soutenir que, vu le droit que les tats signataires de la Convention d'armistice peuvent avoir s'opposer la vente de l'usine, et vu le droit de la Commission des Rparations veiller sur l'acquittement de la dette de rparation en gnral, et vu spcialement le droit qui lui est rserv par l'article 248, l'obligation de la Pologne de payer l'Allemagne une indemnit en faveur de l'Oberschlesische dpend d'une approbation pralable desdits tats ainsi que de la Commission des Rparations. De son ct, le Gouvernement allemand, tout en c0ntestan.t le bien-fond desdites objections du Gouvernement polonais, a dclar admettre la comptence de la Cour pour statuer sur celles-ci (( en tant que questions pralables, pour les questions de la forme, du montant et des modes du paiement des indemnits qu'il rclame, questions pour lesquelles la Cour a dj affirm sa comptence . Il a pri la Cour de rejeter la conclusion subsidiaire polonaise et de dire et juger : que le Gouvernement polonais n'est pas autoris refuser le paiement au Gouvernement allemand des indemnits en raison d'arguments tii-s de l'article 256 ou en raison d'gards vis--vis de la Commission des Rparations ou d'autres tierces personnes 1).

La Cour est d'avis que sa comptence pour statuer sur la conclusion polonaise en question n'est pas douteuse, mais que cette conclusion doit tre rejete comme non fonde. A ce sujet, il y a lieu de remarquer, tout d'abord, que les faits allgus par la Pologne ne peuvent empcher la Cour, saisie maintenant d'une demande en indemnit sur la base de son Arrt no 7, de statuer sur cette demande en ce qui concerne la fixation d'une indemnit correspondant, entre autres, au montant du dommage subi par l'Oberschlesische, dommage dont l'lment le plus important est reprsent par la perte de l'usine. Car, en constatant par son Arrt no 7 que l'attitude du Gouvernement polonais vis--vis de l'oberschleJUDGMENT NO. 13.-CHORZ~W FACTORY (MERITS) 44 to the Armistice Convention, is not entitled to avail itself of the terms of that instrument in order to establish that the alienation of the factory is nul1 and void, and secondly, that that country cannot, on her own account, cite Article 248 of the Treaty of Versailles for the same purpose. It would seem, however, that the said Government contends that, in view of the right which the States signatory to the Armistice Convention may have to oppose the sale of the factory and in view of the right of the Reparation Commission to &sure the discharge of reparation debts in general and especially in view of the right reserved to it under Article 248, Poland's obligation to pay to Germany an indemnity in favour of the Oberschlesische is dependent on the previous approval of the said States and of the Reparation Commission. The Geman Goverment, for its part, whilst disputing the justice of these objections of the Polish Government, has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court to decide upon them "as preliminary points in regard to the questions of form, amount and methods of payment of the indemnities clajmed by it, questions with which the Court has already declared itself competent to deal". It has asked the Court to dismiss the Polish alternative submission and to decide: "that the Polish Government is not justified in refusing to pay compensation to the German Government on the basis of arguments drawn from Article 256 or for motives of respect for the rights of the Reparation Commission or other third parties". The Court considers that there is no doubt as to its jurisdiction to pass judgment upon the Polish submission in question, but that this subrnission must be rejected as not wellfounded. In this respect, it should be observed in the first place that the facts cited by Poland cannot prevent the Court, which now has before it a claim for indemnity based on its

Judgment No. 7, from passing judgment upon this claim in so far as concerns the fixing of an indemnity corresponding, amongst other things, to the amount of the damage sustained by the Oberschlesische, of which damage the most important element is represented by the loss of the factory. For the Court, when it declared in Judgment No. 7 that the attitude sische n'tait pas conforme aux dispositions des articles 6 et suivants de la Convention de Genve, - attitude qui consistait considrer et traiter ladite usine comme acquise par la Pologne en vertu de l'article 256 du Trait de Versailles, la Cour a cart, avec effet entre les Parties, l'applicabilit dudit article l'usine de Chorz6w. D'autre part, il ressort des documents soumis la Cour par les Parties que la Commission des Rparations ne revendique pas la comptence pour statuer sur la question de savoir si tel ou tel bien est, oui ou non, acquis par un tat cessionnaire en vertu dudit article. Elle accepte ce sujet la solution que la question a pu recevoir, soit par les moyens dont disposent les intresss - ngociations diplomatiques, arbitrages, etc. - soit par un acte unilatral de l'tat cessionnaire lui-mme. Et si maintenant les Parties sont d'accord sur ce que la Pologne doit conserver l'usine, cela n'est pas cause de l'article 256 du Trait de Versailles, mais en raison de l'impossibilit pratique de restituer l'usine. Il ne semble pas douteux, dans ces circonstances, que la Pologne ne court aucun risque de devoir payer nouveau la valeur de l'usine la Commission des Rparations, si, conformment la demande de l'Allemagne, elle paie cet tat la valeur de l'usine. En ce qui concerne la Convention d'armistice et l'article 248 du Trait de Versailles, la question se pose autrement. La Convention d'armistice semble avoir t invoque dans le but de rserver la possibilit de faire invalider la vente de l'usine 1'Oberschlesische par une action que les tats signataires de ladite Convention intenteraient cet effet. Comme, cependant, la Cour, dans son Arrt no 7, a estim que la Pologne ne peut pas se prvaloir des dispositions de cette Convention, laquelle elle n'est pas partie, la Cour ne saurait, sans inconsquence, lui reconnatre le droit d'invoquer la Convention aux fins d'obtenir un sursis la rparation du dommage qu'elle avait caus par une attitude non conforme aux obligations rsultant pour elle de la Convention de Genve. comme il a dj t dit, la Cour, dans son Arrt no 7, a dclar que la Pologne ne peut pas se rclamer individuellement de l'article 248 du Trait de Versailles aux fins d'annuler JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~WF ACTORY (MERITS) 45 of the Polish Government in regard to the ~berschlesische

was not in conformity with the provisions of Article 6 and the following articles of the Geneva Convention-which attitude consisted in considering and treating the Chorz6w factory as acquired by Poland under Article 256 of the Treaty of Versailles-established that, as between the Parties, that article was not applicable to the Chorz6w factory. Again it appears from the documents submitted to the Court by the Parties that the Reparation Commission does not claim to be competent to decide whether any particular property is or is not acquired by a succession State under the said article. The Commission accepts in this respect the solution arrived at in regard to this question either by the means at the disposa1 of those concerned-diplomatic negotiations, arbitration, etc.-or as the result of a unilateral act on the part of the succession State itself. The fact that the Parties are now agreed that Poland must retain the factory has nothing to do with Article 256 of the Treaty of Versailles, but is owing to the impracticability of returning it. In these circumstances there seems to be no doubt that Poland incurs no risk of having again to pay the value of the factory to the Reparation Commission, if, in accordance with Germany's claim, she pays this value to that State. With regard to the Armistice Convention and Article 248 of the Treaty of Versailles, the question assumes a different aspect. The Armistice Convention appears to have been cited in order to reserve the possibility of getting the sale of the factory to the Oberschlesische declared invalid by means of an action to be brought to that end by the States signatory to that Convention. As, however, the Court, in Judgment No. 7, has held that Poland cannot avail itself of the provisions of the said Convention to which she is not a party, the Court cannot without inconsistency admit that country's right to invoke the Convention in order to delay making reparation for the damage resulting from her adoption of an attitude not in conformity with her obligations under the Geneva Convention. As has already been said, the Court in Judgrnent No. 7 has declared that Poland cannot on her own account rely on Article 248 of the Treaty of Versailles in order to obtain the la vente de l'usine ; en outre, la Cour a constat que cet article ne comporte pas de dfense d'alination et que les droits rservs aux Puissances allies et associes dans ledit article sont exercs par l'intermdiaire de la Commission des Rparations. Mais il serait difficile de comprendre comment lesdits droits pourraient tre lss du fait du versement au Reich, titre d'indemnit, de la valeur de l'usine, vu que, sans

un tel versement, les droits du Reich dans l'entreprise perdraient probablement toute valeur. L'objection base sur cet article doit donc, elle aussi, tre carte. La Cour estime devoir se borner rejeter la conclusion par laquelle le Gouvernement polonais demande un sursis, considrant que, par ce rejet, ainsi que par le rejet des exceptions prsentes par le Gouvernement polonais sur la base de l'article 256 du Trait de Versailles, elle fait droit la conclusion allemande, dans toute la mesure o cette conclusion est justifie ; en effet, la Cour ne saurait examiner la conclusion dont il s'agit pour autant qu'elle se rfre des tierces personnes qui ne sont pas spcifies. III. L'existence d'un dommage indemniser tant reconnue par la Partie dfenderesse en ce qui concerne la Bayerische, et les objections souleves par cette Partie contre l'existence d'un dommage justifiant une indemnisation de l'Oberschlesische tant cartes, la Cour doit maintenant fixer les critres d'aprs lesquels il y a lieu de procder la dtermination du montant de l'indemnit due. L'acte de la Pologne que la Cour a jug tre contraire la Convention de Genve, n'est pas une expropriation laquelle n'aurait manqu, pour tre lgitime, que le paiement d'une indemnit quitable ; c'est une mainmise sur des biens, droits et intrts qui ne pouvaient tre expropris mme contre indemnit, sauf dans les conditions exceptionnelles dtermines pa l'article 7 de ladite Convention. Comme la Cour l'a expressment constat dans son Arrt no 8, la rparation est, en l'espce, la consqiience non pas de l'application des articles 6 22 de la Convention de Genve, mais d'actes qui sont contraires aux dispositions de ces articles. JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~WF ACTORY (MERITS) 46 annulment of the sale of the factoq. Furthermore, the Court has stated that this article does not involve a prohibition of alienation, and that the rights reserved to the Allied and Associated Powers in the article are exercised through the Reparation Commission. But it would be difficult to understand how these rights d d be affected by the payment to the Reich, as an indemnity, of the value of the factory, seeing that, without such a payment, the rights of the Reich in the enterprise would probably lose all value. The objection based on this article must therefore also be overruled. The Court considers that it should confine itself to rejecting . ' the submission whereby the Polish Government asks for a suspension, since by so doing and by o v e d n g the objections raised by the Polish Government on the basis of Article

256 of the Treaty of Versailles, it is deciding in conformity with the German submission to the extent that that submission is well-founded ; the Court cannot, in fact, consider the submission in question in so far as it relates to third parties who are not specified. III. The existence of a damage to be made good being recognized by the respondent Party as regards the Bayerische, and the objections raised by the same Party against the existence of any damage that would justify compensation to the Oberschlesische being set aside, the Court must now lay down the guiding principles according to which the amount of compensation due may be determined. The action of Poland which the Court has judged to be contrary to the Geneva Convention is not an expropriationto render which lawful only the payment of fair compensation would have been wanting ; it is a seizure of property, rights and interests which could not be expropriated even against compensation, Save under the exceptional conditions fixed by Article 7 of the said Convention. As the Court has expressly declared in Judgment No. 8, reparation is in this case the consequence not ' of the application of Articles 6 to 22 of the Geneva Convention, but of acts contrary to those articles. Il s'ensuit que l'indemnit due au Gouvernement allemand n'est pas ncessairement limite la valeur qu'avait l'entreprise au moment de la dpossession, plus les intrts jusqu'au jour du paiement. Cette limitation ne serait admissible que si le Gouvernement polonais avait eu le droit d'exproprier et que si son tort se rduisait n'avoir pas pay aux deux Socits le juste prix des choses expropries ; dans le cas actuel, elle pourrait aboutir placer l'Allemagne et les intrts protgs par la Convention de Genve, et pour lesquels le Gouvernement allemand a pris fait et cause, dans une situation plus dfavorable que celle dans laquelle l'Allemagne et ces intrts se trouveraient si la Pologne avait respect ladite Convention. Une pareille consquence serait non seulement inique, mais aussi et avant tout incompatible avec le but vis par les articles 6 et suivants de la Convention, voire la dfense, en principe, de liquider des biens, droits et intrts des ressortissants allemands et des socits contrles par des ressortissants allemands en Haute-Silsie, car elle quivaudrait identifier la liquidation licite et la dpossession illicite en ce qui concerne leurs effets financiers. Le principe essentiel, qui dcoule de la notion mme d'acte illicite et qui semble se dgager de la pratique internationale,

notamment de la jurisprudence des tribunaux arbitraux, est que la rparation doit, autant que possible, effacer toutes les consquences de l'acte illicite et rtablir l'tat qui aurait vraisemblablement exist si ledit acte n'avait pas t commis. Restitution en nature, ou, si elle n'est pas possible, paiement d'une somme correspondant la valeur qu'aurait la restitution en nature ; allocation, s'il y a lieu, de dommages-intrts pour les pertes subies et qui ne seraient pas couvertes par la restitution en nature ou le paiement qui en prend la place ; tels sont les principes desquels doit s'inspirer la dtermination du montant de l'indemnit due cause d'un fait contraire au droit international. Cette conclusion s'impose avec une force toute particulire: l'gard de la Convention de Genve, qui a pour but d'assurer le maintien de la vie conomique en Haute-Silsie sur la base di1 respect du statu quo. La dpossession d'une entreprise industrielle, que la Convention dfendait d'exproprier, a donc JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~WF ACTORY (MERITS) 4 7 It follows that the compensation due to the German Government is not necessarily limited to the value of the undertakjng at the moment of dispossession, plus interest to the day of payment. This limitation would only be admissible if the Polish Government had had the right to expropriate, and if its wrongful act consisted merely in not having paid to the two Companies the just price of what was expropriated ; in the present case, such a limitation might result in placing Germany and the interests protected by the Geneva Convention, on behalf of which 'interests the German Government is acting, in a situation more unfavourable than that in which Germany and these interests would have been if Poland had respected the said Convention. Such a consequence would not only be unjust, but also and above al1 incompatible with the aim of Article 6 and following articles of the Conventionthat is to Say, the prohibition, in principle, of the liquidation of the property, rights and interests of German nationals and of companies controlled by German nationals in Upper Silesia-since it would be tantamount to rendering lawful liquidation and unlawful dispossession indistinguishable in so far as their financial results are concerned. The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act-a principle which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals-is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out al1 the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in al1 probability, have existed if that act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this

is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the v a l ~ e which a restitution in kind would bear ; the award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it-such are the principles which should serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international law. This conclusion particularly applies as regards the Geneva Convention, the object of which is to provide for the maintenance of economic life in Upper Silesia on the basis of respect for the status quo. The dispossession of an industrial undertakingthe expropriation of which is prohibited by the pour consquence l'obligation de la restituer, et, si cela n'est pas possible, d'en payer la valeur l'poque de l'indemnisation destine remplacer la restitution devenue impossible. A cette obligation s'ajoute, en vertu des principes gnraux du droit international, celle d'indemniser les pertes prouves la suite de la mainmise. L'impossibilit, constate par un accord des Parties, de restituer l'usine de Chorzow ne saurait donc avoir d'autre effet que celui de remplacer la restitution par le paiement de la valeur de l'entreprise ; il ne serait conforme ni aux principes juridiques, ni la volont des Parties, d'en dduire que la question de l'indemnit doit dsormais tre traite comme si l'on tait sur le terrain d'une vritable expropriation. Tels tant les principes d'aprs lesquels il y a lieu de procder la dtermination de l'indemnit due, il convient maintenant de rechercher si les dommages indemniser doivent tre valus distinctement pour chacune des deux Socits, comme l'a fait la Partie demanderesse, ou s'il est prfrable d'en dterminer la valeur globale. Si la Cour tait en prsence de dommages qui, tout en tant causs par un mme acte, auraient frapp des personnes indpendantes les unes des autres, la mthode qui s'imposerait naturellement serait l'valuation spare du dommage prouv par chacune d'elles ; la somme des indemnits ainsi values constituerait alors le montant de la rparation due l'tat. En l'espce, la situation est diffrente. L'unit conomique de l'entreprise de Chorzow, que la Cour a dj fait remarquer dans son Arrt no 6, se manifeste surtout par le fait que les intrts possds par les deux Socits dans ladite entreprise sont interdpendants et complmentaires ; il s'ensuit qu'on ne saurait les additionner purement et simplement, sous peine d'indemniser deux fois le mme dommage ; car tout ce que la Bayerische aurait retir de sa participation l'entreprise (redevances et parts des bnfices) aurait t la charge de llOberschlesische. La valeur du droit d'option de la Bayerische

JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~W FACTORY (MERITS) 48 Geneva Convention-then involves the obligation to restore the undertaking and, if this be not possible, to pay its value at the time of the indemnification, which value is designed to take the place of restitution which has becorne impossible. To this obligation, in virtue of the general principles of international law, must be added that of compensating loss sustained as the result of the seizure. The impossibility, on which the Parties are agreed, of restoring the Chorz6w factory could therefore have no other effect but that of substituting payment of the value of the undertaking for restitution; it would not be in conformity either with the principles of law or with the wish of the Parties to infer from that agreement that the question of compensation must henceforth be dealt with as though an expropriation properly so called was involved. Such being the principles to be followed in fixing the compensation due, the Court may now consider whether the damage to be made good is to be estimated separately for each of the two Companies, as the Applicant has claimed, or whether it is preferable to fix a lump sum. If the Court were dealing with damage which, though caused by a single act, had affected persons independent the one of the other, the natural method to be applied would be a separate assessment of the damage sustained by each of them; lthe total amount of compensation thus assessed would then constitute the amount of reparation due to the State. In the present case, the situation is different. The economic unity of the Chorz6w undertaking, pointed out by the Court in its Judgment No. 6, is shown above all in the fact that the interests possessed by the two Companies in the said undertaking are interdependent and complementary ; it follows that they cannot simply be added together without running the risk of the same darnage being compensated twice over ; for al1 that the Bayerische would have obtained from its participation in the undertaking (sums due and shares in the profits) would have been payable by the Oberschlesische. The value 49 ARRT NO 13. - USINE DE CHORZOW (FOND) l'achat de l'usine dpendait galement de la valeur de l'entreprise. Tous les dommages que l'une ou l'autre des Socits ont subis la suite de la dpossession, pour autant qu'ils ont trait la suppression de l'exploitation et la perte des bnfices qu'elle aurait rapports, sont dtermins par la valeur de l'entreprise comme telle ; partant, les indemnits fixer de ce chef doivent se tenir dans ce cadre. D'autre part, il est clair que les rapports juridiques entre les deux Socits sont tout fait trangers la procdure

internationale et ne sauraient constituer un obstacle ce que la Cour se place sur le terrain d'une valuation globale, correspondant la valeur de l'entreprise, si, comme elle l'estime, cette valuation est plus simple et donne plus de garanties d'arriver une juste apprcation du montant du dommage et d'viter des doubles emplois. Une rserve cependant s'impose. L'valuation globale, 'cidessus vise, ne concerne que l'entreprise de Chorz6w et n'exclut pas la possibilit de tenir compte d'autres dommages que les Socits auraient subis du fait de la dpossession, mais en dehors de l'entreprise elle-mme. Aucun dommage de cette nature n'a t allgu en ce qui concerne I'Oberschlesische, et il ne semble gure concevable qu'il en existe, car toute l'activit de l'Oberschlesische tait concentre dans l'entreprise. Par contre, il est possible que des dommages de cet ordre se soient vrifis pour ce qui est de la Bayerische, laquelle possde ou exploite d'autres usines du mme genre que celle de Chorz6w; la Cour examinera plus tard si de tels dommages entrent en ligne de compte pour la fixation du montant de l'indemnit. Place devant la ncessit de dterminer quelle est la somme qu'il convient d'allouer au Gouvernement allemand afin de lui permettre de remettre, autant que possible, les Socits dpossdes dans la situation conomique dans laquelle elles se trouveraient vraisemblablement si la mainmise n'avait pas eu lieu, la Cour ne croit pas pouvoir se contenter des lments d'valuation qui lui ont t fournis par les Parties. JUDGMENT NO. 13.-CHORZ~WFA CTORY (MERITS) 49 of the Bayerische's option on the factory depended also on the value of the undertaking. The whole damage suffered by the one or the other Company as the result of dispossession, in so far as concems the cessation of the working and the loss of profit which would have accrued, is detennined by the value of the undertaking as such ; and, therefore, compensation under this head must remain within these limits. On the other hand, it is clear that the legal relationship between the two Companies in no way concerns the international proceedings and cannot hinder the Court from adopting the system of a lump sum corresponding to the value of the nndertaking, if, as is the Court's opinion, such a calculation is simpler and gives greater guarantees that it will arrive at a just appreciation of the amount, and avoid awarding double damages. One reservation must, however, be made. The calculation of a lump surn referred to above concerns only the Chorz6w undertaking, and does not exclude the possibility of taking into account other damage which the Companies may have

sustained owing to dispossession, but which is outside the undertaking itself. No damage of such a nature has been alleged as regards the Oberschlesische, and it seems hardly conceivable that such damage should exist, for the whole activity of the Oberschlesische was concentrated in the undertaking. On the other hand, it is possible that damage of such a nature may be shown to exist as regards the Bayerische, which possesses or works other factories of the same nature as Chorz6w ; the Court will consider later whether such damage must be taken into account in fixing the amount of compensation. *** Faced with the task of determining what sum must be awarded to the German Government in order to enable it to place the dispossessed Companies as far as possible in the economic situation in which they would probably have been if the seizure had not taken place, the Court considers that it cannot be satisfied with the data for assessrnent supplied by the Parties. Les frais de constriiction de l'usine de Chorzow, que le demandeur a pris pour base de son calcul en ce qui concerne l'indemnit de l'Oberschlesische, ont soulev de la part du dfendeur des objections et des critiques, qui ne sont peut-tre pas dknues de tout fondement. Sans entrer dans cette discussion et sans nier l'importance que les frais de construction pourront avoir dans la dtermination de la valeur de l'entreprise, la Cour se borne observer qu'il n'est certainement pas exclu que les frais encourus pour la construction d'une usine ne soient pas en rapport avec la valeur qu'aura l'usine une fois btie. Cette possibilit doit entrer particulirement en ligne de compte lorsque, comme dans le cas prsent, .l'usine a t btie par l'tat en vue de faire face des exigences imprieuses d'intrt public et au milieu de circonstances exceptionnelles comme celles cres par la guerre. D'autre part, la Cour ne saurait pas non plus s'arrter au prix stipul dans le contrat du 24 dcembre 1919 entre le Reich, 1'0berschlesische et la Treuhand, ou l'offre de vente d'actions de I'Oberschlesische la Compagnie de l'azote et des fertilisants de Genve faite le 26 mai 1922. Il a dj t observ ci-dessus que la valeur de l'entreprise au moment de la dpossession ne constitue pas ncessairement la mesure pour la fixation de l'indemnit. Or, il est constant que le moment auquel remontent le contrat de vente et les ngociations avec la Socit genevoise appartient une priode de crise conomique et montaire profonde ; l'cart entre la valeur qu'avait alors l'entreprise et la valeur qu'elle aurait eu actuellement peut donc tre

fort considrable. Tout cela sans compter que le prix stipul dans le contrat de 1919 tait dtermin par des circonstances et accompagn de clauses qui, en ralit, ne permettent gure de le regarder comme la vritable expression de la valeur que les Parties attribuaient l'usine ; et que l'offre la Socit genevoise s'explique probablement par la crainte de mesures du genre de celles que le Gouvernement polonais a effectivement prises peu aprs contre l'entreprise de ChorzOw et que la Cour a jug n'avoir pas t conformes la Convention de Genve. JUDGhfENT NO. 13.-CHORZ~W FACTORY (MERITS) 5O The cost of construction of the Chorz6w factory, which the Applicant has taken as a basis for his calculation as regards compensation to the Oberschlesische, gave rise to objections and criticisms by the Respondent which are perhaps not without some foundation. Without entering into this discussion and without denying the importance which the question of cost of construction may have in detennining the value of the undertaking, the Court merely observes that it is by no means impossible that the cost of construction of a factory may not correspond to the value which that factory will have when built. 7his possibility must more particularly be considered when, as in the present case, the factory was built by the State in order to meet the imperious demands of public necessity and under exceptional circumstances such as those created by the war. Nor yet can the Court, on the other hand, be satisfied with the price stipulated in the contract of December q t h , 1919, between the Reich, the Oberschlesische and the Treuhand, or with the offer of sale of the shares of the Oberschlesische to the Geneva Com;bagnie d'azote et de fertilisants made on May 26th, 1922. It has already been pointed out above that the value of the undertaking at the moment of dispossession does not necessarily indicate the criterion for the fixing of compensation. Now it is certain that the moment of the contract of sale and that of the negotiations with the Genevese Company belong to a period of serious economic and monetary crisis; the difference between the value which the undertaking then had and that which it would have had at present may therefore be very considerable. And further, it must be considered that the price stipulated in the contract of 1919 was detennined by circumstances and accompanied by clauses which in reality seem hardly to admit of its being considered as a true indication of the value which the Parties placed on the factory ; and that the offer to the Genevese Company is probably to be explained by the

fear of measures such as those which the ~oiish Government in fact adopted afterwards agailist the Chorz6w undertaking, and which the Court has judged not to be in confonnity' with the Geneva Convention. Pour ce qui est enfin de la somme sur laquelle les deux Gouvernements, un moment donn, taient tombs d'accord au cours des ngociations qui suivirent l'Arrt no 7 - somme, d'ailleurs, laquelle ni l'une ni l'autre Partie n'a cru devoir se rfrer au cours de la prsente procdure -, il suffit de rappeler que la Cour ne saurait faire tat des dclarations, admissions ou propositions qu'ont pu faire les Parties au cours des ngociations directes qui ont eu lieu entre elles, lorsque ces ngociations n'ont pas abouti un accord complet. Dans ces circonstances, la Cour, afin d'clairer sa religion, avant toute dtermination de l'indemnit que le Gouvernement polonais doit payer au Gouvernement allemand, fera procder, conformment l'article 50 de son Statut et aux suggestions mmes de la Partie demanderesse, une expertise. Cette expertise, dont les modalits sont dtermines par une Ordonnance en date de ce jour d'hui, portera sur les questions suivantes : 1. - A. Quelle tait la valeur, exprime en Reichsmarks actuels, au 3 juillet 1922, de l'entreprise pour la fabrication de produits azots dont l'usine tait sise Chorzow, en HauteSilsie polonaise, telle que cette entreprise (y compris les terrains, btiments, outillage, stocks, procds dont elle disposait, contrats de fourniture et de livraison, clientle et chances d'avenir) se trouvait la date indique entre les mains des Bayerische et Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke ? B. Quels auraient t les rsultats financiers, exprims en. Reichsmarks actuels (profits ou pertes), que l'entreprise ainsi constitue aurait vraisemblablement donns depuis le 3 juillet 1922 jusqu' la date du prsent arrt, entre les mains desdites Socits ? II. - Quelle serait la valeur, exprime en Reichsmarks actuels, la date du prsent arrt, de ladite entreprise de Chorzow, si cette entreprise (y compris les terrains, btiments, outillage, stocks, procds disponibles, contrats de fourniture et de livraison, clientle et chances d'avenir), tant reste entre les mains des Bayerische et Oberschlesische StickstoIfwerke, soit tait demeure essentiellement en l'tat de 1922, soit avait reu, toutes proportions gardes, un dveloppement analogue JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~WFA GTORI' (MERITS) 5I 3 And finally as regards the sum agreed on at one moment by the two Governrnents during the negotiations which

followed Judgment No. 7-which sum, moreover, neither Party thought fit to rely on during the present proceedingsit may again be pointed out that the Court cannot take into account declarations, admissions or proposals which the Parties may have made during direct negotiations between themselves, when such negotiations have not led to a complete agreement. This being the case, and in order to obtain further enlightenment in the matter, the Court, before giving any decision as to the compensation to be paid by the Polish Government to the Gennan Governrnent, will arrange for the holding of an expert enquiry, in confonnity with Article 50 of its Statute and actually with the suggestions of the Applicant. This expert enquiry, directions for which are given in an Order of Court of to-day's date, will refer to the following questions : 1.-A. V17hat was the value, on July 3rd, 1922, expressed in Reichsmarks current at the present time, of the undertaking for the manufacture of nitrate products of which the factory was situated at Chorzow in Polish Upper Silesia, in the state in which that undertaking (including the lands, buildings, equipment, stocks and processes at its disposal, supply and delivery contracts, goodwill and future prospects) was, on the date indicated, in the hands of the Bayerische and Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke ? B. What would have been the financial results, expressed in Reichsmarks current at the present time (profits or losses), which would probably have been given by the undertaking thus constituted from July 3rd, 1922, to the date of the present judgrnent, if it had been in the hands of the said Companies ? II.-What would be the value at the date of the present j udgrnent , expressed in Reichsmarks current at the present time, of the same undertaking (Chorzow) if that undertaking (including lands, buildings, equipment, stocks, available processes, supply and delivery contracts, goodwill and future prospects) had remained in the hands of the Bayerische and Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke, and had either remained substantially as it was in 1922 or had been developed proportionately on 7 celui d'autres entreprises du mme genre, diriges par la Bayerische, par exemple l'entreprise dont l'usine est sise Piesteritz ? La question 1 a pour but d'tablir la valeur en argent, tant de l'objet qui aurait d tre restitu en nature que du dommage supplmentaire, sur la base de la valeur estime de l'entreprise, y compris les stocks, au moment de la prise de possession par le Gouvernement polonais, augmente du profit ventuel

prsumable de cette entreprise entre la date de la prise de possession et celle de l'expertise. D'autre part, la question II vise arriver la valeur actuelle en se fondant sur la situation au moment de l'expertise et en laissant de ct la situation prsume en 1922. Cette question envisage la valeur actuelle de l'entreprise deux points de vue : en premier lieu, on suppose que l'usine serait reste essentiellement dans l'tat o elle se trouvait la date du 3 juillet 1922, et en second lieu on envisage l'usine telle que celle-ci aurait hypothtiquement, mais raisonnablement, d tre entre les mains de I'Oberschlesische et de la Bayerische, si, au lieu d'tre prise en 1922 par la Pologne, l'entreprise avait pu poursuivre son dveloppement prsum normal partir de cette poque. Le caractre hypothtique de cette question est attnu considrablement par la possibilit de la comparaison avec d'autres entreprises du mme genre, diriges par la Bayerische, et surtout avec l'usine de Piesteritz, dont l'analogie avec l'usine de Chorzow, de mme d'ailleurs que certaines diffrences entre les deux, ont t signales maintes reprises au cours de la prsente procdure. A cet gard, il y a lieu d'observer que l'agent du Gouvernement allemand a dpos, au cours de la sance publique du 21 juin 1928, deux certificats notaris contenant un rsum des contrats passs le 16 avril 1925 et le 27 aot 1927 entre la Mitteldeutsche Sticksto8werke A.- G. et la Bayerische avec adhsion des Vereinigte Industrie-Unternehwngen A.-G., contrats moyennant lesquels les Mitteldeutsche donnent en bail la Bayerische les biens-fonds Piesteritz leur appartenant avec toutes les installations et pertinences y affrentes. L'agent du Gouvernement polonais cependant, dans sa plaidoirie du 25 juin, JUDGMENT No. I~.-CHORZ~W FACTORY (MERITS) 52 lines similar to those applied in the case of other undertakings of the same kind, controlled by the Bayerische, for instance, the undertaking of which the factory is situated at Piesteritz ? The purpose of question 1 is to determine the monetary value, both of the object which should have been restored in kind and of the additional damage, on the basis of the estimated value of the undertaking including stocks at the moment of taking possession by the Polish . Government, . together with any probable profit that would :have accrued to the undertaking between the date of taking possession and that of the expert opinion. On the other hand, question II is directed to the ascertainment of the present value on the basis of the situation at the moment of the expert enquiry and leaving aside the situation presumed to exist in 1922.

This question contemplates the present value of the undertaking from two points of view : firstly, it is supposed that the factory had remained essentially in the state in which it was on July 3rd, 1922, and secondly, the factory is to be considered in the state in which it would (hypothetically but probably) have been in the hands of the Oberschlesische and Bayerische, if, instead of being taken in 1922 by Poland, it had been able to continue its supposedly normal development from that time onwards. The hypothetical nature of this question is considerably diminished by the possibility of comparison with other undertakings of the same nature directed by the Bayerische, and, in particular, with the Piesteritz factory, the analogy of which with Chorzow, as well as certain differences between the two, have been many times pointed out during the present proceedings. In regard to this, it should be observed that the Agent for the German Govemment, at the public Sitting of June zIst, 1928, handed in two certificates by notaries containing a summary of contracts concluded on April 16th, 1925, and August z7th, 1927, between the Mittelde~tsche Stickstofwevke A.-G. and the Bayerische, and adhered to by the Vereiaigte Iadustrie-Unternehrut~agea A .- G., under which contracts the Mitteldeutsche leased to the Bayerische the landed properties at Piesteritz belonging to it, together with al1 installations, etc., connected therewith. The Agent for the Polish Governa dclar que, ne connaissant pas les contrats, et ne pouvant nullement apprcier si les rsums en question contiennent tous les lments ncessaires pour faire des calculs exacts, il s'opposait formellement ce que lesdits rsums fussent pris pour base des prsents dbats. En ce qui concerne le Zacrum cessans, par rapport la question II, il convient d'observer que les dpenses d'entretien des choses corporelles faisant partie de l'entreprise et mme' les dpenses d'amlioration et de dveloppement normal des installations et de la proprit industrielle y incorpore, doivent absorber en premire ligne les profits, prsumables ou rels: de l'entreprise. Il y a donc lieu de faire abstraction, jusqu' un certain point, des profits ventuels, car ils se trouveront tre compris dans la valeur hypothtique ou relle de l'entreprise au moment actuel. Si, cependant, de la rponse que les experts donneront la question 1 B, il devait rsulter qu'aprs compensation des dficits des annes pendant lesquelles l'usine a fonctionn perte et aprs application aux dpenses d'entretien et d'amlioration normale pendant les annes suivantes, il reste une marge de profits, le montant de cette marge devrait tre additionn l'indemnit allouer.

D'autre part, si le dveloppement nornial prsuppos par la question II reprsentait un largissement de l'entreprise et un investissement de capitaux nouveaux, leur montant devrait tre dduit de la valeur recherche. La Cour ne manque pas de se rendre compte des difficults que prsentent ces deux questions : difficults d'ailleurs inhrentes au cas spcial dont il s'agit et lies avec le temps qui s'est coul entre la dpossession et la demande en indemnit et avec les transformations de l'usine et les progrs de l'industrie qui en forme l'objet. C'est en vue de ces difficults qu'elle estime prfrable de chercher arriver par des mthodes diffrentes la valeur recherche, afin de permettre une comparaison et de pouvoir ventuellement complter les rsultats de l'une par ceux des autres. Partant, la Cour se rserve toute libert d'apprcier les valuatioils vises par les diverses formules ; c'est sur la base des rsultats desdites valuations, ainsi que des faits et documents qui lui ont t soumis, qu'elle procdera la fixation de la somme qu'il convient d'allouer JUDGMENT NO. 13.-CHORZ~WFA CTORY (MERITS) 53 ment, however, in his speech on June 25th, said that, not being acquainted with the contracts and being entirely unable to form an opinion as to whether the summaries in 'question contained al1 the data necessary for accurate calculations, he formally objected to the said summaries being taken as a basis in the present proceedings.' As regards the lucrum cessans, in relation to question II, it may be remarked that the cost of upkeep of the corporeal objects forming part of the undertaking and even the cost of improvement and normal development of the installation and of the industrial property incorporated therein, are bound to absorb in a large measure the profits, real or supposed, of the undertaking. Up to a certain point, therefore, any profit may be left out of account, for it will be included in the real or supposed value of the undertaking at the present moment. If, however, the reply given by the experts to question 1 B should show that after making good the deficits for the years during which the factory was working at a loss, and after due provision for the cost of upkeep and normal improvement during the following years, there remains a margin of profit, the amount of such profit should be added to the compensation to be awarded. On the other hand, if the normal development presupposed by question II represented an enlargement of the undertaking and an investment of fresh capital, the amount of such sums must be deducted from the value sought for. The Court does not fail to appreciate the difficulties presented

by these two questions, difficulties which are however inherent in the special case under consideration, and closely connected with the time that elapsed between the dispossession and the demand for compensation, and with the transformations of the factory and the progress made in the industry with which the factory is concerned. In view of these difficulties, the Court considers it preferable to endeavour to ascertain the value to be estimated by several methods, in order to permit of a cornparison and if necessary of completing the results of the one by those of the others. The Court, therefore, reserves every right to review the valuations referred to in the different formul ; basing itself on the results of the said valuations and of facts and documents submitted to it, it will then au Gouvernement allemand, conformment aux principes de droit qui ont t rsums ci-dessus. Il convient de constater que l'usine de ChorzOw, valuer par les experts, comprend aussi l'usine chimique. Le Gouvernement polonais, ct des arguments qui, dans son opinion; auraient pour effet de dmontrer que l'exploitation de ladite usine n'aurait pu tre profitable - arguments qu'il appartiendra aux experts d'apprcier -, a fait valoir que l'exploitation dpendait d'une autorisation spciale, et que les autorits polonaises taient en droit de la refuser. Mais la Cour est d'avis que cette thse n'est pas fonde. L'autorisation vise semble tre celle dont il est question dans le paragraphe 18 de la loi prussienne de 1861, aux termes duquel, sauf dispositions contraires d'un trait international, les personnes morales trangres ne peuvent exercer une industrie sans l'autorisation du Gouvernement. Or, dans le cas dont il s'agit, il est certain que la Convention de Genve constitue bien le trait international qui, garantissant aux entreprises industrielles la continuation de leur activit, exclut toute ncessit de l'autorisation spciale requise par la loi de 1861. Le fait 'que l'usine chimique non seulement ne fonctionnait pas, mais encore n'tait pas mme acheve lors du transfert du territoire la Pologne, ne saurait entrer en ligne de compte ; en effet, l'industrie chimique de toute espce tait expressment mentionne dans les statuts de l'Oberschlesische comme un des buts de l'activit de cette Socit, et les sections et installations de l'usine chimique, d'ailleurs troitement lies aux sections et installations o tait produite la chaux azote, avaient t dj prvues et mentionnes dans le contrat de construction et d'exploitation du 5 mars 1915 ; de la sorte, l'entre en fonctionnement de l'usine n'tait que le dveloppement normal et prvu de l'activit industrielle que lYOberschlesische

avait le droit d'exercer en Haute-Silsie polonaise. JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~W FACTORY (MERITS) 54 proceed to determine the sum to be awarded to the German Government, in conformity with the legal principles set out above. * It must be stated that the Chorz6w factory to be valued by the experts includes also the chemical factory. Besides the arguments which, in the Polish Govemment's opinion, tend to show that the working of the said factory was not established on a profitable basis-arguments which it will be for the experts to consider-that Govemment has claimed that the working depended on a special authorization, which the Polish authorities were entitled to refuse. But the Court is of opinion that this argument is not well-founded. The authorization referred to seems to be that envisaged by paragraph 18 of the Prussian law of 1861, under which, failing international treaty provisions to the contrary, moral perons of foreign nationality cannot engage in industry without the authorization of the Government. In the present case, it is certain that the Geneva Convention does actually constitute the international treaty which, guaranteeing to industrial undertakings the continuation of their activities, does away ' with any necessity for the special authorization required by the law of 1861. The fact that the chemical factory was not only not working, but not even completed, at the time of transfer of the territory to Poland, can be of no importance; for chemical industry of al1 kinds was expressly mentioned in the articles of the Oberschlesische Company as one of the objects of that Company's activities, and the sections and plant of the chemical factory, which were, moreover, closely connected with the sections and plant producing nitrate of lime, had already been provided for and mentioned in the contract for construction and exploitation of March 5th, 1915 ; thus, the entry into working of the factory was only the normal and duly foreseen development of the industrial activity which the Oberschlesische had the right to exercise in Polish Upper Silesia. De l'avis de la Cour, la valeur envisage par les questions formules ci-dessus suffira pour lui permettre de fixer, en connaissance de cause, le montant de l'indemnit laquelle a droit le Gouvernement allemand, en prenant comme mesure les dommages subis par les deux Socits dans l'entreprise de ChorzOw. Il est vrai que le Gouvernement allemand a fait valoir

plusieurs reprises, au cours de la procdure crite et orale, qu'une indemnisation quitable du dommage prouv par la Bayerische ne saurait se borner au montant de la valeur de ce qu'on a appel les droits contractuels , savoir, la rmunration stipule dans les contrats entre le Reich ou l'oberschlesische et ladite Socit, pour la mise disposition de ses brevets, licences, expriences, etc., ainsi que pour la direction et l'organisation de la vente des produits finis. La raison en serait que cette rmunration, accepte en vue des rapports particuliers qui liaient les Parties, ne correspondrait gure la rmunration quitable laquelle la Bayerische aurait pu, pour les mmes prestations, prtendre. d'un tiers quelconque, comme le Gouvernement polonais. C'est en partant de ce point de vue que le Gouvernement allemand a propos de prendre pour base de l'valuation du dommage souffert par la Bayerische, un contrat de licence, qui serait suppos conclu entre un tiers et ladite Socit, dans des conditions normales et quitables. Le point de vue auquel s'est place la Cour en posant aux experts les questions indiques ci-dessus, donne cependant satisfaction la thse du Gouvernement allemand pour autant qu'elle est justifie. Car, si la Bayerische avait demand une redevance plus leve ou des paiements supplmentaires en sa faveur, ou bien si elle avait stipul d'autres conditions son profit, la valeur de son apport pour l'Oberschlesische en serait diminue dans la mme mesure, ce qui prouve que la relation entre prestation et contre-prestation n'entre pas en ligne de compte pour la valeur de l'entreprise dans son ensemble. Si la Bayerische avait eu, non seulement la direction, mais aussi la proprit de l'entreprise, cette valeur serait encore la mme ; JUDGMEKT No. 13.-CHORZ~WF ACTORY (MERITS) . 55 In the Court's opinion, the value to which the above questions relate will be sufficient to permit it with a full knowledge of the facts to fix the amount of compensation to which the German Government is entitled, on the basis of the damage suffered by the two Companies in connection with the Chorz6w undertaking. It is true that the Gerrnan Government has pointed out several times during the written and oral proceedings that fair compensation for damage suffered by the Bayerische could not be limited to the value of what has been called the "contractual rights", namely, the remuneration provided for . in the contracts between the Reich or the Oberschlesische and the said Company for having made available its patents, licences and experience gained, for the management and for the organization of the sale of the finished products.

The reason given is that this remuneration, which was accepted in view of the special relationship between the Parties, would hardly correspond to the fair remuneration which the Bayerische might have claimed from any third party, like the Polish Government, for the same consideration. It was on these grounds that the German Govemment proposed to take as a basis for the calculation of damage suffered by the Bayensche a licence supposed to be granted by the said Company to a third party under fair and normal conditions. The method adopted by the Court in putting the questions set out above to the experts meets the German Government's contention, in so far as that contention is justified. For if the Bayerische had demanded a larger sum or additional payments in its favour, or if it had stipulated for other conditions to its advantage, the value to the Oberschlesische of its participation would to the same extent be diminished ; this shows that the relation between value given and value received does not enter into consideration in calculating the worth of the enterprise as a whole. If the Bayerische had not merely managed but also owned the undertaking, this amount would still be the same ; in fact, al1 the elements constituting the en effet, tous les lments qui constituent l'entreprise - l'usine avec ses accessoires, d'une part, l'apport incorporel et autre de la Bayerische, d'autre part - sont indpendants des avantages qu'aux termes de ses contrats chacune des deux Socits peut retirer de l'entreprise. Pour cette raison, la diffrence qui pourrait exister entre les conditions stipules dans les contrats de 1915, 1 9 1 ~et 1920 et celles d'un suppos contrat de licence avec un tiers, est sans importance pour l'valuation du dommage. Il ne reste alors qu' examiner si, con~ormment la rserve faite ci-dessus, la Bayerische a subi, par suite de la dpossession, des dommages autres que ceux qu'a subis l'entreprise et qui pourraient entre1 en ligne de compte aux fins de l'indemnisation demande par le Gouvernement allemand. Bien que la position prise cet gard par ledit Gouvernement ne lui semble pas claire, la Cour peut constater qu'il n'a pas manqu d'appeler l'attention sur certaines circonstances qui seraient de nature dmontrer l'existence de dommages de cet ordre. La possibilit d'une concurrence nuisible aux usines de la Bayerische par une tierce personne qui, moyennant un fait illicite, se serait procure la connaissance et l'utilisation des procds de fabrication de cette Socit, est certainement la circonstance la plus importante et la plus facile saisir dans cet ordre d'ides. La Cour doit cependant observer qu'elle ne se trouve pas en

possession d'lments permettant de dterminer l'existence et l'tendue du dommage qui rsulterait de la concurrence que l'usine de ChorzOw aurait faite aux usines de la Bayerische ; la Cour ne saurait pas mme dire, en connaissance de cause, si l'on a employ et si l'on emploie encpre ChorzOw les mthodes de la Bayerische, ni si les produits de cette usine se trouvent sur les marchs o la Bayerische vend ou pourrait vendre les produits de ses usines. Dans ces conditions, la Cour ne peut que constater le fait que le dommage qui aurait rsult de la concurrence est insuffisamment tabli. JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~W FACTORY (MERITS) 56 undertaking-the factory and its accessories on the one hand, the non-corporeal and other values supplied by the Bayerische on the other-are independent of the advantages which, under its contracts, each of the two Companies may derive from the undertaking. For this reason, any difference which might exist between the conditions fixed in the contracts of 1915, 1919 and 1920 and those laid down in a contract supposed to be concluded with a third party, is of no importance in estimating the damage. ** It therefore only remains to be considered wlyther, in conformity with the reservation made above, the Bayerische has, owing to the dispossession, suffered damage, other than that sustained by the undertaking, such as might be considered in calculating the compensation demanded by the German Government . Although the position taken up on this subject by the German Government does not seem clear to it, the Court is in a position to state that this Govemment has not failed to draw attention to certain circumstances which are said to prove the existence of damage of such a nature. The possibility of competition injurious to the Bayerische's factories by a third party, alleged to have unlawfully become acquainted with and have obtained means of making use of that Company's processes, is certainly the circumstance which is most important and easiest to appreciate in this connection. The Court must however observe that it has not before it the data necessary to enable it to decide as to the existence and extent of damage resulting from alleged competition of the Chorz6w factory with the Bayerische factories; the Court is not even in a position to Say for certain whether the methods of the Bayerische have been or are still being employed at Chorzow, nor whether the products of that factory are to be found in the markets in which the

Bayerische sells or might sel1 products from its own factories. In these circumstances, the Court can only observe that the damage alleged to have resulted from competition is insufficiently proved. Il rentrerait en outre dans la catgorie des dommages possibles mais ventuels et indfinis dont, conformment la jurisprudence arbitrale, il n'y a pas lieu de tenir compte. Il en est de mme, plus forte raison, du dommage qui pourrait rsulter du fait que la Bayerische a vu restreindre le champ o elle peut faire des expriences, perfectionner ses procds et en trouver des nouveaux, ainsi que du dommage qui pourrait rsulter du fait qu'elle n'est plus mme de faire sentir son influence sur le march dans la mesure o elle aurait pu le faire si elle tait reste la dir'ection de l'usine de ChorzOw. La Cour ayant cart, faute de preuves suffisantes, les dommages que la Bayerische aurait subis hors de l'entreprise, il n'est pas ncessaire d'examiner si les intrts dont il s'agit seraient protgs par les articles 6 22 de la Convention de Genve. En plus de l'indemnit en argent au bnfice de la Bayerische, le Gouvernement allemand demande la Cour de dire et juger : cc que, jusqu'au 30 juin 1931, aucune exportation de chaux azote et de nitrate d'ammoniaque n'aura lieu en Allemagne, dans les tats-unis d'Amrique, en France et en Italie ; subsidiairement, que le Gouvernement polonais est oblig de cesser l'exploitation de l'usine, respectivement des installations chimiques pour produire le nitrate d'ammoniaque, etc. )) Au sujet de ces conclusions, il convient de constater, tout d'abord, qu'elles ne sauraient viser le dommage qui s'est dj produit, mais uniquement celui que pourrait souffrir la Bayerische l'avenir. Si la dfense d'exportation a pour objet le dommage rsultant de la concurrence que l'usine de Chorz6w serait mme de faire aux usines de la Bayerische, elle doit tre carte sans autre, en vertu du rsultat auquel la Cour est arrive ci-dessus. Aux raisons sur lesquelles se fondait ce rsultat s'ajoute, en ce qui concerne la dfense d'exportation, que la Partie demanderesse n'a fourni aucun renseignement qui permette JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~WF ACTORY (MERITS) 57 Moreover, it would come under the heading of possible but contingent and indeterminate damage which, in accordance with the jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals, cannot be taken into account. This is more especially the case as regards damage which might aiise from the fact that the field in which the Bayerische

can carry out its experiments, perfect its processes and make fresh discoveries has been limited, and from the fact that the Company can no longer influence the market in the manner that it could have done if it had continued to work the Chorzow factory. As the Court has discarded for want of evidence, indemnity for damage alleged to have been sustained by the Bayerische outside the undertaking, it is not necessary to consider whether the interests in question would be protected by Articles 6 to 22 of the Geneva Convention. In addition to pecuniary damages for the benefit of the Bayerische, the German Goverment asks the Court to give judgment : "that, until June 3oth, 1931, no nitrated lime and no nitrate of ammonia should be exported to Germany, to the United States of America, to France or to Italy ; in the alternative, that the Polish Government should be obliged to cease working the factory or the chemical equipment for the production of nitrate of ammonia, etc." In regard to these submissions, it should be observed in the first place that they cannot contemplate damage already sustained, but solely damage which the Bayerische might suffer in the future. If the prohibition of export is designed to prevent damage arising from the competition which the Chorzi5w factory rnight offer to the Bayerische factories, this daim must be at once dismissed, in view of the result arrived at above by the Court. To the reasons on which this result was based, it is to be added, in so far as the prohibition of export is concerned, that the Applicant has furnished no information la Cour d'admettre le bien-fond de la conclusion allemande relativement la dsignation de certains pays dans lesquels aucune exportation ne devrait avoir lieu, et une dure dtermine de cette dfense. Il convient encore d'observer que si la dfense avait pour but de protger les droits de proprit industrielle de la Bayerische et d'exclure le dommage que celle-ci pourrait prouver par l'usage de ces droits par la Pologne en contradiction avec des licences accordes par la Bayerische d'autres personnes ou socits, le Gouvernement allemand aurait d fournir des renseignements prcis en ce qui concerne l'existence et la dure des brevets et licences en question. Mais, malgr les demandes expresses formules ce sujet par le Gouvernement polonais, le Gouvernement allemand n'en a pas prsent. Cela s'explique, d'ailleurs, par le fait que le Gouvernement allemand ne parat pas vouloir fonder sur l'existence de ces brevets

et licences sa demande visant une dfense d'exportation. Par contre, la demande du Gouvernement allemand semble envisager la dfense d'exportation sous la forme d'une clause qui aurait d se trouver dans un contrat de licence juste et quitable, conclu entre la Bayerische et une tierce personne quelconque ; ce sujet, il y a lieu de faire les observations suivantes : Le simple fait d'exclure de tel ou tel march les produits d'une entreprise dtermine ne saurait videmment en luimme tre dans l'intrt ni de cette entreprise, ni, en tant que telles, des personnes qui y sont intresses. Si la Bayerische qui, tout en participant avec l'Oberschlesische dans l'entreprise de ChorzOw, constitue une entreprise absolument distincte de celle de ChorzOw et pouvant mme avoir des intrts contraires, dans une certaine mesure, ceux de ChorzOw limitait par une clause contractuelle les dbouchs de l'usine en sa faveur, il s'ensuivrait que les bnfices qu'elle retirerait de sa participation l'entreprise de ChorzOw se trouveraient ventuellement diminus dans une mesure correspondante. La Cour ayant, comme il est dit plus haut, adopt pour le calcul de l'indemnit allouer au Gouvernement allemand une mthode suivant laquelle cette indemnit comprendra la valeur globale de l'entreprise, il s'ensuit que les bnfices de la Bayerische seront valus sans dduction des avantages qui pourraient rsulter pour elle d'une clause limitant la facult d'exJUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~WF ACTORY (MERITS) 5 f3 enabling the Court to satisfy itself as to the justification for the German submission naming certain countries to which export should not be allowed and stating a definite period for which this prohibition should be in force. It must further be observed that if the object of the prohibition were to protect the industrial property rights of the Bayerische and to prevent damage which the latter might suffer as a result of the use of these rights by Poland, in confict with licences granted by the Bayerische to other persons or companies, the German Government should have furnished definite data as regards the existence and duration of the patents or licences in question. But notwithstanding the express requests made in this respect by the Polish Government, the German Government has produced no such data. The explanation no doubt is that the German Government does not appear to wish to base its claim respecting a prohibition of export upon the existence of these patents and licences. On the contrary, the German Government's claim seems to present the prohibition of export as a clause which should have been included in a fair and equitable licensing contract concluded between the Bayerische and any third party ; in this

connection the following remarks should be made : The mere fact that the produce of any particular undertaking is excluded from any particular market cannot evidently in itself be in the interests of such undertaking, nor of the persons who, as such, are interested therein. If the Bayerische -wkich, whilst participating with the Oberschlesische in the Chorz6w undertaking, constitutes an entirely separate undertaking from that of Chorz6w and one that may even to a certain extent have interests conflicting with those of Chorz6w -were to limit in its own favour, by contract, the number of the markets of that factory, it would follow that the profit which it would draw from its share in the Chorzow undertaking might be correspondingly diminished. The Court having, as is said above, adopted, in calculating the compensation to be awarded to the German Government, a method by which such compensation shall include the total value of the undertaking, it follows that the profits of the Bayerische will be estimated without deducting the advantages which that Company might draw from a clause limiting export. The portation. La dfense d'exportation demande par le Gouvernement allemand ne saurait donc tre accorde sous peine de donner deux fois la mme indemnit. Ds lors, la Cour n'a pas besoin de s'occuper de la question de savoir si une telle dfense, tout en tant usite dans les contrats entre particuliers, pourrait faire l'objet d'une injonction adresse par la Cour un gouvernement, mme si ce gouvernement, en tant que fisc, exploitait l'usine dont les exportations devraient tre limites, ni si la dfense demande serait quitable et approprie dans les circonstances. Pour ce qui est de la dfense d'exploitation, subsidiairement demande par le Gouvernement allemand, il y a lieu d'ajouter qu'elle ne semble gure compatible avec l'allocation d'une indemnit reprsentant la valeur actuelle de l'entreprise, car, lorsqu'aura t verse cette indemnit qui comprendra les chances d'avenir et sera constitue par une somme d'argent portant intrts, le Gouvernement polonais aura acquis le droit de continuer l'exploitation de l'entreprise telle qu'elle aura t value, d'autant plus qu'il y a accord entre les Parties pour reconnatre que l'usine doit rester entre les mains du Gouvernement polonais. Cet accord ne saurait tre interprt dans ce sens que l'usine devrait rester une usine morte ou tre adapte une destination diffrente, si la rparation envisage ne comprenait pas, en dehors d'une indemnit pcuniaire, la dfense d'exportation demande. Il est d'ailleurs fort douteux que, abstraction faite de toute autre considration, une dfense d'exploitation soit admissible sous l'empire de la

Convention de Genve, laquelle a pour but d'assurer le maintien des entreprises industrielles, et qui, cet effet, en permet mme exceptionnellement l'expropriation (article 7). La Cour estime prfrable de ne pas examiner ds maintenant les conclusions des Parties concernant certaines conditions et modalits du paiement de l'indemnit allouer, qui sont troitement lies, soit au montant de la somme payer, soit aux circonstances qui pourront exister au moment oh le paiement devra tre fait. Il en est ainsi notamment de la conclusion allemande no 4 a) - b) - c) et des conclusions JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~WFA CTORY (MERITS) 59 prohibition of export asked for by the German Government cannot therefore be granted, or the same compensation would be' awarded twice over. This being so, the Court need not deal with the question whether such a prohibition, although customary in contracts between individuals, might form the subject of an injunction issued by the Court to a government, even if that government were working, as a State enterprise, the factory of which export was to be limited, nor if the prohibition asked for would be fair and appropriate in the circumstances. As regards the German Government's alternative claim for a prohibition of exploitation, it may be added that this seems hardly compatible with the award of compensation representing the present value of the undertaking; for when that compensation, which is to cover future prospects and will consist in a sum of money bearing interest, has been ' paid, the Polish Government will have acquired the right to continue working the undertaking as valued, more especially as the Parties agree that the factory shall remain in the hands of the Polish Government. This agreement cannot, in fact, be construed as mea&ng that the factory should remain inoperative or be adapted to some other purpose, if the reparation contemplated did not include, in addition to a pecuniary indemnity, the prohibition of export sought for. It is moreover very doubtful whether, apart from any other consideration, prohibition of exploitation is admissible under the Geneva Convention, the object of which is to provide for the maintenance of industrial undertakings, and which, for this purpose, even pennits them, in exceptional cases, to be expropriated (Article 7). IV. The Court thinks it preferable not to proceed at this stage to consider the Parties' subrnissions concerning certain conditions and methods in regard to the payment of the indemnity to be awarded, which conditions and methods are closely

connected either with the amount of the sum to be paid or with circumstances which may exist when the time comes for payment. This applies more especially as regards the 8 polonaises A 3 et B 1 c), sur lesquelles, partant, la Cour se rserve de statuer dans l'arrt qui fixera l'indemnit. 11 est, par contre, possible et convenable de trancher ds prsent la question dite de la compensation, laquelle ont trait respectivement la conclusion no 4 d) de la Partie demanderesse et la conclusion C de la Partie dfenderesse. La demande du Gouvernement allemand cet gard a pris finalement la forme suivante : Dire et juger, que le Gouvernement polonais n'est pas. autoris compenser contre la crance susdite du Gouvernement allemand d'tre indemnis, sa crance rsultant des assurances sociales en Haute-Silsie ; qu'il ne peut se prvaloir d'aucune autre compensation contre ladite crance d'indemnit p subsidiairement, qu'une compensation n'est autorise que lorsque le Gouvernement polonais invoque cette fin une crance reconnue par le Gouvernement allemand ou constate par un arrt rendu entre les deux Gouvernements. )) Quant au Gouvernement polonais, il s'est born demander le rejet de la susdite conclusion. Si l'on prend la conclusion allemande au pied de la lettre, on! peut croire qu'elle vise en premier lieu exclure un cas de compensation concret, savoir la compensation qui rsulterai& de la crance que le Gouvernement polonais prtend avoir en vertu des assurances sociales en Haute-Silsie, et qui fut cause de l'chec des ngociations entre les deux Gouvernements la suite de l'Arrt no 7. Mais, si l'on examine la conclusion la lumire des observations contenues dans le Mmoire et surtouQ dans la Rplique, il est facile de constater que la crance rsultant des assurances sociales en Haute-Silsie n'est vise qu' titre d'exemple. En ralit, le Gouvernement alleman& demande la Cour une dcision de principe, dont l'effet serait, soit d'exclure toute compensation de la crance rsultant de futur arrt de la Cour, soit, subsidiairement, de n'admettre pareille compensation que dans, des circonstiances dtermines. Quant au Gouvernement pohnais, s'il se b~rne, comme on l'a vu plus haut, demander dans sa conclrision Ie rejet de la conclusion allemande, il rsulte avec certitude des motifs JUDGMENT NO. 13.-CHORZ~WFA CTORY (MERITS) 60 German submission No. 4 (a)-(b)-(c), and the Polish submissions A 3 and B 1 (c), which the Court therefore reserves for the judgment fixing the indemnity. On the other hand, it is possible and convenient at once

to decide the so-cded question of set-off to which submission No. 4 (d) of the Applicant and submission C of the Respondent respectively relate. The claim of the German Government in regard to this matter has, in the last instance, been couched in the following terms: [Translation. j "It is submitted that the Polish Government is not entitled to set off, against the above-mentioned claim for indemnity of the German Government, its claim in respect of social insurances in Upper Silesia; that it may not make use of any other set-off against the above-mentioned claim for indemnity ; in the alternative, that set-off is only permissible if the Polish Government puts forward for this purpose a claim in respect of a debt recognized by the German Government or established by a judgment given between the two Governments." ' The Polish Government, for its part, has simply asked for the rejection of this submission. If the German submission is read literally, it is possible to regard it as mainly designed to prevent a specific case of setoff, that is to Say, the setting-off in this case of the clairn which the Polish Government contends that it possesses in respect of social insurances in Upper Silesia, and which was the cause of the failure of the negotiations between the two Governments following Judgment No. 7. But, if we consider the submission in the light of the observations contained in the Case and more especially in the Reply, it is easy to see that the claim in respect of social insurances in Upper Silesia is only taken as an example. In reality, the German Government asks the Court for a decision of pnnciple the effect of which would be either to prevent the set-off. of any counterclaim against the indemnity fixed in the judgment to be given by the Court, or, alternatively, only to allow such set-off in certain defined circumstances. Though, as has been seen, the Polish Governrnent for its part confines itself in its submission to asking the Court to reject the German submission, the arguments advanced in 61 ARRT NO 13. - USINE DE CHORZOW (FOND) l'appui de sa demande qu' son avis, ladite conclusion allemande est la fois prmature et inadmissible et que, par consquent, la Cour n'a pas le pouvoir de s'en occuper. Ds lors, la question de la comptence de la Cour se trouve pose. Un accord des Parties pour soumettre la Cour la question dite de la compensation tant exclu, il convient d'examiner avant tout si la Cour est comptente pour statuer sur la conclusion allemande no 4 d) en vertu d'un autre titre qui,

en l'espce, ne saurait tre que l'article 23 de la Convention de Genve. Il est vident que la question de savoir si le droit international admet la compensation des crances, et, dans I'affirmative, quelles sont les conditions dans lesquelles la compensation est admise, est, comme telle, en dehors de la comptence que la Cour puise dans ledit article. Mais le Gouvernement allemand prtend que la question pose par lui ne concerne qu'une modalit du paiement que le Gouvernement polonais devra faire, et que, de ce chef, elle constitue une divergence d'opinions comprise dans la clause compromissoire de l'article. La Cour croit devoir interprter cette thse dans le sens que l'exclusion de la compensation est demande dans le but d'assurer, en l'espce, l'effectivit et l'efficacit de la rparation. On peut admettre, comme la Cour l'a dit dans son Arrt no 8, que la comptence pour statuer sur la rparation, due raison de la violation d'une convention internationale, implique la comptence pour statuer sur les formes et modalits de la rparation. Si la rparation consiste dans le paiement d'une somme d'argent, la Cour peut donc fixer les modalits de ce paiement. C'est pourquoi elle peut bien dterminer qui le paiement doit tre fait, dans quel endroit, et quel moment ; si le paiement doit tre intgral ou peut avoir lieu par tranches ; qui doit en supporter les frais, etc. 11 s'agit alors de l'application au cas d'espce des rgles gnrales relatives aux paiements, et la comptence de la Cour dcoule tout naturellement de sa comptence pour allouer une indemnit en argent. Mais on tendrait d'une manire injustifie la porte de ce principe si on l'entendait dans le sens que la Cour pourrait connatre de n'importe quelle question de droit international, JUDGMENT NO. 13.-CHORZ~WF ACTORY (~VERITS) 61 support of its clairn clearly show that it considers the said German submission to be both premature and inadmissible, and that the Court has therefore no power to deal with it. The question of the Court's jurisdiction is thus clearly raised. Since there is no agreement between the Parties to submit to the Court the so-called question of set-off, it remains first of al1 to be considered whether the Court has jurisdiction to pass judgrnent on the German submission No. 4 (d) in virtue of any other provision, which, in the present case, could only be Article 23 of the Geneva Convention. It is clear that the question whether international law allows claims to be set-off against each other, and if so, under what conditions such set-off is permitted, is, in itself, outside the jurisdiction derived by the Court from the said article. But the German Government contends that the

question raised by it only relates to one aspect of the payment which the Polish Government must make and that, this being so, it constitutes a difference of opinion covered by the arbitration clause contained in the article. The Court considers that this argument must be interpreted in the sense that the prohibition of set-off is asked for in order to ensure that in the present case reparation shall be really effective. It may be adrnitted, as the Court has said in Judgment No. 8, that jurisdiction as to the reparation due for the violation of an international convention involves jurisdiction as to the forms and methods of reparation. If the reparation consists in the payment of a sum of money, the Court may therefore detemine the method of such payment. For this reason it may well determine to whom the payment shall be made, in what place and at what moment; in a lump sum or maybe by instalments; where payment shall be made; who shall bear the costs, etc. It is then a question of applying to a particular case the general rules regarding payment, and the Court's jurisdiction arises quite naturally out of its jurisdiction to award monetary compensation. But this principle would be quite unjustifiably extended if it were taken as meaning that the Court might have cognizance of any question whatever of international law. mme tout fait trangre la convention dont il s'agit, pour le seul motif que la manire dont cette question est rsolue peut avoir une influence sur l'efficacit de la rparation demande. Pareille thse ne semble gure conciliable avec les principes qui sont la base de la comptence de la Cour, comptence limite aux cas spcialement prvus dans les traits et conventions en vigueur. Le point de vue du Gouvernement allemand est cependant que le pouvoir pour la Cour de statuer sur l'exclusion de la compensation dcoulerait du pouvoir qu'elle a d'assurer l'efficacit de la rparation. Or, il semble clair que cette thse ne peut se rfrer qu' une exception de compensation oppose au bnficiaire par le dbiteur, et qui serait de nature dnuer la rparation de son efficacit. Tel serait notamment le cas si la crance oppose la crance de rparation tait conteste et devait donner lieu un procs qui aurait en tout cas pour effet de retarder l'entre en po~session par l'intress de l'indemnit qui lui a t reconnue. Au contraire, si la crance de rparation tait oppose une crance liquide et non conteste, on ne voit pas pourquoi une exception de compensation fonde sur cette demande affecterait ncessairement l'efficacit de la rparation. Il s'ensuit que la comptence de

la Cour, fonde sur l'article 23 de la Convention de Genve, ne pourrait en tout cas tre invoque qu' l'gard d'une exception souleve par la Partie dfenderesse. Or, il est constant que la Pologne n'a soulev aucune exception de compensation ayant trait telle ou telle crance dtermine qu'elle prtendrait avoir envers le Gouvernement allemand. Il est vrai que, dans les ngociations qui suivirent l'Arrt no 7, la Pologne avait avanc la prtention de compenser une partie de l'indemnit qu'elle se serait oblige de verser au Gouvernement allemand contre sa prtendue crance rsultant des assurances sociales en Haute-Silsie. Mais la Cour a dj eu l'occasion de constater qu'elle ne saurait faire tat des dclarations, admissions ou propositions qu'ont pu faire les Parties au cours de ngociations directes qui ont eu lieu entre elles. Rien, d'ailleurs, n'autorise la Cour penser que le Gouvernement polonais voudrait faire valoir, l'encontre d'un arrt de la Cour, des prtentions qu'il a cru pouvoir avancer, JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~WFA CTORY (MERITS) 62 ~even quite foreign to the convention under consideration, for the sole reason that the manner in which such question is decided rnay have an influence on the effectiveness of the reparation asked for. Such an argument seems hardly reconcilable with the fundamental principles of the Court's jurisdiction, which is limited to cases specially provided for in treaties and conventions in force. The German Government's standpoint however is that the power of the Court to decide on the exclusion of set-off is derived rom the power which it has to provide that reparation shall be effective. Now, it seems clear that this argument can only refer to a plea of set-off raised against the beneficiary by the debtor, of such a nature as to deprive reparation of its effectiveness. Such for instance would be the case if the claim put fonvard against the claim on the score of reparation was in dispute and was to lead to proceedings which would in any case have resulted in delaying the entry into possession by the person concerned of the compensation awarded to him. On the contrary, if a liquid and undisputed daim is put forward against the reparation claim, it is not easy to see why a plea of set-off based on this demand should necessarily prejudice the effectiveness of the reparation. It follows that the Court's jurisdiction under Article 23 of the Geneva Convention could in any case only be relied on in regard to a plea raised by the respondent Party. Now it is adrnitted that Poland has raised no plea of setoff in regard to any particular claim asserted by her against the Germa11 Government .

It is true that in the negotiations which followed Judgment No. 7 Poland had put fonvard a claim to set off a part of the indemnity which she would have undertaken to pay the German Government, against the claim which she put fonvard in regard to social insurances in Upper Silesia. But the Court has already had occasion to state that it can take no account of declarations, admissions or proposals which the Parties may have made during direct negotiations between them. Moreover, there is nothing to jutify the Court in thinking that the Polish Government would wish to put fonvard, against a judgnient of the Court, claims which it may have thought au cours d'une ngociation amiable destine, dans l'intention des Parties, aboutir une transaction. Ida Cour doit aussi rappeler ce propos ce qu'elle a dj dit dans son Arrt no 1, savoir qu'elle ne peut ni ne doit envisager l'ventualit que l'arrt resterait inexcut aprs l'expiration du dlai fix pour son excution,. Dans ces conditions, la Cour doit s'abstenir de statuer sur les conclusions dont il s'agit. PAR CES MOTIFS, La Cour, statuant contradictoirement, par neuf voix contre trois, 1) dcide et juge que, en raison de l'attitude prise par le Gouvernement polonais vis--vis des Socits anonymes Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke et Bayerische Stickstoffwerke et constate par la Cour comme n'tant pas conforme aux dispositions des articles 6 et suivants de !a Convention de Genve, le Goilvernement polonais est tenu de payer, titre de rparation, au Gouvernement allemand une indemnit correspondant au prjudice subi par lesdites Socits du chef de ladite attitude ; 2) rejette les exceptions du Gouvernement polonais, tendant exclure de l'indemnit payer tout montant correspondant tout ou partie du dommage subi par les Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke, et fondes soit sur le jugement rendu par le Tribunal de Katowice, le 12 novembre 1927, soit sur l'article 256 du Trait de Versailles ; 3) rejette la conclusion formule par le Gouvernement polonais tendant ce que le Gouvernement allemand, en premier lieu, livre au Gouvernement polonais la totalit des actions de la Socit anonyme Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke, de la valeur nominale de ~~o.ooo.oodoe marks, dont le GouverneJUDGMENT NO. 13.-CHORZ~W FACTORY (MERITS) 63 fit to raise during friendly negotiations which the Parties intended should lead to a compromise. The Court must also

draw attention in this connection to what it has already said in Judgment No. I to the effect that it neither can nor should contemplate the contingency of the judgment not being complied with at the expiration of the tinie fixed for compliance. In these circumstances the Court must abstain from passing upon the submissions in question. FOR THESE REASONS, The Court, having heard both Parties, by nine votes to three, (1) gives judgment to the effect that, by reason of the attitude adopted by the Polish Government in respect of the Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke and Bayerische Stickstoffwerke Cornpanies, which attitude has been declared by the Court not to have been in confonnity with the provisions of Article 6 and the following articles of the Geneva Convention, the Polish Government is under an obligation to pay, as reparation to the German Government, a compensation corresponding to the damage sustained by the said Companies as a result of the aforesaid attitude ; (2) dismisses the pleas of the Polish Government with a view to the exclusion from the compensation to be paid of an aniount corresponding to al1 or a part of the damage sustained by the Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke, which pleas are based either on the judgment aven by the Tribunal of Katowice on November ~ z t h , 1927, or on Article 256 of the Treaty of Versailles ; (3) dismisses the submission formulated by the Polish Government to the effect that the Gennan Government should in the first place hand over to the Polish Government the whole of the shares of the Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke Company, of the nominal value of IIO,OOO,I-,OO ment allemand dispose en vertu du contrat en date du 24 dcembre 1919 ; 4) rejette la conclusion formule subsidiairement par le Gouvernement polonais tendant faire surseoir provisoirement sur la demande en indemnit pour ce qui concerne la Socit Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke ; 5) rejette les conclusions du Gouvernement allemand tendant ce qu'il soit dit et jug que, jusqu'au 30 juin 1931, aucune exportation de chaux azote et de nitrate d'ammoniaque n'aura lieu en Allemagne, dans les tats-unis d'Amrique, en France et en Italie ; et, subsidiairement, que le Gouvernement polonais est oblig de cesser l'exploitation de l'usine de ChorzOw, respectivement, des installations chimiques pour produire le nitrate d'ammoniaque, etc. ;

6) dcide et juge qu'il n'y a pas lieu de statuer sur les conclusions formules par le Gouvernement allemand et tendant ce qu'il soit dit et jug que le Gouvernement polonais n'est pas autoris compenser contre la crance susdite du Gouvernement allemand d'tre indemnis sa crance rsultant des assurances sociales en Haute-Silsie ; qu'il ne peut se prvaloir d'aucune autre compensation contre ladite crance d'indemnit, et, subsidiairement, qu'une compensation n'est autorise que lorsque le Gouvernement polonais invoque cette fin une crance reconnue par le Gouvernement allemand ou constate par un arrt rendu entre les deux Gouvernements ; 7) dcide et juge que l'indemnit payer par le Gouvernement polonais au Gouvernement allemand sera fixe une somme globale ; 8) se rserve de dterminer, dans un futur arrt, le montant de ladite indemnit, aprs avoir reu le rapport des experts qu'elle nommera pour clairer sa religion sur les questions formules dans le prsent arrt et aprs avoir entendu les Parties au sujet de ce rapport ; g) rserve galement, pour ce futur arrt, les conditions et modalits du paiement de l'indemnit en ce qui concerne les points qui ne sont pas tranchs par le prsent arrt. JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~W FACTORY (MERITS) 64 marks, which are in the hands of the German Government under the contract. of December z4th, 1919 ; (4) dismisses the alternative submission formulated by the Polish Government to the effect that the claim for indemnity, in so far as the Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke Company is concerned, should be provisionally suspended ; (5) dismisses the submission of the German Government asking for judgment to the effect that, until June 3oth, 1931, no nitrated lime and no nitrate of ammonia should be exported to Germany, to the United States of America, to France or to Italy, or, in the alternative, that the Polish Government should be obliged to cease working the factory or the chemical equipment for the production of nitrate of ammonia, etc. ; (6) gives judgment to the effect that no decision is called for on the submissions of the German Government asking for judgment to the effect that the Polish Government is not entitled to set off, against the above-mentioned claim for indemnity of the German Government, its claim in respect of social insurances in Upper Silesia ; that it may not make use of any other set-off against the said claim for indemnity, and, in the alternative, that set-off is only permissible if the Polish Government puts fonvard for this purpose a claim in respect of a debt recognized by the German Government or

established by a judgment given between the two Governments ; (7) gives judgment to the effect that the compensation to be paid by the Polish Government to the German Government shall be fixed as a lump sum ; (8) reserves the fixing of the amount of this compensation for a future judgment, to be given after receiving the report of experts to be appointed by the Court for the purpose of enlightening it on the questions set out in the present judgment and after hearing the Parties on the subject of this report ; (9) also reserves for this future judgment the conditions and methods for the payment of the compensation in so far as concerns points not decided by the present judgment. Le prsent arrt ayant t rdig en franais et en anglais, c'est le texte franais qui fait foi. Fait au Palais de la Paix, La Haye, le treize septembre mil neuf cent vingt-huit, en trois exemplaires, dont l'un restera dpos aux archives de la Cour et dont les autres seront transmis aux agents des Gouvernements des Puissances requrante et dfenderesse respectivement. Le Prsident : (Sign) D. ANZILOTTI. Le Greffier-adjoint : (Sign) PAUL RUEGGER. M. de Bustamante, juge, dclare ne pouvoir se rallier l'arrt rendu par la Cour, en ce qui concerne le no 8 du dispositif, en ce sens qu'il est d'avis que les questions indiques sous les numros 1 B et II dans l'arrt ne devraient pas tre poses aux experts. M. Altamira, juge, dclare ne pouvoir se rallier l'arrt rendu par la Cour en ce qui concerne le no 6 du dispesitif. M. Rabel, juge national, dsire ajouter l'arrt les observations qui suivent. Lord Finlay, juge, et M. Ehrlich, juge national, dclarant ne pouvoir se rallier l'arrt rendu par la Cour et se prvalant du droit que leur confre l'article 57 du Statut, ont joint audit arrt les exposs suivants de leur opinion individuelle. M. Nyholm, juge, ne pouvant se rallier au rsultat de l'arrt, dsire y ajouter les observations suivantes. (Paraph) D.' A. (Paraph) P. R. JUDGMENT No. 13.-CHORZ~W FACTORY (MERITS) 65 Done in French and English, the French text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this thirteenth day of September nineteen hundred and twenty-eight, in three copies, one of which is to be placed in the archives of the

Court, and the others to be fonvarded to the Agents of the applicant and respondent Parties respectively. (Signed) D . ANZILOTTI, President . '1> (Signed) PAUL RUEGGER, Deputy-Registrar . M. de Bustamante, Judge, declares that he is unable to concur in the judgment of the Court as regards No. 8 of the operative portion ; he consideris that the questions numbered 1 B and II in the judgment should not be put to the experts. M. Altamira, Judge, declares that he is unable to concur in the judgment of the Court as regards No. 6 of the operative portion. M. Rabel, National Judge, desires to add to the judgment the remarks which follow hereafter. Lord Finlay, Judge, and M. Ehrlich, National Judge, declaring that they cannot concur in the judgrnent of the Court and availing themselves of the right conferred on them by Article 57 of the Statute, have delivered the separate opinions which follow hereafter. M. Nyholm, Judge, being unable to concur in the result arrived at by the judgment, desires to add the remarks which follow hereafter. (Initialled) D. A. (Initialled) P. R.

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE RECUEIL DES ARRTS, AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES AFFAIRE DU DETROIT DE CORFOU (FOND) ARRET DU 9 AVRIL 1949 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS, ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS THE CORFU CHANNEL CASE (MERITS) jttbGlMENT OF APRIL 9th, 1949 LEYDE Il LEY DEN SOCIT D'DITIONS A. W. SIJTHOFF'S A. W. SIJTHOFF PUBLISHING COMPANY Le prsent arrt doit tre cit comme suit : A$aire du Dklroit & CorJou, Arrt dzl g avril 1949 : C. I. J . Rec~cez~ZI H~,p . 4. )) This Judgment should be cited as foiiows : "Corfic ChanneZ case, Judgment of April gth, 1949 : I.C. J. Reports 1949, P. 4." 1949. Le g avril. Rle gnral no 1. COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE ANNEE 1949 9 avril 1949. AFFAIRE DU DTROIT DE CORFOU (FOND) Responsabilit internationale du chef d'explosions de tnines dans les eaux terriforiales. - Connivence avec un autre tat ; preuves. - Mouillage par auteurs inconnus. - Connaissance du mouillage chez l'tat mis en cause : notion du contr6le comme fondement de la responsabilit ; son influence sur le choix des rnqyens de preuve; moyens de preuve indirecte, prsomptions de fait concordantes. - Manquement aux obligations rsultant de la connaissance du mouillage, fondement de la responsabilit. - Comptence de la Cour aux fins de fixer le montant des rparations ; interprtation du compromis ; attitude ultrieure des Parties. Droit de passage en temps de paix des navires de guerre par les dtroits reliant deux zones de haute mer. - Coutume internationale. - Dtroits l'gard desquels existe un droit de passage. - Dtroit Nord de Corfou. - Passage innocent ; but du passage ; tnodalits dexcution. - Production de documents d la demande de la Cour; refus de communiquer; article 49 du Statut de la Cour, article 54 du Rglement. - Opration de dminage entreprise dans les eaux territoriales d'un tat tranger contre la volont de cet tat; justifications dduites de la thorie de l'intervention et d2 la notion de self-help. - Violation de la souverainet territoriale ; responsabilit internationale ; satisfaction accorde

en la forme d'une constatation par la Cour dtr droit viol. Prsents: M. GUERREROfa,i sant fonction de Prsident ;M . BASDEVANT, Prsident ;M M. ALVAREZF,A BELAH, ACKWORTH, WINIARSKZI,O RIEICD, E VISSCHERsi,r Arnold MCNAIR, M. KLAESTADB, ADAWIP ACHA,M M. KRYLOVR, EAD, Hsu Mo, AZEVEDOju, ges ;M . EEER, juge ad hoc. INTERNATIONAL COUI2T OF JUSTICE YEAR 1949. April 9tb, 1949. THE CORFU CHANNEL CASE (MERITS) International responsibility for explosion of mines i n territorial waters.--Connivance with another State ; 'midence.-Minelaying by persons unknown.-Knowledge of minelaying by State party.to proceedings : control of territory as ground for responsibility ; its influence on the choice of means of proof; indirect midence, concordant inferences of tact.-Breach of obligations resulting from knowledge of minelaying, gvounds for responsibi1ity.-Court's jurisdiction to assess amount of compensation ; interpretation of Special Agreement ; subsequent attitude of Parties. Right of passage of warships in time of peace through Straits connecting two parts of the high seas.-International custom.-Straits in which right of passage exists.-North Corfu Channel.-Innocent passage ; purpose of passage and manner of its execution.-Production of documents at Court's request ; refusa1 to produce ; Article 49 of Statute of Court and Article 54 of Rules.-Minesweeping undertaken i n territorial waters contrary to wish of territorial State ; justification derived from theory of intervention and notion of self-he1p.-Violation of territorial sovereignty ; international responsibility ; satisfaction in form of a declaration by the Court of violation of right. JUDGMENT 1949. April 9th. General List No. 1. Present : Acting President GUERRER;O President BASDEVAN;T Judges ALVAREZF, ABELA,H ACKWORTHW, INIARSKI, ZORIEIC,D E VISSCHERS,i r Arnold MCNAIRK, LAESTAD, BADAWIP ASHA,K RYLOVR, EAD,H SU MO, AZEVED;O M. EEER, Judge ad hoc. Dans l'affaire du Dtroit de Corfou, entre le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, reprsent par : Sir Eric Beckett, K. C. M. G., K. C., jurisconsulte du ministre

des Affaires trangres, comme agent et conseil, assist du trs honorable sir Hartley Shawcross, K. C., M. P., AttorneyGeneral, remplac le I j novembre 1948 par Sir Frank Soskice, K. C., M. P., Solicitor-General; et de M. C. H. M. Waldock, professeur de droit international l'universit d'Oxford, de M. R. O. Wilberforce, M. J. Mervyn Jones, M. M. E. Reed (du bureau de l'Attorney-General), membres du barreau anglais, comme conseils ; le Gouvernement de la Rpublique populaire d'Albanie, reprsent par : M. Kahreman Ylli, envoy estraordinaire et ministre plnipotentiaire d'Albanie Paris, comme agent, remplac le 14 fvrier 1949 Par M. Behar Shtylla, envoy extraordinaire et ministre plnipotentiaire d'Albanie Paris, assists de M. Pierre Cot, professeur agrg des Facults de droit de France, et de Me Jor Nordmann, avocat la Cour de Paris, comme conseils ; de Mc Marc Jacquier, avocat la Cour de Paris, et de Me Paul Villard, avocat la Cour de Paris, comme avocats. LA COUR, ainsi cohpose, rend l'arrt suivant : Par son Arrt du 25 mars 1948 (C. 1. J. Recueil 1947-1948, p. 15) en l'affaire du Dtroit de Corfou, introduite le 22 mai 1947 par requte du Gouvernement di1 Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord contre le Coi~vernement de la Rpublique populaire d'Albanie, la Cour s'est prononce sur l'exception prli5 In the Corfu Channel case, between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, represented by : Sir Eric Beckett, K.C.M.G., K.C., Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office, as Agent and Counsel, assisted by The Right Honourable Sir Hartley Shawcross, K.C., M.P., Attorney-General, replaced on November I jtfi, 1948, by Sir Frank Soskice, K.C., M.P., Solicitor-General ; Mr. C. H. M. Waldock, Professor of international law in the University of Oxford, Mr. R. O. Wilberforce, Mr. J. Mervyn Jones, and Mr. M. E. Reed (of the Attorney-General's Office), members

of the English Bar, as Counsel, the Government of the People's Republic of Albania, represented by : M. Kahreman Ylli, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Albania in Paris, as Agent, replaced on February 14th, 1949, by M. Behar Shtylla, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Albania in Paris, assisted by M. Pierre Cot, Profssseur agrg of the Faculties of Law of France, and Matre Joe Nordmann, of the Paris Bar, as Counsel; and Slaitre Marc Jacquier, of the Paris Bar, and Matre Paul Villard, of the Paris Bar, as Advocates. composed as above, delivers the following judgment : By a Judgment delivered on March 25th, 1948 (I.C. J. Reports 19471948, p. 15), in the Corfu Channel case, in proceedings instituted on May zznd, 1947, by an application of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland against the Government of the People's Republic of Albania, the Court gave its decision 5 6 AFFAIRE DU DTROIT DE CORFOU (FOND) minaire prsente le g dcembre 1947 par ce dernier Gouvernement. Rejetant l'exception, elle a dcid que la procdure sur le fond serait poursuivie, et a fix les dlais suivants pour le dpt des pices ultrieures : 15 juin 1948, pour le Contre-Mmoire de 1'Albanie ; 2 aot 1948, pour la Rplique du Royaume-Uni ; 20 s e p tembre 1948, pour la Duplique de l'Albanie. Immdiatement aprs le prononc de l'arrt, la Cour a t saisie par les agents des Parties d'un compromis ainsi conu : (( Le Gouvernement de la Rpublique populaire d'-Ubanie, reprsent par son agent 31. Kahreman Ylli, enrov estraordinaire et ministre plnipotentiaire d'Albanie Paris ; et le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, reprsent par M. W. E. Beckett, C. M. G., K. C., jurisconsulte au Foreigtr O@ce ; Sont convenus par le prsent compromis, tabli la suite de la Rsolution du Conseil de Scurit du g avril 1947, de soumettre la Cour internationale de Justice, aus fins de jugement, les questions suivantes : 1) L'Albanie est-elle responsable, selon le droit international, des explosions qui ont eu lieu le 22 octobre 1946 dans les eaus albanaises, et des dommages et pertes humaines qui en seraient suivis, et y a-t-il le cas de rparations donner ? 2) Le Royaume-Uni a-t-il viol, selon le droit international,

la souverainet de la Rpublique populaire d'Albanie par les actions de la marine de guerre britannique dans les eaus albanaises le 22 octobre 1946 et les 12 et 13 novembre 1g4G et y a-t-il lieu donner satisfaction ? Les Parties sont d'accord que le prsent compromis sera soumis la 'Cour internationale de Justice immdiatement aprs que la Cour rendra son arrt, le 2j mars, relatif l'exception prliminaire. Les Parties demandent la Cour, eu gard au prsent compromis, de prendre, conforrnment au Statut et au Rglement de la Cour, et apr& avoir consult les agznts des Parties, des dispositions qu'elle jugera appropries pour la procdure suivre. En foi de quoi, les agents susmentionns, dment autoriss par leurs Gouvernements, ont sign le prsent compromis. Fait La Haye, le 2 j mars 19@, -midi, ea franais et en anglais, les deux textes faisant galement foi, en un seul exemplaire qui sera dpos la Cour internationale de Justice. )i Le 26 mars 1948, la Cour a rendu une ordonnance (C. 1. J. Recueil 1947-1948,p . 53) o, constatant que le compromis forme dsormais 6 THE COR^ CHANNEL CASE (MERITS). 6 on the Preliminary Objection filed on December gth, 1947, by the latter Government. The Court rejected the Objection and decided that proceedings on the merits should continue, and fixed the time-limits for the filing of subsequent pleadings as follows : for the Counter-Memorial of Albania : June q t h , 1948 ; for the Reply of the United Kingdom : August znd, 1948 ; for the Rejoinder of Albania : September zoth, 1948. Immediately after the delivery of the judgment, the Court was notified by the Agents of the Parties of a Special Agreement, which is as follows : "The Government of the People's Republic of Albania, represented by their Agent Mr. Kahreman YUi, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Albania at Paris ; and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, represented by their Agent, Mr. W. E. Beckett, C.M.G., K.C., Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office ; Have accepted the present Special Agreement, which has been drawn up as a result of the Resolution of the Security Council of the 9th April, 1947, for the purpose of subrnitting to thi: International Court of Justice for decision the following questions :(1) 1s Albania responsible under international law for the explosions which occurred on the zznd October 1946 in Albanian waters and for the damage and loss of human life which resulted from them and is there any duty to pay compensation ? (2) Has the United Kingdom under international law violated

the sovereignty of the Albanian People's Republic by reason of the acts of the Royal Navy in Albanian waters on the ~ 2 n dO ctober and on the 12th and 13th November 1946 and is there any duty to give satisfaction ? The Parties agree that the present Special Agreement shall be notified to the International Court of Justice immediately after the delivery on the 25th March of its judgment on the question of j urisdiction. The Parties request the Court, having regard to the present Special Agreement, to make such orders with regard to procedure, in conformity wlth the Statute and the Rules of the Court, as the Court may deem fit, after having consulted the Agents of the Parties. In witness whereof the above-mentioned Agents, being duly authorized by their Governments to this effect, have signed the present Special Agreement. Done this 25th day of March, 1948, at midday, at The Hague, in English and French. both texts being equally authentic, in a single copy which shall be deposited with the International Court of Justice." On March 26th, 1948 (I.C. J. Reports 1947-1948, p. j3), the Court made an Order in which it placed on record that the Special 6 7 AFFAIRE DU DTROIT DE CORFOU (FOXD) la base sur laquelle elle devra connatre de l'affaire et nonce les questions elle soumises ; rappelant qu' la date du IC: octobre 1947, dans le dlai prescrit par la Cour, le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni avait dpos un Mmoire contenant un expos et des conclusions relatifs l'incident survenu le 22 octobre 1946 ; prenant acte que les agents, consults, se sont dclars d'accord pour lui demander que soient maintenus l'ordre et les dlais de prsentation des pices ultrieures fixs par l'Arrt du 25 mars 1948, elle a confirm cet ordre et ces dlais. Le Contre-Mmoire, la Rplique et la Duplique furent effectivement dposs dans ces dlais ; de la sorte, l'affaire s'est trouve en tat le 20 septembre 1948, et la date d'ouverture de la procdure orale fut alors fixe au 5 novembre 194s. La Cour ne comptant pas sur le sige de juge de nationalit albanaise, le Gouvernement de l'Albanie s'tait, lors de la procdure sur l'exception prliminaire, prvalu du droit prvu l'article 31, paragraphe 2, du Statut, et avait dsign comme juge ad hoc M. Igor Daxner, docteur en droit, prsident de chambre la Cour suprme de Tchcoslovaquie. Le 28 octobre 1948, le Greffier fut avis que, pour des raisons de sant, M. Dasner tait empch de siger la date fixe. La Cour dcida, le 2 novembre 1948, de fixer au 7 novembre l'expiration du dlai dans lequel le

Gouvernement de l'Albanie pouvait notifier le nom de la personne qu'il voudrait dsigner pour siger comme juge ad JZOC, en remplacement de M. Daxner, et de remettre au 9 novembre l'ouverture des audiences. Dans le dlai prescrit, le Gouvernement de l'Albanie dsigna M. Bohuslav Ecer, docteur en droit, professeur la Facult de droit de Brno, dlgu du Gouvernement tchcoslovaque au Tribunal militaire international de Nuremberg. Des audiences publiques furent tenues par la Cour aux dates suivantes : novembre 1948, du g au 12, du 15 au 19, du 22 au 26, les 28 et 29; dcembre 1948, du 1.8 au 4, du 6 au II, les 13, 14 et 17 ; janvier 1949, du 17 au 22. AU cours des audiences du 9 au 19 novembre 1948 et du 17 au 22 janvier 1949, la Cour entendit dans leurs plaidoiries : pour le Royaume-Uni, sir HartiejShawcross, K. C., conseil, sir Eric Beckett, K. C., agent et conseil, et sir Frank Soskice, K. C., conseil ; et, pour l'Albanie, M. Kahreman Ylli, agent, et MM. J. Nordmann et Pierre Cot, conseils. ,4u cours des audiences du 22 novembre au 14 dcembre 1948, la Cour entendit les tmoins et experts prsents par chacune des Parties, dans leurs rponses aux questions qui leur taient poses tant au nom des Parties, en interrogatoire et contreinterrogatoire, que par le Prsident, au nom de la Cour, ou par l'un des membres de la Cour. Ont ainsi dpos : Agreement now formed the basis of further proceedings before the Court, and stated the questions submitted to it for decision. The Court noted that the United Kingdom Government on October ~ s t , 1947, that is within the time-limit fixed by the Court, had filed a Meinorial with statements and submissions relating to the incident that occured on October zznd 1946. It further noted that the Agents, having been consulted, declared that they agreed in requesting that the order and time-limits for the filing of the subsequent pleadings as fixed by the Judgment of hlarch q t h , 1948, be maintained. The Court confirmed this order and these time-limits. The Counter-Memorial, Iieply and Rejoinder were filed within these limits. The case was thus ready for heanng on September zoth, 1948, and the commencement of the oral proceedings was then fised for November 5th, 1948. As the Court did not include upon the Bench a judge of Albanian nationality, the Albanian Government availed itself during the proceedings on the Preliminary Objection of the right provided by Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute, and chose hf. Igor Daxner, Doctor of Lam, President of a Chamber of the Supreme Court of Czechoslovakia, as Judge ad hoc. On October z8th, 1948, the Registrar was informed that Judge Daxner was prevented byreasons of health from sitting or1 the date fixed. The Court decided on November znd, 1948, to fix a time-limit expiring on November 7th,

within which the Albanian Government might notify the name of the. person whom it wished to choose as Judge ad hoc in place of Dr. Daxner, and to postpone the opening of the hearing until November 9th. Within the time fixed the Albanian Government designated 11. Bohuslav EEer, Doctor of Law and Professor in the Faculty of Law at Brno, and delegate of the Czechoslovak Government to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. Public sittings were held by the Court on the following dates : November, 1948, 9th to ~ z t h1,5 th to rgth, zznd to 26th, 28th and 29th ; December, 1948,1st to 4th, 6th to t th, 13th, 14th and 17th ; January, 1949, 17th to zznd. In the course of the sittings from November 9th to ~ g t h1,9 48, and from January 17th to zznd, 1949, the Court heard arguments by Sir Hartley Shawcross, K.C., Counsel, Sir Eric Beckett, K.C., Agent and Counsel, and Sir Frank Soskice, I<.C., Counsel, on behalf of the United Kingdom ; and by M. Kahreman Ylli, Agent, and MM. J. Nordmann and Pierre Cot, Counsel, on behalf of Albania. In the course of the sittings from November zznd to December 14th, 1948, the Court heard the evidence of the witnesses and experts called by each of the Parties in reply to questions put to them in examination and cross-examination on behalf of the Parties, and by the President on behalf of the Court or by a Member of the Court. The following perons gave evidence : Sur prsentation par le Royaume-Uni : E. R. D. Sworder, O. B. E., D. S. C., capitaine de frgate, de la Rserve volontaire de la Manne du Royaume-Uni, titre de tmoin et expert ; Karel Kovacic, anciennement capitaine de corvette de la Manne yougoslave, titre de tmoin ; W. H. Selby, D. S. C., capitaine de vaisseau, de la Marine du Royaume-Uni, titre de tmoin ; R. T. Paul, C. B. E., capitaine de frgate, de la Marine du Royaume-Uni, titre de tmoin ; P. K. Lankester, capitaine de corvette, de la Marine du RoyaumeUni, titre de tmoin et expert ; R. Mestre, capitaine de frgate, de la Marine franaise, titre de tmoin ; Q. P. Whitford, O. B. E., capitaine de frgate, de la Manne du Royaume-Uni, titre de tmoin et expert ; Sur prsentation par L'Albanie : Ali Shtino, capitaine, de l'Arme albanaise, titre de tmoin ; Aquile Polena, premier capitaine, de l'Arme albanaise, titre de tmoin ; Xhavit Muo, ancien vice-prsident du Comit excutif de Saranda, titre de tmoin ; B. 1. Ormanov, capitaine, de la Marine bulgare, titre d'expert ;

Raymond Moullec, contre-amiral, de la Marine franaise, titre d'expert. En annexe aux pices crites et aprs la fin de la procdure crite, des documents (y compris des cartes, des photographies et des croquis) ont t dposs par l'une et l'autre des Parties, et, une fois, par les Parties conjointement. A l'occasion de la prsentation, au cours d'une audience, de l'extrait photocopi d'un document, la Cour a, le zq novembre 1948, rappel aux deux Parties les dispositions de l'article 48 ainsi que de l'article 43, paragraphe 1, de son Rglement ; elle a dcid que le document dont il s'agissait ne pouvait tre reu par elle que s'il lui tait prsent en original complet ; elle a ordonn que tous documents dont les Parties se proposaient de faire usage devraient tre pralablement dposs au Greffe, et s'est rserv de faire connatre ultrieurement aux Parties quels sont ceux de ces documents dont la production en original ou en copie certifie conforme lui paratrait ncessaire. Une autre dcision portant sur la production d'une srie de nouveaux documents a t prise par la Cour le IO dcembre 1948. Cette dcision constate que la prsentation de certains de ces documents fait l'objet de l'accord des Parties et qu'il est renonc la prsentation de certains autres ; elle autorise la prsentation de certains autres encore ; enfin, s'agissant d'un de ces documents 8 Ca-lled by the United Kingdom : Commander E. R. D. Sworder, O.B.E., D.S.C., Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, as witness and expert ; Karel Kovacic, former Lieutenant-Commander in the Yugoslav Navy, as witness ; Captain IV. H. Selby, D.S.C., Royal Navy, as witness ; Commander R. T. Paul, C.B.E., Royal Navy, as witness; Lieutenant-Commander P. K. Lankester, Royal Navy, as witness and expert ; Commander R. Mestre, French Navy, as-witness ; Commander Q. P. Whitford, O.B.E., Royal Navy, as witness and expert ; Called by Albania : Captain Ali Shtino, Albanian Army, as witness ; First Captain Aquile Pdena, Albanian Army, as witness ; Xhavit Muo, former Vice-President of the Executive Cornmittee of Saranda, as witness ; Captain B. 1. Ormanov, Bulgarian Navy, as expert ; Rear-Admira1 Raymond Moullec, French Navy, as expert. Documents, including maps, photographs and sketches, were ?Xed by both Parties, and on one occasion by the Parties jointly, both as annelIes to the pleadings, and after the close of the written proceedings. On one occasion during the sittings when a photostat

of an extract 'from a document was submitted, the Court, on November q t h , 1948, made a decision in which it reminded both Parties of the provisions of Article 48 and Article 43, paragraph I, of the Rules of Court ; held that the document in question could be received only if it were presented in an original and complete form ; ordered that al1 documents which the Parties intended to use should previously be filed in the Registry ; and reserved the right to inform the Parties later which of these documents should be presented in an original, and which in certified true copy, form. Another decision as to the production of a senes of new documents was given by the Court on December xoth, 1948. This decision noted that the Parties were agreed as to the production of certain of these documents and that certain others were withdrawn ; authonzed the production of certain other documents ; lastly, in the case of one of these documents, the examination 8 9 .IFFAIRE DU DTROIT DE CORFOU (FOXD) dont la consultation avait t soumise certaines conditions, la dcision, constatant l'assentiment de la Partie adverse la production dans ces conditions, accepte la production tant donn cet assentiment et compte tenu des circonstances de l'espce, mais spcifie expressment que cette acceptation ne saurait faire prcdent pour l'avenir l. Par ordonnance du 17 dcembre 1948, la Cour, considrant que certains points dbattus entre les Parties rendaient une expertise ncessaire, a formul ces points et a confi l'expertise un comit compos du capitaine de vaisseau chef de division J. Bull, de la Marine royale norvgienne, du capitaine de vaisseau chef de division S. A. Forshell, de la Marine royale sudoise, et du capitaine de corvette S. J. W. Elfferich, de la Marine royale nerlandaise. Les experts, qui lirent le capitaine de vaisseau Bull comme leur prsident, dposrent leur rapport le 8 janvier 1949, c'est--dire dans le dlai qui leur avait t imparti. Le 17 janvier, par une dcision lue en audience publique, la Cour invita les experts se rendre Sibenik (Yougoslavie) et Saranda (Albanie) pour faire, sur le territoire et dans les eaux adjacents, les constatations qu'ils jugeraient utiles, ainsi que des expriences en vue de vrifier, complter et, s'il y a lieu, modifier les rponses donnes dans leur rapport du 8 janvier. Le second rapport des experts - auquel le caE;itaine de vaisseau Bull ne put participer, l'tat de sa sant l'ayant empch de voyager - fut dpos le 8 fvrier 1949. Enfin, trois membres de la Cour ayant pos des questions aux experts le IO fvrier, ceux-ci y donnrent rponse lc 12 fkrier. Les reprsentants des Parties ont eu l'occasion de commenter oralement le rapport des experts du 8 janvier lors des audiences

tenues du 17 au 22 janvier 1949. En ce qui concerne les constatations nouvelles contenues dans le rapport du 8 fevrier et dans les rponses du 12 fvrier, ils ont, comme le prvoyait la dcision de la Cour du 17 janvier, dpos des observations crites 2. Les conclusions des Parties, telles qu'elles ont t formules par leurs agents ou conseils en fin de plaidoirie (audiences des x8, 19, 21 et 22 janvier 1g4g), sont ainsi conues : Sztr la question 1) du compromis. -Au nom du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni : I( Le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni demande la Cour, en l'espce, cle dire et juger : ' La liste des documents justificatifs produits par les Parties et reiis par la Cour est donne dans l'annexe r au prsent arrt. ? Voir, en annexe 2 , le rapport d.es experts du 8 janvier, la dcision de la Cour du 17 janvier, le second rapport des experts du 8 fvrier, les questions poses par trois membres de la Cour et les rponses des experts du i~ fvrier. THE CORFD CHt\NPIEI, CASE (IIERITS) 9 of which had been subjected to certain conditions, the Court's decision placed on record the consent of the other Party to its production and, in view of that consent, permitted its production, having regard to the special circumstances ; but the Court expressly stated that this permission could not form a precedent for the future l. By an Order of December 17th, 1948, the Court, having regard to the fact that certain points had been contested between the Parties which made it necessary to obtain an expert opinion, defined these points, and entrusted the duty of giving the expert opinion to a Committee composed of Commodore J. Bull of the Royal Korwegian Navy, Commodore S. A. Forshell of the Royal Swedish Kavy, and, Lieutenant-Commander S. J. Elfferich of the Royal Netherlands Navy. These Experts elected Commodore Bull as their chairman, and filed their Report on January Sth, 1949, within the prescribed time-limit. By a decision read at a public sitting on January 17th, the Court requested the Experts to proceed to Sibenik in Yugoslavia and Saranda in Albania and to make on the land and in the waters adjacent to these places any investigations and experiments that they might consider useful with a view to verifying, completing, and, if necessary, modifying the answers given in their report of January 8th. The Experts' second report-in which Commodore Bull did not join, having been unable to niake the journey for reasons of health-was filed on February 8th, 1949. On February ~ o t ht,h ree members of the Court put questions to the Experts, to which the Experts replied on February 12th. At sittings held from January 17th to mnd, 1949, the representatives of the Parties had an opportunity of commenting orally

on the Experts' report of January 8th. They also filed written observations concerning the further statements contained in the Report of February 8th and the replies of February ~ z t h ,a s provided in the Court's decision of January 17th. The Parties' submissions, as formulated by their Agents or Counsel at the end of the hearings on the 18th, ~ g t h~, 1 satn d 22nd Januaiy, 1949, are as follows : Question (1) of the Special Agreement. On behalf of the United Kingdom : "The Governnient of the United Kingdom asks the Court in this case to adjudge and declare as follows : The list of documents in support produced by the Parties and accepted by the Court will be found in Xnnex I to this Judginent. 2 See Annex 2 for the Experts' Report of Jariuarp Sth, the Court's decision of January i;th, the Experts' second Report of February Xth, the qiiestions put by three members of the Court, and the Experts' replies of February i2th. 1) Que, le 22 octobre 1946, les navires de Sa Majest Saumavez et Volage ont subi des dommages ayant entran la mort pour quarante-quatre officiers et marins britanniques et des blessures pour quarante-deux autres officiers et marins, du fait de la prsence d'un champ de mines automatiques amarres dans la voie de navigation internationale qu'est le Dtroit de Corfou, en une zone situe au sud-ouest de la baie de Saranda ; 2) Que le champ de mines susmentionn a t mouill entre le 15 mai et le 22 octobre 1946, soit par le Gouvernement albanais, soit avec sa connivence ou sa connaissance ; 3) Que (alternativement la conclusion 2) le Gouvernement albanais savait que ledit champ de mines se trouvait dans une partie de ses eaux territoriales ; 4) Que le Gouvernement albanais n'a pas notifi l'existence de ces mines comme le requiert la Convention VI11 de La Haye, de 1907, conformment aux principes gnraux du droit international et aux rgles d'humanit ; 5) Qu'en outre, et comme aggravation de la conduite de l'Albanie telle qu'elle est nonce dans les co~iclusions 3 et 4 ci-dessus, le Gouvernement albanais ou ses agents, sachant que des navires de Sa Majest allaient emprunter le chenal nord de Corfou qui avait t dmin, et tant en mesure d'observer leur approche, et ayant omis, comme il est avanc au paragraphe 4 des prsentes conclusions, de notifier l'existence desdites mines, d nt manqu avertir les navires de Sa Majest du danger prsent par ces mines, danger dont le Gouvernement albanais ou ses agents se rendaient compte ; 6) Qu'en outre et comme aggravation additionnelle de la conduite de l'Albanie telle qu'elle est nonce dans les conclusions 3, 4 et 5 ci-dessus, le fait d'avoir tolr I'existence sans notification de

ce champ de mines dans le chenal nord de Corfou, lequel est une voie de navigation internationale, constitue une violation du droit de passage innocent dont jouissent les navires trangers (de guerre ou de commerce), sur une telle voie de navigation internationale ; 7) Que le passage des navires de Sa Majest par le chenal nord de Corfou, le 22 octobre 1946, est un cas d'exercice du droit de passage innocent conforme au droit et la pratiqu des nations civilises ; 1) Que, mme si pour un motif quelconque il tait jug que la conclusion 7 n'est pas dmontre, le Gouyernement albanais ne serait pas pour autant libr de la responsabilit internationale qui lui incsmbe pour le dommage caus aux navires du fait de l'existence d'un champ de mines non notifi et connu de lui ; g) Que, dans les circonstances exposes dans le Mmoire et telles qu'elles sont rsumes dans les paragraphes prcdents des prsentes conclusions, le Gouvernement albanais a commis une violation des obligations lui incombant en vertu du droit international, et qu'il est internationalement responsable envers le Gouvernement de Sa Majest au Royaume-Uni des morts et dommages corporels et matriels causs aux navires de Sa Majest et leurs quipages, et relats notamment au paragraphe 18 du Mmoire et dans ses annexes ; 1 O That, on October aand, 1946, damage was caused to His Majesty's ships Saumarez and Volage, which resulted in the death and injuries of 44, and persona1 injuries to 42, British officers and men by a minefield of anchored automatic mines in the international highway of the Corfu Strait in an area south-west of the Bay of Saranda ; That the aforesaid minefield was laid between May 15th and October zznd, 1946, by or with the connivance or knowledge of the Albanian Government ; That (alternatively to 2) the Albanian Government knew that the said minefield was lying in a part of its territorial waters ; That the Albanian Government did not notify the existence of these mines as required by the Hague Convention VI11 of 1907 in accordance with the general principles of international law and humanity ; That in addition, and as an aggravation of the conduct of Albania as set forth in Conclusions (3) and (4). the Albanian Government, or Cts agents, knowing that His Majesty's ships were going to make the passage through the North Corfu swept channel, and being in a position to observe their approach, and having omitted, as alleged in paragraph 4 of these conclusions, to riotify the existence of the said mines, failed to warn His

Majesty's ships of the danger of the said mines of which the Albanian Government or its agents were well aware ; That in addition, and as a further aggravation of the conduct of Albania as set forth in Conclusions (3), (4), and (5), the permission of the existence without notification of the minefield in the North Corfu Channel, being an international highway, was a violation of the right of innocent passage which exists in favour of foreign vessels (whether warships or merchant ships) through such an international highway ; That the passage of His Majesty's ships through the North Corfu Channel on October zznd, 1946, was an exercise of the right of innocent passage, according to the law and practice of civilized nations ; That even if, for any reason, it is held that conclusion (7) is not established, nevertheless, the Albanian Government is not thereby relieved of its international responsibility for the damage caused to the ships by reason of the existence of an unnotified minefield of which it had knowledge ; That in the circumstances set forth in the Memorial as summarized in the preceding paragraph of these Conclusions, the Albanian Government has committed a breach of its obligations under international law, and is internationally responsible to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom for the deaths, injuries and ainage caused to His Majesty's ships and personnel, as set out more particularly in paragraph 18 of the Memorial and the Annexes thereto ; IO) Que le Gouvernement albanais est tenu rparation envers le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, du fait de la violation de ses obligations internationales comme il est dit plus haut ; II) Que le Gouvernement de Sa Majest au Royaume-Uni a, en consquence de la violation, par le Gouvernement albanais, des obligations lui incombant en vertu du droit international, subi les dommages suivants : Dommages causs au navire Saumarez . . . j(;7jo.ooo Dommages causs au navire Volage . . . . 7j.000 Compensation pour les pensions et autres frais encourus par le Gouvernement du RoyaumeUni du fait des morts et blessures subies par les quipages . . . . . . . . . . . 50.000 E S7j.000 11 Au nom du Gouvernement de l'Albanie : <( 1) Aux termes dil compromis conclu le 2 j mars 1948, la Cour internationale de Justice est saisie de la question suivante : L'Albanie est-elle responsable selon le droit international des explosions qui ont eu lieu le 22 octobre 1946 dans les eaux albanaises, et des dommages et pertes humaines qui en seraient suivis,

et y a-t-il le cas de rparations a donner ? 1) La Cour ne serait pas comptente en vertu de ce compromis pour statuer le cas chant sur la demande de fixation de dommagesintrts formule dans les conclusions du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni. 2) Il n'est pas tabli que les mines qui ont caus les accidents du 22 octobre 1946 ient t poses par l'Albanie. 3) Il n'est pas tabli que ces mines aient t poses par une tierce Puissance pour le compte de l'Albanie. 4) Il n'est pas ta.bli que ces mines aient t poses avec le concours ou l'acquiescement de l'Albanie. j) Il n'est pas tabli que l'Albanie ait su avant les accidents du 22 octobre 1946 que ces mines se trouvaient dans ses eaux territoriales. 6) En consquence, l'Albanie ne peut tre dclare responsable selon le droit international des explosions qui ont eu lieu le 22 octobre 1946 dans ses eaux et des dommages et pertes humaines qui en ont t la consquence. Elle ne doit pas de rparations au Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni. )) Sur la question 2) du comfiromis. Au nom du Gouvernement de l'Albanie: 11 Aux termes du compromis conclu le 25 mars 1948, la Cour internationale de Justice est saisie de la question suivante : (IO) That the Albanian Government is under an obligation to the Government of the United Kingdom to make reparation in respect of the breach of its international obligations as aforesaid ; (II) That His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom has. as a result of the breach by the Albanian Government of its obligations under international law, sustained the foiiobving damage : Damage to H.M.S. Saurmrez . . . . . . L~~O,OOO Damage to H.M.S. Volage. . . . . . . 75,000 Compensation for the pensions and other expenses incurred by the Government of the United Kingdom in respect of the deaths and injuries of naval personnel. . 50,000 ~875,000" On behalf of the Albanian Government : [Translation.] "(1) Under the terms of the Special Agreement of March 25th, 1948, the following question has been submitted to the International Court of .,T ustice : *'Is Albania responsible under international law for the explosions which occurred on the 22nd October 1946 in Albanian waters and for the damage and loss of human life which resulted rom them and is there any duty to pay compensation ?'

The Court would not have jurisdiction, in virtue of this Special .4greement, to decide, if the case arose, on the claim for the assessment of the compensation set out in the submissions of the United Kingdom Government. (2) It has not been proved that the mines which caused the accidents of October zznd, 1946, were laid by Albania. (3) It has not been proved that these mines were laid by a third Power on behalf of Albania. (4) It has not been proved that these mines were laid with the help or acquiescence of Albania. (5) It has not been proved that Albania knew, befote the incidents of October zznd, 1946, that thee mines were in her territorial waters. (6) Consequently, Albania cannot be declared responsible, under international law, for the explosions which occurred on October zznd, 1946, in Albanian waters, and for the damage and loss of human life which resulted rom them. Albania owes no compensation to the United Kingdoin Government." Question (2) of the Special Agreement. On behalf of the Albanian Governrnent : [Translation.] "(1) Under the terms of the Special Agreement concluded on March 25th, 1948, the International Court of Justice has before it the following question : II 12 AFFAIRE DU DTHOIT DE CORFOU (FOXD) Le Koyaume-Uni a-t-il viol, selon le droit international, la souverainet de la Rpublique populaire d'Albanie par les actions de la marine de guerre britannique dans les eaus albanaises le 22 octobre 1946 et les 12 et 13 novembre 1946, et y a-t-il lieu donner satisfaction ? 2) tat riverain a le droit, en cas de circonstances exceptionnelles, de rglementer le passage des navires de guerre trangers dans ses eaux territoriales. 3) Cette rgle est applicable au Dtroit Nord de Corfou. 4) Il existait dans cette rgion, en octobre et novembre 1946, des circonstances exceptionnelles qui justifiaient le droit du Gouvernement albanais d'exiger une autorisation pralable pour le passage des navires de guerre trangers dans ses eaux territoriales. 5) Le passage dans les eaux territoriales albanaises le 22 octobre 1946 de plusieurs navires de guerre britanniques sans autorisation pralable constituait une infraction au droit international. 6) En tout tat de cause, ce passage n'avait pas un caractre innocent. 7) Les autorits navales britanniques n'avaient pas le droit de faire procder les 12 et 13 novembre 1946 des oprations de dminage dans les eaux territoriales albanaises sans l'agrment pralable

des autorits albanaises. 8) La Cour doit constater qu'en ces deus circonstances !e Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord a commis des infractions aux rgles du droit international et que le Gouvernement albanais est fond lui demander satisfaction de ce chef. 11 Au nom du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni : iTradwtion .] Plaise la Cour dire et juger que l'Albanie n'a tabli son droit sur aucun des chefs de la demande reconventionnelle et qu'il n'y a pas lieu d'accorder une indemnit symbolique d'un centime ou d'un franc. * * Aux termes de la premire partie du compromis, la question suivante est soumise la Cour : 1) L'Albanie est-elle responsable, selon le. droit international, des explosions qui ont eu lieu le 22 octobre 1946 dans les eaus albanaises, et des dommages et pertes humaines qui en seraient suivis, et y a-t-il le cas de rparations donner ? A la date du 22 octobre 1946, une escadre de navires de guerre britanniques, compose des croiseurs .IInz~ritius et Leander et des contre-torpilleurs Snunzarez et Volage, quitta le port de Corfou et, s'avanant dans la direction du Kord, s'engagea dans un chenal antrieurement dmin dans le Dtroit Nord de Corfou. Le croiseur Jilat4ritizts tait en tte, suivi du contre-torpilleur Snunzarez; derrire eux, une certaine distance, venait le croiseuf Leawdrr suivi du contre-torpilleur T'olage. A l'estrieur de la baie de Saranda, 12 'Has the United Kingdom under international law violated the sovereignty of the Albanian People's Kepublic by reason of the acts of the Royal Navy in Aibanian waters on the 22nd October and on the 12th and 13th November 1946, and is there any duty to give satisfaction ?' (2) The coastal State is entitled, in exceptional circumstances, to regulate the passage of foreign warships through its territorial waters. (3) This rule is applicable to the North Corfu Channel. (4) In October and November, 1946, there existed, in this area, exceptional circumstances which gave the Albanian Government the right to require that foreign warships should obtain previous authorization before passing through its territorial waters. (5) The passage of several British warships through Albanian territorial waters on October zznd, 1946, without prcvious authorization, constituted a breach of international law. (6) In any case that passage was not of an innocent character. (7) The British naval authorities were not entitled to proceed, on

November 12th and 13th, 1946, to sweep mines in A!banian territorial waters without the previous consent of the Albanian authorities. (8) The Court should find that, on both these occasions, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland committed a breach of the rules of international law and that the Albanian Government has a right to (Icmand that it should give satisfaction therefor." On hehcrlf of the United Kingdom Govcrnmcint : "1 ask the Court to decide that on neither heatl of tlic, counterclaim has Albania made out her case, and that there is rio ground for the Court to award nominal damages of one farthing or one franc." * * * By the first part of the Special Agreement, the following question is submitted to the Court : "(1) 1s Albania responsible under international law for the cxplosions which occurred on the 22nd October 1946 in Albanian waters and for the tlamage and loss of human life which resulted from them and is there any duty to pay compensation ?" On October zznd, 1946, a squadron of British warships, the cruisers Mauritius and Leander and the destroyers Saumarez and I'olage, left the port of Corfu and proceeded northward through a channel previously suftpt for mines in the North Corfu Strait. The cruiser Mauritius was leading, followed by the destroyer Saumarez; at a certain distance therealter came the cruiser Leander followed by the ciestroyclr Volage. Outside thc Bay of Saranda, Saumarez btruck ;L rninc and was hcavily damaged. Volnga was le Saumarez heurta une mine et fut gravement avari. Le Volage fut envoy son aide et reut l'ordre de le remorquer. Alors qu'il remorquait le navire avari, le Volage heurta une mine et subit de srieux dommages. Il russit nanmoins remorquer l'autre navire et le ramener Corfou. Trois semaines plus tard, la date du 13 novembre, le Dtroit Nord de Corfou fut dmin par des dragueurs britanniques et vingt-deux mines amarres furent dtaches. Deux mines furent amenes Malte, afin d'y tre examines par des experts. Au cours de l'opration de dminage, on crut que les mines taient du type allemand GR, mais on constata par la suite qu'elles appartenaient au type allemand GY. La Cour examinera d'abord si les deux explosions qui ont eu lieu le 22 octobre 1946 ont te causes par des mines appartenant au champ de mines dcouvert le 13 novembre. Il a t indiqu, au nom du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, que ce champ de mines avait t rcemment mouill. Ce point a t contest dans les critures albanaises, mais il ne l'a plus t en plaidoirie : d'une part, un des conseils du Gouvernement albanais

a reconnu expressment que le champ de mines avait t rcemment mouill, et l'autre conseil a fait, par la suite, une dclaration semblable ; d'autre part, il a t allgu, au nom du Gouvernement albanais, que ce champ de mines aurait t mouill aprs le 22 octobre, allgation qui exclut la possibilit de soutenir en mme temps que le champ de mines tait ancien. Les documents verss au dbat par le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni et les constatations faites par les experts de la Cour sur la base de ces documents tablissent que ledit champ de mines avait t rcemment mouill. Ce point est dsormais acquis. Le Goiivernement britannique soutient que les mines auxquelles se heurtrent les deux navires, le 22 octobre, faisaient partie de ce champ de mines. Cette assertion est conteste par le Gouvernement albanais, qui a mis l'opinion que les mines dont il s'agissait pouvaient avoir t des mines flottantes, provenant d'anciecs champs de mines situs dans le voisinage, ou des mines magntiques de fond, des mines magntiques amarres ou, enfin, des mines allemandes GR. Il est contest que les explosions se soient produites dans le chenal dmin antrierement, l'endroit o fut dcouvert le champ de mines. Le Gouvernement albanais a prtendu galement que le champ de mines avait t pos aprs le 22 octobre, entre cette date et celle laquelle eut lieu l'opration de dminage (12-13 novembre). Sur la base des preuves produites, la Cour considre comme tablis les faits noncs ci-aprs : Au mois d'octobre 1944, la Marine britannique procda au dminage du Dtroit Nord de Corfou et aucune mine ne fut dcouverte dans le chenal ainsi dmin. Sur quoi, l'existence d'une route sre dans le chenal fut annonce au mois de novembre 1944. ordered to give her assistance and to take her in tow. Whilst towing the damaged ship, Volage struck a mine and was much damaged. Nevertheless, she succeeded in towing the other ship back to Corfu. Three weeks later, on November 13th, the North Corfu Channel was swept by British minesweepers and twenty-two moored mines were cut. Two mines were taken to Malta for expert examination. During the minesweeping operation it was thought that the mines were of the German GR type, but it was subsequently established that they were of the German GY type.. The Court will consider first whether the two explosions that occurred on October zznd, 1946, were caused by mines belonging to the minefield discovered on Novemter 13th. It was pointed out on behalf of the United Kingdom Government that this minefield had been recently laid. This was disputed in the Albanian pleadings but was no longer disputed during the liearing. One of the Albanian Counsel expressly recognized that

the minefield had been recently laid, and the other Counsel subsequently made a similar declaration. It was further asserted on behalf of the Albanian Government that the minefield must have been laid after October 22nd ; this would make it impossible at the same time to mainiain that the minefield was old. The documents produced by the United Kingdom Governmerit and the statements made by the Court's Experts and based on these documents show that the minefield had been recerttlv laid. This is - now established. The United Kingdom Government contended that the mines which struck the two ships on October zznd were part of this minefield. This was contested by the Albanian Government, which argued that these mines may have been floating mines, coming from old minefields in the vicinity, or magnetic ground mines, magnetic moored mines, or German GR mines. It was also contested by them that the explosions occurred in the previously swept channel at the place where the minefield was dircovered. The Albanian Government also contended that the minefield was laid after Octcber 2211d, between that date and the minesweeping operation on 12-13th November. On -the evidence produced, the Court finds that the following facts are established : In October, IW, the North Corfu Channel was swept by the British Navy and no mines were found in the channel thus swept, whereupon -the existence of a safe route through the Channe! was announced in November 1944. In January and February, 14 AFFAIRE DL: D~TROIT DE CORFOU (FO.XD) Durant les mois de janvier et de fvrier 1945, le Dtroit fut vrifie par la Marine britannique; le rsultat de ces recherches fut ngatif. Ce qui dmontre que l'Amiraut britannique doit avoir considr le chenal comme ofirant une route sre la navigation, c'est qu' la date du 15 mai 1946, elle envoya, dans ce Dtroit, deux croiseurs britanniques et, la date du 22 octobre, une escadre, sans prendre de mesures de prcaution spciales contre le danger de mines amarres. C'est dans ce chenal dmin que, le 13 novembre 1946, fut dcouvert le champ de mines. Il est en outre dmontk, l'aide des preuves produites par le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, que l'accident, caus par des mines au Sauwzarez et au Volage, se produisit dans les eaux territoriales albanaises, prcisment l'endroit o fut dcouvert le champ de mines, dans le chenal dmin, ainsi qu'il est indiqu sur la carte jointe en annexe au Mmoire du Royaume-Uni (annexe 9). Ceci est confirm par les experts de la Cour, qui considrent que les deux navires heurtrent indubitablement des mines, alors qu'ils se trouvaient occuper une position qui est

sensiblement celle qui est porte sur cette carte. Les dpositions des tmoins ont permis d'tablir que le champ de mines se composait de mines de contact amarres, du type allemand GY. En outre, le caractre des avaries subies par les deux navires dmontre - et cela est confirm par les tmoins et les experts - que les explosions ne peuvent avoir t causes par des mines flottantes, des mines magntiques de fond, des mines magntiques amarres ou des mines allemandes du type GR. Selon les experts de la Cour, le caractre des dommages causs exclut toute possibilit qu'ils aient t provoqus par une mine flottante ; ils ne peuvent pas non plus avoir t causs par une mine de fond. Ces experts sont galement d'avis que les avaries doivent a\-oir t causes par l'explosion de mines de contact amarres, contenant une charge d'environ six cents lil-res d'esplosifs, et que les deux navires ont heurt des mines du mme type que celles qui furent dragues le 13 novembre 1946. Le Gouvernement albanais a fait noncer l'hypothse selon laquelle le champ de mines dcouvert le 13 novembre aurait t mouill aprs le 22 octobre, de sorte que les explosions qui se sont produites cette dernire date n'auraient pu tre causes par des lments de ce champ de mines. Ce Gouvernement n'a d'ailleurs appuy cette hqpothse sur aucun lment de preuve. Comme il vient d'tre tabli que les explosions n'ont pu tre causes que par des mines amarres contenant une charge d'explosifs voisine de celle contenue dans les mines GY, si l'hypothse albanaise correspondait la ralit, il se serait trouv deux mines au moins de cette nature dans le chenal en dehors de la baie de Saranda, nonobstant le dminage effectu en octobre 1944 et les vrifications effectues en janvier et fvrier 1945, mines que les deus navire< auraient heurtes le 22 octobre 1946 a des points 14 THE COKFU CHANNEL CASE (BIERITS) I4 1945, the Channel was check-swept by the British Navy \vitil negative results. That the British Admiralty must have considered the Channel to be a safe route for navigation is s h o ~ nby the fact that on May ~ j t h , 1946, it sent two British cruisers and on October zznd a squadron through the C.hanne1 without any special measlires of precaution against danger from nloored mines. It was in this swept channel that the minefield was discovered on November 13th, 1946. It is further proved by evidence produced by the United Kingdom Govemment that the mining of Snzrnrarez and 1,'olage occurred in Albanian territorial n ~ t e r s ,ju st at the place in the swept channel where the minefield was found, as indicated on the chart forming Annex g to the United Kingdom hlemorial. This is confirmed by the Court's Experts, ~ h coon sider it to be

free from any doubt that the two ships were mined in approxinlately the position indicated on this chart. It is established by the evidence of witnesses that the minefield consisted of moored contact mines of the German GY type. It is further shown by the nature of the damage sustained hy the two ships, and confirmed by witnesses and experts, that it could not have been caused by floating mines, magnetic ground mines, magnetic moored mines, or German GR mines. The experts of the Court have stated that the nature of the damage excludes the faintest possibility of its cause being a floating mine ; nor could it have been caused by a ground mine. They also expressed the view that the damage must have been caused by the explosion of moored contact mines, each having a charge of approximately 600 lbs. of explosives, and that the two ships struck mines of the same type as those which were swept on November 13th, 1946. The Albanian Government put forward a suggestion that the minefield discovered on November 13th may have been laid after October zznd, so that the explosions that occurred on this latter date would not have been caused by mines from the field in question. But it brought no evidence in support of this supposition. As it has been established that the explosions could only have been due to moored mines having an explosive charge similar to that contained in GY mines, there would, if the Albanian contention were true, have been at least two mines of this nature in the channel outside the Bay of Saranda, in spite of the sweep in October 1941 and the check-sweeps in January and February 1945 ; and these mines would have been struck by the two vessels at poi~its fairly close to one another on October 2211d, 1946. Such a supposition is too improbable to be accepted. 14 proches l'un de l'autre. Une telle hypothse est trop invraisemblable pour pouvoir tre retenue. La Cour est donc amene aux constatations suivantes. Les deux navires heurtrent des mines, dans les eaux territoriales albanaises, dans un chenal antrieurement dmin et vrifi, prcisment l'endroit o fut dcouvert, trois semaines plus tard, un champ de mines rcemment mouill et compos de mines allemandes de contact amarres du type GY. Il n'y a pas de rapport entre les avaries subies par les navires et celles qu'auraient pu provoquer des mines fiottantes, des mines magntiques de fond, des mines magntiques amarres ou des mines allemandes du type GR. Par contre, ces avaries sont de la nature et de l'importance de .celles que peuvent causer des mines du mme type que les mines dcouvertes dans le champ de mines. Dans ces conditions, la Cour arrive la conclusion qiie les explosions ont t provoques par des mines appartenant audit champ de

mines. * * * Tels sont les faits la suite desquels la Cour doit, pour rpondre la premire question du compromis, se prononcer sur la responsabilit qui incomberait l'Albanie du chef des explosions du 22 octobre 1946, pour les dommages et pertes humaines qui en rsultrent et, le cas chant, sur la rparation de ces dommages et pertes. Il convient d'examiner avant tout le fondement juridique que le Gouvemement du Royaume-Uni assigne aux responsabilits de l'Albanie. Sa position principale cet gard est nonce dans sa conclusion no 2, selon laquelle le mouillage du champ de mines qui a provoqu les explosions aurait t effectu entre le 15 mai 1946 et le 22 octobre 1946 par le Gouvernement albanais ou avec sa connivence ou sa connaissance. L'examen de la Cour s'est port en premier lieu sur les divers chefs de responsabilitl: viss dans cette conclusion. S'il est vrai que le Govemement du Royaume-Uni n'a jamais abandonn la thse selon laquelle l'Albanie aurait elle-mme mouill les mines, il faut constater qu'il ne s'est gure attach en dmontrer le bien-fond. Ds sa Rplique crite, le Gou-~emement du Royaume-Uni dclare, en effet, prendre note de l'affirmation du Gouvernement albanais qu'il n'avait pas mouill les mines et qu'il n'tait pas en situation de le faire, l'Albanie ne possdant pas de marine et les autorits albanaises ne disposant sur tout Je littoral que de quelques barques et de quelques canots moteur. C'est en tenant compte de ces dclarations que la Rplique invitait le Gouvemement albanais rvler les circonar ta nces dans lesquelles deux navires de guerre yougoslaves, le Mljet et le Meljine, chargs de mines du type GY auraient quitt le port de Sibenik le 18 octobre ou une date voisine et fait route au The Court consequenrly finds that the following facts are established. The two ships were mined in Albanian territorial waters in a previously swept and check-swept channel just at the place where a newly laid minefield consisting of moored contact German GY mines was discovered three weeks later. The damage sustained by the ships was inconsistent with damage which could have been caused by floating mines, magnetic ground mines, magnetic moored mines, or German GR mines, but its nature and extent were such as would be caused by mines of the type found in the minefield. In such circumstances the Court arrives at the conclusion that the explosions were due to mines belonging to that minefield. Such are the facts upon which the Court nust, in order to reply to the first question of the Special Agreement, give judgment as to Albania's responsibility for the explosions on October zznd, 1946, and for the damage and loss of human life which resulted, and for

the compensation, if any, due in respect of such damage and loss. To begin with, the foundation for Albania's responsibility, as alleged by the United Kingdom, must be considered. On this subject, the mzin position of the United Kingdom is to be found in its submission No. 2 : that the minefield which caused the explosions was laid between May 15th, 1946, and October zznd, 1946, by or with the connivance or knowledge of the Albnian Government. The Court considered first the various ground for responsibility alleged in this submission. In fact, although the United Kingdom Govemment never abandoned its contention that Albania herself laid the mines, very little attempt was made by t5e Government to demonstrate this point. In the written Reply, the United Kingdom Govemment takes note of the Albanian Government's forma1 statement that it did not lay the mines, and was not in a position to do so, as Albania possessed no navy ; and that, on the whole Albanian littoral, the Albanian authorities only had a few launches and motor boats. In the light of these statenlents, the Albanian Government was called upon, in the Reply, to disclose the circumstances in which two Yugoslav war vessels, the Mljet and the Meljine, carrying contact mines of the GY type, sailed routhward from the port of Sibenik on or about October 18th, and proceeded to the Corfu Channel The United Kingdom Government, having thus indicated the argument upon 15 Sud vers le Dtroit de Corfou. Annonant la thse sur laquelle il allait dsormais concentrer son argumentatioii, lc Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni dclarait qu'il se proposait d'tablir que lesdits navires de guerre avaient, juste avant le 22 octobre 1946, mouill les mines dans le Dtroit Nord de Corfou avec la connaissance et la connivence du Gouvernement albanais. C'est sous le mme jour que les faits ont t prsents, aux termes de la rplique orale, par le conseil du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni aux sances publiques des 17 et 18 janvier 1949. Bien que dans son expos oral du 18 janvier 1949, ainsi que dans les conclusions finales lues le mme jour devant la Cour, la suggestion soit reproduite selon laquelle le champ de mines aurait t mouill par l'Albanie, c'est un fait que cette.suggestion n'y est plus gure nonce que pour mmoire et aucune preuve n'a t apporte son appui. Dans ces conditions, il n'y a pas lieu pour la Cour de s'y attacher plus longuement. La Cour passe l'examen de la deuxime thse prsente alternativement par le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, d'aprs laquelle le mouillage des mines aurait t effectu avec la connivence du Gouvernement albanais. Selon cette thse, l'opration du mouillage aurait t faite par deux navires de guerre yougoslaves une

poque antrieure au 22 octobre, mais trs voisine de cette date. Le fait impliquerait une collusion entre le Gouvernement albanais et le Gouvernement yougoslave, collusion qui se serait manifest6e ou dans une demande d'assistance par le Gouvernement albanais au Gouvernement yougoslave, ou par un acquiescement au mouillage par les autorits albanaises. Pour dmontrer cette collusion, le Gouvernement di1 RoyaumeUni s'est appuy sur le tmoignage du commandant Kovacic, tel qu'il ressort de sa dclaration sous serment, date du 4 octobre 1948, et de ses dpositions devant la Cour dans les sances publiques des 24, 25, 26 et 27 novembre 1948. La Cour a longuement esamin le tmoignage en question ainsi que les informations docurnentaires produites par les Parties. Elle a complt et vrifi ces donnes par l'envoi Sibenik de deux experts dsigns par elle : le capitaine de vaisseau chef de division S. A. Forshell et le capitaine de corvette S. J. Ur. Elfferich. Sans se prononcer sur la sincrit personnelle du tmoin Kovacic ni sur la vracit de ses dires, la Cour ne peut que constater que les faits relats de science personnelle par le tmoin ne suffiserit pas faire la dmonstration que le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni croit pouvoir y trouver. Ni l'observation prtendue d'un chargement de mines Sibenik bord de deux dragueurs de mines yougoslaves, ni le dpart allgu de ces deux navires vers le ~8 octobre et leur retour quelques jours aprs la date des explosions, ne suffisent rapporter la preuve judiciaire dcisive d'un mouillage de mines effectu par ces mmes navires dans les eaus albanaises de TG which it was thenceforth to concentrate, stated that it proposed to show that the said warships, with the knowledge and connivance of the Albanian Government, laid mines in the Corfu Channel just before October zznd, 1946. The facts were presented in the same light and in the same language in the oral reply by ~ounseflo r the United Kingdom Government at the sittings on January 17th and 18th, 1949. Although the suggestion that the minefield was laid by Albania was repeated in the United Kingdom statement in Court on January 18tii, 1949, and in th final submissions read in Court on the same day, this suggestion was in fact hardly put forward at that time except pro memoria, and no evidence in support was furnished. In these circumstances, the Court need pay no further attention to this matter. The Court now comes to the second alternative argument of the United Kingdom Govemment, namely, that the minefield was laid with the connivance of the Albanian Government. According to this argument, the minelaying operation was carried out by tw70

Yugoslav warships at a date prior to October zznd, but very near that date. This would imply collasion between the Albanian and the Yugoslav Governments, consisting either of a request by the Albanian Govemment to the Yugoslav Government for assistance, or of acquiescence by the Albanian authoritieo in the laying of the mines. In proof of this collusion, the United Kingdom Government relied on the evidence of Lieutenant-Commander Kovacic; as shown in his affidavit of October 4th, 1948, and in his statements in Court at the public sittings on November 24th, 25th, 26th and 27th, 1948 The Court gave much attention to this evidence and to the documentary information supplied by the Parties. It supplemented and checked al1 this information by sending two experts appointed by it to Sibenik : Commodore S. A. Forshell and LieutenantCommander S. J. W. Elfferich. Without deciding as to the persona1 sincerity oi the witness Kovacic, or the truth of what he said, the Court finds that the facts stated by the witness from his persona1 knowledge are not sufficient to prove what the United Kingdom Government considered them to prove. His ayegations that he saw mines being loaded upon two Yugoslav minesweepers at Sibenik and that these two vessels departed from Sibenik about October 18th and returned a few days after the occurrence of the explosions do not suffice to constitute decisive legal proof that the mines were laid by these two vessels in Albanian waters off Saranda. The statements attributed 16 Saranda. Quant aux propos attribus par le tmoin des tiers, la Cour n'en a pas reu confirmation personnelle et directe et elle ne peut y voir que des allgations sans force probante suffisante. Une imputation d'une gravit aussi exceptionnelle articule contre un tat exigerait un degr de certitude qui n'est pas atteint ici. Indpendamment du tmoignage Kovacic, le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni a cherch dmontrer l'existence d'une collusion entre l'Albanie et la Yougoslavie par certaines prsomptions de fait ou preuves circonstancielles, telles que la possession l'poque, par la Yougoslavie, l'exclusion de tout autre Etat voisin, de mines du type GY, et les liens d'troite alliance, la fois politique et militaire, entre l'Albanie et la Yougoslavie, rsultant du Trait d'amiti et d'assistance mutuelle conclu par ces deux tats le g juillet 1946. La Cour estime que ces faits, mme dans la mesure o ils sont tablis, n'autorisent aucune conclusion ferme. Il n'est pas judiciairement tabli que la Yougoslavie possdait des mines GY et la provenance des mines mouilles dans les eaux territoriales albanaises reste conjecturale. D'autre part, il va de soi que l'existence d'un trait tel que celui du g juillet 1946, si intimes que soient les

liens qui unissent ses signataires, n'autorise aucunement conclure leur participation un acte criminel. De son ct, le Gouvernement de Yougoslavie, bien que non partie l'instance, a autoris le Gouvernement albanais produire certains documents lui appartenant, destins rfuter la thse britannique du mouillage par deux navires de sa marine de guerre. Dsireuse de faire la pleine lumire sur les faits allgus, la Cour ne s'est pas refuse recevoir ces documents. Mais l'absence du Gouvernement yougoslave l'instance rend leur utilisation dlicate et sujette caution, et la Cour estime n'avoir pas prendre position sur leur force probante. Il n'y a pas lieu, pour la Cour, de s'arrter l'allgation de l'un des conseils du Gouvernement albanais, selon laquelle le champ de mines aurait pu tre mouill par la Grce. Il suffit de relever qu'il s'agit l d'une conjecture qui, de l'aveu du mme conseil, n'est appuye sur aucune preuve. C'est un fait que, dans l'tat prsent des informations dont dispose la Cour, les auteurs du mouillage sont rests inconnus. Aussi bien, la mission de la Cour, dfinie par les termes du compromis, est de dcider si l'Albanie est responsable, selon le droit international, des explosions du 22 octobre 1946 et de statuer, ventuellement, sur la rparation des dommages. Le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni a enfin mis la thse selon laquelle, quels que fussent par ailleurs les auteurs du mouillage des mines, celui-ci n'a pu tre effectu sans que le Gouvernement albanais en et connaissance. by the witness Kovacic to third parties, of which the Court has received no persona1 and direct confirmation, can be regarded only as allegations falling short of conclusive evidence. A charge of such exceptional gravity against a State would require a degree of certainty that has not been reached here. Apart from Kovacic's evideqce, the United Kingdom Government endeavoured to prove coliusion between Albania and Yugoslavia by certain presumptions of fact, or circumstantial evidence, such as the possession, at that time, by Yugoslavia, and by no other neighbouring State, of GY mines, and by the bond of close political and military alliance between Albania and Yugoslavia, resulting from the Treaty of friendship and mutual assistance signed by those two States on July gth, 1946. The Court considers that, even in so far as these facts are established, they lead to no firm conclusion. It has not been legaliy established that Yugoslavia possessed any GY mines, and the origin of the mines laid in Albanian territorial waters remains a mat ter for conjecture. It is' clear that the existence of a treaty, such as that of July gth, 1946, however close may be the bonds uniting its signatories, in no way leads to the conclusion that

they participated in a criminai act. On its side, the Yugoslav Government, although not a party to the proceedings, authorized the Albanian Govemment to produce certain Yugoslav documents, for the purpose of refuting the United Kingdom contention that the mines had been laid by two ships of the Yugoslav Navy. As the Court was anxious for fuli light to be thrown on the facts alleged, it did not refuse to receive these documents. But Yugoslavia's absence from the proceedings meant that these documents could only be admitted as evidence subject to reserves, and the Court finds it unnecessary to express an opinion upon their probative value. The Court need not dwell on the assertion of one of the Counsel for the Albanian Govemment that the minefield might have been laid by the Greek Govemment. It is enough to Say that this was a mere conjecture which, as Counsel himself admitted, was based on no proof. In the light of the information now available to the Court, the authors of the minelaying remain unknown. In any case, the task of the Court, as defined by the Special Agreement, is to decide whether Albania is responsible, under international law, for the explosions which occurred on October zznd, 1946, and to give judgment as to the compensation, if any. Finally, the United Kingdom Govemment put forward the argument that, whoever the authors of the minelaying were, it could not have been done without the Albanian Government's knowledge. 1 s AFFAIRE DU DTROIT DE CORFOU (FOSD) On ne peut assurment induire la connaissance du mouillage chez le Gouvernement albanais du seul fait qu'un champ de mines dcouvert dans ses eaux territoriales a provoqu les explosions dont iurent victimes les iiavires de guerre britanniques. Il est vrai, ainsi que le dmontre la pratique internationale, qu'un tat, sur le territoire duquel s'est produit un acte contraire au droit international, peut tre invit s'en expliquer. 11 est galement vrai qu'il ne peut se drober cette invitation en se bornant rpondre qu'il ignore les circonstances de cet acte ou ses auteurs. Il peut, jusqu' un certain point, tre tenu de fournir des indications sur l'usage qu'il a fait des moyens d'information et d'enqute sa disposition. Mais on ne saurait conclure du seul contrle exerc par lin tat sur son territoire terrestre ou sur ses eaux territoriales que cet Etat a ncessairement connu ou d connatre tout fait illicite international qui y a t perptr non plus qu'il a ncessairement connu ou d connaftre ses auteurs. En soi, et indpendamment d'autres circonstances, ce fait ne justifie ni responsabilit firifnn facie ni dplacement dans le fardeau de la preuve.

Er1 revanche, le contrle territorial exclusif exerc par l'tat dans les limites de ses frontires n'est pas sans influence sur le choix des modes de preuve propres dmontrer cette connaissance. DU fait de ce contrle exclusif, 1'Etat victime d'une violation du droit international se trouve souvent dans l'impossibilit de faire la meuve directe des faits d'o dcoulerait la res~onsabilit. Il doii lui tre permis de recourir plus largement au~prsomptions de fait. aux indices ou Dreuve circonstancielles fcircicntstantial ezidence). Ces moyens de 'peuve indirecte sont admis dans tous les systmes de droit et leur usage est sanctionn par la jurisprudence internationale. On doit les considrer comme particulirement probants quand ils s'appuient sur une sine de faits qui s'enchanent et qui conduisent logiquement une mme conclusion. Il y a donc lieu de rechercher s'il est tabli par des moyens de preu\-e indirecte que l'Albanie a eu connaissance d'un mouillage de mines dans ses eaux territoriales indpendamment de toute conni\-ence de sa part dans cette opration. La preuve pourra rsulter de prsomptions de fait condition que celles-ci ne laissent place aucun doute raisonnable. Les lments de fait sur lesquels elles s'appuieront peuvent tre differents ae ceux qui auraient pu servir tablir la connivence. Dans l'affaire prsente, deux ordres de faits qui se corroborent mutuellement entrent en considration. Les premiers ont trait aux attitudes de l'Albanie avant et aprs la catastrophe du 22 octobre 1946 ; les autres concernent ies possibilits d'observer de ia cte albanaise un mouillage de mines. I. Il est clairement tabli que le Gouvernement albanais n'a cess d'exercer une vigilance trs attentive sur les eaux du Dtroit Xord de Corfou, tout au moins depuis le mois de mai 1946. Cette 1 S It is clear that knou-leoge of the mineIaying cannot be imputed to the Albanian Government by reason merely of the fact that a minefield discovered in Albanian temtorial waters caused the explosions of which the British warships were the victims. It is true, as international practice shows, that a State on whose territory or in whose waters an act contrary to international law has occurred, may be called upon to give an explanation. It is also true that that State cannot evade such a request by limiting itself to a reply that it is ignorant of the circumstances of the act and of its authors. The State may, up to a certain point, be bound to supply particulars of the use made by it of the means of information and inquiry at its disposal. But it cannot be concluded from the mere fact of the control exercised by a State over its territory and waters that that State necessarily knew, or ought to have known, of any unlawful act perpetrated

therein, nor yet that it necessarily knew, or should have known, the authors. This fact, by itself and apart from.other circumstances, neither involves prima facie resp~nsibility nor shifts the burden of proof. On the other hand, the fact of this exclusive temtorial control exercised by a State within its frontiers has a bearing upon the methods of proof available to establish the knowledge of that State as to such events. By reason of this exclusive control, the other State, the. victim of a breach of international law, is often unable to furnish direct proof of facts giving rise to responsibility. Such a State should be dowed a more liberal recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence. This indirect evidence is admitted in al1 systems of law, and its use is recognized by international decisions. It must be regarded as of special weight when it is based on a series of facts linked together and leading logically to a single conclusion. The Court must examine therefore whether it has ken established by means of indirect evidence that Albania has knowledge of minelaying in her territorial waters independently of any connivance on her part in this operation. The proof may be drawn from inferences of fact, provided that they leave no room for reasonable doubt. The elements of fact on which these inferences can be based may differ from those which are relevant to the question of connivance. In the present case, two series of facts, which corroborate one another, have to be considered : the first relates to Albania's attitude before and after the disaster of October zznd, 1946 ; the other concerns the feasibility of observing minelaying from the Xlbanian coast. I. It is clearly estabilshed that the Albanian Government constantly kept a close watch over the waters of the North Corfu Charinel, at any rate after May 1946. This vigilance is proved 18 I9 AFFAIRE DU DTROIT DE CORFOU (FOND) vigilance est atteste par la dclaration du dlgu de l'Albani(: au Conseil de Scurit, Ie 19 fvrier 1947 (Procs-verbaux o$ciils du Conseil de Scurit, zma anne, no 16, p. 328), et surtout par les notes diplomatiques du Gouvernement albanais relatives au passage de navires trangers dans ses eaux territoriales. Cette vigilance a t pousse parfois jusqu' l'emploi de la force. Dans cet ordre d'ides, il faut relever les coups de canon tirs le 15 mai 1946, dans la direction des croiseurs britanniques Orion et Superb, ainsi que les coups de feu dirigs, le 29 octobre 1946, sur le convoi de 1'U. N. R. R. A., ce dernier fait tabli par l'affidavit non srieusement contest de Enrico Bargellini. Quant aux notes du Gouvernement albanais, toutes tmoignent

de sa volont d'exercer une surveillance jalouse sur ses eaux territoriales. La note verbale du 21 mai 1946 au Royaume-Uni rvle l'existence d'un ordre gnral )) en excution duquel le commandement ctier a ordonn de tirer dans la direction des croiseurs britanniques. Cette mme note formule l'exigence d'un (( permis des autorits albanaises pour le passage par les eaux telritoriales. L'exigence de (( formalits 1) et d'un (( permis )) albanais est affirme nouveau dans la note albanaise du 19 juin. Les Parties tant d'accord pour reconnatre que le champ de mines avait t mouill rcemment, il faut en conclure que l'opration de mouillage a t effectue au cours dc la priode d'troite surveillance dont ce secteur a t l'objet de la part des autorits albanaises. Cette constatation rend a priori assez peu vraisemblable l'allgation d'ignorance chez le Gouvernement albanais. La Cour a galement pris note de la rponse du capitaine Ali Shtino une question pose par elle, rponse d'o ressort que le tmoin, appel remplacer pendant treize ou quinze jours le commandant de la dfense ctire une poque qui a prcd immdiatement les vnements du 22 octobre, avait reu la consigne suivante : (( Que les postes de guet devaient me rendre compte de tous les mouvements [dans le canal de Corfo] et qu'aucune mesure ne serait prise de notre part. 1) Particulirement significatifs des dispositions du Gouvernement albanais sont les tlgrammes par lui adresss, le 13 novembre et le 27 novembre 1946, au Secrtaire gnral des Nations Unies, un moment ou ce Gouvernement avait pleine connaissance du champ de mines dcouvert dans les eaux territoriales albanaises. Dans le premier de ces tlgrammes, le Gouvernement albanais levait la plus nergique protestation contre les mouvements et activits des units navales britanniques dans ses eaux territoriales les 12 et 13 novembre 1946, sans mme faire mention de l'eristence d'un champ de mines dans ces eaux. Dans le second, il ritrait ses accusations contre le Royaume-Uni sans protester d'aucune manire contre le mouillage de ce champ, mouillage qui, le supposer excut sans son assentimerit, aurait constitu une violation particulirement grave de sa souverainet. Un autre indice de la connaissance du mouillage chez le (s' ouvernemcnt albanais r6sulte du fait que e Gouvernement, aprs avoir THE CORFU CHANNEL CASE (MERITS) 19 by the declaration of the Albanian Delegate in the Security Council on February ~ g t h ,1 947 (Oficial Records of the Security Council, Second Year, No. 16, p. 328), and especially by the diplomatic notes of the Albanian Government concerning the passage of foreign ships through its territorial waters. This vigilance sometimes went so far as to involve the use of force : for esample the gunfire in the direction of the British cruisers

Orion and Sztperb on May ~ g t h 1, 946, and the shots fired at the U.N.R.R.A. tug and barges on October 29th, 1946, as established by the affidavit of Enrico Bargellini, which was not seriously contested. The Albanian Government's notes are al1 evidence of its intention to keep a jealous watch on its temtorial waters. The note verbale addressed to the United Kingdom on May z ~ s t 1, 9 46, reveals the existence of a "General Order", in execution of which the Coastal Commander gave the order to fire in the direction of the British cruisers. This same note formulates a demand that "permission" shall be given, by the Albanian authorities, for passage through territorial waters. The insistence on "formalities" and "permission" by Albania is repeated in the Albanian note of June 19th. As the Parties agree that the minefield had been recently laid, it must be concluded that the operation was carried out during the period of close watch by the Albanian authorities in this sector. This conclusion renders the Albanian Govemment's assertion of ignorance a priori somewhat improbable. The Court also noted the reply of Captain Ali Shtino to a question put by it ; this reply shows that the witness, who had been called on to replace the Coastal Defence Commander for a period of thirteen to fifteen days, immediately before the events of October zznd, had received the following order: "That the look-out posts must inform me of every movement [in the Corfu Channel], and that no action would be taken on our part." The telegrams sent by the Albanian Government on November 13th and November 27th, 1946, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, at a time when that Government was fully aware of the discovery of the minefield in Albanian territorial waters, are especially significant of the measures taken by the Albanian Government. In the first telegram, that Government raised the strongest protest against the movements and activity of British naval units in its territorial waters on November 12th and 13th, 1946, without even mentioning the existence of a minefield in these waters. In the second, it repeats its accusations against the United Kingdom, without in any way protesting against the laying of this minefield which, if effected without Albania's consent, constituted a very serious violation of her sovereignty. Another indication of the Albanian Govemment's knowledge consists in the fact that that Govemment did not notify the eu connaissance de l'existence de mines dans ses eaux, au plus tard aprs le dminage du 13 novembre, n'en a pas fait notification. D'autre part, et la diffrence de la Grce qui a institu aussitt une commission charge d'enquter sur les vnements du 22 octobre, le Gouvernement albanais n'a pris aucune dcision de cet ordre, pas plus qu'ii n'a procd aux mesures d'instruction

j~diciaire qui incombent, en pareil cas, au souverain temtorial. Ces attitudes n'apparaissent pas conciliables avec l'ignorance prtendue des autorits albanaises du mouillage du champ de mines dans les eaux territoriales de l'Albanie. Elles s'expliquent, au contraire, si le Gouvernement albanais, ayant eu connaissance d'un tel mouillage, a entendu maintenir caches les circonstances dans lesquelles il s'tait effectu. 2. Quant aux possibilits d'observation du mouillage de la cte albanaise, la Cour retient comme particulirement importantes les constatations suivantes qui concement, les unes les conditions techniques d'un mouillage clandestin, les autres le service de surveillance albanais. Par leur configuration gographique, la baie de Saranda et le chenal emprunt dans le Dtroit par la navigation se prtent bien une surveillance troite, l'entre de la baie tant domine par des hauteurs qui fournissent d'excellents points d'observation, tant sur la baie elle-mme que sur le Dtroit, tandis que le chenal est constamment proximit immdiate de la cte albanaise. Le mouillage d'un champ de mines dans ces eaux n'a gure pu chapper la vigilance du commandement ctier albanais. A cet gard. il y a lieu d'observer tout d'abord que l'opration mme du mouillage a d exiger un certain temps. En effet, selon les experts de la Cour, le dispositif adopt comportait l'tablissement raisonn et mthodique de deux ranges de mines et rvlait un objectif complexe, la fois offensif et dfensif : offensif, afin d'empcher le passage par le chenal de navires ayant un tirant d'eau de dix pieds ou plus ; dfensif, afin d'empcher les navires de mme tirant d'eau de pntrer dans la baie de Saranda. Le rapport des experts estime deux heures ou deux heures et demie le temps durant lequel les mouilleurs de mines se seraient trouvs dans les eaux situes entre le cap Kiephali et le monastre SaintGeorges. C'est l un temps suffisant pour attirer l'attention des postes d'observation placs, selon les dclarations du Gouvemement albanais, au cap Kiephali et au monastre Saint-Georges. Les facilits d'observation de la cte sont confirmes par les deux circonstances suivantes : la distance qui sparait de la cte la mine la plus proche n'tait que de 500 m. ; les navires mouilleurs de mines doivent tre passs environ 500 m. seulement au large de la cte entre la pointe Denta et le monastre SaintGeorges. La Cour ayant voulu s'entourer de tous les renseignements d'ordre technique susceptibles de la guider dans la recherche de la vrit, a soumis aux experts dsigns par eiie la que$ion suivante : 20 presence of mines in its waters, at the moment when it must have known this, at the latest after the sweep on November 13th, and

further, whereas the Greek Government immediately appointed a Commission to inquire into the events of October zznd, the Albanian Govemment took no decision of such a nature, nor did it proceed to the judicial investigation incumbent, in such a case, on the territorial sovereign. This attitude does not seem reconcilabIe with the alieged ignorance of the Albanian authorities that the minefield had been laid in Albanian territorial waters. It could be explained if the Albanian Government, while knowing of the minelaying, desired the circumstances of the operation to remain secret. 2. As regards the possibility of observing minelaying from the Albanian coast, the Court regards the following facts, relating to the technical conditions of a secret minelaying and to the Albanian surveillance, as particularly important. The Bay of Saranda and the channel used by shipping through the Strait are, from their geographical configuration, easily watched ; the entrance of the bay is dominated by heights offenng excellent observation points, both over the bay and over the Strait ; whilst the channel throughout is close to the Albanian coast. The laying of a minefield in these waters could hardly fail to have been observed by the Albanian coastal defences. On this subject, it must first be said that the minelaying operation itself must have required a certain time. The method adopted required, according to the Experts of the Court, the methodical and well thought-out laying of two rows of mines that had clearly a combined offensive and defensive purpose : offensive, to prevent the passage, through the Channel, of vessels drawing ten feet of water or more ; defensive, to prevent vessels of the same draught frorn entering the Bay of Saranda. The report of. the Experts reckons the time that the minelayers would have been in the waters, between Cape Kiephali and St. George's Monastery, at between two and two and a haif hours. This is sufficient time to attract the attention of the observation posts, placed, as the Albanian Government stated, at Cape Kiephali and St. George's Monastery. The facilities for observation from the coast are confirmed by the two following circumstances : the distance of the nearest mine from the coast was only 500 metres ; the minelayers must have passed at not more than about 500 metres from the coast between Denta Point and St. George's Monastery. Being anxious to obtain any technical information that might guide it in its search for the truth, the Court submitted the following question to the Experts appointed by it : (( En supposant que les mines dcouvertes le 13 novembre 1946 aient t mouilles quelque moment, au cours des quelques mois prcdents, quel que soit l'auteur de ce fait, tudier les renseignements que l'on possde sur: a) le nombre et la nature de ces

mines, h) les moyens de les mouiller, et c) le temps ncessaire cet effet, compte tenu des diffrents tats de la mer, des circonstances locales et des diffrentes circonstances atmosphriques, et dterminer si l'on peut, de cette tude, tirer quelques conclusions et lesquelles au sujet : IO des moyens employs pour l'tablissement du champ de mines dcouvert le 13 novembre 1946, et 2" de la possibilit de mouiller ces mines par ce5 moyens sans que les autorits albanaises en aient eu connaissance, compte tenu des moyens de surreillance existant dans la rgion de Saranda. 1, Le premier rapport remis la Cour par les experts n'ayant pas yriru entirement concluant, la Cour les a pris, par dcision du 17 janvier 1949, de vrifier, complter et, s'il y a lieu, modifier leurs rponses la suite d'une descente sur les lieux Saranda. C'est donc sur place et en prsence des experts des Parties et de fonctionnaires albanais que furent consignes les obsenrations et conduites diverses expriences propres apprcier les possibilits d'observation du mouillage par les postes albanais. Il faut signaler ce sujet l'exprience de visibilit de nuit qui fut effectue, dans la soire du 28 janvier 1949, au monastre Saint-Georges. Un bateau moteur de 27 m. de long, sans passerelle, sans abri de navigation, sans chemine et ras sur l'eau fut utilis. Naviguant tous feux teints et par une nuit sans lune, c'est--dire dans les conditions les plus favorables pour viter d'tre dcouvert, il fut parfaitement vu et entendu du monastre Saint-Georges. Le bruit du moteur fut entendu d'une distance de 1.800 mtres ; le bateau lui-mme fut aperu 670 mtres et resta visible jusqu' environ 1.900 mtres. Le rapport tabli par les experts la suite de cette descente sur les lieux s'exprime dans les termes suivants : (1 Les experts considrent comme indiscutable que, si des postes de veille normaux taient maintenus au cap Kiephali, au cap Denta et au monastre Saint-Georges, si ces postes taient munis de jumelles, comme on l'a dclar, et si les conditions atmosphriques avaient tC normales peur cette rgion, les oprations de mouillage de mines, relates dans l'annexe g du Mmoire du RoyaumeUni, ont d tre observes par ces postes de veille de la cte. )) La Cour ne peut manquer d'attacher un grand poids l'avis d'experts qui ont procd un examen des lieux entour de toutes les garanties d'information esacte et d'impartialit. Abstraction faite de l'esistence d'un poste de veille au cap Denta, existence qui n'est pas tablie, et se fondant sur les dclarations du Gouvernement albanais que de tels postes taient placs au cap Kiephali et au monastre Saint-Georges, la Cour relve dans le rapport: 21

"On the assumption that the mines discovered on November 13th, 1946, were laid at some date within the few preceing months, whoever may have laid them, you are requested to examine the information availabie regarding (a) the number and the nature of the mines, (b) the means for laying them, and (c) the time required to do so, having regard to the different states of the sea, the conditions of the locality, and the different weather conditions, and to ascertain whether it is possible in that way to draw any concl~~sions, and. if so, what conclusions, in regard to : (1) the means employed for laying the minefield discovered on November 13th, 1946, and (2) the possibility of mooring those mines with those means without the Albanian authorities being aware of it, having regard to the extent of the measures of vigilance existing in the Saranda region." As the first Report submitted by the Experts did not seen entirely coaclusive, the Court, by a decision of January 17th, 1949, asked the Experts to go to Saranda and to venfy, complete and, if necessary, modify their answers. In this way, observations were made and various expenments carned out on the spot, in the presence of the experts of the Parties and of Albanian officials, with a view to estimating the possibility of the minelaying having been observed by the Albanian look-mit posts. On this subject reference must be made to a test of visibility by night, carried out on the evening of January 28th, 1949, at St. George's Monastery. A motor ship, 27 metres long, and with no bridge, wheel-house, or funnel, and very low on the water, was used. The ship was completely blacked out, and on a moonlcss night, i.e., under the mot favourable conditions for avoiding discovery, it was clearly seen and heard from St. George's Monastery. The noise of the motor was heard at a distance of 1,800 metres, and the ship itself was sighted at 570 metres and remained visible up o about 1,900 metres. The Experts' Report on this visit stated that : "The Experts consider it to be indisputable that if a normal look-out was kept at Cape Kiephali, Denta Point, and St. George's Monastery, and if the look-oiits were equipped with binoculars as has been stated, under normal weather conditions for this area, the minelaying operations shown in Annex g to the United Kingdom Memorial must have been noticed by these coastguards." The Court canriot fail to give great weight to the opinion of the Experts who examined the locality in a manner giving every guarantee of correct and impartial information. Apart from the existence of a look-out post at Cape Denta, which hs not been proved, the Court, basing itself on the declarations of the Albanian Government that look-out posts were stationed at Cape Kiephali

and St. George's Monastery, refers to the following conclusions 21 des experts les conclusions suivantes : 1) dans l'hypothse d'un mouillage effectu du Nord vers le Sud, les mouilleurs de mines auraient t aperus du cap Kiephali; 2) dans l'hypothse d'un mouillage effectu en partant du Sud, les mouilleurs de mines auraient t observs du cap -Kiephali et du monastre SaintGeorges. De l'ensemble des faits et constatations relevs ci-dessus, la Cour tire la conclusion que le mouillage du champ de mines, qui a provoqu les explosions du 22 octobre 1946, n'a pas pu chapper la connaissance du Gouvernement albanais. Les obligations qui drivent pour l'illbanie de cette connaissance ne sont pas contestes entre les Parties. Il a t expressment reconnu par le conseil du Gouvernement albanais que si l'Albanie avait t mise au courant de l'opration avant les accidents du 22 octobre, et en temps utile pour pouvoir prvenir les navires britanniques et, de faon plus gnrale, la navigation, de l'existence de mines dans le Dtroit de Corfou, alors la responsabilit de l'Albanie serait engage.. . . )). Les obligations qui incombaient aux autorits albanaises consistaient faire connatre, dans l'intrt de la navigation en gnral, l'existence d'un champ de mines dans les eaux territoriales albanaises et avertir les navires de guerre britanniques, au moment o ils s'approchaient, du danger imminent auquel les exposait ce champ de mines. Ces obligations sont fondes non pas sur la Convention VI11 de La Haye, de 1907, qui est applicable en temps de guerre, mais sur certains principes gnraux et bien reconnus, tels que des considrations lmentaires d'humanit, plus absolues encore en temps de paix qu'en temps de guerre, le principe de la libert des communications maritimes et l'obligation', pour tout Etat, de ne pas laisserutiliser son temtoire aux fins d'actes contraires aux droits d'autres Etats. En fait, l'Albanie n'a ni notifi l'existence du champ de mines ni averti les navires de guerre britanniques du danger vers lequel ils avanaient. Toutefois, l'obligation de l'Albanie de signaler la navigation l'existence de mines dans ses eaux dpend de la connaissance qu'elle en aurait eue avant le 22 octobre, et en temps utile, tout comme le devoir de ses autorits ctires d'avertir les navires de guerre britanniques dpend du temps qui s'est coul entre le moment o ces navires furent signals et le moment o s'est produite la premire des explosions. A cet gard, la Cour fait les constatations suivantes. Ainsi qu'il a dj t relev, les Parties s'accordent dire que les mines avaient t rcemment mouilles. On doit en conclure que l'opration

du mouillage, quelque date prcise qu'elle ait eu lieu, a t effectue un moment o une surveillance troite de l'Albanie s'exerait sur le Dtroit. En supposant mme que l'on place l'opration l'extrme limite de temps, soit dans la nuit du 21 au 22 octobre, in the Experts' Report : (1) that in the case of minelaying from the North towards the South, the minelayers would have been seen from Cape Kiephali ; (2) in the case of minelaying from the South, the minelayers would have been seen from Cape Kiephali and St. George's Monastery. From al1 the facts and observations mentioned above, the Court draws the conclusion that the laying of the minefield which caused the explosions on October zznd, 1946, could not have been accomplished without the knowledge of the Albanian Government. The obligations resulting for Albania from this knowledge are not disputed between the Parties. Counsel for the Albanian Government expressly recognized that [t[tvnnslatio?z"]i f Albania had been informed of theuperation before the incidents of October zznd, and in tirne to warn the British vessels and shipping in general of the existence of mines in the Corfu Channel, her responsibility would be involved.. . .". The obligations incumbent upon the Albanian authori ties consisted in notifying, for the benefit of shipping in general, the existence of a minefield in Albanian territorial waters and in warning the approaching British warships of the imminent danger to which the minefield exposed them. Such obligations are based, not on the Hague Convention of 1907, No. VTII, which is applicable in time of war, but on certain general and well-recognized principles, namely : elementary considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war ; the principle of the freedom of maritime communication ; and every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States. In fact, Albania neither notified the existence of the minefield, nor warned the British warships of the danger they were approaching. But Albania's obligation to notify shipping of the existence of mines in her waters depends on her having obtained knowledge of that fact in sufficient time before October zznd ; and the duty of the Albanjan coastal authorities to warn the British ships depends on the time' that elapsed between the moment that these ships were reported and the moment of the first explosion. On this subject, the Court makes the following observations. As has already been stated, the Parties agree that the mines were recently laid. It must be concluded that the minelaying, whatever may have been its exact date, was done at a time when there was a close Albanian surveillance over the Strait. If it be supposed

that it took place at the last possible moment, i.e., in the night of October zrst-zznd, the only conclusion to be drawn would 23 AFFAIRE DU DTROIT DZ COEFOU (FOND) la seule consquence qu'on en pourrait tirer, c'est que la notification gnrale la navigation de tous les Etats et t difficile, peut-tre mme impossible avant le jour o se produisirent les explosions. Mais cette circonstance n'aurait nullement empch les autorits albanaises de prendre, comme elles le devaient, toutes les mesures ncessaires pour avertir immdiatement les navires qui se trouvaient proximit de la zone dangereuse, plus spcialement ceux qiii faisaient route vers cette zone. Quand, le 22 octobre vers 13 heiires, les navires de guerre britanniques furent signals au commandement de la dfense ctire par le poste de guet di1 monastre SaintGeorges, comme s'approchant du cap Long, il tait parfaitement possible aux autorits albanaises d'utiliser l'intervalle de prs de deux heures qui s'est coul jusqu' l'explosion du Sazi~~iarez (14 h. 53 ou 14 h. 55) pour avertir ces navires du danger au-devant duquel ils s'avanaient. En fait, rien ne fut tent par les autorits albanaises pour prvenir le dsastre. Ces graves omisions engagent la responsabilit internationale de l'Albanie. En consquence, la Cour est arrive la conclusion que l'Albanie est responsable, selon le droit international, des explosions qui ont eu lieu le 22 uctobre 1946 dans les eaux albanaises, et des dommages et pertes humaines qui en suivirent, et qu'il y a lieu pour l'Albanie de donner rparation au Royaume-Uni. Dans les conclusions finales qu'il a prsentes dans sa rplique orale, le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni a demand la Cour de dire et juger qu'il a, en consquence de la violation, par le Go:ivernement albanais, des obligations incombant ce Gouvernement en vertu du droit international, subi des dommages s'levant la somme totale de 875.000. Dans le dernier expos oral prsent en son nom, le Gouvernement albanais a nonc, pour la premire fois, que la Cour ne serait pas comptente, en vertu du compromis, pour valuer le montant du dommage subi. Aucune raison n'a t donne l'appui de cette nouvelle allgation, et l'agent du Royaume-Uni n'a pas demand qu'il lui soit fourni l'occasion de rpliquer. La question relative la comptence de la Cour n'a donc pas t dbattue entre les Parties. Aux termes de la premire question du compromis, la Cour est invite rpondre aux deux points suivants : (i) l'Albanie est-elle responsable, selon le droit international, des explosions et des dommages et pertes humaines qui en seraient suivis, et (ii) y a-t-il le cas de rparations donner ? Ce texte a fait natre certains doutes. Si la rponse au premier

point est affirmative, il en rsulte dj que rparation est due et il be that a general notification to the shipping of al1 States before the time of the explosions would have been difficult, perhap-a even impossible. But this would certainly not have prevented the .Ilbanian authorities from taking, as they should have done, al1 necessary steps immediately to warn ships near the danger zone, more especially thcse that were approaching that zone. X'hen on October zznd about 13.00 hours the British warships were reported by the look-out post at St. George's hlonastery to the Commander of the Coastal Defences as approaching 'Cape Long, it nas perfectly possible for the Albanian authorities to use the interval of almost two hours that elapsed before the explosion affecting Sairnznvez (14.53 hours or 14.55 hours) to warn the vessels of the danger into which they were running. In fact, nothing was attempted by the Albanian authorities to prevent the disaster. These grave omissions in\-olve the international responsibility of Albania. The Court therefore reaches the conclusion that Albania is responsible under international law for the explosions which occurred on October zznd, 1946, in Albanian waters, and for the damage and loss of human life which resulted from them, and that there is a duty iipon Albania to pay compensation to the United Kingdom. * * * In the final submissions contained in its oral reply, the United Kingdom Government asked the Court to give judgment that, as a result of the breach by the Albanian Govemment of its obligations under international law, it had sustained damages amounting to 87 5,000. In the last oral statement submitted in its name, the Albanian Government, for the first time, asserted that the Court would ilot have jurisdiction, in virtue of the Special Agreement, to assess the amount of compensation. No reason was given in support of this new assertioc, and the United Kingdom Agent did not ak leave to reply. The question of the Court's jurisdiction was not argued between the Parties. In the first question of the Special Agreement the Court is asked : (i) 1s Albania under international law responsible for the explosions and for the darnage and loss of human life which resulted from them, and (ii) is there any duty to pay compensation ? This text gives rise to certain doubts. If point (i) is answered in the affirmative, it follows from the establishment of responsaurait t superflu d'ajouter le deuxime point, moins que dans l'esprit des Parties ce point vist quelque chose de plus qu'une simple dclaration, aux termes de laquelle la Cour constaterait que

rparation est due. II serait en effet contraire aux rgles d'interprtation gnralement reconnues de considrer qu'une disposition de ce genre, insre dans un compromis, soit une disposition sans porte et sans effet. A cet gard, la Cour se rfre l'opinion exprime par la Cour permanente de Justice internationale propos de questions d'interprtation semblables. Dans l'Avis consultatif no 13 en date du 23 juillet 1926, cette Cour s'est exprime comme suit (Srie B, no 13, p. 19) : Mais, pour autant qu'il s'agit de la question spcifique de comptence, actuellement dbattue, il peut suffire d'observer que la Cour, en dterminant la nature et l'tendue d'une disposition, doit envisager ses effets pratiques plutt que le motif prdominant par lequel on Ia suppose avoir t inspire. Dans son ordonnance du 19 aot 1929 dans l'affaire des Zones franches, la Cour a dit (Srie A, no 22; p. 13) que dans le doute, les clauses d'un compromis par lequel la Cour est saisie d'un diffrend doivent, si cela n'est pas faire violence leurs termes, tre interprtes d'une manire permettant ces clauses de dployer leurs effets utiles 1). La Cour croit ncessaire de rappeler les tapes diverses de la procdure. Le Conseil de Scurit, dans sa RsoluLion du 9 avril 1947, avait recommand aux deux Gouvernements de soumettre immdiatement le diffrend la Cour. Cette Rsolution visait sans aucun doute au rglement du diffrend tout entier. En excution de cette Rsolution, le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni dposa une requte par laquelle la Cour tait, entre autres demandes, prie de fixer les rparations ou indemnits a ; dans son Mmoire, ce Gouvernement a nonc les diverses sommes rclames. Le Gouvernement albanais souleva ensuite une exception prliminaire que la Cour rejeta par son Arret du 25 mars 1948. Immdiatement aprs le prononc de cet Arrt, les agents des Parties ont notifi la Cour la conclusion d'un compromis. Commentant cette initiative des Parties, l'agent du Gouvernement albanais a dclar que, dans les circonstances de la prsente affaire, un compromis s'imposait sur lequel devait se fonder toute la procdure . Il a ajout : Ainsi que je l'ai dit plusieurs fois, le Gouvernement albanais a tenu respecter la dcision du Conseil de Scurit, du 9 avril 1947, en vertu de laquelle le prsent compromis est soumis la Cour internationale de Justice. )) Ni l'agent du Gouvernement albanais ni l'agent du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni n'ont en quoi que ce soit donn entendre que, par le compromis, la comptence de la Cour cet gard ait t limite au seul principe de rparation, ni que le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni ait renonc une partie importante de sa ibility that compensation is due, and it wodd be superfiuous to add point (ii) unless the Parties had something else in mind than a mere declaration by the Court that compensation is due.

It would indeed be incompatible with the generally accepted rules of interpretation to admit that a provision of this sort occurring in a special agreement should be devoid of purport or effect. In this connexion, the Court refers to the views expressed by the Permanent Court of International Justice with regard to similar questions of interpretation. In Advisory Opinion No. 13 of July 23rd, 1926, that Court said (Series B., No. 13, p. 19) : "But, so far as concerns the specific question of competence now pending, it rnay suffice to observe that the Court, in determining the nature and scope of a measure, must look to its practical effect rather than to the predominant motive that may be conjectured to have inspired it." In its Order of August ~ g t h1,9 29, in the Free Zones case, the Court said (Series A., No. 22, p. 13) : "in case of doubt, the clauses of a special agreement by which a dispute is referred to the Court must, if it does not involve doing violence to their terms, be construed in a manner enabling the clauses themselves to have appropriate effects" The Court thinks it necessary to reier to the different stages of the procedure. In its Resolution of April gth, 1947, the Security Council recommended that the two Governments should immediately refer "the dispute" to the Court. This Resolution had without doubt for its aim the final adjustment of the whole dispute. In pursuance of the Resolution, the Government of the United Kingdom filed an Application in which the Court was asked, iwter dia, to "determine the reparation or compensation", and in its Memorial that Government stated the various sums claimed. The Albanian Govemment thereupon submitted a Preliminary Objection, which was rejected by the Court by its Judgment of March 25th, 1948. Immediately after this judgment nas delivered, the Agents of the Parties notified the Court of the conclusion of a Special Agreement. Commenting upon this step taken by the Parties, the Agent of the Albanian Government said that in the circumstances of the present case a special agreement on which "the whole procedure" should be based was essential. He further said [translation] : "As 1 have stated on several occasions, it has always been the intention of the Albanian Govemment to respect the decision taken by the Security Council on April gth, 1947, in virtue of \\-hich the present Special Agreement is submitted to the International Court of Justice." Neither the Albanian nor the Cnited Kingdom Agent suggested in any way that the Special Agreement had limited the competence of the Court in this matter to a decision merely upon the pnnciple of compensation or that the United Kingdom Government had abandoned an important part of its original claim. The main 24 demande primitive. Le but principal des deux Parties, lors de la

conclusion du compromis, tait d'instituer entre elles une galit complte,'en remplaant la procdure primitive, qui se fondait sur une requte unilatrale, par une procdure fonde sur un conipromis. Rien ne permet de conclure que cette modification, introduite dans la procdure, ait eu pour objet d'apporter une modification quelconque touchant le fond de la demande du Royaume-Uni telle que cette demande avait t, l'origine, prsente dans la requte et dans le Mmoire. La Cour, en consquence, les Parties consultes, a retenu dans son Ordonnance du 26 mars 1948 le Mmoire dpos prcdemment par le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni avec l'expos et les conclusions qu'il contenait. Ces conclusions comprenaient une demande tendant obtenir une somme fixe titre de rparation. Il ressort de l'attitude ultrieure des Parties que leur intention, lorsqu'elles ont conclu le compromis, n'tait pas d'empcher la Cour de fixer le montant de l'indemnit. Dans le paragraphe 71 de sa Rplique, le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni a maintenu les conclusions nonces dans le paragraphe 96 de son Mmoire, y compris la demande d'une somme fixe titre de rparation. Cette demande a t expressment rpte dans les conclusions finales du Royaume-Uni. Le Gouvernement albanais, dans le paragraphe 52 de son Contre-Mmoire, a dclar qu'il ignorait les pertes de vies humaines et les dommages subis par les navires, mais il n'a pas contest la comptence de la Cour pour rgler cette question. Au paragraphe 96 de la Duplique, le Gouvernement albanais dclare, en consquence de sa demande de dbout, qu'il n'avait pas examiner la demande d'indemnit prsente par le Gouvernement britannique. Il se rserve, le cas chant, de discuter ce point, qui devrait de toute vidence faire l'objet d'une expertise. Eu gard ce qi a t dit plus haut au sujet de l'attitude antrieure de ce Gouvernement, cette dclaration doit tre considre comme l'acceptation implicite de la comptence de la Cour pour rgler cette question. On peut se demander pourquoi les Parties, dans la rdaction du compromis, n'ont pas expressment demand la Cour de fixer le montant des rparations demandes, mais se sont servies de la formule et y a-t-il le cas de rparations donner ? )) Il parait probable que l'explication de ce fait se trouve dans la similitude que prsente cette clause avec la clause correspondante qui figure dans la seconde partie du compromis : et y-a-t-il lieu donner satisfaction ? )) Le Gouvernement albanais n'a pas contest la comptence de la Cour-pour dcider ce que doit tre la snfisfacfion prvue dans cette partie du compromis. Les deus Parties ont plaid6 l'afiaire en partant du point de vue que cette question devait tre tranche par la Cour. Dans les critures, le Gouvernement albanai: a soutenu

qu'il lui est d des excuses. Au cours des dbats oraux, le conseil 25 object both Parties had in mind when they concluded the Special Agreement Ras to establish a complete equality between them by replacing the original procedure based on a unilateral Application by a procedure based on a Special Agreement. There is no suggestion that this change as to procedure was intended to involve any change with regard to the merits of the British claim as originally presented in the Application and Memorial. Accordingly, the Court, after consulting the Parties, in its Order of Iiarch 26th, 1948, maintained the United Kingdom's BZemonal, filed previously, "with statements and submissions". These submissions included the claim for a fixed sum of compensation. The subsequent attitude of the Parties shows that it \vas not their intention, by entering into the Special Agreement, to preclude the Court from fixing the amount of the compensation. In its Reply (paragraph 71) the United Kingdom Government maintained the submissions contained in paragraph 96 of its hiemorial, including the claim for a fixed amount of reparation. This claim \vas expressly repeated in the final United Kingdom submissions. In paragraph 52 of its Counter-Memorial, the Albanian Governrnent stated that it had no knowledge of the loss of human life and damage to ships, but it did not contest the Coart's competence to decide this question. In the Rejoinder, paragraph 96, that Government declared that, owing to its claim for the dismissal of the case, it was unnecessary for it to examine the United Kingdom's claim for reparation. [T~.an.slafio~z".]I t reserves the right if need be, to discuss this point which should obviously form the subject of an expert opinion." Having regard to what is said above as to the previous attitude of that Government, this statement must be considered as an implied acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction to decide this question. It may be asked why the Parties, when drafting the Special Agreement, did not expressly ask the Court to assess the amount of the damage, but used the words : "and is there any duty to pay compensation ?" It seems probable that the explanation is to be found in the similarity betn-een this clause and the corresponding clause in the second part of the Special Agreement : "and is there axiy duty to give satisfaction ?" The Albanian Government has not disputed the competence of the Court to decide what kind of sntisfactio~z is due under this part of the Agreement. The case \vas argued on behalf of both Parties on the basis that this question should be decided by the Court. In the witten plendings, the Xlbanian Government contended that it \vas entitled to apologies. During the oral procedings, 25

du Gouvernement albanais a discut le point de savoir si une satisfaction d'ordre pcuniaire tait due l'Albanie. Aucun dommage n'ayant t caus, il ne demandait aucune somme d'argent. Il a conclu : Ce que nous voulons, c'est la sanction de la Cour du point de vue du droit .... )) Si cependant la Cour est comptente pour dcider quelle sorte de satisfaction est due l'Albanie aux termes de la seconde partie du compromis, il est difficile de concevoir pourquoi cette comptence lui ferait dfaut pour dcider du montant des rparations dues au Royaume-Uni aux termes de la premire partie du mme instnirnent. Les clauses qui figurent dans le compromis sont parallles. On ne peut supposer que les Parties, tout en rdigeant ces clauses sous la mme forme, aient entendu leur donner des significations opposes - l'une devant confrer comptence la Cour, l'autre devant lui refuser cette comptence. Comme il est dit plus haut, le Conseil de Scurit, par sa Rsolution du g avril 1947, entendait indubitablement que le diffrend tout entier ft tranch par la Cour. Si cependant la Cour se bornait dire que rparation est due, sans en fixer le montant, le diffrend ne serait pas finalement tranch par la Cour. Une partie importante de ce diffrend demeurerait sans rglement. Les deux Parties ayant dclar plusieurs reprises qu'elles acceptent la Rsolution du Conseil de Scurit, un tel rsultat ne serait pas conforme leurs dclarations. Il ne donnerait pas plein effet la Rsolution, mais laisserait subsister la possibilit d'un nouveau diffrend. La Cour est, en consquence, arrive conclure qu'elle possde comptence pour fixer le montant des rparations. Ceci ne pourrait toutefois tre fait dans le prsent arrt. Le Gouvernement albanais n'a pas encore indiqu quels sont, parmi les diverses sommes rclames, les articles qu'il conteste, et le Gouvernement du RoyaumeUni n'a pas prsent de preuve 'l'appui de ses demandes. La Cour estime donc qu'il y a lieu d'instituer cet gard une procdure dont l'ordre et les dlais sont fixs par ordonnance de ce jour. Aux termes de la seconde partie du compromis, la qestion suivante est soumise la Cour : 2) Le Royaume-Uni a-t-il viol, selon le droit international, la souverainet de la Rpublique populaire d'Albanie par les actions dz la marine de guerre britannique dans les eaux albanaises le 22 octobre 1946 et les 12 et 13 novembre 1946, et Y a-t-il lieu a donner satisfaction ? )) La Cour examinera d'abord le point de savoir si une atteinte a t porte la souverainet de l'Albanie, du fait des actions de la marine britannique dans les eaux albanaises, le 22 octobre 1946. 26 Counsel for Albania discussed the question whethes pecuniary

satisfaction \vas due. As no damage was caused, he did not claim an57 s u n ~of money. He concluded [t~atzslntion:] " What we desire is the declaration of the Court from a legal point of view ...." If, hon-ever, the Court is competent to decide what kind of satisfaction is due to Albania under the second part of the Speia! Agreement, it is difficult to see why it should lack competence to decide the amount of compensation which is due to the United Kingdom under the first part. The clauses used in the Special Agreement are parallel. It cannot be supposed that the Parties, while drafting these clauses in the same form, intended to give them opposite meanings-the one as giving the Court jurisdiction, the other as denying such jurisdiction. As has been said above, the Security Cmncil, in its Resolution of April gth, 1947, undoubtedly intended that the whole dispute should be decided by the Court. If, however, the Court should limit itself to saying that there is a duty to pay compensation without deciding what amount of compensation is due, the dispute would not be finally decided. An important part of it would remain unsettled. As both Parties have repeatedly declared that they accept the Resolution of the Security Council, such a result mould not conform with their declarations. It would not give full effect to the Resolution, but would leave open the possibility of a further dispute. For the foregoing reasons, the Court has arrived at the conclusion that it has jurisdiction to assess the amount of the compensation. This cannot, however, be done in the present Judgment. The Albanian Government has not yet stated which items, if any, of the various sums claimed it contests, and the United Kingdom Government has not submitted its evidence with regard to them. The Court therefore considers that further proceedings on this subject are necessary ; the order and time-limits of these proceedings will be fixed by the Order of this date. ' In the second part of the Special Agreement, the following question is submitted to the Court : "(2) Has the United Kingdom under international law violated the sovereignty of the Albanian People's Republic by reason of the acts of the Royal Navy in Albanian waters on the 22nd October and on the 12th and 13th November 1946 and is there any duty to give satisfaction ?" The Court will first consider whether the sovereignty of Albania was violated by reason of the acts of the British Navy in Albanian waters on October zznd, 1946. 26 A la date du 15 mai 1946, les croiseurs britanniques Orion et Superb, alors qu'ils passaient par le Dtroit Nord de Corfou, se dirigeant vers le Sud, subirent le feu d'une batterie albanaise dans

le voisinage de Saranda. Il ressort du rapport prsent par l'officier de marine qui exerait le commandement - rapport dat du 29 mai 1946 - que le feu fut ouvert dors que les navires avaient dj dpass la batterie et s'en loignaient ; que douze vingt coups furent tirs ; que le feu dura douze minutes et ne cessa que quand les navires se trouvrent hors de porte ; mais que les navires ne furent pas atteints, bien qu'il y et un certain nombre de coups courts et de coups longs. Il est dit, dans une note albanaise date du 21 mai, que le commandant ctier a fait tirer quelques coups dans la direction des navires conformment un ordre gnral bas sur le droit international D. Le Gouvemement du Royaume-Uni protesta immdiatement auprs du Gouvernement albanais ; il fit observer que le passage innocent des navires par les dtroits est un droit reconnu par le droit international. Une correspondance diplomatique s'engagea, dans laquelle le Gouvernement albanais affirma que les navires de guerre et de commerce trangers n'avaient pas le droit de pntrer dans les eaux territoriales albanaises, sans avoir au pralable avis de leur passage les autorits albanaises et sans avoir obtenu l'autorisation de celles-ci. Cette conception a reu son application dans une communication manant du chef d'tatmajor albanais et date du 17 mai 1946, laquelle soumettait le passage des navires de guerre et de commerce trangers, par les eaux territoriales albanaises, une notification pralablement adresse au Gouvernement albanais et l'autorisation de celui-ci. La correspondance diplomatique se poursuivit ; elle atteignit son point culminant dans une note du Gouvernement du RoyaumeUni, en date du 2 aot 1946, dans laquelle ce Gouvemement maintenait sa manire de voir, relativement au droit de passage innocent par les dtroits qui constituent, pour le trafic maritime international, des routes mettant en communication deux parties de haute mer. La ilote se terminait par un avertissement: si, l'avenir, les batteries ctires albanaises ouvraient le feii sur un navire de guerre britannique passant par le Dtroit de Corfou, le navire riposterait. Le contenu de cette note fut, le I ~ F aot, communiqu par l'Amiraut britannique ail commandant en chef en Mditerrane, et instruction fut donne celui-ci de ne pas utiliser le Dtroit jusqu' ce que la note et t remise au Gouvernement albanais. A la date du IO aot, le commandant en chef reut dc l'Amiraut le tlgramme suivant [fradztcfio~1t : Les Albanais ont nuintenant reu la note. Le Dtroit Nord de Corfou peut dsormais tre utilis par les navires de votre flotte, mais seulement lorsque ce sera essentiel, et les canons devront demeurer points dans l'axe du navire. Si les batteries ctires ouvrent le feu sur les navires 27

On May rgth, 1946, the British cruisers Oviolt and Szrpevb, while passing southward through the North Corfu Channel, were fired at by an Albanian battery in the vicinity of Saranda. It appears from the report of the commanding naval officer dated May zgth, 1946, that the firing started when the ships had already passed the battery and were mo ~ i n gaw ay from it ; that from 12 to 20 rounds were fired ; that the finng lasted 12 minutes and ceased only when the ships were out of range ; but that the ships were not hit although there were a number of "shorts" and of "overs". An Albanian note of May zrst states that the Coastal Commander ordered a few shots to be fired in the direction of the ships "in accordance with a General Order founded on international law". The United Kingdom Government at once protested to the Albanian Government, stating that innocent passage through straits is a right recognized by international law. There ensued a diplomatic correspondence in which the Albanian Government asserted that foreign warships and merchant vessels had no right to pass through Albanian territorial waters without pnor notification to, and the permission of, the Albanian authorities. This view was put into effect by a communication of the Albanian Chief of Staff, dated Jlay 17th, 1946, which purported to subject the passage of foreign warships and merchant vessels in -4lbanian territorial. waters to previous notification to and authorization by the Albanian Government. The diplomatic correspondence continued, and culminated in a United Kingdom note of August znd, 1946, in which the United Kingdom Government maintained its view with regard to the right of innocent passage through straits forming routes for international maritime traffic between two parts of the high seas. The note ended with the warning that if Albanian coastal batteries in the future opened fire on any British warship passing through the Corfu Channel, the fire would be returned. The contents of this note were, on August ~ s t c,o mmunicated by the British Admiralty to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, with the instruction that he should refrain from using the Channel until the note had been presented to the Albanian Government. On Aiigust ~ o t h , he received from the Admiralty the following telegram : "The Albanians have now received the note. North Corfu Strait may now be used by ships of your fleet, but only when essential and with armament in fore and aft position. Jf coastal guns fire at ships passing through the Strait, ships should fire back." On September zrst, the following telegram passant par le Dtroit, ces navires devront riposter. A la date du 21 septembre, l'Amiraut adressa au commandant en chef le tlgramme suivant [ fvaduct io~l:] L'tablissement de relations diplomatiques avec l'Albanie est de nouveau examin par le Gouvernement de Sa Majest, qui dsire savoir si le Gouvernement

albanais a appris se conduire. Veuillez faire connatre si des navires placs sous votre commandement sont passs par le Dtroit Nord de Corfou depuis le mois d'aot et, dans le cas contraire, si votre intention est qu'ils passent d'ici peu par ce Dtroit 1) Le commandant en chef rpondit le jour suivant que ses navires n'avaient pas encore utilis le Dtroit mais que son intention tait d'y envoyer le ilfaztritizis et le LennrZPr, ainsi que deux contre-torpilleurs, quand ils quitteraient Corfou, le 22 octobre. C'est dans ces circonstances que ces deux croiseurs, accompagns des contre-torpilleurs Snumarez et Volage, furent ladite date envoys dans le Dtroit Nord de Corfou. La Cour examinera d'abord la thse albanaise, selon laquelle le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni aurait port atteinte la souverainet albanaise ea faisant passer les nzvires de guerre par ce Dtroit, sans avoir obtenu l'autorisation pralable du Gouvernement albanais. De l'avis de la Cour, il est gnralement admis et conforme la coutume internationale que les tats, en temps de paix, possdent le droit de faire passer leurs navires de guerre par des dtroits qui servent, aux fins de la navigation internationale, mettre en communication deux parties de haute mer, sans obtenir au pralable l'autorisation de 1' tat riverain, pourvu que le passage soit innocent. A moins qu'une convention internationale n'en dispose autrement, un Etat- riverain ne possde pas le droit d'interdire un tel passage par les dtroits en temps de paix. Le Gouvernement albanais ne conteste pas que le Dtroit Nord de Corfou soit un detroit au sens gographique ; ce qu'il conteste, c'est que ce Dtroit appartienne la catgorie des voies maritimes internationales l'gard desquelles il existe un droit de passage, parce que ce Dtroit ne prsente qu'une importance secondaire, qu'il ne constitue mme pas une route que l'on doive ncessairement emprunter, entre deux parties de haute mer, et parce qu'il ne sert presque exclusivement qu'au trafic local en provenance et destination des ports de Corfou et de Saranda. On peut se demander si le critrium dcisif est rechercher dans le volume du trafic qui passe par le Dtroit ou dans l'importance plus ou moins grande de celui-ci pour la navigation internationale. Le critre dcisif paraituplutt devoir tre tir de la situation gographique du Dtroit, en tant que ce dernier met en communication deux parties de haute mer, ainsi que du fait que le Dtroit est utilis aux fins de la navigation internationale. On ne saurait non plus tenir pour dcisive la considration selon laquelle ce Dtroit n'est pas une route emprunter ncessairement entre deux parties de haute me^, maiseulement un itinraire facultatif pour la navigation entre la mer Ege et l'Adriatique. Le Dtroit Nord de Corfou was sent by the Admiralty to the Commander-in-Chief, hiediterranean

: "Establishment of diplomatic relations wvith Albania is again under consideration by His Riajesty's Government who wish to know whether the Albanian Government have learnt to behave themselves. Information is requested whether any ships under your command have passed through the North Corfu Strait since August and, if not, whether you intend them to do so shortly." The Commander-in-Chief answered the next day that his ships had not done so yet, but that it ww7as his intention that Jfazlritius and Lennder and twvo destroyers should do so when they departed from Corfu on October zznd. It wvas in such circumstances that these two cruisers together with the destroyers Saz~inarez and T701age were sent through the North Corfu Strait on that date. The Court will now consider the Albanian contention that the United Kingdom Government violated Albanian sovereignty by sending the warships through this Strait without the previous authorization of the Albanian Government. It is, in the opinion of the Court, generally recognized and in accordance with international custom that States in time of peace have a right to send their warships through straits used for international navigation be'nveen two parts of the high seas without the previous authorization of a co'astal State, provided that the passage is innocent. Unless othenvise prescribed in an international convention, there is no right for a coastal State to prohibit such passage through straits in time of peace. The Albanian Government does not dispute that the liorth Corfu Channel is a strait in the geographical sense ; but it denies that this Channel belongs to the class of international highn-ays through wvhich a right of passage exists, on the grounds that it is only of secondas. importance and not el-en a necesary route between twvo parts of the high seas, and that it is used almost exclusively for local traffic to and from the ports of Corfu and Saranda. It may be asked whether the test is to be found in the \lolume of traffic passing through the Strait or in its greater or lesser importance for international navigation. But in the opiiiion of the Court the decisive criterion is rather its geographical situation as connecting two parts of the high seas and the fact of its being used for international navigation. Sor can it be decisire that this Strait is not a necessary route bettveen tn-O parts of the high aeas, but only an alternative passage betwveen the Egean and the Adriatic Seas. It has nevertheless been a useful route for international maritime traffic. In this respect, the -\gent of the Vnited Kingdom Government gave the Court tlie foilowing information relating to the 28 n'en a pas moins t une route utile au trafic international. A cet

gard, l'agent du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni a communiqu la Cour les renseignements suivants, concernant la priode du I~~ avril 1936 au 31 dcembre 1937 : (( Le chiffre ci-aprs indique le nombre total des navires faisant escale dans le port de Corfou aprs avoir pass par le Dtroit, ou juste avant d'y passer. Pendant la priode d'un an et neuf mois, le nombre total des navires fut de 2.884. Ces navires battaient pavillon grec, italien, roumain, yougoslave, franais, albanais et britannique. Il est clair que de trs petits btiments sont inclus, car il y a beaucoup d'inscriptions pour des btiments albanais, et, bien entendu, un navire peut faire plusieurs voyages ; cependant, 2.884 navires pour une priode d'un an et neuf mois, c'est un chiffre important. Ce chiffre se rapporte aux navires inspects par la douane Corfou et, par suite, ne comprend pas les nombreux navires qui ont travers le Dtroit sans aucune escale Corfou. 1) En outre, il y a eu des traverses rgulires du Dtroit trois fois par semaine par des btiments grecs, une fois par quinzaine par un navire britannique, une fois par semaine par deux btiments yougoslaves et une fois par quinzaine par deux autres. La Cour est, d'autre part, informe que la marine de guerre britannique a utilis rgulirement ce Dtroit depuis 80 ans et plus et que les marines de guerre d'autres Etats en ont galement fait usage. Un fait particulirement important est que le Dtroit Nord de Corfou constitue une frontire entre l'Albanie et la Grce, qu'une partie de ce Dtroit est entirement comprise dans les eaux territoriales de ces Etats et que le Dtroit prsente pour la Grce une importance particulire, raison du trafic maritime en provenance et destination du port de Corfou. Eu gard ces diverses considrations, la Cour est arrive la conclusion que le Dtroit Nord de Corfou doit tre considr comme entrant dans la catgorie des voies maritimes internationales, o le passage ne saurait tre interdit en temps de paix par un Etat ctier. D'autre part, c'est un fait que les deux tats ctiers n'entretenaient pas des relations normales, que la Grce avait prsent des revendications territoriales prcisment sur une partie du territoire albanais riveraine du Dtroit et au'elle avait fait connatre au'elle se considrait comme techniquemint en tat de guerre avec 1'~lbanie, laquelle avait estim ncessaire de prendre certaines mesures de vigilance dans cette rgion en invoquant le danger d'incursions grecques. La Cour estime que l'Albanie, eu gard ces circonstances exceptionnelles, aurait t fonde rglementer le passage des navires de guerre par le Dtroit, sans toutefois l'interdire, ni l'assujettir une autorisation spciale. Pour ces motifs, la Cour ne peut accepter la thse selon laquelle le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni aurait port atteinte la

souverainet albanaise, en faisant passer par le Dtroit les navires period from April ~ s t1,9 36, to December 31st, 1937 : "The following is the total number of ships putting in at the Port of Corfu after passing through or just before passing through the Channel. During the period of one year nine months, the total number of ships was 2,884. The flags of the ships are Greek, Italian, Roumanian, Yugoslav, French, Albanian and British. Clearly, very small vessels are included, as the entries for Albanian vessels are high, and of course one vesse1 may make several journeys, but 2,884 ships for a period of one year nine months is quite a large figure. These figures relate to vessels visited by the Customs at Corfu and so do not include the large number. of vessels which went through the Strait without calling at Corfu at all." There were also regular sailings through the Strait by Greek vessels three times weekly, by a British ship fortnightly, and by two Yugoslav vessels weekly and by two others fortnightly. The Court is further informed that the British Navy has regularly used this Channel for eighty years or more, and that it has also been used by the navies of other States. One fact of particular importance is that the North Corfu Channel constitutes a frontier between Albania and Greece, that a part of it is wholly within the territorial waters of these States, and that the Strait is of special importance to Greece by reason of the traffic to and from the port of Corfu. Having regard to these various considerations, the Court has arrived at the conclusion that the North Corfu Channel should be considered as belonging to the class of international highways through which passage cannot be prohibited by a coastal State in time of peace. On the other hand, it is a fact that the two coastal States did not maintain normal relations, that Greece had made territorial claims precisely with regard to a part of Albanian territory bordering on the Channel, that Greece had declared that she considered herself technically in a state of war with Albania, and that Albania, invoking the danger of Greek incursions, had considered it necessary to take certain measures of vigilance in this region. The Court is of opinion that Albania, in view of tliese exceptional circumstdnces, would have been justified in issuing regulations in respect of the passage of warships through the Strait, but not in prohibiting such passage or in subjecting it to the requirement of special authorization. For these reasons the Court is unable to accept the Albanian contention that the Government of the United Kingdom has violated Albanian sovereignty by snding the warships through de guerre, sans avoir obtenu au pralable l'autorisation du Gouvernement albanais.

Dans ces conditions, il est superflu d'examiner la question plus gnrak, longuement dbattue par les Parties, et qui consiste savoir si les Etats ont, en droit international, un droit de faire passer en temps de paix des navires de guerre par les eaux territoriales non comprises dans un dtroit. Le Gouvernement albanais a prtendu en outre que le passage des navires de guerre britanniques le 22 octobre 1946 constituait une violation de la souverainet de l'Albanie parce que ce passage n'tait pas un passage innocent. Les raisons donnes peuvent tre rsumes de la faon suivante : Le passage n'tait pas un passage ordinaire mais une mission politique ; les navires manoeuvraient et naviguaient en formation de combat en losange, avec des soldats bord ; la position des canons n'tait pas compatible avec le passage innocent ; les navires passaient avec les quipages aux postes de combat ; le nombre des navires, ainsi que leur armement, tait plus important que ne le comportait l'objet de leur mission et montrait qu'il y avait intention, non seulement de passer, mais d'intimider ; enfin, les navires avaient reu l'ordre d'observer les dfenses ctires et d'en rendre compte, ordre qui fut excut. Il est dmontr par le tlgramme de l'Amiraut en date du 21 septembre, cit plus haut, et reconnu par l'sent britannique, que les navires de guerre ont t envoys dans le Dtroit non seulement pour effectuer un passage des fins de navigation, mais galement pour prouver l'attitude de l'Albanie. Le 15 mai 1946, ainsi qu'il a tC dit plus haut, le Gouvernement albanais tenta d'imposer ses vues relativement au passage en ayant recours l'artillerie. L'change de notes diplomatiques n'ayant pas clairci la situation, le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni voulut user d'autres moyens pour savoir si le Gouvernement albanais maintiendrait son attitude illgale et si, pour l'imposer, il recourrait encore l'artillerie contre les navires en passage. La lgitimit de cette mesure pr;se par le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni ne saurait tre conteste, condition qu'elle ft excute d'une faon compatible avec les prescriptions du droit international. La (( mission )) tait destine affirmer un droit qui avait t injustement refus. Le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni n'tait pas tenu de s'abstenir d'exercer son droit de passage, refus tort par le Gouvernement albanais. Il reste par consquent savoir si les modalits d ' e x c u t i o n du passage taient compatibles avec le principe du passage innocent et examiner les diverses prtentions du Gouvernement albanais dans la mesure o elles semblent pertinentes. Quand les gardes-ctes albanais du monastre Saint-Georges rendirent compte que les navires de guerre britanniques naviguaient en formation de combat et taient en train de manoeuvrer, ils durent tre victime d'une mprise. Il rsulte des dpositions que les navires

the Strait without having obtained the previous authorization of the Albanian Government. In these circumstances, it is unnecessary to consider the more general question, much debated by the Parties, n-hether States under international law have a right to send warships in time of peace through territorial waters not included in a strait. The Albanian Government has further contended that the sovereignty of Albania was violated because the passage of the British warships on October zznd, 1946, was not an i?z.izocejzt passage. The reasons advanced in support of this contention may be summed up as foilows : The passage was not an ordinary passage, but a political mission ; the ships were manoeuvring and sailing in diamond combat formation with soldiers on board ; the position of the guns was not consistent with innocent passage ; the vessels passed with crews at action stations ; the number of the ships and their armament surpassed what \vas necessa- in order to attain their object and showed an intention to intimidate and not merely to pass ; the ships had received orders to obsen-e and report upon the coastal defences and this order was carried out. It is shown by the Adniiralty telegram of September z ~ s tc,i ted above, and admitted by the United Kingdom Agent, that the object of sending the warships through the Strait \vas not only to cany out a passage for purposes of navigation, but also to test Albania's attitude. As mentioned above, the Albanian Government, on May 15th, 1946, tried to impose by means of gunfire its view with regard to the passage. As the exchange of dipIomatic notes did not lead to any clarification, the Government of the United Kingdom wanted to ascertain by other ineans whether the Albanian Govemment would maintain its illegal attitude and again impose its view by firing at passing ships. The legality of this measure taken-by the Goveniment of the United Kingdom cannot be disputed, provided that it \vas carried out in a manner consistent with the requirements of international law. The "mission" was designed to affirm a right which had been unjustly denied. The Government of the United Kingdom was not bound to abstain from exercising its right of passage, which the Albanian Government had illegally denied. It remains, therefore, to consider whether the mnnner in which the passage was carried out was consistent with the principle of innocent passage and to examine the various contentions of the Albanian Government in so far as they appear to be relevant. When the Albanian coastguards at St. George's Monastery reported that the British warships were sailing in combat formation and were manoeuvring, they must have been under a misapprehension. i t is shown by the evidence that the ships were not proceeding in combat forrnatior,, but in line, one after the other,

3 1 AFFAIRE DU DTROIT DE CORFOU (FOXD) n'avanaient pas en formation de combat, mais en ligne de Me, l'un demre l'autre, et qu'ils n'avaient pas manoeuvr avant la premire explosion. Par la suite, leurs mouvements furent dtermins par les explosions et rendus ncessaires afin de sauver les vies humaines et les navires atteints par des mines. Il rsulte des dpositions des tmoins que l'affirmation selon laquelle il y avait bord des soldats doit tre due un malentendu provenant probablement du fait que les deux croiseurs avaient bord leur contingent normal d'infanterie de marine (marines). On sait, par un ordre de l'Amiraut britannique en date du IO aot 1946, cit plus haut, que les navires, quand ils utilisaient le Dtroit de Corfou, devaient passer avec leur armement en position axiale. Le commandant en chef en Mditerrane a affirm dans un tlgramme du 26 octobre l'Amiraut que cet ordre fut observ au cours du passage du 22 octobre. Les canons, dit-il dans son rapport, taient points dans l'axe des navires, ce qui est leur position normale en mer, en temps de paix, et ils n'taient pas chargs )). Les commandants du Saumarez et du Volage confirment que les canons taient dans cette position avant les explosions. L'officier de navigation du i\lauritius a expliqu que tous les canons de ce croiseur taient dans leur position normale d'arrimage. L'artillerie principale tait dans l'axe du navire, les canons anti-ariens points vers l'extrieur et vers le ciel, ce qui est la position normale de ces canons sur un croiseur, tant au port qu' la mer. Eu gard ces tmoignages, la Cour ne saurait admettre l'affirmation albanaise selon laquelle la position des canons tait incompatible avec les rgles du passage innocent. Dans un tlgramme en date du 26 octobre, dj mentionn, le commandant en chef rapportait que le passage du 22 octobre (( fut effectu par les navires avec les hommes aux postes de combat, afin qu'ils puissent riposter rapidement si on leur tirait dessus nouveau N. tant donn les coups de canon tirs par la batterie albanaise le 15 mai, cette mesure de prcaution ne saurait en soi tre considre comme draisonnable. Mais quatre navires de guerre - deux croiseurs et deux contre-torpilleurs passrent de cette faon, avec les hommes aux postes de combat, prts riposter rapidement si l'on ouvrait le feu sur eux. Ils passrent l'un aprs l'autre par ce chenal troit, tout prs de la cte albanaise, un moment de tension politique dans cette rgion. L'intention devait tre non seulement d'prouver l'attitude albanaise mais en mme temps de faire montre d'une force telle que l'Albanie s'abstiendrait de tirer nouveau sur les navires en passage. Considrant cependant toutes les circonstances de l'affaire dcrites plus haut, la Cour ne saurait qualifier de violation de la souverainet albanaise ces mesures prises par les autorits

britanniques. La carte de l'Amiraut (annexe 21 du Mmoire) montre que les dfenses ctires de la rgion de Saranda avaient t observes et notes. Il est dit dans un rapport du commandant du Volage, 31 THE CORFU CHANNEL CASE (MERITS) 3I and that they were not manoeuvnng until after the first explosion. Their movements thereafter were due to the explosions and were made necessary in order to Save human life and the mined ships. It is showvn by the evidence of wvitnesses that the contention that soldiers were on board must be due to a misunderstanding probably ansing from the fact that the two cruisers carried their usual detachment of marines. It is knowvn from the above-mentioned order issued by the British -1dmiralty on -4ugust ~ o t h1,9 46, that ships, when using the North Corfu Strait, must pass with armament in fore and aft position. That this order was carried out during the passage on October ~ 2 n d is stated by the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, in a telegram of October 26th to the Admiralty. The guns were, he reported, "trained fore and aft, which is their normal position at sea in peae time, and n-ere not loaded". It is confirmed by the commanders of Sazinzarez and Volage that the guns were-in this position before the explosions. The navigating officer on board Jfauritius explained that al1 guns on that cruiser were in their normal stowage position. The main guns u-ere in the line of the ship, and the antiaircraft guns were pointing outwards and up into the air, which is the normal position of these guns on a cruiser both in harbour and at sea. In the light of this evidence, the Court cannot accept the Albanian contention that the position of the guns was inconsistent with the rules of innocent passage. In the above-mentioned teleg~am of October 26th, the Commanderin-Chief reported that the passage "was made with ships at action stations in order that they might be able to retaliate quickly if fired upon again". In view of the firing from the Albanian battery on May I jth, this measure of precaution cannot, in itself, he regarded as unreasonable. But four warships-t~vo cruisers and t~vod estroyers-passed in this manner, with crews at action stations, ready to retaliate quickly if fired upon. They passed one after another through this narrow channel, close to the Albanian Coast, at a time of political tension in this region. The intention must have been, not only to test Albania's attitude, but at the same time to demonstrate such force that she wvould abstain from firing again on passing ships. Having regard, however, to al1 the circumstances of the case, as described above, the Court is unable to characterize these measures taken by the United Kingdom authorities as a violation of Albania's sovereignty.

The Admiralty Chart, Annex 21 to the Memorial, shows that coastal defences in the Saranda region had been observed and reported. In a report of the commander of Volage, dated Octoen date du 23 octobre 1946, rapport concernant le passage du 22 : (( On utilisa au maximum l'occasion d'tudier les dfenses albanaises courte distance. Ces dernires comprenaient, me rfrant XCU ....", et il donne ensuite une description de quelques dfenses ctires. Conformment l'article 49 du Statut de la Cour et l'article 54 de son Rglement, la Cour a demand l'agent du Royaume-Uni de produire les documents intituls XCU pour l'usage de la Cour. Ces documents ne furent pas produits, l'agent arguant du secret naval, et les tmoins s'abstinrent de rpondre aux questions relatives ces documents. Il n'est par consquent pas possible de connatre la porte relle de ces ordres militaires. La Cour ne peut toutefois tirer du refus de communication de l'ordre en question des conclusions diffrentes de celles que l'on peut tirer des faits tels qu'ils se sont effectil-ement drouls. L'agent du Gom-ernement du RoyaumeUni a dclar que les instructions contenues dans cet ordre concernaient exclusix-ement l'ventualit d'un tir de la cte, ventualit qui ne s'est pas produite. S'il est vrai, ainsi qu'il rsulte du tmoignage du commandant du Volage, que l'ordre contenait des indications concernant certaines positions d'o le tir aurait pu tre dirig sur les navires de guerre britanniques, on ne peut dduire de ce fait que ces navires avaient reu la mission de reconnatre les dfenses ctires albanaises. Enfin, la Cour, ayant apprcier le caractre innocent du passage, ne peut rester indiffrente au fait que deux btiments de guerre ayant lieurt des mines, il n'y eut aucune raction de leur part et de la part des croiseurs qui les accompagnaient. En ce qui concenie les observations des dfenses ctires effectues aprs les explosions, elles se trouvaient justifies du fait que deux navires venaient de faire esplosion et que dans cette situation critique leurs commandants pouvaient redouter d'tre l'objet d'un tir de la cte, comnle le 15 mai. Ayant ainsi examin les diffrentes prtentions du Gouvernement albanais, dans la mesure o elles semblent tre pertinentes, la Cour arrive la conclusion que le Royaume-Uni n'a pas viol la souverainet de l'Albanie par les actions de la inarine de guerre britannique dans les eaux albanaises le 22 octobre 1946. Outre le passage des navires de guerre britanniques, le 22 octobre 1946. la deuxime question du compron~is met en cause les actions de la marine de guerre britannique dans les eaus albanaises les 12 et 13 novembre 1946. II s'agit ici de l'opration de deminage qui, dans la procdure, a t d6signe par les Parties sous la dnomination Opration Retail s, dcnomination qui lui sera conserve dans le prsent arrt.

ber z3rd, 1~46-a report relating to the passage on the zznd-it is stated : "The most was made of the opportunities to study Albanian defences at close range. These included, with reference to XCU ...."- and he then gives a description of some coastal defences. In accordance with Article 49 of the Statute of the Court and Article 54 of its Rules, the Court requested the United Kingdom Agent to produce the documents referred to as XCU for the use of the Court. Those documents were not produced, the Agent pleading naval secrecy ; and the United Kingdom witnesses declined to answer questions relating to them. It is not the~eforep ossible to know the real content of these naval orders. The Court cannot, however, draw from this refusa1 to prodaice the orders any conclusions differing from those to which the actual events gave rise. The United Kingdom Agent stated that the instructions in these orders related solely to the contingency of shots being fired from the coast-which did not happen. . If it is tme, as iAe commander of Volage said in evidence, that the orders contained information concerning certain positions from which the British warships might have been fired at, it cannot be deduced therefrom that the vessels had received orders io reconnoitre Albanian coastal defences. Lastly, as the Court has to judge of the innocent nature of the passage, it cannot remain indifferent to the fact that, though two warships struck mines, there was no reaction, either on their part or on that of the cruisers that accompanied them. With regard to the observations of coastal defences made after the explosions, these were justified by the fact that two ships had just been blown up and that, in this critical situation, their commander~ m ight fear that they would be fired on from the coast, as on May 15th. Having thus examined the various contentions of the Albanian Govemment in so far as they appear to be relevant, the Court has arrived at the conclusion that the United Kingdom did not violate the sovereignty of Albania by reason of the acts of the British Navy in Albanian waters on October zznd, 1946. In addition to the passage of the United Kingdom warships on October zznd, 1946, the second question in the pecial Agreement relates to the acts of the Royal Navy in Albanian waters on November 12th and q t h , 1946. This is the minesweeping operation called "Operation Retail" by the Parties during the proceedings. This name will be used in the present Judgment. A la suite des explosions du 22 octobre, le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni adressa au Gouvernement albanais une note o il lui faisait part de son intention de procder bref dlai au dminage du Dtroit de Corfou. La rponse albanaise, reue Londres le 31 octobre, dclarait que le Gouvernement albanais ne donnait

son consentement cette entreprise qu' condition que l'opration envisage se droulerait en dehors des eaux temtoriales de 1'Albanie. Dans l'intervalle et la requte du Gouvernement du RoyaumeUni, le Comit international central de dminage, par une rsolution du ler novembre 1946, avait dcid qu'il y avait lieu de procder un nouveau dragage du Dtroit sous la rserve du consentement de l'Albanie. Le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni ayant annonc, par une communication du IO novembre, au Gouvernement albanais, que le dragage envisag aurait lieu le 12 novembre, le Gouvernement albanais rpondit, en date du II, en protestant contre cette (( dcision unilatrale du Gouvernement du Royaume--Uni 1). II dclarait n'avoir pas d'objection ce que la marine britannique entreprit le dragage du chenal na\iigable mais en ajoutant que, pralablement cette opration, il estimait indispensable de dcider quelle tendue de mer serait considrer comme constituant ce chenal et en proposant de dsigner cet effet une Commission miste. Il concluait en disant que tout dminage entrepris sans son consentement par le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni en dehors dudit chenal, c'est--dire dans les eaux temtoriales albanaises que les navires de guerre trangers n'avaient aucune raison de traverser, serait tenu pour une violation dlibre du temtoire et de la souverainet de 1'-Ubanie. C'est la suite de cet change de notes que fut excute, les I r et 13 novembre, 1'(( Opration Retail 1). Le capitaine de frgate Nestre de la manne francaise, invit comme observateur, assista aus oprations de dminage du 13 novembre. Ces oprations s'effecturent sous la protection d une importante force de couverture compose d'un porte-al-ions, de croiseurs et d'autres navires de guerre. Cette force de couverture fut maintenue pendant la dure des oprations une certaine distance l'ouest du chenal, l'exception de la frgate Sf. Bride's Bay, qui stationna dans le chenal au sud-est du cap Kiephali. Les oprations, commences le matin du 13 novembre vers g heures, se terminrent dans l'aprs-midi la tombe du jour. Les surfaces dmines appartenaient aux eaux territoriales albanaises et taient comprises dans les limites du chenal antrieurement dmin. Le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni ne conteste pas que l'Opration Retaii )) fut excute contre la volont clairement affirme du Gouvernement albanais ; il reconnat que cette opration ne pouvait s'autoriser de l'assentiment des organisations internationales de dminage, qu'elle ne pouvait se justifier par l'exercice du droit de passage innocent et enfin que le droit international n'autorise pas, en principe, un tat rassembler dans les eaux 33 After the explosions of October zznd, the United Kingdom Govemment sent a note to the Albanian Government, in which

it announced its intention to sweep the Corfu Channel shortly. The Albanian reply, which was received in London on October p s t , stated that the Albanian Govemment would not give its consent to this unless the operation in question took place outside Albanian tem'torial waters. Meanwhile, at the United Kingdom Government's request, the International Central Mine Clearance Board decided, in a resolution of November ~ s t1,9 46, that there should be a further sweep of the Channel, subject to Albania's consent. The United Kingdom Govemment having infonned the Albanian Government, in a communication of November ~ o t h ,t hat the proposed sweep would take place on November ~ z t ht,h e Albanian Government replied 0x1 the n t h , protesting against this "unilateral decision of His Majesty's Government". It said it did not consider it inconvenient that the British fleet should undertake the sweeping of the channel of navigation, but added that, before sweeping was camed out, it considered it indispensable to decide what area of the sea should be deemed to constitute this channel, and proposed the establishment of a Mixed Commission for the purpose. It ended by saying that any sweeping undertaken without the consent of the Albanian Government outside the channe1 thus constituted, i.e., inside Albanian temtorial waters where foreign warships have no reason to sail, could only be considered as a deliberate violation of Albanian territory and sovereignty. After this exchange of notes, "Oyeration Retail" took place on November 12th and 13th. Commander Mestre, of the French Navy, was asked to attend as observer, and was present at the sweep on November 13th. The operation was camed out under the protection of an important covering force composed of an aircraft carrier, cruisers and other war vessels. This covering force remained throughout the operation at a certain distance to the west of the Channel, except for the frigate St. Bride's Bay, which was stationed in the Channel south-east of Cape Kiephali. The sweep began in the morning of November 13th, at about g o'clock, and ended in the afternoon near nightfall. The area swept was in Albanian territorial waters, and within the limits of the channel previously swept. The United Kingdom Govemment does not dispute that "Operation Retail" was carried out against the clearly expressed wish of the Albanian Govemment. It recognizes that the operation had not the consent of the international mine clearance organizations, that it could not be justifie& as the exercise of a right of innocent passage, and lastIy that, in principle, international law does not allow a State to assemble a large number of warships in the territoriales d'un autre tat un grand nombre de navires de guerre et d'effectuer des dminages dans ces eaux. Il dclare que l'opration prsentait la plus extrme urgence et qu'au surplus il s'estimait

en droit d'y procder sans le consentement de personne. Deus raisons ont t avances par lui pour la justifier. 11 s'est prvalu d'abord de l'Accord du 22 novembre 1945, sign par les Gouvernements du Royaume-Uni, de la France, de l'Union sovitique et des Etats-Unis d'Amrique, accord qui autorisait les organismes rgionaux de dminage, tel que le Jfediferrn)zzan Zotze Board, rpartir entre les Etats intresss, aux fins de dminage, les secteurs compris dans leurs zones respectives. Se prvalant de la circonstance que le Dtroit de Corfou appartenait au secteur attribu la Grce par le Al l edi f e~ra~l eZaonz e Board ds le 5 novembre - date antrieure la signature de l'accord prcit -, le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni fait tat d'une autorisation qui lui a t donne par le Gouvernement hellnique pour dminer noux7eau le chenal navigable. La Cour ne considre pas cet argument comme convaincant. Il y a lieu de noter que, de l'aveu du Gouvernement du RoyaumeUni, on n'envisageait plus, en -novembre 1945, la ncessit de dminer nouveau le chenal, les dragages antrieurement effectus en 1944 et en 1915 tant considrs comme ayant ralis une scurit absolue. Il en rsulte que l'attribution la Grce du secteur en question et, par voie de consquence, l'autorisation du Gouvernement hellnique dont il est faii tat, n'avaient l'une et l'autre qu'un caractre purement nominal. Il y a galement lieu de remarquer que l'Albanie n'a pas t consulte au sujet de l'attribution la Grce de ce secteur, en dpit du fait que le chenal passe par les eaux territoriales albanaises. En ralit, les explosions du 22 octobre 1946, dans un chenal dclar sr pour lanavigation et que le Gouvernement du RoyaumeUni, plus que tout autre, avait ses raisons de croire tel, posaient clairement un problme bien diffrent de celui d'un dminage courant excuter sous le rgime des organisations de dminage. Ces explosions revtaient un caractre suspect ; elles posaient un problme de responsabilits. Aussi bien, c'est sur ce terrain que le Gouvernement britannique il cherch principalement tablir son systme de dfense. Il fallait, selon lui, mettre la main, dans le plus bref dlai possible, sur les covpora rielicti par crainte que ceux-ci fussent enlevs sans laisser de traces par les auteurs du n~ouillage ou par les autorits albanaises. Cette justification a revtu dans l'argumentation du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni deux formes distinctes. Elle a t prsente d'abord comme une application particulire et nouvelle de la thorie de l'inten-ention par laquelle l'tat intervenant s'assurerait la possession de moyens de preuve dans le territoire d'un autre tat pour les soumttre la justice internationale et faciliter ainsi sa tche. territorial waters of another State and to carry out minesweeping

in those waters. The United Kingdom Government states that the operation was one of extreme urgency, and that it considered itself entitled to carry it out without anybody's consent. The United Kingdom Government put forward two reasons in justification. First, the Agreement of November zznd, 1945, signed by the Govemments of the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, authorizing regional mine clearance organizations, such as the Mediterranean Zone Board, to divide the sectors in their respective zones amongst the States concerned for siveeping. Relying on the circumstance that the Corfu Channel was in the sector allotted to Greece by the Mediterranean Zone Board on November 5th, i.e., before the signing of the above-mentioned Agreement, .the United Kingdom Government put forward a permission given by the Hellenic Govemment to resweep the navigable channel. The Court does not consider this argument convincing. It must be noted that, as the United Kingdom Govemment admits, the need for resweeping the Channel was not under consideration in November 1945 ; for previous sweeps in 1944 and 1945 were considered as having effected complete safety. As a consequence, the allocation of the sector in question to Greece, and, therefore, the permission of the Hellenic Govemment which is relied on, were both of them merely nominal. It is also to be remarked that Albania was not consulted regarding the allocation to Greece of the sector in question, despite the fact that the Channel passed through Albanian territorial waters. But, in fact, the explosions of October 22nd, 1946, in a channel declared safe for navigation, and one which the United Kingdom Government, more than any other govemment, had reason to consider safe, raised quite a different problem from that of a routine sweep carried out under the orders of the mineclearance organizations. These explosions were suspicious ; they raised a question of responsibility. Accordingly, this was the ground on which the United Kingdom Govemment chose to establish its main line of defence. According to that Government, the corpora delicti must be secured as quickly as possible, for fear they should be taken away, without leaving traces, by the authors of the minelaying or by the Albanian authorities. This justification took two distinct forms in the United Kingdom Government's arguments. It was presented first as a new and special application of the theory of intervention, by means of which the State intervening would secure possession of evidence in the territory of another State, in order to submit it to an international tribunal and thus facilitate its task. La Cour ne peut admettre un tel systme de dfense. Le prtendu droit d'intervention ne peut tre envisag par elle que comme la

manifestation d'une politique de force, politique qui, dans le pass, a donn lieu aux abus les plus graves et qui ne saurait, quelles que soient les dficiences prsentes de l'organisation internationale, trouver aucune place dans le droit international. L'intervention est peut-tre moins acceptable encore dans la forme particulirc qu'elle prsenterait ici, puisque, rserve par la nature des choses aux tats les plus puissants, elle pourrait aisment conduire fausser l'administration de la justice internationale elle-mme. En outre, l'agent du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, dans sa rplique orale, a rang l' Opration Retail parmi les procds d'auto-protection ou self-help. La Cour ne peut pas davantage accueillir cette dfense. Entre Etats indpendants, le respect de la souverainet territoriale est i'une des bases essentielles des rapports internationaux. La Cour reconnat que la carence complte du Gouvemement albanais dans l'exercice de ses fonctions au lendemain des explosions, ainsi que le caractre dilatoire de ses notes diplomatiques constituent pour le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni des circonstances attnuantes. Elle doit, nanmoins, pour assurer l'intgrit du droit international dont elle est l'organe, constater la violation par l'action de la marine de guerre britannique de la souverainet de l'Albanie. Cette constatation correspond la deniande faite au nom de l'Albanie par son conseil et constitue en elle-mme une satisfaction approprie. Les modalits d'excution de 1' Opration Retail ont galement t critiques par le Gouvemement albanais, qui fait principalement grief au Royaume-Uni d'avoir fait usage cette occasion d'un dploiement de forces exagr, sans rapport avec les exigences de l'opration de dminage effectuer. La Cour considre ces critiques comme non fondes. Elle ne voit pas dans l'action de la marine de guerre britannique une dmonstration de force destine exercer une pression politique sur l'Albanie. On ne peut reprocher au commandement naval responsable d'avoir, tout en les maintenant distance des ctes, employ des effectifs de couverture importants dans une rgion o, par deux fois en quelques mois, ses navires avaient t l'objet de graves attentats. The Court cannot accept such a line of defence. The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such .as has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the present defects in international organization, find a place in international law. Intervention is perhaps still less admissible in the particular form it would take here ; for, from the nature of things, it would be reserved for the most powerful States,

and might easily lead to perverting the administration of international justice itself. The United Kingdom Agent, in his speech in reply, has further classified "Operation Retail" among methods of self-protection or self-help. The Court cannot accept this defence either. Between independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of intemational relations. The Court recognizes that the Albanian Govemment's complete failure to cany out its duties after the explosions, and the dilatory nature of its diplornatic notes, are extenuating circumstances for the action of the United Kingdom Government. But to ensure respect for international law, of which it is the organ, the Court must declare that the action of the British Navy CO stituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty . This declaration is in accordance with the request made by Albania through her Counsel, and is in itself appropriate satisfaction. The method of carnina out "O~eration Retail" has also been 4 " criticized by the Albanian Govemment, the main ground of complaint being that the United Kingdom, on that occasion, made use of an unnecessarily large display of force, out of proportion to the requirements of the sweep. The Court thinks that this criticism is not justified. It does not consider that the action of the British Navy was a de~nonstrationo f force for the purpose of exercising political pressure on Albania. The responsible naval commander, who kept his ships at a distance from the coast, cannot be reproached for having employed an important covering force in a region where twice within a few months his ships had been the object of serious outrages. sur la premire question pose par le compromis du 25 mars 19481 par onze voix contre cinq, Dit que la Rpublique populaire d'Albanie est responsable, selon le droit international, des explosions qui ont eu lieu le 22 octobre 1946 dans les eaux albanaises et des dommages et pertes humaines qui en sont suivis ; par dix voix contre six, Retient la question de la fixation du montant des rparations et, par ordonnance de ce jour, fixe la procdure suivre cet gard ; sur la deuxime question pose par le compromis du 25 mars 1.948, par quatorze voix contre deux, Dit que, par les actions de sa marine de guerre dans Ies eaux albanaises le 22 octobre 1946, -le Royaume-Uni n'a pas viol la souverainet de la Rpublique populaire d'Albanie ; et l'unanimit, Dit que, par les actions de sa marine de guerre dans les eaux

albanaises au cours de l'opration des 12-13 novembre 1946, le Royaume-Uni a viol6 la souvzrainet de la Rpublique populaire d'Albanie, cette constatation par la Cour constituant en elle-mme iine satisfaction approprie. on the first question put by the Special Agreement of March zjth, 1948, by eleveil votes to five, Gives judgment that the People's Republic of Albania is responsible under international law for the explosions which occurred on October zznd, 1946, in Albanian waters, and for the damage and loss of human life that resulted therefrom ; and by ten votes to six, Reserves for further consideration the assessment of the amount of compensation and regulates the procedure on this subject by an Order dated this day ; on the second question put by the Special Agreement of Jiarch zjth, 1948, by fourteen votes to two, Gives judgment that the United Kingdom did not violate the sovereignty of the People's Republic of Albania by reason of the acts of the British Navy in Albanian waters on October zznd, 1946 ; and unanimously, Gives judgment that by reason of the acts of the British Navy in =Ilbanian waters in the course of the Operation of November 12th and 13th, 1946, the United Kingdom violated the sovereignty of the People's Republic of Albania, and that this declaration by the Court constitutes in itself appropriate satisfaction. Fait en franais et en anglais, le texte franais faisant foi, au Palais de la Paix, La Haye, le neuf avril mil neuf cent quaranteneuf, en trois exemplaires, dont l'un restera dpos aux archives de la Cour et dont les autres seront transmis respectivement au Governement du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord et au Gouvernement de la Rpublique populaire d'Albanie. Le Prsident en fonction, (Sign) J. G. GUERRERO. Le Greffier de la Cour, bf. BASDEVANTPr, sident de la Cour, tout en acceptant en son entier le dispositif de l'arrt, croit devoir noncer qu'il ne peut accepter les motifs que la Cour a cru pouvoir invoquer pour fonder sa comptence pour fixer le montant des rparations, d'autres motifs tant, son jugement, plus dcisifs. M. ZORIEIC, juge, dclare ne pouvoir se rallier ni au dispositif in aux motifs de l'arrt dans la partie relative la responsabilit de l'Albanie ; en effet, les arguments prsents et les faits tablis ne

lui permettent pas d'arriver la conviction que le Gouvernement albanais aurait eu ou d avoir connaissance, avant le 13 novembre 1946, de l'existence du champ de .mines dcouvert ii cette date. D'une part l'attitude prise par un gouvernement l'occasion de certains faits varie selon les circonstances, selon sa mentalit et ses moyens et selon l'exprience qu'il a dans la conduite des affaires publiques. Or, il n'a pas t contest que l'Albanie avait, en 1946, un gouvernement nouveau sans exprience de la pratique internationale. 11 est donc difficile de dduire quoi que ce soit de son attitude. D'autre part, les experts n'arrivent la conclusion que l'on a d observer l'opration du mouillage des mines que sous une rserve expresse : il faut supposer ralises plusieurs conditions, notamment le maintien de postes de veille normaux au cap Kiephali, au cap Denta et au monastre Saint-Georges et l'tat Done in French and English, the French text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this ninth day of April, one thousand nine hundred and forty-nine, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transrnitted to the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of the People's Republic of Albania respectively. (Signed) J. G. GUERRERO, Acting. President. (Signed) E. HAXIBRO, Registrar. Judge BASDEVANTP,r esident of the Court, whilst accepting the whole of the operative part of the Judgment, feels bound to state that he cannot accept the reasons given by the Court in support of its jurisdiction to assess the amount of compensation, other. reasons being in his opinion more decisive. Judge ZORIEId~e clares that he is unable to agree either with the operative clause or with the reasons for the Judgment in the part relating to Albania's responsibility ; the arguments submitted, and the facts established are not such as to convince him that the Albanian Govemment was, or ought to have been, aware, before Noveinber 13th, 1946, of the existence of the minefield discovered on that date. On the one hand, the attitude adopted by a government when confronted by certain facts varies according to the circumstances, to its mentality, to the means at its disposal and to its experience in the conduct of public affairs. But it has not been contested that, in 1946, Albania had a new Government possessing no experience in international practice. It is therefore difficult to draw any inferences whatever from its attitude. Again, the conclusion of tlie Experts that the operation of laying the mines must have been seen is subject to an express reservation : it would be necessary to assume the realization of several conditions, in

particular the maintenance of normal look-out posts at Cape 38 AFFAIRE DU DTROIT DE CORFOU (FOKD) normal des conditions atmosphriques existant cette date. Or, la Cour ne connat ni la date du mouillage, ni les conditions atmosphriques existant cette date.. Au surplus, on n'a pas prouv la prsence au cap Denta d'un poste, le seul qui, d'aprs les experts, aurait d obsemer l'opration du mouillage. En revanche, les autres postes n'auraient pu observer que le passage des navires, mais rien ne prouve qu'ils auraient d conclure que les navires allaient poser des mines. Ces postes ne pouvaient, selon les experts, ni voir ni entendre l'opration du mouillage, puisque le monastre Saint-Georges tait 2.000 m. de la mine la plus proche, tandis que le cap Kiephali tait une distance de plusieurs kilomtres. Il en rsulte que la Cour se trouve en prsence de soupons, de conjectures et de prsomptions dont le fondement, d'aprs le juge ZoriEiC, est trop incertain pour lui permettre de faire peser sur un Etat la responsabilit d'un grave dlit de droit international. 31. ALVAREZju,g e, tout en souscrivant l'arrt de la Cour, se prvaut du droit que lui confre l'article 57 du Statut, et joint audit arrt l'expos de son opinion individuelle. 31. ~YIKIARSKBI.\,D .\\VI PACHAM, M. KRYLOVe t AZEVEDG, juges, et M. ECER, juge ad Izoc, dclarant ne pas pouvoir se rallier l'arrt de la Cour et se prvalant du droit que leur confre l'article 57 du Statut, joignent audit arrt les exposs de leur opinion dissidente. (Paraph) J. G. G. (Paraph) E. H. Kiephali, Denta Point and San Giorgio Monastery, and the existence of normal weather conditions at the date. But the Court knows neither the date on which the mines were laid nor the weather conditions prevailing on that date. Furthermore, no proof has been fumished of the presence of a look-out post on Denta Point, though that, according to the Experts, would have been the only post which would necessarily have observed the minelaying. On the other hand, the remaining posts would merely have been able to obsen~eth e passage of the ships, and there is no evidence to show that they ought to have concluded that the ships were going to lay mines. According to the Experts, these posts could neither have seen nor heard the minelaying, because the San Giorgio Monastery was 2,000 m. from the nearest mine and Cape Kiephali was several kilometres away from it. As a result, the Court is confronted with suspicions, conjectures and presilmptions, the foundations for which, in Judge Zori-iCiC's view, are too uncertain to justify him in imputing to a State the responsibility for a grave delinquency in international law. Judge ALVAREZw, hilst concurring in the Judgment of the

Court, has availed himself of the right conferred on him by Article 57 of the Statute and appended to the Judgrnent a statement of his individual opinion. Judges \~'INIARIBIIA, DAWPIA SHAK, RYLOVan d ~ E V E D Oan,d Judge ad hoc EGER, declaring that they are unable to concur in the Judgment of the Court, have availed themselves of the right conferred on them by Article 57 of the Statute and appended to the Judgment statements of their dissenting opinions. LISTE DES DOCUMENTS SOUMIS A LA COUR 1. - PICES DPOSES AU NOM DU GOUVERNEMEDNUT R OYAUME-UNT. A. - Au cours de la procdure crite. I. Carte de l'Amiraut no 206, indiquant le Dtroit de Corfou. 2. Section de la carte allemande montrant la position des mines. (Cette carte, qui a t saisie par les Allis, indique le chenal du nord de Corfou, la position des mines qui y avaient t poses par les Puissances de l'Axe ; la carte originale a t dpose au Greffe.) 3. Accord international conclu le 22 novembre 1945 entre les Gouvernements du Royaume-Uni, de la France, de YU. R. S. S. et des tats-Unis et instituant les Comits de dminage. 4. Affidavit du fonctionnaire de l'Amiraut, charg des expditions, attestant l'envoi l'Albanie des cartes Mdri (20 aot 1947). 5. Section de la carte index Mdri indiquant le chenal dmin du nord de Corfou et la route internationale tablie dans ce chenal, et brochures Mdri destines tre utilises avec la carte index. (Un exemplaire unique de la carte tout entire et des brochures compltes numrotes 5, g et 12 ont t dposes au Greffe.) 6. Correspondance diplomatique change entre le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni et l'Albanie au sujet du droit de naviguer dans le Dtroit de Corfou. 7. Calques de l'Amiraut indiquant le chenal dmin du nord de Corfou, la position et la rbute des navires Orion, Superb, Leander, Saumarez et Mauritius, lors de leur passage par le Dtroit Nord de Corfou, les 15 mai 1946 et 22 octobre 1946. 8. Photogaphies des navires Saumarez (en dessous de la ligne de flottaison) et Volage (avec l'avant emport) prises peu de temps aprs l'explosion du 22 octobre 1946. g. Calque de l'Amiraut indiquant la position des navires britanniques au moment de l'explosion. IO. Rapport sur les dommages causs au Saumarez (8 dcembre 1946). II. Rapport sur les dommages causs au Volage (30 novembre 1946). 12. Liste des marins tus, et indication des pensions, etc., verser aux ayants droit. 13. Liste des marins blesss et expos des dpenses, pensions, etc. 14. Expos du cot des rparations faire au navire Volage et du cot de remplacement du navire Saumarez.

15. Procs-verbaux des Comits de dminage. 16. Rapports du capitaine Mestre (16 et 23 novembre 1946). (Il y a eu deux rapports, l'un et l'autre en franais. Le motif pour lequel deux rapports furent prsents est que le capitaine Mestre dsirait apporter certaines corrections dans son second rapport certaines allgations faites par lui dans son premier rapport.) 17. Rapports sur l'opration (( Retail )) tablis par le contre-amiral Kinahan et le capitaine de frgate Whitford. (Opration de dminage du 13 novembre 1946.) IO. II. 12. Ij. 16. LIST OF DOCUMENTS SUBhlITTED TO THE COURT. A.-During the written proceedzngs . Admiralty Chart No. 206 showing the Corfu Strait. Section of German Mine Information Chart. (This is a chart which was captured by the Allies, showing tlie North Corfu Channel and the position of mines laid by the Axis there ; the original chart has been filed with the Registry.) International Agreement between the Govemments of the United Kingdom, France, .U.S.S.R. and the United States, setting up the Mine Clearance Boards and dated November 22nd, 1945. Affidavit by despatch clerk at the Admiralty proving despatch of Medri Charts to Albania (August zoth, 1947). Section of Medri Index Chart showing North Corfu swept channel and the international highway established therein together with Medri pamphlets for use with the Index Chart. (Single copy of the entire Chart and of the complete pamphlets numbered 5, 9 and 12 have been filed with Registry.) Diplomatic correspondence between the Government of the United Kingdom and Albania regarding the nght of navigation in the Strait of Corfu. Admiralty tracings showing the North Corfu swept channel and the position and tracks of H.M.S. Orion, Superb, Leander, Sarcmavez and Mauritizbs, passing through the North Corfu Channel on May 15th, 1946, and on October aznd, 1946. Photographs of H.M.S. Saumarez (below water line) and Volage (bows blown off) taken shortly after the explosion on October 22nd, 1946. Admiralty tracing showing position of H.M. ships at the time of the explosion. Report on damage to H.M.S. Saumarez (December 8th, 1946). Report on damage to H.M.S. Volage (November 3oth, 1946). List. of sailors killed, with statement of pensions, etc., payable

to dependants. List of sailors injured, with statement of expenses, pensions, etc. Statement of cost of repairs to the Volage and cost of replacement of the Saumare:. Minutes of Mine Clearance Boards. Reports of Capitaine Mestre (November 16th and 23rd, 1946). (There were two reports, both in French. The reason why there were two reports was that Capitaine Mestre wished to make certain corrections in his second report of certain statements which he had made in his first report.) Reports on Operation Retail by Rear-Admira1 Kinahan and Commander Whitford. (The minesweeping operation of November ~ j t h ,1 946.) 132 18. Carte montrant la position dans laquelle furent trouves les mines, le 13 novembre 1946. 19. Photographies des mines. 20. Rapport sur les mines examines l'Institut spcial de l'Amiraut, Leigh Park House, Hants. 21. Carte montrant les dfenses de Saranda. 22. ffidavit du capitaine marchand Bargellini relatif l'incident du 29 dtobre 1946 qui s'est pass pour les chalands de SU. N. R. R. A. (31 dcembre 1946). 23. Documents et comptes rendus des sances du' Conseil de Scmit, etc., relatifs au diffrend. 24. Troisime rapport intrimaire du Comit central de dminage des eaux europennes aprs la guerre (~eorc tobre 1946 - 30 juin 1947). 25. Carte no 2711 indiquant la position des mines. 26. Deux signaux relatifs au dragage du Dtroit de Corfou en octobre 1944. 27. Extraits de Hansard (Dbats parlementaires). contenant diverses dclarations du secrtaire d'tat aux Affaires trangres relatives l'Albanie. 28. Tlgramme de l'amiral commandant la 15me escadre de croiseurs, relatant l'incident du 15 mai 1946. 29. Copies photostatiques d'extraits du rapport politique du 29 juillet 1%. dont certaines parties figurent l'annexe II du ContreMmoire albanais. 3-0 . Texte de la dclaration faite par l'amiral Willis. en date du 26 octobre 1946. 31. Photographie du Sautnurez qui manquait & l'annexe 8 du Mmoire du Royaume-Uni. 32. Extrait du troisime rapport intrimaire du Comit central de dminage des eaux europennes aprs la guerre. 33. Affidavit de l'officier commandant le Skih'ack, certifiant que les mines apportes Malte taient celies qui avaient t trouves A

Corfou (5 septembre 1947). 34. Petite carte montrant les secteurs dragus la date du 12 novembre 1946. 35. Procs-verbaux du* Comit central de dminage des eaux europennes aprs la guerre (25 mai ~gqg- 19 mai 1948). 36. Procs-verbaux du Comit de dminage de la Zone mditerranenne (5 novembre 1945-11 mai 1948). 37. Extraits du Procs-verbal de la premire runion du Comit de dminage de la Zone mditerranenne (5 novembre 1945) et de la quatrime runion (deuxime sance - 27 fvrier 1946). a) Avad lcs audiences : 38. Dposition sous serment faite A Londres, le 4 octobre 1948, par Karel Kovacic, anciennement capitaine de corvette de la Marine yougoslave. 39. Carte annexe la dposition susmentionne, montrant la route que suivraient, vraisemblablement, les n a e s pour se rendre de Sibenik Boka Kotorska et au Dtroit de Corfou. Chart showing position in which mines were found on November 13th, 1946. Photographs of the mines. Report on mines examined at Admiralty Mining Establishment, Leigh Park House, Hants. Chart showing the defences of Saranda. Affidavit of Skipper Bargellini regarding the incident of U.N.R.R.A. barges on October q t h , 1946 (December 31st, 1946). Documents and records of the Security Council, etc., relative to the dispute. Third Interim Report of the Central Mine Clearance Board in European Waters after the war (October ~ s t1,9 46-June 3oth, 1947). Mine Information Chart No. 2711. Two signals relating to the sweeping in October .1g44 of the Corfu Channel. Extracts from Hansard (Parliamentary Debates), containing Statements by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs regarding Albania. Telegram from Flag Officer Commanding 15th Cruiser Squadron, describing the incident of May ~ j t h ,1 946. Photostat copies of extracts from Political Report of July zgth, 1945, portions of which appear in Annex II of the Albanian Counter-Memorial. Text of Admira1 Willis's statement of October 26th, 1946. Photograph of Saumarez omitted from Annex 8 of United Kingdom Memorial. Extract from Third Interim Report of Central Mine Clearance Board in European waters after the war.

Affidavit by Commanding Officer of Skipjack identifying mines brought to Malta with those found at Corfu (September 5th, 1947). Chartlet showing areas swept on November ~ z t h 1, 9 46. Minutes of the Central Mine Clearance Board in European waters after the war (May 25th, 1945-May 19th, 1948). Minutes of the Mediterranean Zone Mine Clearance Board (November jth, 1945-May th, 1948). Extracts from the Minutes of the First Meeting of the Mediterranean Zone Mine Clearance Board (November 5th, 1945). and of the Fourth Meeting (Second Sitting-February 27th, 1946). B.- A!ter the clostcre of the written proceedings. (a) Before the Itearing : Affidavit sworn in London on October 4th, 1948, by Karel Kovacic, former Lieutenant-Commander in the Yugoslav Navy. Chart annexed to above affidavit, showing the route probably followed by the vessels in going from Sibenik to Boka Kotorska and to Corfu Channel. 133 39 bis. Calque tabli d'aprs le croquis de Panikovac de l'Institut hydrog~aphique yougoslave du 20 novembre 1948 (dpos par l'agent du Gouvernement albanais) avec indication de la position des mouilleurs de mines M dans l'anse de Panikovac. 40. Copie d'une note du ministre des Affaires trangres l'ambassade britannique a Athnes, 13 aot 1948. 41. Affidavit du capitaine de frgate Sworder (22 octobre 1948) concernant les oprations de dminage et d'exploration dans le Dtroit de Corfou en octobre 1944, janvier et fvrier 1945. 42. Extrait des instructions de l'Amiraut relatives au dminage en temps de guerre. 43. Carte indiquant les secteurs dmins en octobre 194.4. 44. Affidavit de M. D. G. Jacobs, lieutenant en premier bord du BYMS 2009 de la 153me flottille de dminage, en octobre 1944 (22 octobre 1948). 45. Affidavit du capitaine de frgate Sworder, indiquant la manire dont ont t dresses les cartes hldri (22 octobre 1948). 46. Journaux de navigation du Volage, du Mauritius et du Leander. 47. Affidavit du lieutenant de vaisseau Godsall, officier de quart bord du Snumarei le 22 octobre 1946, de 14 h. 14. h. 53 (22 octobre 1948). 48. Rapport d'une commission navale constitue lors de l'arrive du Saumarez Corfou (24 octobre 1946). 49. Carte indiquant la route suivie par le Saumarez, dresse par les membres de la commission navale susmentionne. 50. Affidavit du capitaine de frgate Paul, officier commandant a bord du Volage le 22 octobre 1946 (22 octobre 1948). 51. Carte indiquant la route suivie par le Volage, dresse par le commandant

Paul. 52. Copie certifie conforme de la lettre adresse par le commandant en chef en Mditerrane l'Amiraut, pour transmettre le programme tabli par lui de la croisire d'automne de sa flotte (15 aot 1946). 53. Copie photostatique du rapport de mer du Volage, par le capitaine de frgate Paul (23 octobre 1946). 54. C~pie~hotostatiqdeu rapport de mer du Saumarez, par le capitaine de vaisseau Selbv (23 octobre 1946). 55. Copie photostatique du rapport de mer du Leander, par le capitaine de vaisseau Otway Ruthven (23 octobre 1946). 56. Copie photostatique du rapport de mer de l'Ocean, par le capitaine de vaisseau John (24 octobre 1946). 57. Copie certifie conforme du rapport du contre-amiral Kinahan, commandant de la premire escadre de croiseurs bord du Mauritizds, sur les esplosi'ons causes par des mines a bord du Sazimareet du Volage (23 octobre 1946). 58. Exemplaire original d'une carte allemande saisie par les Allis l'Amiraut allemande a Berlin (mer Ionienne et golfe de Tarente. cte sud-ouest de la Grce). 59. Affidavit du capitaine de frgate Whitford, officier suprieur de la 5"e flotte de dminage de mars dcembre 1946, exposant la diffrence entre les mines rcemment mouilles et celles qui ont sjourn longtemps dans l'eau (22 octobre 1948). bis. Tracing made from sketch of Panikovac from the Yugoslav ' Hydrographie Institute, November zoth, 1948 (filed by Albanian Government's Agent), showing the position of M-minesweepers in Panikovac Cove. Copy of a note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the British Embassy, Athens, August 13th, 1948. Affidavit by Commander Sworder (October zznd, 1948) regarding minesweeping in the Corfu Channel in October 194.4, January and February, 1945. Estract from Admiralty Instructions on minesweeping in war time. Chart showing sectors swept in October 1944. Affidavit by D. G. Jacobs, First Lieutenant of BTMS zoo9 of the 153rd Minesweeping Flotilla, in October 1944 (October zznd, 1948). Affidavit by Commander Sworder showing the manner in which Medri Charts were drawn up (October zznd, 1948). Log-books of the Volage, Mauritius and Leander. Affidavit by Lieutenant Godsall, Officer of the Watch on board the Saumarez on October z ~ n d1, 9 46, from 14.00 hours to 14.53 hours (October 22nd, 1948). Report of a Board of Enquiry set up on the arriva1 of the Saumare= at Corfu (October q t h , 1946).

Chart prepared bu the Members of the above-mentioned Board of Enquiry, showing the route followed by the Saumarez. Affidavit by Commander Paul, in command of the Volage on October zznd, 1946 (October 22nd, 1948). Track-chart of the Volage prepared by Commander Paul. Certified true copy of the letter of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to the Admiralty of August 15th, 1946, transmitting the programme for the autumn criiise of his Fleet. Photostat copy of Report of Proceedings of Volage, by Commander Paul (October 23rd, 1946). Photostat copy of Report of Proceedings of Saumarez, by Captain Selby (October 23rd, 1946). Photostat copy of Report of Proceedings of Leander, b57 Captain Otway Ruthven (October 23rd, 1946). Photostat copy of Report of Proceedings of Ocean, by Captain John (October 24th, 1946). Certified true copy of Report of Rear-Admiral Kinahan, Commanding First Cruiser Squadron in H.M.S. Mnlcritizts, on the explosions caused on board the Saumarez and Volage by mines (October q r d , 1946). Original copy of a German chart captured by the Allies at the German Admiralty, Berlin (Ionian Sea and Gulf of Taranto, south-western Coast of Greece). Affidavit by Commander Whitford, Senior Officer of the 5th Minesweeping Flotilla from March to December, 1946, explainine the difference between mines recently laid and those that have been long in the water (October zznd, 1948). 60. Photographies M 1, 2 et 3 d'une mine allemande ayant sjourn deux ans dans l'eau, avec attestation du colonel Golemis. 61. Photographies M 4,. 5, 6, 7 et 8 d'une mine allemande ayant sjourn cinq ans dans l'eau, avec attestation du capitaine de frgate Littleboy. 62. Tlgrammes changs entre le commandant en chef en Mditerrane et l'Amiraut avant l'incident du 22 octobre 1946, nonant les instructions donnes par l'Amiraut au sujet du passage des navires de la Marine royale par le Dtroit de Corfou. 63. Tlgrammes changs entre le commandant en chef en Mditerrane et l'Amiraut, nonant les instructions de l'Amiraut relatives l'opration (( Retail . 64. Affidavit du professeur J. E. Harris, professeur de zoologie A l'universit de Bristol, concernant l'tat des mines dragues le 13 novembre 1946 dans le Dtroit de Corfou (27 octobre 1948). 65. Affidavit de M. N. 1. Hendey, du Laboratoire mtallurgique central de l'Amiraut Emsworth, exposant les raisons de l'absence d'encrassement des mines mouilles dans la mer Noire (25 octobre 1948). 66. Affidavit du capitaine de frgate Moloney, certifiant qu'aucun

dpt de mines allemandes n'a t laiss en Grce (29 octobre 1948). b) Au cours des audiemes : 67. Photographie de l'anse de Panikovac. 68. Copie de deux tlgrammes de l'Amiraut britannique, en date du g novembre 1948, concernant le Mljet et le Meljine. 69. Copie de deux tlgrammes du ministre de l'Air du Royaume-Uni, en date du 8 novembre 1948, concernant les conditions atmosphriques et la hauteur du soleil Sibenik les 16,17 et 18 octobre 1946. 70. Jaw's Fighting Ships 1946-1947. 71. Photographies de m e s trouves lors de l'opration de dminage, le 13 novembre 1946. (Ces photographies avaient t soumises en 1947 au Conseil de Scurit et portaient les no$ VI b) et VI c)). 72. Trait d'amiti et d'assistance mutuelle entre la Yougoslavie et l'Albanie (9 juillet 1946. - La date ne figurait pas sur l'exemplaire dpos.) 73. Accord conomique entre la Yougoslavie et l'Albanie (27 novembre 1946. - La date ne figurait pas sur l'exemplaire dpos.) 74. Marinkalender 1947. 75. School and CoUege Atlas (publi A Londres : G. W. Bacon & Co.). 76. Leqold's WereZdatlas (publi La Haye : H. P. Leopold). 77. Serd Map Service Atlas (publi Londres, 1947). 78. The Citizen's Allas of the World (publi Edimbourg et Londres, I* 79. Brouillon du journal de navigation du Mauritius. 80. Document' montrant les diffrences existant entre les annotations figurant sur le journal de navigation (mis au net) et le brouillon du journal de navigation du hiauritaus. 81. Trois fragments de la mine qui a heurt le Volage. 82. Extrait du rapport adress, le 29 mai 1946, par le contre-amiral Kinahan au commandant en chef des forces mditerranennes, 135 CORFU CHANNEL CASE (MERITS) (ANNEX 1) 135 Photographs M 1, 2 and 3 of a German mine that had been two years in the water, with a cerificate by Colonel Golemis. Photographs M 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of a German mine that had been five years in the water, with a certificate by Commander Littleboy. Telegrams passing between the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and the Admiralty, prior to the incident of October aznd, 1946, embodying the instructions of the Admiralty regarding the passage of H.M. ships through the Corfu Chamel. Telegrams passing between the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and the Admiralty, embodying the instructions of the Admiralty regarding Operation Retail. Affidavit by Professor J. E. Hams, Professor of Zoology in the University of Bristol, conceming the state of the mines

swept in the Corfu Channel on November 13th, 1946 (October 27th, 1948). Affidavit by Mr. N. 1. Hendey, of the Admiralty Central Metallurgical Laboratory, Emsworth, giving the reasons for the absence of fouling on mines in the Black Sea (October 25th, 1948)Affidavit by Commander Moloney, certifying that no dumps of German mines had been left in Greece (October zgth, 1948). (b) At the hearing : Photograph of Panikovac Cove. Copies of two telegrams from the British Admiralty dated November gth, 1948, relating to the Mljet and Meljine. Copy of two telegrams from the Air Ministry, United Kingdom, dated November 8th, 1948, and concerning weather conditions and the angle of the Sun at Sibenik on October 16th, 17th and 18th, 1946. Jane's Fightifig Ships 1946-1947. Photographs of mines found during the sweep on November 13th. 1946. (These photographs had ben submitted to the Security Council in 1947 and were marked VI (b) and VI (c).) Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between Yugoslavia and Albania (July gth, 1946.-The date did not appear on the copy filed). Economic Agreement between Yugoslavia and Albania (November 27th, 1946.-The date did not appear on the copy filed). Marinkalender I 947. School and College Atlas (Londcn : G. W. Bacon & Co.). : H. P. Leopold). & London, IN). Rough copy of log of the Mauritiws. Document showing the differences between the entries in the log-book (fair copy) and the rough log of the Mauritius. Three fragments of the mine which struck Volage. Extract from Report dated May zgth, 1946, from Rear-Admiral Kinahan, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediter135 136 AFFAIRE DU DTROIT DE CORFOU (FOND) (ANNEXE 1) relatif aux activits de son escadre du 29 avril au 25 mai 1946 (paragraphe 23, relatif au passage de l'escadre par le Dtroit de Corfou le 15 mai 1946). 83. Warships of the World, Victory Edition, U. S. A. 84. Deux croquis faits par le capitaine de corvette Kovacic lors de l'audience du 24 novembre 1948, au matin, montrant un des bateaux yougoslaves avec les rails et le mcanisme permettant de mouiller les mines. 85. Photographie de l'anse de Panikovac sur laquelle le capitaine de

corvette Kovacic a trac une flche montrant l'entre du tunnel qui servait de dpt pour les mines (audience du 24 novembre 1948, matin). 86. Deux plans schmatiques de la rgion de Sibenik sur lesquels le capitaine de corvette Kovacic a indiqu : a) le trajet qu'il a suivi en vedette moteur et l'endroit d'o il a pu reconnatre les mines ; b) la jete d'o aurait t probablement prise la photographie de l'anse de Panikovac (audience du 24 novembre 1948, matin). 87. Rapport de la I53me Flottille de dminage (8 octobre 1944) sur le dminage des chenaux de Korcula et de Scedro, accompagn d'un calque indiquant les oprations de dminage. 88. Dossier relatif aux mines mouilles par les Allemands (documents allemands). 89. Dossiers allemands relatifs aux stocks de mines. go. Original du rapport de mer du Leander, tabli le 23 octobre 1946 par le capitaine de vaisseau Otway Ruthven (dont une copie photostatique avait dj t dpose), avec signature certifie conforme par le capitaine de vaisseau Selby. 91. Calque indiquant la route suivie par le Leander le 22 octobre 1946, dat du 23 octobre 1946 et annex au rapport de mer du capitaine de vaisseau Otway Ruthven (ce calque doit remplacer la carte itinraire, tablie le 26 dcembre 1946, qui avait t dpose en annexe 7 au Mmoire britannique). 92. Copie dactylographie du rapport de mer du Volage, tabli le 23 octobre 1946 par le capitaine de frgate Paul (dont une copie photostatique avait dj t dpose), avec attestation du capitaine de frgate Paul. 93. Copie originale du rapport adress, le 29 mai 1946, par le contreamiral Kinahan au commandant en chef des forces mditerranennes, relatif aux activits de son escadre du 29 avril au 25 mai 1946, avec signature certifie par le capitaine de frgate Whitford. 94. Croquis fait par le capitaine de corvette Kovacic lors de l'audience du 26 novembre 1948 au matin, montrant la position du Mljet et du Meljine tels qu'il les a w s le soir du 17 ou du 18 octobre 1946, vers 18 h. 30. 95. Plan schmatique de la rgion de Sibenik sur lequel le capitaine de corvette Kovacic a indiqu l'emplacement de la maison d'o il a vu le Mljet et le Meljine le 17 ou le 18 octobre 1946, vers 18 h. 30 (audience du 26 novembre 1948, au matin). 96. Croquis fait par le capitaine de corvette Kovacic lors de l'audience du 25 novembre 1948, aprs-midi, montrant la position du Mljet et du Meljzne par rapport l'entre du tunnel de l'anse de Panikovac, le 17 oii le 18 octobre 1946, vers 16 h. 30. 136 CORFU CHANNEL CASE (MERITS) (ANNEX 1) 136 Xj.

Sh. gr. ranean, reporting the proceedings of the squadron under his command for the period April 29th to May 25th, 1946 (paragraph 23, relating to the passage of the squadron through the Corfii Channel on May 15th, 1946). Warships of the World, Victory Edition, U.S.A. Two sketches made by Commander Kovacic at the hearing on November q t h , 1948, morning, showing one of the Yugoslav ships with the rails and mifielaying mechanism. Photograph of Panikoc-ac Cove on which Commander Koc-acic drew an arrow showing the entrance to the tunnel used as a mine store (hearing on iu'ovember q t h , 1948, morning). Two plans of the region of Sibenik on which Commander Kovacic had marked : (a) the course foliowed ip the launch and the place from which he could recognize the mines ; (b) the jetty from which the photograph of Panikovac Cove was probably taken (hearing on November 24th, 1948, morning). Report of the 153rd Minesweeping Flotilla (October 8th, 1944) on the sweeping of the Korcula and Scedro Channels, with a tracing showing the minesweeping operations. File relating to mines laid by the Germans (German documents). German files relating to mine stocks. Original of the Report of Proceedings of the Leander, made by Captain Otway Ruthven (October 23rd, 1946) (a photocopy had already been filed), with signature certified by Captain Selby. Tracing showing course followed by the Leander on October 22nd, 1946, dated October q r d , 1946, and attached to the Report of Captain Otway Ruthven (this tracing replaces the trackchart made on December 26th, 1946, and filed as Annex 7 to the United Kingdom Memorial). Typeu~itten copy of the Report of the Volage made on October 23rd, 1946, by Commander Paul (a photocopy had already been filed), with certificate by Commander Paul. Original of Report sent by Rear-Admira1 Kinahan on May zgth, 1946, to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, on proceedings of his Squadron from April 29th to May 25th, 1946, with signature certified by Commander Whitford. Sketch made by Lieutenant-Commander Kovacic at the hearing on the morning of November 26th, 1948, showing the position of Mljet and Meljine as he saw them on the evening of October 17th or 18th, 1946, about 18.30 hours. Plan of environs of Sibenik, on which Commander Kovacic marked the site of the house from which he saw the Mljet and the Meljine on October 17th or 18th, 1946, about 18.30 hours (hearing on morning of November 26th, 1948).

Sketch made by Lieutenant-Commander Kovacic at the hearing in the afternoon of November 25th, 1948, showing the position of Mljct and Meljine in relation to the mouth of the tunnel at Panikovac Cove, on October 17th or 18th, about 16.30 hours. 136 97. Deux croquis faits par le capitaine de corvette Kovacic lors de l'audience du 26 novembre 1948, aprs-midi, montrant la manoeuvre effectuf'e par le Mljet et le iMeljine pour faciliter la mise bord des mines, et la position des deux bateaux lors du chargement des mines. 98. Croquis montrant un dragueur de mines avec son cble coupant l'amarre d'une mine, et une mine dj coupe (croquis fait par le capitaine de frgate Sworder et montr la Cour lors de l'audience du 22 novembre 1948, au matin). 99. Diagramme montrant les oprations de dragage de mines amarres offrant cent pour cent de scurit (diagramme tabli par le capitaine de frgate Sworder et montr la Cour lors de l'audience du 22 novembre 1948, au matin). IOO. Photographie montrant le :I.iatcritius et le Saicmarez aprs l'explosion (cette photographie avait t soumise en 1947 au Conseil de S6curit et portait le no II a), A. 4). . 101. Deus estraits de journaux illustrs yougoslaves montrant deux photographies d'un mouilleur de mines avec son mt de charge. 102. Carte de Sibenik, de l'arme des tats-unis d'Amrique (chelle I/~O.OOO). 103. Carte de l'Amiraut no 1581 : .4bords du port de Sibenik. 104. Photographie (no 4025), prise par avion, de Sibenik et de l'anse de Panikovac. 105. Page d'un journal illustr montrani la vue que l'on a sur la mer d'une maison situe prs de l'endroit o rsidait Keric. 106. Calque du croquis de Panikovac tabli par l'Institut hydrographique yougsslave, 20 novembre 1940 (original dpos par l'Albanie). 107. Tlgramme reu de Rome par la dlgation britannique et relatif aux bulletins mtorologiques publi6s -Sibenik les 17 et 18 octobre 1946 (24 novembre 1948). 108. Rponse donne par les experts de la dlgation britannique aux questions poses par M. le juge ECer au comit mixte d'experts, le 30 novembre 1948 : 1) La lumire taitelie suffisante 17 h. 35 pour permettre au capitaine de corvette Kovacic de voir les navires mouills dans l'anse de Panikovac ? 2) Si la lumire tait suffisante, la terre auraitelle pu arrter la vue ? 109. Lettre adresse, le 8 dcembre 1948, par le capitaine de frgate Surorder au contre-amiral Moullec, transmettant une revision de la rponse commune la question no 5 du questionnaire soumis par les agents, le 26 novembre 1948, aux experts des deux Parties. 110. Affidavit de M. Zivan Pavlov (IO dcembre 1948) certifiant que,

entre le 23 et le 26 octobre 1946, il a vu, dans le golfe de Kotor, un mouilleur de mines yougoslave de la classe du Meljine se dirigeant vers les points de ravitaillement en combustible de Boka Kotorska (texte original en langue serbo-croate, avec traduction an@aise). III. Carte de membre de l'Union syndicale des marins et travailleurs des ports de Yougoslavie au nom de Zivan Pavlov (texte en langue serbo-croate, avec traduction anglaise des passages pertinents). 112. Instructions for rendering Safe Undenoder IYeapons-Germnn Buoyant Illines.-1943. 137 97. Two sketches made by Lieutenant-Commander Kovacic at the heanng in the aftemoon of November 26th, 1948, showing the manoeuvre made by the MZjet and Meljine to facilitate the loading of the mines, and the position of the two vessels during the loadirig. 98. Sketch showing a minesweeper with its cable cutting the moonng of a mine, and a mine already swept (sketch made by Commander Sworder and shown to the Court at the hearing in the morning of November ~2nd. 1948). 99. Diagram showing sweeps of moored mines, 100% safe (made by Commander Sworder and shown to the Court at the hearing on the morning of Not-ember aznd, 198). IOO. Photograph showing Mazrritius and Saumarez after the esplosion (this photograph was -spbmitted to the Security Council in 1947, and was number. II (a), A. 4). 101. Two extracts from Yugoslav illustrated papers, showing two photographs of a minelayer with its demck. 102. Map of Sibenik, from U.S. Army (scale 1/5o,ooo). 103. Admiralty Chart No. 1581 : Approach to Sibenik harbour. III. 112. Air photograph (No. 4025) of Sibenik and Panikovac Cove. Page of an illustrated paper, showing the view over the sea from a house situated near Keric's house. Tracing of Panikovac Cove, made bp Yugoslav Hydrographic Institute, November aoth, 1940 (original fded by Albania). Telegram received from Rome by United Kingdom Delegation, conceming weather reports published at Sibenik on October 17th and 18th, 1946 (November 24th, 1948). Reply by the United Kingdom experts to questions put 0 the Mixed Committee of Experts by Judge EEer on November 3oth, 1948 : (1) Was the light sufficient at 17.35 hours to enable Lieutenant-Commander Kovacic to see the vessels moored in Panikovac Cove ? (2) If the light was sufficient, would the view have been interrupted by the lie of the land ? Letter from Commander Sworder to Rear-Admiral Moullec, dated

December 8th, 1948, forwarding a revision of the common reply to question 5 of the Questionnaire by the agents submitted on November 26th, 1948, to the experts of the two Parties. Affidavit by hl. Zivan Pavlov (December roth, 1948), certifying that between October ~ 3 r da.n d 26th, 1946, in the Gulf of Kotor, he saw a Yugoslav minelayer of the Meljilte class, mo\.ing towards the fuel refdling points at Boka Kotorska (original in Serb-Croat, with English translation). Mernbership card of the Yugoslav Seamen's and Port-workers' Union, bearing name of Zivan Pavlov (in Serbo-Croat language, with English translation of pertinent passages). Instructions for rendering Safe Underwater II'eapons-German Buoyant Mines-1943. 137 113. Photographie, prise d'un avion en 1943, de la rgion de Saranda, montrant certains sentiers et routes. 114. Carte de la rgion de Saranda (~/go.ooo Albania sheet 26-IV Saranda) . 115. Amendements soumis par les experts navals du Royaume-Uni aux rponses qu'ils avaient donnes aux questions de M. le juge EEer. 116. Photographies en six exemplaires du H. M. S. Mauritius (les photographies nos A 1, A 2, A 3 et A 4 sont des exemplaires supplmentaires des photographies figurant au supplment 6 des Procsverbaux du Conseil de Scurit, et mal reproduites). II. - PICESD POSES AU NOM DU GOUVERNEMEDN'ATL BANIE. A. -. Au cours de la procdure crite : I. Lettre du reprsentant de la Grce au Secrtaire gnral des Nations Unies (IO mars 1947). 2. Dclaration du capitaine Avdi Mati (4 octobre 1947). 3. Lettre du chef de la Mission militaire britannique en Albanie a l'tat-major de l'Arme albanaise (25 janvier 1946). 4. Procs-verbal de la sance du Comit de dminage de la Zone mditerranenne tenue le 2 juillet 1946. 5. Rapport sur l'incident du 15 mai 1946. 6. Lettre du reprsentant de l'Albanie au Secrtaire gnral des Nations Unies, 12 avril 1947. 7. Rapport sur l'incident du 22 octobre 1946. 8. Communiqu de l'agence Reuter du 26 octobre 1946. 9. Article 3 de l'Arrangement maritime albano-yougoslave du IO septembre 1946. IO. Rapport sur les vnements des 12 et 13 novembre 1946. II. Rapport du gnral Hodgson en date du 29 juillet 1945 sur les provocations grecques. 12. Carte indiquant le passage de l'escadre de guerre britannique le 22 octobre 1946.

13. Carte du littoral albanais de Saranda et de ses environs. 14. Rapport du commandement de la Marine yougoslave sur les champs de mines allemands. 15. Liste d'incidents de navires ayant heurt des mines, publie par Lloyds. 16. Actes agressifs du Gouvernement monarcho-fasciste grec contre l'Albanie. )) 17. e Provocations de guerre du Gouvernement monarcho-fasciste grec contre l'Albanie. )) 18. Texte complet de l'Arrangement maritime albano-yougoslave du IO septembre 1946. 19. Message du commandant en chef alli en Mditerrane, Maitland Wilson, au gnral-colonel Enver Hoxha (12 novembre 1944). 20. Message du M. Corde11 Hull (28 novembre 1943). 21. Message de M. Edward Stettinius (22 mai 1945). 138 IO. II. Air photograph of the environs of Saranda, showing certain paths and roads (1943). Map of Saranda District (I/~O,OOAOlb ania sheet 26-IV Saranda). Amendments submitted by the United Kingdom naval experts to the replies they had given to questions by Judge EZer. Six copies of photographs of H.M.S. Mauritius (photographs Nos. A 1, A 2, A 3 and A 4 are additional copies of photographs appearing in Supplement 6 to Minutes of the Security Council, and are bad reproductions). A.-During the written proceedings : Letter from the Greek Representatiw to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (March ~ o t h ,1 947). Declaration by Captain Avdi Mati (October 4th, 1947). Letter from the Head of the United Kingdom Military Mission in Albania to the Albanian Amy General Staff (January 25th, 1946). Minutes of the Meeting of the Mediterranean Zone Mine Clearance Board, held on July znd, 1946. Report on the incident of May 15th, 1946. Letter from the Albanian Representative to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, April ~ z t h ,1 947. Report on the incident of October zznd, 1946. Reuter's communiqu of October 26th, 1946. Article 3 of the Albanian-Yugoslav Maritime Arrangement of September ~ o t h 1, 9 46. Report on the occurrences on November 12th and 13th, 1946. Report by General Hodgson (July zgth, 1945) on Greek provocation. Chart showing passage of British war squadron on October zznd,

1946. Map of Albanian coast ; Saranda and environs. Report of the Commander of the Yugoslav Navy on German minefields. List of cases of vessels that have struck mines, published by Lloyds. "Aggressive acts of the G~eek monarcho-fascist Government against Albania." "War provocation by the Greek monarcho-fascist Government against Albania." Full text of the Albanian-Yugoslav Maritime Arrangement of September ~ o t h1,9 46. Message from General Maitlahd Wilson, Allied Commander-inChief, Mediterranean, to Colonel-General Enver Hoxha (November ~ z t h1, 9 44). Message from Mr. Corde11 Hull (November zSth, 1943). Message from Mr. Edward Stettinius (May zznd, 1945). 22. Dclaration de M. Winston Churchill (4 novembre 1943). 23. Dclaration de M. Cordell Hull (non date). 24. Lettre du gnral Hodgson flicitant le gnral Enver Hoxha l'occasion des lections gnrales (4 dcembre 1945). 25. Photocopies partielles des cartes Mdri M. 6502 : no 3, du 17 dcembre 1945 ; no 8, du 6 mai 1946 ; no 12, du 26 aot 1946, indiquant la route du canal nord de Corfou ces dates. L'dition du 17 dcembre 1945 montre la route sous le no 18/54. 26. Tlgramme du commandant du port de Saranda en date du 22 octobre 1946. 27. Lettre de l'tat-major de l'Arme albanaise au ministre des Affaires trangres Tirana, 30 aot 1948. 28. Rsum d'un article du journal toile rouge, reproduit par le journal Bashkimi, en date du 18 mai 1947. 29. Lettres de deux marins grecs adresses la Commission d'enqute des Nations Unies en Grce (15 fvrier 1947). 30. Rapport sur la possibilit d'un mouillage de mines clandestin. 31. Calque indiquant la route suivie par le Mauriiius, d'aprs la carte britannique annexe 7, et la position des mines d'aprs la carte britannique annexe g. B. - Aprs la clture de la procdure crite : a) Avant les audiences : 32. Note adresse par la lgation de Yougoslavie La Haye l'agent du Gouvernement albanais, en date du 8 novembre 1948, transmettant un communiqu du Gouvernement yougoslave concernant la dposition du capitaine de corvette Kovacic. 33. Calque indiquant le chenal dmin et la voie normale de la navigation passant au milieu du canal nord de Corfou.

34. Calque indiquant le chenal dmin et la zone du canal nord de Corfou d'une profondeur infrieure 25 brasses. 35. Calque indiquant les positions respectives du chenal allemand et du chenal dmin. 36. Calque indiquant la position du champ de mines et le trajet suivi par les navires Mauritius, Leader, Superb et Orion. 37. Procs-verbaux du Conseil de Scurit, Premire Anne, Seconde Srie, Supplment no 4. b) AU cours des audiences : 38. Rapport de M. Jacques Chapelon; professeur d'analyse l'cole polytechnique de Paris, au sujet du passage du Mauritius dans un champ de mines. 39. Extrait de l'ordonnance no 892 du ministre de la Dfense nationale yougoslave, en date du 17 novembre 1945, concernant les dragueurs de mines M 1, M 2 et M 3 (texte en langue serbo-croate, avec traduction franaise vise la lgation de Yougoslavie La Haye, comme conforme l'original). 40. Attestation, en date du 17 novembre 1948, relative la rparation des btiments de la classe et du type M, dans les chantiers de Sibenik, du 27 septembre au g novembre 1946 (texte en langue 139 Declaration by MI'. Winston Churchill (November 4th, 1943). Declaration by Mr. Cordell Hull (undated). Letter from General Hodgson congratulating General Enver Hoxha on the general elections (December 4th, 1945). Photocopies of parts of Medri Charts, M.6502 : NO. 3, December 17th, 1945 ; No. 8, May 6th, 1946 ; No. 12, August 26th, 1946, showing the route through the North Corfu Channel on those dates. The map of December 17th, 1945, gives to the route the number 18/54. Telegram from harbour-master of Saranda, October zznd, 1946. Letter from the Albanian Amy General Staff to the Foreign Ministry, Tirana, August 3oth, 1948. Summary of an article in the "Red Star", appearing in the Bashkimi newspaper, May 18th, 1947. Letters from two Greek sailors to the United Nations Commission of Enquiry in Greece (February 15th, 1947). Report on the possibility of secret minelaying. Tracing of track-chart of Mauritius, taken from British Chart Annex 7, and position of mines according to British Chart, Annes 9. B.- Af t e~th e closure of the written proceedings : (a) Before the hearing : Note from the Yugoslav Legation at The Hague to the Agent for the Albanian Govemment, dated November 8th, 1948, and fonvarding a communiqu of the Yugoslav Govemrnent concerning Lieutenant-Commander Kovacic's evidence.

Tracing of swept channel and normal route for shipping through the middle of the North Corfu Channel. Tracing of swept channel and of the North Corfu Channel Zone not deeper than 25 fathoms. Tracing of respective positions of German channel and swept channel. Tracing of position of the minefield and track of Mauritius, Leander, Superb and Orion. Minutes of the Secunty Council, First Year, Second Series, Supplement No. 4. (b) At the heczring : Report by M. Jacques Chapelon, Professor of Analysis at the cole polytechnique, Paris, concerning the passage of Mauritius through a minefield. Extract from Order No. 892 of the Yugoslav Ministry of National Defence, dated November 17th, 1945, concerning minesweepers M I, M 2 and M 3 (in Serbo-Croat, with French translation certified correct by Yugoslav Legation at The Hague). Sworn statement, dated November 17th, 1948, relating to repair of ships of the M class and type in Sibenik dockyard, between September 27th and November gth, 1946 (in Serbo-Croat, with 139 140 AFF.4IRE DU DTROIT DE CORFOU (FOND) (ANNEXE 1) serbo-croate, avec traduction franaise vise la lgationde Yougoslavie La Haye comme conforme l'original). 41. Photocopie d'une page du registre des rparations des chantiers de Sibenik (certifie conforme l'original, avec traduction franaise des inscriptions concernant les btiments M I, M 2 et M 3, vise a la lgation de Yougoslavie La Haye comme conforme l'original). 42. Calcul sur la hauteur du soleil Sibenik le 18 octobre 1946 15 h. 15, tabli par le capitaine Ormanov. 43. Attestation relative l'officier Drago Blazevic, en date du 17 novembre 1948 (texte en langue serbo-croate, avec traduction franaise vise la lgation de Yougoslavie La Haye comme conforme l'original). 44. Certificat relatif aux mouvements des btiments de la classe et du type M en octobre 1946, en date du 17 novembre 1948 (texte en langue serbo-croate, avec traduction franaise vise la lgation de Yougoslavie La Haye comme conforme l'original). 45. Carte de l'Amiraut britannique no 1581 : Abords du port de Sibenik. 46. Croquis de Panikovac tabli par l'Institut hydrographique yougoslave en date du 20 novembre 1948. 47. Plan de cadastre de la ville de Sibenik. 48. .Photographies nos 1, II et III de Panikovac prises du quai de Cipad, ou des environs. 49. Photographies nos IV et V, prises en direction de Panikovac de

la terrasse o se trouvait le capitaine Kovacic. jo. Carte italienne de Sibenik (no 558). 51. Rapport de la ((Commission 1) yougoslave au sujet de l'indisponibilit des btiments M 1, M 2 et M 3 (trois documents originaux dats du II novembre 1946, avec traductions franaises vises la lgation de Yougoslavie La Haye comme conformes aux originaux). 52. Fiches de travail des chantiers de Sibenik pour les commandes no9 920, 921 et 922 concernant les btiments M 1, M 2 et M 3 (documents originaux en langue serba-croate, avec traductions franaises vises la lgation de Yougoslavie La Haye comme conformes aux originaux). 53. Fiche de travail concernant le btiment M 1, portant la signature du capitaine de corvette Kovacic (document original en langue serba-croate, avec traduction franaise vise la lgation de Yougoslavie La Haye comme conforme l'original). 54. N Commandes de travail 1109 920, 921 et 922 adresses la direction des chantiers de Sibenik en date du 26 septembre 1946 et concernant les rparations effectuer aux chaudires des btiments M 1, M 2 et M 3 (trois documents originaux en langue serbocroate, avec traductions franaises vises la lgation de Yougoslavie La Haye comme conformes aux originaux). 55. Affidavit de la prsidence du Gouvernement de la Rpublique fdrative populaire de Yougoslavie au sujet de l'heure lgale en Yougoslavie (texte en langue serbo-croate dat du 27 novembre 1948, avec traduction franaise vise la lgation de Yougoslavie La Haye comme conforme l'original). 56. Rponse dome par les experts de la dlgation albanaise (4 dcembre 1948) aux questions poses par M. le juge EZer au Comit mixte d'experts, le 30 novembre 1948 : 1) La lumire French translation certified correct by Yugoslav Legation at The Hague). Photocopy of a page of the Repairs Register of Sibenik dockyard (copy, with French translation of the entries conceming the M 1, M 2 and M 3 vessels, certified correct by Yugoslav Legation at The Hague). Calculation made by Captain Ormanov of height of sun at Sibenik on October ~ S t h ,1 946, at 15.15 hours. Sworn statement concerning the officer Drago Blazevic, dated November 17th, 1948 (in Serbo-Croat, with French translation certified correct by Yugoslav Legation at The Hague). Certificate concerning movements of ships of the ill.class and type in October 1946, dated No\-ember 17th, 1948 (in Serbo-Croat, with French translation certified correct by Yugoslav Legation at The Hague). British Admiralty Chart No. 1581 : Approach to Sibenik harbour.

Sketch of Panikovac by Yugoslav Hydrographid Institute, dated November zoth, 1948. Cadastral plan of town of Sibenik. Photographs Nos. 1, II and III of Panikovac, taken from Cipad quay, or near hi. Photographs Nos. IV and V, looking towards Panikovac from the terrace on which Lieutenant-Commander Kovacic was. Italian map of Sibenik (No. 558). Report of the 1-ugoslav "Commission" concerning the nonarailability of the M 1, M 2 and BI 3 (three original documents dated Kovember th, 1946, with French translations certified correct by Yugoslav Legation at The Hague). Work dockets of Sibenik dockyard for Orders Nos. 920, 921 and 922, relating to ships M 1, M 2 and M 3 (original documents in Serbo-Croat, with French translations certified correct by Yugoslav Legation at The Hague). 1Vork docket concerning ship M 1, signed by Lieutenant-Cornmander Kovacic (original in Serbo-Croat, with French translation certified correct by the Yugoslav Legation at The Hague). ''\York Orders" Nos. 923, 921 and 922, addressed to the Directorate of Sibenik Dockyard, dated September 26th, 19.46, and concerning repairs to be done to the boilers of the ships Ii.I r, AI 3 and JI 3 (three original documents in Serbo-Croat, with French translations certified correct by Yugoslav Legation at The Hague). Affidavit by the Presidency of the Government of the People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, on the subject of legal time in Yugoslavia (in Serbo-Croat, dated November 27th, 1948, with French translation certified correct by Yugoslav Legation at The Hague). Reply by the experts of the Albanian Delegation (December 4th 1948) to questions piit by Judge ECer to the Mixed Committee of Experts on November 3oth, 1948 : (1) 15:as there sufficient light 140 141 AFFAIRE DU DTROIT DE CORFOU (FOND) (ANNEXE 1) tait-elle suffisante 17 h. 35 pour permettre au capitaine de corvette Kovacic de voir les navires mouills dans l'anse de Panikovac ? 2) Si la lumire tait suffisante, la terre aurait-elle pu arrter la vue ? 57. Irtstructio~ts nautiques pour la Mditerrane orientale, dition Imprimerie nationale, 1945. 58. Croquis montrant la partie d'un btiment de la classe M qui aurait pu tre aperue, la nuit, de la cte, d'une altitude de 15 pieds, le btiment tant : 1) 550 m. de la cte ; 2) 1,5 mille de la cte (croquis fait par le capitaine Ormanov et montr la Cour lors de l'audience du 8 dcembre 1948, aprs-midi). 59. Registre des chantiers navals de Sibenik.

60. Carte Europe et Afrique du Nord , feuille 4, publie par 1'Institut gographique national franais en 1941 - avec indication des lignes maritimes. 61. Quatre photographies montrant la cte prs de Saranda. 62. Croquis tablissant approximativement les hauteurs de l'anse de Panikovac en direction de Sibenik (croquis fait par le contreamiral Moullec). 63. Observations du contre-amiral Moullec sur les rapports du capitaine de frgate Sworder relatifs la position des navires dans les eaux de Panikovac. 64. Rapport en original du commandant du ~ e rrg iment d'infanterie en date du 15 mai 1946. 65. Texte original de la lettre du 16 mai 1946 adresse Tirana. 66. Texte original du rapport du capitaine Ali Shtino en date du 23 octobre 1946 (relatif aux incidents du 22 octobre 1946). III. - PICES DPOSES CONJOINTEMENT PAR LES PARTIES. A. - Au cours de la procdure crite : I. Compromis entre l'Albanie et le Royaume-Uni en date du 25 mars 1948. B. - Au cozcrs de la procdure oraie : 2. Questionnaire tabli par M. Piene Cot et sir Eric Be*.kett et soumis aux experts des deux Parties le 26 novembre 1948 : position du soleil Sibenik les 17 et 18 octobre 1946. 3. Rponses, tablies d'accord entre les Parties, au questionnaire susmentionn (27 novembre 1948). 4. Deux diagrammes montrant le moment auquel une ombre aurait t projete sur la jete o les mines taient charges. 5. Croquis schmatique de la rgion de Sibenik avec indication des points les plus proches d'o la jete aurait t visible au cours du trajet effectu par la vedette o se trouvait le capitaine Kovacic (trois trajets possibles sont indiqus dans le questionnaire). 6. Note commune des experts britanniques et albanais sur les questions poses par M. le juge ECer au Comit mixte d'experts, le 30 novembre 1948 : 1) La lumire tait-elle suffisante 17 h. 35 pour permettre au capitaine Kovacic de voir les navires mouills dans l'anse de Panikovac ? 2) Si la lumire tait suffisante, la terre auraitelle pu arrter la vue ? at 17.35 hours to enable Lieutenant-Cornmander Kovacic to see the vessels moored in Panikovac.Co1-e ? (2) If the light was sufficien, would the lie of the land have obstructed the \?ew ? 57. Nautical instructions for the East Mediterranean (Imprimerie nationale, 194 5). 5s. Sketch showing part of a vessel of the hl-class that might have been seen from the coast at night from an altitude of 15 feet, the vessel being : (1) 550 metres from the shore ; (2) I$ miles from the shore (sketch made by Captaiii Ormanov and shown

to the Court at the hearing on the afternoon of December 8th, 1948). 59. Register of the naval dockyard at Sibenik. 60. Map of "Europe and North Africa", sheet 4, published by the French National Geographical Institute in 1941-showing shipping routes. 61. Four photographs of the coast near Saranda. 62. Sketch showing roughly the hills around Panikovac Cove towards Sibenik (sketch made by Rear-Admira1 Moullec). 63. Observations by Rear-Admira1 Moullec on the Reports of Commander Sworder as to the position of the ships in Panikovac Bay. 64. Original of Report of Commander of First lnfantry Regiment, dated May ~ j t h ,1 946. 65. Original of letter of May 16th, 1946, addressed to Tirana. 66. Original of Captain Ali Shtino's Report, dated October 23rd, 1946 (concerning events on October zznd, 1946). ,4.-During the written proceedings : I. Special Agreement between Albania and the United Kingdom, dated llarch 25th 1948. B.-During the hearing : 2. Questionnaire prepared b M. Pierre Cot and Sir Eric Beckett, and submitted to the experts of the two Parties on November 26th, 1948 : height of the sun at Sibenik on October 17th and 18th, 1946. 3. Replies established jointly by the Parties to above Questionnaire (?\To\.ember 27th, 1948). 4. Two diagrams showing the mornent when a shadow would have faIlen on the jetty where the mines were being loaded. 5. Sketch of the environs of Sibenik showing nearest points from which the jetty would have been visible during the journey of the motor-boat that Lieutenant-Commander Kovacic was in. (Three possible routes are gi\-en in the Questionnaire.) 6. Joint Sote of Cnited Kingdom and Albanian experts on the qiiestions put by Judge ECer to the Mixed Committee of Experts on Yo\wnber 3oth, 1948 : (1) \Vas there sufficient light at 17.35 hours to enable Lieutenant-Commander Kovacic to see the vessels inoored in Paniko\-ac Co\-e ? (2) If the light was sufficient, wouid the lie of the land have obstructed the view ? ANNEXE 2 RAPPORT DES EXPERTS EN DATE DU S JANVIER 1949 [Traduction.] Le Comit d'experts navals dsigns, le 17 dcembre 1948 par la Cour internationale de Justice, a l'honneur de soumettre ci-aprs a la Cour les rponses - adoptes a l'unanimit de ses membres - aux questions qui lui avaient t poses. Question 1). Examen de la situation du Dtroit Nord de Corfou ci la veille du 22 octobre 1946 au point de vue : a) de l'emplacement dzt chenal dnzin.

1) a ) RPOXSE: La route allemande, indique dans l'annexe 2 du Mmoire du RoyaumeUni, ne peut tre l'axe central d'un chenal dmin large d'un mille, parce que, daris ce cas, la limite occidentale couperait le champ de mines G 146 c. Quand la marine britannique a dcid, en 1944, de draguer un chenal dans le Dtroit Nord de Corfou, les routes 18/32 et 18/34 ont t cres, ce qui, a notre avis, tait la seule manire pratique d'ouvrir un passage dans le Dtroit de Corfou, sans procder au dragage inutile du champ de mines QBY j39. Nous estimons donc que les routes 18/32 et 18/34 constituaient la \,oie la plus rapide et la plus sre pour ouvrir un itinraire travers le chenal du Dtroit Nord de Corfou. b) de L'e@cacit du dminage anfriezcrement edectu. Pour pouvoir dcider si les oprations de dminage auxquelles il a t procd, au mois d'octobre 19++ et au mois de janvier Iglj, ont t efficaces, il est ncessaire d'examiner les rapports de dminage. Ces derniers, toutefois, n'ont pu tre produits. Mais il faut se souvenir : I" que la marine britannique avait une grande exprience du dminage ; 2" que le dragage d'un champ de mines amarres est bien plus facile que celui d'un champ de mines de fond ; que le dminage d'un champ de mines amarres peut, s'il est excut comme il convient, tre considr comme offrant une scurit de IOO % ; Note. - Strictement parlant, un chenal ne peut tre dclar sr qu' l'poque o il a t dragu. On ne peut garantir qu' l'avenir le chenal conserve le mme degr de scurit. Une personne malintentionne peut poser des mines - c'est ce qui s'est produit dans le cas prsent - et la possibilit trs lointaine esicte galement qu'une mine, qui avait coul au fond lorsqu'elle al-ait t EXPERTS' REPORT OF JANUARY 8th, 1949. The Committee of Naval Experts appointed by the International Court' of Justice on December 17th, 1948, have the honour to submit ,to the Court the following unanimous answers to the questions put to them : Question (1). You are requested to examine the situation in tlze North Corfu Strait immediately before October eond, 1946, ' from the point of view of (a) the position of the swept channel. (1) (a) ANSWER: The German track shown in Annex 2 to the United Kingdom Memorial could not be the centre line of a one-mile swept channel because the western boundary would in this case intersect Minefield G 146 c. When the Royal Navy planned to sweep a channel through the North Corfu Strait in 1944, route 18/32 and 18/34 was established,

which was, according to us, the only feasible way to make a passage through Corfu Channel without doing unnecessary sweeping of Minefield QBY 539. We consider therefore route 18/32 and 18/34 the quickest and safest way to open up a route through the North Corfu Channel. (b) the efjectiveness of the mineclearance prer~iolrsly carried out. (1) (6) ANSWER: In order to decide whether the sweeping operations which were carried out in October 1944 and January 1945 were effective, it is necessary to 'study the minesweeping reports. The latter, however, could not be produced. But bearing in mind : 1st. That the Royal Navy had a great esperience in mineclearing ; 2nd. That the sweeping .of a moored minefield is far easier than sweeping a ground minefield ; 3rd. That the sweeping of a moored minefield, if carried out in the proper way, can be considered 100% safe ; Nok-Speaking strictly, a channel can only be declared safe at the time when it is cleared. One cannot guarantee that the channel in the future will remain so. Some evil person may lay mines-as in fact has been done in this case-and there is also the very remote possibility of a mine which went to the bottom when laid, rising to "correct" depth later on. mouille revienne plus tard la profondeur (( correcte 1). Mais, si I'on devait tenir compte de ces possibilits, il s'ensuivrait que I'on ne pourrait dclarer sres des eaux quelconques et les secteurs mins ne pourraient jamais plus tre utiliss ; 4" que ce chenal avait t dragu de faon permettre le passage de transports de troupes et de fournitures destines au front italien, vu ce qui prcde, nous estimons que le dminage a t opr avec le plus grand soin possible. et c) du risque de remontrer dans ce chenal des mines flottantes par suite du voisinage de champs de mines anciens, avec examen des documents allemands en vue d'y rechercher des indications sur les types de mines qui y avaient te mouilles. 1) c) RPONSE : La prsence des champs de mines italiennes amarres au large de Corfou expliquerait la: possibilit qu'il se trouvt dans cette rgion des mines flottantes. Nous ne pouvons cependant concevoir qu'un rapport puisse tre tabli entre la prsence &entuelle de mines flottantes et l'accident survenu au Saumarez et au Volage, car la nature des avaries causes aux deux navires ci-dessus mentionns exclut la moindre possibilit que ces avaries aient t causes par une mine flottante. On estime souvent que les mines flottantes constituent un danger srieux pour la navigation. Ceci est entirement erron.

Autant que nous le sachions, il n'a pas t prouv catgoriquement que plus d'un seul navire l suivant un itinraire en ligne droite (comme c'tait Ie cas pour le Snumarez et le Volage) ait t endommag par une mine flottante, bien que des milliers de celles-ci aient t mises l'eau au cours des deux grandes guerres. A la vrit, on cite dix autres cas o des navires se seraient prtendment heurts des mines flottantes ; mais ces cas n'ont pas t prouvs. Indpendamment d'autres raisons videntes, telles que le trs faible espace occup dans la mer par une mine, la facilit qu'il y a l'apercevoir la lumire du jour et son innocuit normale, il y a le fait que la lame d'trave carte la mine du navire. Des expriences pratiques approfondies ont dmontr qu'il. est impossible de heurter exprs une mine flottante, quelque effort que l'on fasse. Quelle qur soit la possibilit que deux mines dtachrs de l'ancien champ de mines allemand aient flott dans ces parages, ceci, comme il a t dit plus .haut, n'offre aucun intrt dans la prsente espce, car les avaries causes aux deux navires n'ont aucunement pu tre provoques par des mines flottantes. D'un examen approfondi des documents allemands il ressort : 1. Que, jusqu'au 23 octobre IN, il n'a t mouill que des mines italiennes dans la rgion du canal Nord de Corfou ; ' Le Betty Hindley, 7 cctobre 1947. 143 Eut if such eventualities were to be taken into account, it would mean that no waters could be declared safe, and mined areas could never be used any more ; 4th. That this charnel was swept for troopships and supplies to pass through for the Italian front, we assume that the clearing was camed out with the greatest possible care. and (c) the risk of encountering floating mines in this chanfiel owing to the $roximity of the old minefields, and to study the German documents in order to obtain information from them concerning the ty$es of mines laid in those minefields. The presence of moored Italian minefields off Corfu explains the possibility of floating mines in this area. We cannot see, however, that the possible presence of floating mines could be connected with the mining of H.M.S. Saumarez and H.M.S. Volage, as the nature of the damage sustained by the above ships excludes the faintest possibility of its cause being a floating mine. It is often thought thatsfloating mines are a serious danger to shipping. This is entirely wrong. To Our knowledge, it has not been definitely proved that more than

one single ship l, steaming on a straight course (as was the case with Saumarez and Volage), has been damaged by a floating mine, although thousands have been afloat during the two great wars. Admittedly, there are ten more cases of ships having been struck by alleged floating mines ; but these cases have not been proved. Apart from other obvious reasons, such as the very minute space of sea occupied by a mine, the ease with which it is seen in daylight and its normally harmless condition, there is the fact that the bow wave bnishes the mine clear of the ship. Extensive practical tests have proved that it is impossible to ram a floating mine, however hard one tries. Whatever the possibility may be of two mines from the old German minefield floating about, it is, as stated above, of no interest in this case, as the damage done to the two ships could not possibly be caused by floating mines. A close study of the German docunlents diows : I. That until October 23rd, I ~ Mo,n ly Italian mines were laid in the North Corfu Channel area ; l The Belty Hindley, October 1947. 143 2. Qu'au mois d'avril 1945 on disposait Trieste de mines du type GY ; 3. Qu'aucun numro de fabricant ne figure sur ces documents. Note. - Chaque mine porte un numro tamp sur sa plaque inf~ieure. Les Allemands, suivant une mthode trs tudie adopte par eux, runissaient tous les dtails relatifs aux mines dans des docuinents qu'ils appelaient Kennkarten. Si l'on retrouvait ces cartes, pour la zone de l'Adriatique, il serait possible de comparer les plaques infrieures des mines dragues avec les indications fournies par les Kennkarten, afin de dcouvrir le lieu d'origine des mines poses dans le Dtroit Nord de Corfou. Qzcestion 2). Examen des renseignenzents et documents concernant la navigation du hfauritius, du Saumarez et du Volage et Ivre de dterminer s'il en rsz~lte qzielqties prsomptions et lesquelles touchant l'idrntit du type des miles qu'ont heurtes ces deux derniers btintents et dzc type des mines dcoiti*erfes le 13 novembre 1946. Dterminer le degr dr certifztde qitl s'attache, de l'avis des e .~pe r f s ,i ces prsomptions. 2) RPONSE: Rien que l'on relve, dans les journaus de navigation du hfauritilis, du Leander et du Volage, quelques inexactitudes au sujet de la vitesse et de la route des navires, nous considrons comme hors de doute que le Saumarez et le Volage ont heurt des mines, alors qu'ils occupaient approximativement les positions indiques dans l'annexe g du Mmoire du Royaume-Uni. Mme si les deus navires ont heurt des mines plus prs de la limite

nord du chenal, leur accident est cependant d aus deus lignes de mines indiques l'annexe 9. Nous concluons donc nettement que les deus navires ont heurt des mines du mme type que celles qui ent t dragues le 13 novembre 1946. Qzcesfiott 3). Examen drs rensoigneme~tts et docz~ments relutifs a11.v minries subies par le Saumarez et le Volage et drs fragments d'engivt troue~s sur le Volage en zlue de dterminer s'il ru rsulte quelqiles prsomptions et lesquelles toi~chatlt la natzirt7 dos mines qu'ont Itez~rtrs ces bdtiments. Diternziner le degrE d5 certititdr qui, dc l'alis des experts, s'att~clze i ces prsorriptions. Dans la mesure o il est possible d'apprcier les dommages subis par le Saz~marez et le Volage, qui taient des navires de construction moderne, ces dommages doivent avoir t causs par l'explosion d'une mine de contact amarre, contenant une charge d'explosif d'environ 600 lb. Les raisons qui viennent A l'appui de cette manire tle voir sont les suivantes : 144 2. That GY types of mines were available at Trieste on April 25th, 194.5 ; 3. No manufacturer's numbers are shown in these documents. ,Vote.-Each mine has a number stamped on the bottom plate. The Germans had a very elaborate spstem of tabulating al1 particulars of the mines on so-called Kennkarten. If those cards could be traced for the Adriatic Zone, one could compare the numbers on the bottom plates of the swept mines with these Kennkarten in order to find out the place of origin of the mines that were laid in North Corfu Channel. Q~lestion (2). 1-ou are reqzresfed to examine the information and docniments available concerning tlze navigation of the Mauritius, the Saumarez and the Volage, in order to ascertain wltat conclusions, if any, may be drawn concerning the identify of the type of mines which strnick the two last-named z-essels with the type of mines discovered on Noaember 13flt, 1946, and to state how fur, in yozcr opinion, these conclusions can be regarded as oalid. .. -1lthough the log-books of APatcritizds, Leander and 1701age show some inaccuracies in speed and course, we consider it beyond any doubt that Saumarez and Volage were mined in approsimately the positions indicated in Annex g to the United Kingdom Memorial. Even if both ships were mined nearer the northern edge of the channel, they would still have been victims of the two lines of mines shomn in Annes g. Our conclusion, therefore, is definite : that both ships were struck by the type of mine which was swept on November 13th, 1946. Qtrestion (3). 1-OU are requested to examine the information and documents

aziailable relating to tlze danzage sugered by the Saumarez and tlze Volage, and fo the fragments of n mine found i n tlze Volage, with a aiew to ascertaining wltat conclusions, if any, may be drawn regarding tlze type of mines which strzrck these aessels, and how fur these co~tcl~rsio~cazsn , in yozrr opinion, be regarded as valid. (3) AXSWER: -4s far as it is possible to estimate the damage sustained by Sazrmare: and I'olage, which were ships of modern construction, this damage must have been caused by the esplosion of a moored contact mine of approximately 600 lb. charge. The reasons for this are : IO une inine de fond ne causerait pas une avarie de cette nature, et certainement pas cette prpfondeur d'eau ; 2" ainsi qu'il a tC expliqu plus haut, on peut entirement mettre de ct l'hjpothse d'une mine flottante ; 3" la seule possibilit qui subsiste est celle d'une mine de contact amarre. Des fragments trouvs sur le Volage, les deux petits clats, lgrement incurvs, ne sont videmment pas des morceaux de l'enveloppe d'une mine, car ils sont en fonte. Un troisime fragment, qui- est une partie du raccord servant adapter l'antenne, s'adapte parfaitement aux antennes et aux lments d'une mine GY ou d'une mine GR, cette pice tant identique sur les mines de ces deux types. Question 4). Rechercher si a) de la position des miltes dragueres le 13 novembre 1946, b) du fait qu'un dragage com let des eaux albanaises dans cette rgion n'a pas t e! ec tue' cette date, et c) du passage du Mcuntius, le 22 octobre 1946, sans heurter aucune m i w , on pezlt tirer q d q u e s colzclusions et lesquelles touchant l'existence d'un champ de mines mthodiauement tabli et, selon le dispositif ainsi recomu, touchant l'objectif ailquel ce champ de mifzes parait rpondre. La position des mines draguees le 13 rovembre 1946 indique nettement que les mines ont t mthodquement disposes sur deux ranges. Tout dragage antrieur, opr dans le chenal de la route Mdri, aurait ncessairement conduit la dcoui.erte de ces mines, si elles avaient t mouilles cette poque. Le champ de mines tait habilement plac, comme si son objet et t la Bjis offensif et dfensii : 1) offensif : afin d'empcher le passage, par le chenal, de navires ayant un tirant d'eau de quelque dix pieds ou plus ; 2) dfensif : afin d'empcher les navires du mme tirant d'eau de pnftrer dans la h i c dz Saranda. Le fait qiie le Alazrritzzcs a travers sans accident le chax~ip de mines moritre sirnplem~nt que ce navire z eu de la chance. Il n'y a rien d'trange, tant donn la densit des mines qu'a rCvlPe h dragage, ce qu'un navire passe au travers d'un champ de mines de cette nature. Qi~estion 5). De l'tat des mines dragu.kes le 13 novembre 1946, poucezvous

tirer quelpues conclusions et lesquelles au sujet de la date ( laquelle ces mines ont t mot~illes et, en particulier, au sujet de leur mouillage avant ou npris le 22 octobre 1g4b ? L'tat des mines dragues au cours de l'opration de dminage du 13 novembre 1946 -ainsi q'il ressort du Supplment no 6 aux Comptes rendus officiels du Consei: de Scurit - porte coniclure que les miiies sont considrer comme ayant t rcemment mouilles. 14s 1st. A ground mine would not cause this type of damage, and certainly not at this depth of water ; 2nd. A floating mine can be excluded altogether, as previously explained ; 3rd. The only remaining possibility is a moored contact mine. Of the fragments found in Volage, the two small, slightly curved pieces are obviously not parts of a mine shell ; for they are of cast iron. The third piece, which is part of a horn adapter, fits closely to the homs and elements of a GY mine or of a GR mine, the adapters of these two types of mine being identical. Question (4). You are requested to examine tlze qwstims whether it is possible to draw (a) from the Positiolt of the mines swept on Noaember 13th, 1946 ; (b) from the fact that a complete mineclearafice of the Albanian waters in this area had not yet been carried out ut that time; and (c) from the passage of the Mauritius on the zznd October, 1946, without striking any mine, any conclusions, and, if so, what conclusions, regarding the existence of a methodicdly laid minefield and the object for which, in the light of tlze disposition of the mines, the9 appear to have been laid. The position of the mines swept on the 13th November, 1946, strongly indicates that the mines were methodically laid in two rows. Any previous minesweeping in the Medri Route Channel would necessarily have detected such mines, if they had been laid at that time. The minefield was skilfully placed, as if its combined object was : (1) offensive : to stop ships drawing some IO feet or more from passing through the channel; (2) defensive : to stop ships of the same draught from entering Saranda Bay. That Mauritius passed unmolested through the minefield only shows she had good luck. There is nothisg strange in a ship getting through a minefield with a densiiy of mines as indicated by the sweep. Question (5). From the state of the mines sze~epto n h70z~ember1 3th, 1946, can you draw any conclusions, and, if so, what conclusions, as to the date on which they were moored, and, in particular, on the question whether they ulere moored before or aftej the ~ 2 n dO ctober, 1946 ? The condition of the mines swept during the sweeping operation on the 13th November, 1946, as shown in Supplement No. 6 of the Security

Council Officia1 Records, leads to the conclusion that the mines should be considered as recently laid. 145 Nous ne sommes pas en mesure d'indiquer une date, mme approximative, l'gard du mouillage. La quantit de coquillages, la vgtation, la rouille, etc., dpendent de bien des lments, qui varient considrablement selon les conditions existantes. Seules des expriences, auxquelles il serait procd durant la mme saison de l'anne et dans les mmes eaux, pourraient fournir des donnes suffisantes pour permettre d'valuer approximativement l'ge du champ de mines. Ne disposant que de renseignements d'ordre gnral, tout ce que nous sommes prts a affirmer avec certitude est que les mines ne peuvent en aucune manire appartenir un champ de mines qui aurait t mouill durant la guerre. Il est impossible de dire, en rponse la question pose, si les mines ont t mouill2s avant ou aprs le 22 octobre 1946. L'tat des mines n'a certainement pas subi de modification apprciable entre le 21 et le 23 octobre. Question 6). Compte tenu drs rponses, tablies d'accord entre les Parties, aux questions relatives la position du soleil Sibenik les 17 et 18 octobre 1946 et sur la base des lments du dossier, 1'exam.n des circonstances de fait tenant la date, l'heure, au site, aux conditions de visibilit, la situation des objets (navires, mines, antennes, rails), leurs forme, couleztr et dimsnsions, vous conduit-il la conclusion que, dans les conditions ou se trouvait le tmoin Kovacic, il tait possible d'observer le chargement et la prsence de mines G1- bord dr navires de la classe (( M )), dans l'anse dr Panikovac, a i ~ t s iq ue de rails sur ces navires ? 6) RPONSE: On aurait pu observer : a) Les deux navires de la classe M , s'ils avaient t ancrs dans l'anse de Panikovac ; b) les mines et leurs crapauds bord de ces navires ; c) le chargement des mines. Ces observations auraient pu facilement tre faites, quelle que soit celle des trois routes indiques sur la carte N. 1. D. 14/32/48, annexe C, dossier E.II/1/72, qu'ait suivie la vedette. En outre, pourvu que les navires aient t mouills du ct nord de l'anse, ainsi que l'a indiqu le tmoin Kovacic, on aurait pu observer : d) que les mines taient frachement peintes (clat de la peinture). Si la vedette avait suivi la route i), elle serait passe une distance d'environ 450 m. de l'anse, et alors e) les antennes et les rails auraient pu tre aperus, mais faiblement.

Si les routes ii) ou iii) avaient t suivies, nous estimons qu'il aurait t impossible d'apercevoir les antennes ou les rails. 1f7e are not in a position to give even an approximate date for the minelaying. The amount of barnacles, growth, rust, etc., is dependent on many factors which Vary considrably with prevailing conditions. Only actual tests at the same time of the year and in the same waters could give sufficient information to afford a rough estimate of the age of the minefield. 1Vith nothing more than general information, al1 we are prepared to state with certainty is that the mines cannot possibly belong to a minefield laid during the war. The question whether the mines were laid before or after the 22nd October, 1946, cannot possibly be answered. The state of the mines would certainly not alter noticeably from the 21st to the 23rd of October. Question (6). Having regard to the replies given, by agreement between the Parties, to the qz~estions concerning the position of the sztn at Sibenik on October 17th and 18th, 1946, and on the basis 01 the docz~mentsi n the case, does the examination of the factztal circumstances concerning (a) the date, (b) the time of day, (c) the lie of the land, (d) the conditions of visibility, (e) the position of the objects (ships, mines, horns, rails), ( f ) their form, coloztr and dimensions, lead yozt to the conclusion that, in the circumstances in which the witness Kovacic wm sitztated, it was possible for him to see the loading and the presence of GY mines on board two ships of the "M"-class in Panikovac Cove and the rails on the ships ? (6) AKSWER: 'The following could have been seen : 1. At 16.15 hours: (a) The two ships of the "JI"-class, if moored at Panikovac Cove ; (b) the mine-bodies and sinkers on board these ships ; (c) the loading of the mines. These observations could easily have been made, whichever of the three courses indicated on map N.I.D. 14/32/48> Annex C in File E.1111172, was followed by the launch. Provided that the ships were moored on the northern side of the Cove, as stated by the witness Kovacic, also : (d) that the mines were newly painted (the gloss). If the launch had followed course (i), it would have passed within about 4jo metres of the Cove, and then (e) horns and rails could have been seen, although idintly. If either of courses (ii) or (iii) was followed, we think it must have been impossible to see horns or raiis. I 46

147 AFFAIRE DU DTROIT DE CORFOU (FOND) (ANNEXE 2) II. A 17 h. 35 : A la conrlition que la vue m'ait pas t arrte par des obstacles : f) On aurait peut-tre aperu de la maison de Keric les silhouettes des navires chargs de mines. Les conclusions a) f ) , nonces ci-dessus, se fondent sur des expriences auxquelies il a t procd la (( base navale 5 )) (voir annexe 11). Ces expriences ont t effectues une heure du jour qui correspondait 17 h. 2s Sibenik le 18 octobre 1946 et dans des circonstances semblables. Obstacles ayant pu arrter la vue : Les Parties ont exprim trois opinions diffrentes au sujet de la position ventuelle des navires 17 h. 35. I. Les navires auraient t amarrs le Iong de la jete sud-ouest : dans ce cas, la configuration du terrain aurait empch de les apercevoir. 2. Les navires auraient t amarrs le long de la partie situe le plus l'ouest de la jete nord-est : dans ce cas, ils auraient t galement dissimuls la vue. 3. Les navires auraient t amarrs le long de la jete (( construite pour prolonger le quai nord-est. Sur la base des documents dposs au Greffe de la Cour - notamment l'annexe 4 (V), dossier E.I1/1/77 - nous estimons que les indications donnes par l'expert naval du Royaume-Uni, dans l'appendice z l'annexe I, dossier E.I1/1/89, au sujet de la configuration du terrain, paraissent tre les plus exactes. Dans ce cas, les silhouettes des navires auraient pu tre partiellement aperues de la maison de Keric. On ne saurait, sans une inspection sur les lieux, donner une rponse plus prcise. Question 7). Dterminer : a) le nombre de mines G 1' qu'rrn navire mouiIZeur de mines de la classe M peut charger. 7) a) RPONSE: Nous estimons que les navires de la classe (( M 1) sont d'environ 130 tonnes, auquel cas les dimensions indiques dans le Ilfarinkalender sudois seraient approximativement exactes. tant donn ces dimensions, le nombre de mines GY que pourraient charger ces mouilleurs de mines serait de vingt, si un poids pareil, sur le haut, ne mettait pas en danger la stabilit de celui-ci. b) le temps ncessaire pour que deux nazlires de ce type dis$osand chacun d'un mt de charge et d'un trewil 2 ziapezcr et placs approximativement dans la fiosition ircdiqzte par le tmoin Kooacic, prennent leur chargemen4 conzplet de mines. 7) 6) RPONSE: Dans des conditions normales, il serait possible de charger en une minute e-t de mie une mine avec un mt de charge. Ce temps se fonde

l Non reproduite. 147 II. At 17.35 h0~r.S: Given no obstacles in the line of sight : (f) It would perhaps be possible from Kenc's house to see the silhouettes of the ships loaded with mines. The above conclusions (a) to ( f ) are based upon tests made at "Naval Base A" (see Annex rl) which were carried out at a time corresponding to 17.28 hours in Sibenik, on October 18th, 1946, and under similar circumstances. Possible obstructions to the line of sight : Three different opinions have been given by the Parties as to the possible position of the ships at 17.35 hours. 1. Ships moored along the south-western pier. In this case the configuration of the land wold prevent the ships from being seen. 2. Ships moored in the most westerly part of the north-eastern pier, where they also wodd have been hidden. 3. Ships moored along the "built-up" extension of tlie north-eastern 9UaY. From the documents tled with the Court-espcial:y Annex 4 (V), File E.II/1/77 - we think that the statement made by the United Kingdom expert in Appendix z to Annex 1, File E.I1/1/89, as to the configuration of the land, appears to be the more correct. In that case the silhouettes of the ships may partly have been seen from Keric's house. A more definite statement cannot be made without inspection of the locality. Question (7). You are requested to state your opinion as to (a) the r~umber of GY mines which a minelayer of the "M"-class could load. (7) (a) ANSWER: We assume that the "W-class ships are of about 130 tons, in which case the dimensions given in the Swedish Marinkalender would be approximately correct. According to these dimensions, the number of GY mines these minelayers can take would be. twenty, if stability allowed for this top weight. (b) the time required by h o shifis of this clas, emh possessing a derrick and a steam winch, a d lying apfiroximately in the positions iftdicated by the m'tness Kovacic, to take their complete load of mines. (7) (b) ANSWER: Under normal conditions, it should be possible to load oce mine with one derrick in 14 minutes' time. This time is based upon a g~e antu mber Not reproduced. 147

sur un grand nombre de donnes, manant de nos trois marines ; les temps indiqus sont remarquablement concordants. Dans des conditions moins favorables, le temps ncessaire ne devrait pas dpasser trois minutes par mine et par mt de charge. Nous estimons que la pleine charge de mines aurait pu tre embarque en une heure. et c) si les mines type GY sont normalement pourvues d'antennes quand elles sont charges sur le navire ou si, au contraire, les antennes doivent laormalement tre fixes sztr les mines au moment du mouillage. Les mines GY ne sont pas pourvues d'un dispositif protecteur pour les antennes. Ces mines sont mises en place avec ou sans leurs antennes, selon les instructions donnes par les autorits intresses. A notre avis, la mthode la plus sre consisterait dvisser les couvercles de baklite et . visser les antennes, une fois les mines bord. Cette opration exige environ 5 minutes par mine, si elle est effectue par une personne non spcialise ; il pourrait y tre procd tout moment avant le mouillage des mines. Question 8) i). En supposant que les mines dcouvertes le 13 novembre 1946 aient t mouilles quelque moment, au cours des quelques mois prcdents, quel que soit l'auteur de ce fait, tudier les renseignements que l'on possde sur a) le nombre et la nature de ces mines, b) les moyens de les mouiller, et c) le temps ncessaire cet eflet, compte tenu des di4rents tats de la mer, des circonstances locales et des difirentes circonstances atmosphriques, et dterminer si l'on peut, de cette tude, tirer quelques conclusions et lesquelles au sujet i) des moyens employs pour l'tablissement du champ de mines dcouvert le 13 novembre 1946. II n'est pas douteux que les mines GY, au nombre de 24 ou plus, qui ont t mouilles Saranda, ont t places dans la position qu'elles occupaient par un navire de surface. Ce n'est pas par des sous-marins ou des avions que s'effectue le mouillage de mines GY. Le temps ncessaire au mouillage de ces mines est approximativement le mme que celui qu'il faut un navire vapeur pour parcourir la distance comprise entre les points o le barrage des mines doit tre install, augment du temps ncessaire pour s'approcher de la rgion surveille, pour quitter cette rgion et pour prendre des alignements. Au total, le temps durant lequel des mouilleurs de mines se seraient trouvs dans les eaux situees entre le cap Kiephali et le monastre Saint-Georges aurait t d'environ 2 h. 112, la vitesse tant de 6 noeuds, si les navires s'taient approchs venant du Nord et taient repartis vers le Nord. 148 of actual reports from Our three navies, and the times are remarkably

consistent. Under less favourable conditions, the time required should not be more than 3 minutes per mine per derrick. We assume that the full load of mines could have been taken on board within an hour. and (c) whether GI' mines are normally fitted with lzorns wherz they are loaded on ships, or wlzetlzer, on the contrary, they norntally have to be fitted with the horns at the time when they are moored. (7) (c) ANSWER: Guards to the horns are not fitted to GY mines. These mines are loaded with or without horns in place, according to the rules laid down by the authorities concerned. In Our opinion, the safest procedure would be to unscrew the bakelite covers and screw in the horns after the mines were on board. This requires approximately 5 minutes per mine per unskilled person and could be done at any time before the mines are laid. Question (8) (i). On the assumption that the mines discovered on November 13th, 1946, were laid at some date within the fm preceding months, whoever may have laid them, you are reqwsted to examine the information available regarding (a) the number and the naizcre of the mines, (b) the means for laying them, alzd (c) the time required to do so, having regard to the dieerent states of the sea, the conditions of the locality, and the diflcrent weather conditions, and to ascertain whether it is possible in that way to draw any conclusions, and, if so, whd conclusions, in regard to-(i) the means employed for layingthe mine field discovered cm ATovember q t h , 1946. (8) (i) ANSWER There is no doubt that the 24 or more GY mines which were laid at Saranda, were placed in their position by means of surface craft. The laying of GY mines is not done by submarine or by aircraft. The time necessary to lay those mines is approximately the same as the time taken to steam the distance between the points where the mine barrage is to be laid, plus the necessary time to approach and leave the area of vigilance and to take fixes. The total time that the minelayers would be in the waters between Cape Kiephali and San Giorgio Monastery amounts to about two and a half hours at a speed of six knots, if the ships are approaching from the North and leaving towards the North. 149 AFFAIRE DU DTROIT DE CORFOU (FOND) (ANNEXE 2) Si les navires avaient abord le secteur par le Sud, le temps ncessaire serait d'environ deux heures pour une distance comprise entre le voisinage de Barchetta Rock et l'extrmit nord du champ de mines pourvu que les navires soient repartis vers le Sud.

Si les navires avaient pntr dans la rgion surveille en venant du Nord, et l'avaient quitte en se dirigeant vers le Sud, le temps ncessaire pour la pose des mines entre le cap Kiephali et Ie monastre SaintGeorges aurait t d'environ deux heures. Si les navires venant du Sud avaient quitt la rgion en se dirigeant vers le Nord, le temps aurait t d'environ deux heures. Question 8) ii). et (ii) de la possibilit de mouiller ces mines par ces moyens sans que les autorits albanaises en aient eu connaissance, compte tenu des moyens de surveillance existant dans la rgion de Saranda. 8) ii) RPONSE: Possibilit de voir l'opration. La navigation par le Dtroit de Corfou ne prsente pas de grandes difficults, quand il s'agit simplement de franchir ce dtroit. Mais, pour pouvoir placer un champ de mines avec prcision, ainsi que cela a t fait, il faut que la visibilit soit normaiement bonne, pour permettre de prendre avec prcision sur la cte des relvements croiss, tant donn qu'il n'existe qu'un seul phare dans le voisinage. Les points de repre ncessaires se trouveraient probablement une distance plus grande que celie qui sparait de la cte le point observ, lors de l'alignement pris avant de procder au mouillage des mines: par exemple on aurait pu choisir le monastre et la pointe de Limione. Soit dit en passant, l'une des ranges de mines concide effectivement avec une ligne joignant ces deux points de repre. On aurait pu prendre un autre alignement sur le promontoire nord-ouest de la pointe Denta. Bien entendu, les objets s'aperoivent plus clairement lorsque l'on regarde vers la mer, que lorsque l'on regarde vers la terre. Les mouilleurs de mines doivent tre passs cinq cents mtres environ au large de la cte, entre la pointe Denta (endroit tout indiqu pour un poste d'observation) et le monastre Saint-Georges. De cette partie de la cte, une opration de mouillage aurait facilement pu tre observe par un guetteur l'aide de jumelles ordinaires. Les navires seraient probablemcnt rests dans le chenal dmin et, en consquence, auraient galement pu tre apetus du cap Kiephali et plus facilement encore du monastre Saint-Georges ; en effet, si l'on avait mouill, en partant du Sud, les mines de la range situe le plus l'Est, le mouiileur de mines aurait probablement t moins d'un demi mille du monastre. Si la pose des mines a t effectue dans l'obscurit, il est douteux que l'opration ait pu tre observe de Porto Edda. Si l'opration a t effectue en plein jour, on peut dire sans hsitation qu'elle a d tre remarque par les autorits albanaises. Possibilit d'entendre l'opration. Los coriditions les plus favorables pour permettre d'entendre le mouiilage des mines seraient : a) calme plat dans le voisinage immdiat de l'observateur ; If they approached frorn the South the time would be about two

hours from the neighbourhood of Barchetta Rock to the northern end of the minefield, provided they left towards the South. If the ships approached the area of vigilance from the North and left towards the South, the time necessary between Cape Kiephali and San Giorgio Monastery would be about two hours. If the ships approached from the South and left towards the North, the time would be about two hours. Questiota (8) (ii). and to (ii) the possibility of mooring those mines with those means zithout the Albanian authorities being aware of i t , having regard to tlze extent of the measures of vigilance existing in the Saranda region. (8) (ii) AXSWER: The possibility of seeing the operation. The Corfu Channel can be navigated with no great difficulty, when it i a question of simply passing through. But to place a minefield accurately, as was done, requires a reasonably good visibility so that definite cross-bearings on the coast can be taken, as there is only one lighthoiise in the 1-icinity. The necessary landmarks would probably be at a greater distance away than the distance from the fix (taken before starting the minelaying) to the shore : for instance, the Monastery and Limion Point might be selected. Incidentally, one row of mines does actually point to both of these landmarks. Another bearing might be taken on the north-west promontory of Denta Point. Of course, objects can be seen much more clearly when looking seawards than when looking landwards. The minelayer must have passed at about 500 metres off the coast between Denta Point (an obvious place for a look-out) and the San Giorgio Monastery. From this part of the coast the minelaying could easily have been observed by a look-out with ordinary hinoculars. The ships would probably have kept t~ the swept channel and might therefore also have been seen from Cape Kiephali and even more so from the San Giorgio hIonastery ; for if the eastern line of mines was laid frorn the South, the minelayer must probably have been within half a mile of the Monastery. If the minelaying was done in darkness, it is doubtful whether it could have been observed from Porto Edda. If done in daylight, it can unhesitatingly be said that the operation must have been noticed b the Albanian authorities. The possibility of hearing. The most favourable conditions for liearing a minelaying operation would be : (a) dead quiet in the immediate vicinity of the observer ; 149 150 AFFAIRE DU DTROIT DE CORFOU (FOND) (ANNEXE 2) b) vent soufflant de la cte (pas de ressac) ; c) force du vent : 3 ou moins (chelle Beaufort) ;

d) les personnes terre s'attendant une opration quelconque, et tant en tat d'alerte ; e) l'quipage bord des mouilleurs de mines manquant de pratique (bruits et lumires inutiles) ; f ) cho renforant le son. Des expriences ausquelles il a t procd la base navale B )) (voir annese 2 l), dans des conditions analogues celles qui ont t indiques ci-dessus, ont dmontr que le bruit provenant du rail pouvait s'entendre faiblement une distance d'environ douze cents mtres, et que le bruit caus par l'immersion de la mine ne.pouvait s'entendre faiblement qu' six cent cinquante mtres environ. D'autres bruits, en outre, rduisent rapidement la perceptibilit. En consquence, si les conditions taient favorables, il aurait t possible d'entendre le mouillage des mines, de la pointe de Limione et de la cte entre la pointe Denta et le monastre Saint-Georges, mais non de Porto Edda. Dans des conditions moins favorables, il serait toutefois impossible, de tous les points qui viennent d'tre indiqus, d'entendre l'opration. Nous ne possdons pas de renseignements uffisants, quant aux conditions dans lesquelles ont t poses les mines, pour pouvoir donner une rponse plus prcise. Le prsent rapport a t tabli en anglais, en un exemplaire, dpos au Palais de la Pais, La Haye, le huit janvier mil neuf cent quaranteneuf. (Sigz) S. T. CROSS, Secrtaire du Comit. 1 Non reproduite. 1.50 (b) wind blowing off shore (no surf) ; (c) wind force 3 or less (scale Beaufort) ; (d) people ashore suspecting some action to be going on, and being on the alert ; (e) people on board minelayers not skilful (unnecessary lights and noises) ; (f) where echoes strengthen the sound. Tests which we have canied out at "Naval Base B" (see Annex 2 l) under similar conditions to those stated above show that rail noise could be heard faintly at a distance of about 1,200 metres, while a splash could be heard faintly only at about 650 metres. Additional noises quickly reduce the audibility. Accordingly, under favourable conditions it would be possible to hear the minelaying operation from Limion Point and from the coast b-e tweenDenta - - Point and San Giorgio Monastery, but not from Porto Edda. Under less favourable conditions it would, however, be impossible to hear the minelaying from any of the positions mentioned. We are not in the possession of sufficient information as to conditions

when the mines were laid to give a more definite statement. This Report was drawn up in English in one copy, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this eighth day of January, one thousand nine hundred and forty-nine. (Signed) S. ELFFERICH. J. BULL. AND. FORSHELL. (Signed) S. T. CROSS, Secretary of .the Cornmittee. ' Not reproduced. DCISION DE LA COUR, DU 17 JANVIER 1949, RELATIVE A UNE ENQUTE SUR LES LIEUX La Cour invite les experts dsigns par l'Ordonnance du 17 dcembre 1948 se rendre Sibenik et Saranda, faire sur le territoire et dans les eaux adjacents les constatations qu'ils jugeraient utiles ainsi que, le cas chant et dans la mesure du possible, des expriences, le tout en vue de vrifier, complter et, s'il y a lieu, modifier les rponses nonces dans le rapport dpos par eux le 8 janvier 1949. Les Parties auront la facult de prsenter aux experts des suggestions touchant les points sur lesquels devraient porter leurs constatations ou expriences. Le Greffier, sous l'autorit du Prsident, prendra les mesures ncessaires pour la mise en route des experts et pour que leur soient assures les facilits indispensables la bonne et prompte excution de leur mission. Dans les huit jours qui suivront le dpt au Greffe du rapport complmentaire des experts, les Parties pourront dposer au Greffe des observations concernant les constatations nouvelles faites dans le rapport. DECISION OF THE COURT, DATED JANUARY 17th, 1949, REGARDING AN ENQUIRY ON THE SPOT. The Court requests the Experts appointed by the Order of the,17th December, 1948, to proceed to Sibenik and Saranda, and to make, on the land and in the waters adjacent to these two places, any investigations and, so far as possible, any experiments which they may consider useful with a view to verifying, completing and, if necesary, modifying the answers given in their Report filed by them on January 8th, 949. The Parties shall have the right to make suggestions to the Experts regarding the points to which their investigations and experiments should be directed. The Registrar, with the authority of the President, shall make the preparations required for the journey of the Experts and for ensuring that they will receive a11 the facilities essential to the due and prompt accomplishment of their mission. IVithin one week of the filing of the complementary Report of the Experts in the Registry, the Parties may file in the Registry their observations upon any new statements which it may contain.

RAPPORT DES EXPERTS, DU 8 FVRIER 1949, SUR LES CONSTATATIONS ET EXPRIENCES FAITES A SIBENIK ET A SARANDA [Traduction.] dsigns par l'ordonnance de la Cour du 17 dcembre 1948 et qui, en excution de la dcision de la Cour du 17 janvier 1949, se sont rendus Sibenik et Saranda, ont l'honneur de prsenter la Cour leur rapport sur les constatations et expriences faites par eux. Les investigations ont port sur les points suivants : 1. A Sibenik, les 24 et 25 janvier 1949 : a) Longueur des quais dans l'anse de Panikovac ;, b) existence d'un quai prolong )1 ; c) profondeur de l'eau le long des quais dans l'anse de Panikovac ; d) existence d'paves ou d'obstacles le long du quai sud-ouest ; e) configuration du terrain autour de l'anse de Panikovac ; f) disposition gnrale des tunnels dans l'anse de Panikovac ; g) vue que, d'une vedette passant devant l'anse de Panikovac et suivant 1) le trajet i), 2) le trajet iii), tels que ces trajets sont indiqus dans l'annexe C au document dpos au Greffe le 27 novembre 1948 et intitul Rponses, tablies d'accord entre les Parties, aux questions relatives la position du soleil Sibenik II, on peut avoir sur un mouilleur de mines de la classe (( M )) amarr dans cette anse ; Jz) possibilit pour une vedette d'accoster la pointe de Kulina ; i) inspection d'ensemble du M 2 )I ; j) champ de vision de la terrasse de Keric, et visibilit de cette terrasse en plein jour et l'heure o se terminait le crpuscule civil le 24 janvier 1949 (17 h. 30) ; k) temps ncessaire pour se rendre pied de Mo10 Krka la maison de Keric, en passant par la maison de Kovacic ; II. A Saranda, les 28 et 29 janvier 1949 : a) Observation de la cte entre la colline de Limione et le monastre de Saint-Georges ; b) visite du monastre, en y parvenant de terre ; c) visite du cap Denta, en y parvenant de terre ; d) possibilit d'observer, pendant la nuit, depuis le monastre Saint-Georges, le passage d'un navire suivant la ligne est, l'emplacement de la range est des mines indique l'annexe g du Mmoire du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni ; e) dbarquement au cap Denta afin de vrifier l'esactitude des observations qui, de la mer, avaient t faites sur ce lieu ; EXPERTS' REPORT DATED FEBRUARY 8th, 1949, ON THE INVESTIGATIONS AND TESTS AT SIBENIK AND SARANDA. appointed by Order of Court of Decernber 17th, 1948, visited Sibenik

and Saranda in pursuance of the Court's decision of January 17th, 1949. They have the honour to subrnit to the Court a report on the observations made and tests carried out by them. Investigations were made as to the following points : 1. At Sibenik on January 24th and 25th, 1949 (a) Length of the quays at Panikovac Cove ; (b) existence of a "built-up quay" ; (c) depth of water alongside the quays in Panikovac Cove ; (d) existence of a wreck or of obstructions alongside the southwestern quay ; (e) configuration of the land at Panikovac Cove ; (f) general lay-out of the tunnels at Panikovac Cove; (g) what could be seen of an "Mt'-class minelayer moored in Panikovac Cove, during the course of the journey by motor boat past the Cove, following : (1) route (i), (2) route (iii), as these routes are described in Annex C to the document filed in the Registry on November 27th, 1948, and headed : "Agreed answers to questions in connexion with state of Sun at Sibenik" ; (h) possibility of mooring a motor launch at Kulina Point ; (2) a general inspection of "M 2" ; ( j ) the line of sight from Keric's terrace, and what could be seen from the tenace in broad daylight, and at the end of civil twilight on January q t h , 1949 (17.30 hours) ; (k) the time required for walking from Mo10 Krka, via Kovacic's house, to Keric's house ; II. At Saranda on Janzcary 28th and zgth, 1949 : (a) Survey of the Coast from Limion Hill to San Giorgio Monastery ; (b) \-kit to the Monastery by land ; (c) visit to Denta Point by land ; (d) possibility of observing, from the San Giorgio Monastery, the passage of a ship by night along the line on which the eastern row of mines was laid (as shown in Annex 9 of the United Kingdom Memorial) ; (e) a landing at Denta Point to check the accuracy of observations made of this area from the sea ; 152 1) observation de la cte entre Saranda et le cap Kiephali ; g) visite de la colline de Limione ; A) visite du feu de Saranda. Le croquis ci-joint (annexe 1 l) rend compte de l'tat de choses constat dans l'anse de Panikovac. DT-~IL DES IXVESTIGATIONS NUMRES DAXS LA SECTION 1.

1 a) Les quais ont t mesurs, les dimensions tant approsimativement celles qu'avait indiques l'amiral Moullec (les dimensions sont donnes l'annexe Il). Sur le quai nord-est, des rails de voie trcite et des wagonnets porte-mines ont t observs. Ces wagonnets n'taient manifestement pas du type employ pour transporter des mines allemandes GY. 1 b) L'absence de tout (( quai prolong )) a t constate, comme celle de tout vestige qui et pu laisser supposer qu'un tel quai ait exist autrefois. 1 c) Des sondages pour connatre 1s profondeur de l'eau le long des quais ont t effectus mare basse ; les rsultats sont indiqus l'annexe 1 l. La diffrence entre la niare haute et la mare basse est d'environ 60 centimtres. 1 d) Il n'y a trace d'aucune pave ou a obstacles le long du quai sud-ouest. 1 e) La configuration du terrain est telle qu' 16 h. 06, le 24 janvier ~g q g ,u ii navire mouill en un endroit quelconque de l'anse de Panikovac se serait trouv dans l'ombre. A la dzte et l'heure qui viennent d'tre indiques, la hauteur du soleil tait de 7" 6'. Note. - Le 24 janvier 1949, le soleil s'est couch 55 minutes aprs 16 h. 06 ; le 19 octobre 1946, le soleil s'tait aussi couch 55 minutes aprs 16 h. 20. 1 1) L'entre des tunnels a t mesure. Les rails qui y conduisent semblaient en bon tat et avaient probablement t .utiliss peu de temps auparavant. Ceci est dmontr par l'absence de rouille, alors que la rouille apparaissait sur les rails mentionns sous !a rubrique 1 a). Le sol des tunnels tant recouvert de plaques de tle, il n'tait pas possible d'observer les rails qu'elles recouvraient. Le tunnel conduit une excavation plus large que les experts n'ont pas insist pour examiner entirement. Toutefois, il a t possible de voir, entreposes dans le tunnel, de vieilles munitions ainsi que des mines de fond et, dans l'excavation, des mines de fond allzmandes de type moderne (mines ovales). Lalumire lectrique tait installe dans les tunnels maisne fonctionnait pas lors de la visite. Les observations furent faites l'aide d'une seule lampe de poche lectrique, et les dtails ne pouvaient tre vus trs nettement. 1 Non reproduite. 153 ( f ) survey of the coast from Saranda to Cape Kiephali ; (g) visit to Limion Hill ; (h) visit to Saranda lighthouse. The attached sketch (Annex 1 l) shows the situation as it was found to be at Panikovac Col-e. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION MENTIONED UNDER 1. 1 (a) The quays were measured and the dimensions found to be

approximately as given by Admiral Moullec (dimensions are shown in Annex 1 l). At the north-eastern quay, standard small-gauge rails and minetransport cars were observed ; the latter were evidently not of the type used to transport German GY mines. - 1 (b) No "built-up quay" was observed, nor were any remnants seen such as would indicate the previous existence of such a quay. 1 (c) Soundings of the depth of water alongside the qua s were taken at low tide, and are shown in Annes 1 l. Difference etween high and low water : approximately 60 cm. g 1 (d) There were no traces of any wrecks or obstructions alongside the south-western quay. 1 (e) The configuiation of the land was such that, at 16.06 hours on January q t h , 1919, a ship moored an'where in Panikovac Col-e would be in the shade. On this dai; and at this time, the altitude of the sun was 7" 6'. Note.-16.06 hours on Januarjr 24th, was 55 minutes before sunset ; 16.20 hours on October ~ g t h 1, 9 46, was also 55 minutes before sunset. 1 (f) The entrances to the tunnels were measured. The rails leading to them appeared to be in working order and had probably been used not long before. This was proved by the absence of mst, which was apparent on the rails mentioned under 1 (a). The fact that the floor of the tunnels was covered with iron sheeting prevented rails from being observed. The tunnel led to a widened excavation which the esperts did not insist on examining entirely. But they were able to see old ammunition and ground mines stored in the tunnel and modem German ground mines (oval) stored in the excavation. Electnc light was installed in the tunnels, but was not working at the time of Our visit. Observations were made with the aid of a single electric torch and details could not be seen \-ery distinctly. Not reproduced. Des observations ainsi faites dans l'anse de Panikovac, il ressort les conclusions suiziantes : i) On et pu amarrer un mouilleur de mines de la classe M le long du quai sud-ouest ou du quai nord-est. L'emplacement le plus favorable au chargement aurait t le quai sud-ouest, plus proche des deux tunnels. Si, sur deux mouilleurs de mines de la classe M , l'on devait en mme temps charger des mines provenant de ces deux tunnels, la mthode la plus rapide consisterait a les amarrer le long du quai sud-ouest, l'un derrire l'autre. L'absence de quai prolong )) empcherait les deux navires d'tre amarrs le long du quai nord-est, l'un derrire l'autre.

ii) L'clat des mines frachement peintes ne pouvait avoir t observ aprs 16 h. 15, le 19 octobre 1946, car, ce moment, les navires se trouvaient dans l'ombre. iii) La dimension des entres des tunnels n'est pas un obstacle leur utilisation pour le stockage des mines allemandes GY. Si les tunnels ont servi stocker en mme temps des mines GY (mines ancres) et des mines de fond, les premires ont pu tre places dans la partie largie de l'excavation, et les secondes dans le tunnel proprement dit. Dans ce cas, et s'il avait fallu charger bord les mines GY, le tunnel aurait d tre dgag pour pouvoir les sortir, ce qui aurait amen entreposer momentanment sur le quai les mines de fond. Note. - Le reprsentant du Gouvernement yougoslave a dclar qu'il tait impossible de faire des expriences avec des mines GY (par exemple, de les charger a bord des navires), car aucune mine de ce type n'tait disponible. 1 g) Des expriences de visibilit ont t faites en passaiit en vedette devant l'anse de Panikovac en suivant les trajets indiqus dans l'annexe C au document dpos au Greffe le 27 novembre 194s et mentionn ci-dessus. Le 24 janvier 1949, a 16 h. 16, le premier passage fut effectu selon le trajet i). La hauteur du soleil tait alors de 6" 1'. Le mouilleur de mines M 2 )) tait amarr, l'arrire vers la rade de Sibenik, le long de la jete nord-est, et se trouvait entirement dans l'ombre des collines. En passant devant l'anse de Panikovac selon le trajet i), la distance de la vedette l'anse fut mesure : elle tait de 520 mtres. A 16 h. 25, un second trajet fut effectu suivant la mme route. Pendant les deux trajets, il tait possible d'observer : a) le M 2 s, quelque endroit qu'il ft amarr dans l'anse de Panikovac ; b) des gens marchant sur le pont du M 2 . On et pu voir : c) les mines en train d'tre charges bord du M 2 1). Peut-tre et-on pu voir : d) les mines et les crapauds placs bord des navires. 1.54 The following colzclusions can be drawn fiom the above obsewations ut Pa7tikaiac Coae : (i) An "M"-class minelayer could have been moored along the south-western or along the north-eastern quay. The best place for loading would be the south-western quay, which is closest to both tunnels. If loading were to be done simultaneously from both tunnels, the quickest way to load two "M"-class minelayers would be to moor them alongside the south-western

quay, one astern of the other. As there is no "built-up quay", two ships could not be moored along the north-eastem quay, one behind the other. (ii) The gloss of newly painted mines codd not have been observed at any tirne after 16.15 hours on October ~ g t h ,1 946; for at that time the ships were in the shade. (iii) The entrantes to the tunnels were wide enough to permit their being used to accommodate German GY mines. If both GY mines (moored mines) and ground mines were stored in the excavations, it would be feasible to stow the moored mines in the widened area and the others in the tunnel itself. If this were done and if the GY mines had to be loaded, the ground mines would have to be cleared from the tunnel and placed temporarily on the quay-side, in order to remove the GY mines. Note.-The Yugoslav representative said that it was impossible to carry out tests with GY mines (e.g., loading on board ship), since no such mines were available. 1 (g) Observations were made as to visibility while passing Panikovac Cove in a launch, at various distances, as shown in Annex C to the document filed in the Registry on November 27th, 1948, and mentioned above. At 16.16 hours on January 24th, 1949, the first trip was made on route (i). The altitude of the Sun at the moment was 6" 1'. The "M 2" was moored with her stern towards the Sibenik Bay alongside the north-easter'h quay, and was completely in the shade of the hills When passing Panikovac Cove on route (i), the distance from the launch to the Cove was measured and found to be 520 metres. At 16.25 hours a second trip was made over the same route. During both trips it was possible to obsewe : (a) the "M 2" moored at any place in Panikovac Cove ; (b) people waiking on the deck of the "M 2". It would be fiossible to see : (c) mines being loaded on board the "M 2". It might be possible to see : (d) mine bodies and sinkers on board these ships. Il attrait t impossible de voir : e) que les mines taient frachement peintes ; f) les antennes ou les rails (les navires se trouvant dans l'ombre). Un troisihme passage fut effectu le mme jour, 16 h. gj, suivant le trajet iii). La hauteur du soleil tait alors de 3" 2'. Le M 2 tait amarr dans la mme position ; la distance de la vedette au M 2 fut mesure, elle tait de 840 mtres. Au corn de ce passage, on constata qu'il tuit possible d'observer les navires amarrs dans l'anse de Panikovac.

I l aurait t possible de voir des mines en train d'tre charges. Aucune azctre observation n'aurait #JU tre faite en suivant ce trajet. 1 h) Pendant les prparatifs des passages relats sous la rubrique 1 g), la cte nord-est de la presqu'le de Mandalina fut observe. Plusieurs appontements furent aperus auxquels une vedette aurait aisment pu accoster. Si la vedette avait accost la pointe de Kulina, elie n'en aurait pas moins d suivre le trajet ii), de la pointe de Kulina Mo10 Krka. On ne voit pas pourquoi elie aurait suivi le trajet i). Le trajet iii) aurait t suivi si la vedette n'avait pas relch la pointe de Kulina. En suivant le trajet ii), la distance de la vedette l'anse de Panikovac aurait t de 600 mtres, et les possibilits d'observation auraient t les mmes que dans le cas du trajet i). 1 i) Le M 2 fut trouv quip en dragueur de mines. L'appareil de dragage consistait en une drague Oropesa pour mines ancres. Le treuil de dragage se trouvait un mtre en avant du mt arrire. Ce navire pourrait cependant tre aisment converti en mouilleur de mines. Il comporte, cet effet, l'quipement suivarit : a) un mt de charge pour embarquer les mines, d'une longueur de 7,80 m., dimension de la manille : 0,025 m. ; b) des boulons logs dans le pont pour fixer les traverses des rails, ces boulons taient bien graisss et faciles ter; c) longueur des rails tribord et bbord : 12,70 In. chaque ; distance entre les boulons : 0,675 m. ; trois charnires par rail ; pas de p!zque tournante. Ces rails sont d'une longueur suffisante pour y placer en tout 18 20 mines GY. Toutefois, l'cartement intrieur ncessaire pour les mines GY est de 0,70 m., et, sur le c M 2 , la distance entre les boulons est de 0,675 m. On doit se souvenir que l'cartement des rails dpend uniquement de la faon dont les traverses sont construites et dont les rails sont fixs sur les traverses. Il existe des rails pour voies troites, dont l'cartement peut tre rgl selon les besoins. Toutefois, il n'y avait pas Sibenik de rails disponibles qu'on pt inspecter ; d) des treuils pour filin de petite dimension taient fixs sur le pont ; mais on aurait pu facilement les enlever. It would have been impossible to see : (e) that the mines were newly painted ; (f) horns or rails (ships being in the shade). A third trip was made at 16.35 hours on January 24th, 1949, on route (iii). The altitude of the sun at this moment was 3' 2'. The "M 2" was moored in the same position and the distance measured from the launch to the "M 2" was found to be 840 metres.

During this run 'it zeu.~ found possible to observe ships moored in Panikovac Cove. It would be possible to observe the actual loading of mines. No other observations could have been made while following this route. 1 (h) During the preparation for the trips mentioned under 1 (g), the north-east coast of Mandalina Peninsula was observed. Several jetties were seen at which a launch could easily be moored. If the launch calIed at Kulina Point, it would, however, follow route (ii) from Kulina Point to Mo10 Krka. We can see no reason why route (i) should be followed. Route (iii) would be followed if the launch clid not cal1 at Kulina Point. The distance from route (ii) to Panikovac Cove would be 600 metres and the possibility of observation would be the same as mentioned for route (i). 1 (i) The "M 2" was found to be fitted out as a minesweeper. Minesweeping gear consisted of Oropesa gear for moored mines ; the minesweeping winch was situated about one metre in front of the aft mast. This ship could, however, easily be converttd into a minelayer, and had for the purpose the following equipment : (a) a derrick to load mines. Length of derrick: 7.80 metres. Diameter of shackle: I inch; (b) props in the deck to fix the sleepers of the mine rails. These props were well greased, and easily removable ; (c) length of rails on starboard and port side : each 12.70 metres ; distance between props : 0.675 metres ; three joints on either rail ; no turntables. These rails are of a sufficient length to accommodate 18-20 GY mines in all. Although the inside width of rails needed for GY mines is 70 cm. and the distance between the props on "M 2" is 67.5 cm., it should be borne in mind that the actual width of the rails dependr entirely on the construction of the sleepers and the attachment of the rails to the sleepers. There exist smallgauge rails of which the width can be regulated as required ; at Sibenik, however, the rails were not available for inspection ; (d) small wire winches were screwed into the deck, but were easily removable. 155 Ce qui prcde permet de conclure qu' bord du A-I 2 on aurait pz4 charger des mines G Y. 1 j) et k) Les experts se sont rendus sur la terrasse de Keric afin d'observer la vue que l'on y a sur l'anse de Panikovac. Ils ont emprunt la route que le tmoin Kovacic dclare avoir suivie partir de Mo10 Krka. Le trajet a t effectu le 24 janvier 1949. L'heure d'arrive a Mo10

Krka tait 16 h. 43. Il fallut 12 minutes de marche pour se rendre la maison de Kovacic, et 14 minutes pour aller de la maison de Kovacic celle de Keric. Les coltditions atmosphriques, le 24 janvier 1949, taient les suivantes : ciel sans nuages, temps clair, bonne visibilit, lgre brise. Le 19 octobre 1946, le soleil s'tait couch CL 17 h. 15 ; le crpuscule civil tait 17 h. 41. Le 24 janvier 1949, le soleil s'est couch 17 h. I ; le crpuscule civil tait 17 h. 30. Les observations suivantes furent faites: le 24 janvier 1949, 17 h. 30, le M 2 )) n'tait pas visible de la maison de Keric. Le 2 se trouvait dans la mme position que pendant l'aprs-midi (amarr le long du quai nord-est). On demanda alors par tlphone au M 2 )) de se dplacer vers l'Est et de s'amarrer dans la position qu'il aurait occupe s'il y avait eu un quai prolong D. A 17 h. 35, lorsque le M 2 fut amarr au nouvel emplacement, il tait encore impossible de le voir de la terrasse de Keric. Ceci tait uniquement d la configuration du terrain et non aux conditions de visibilit. Tant que le navire resta amarr dans l'anse, on ne pouvait apercevoir de la terrasse de Keric que la fume de la chemine. C'tait d'ailleurs l la seule preuve que le navire tait en train de se dplacer. Le M 2 reut alors par tlphone l'ordre de quitter l'anse de Panikovac et, .17 h. 40, sa silhouette devint nettement visible lorsque, aprs tre sorti de l'anse, il eut atteint un point de la rade de Sibenik qui se trouvait en dehors de l'ombre porte par les collines. (Annexe II1.) Dans cette position, il aurait t possible d'observer si le navire tait ou non charg de mines. En partant del'hypothse que les bateaux de la classe u M se trouvaient dans l'anse de Panikovac et l'avaient quitte aprs le coucher du soleil, les obsewations ci-dessus conduisent aux comlusions suivawtes : A. Les navires de la classe M pouvaient tre employs pour le mouillage des mines. Il tait possible de loger des mines GY dans les tunnels. B. Il importe peu de savoir o et comment les navires de la classe M D taient amarrs dans l'anse de Panikovac, tant donn que : 1) le 19 octobre 1946, 16 h. 15, il et t possible d'observer les navires et le chargement des mines, que le trajet emprunt soit le i), le ii) ou le iii) ; l Non reproduite. 156 CORFU CHANNEL CASE (MERITS) (ANXES 2) 156

The abozle Zeads ILS to the conclzuio~t fhat GT- mines co~rld be zued o.ir board "11 2". 1 ( j ) and (k) The experts visited Keric's house to observe the view of Panikovac Cove from the terrace. The- went by the same way as Kovacic said he followed from Mo10 Krka. Mo10 Krka was reached at 16.43 on January 24th, 1949. The walk to Kovacic's house took 12 minutes, and that from Kovacic's house to Keric's house 14 minutes. tt-entlzev co?ulitions 0% January 2$h, 1949 : cloudless-clear-good visibility-slight breeze. On October ~ g t h , 1946, sunset \vas at 17.15 ; civil twilight Ras at 17.41. On January 24th, 1949, sunset \vas 17.01 ; cilil twilight at 17.30. The follou-ing obserc-ations were made : at 17.30 on January q t h , 1949, "11 2" mas not visible from Keric's house ; "JI 2;' was in the same position as during the afternoon (moored alongside the northeastern qua)-). "hl 2" \vas then instructed by telephone to move eastmard and to moor in a position as if a "built-up quay" esisted. At 17.35, when "M 2" was moored in her nexv position, it \vas still impossible to observe her from Keric's terrace. This was solely due to the configuration of the land and not to the visibility conditions. So long as the ship was moored in the ColTe, only the smoke of the funnel could be seen from Keric's terrace. As a matter of fact, this was the only proof that the ship was shifting. "AI 2" \vas then instructed by telephone to leave Panikovac Cove, and at 17.40 her silhouette became clearly visible when she had left the Cove and reached a part of Sibenik Ba\- that was not shaded bj- the hills. (See Annes II l.) In this position it would have been possible to obserl-e whether the ship was loaded with mines or not. Assuming that the "hl"-class ships were at Panikovac Cove and left the Cove after sunset, the obserz~ationsm ade in Sibefzik lead te the /olloxing co~tclzcsioizs: A. "M"-class ships could be used for the minelaj-ing operation. The tunnels could accommodate GY mines. B. It is of no importance where and how the "JI"-class ships were moored in Panikovac Cove, for : (1) at 16.15 on October ~ g t h ,1 946, it was possible on an? of the routes (i), (ii) or (iii) to observe the ships and the loading of mines ; ' Not reproduced. 156 2) le mme jour, 17 h. 35, il et t impossible au tmoin Kovacic d'apercevoir quoi que ce ft des navires, en quelque point de l'anse qu'ils eussent t amarrs. Les controverses concernant :

la faon dont les navires taient amarrs ; les paves ou obstacles le long du quai sud-ouest ; la configuration du terrain ; les appontements la pointe de Kulina ; la visibilit 17 h. 35, lorsque le tmoin Kovacic se trouvait la maison de Keric ; l'existence d'un quai prolong n, sont donc sans importance pratique. Depuis la terrasse de Keric, il y avait une seule possibilit d'observer les navires de la classe M 1) : ce n'tait pas lorsqu'ils se trouvaient dans l'anse, mais au moment o ils l'avaient quitte. Selon le tmoin Kovacic, l'obscurit serait devenue trop grande pour permettre d'apercevoir les navires ayant quitt l'anse. Or, au contraire, c'est seulement aprs leur dpart qu'ils eussent pu tre observs, quand ils taient sortis de l'ombre porte sur la rade de Sibenik par les collines entourant l'anse de Panikovac. II. A SARANDA, LES 28 ET 29 JANVIER 1949. II a) Le 28 janvier, des observations furent faites de la mer sur la cte, au dpart de Saranda et jusqu'au monastre Saint-Georges, en passant devant la colline de Limione. L'itinraire est indiqu l'annexe III l; il passe par les positions A, B, C, D et revient sur Saranda. Furent nots : I. une batterie situe juste l'ouest de Saranda ; 2 . le fort Likurski, point de repre trs visible ; 3. un phare au sud de Likurski ; 4. des maisons sur le cap Denta ; j. un lieu de dbarquement prs du cap Denta ; 6. le monastre Saint-Georges, se dtachant trs nettement sur le ciel. Il y a lieu de remarquer que l'itinraire suit l'emplacement de la range est des mines. La direction est facile contrler, en gardant Ie cap sur le monastre et en ayant la colline de Limione droit derrire ou vice-versa. II b) Aprs l'observation d'ensemble de la cte de Saranda la colline de Limione et au monastre Saint-Georges, il fut dcid d'examiner plus en dtail les points nots. Le 28 janvier, les experts allrent de Saranda au monastre Saint-Georges ; il faut 2j minutes environ p3ur se rendre en automobile au pied de la colline sur laquelle il est situ. Dr I un sentier mnz au monastre. Se rendre pied au sommet prend g minutes. Des mulets empruntent ce sentier. A l'arrive au monastre, l'expdition trouva la porte close. Les autorits albanaises ' Non reproduite. 157 ( 2 ) at 17.35 on tlie same day it was impossible for ivitness Kovacic to see anything of the ships wherever they might be moored in Panikovac Cove.

The arguments concerning : the way the ships ivere moored ; wrecks or obstructions alongside tlie south-western qiiay ; the configuration of tlie land ; jetties at KuIina Point ; visibility at 17.3 j hours while witness Kovacic ivas at Keric's liouse ; esistence of "built-up quay", are of no material importance. C. The only possibility of observing the "M"-class ships froni Keric's terrace rvould not be when they ivere in the COI-e, but when they had left it. Witness Kovacic stated that it became too dark to see the ships leave the Cove. On the contrary, it would only be after their departure, when they had left tlie portion of Sibenik Bay shaded by the hills around the Cove, that they could have been observed. II. -4T S.9R.4NDA OH JANUARY 28th AND 2gth, 1949. II (a) -4 trip along the coast by sea, from Saranda, past Liniion Hill to San Giorgio Jlonastery, was made on January 28th. The route followed is shown in Annex III l; and passed throiigli the positions A, B, C, D, and back to Saranda. The following were observed : I. battery at a position just west of Saranda ; 2. fort Likiirski, a i-ery conspicuous landmark ; 3. lighthouse south of Likurski ; 4. houses at Denta Point ; 5. a landing beach near Denta Point ; 6. San Giorgio &lonasterj-, very conspicuous against the sky. Attention is drawn to the fact that the course followed coincicles with the direction of the eastern row of mines. This course was easily checked bj. heading for the Jfonastery and keeping Limion Hill right astern, or vice versa. II (b) After making a general survev of the coast from SarandaLimion Hill-San Giorgio IIonasterj7, it was decided to examine furtlier the points coted. On January 28th, a trip \vas made from Saranda to San Giorgio 3Ionastery ; the foot of the liill, on which this is situated, can be reached by car in about 25 minutes. From there, a patli leads up to the llonastery. The walk to the top takes 9 minutes. Mules use this track. 3n reaching the actual ItIonastery, the party- found the door closed. The Albanian authorities tried in l Not reproduced. essayrent en vain de la faire ouvrir par ceux qui se trouvaient l'intrieur. On demanda alors - et on obtint - la permission de forcer la porte ; ce qui fut fait. Le monastre tait occup par six soldats, mais il y avait la possibilit d'en loger beaucoup plus ; il tait pourvu d'un tlphone. Il s avait une curie mulets.

Au cours d'un examen gnral des lieux autour du monastre, les observations suivantes furent faites : a) Des lignes de tranches sont situes aux abords immdiats du btiment. b) Si les postes de veille taient situs en dehors du monastre, la surveillance s'tendrait seulement sur une partie de la baie de Saranda, car des arbres obstruent le champ de vision. Il s'ensuit qu'un autre emplacement devait tre utilis pour surveiller le passage des navires a proximit du monastre: Cet emplacement est une tour de veille qui se trouve a l'intrieur du monastre ; des bancs y sont placs, et de cet endroit plus lev l'on a une vue bien plus dgage sur le Dtroit de Corfou et la baie de Saranda, sans tre autant gn par des arbres. Les autorits albanaises dclarrent que les hommes qui se trouvaient dans-le monastre dormaient pendant la nuit et ne surveillaient la mer que pendant le jour. Cette dclaration, toutefois, ne semble pas se concilier parfaitement avec les difficults qui avaient t rencontres peu de temps avant pour obtenir l'entre du monastre. II c) et e) En revensnt du monastre, les experts dsirrent vrifier le champ de vision des maisons qu'ils avaient observes au cap Denta. Dans la Inesurz o il tait possible de le voir, il n'existait pas de sentier convenable qu? l'on pt emprunter pour se rendre aux maisons qui al-aient t observes de la mer. Il fut alors dzid d'atteindre le cap Denta en venant de la mer. Le 29 janvier, un? expdition eut lieu it bord d'un bateau moteur remorquant un canot. Un dbarqu3mrnt fut effectu prs du cap Denta sur une p.dite plage (voir annexe III l). De l, deux sentiers, que des mulets empruntent, cx~duisenta us misons, le long des pentes du cap Denta. Il ne fallut qu? qullques minutes pour se rendre du rivage la maison la moins lev?. Il fut alors p~ssible d'observer : i) une ligne de tranch-.^ et des pmtes de mitrailleuses ; ii) un vieux btiment toit, pouvant servir de logement pour des hommes et des mulets ; iii) des emplacements pour faire du feu ; iv) un journal Bas.hkimi, en date du II septembre 1948, fut trouv dans les tranches. De cet endroit, l'on a une rue entirement dgage sur l'ensemble du Dtroit de Corfou et sur la baie de Saranda. Les fnits indiqus ci-d5ssits nmlaent Zn conclusion qire d-s gnrdos ozt des POS!~S ileille fzirzltt in:tiiitenrts nlc cap Dettfa j~rsqu'ntc II sepfelltbre 1948. Il est remarquer que le rapport des experts du S janvier 1949 disait que le cap Drnta tait un (( endroit tout indiqu6 pour un poste d'obsrrvation 11, car il commandait la fois le Dtroit de Corfou et la baie de Saranda. l Kon reproduite. 15s

vain to get those inside to open the door. Permission was then requested and obtained to force the door and this was done. The Monastery was occiipied by six soldiers, but there was accommodation for many more ; it had telephone communication. A stable for mules was seen. During a general survey around the Monastery, the following were observed : (a) Infantry defences just outside the building. (b) If the look-out posts were stationed outside the Monastery, thev would be able to watch only part of the Bay of Saranda, as a number of trees partly obstructed the line of sight. It was therefore obvious that another place would be used to watch the sea traffic close to the Monastery. This place was a look-out tower inside the Monastery ; it was equipped with benches and this higher spot afforded a much clearer view over the Corfu Strait and Bay of Saranda, and was not obstructed by trees to the same extent. The Albanian authorities said that the men in the Monastery slept there during the night and only watched the seavduring the day-time. This statement, however, does not seem quite to coincide with the difficulties experienced in obtaining entrance at the door of the Monastery earlier in the day. II (c) and (e) On the way back from the Monastery, the experts desired to test the observation off the houses that had been noticed on Denta Point. As far as could be seen, no suitable path existed, leading to the houses observed from the sea. It was therefore decided to approach Denta Point from the sea side. On January 29th, a trip was made by motor ship with a rowingboat in tow. A landing was made near Denta Point on a small beach (see Annex III l). From here, two paths, which are used by mules, lead over the slopes of Denta Pomt to the houses. It only took a couple of minutes from the shore to the lowest situated house. Here were seen : (i) infantry defence line and machine-gun posts ; (ii) an old house with a roof, capable of accommodating men and mules ; (iii) places where a fire could be lighted ; (iv) a newspaper Bashkimi dated September t th, 1948, was found in the trenches. At this place one has a clear view over the whole of the Corfu Strait, as well as the Bay of Saranda. The above fmts point to the conclusion that guards or look-out posts were kept at Denta Point until September th, 1948. Attention is drawn to the fact that the Experts' Report of January 8th, 1949, called this spot an "obvious place" to keep a look-out, as it commanded the Corfu Strait as weil as Saranda Bay.

1 Not reproduced. 158 Note. - Une seconde maison, beaucoup plus importante que la prcdente, et qui pourrait tre utilise comme cantonnement, est situe plus haut sur la pente. Cette maison ne fut pas visite par les experts. II d) Dans la soire du 28 janvier, une exprience de visibilit de nuit fut effectue au monastre Saint-Georges. Conditions itmosphriques : ciel sans nuages, lgre brise, pas de lune. Le navire mentionn plus haut fut emprunt nouveau, tous les feux taient teints. Un des experts, accompagn des experts des Parties, se rendit au monastre Saint-Georges pour y tudier le degr de visibilit, tandis que l'autre expert, bord du navire, suivait l'emplacement de la range est des mines (voir annexe g du Mmoire du Royaume Uni). Le groupe partant pour le monastre quitta Saranda trois quarts d'heure environ avant le dpart du navire. A Saranda, l'autre groupe reut par tlphone, en arrivant sur le navire, un message du monastre lui confirmant que le premier groupe tait arriv. En montant vers le monastre, le premier groupe fut arrt par deux soldats arms de fusils. Cet incident ne semble pas cadrer avec la dclaration faite l'aprs-midi selon laquelle les hommes dormaient pendant la nuit. La route du bateau le long de la range est de mines fut facilement contrle en prenant comme repres : la ligne d'horizon derrire la colline de Limione ; le feu de Saranda ; le cap Kiephali ; le monastre Saint-Georges ; le cap Denta ; le phare de Tignoso. Le bateau marchait tous feux teints. Note. - Ces conditions sont les plus favorables pour viter d'tre dcouvert. Car, d'ordinaire, un mouilleur de mines, comme tous les navires chauffant au mazout ou au charbon, met de la fume par ses chemines ; et gnralement, sur un petit btiment, il faudrait bien se servir de quelque lumire au cours de l'opration mme du mouillage de mines. Tandis que le bateau se dirigeait vers le monastre, de ce poste d'observation le champ de vision se trouvait partiellement obstru par les arbres (voir annexe IV l). Le bruit du moteur fut dj entendu du monastre partir de 22 h. 20 (distance 1.800 mtres). Pendant un court moment le bateau fut entrevu, 22 h. 26 (distance 670 mtres). Il ne fut pas possible, cette occasion, de l'observer pendant longtemps, car il disparut

derrire les arbres (voir annexe IV l). Aprs avoir chang de route, 22 h. 30, il fut distinctement aperu nouveau du monastre (distance environ 800 mtres). Il mit alors le cap au Nord, et 22 h. 47 un signal en provenance du monastre fut reu bord disant .que le navire se trouvait hors 1 Non reproduite. -Vote.-X second house which was much bigger than the former and could be used as quarters, was situated higher up the slope. This house was not visited by the experts. II (d) In the evening of January 28th, a test of visibility by night from San Giorgio Monastery was carried out. Weathev conditions : cloudless ; slight breeze ; no moon. The ship mentioned above was again used. Al1 lights were extinguished. One of the experts, and the Parties' experts, went to San Giorgio Monastery to test the degree of visibility, while the other expert travelled on the ship along a line identical with that on which the eastern row of mines had been laid (see Annex g of the United Kingdom Memorial). The party for the Monastery left Saranda about three quarters of an hour before the ship sailed. On arriving at the ship in Saranda, the other party received a telephone message from the Monastery confirming that the first party had arrived. On their way up the hi11 to the Monastery, the first party was halted by two soldiers with rifles. This occurrence did not seem to taliy with the statement made' that afternoon that the men slept during the night. The course of the ship dong the eastem line of mines was easily checked with the aid of: the background of Limion Hill ; Saranda lighthouse ; Cape Kiephali ; San Giorgio Monastery ; Denta Point ; Tignoso lighthouse. The ship was completely blacked out. Note.-This is the most favourable condition for the avoidance of detection. For usually a minelayer, like al1 oiland coal-burning vessels, would emit some smoke from its funnels ; and, as a rule, some sort of light would be used on a small ship during the actual minelaying operation. While the ship was following a course towards the Monastery, the line of sight from that observation post was partly obstructed by trees (see Annex IV l). The noise of the motor was already heard from the Monastery at

22.20 hours (distance 1,800 metres). The ship was sighted for a very short while at 22.26 hours (distance 670 metres). It was not possible on this occasion to observe the ship for long, as it disappeared behind the trees (see Annex IV l). After altering course, it was sighted clearly again from the Monastery at 22.30 hours (approximate distance 800 metres). A northerly course was then set and, at 22.47 hours, a signal was received on board from the Monastery, stating that the ship was out Not reproduced. 159 de vue. La distance fut alors calcule sur la base d'un relvement crois pris zz h. 50, sur le feu de Saranda et sur un promontoire au sud du monastre ; les calculs indiqurent que la distance 22 h. 47 tait d'environ 1.900 mtres. Bruit du moteur entendu . 1.800 m. ; Bateau vu pour la premire fois 670 m. ; Bateau vu nouveau distinctement 800 m. ; Bateau suivi des yeux jusqu' une distance de 1.900 m. Note. - Le bateau moteur avait 27 m. de long, sans passerelle, sans poste de timonerie, sans chemine et ras sur l'eau. II f ) Le 29 janvier, un examen gnral de la cte de Saranda au cap Kiephali fut effectu. Il ne fut rien observ d'estrordinaire. Par endroits se trouvaient des postes de veille apparemment abandonns. On remarqua aussi des rduits bCtonns. Au cap Kiephali, une maison fut aperue qui aurait constitu 11x1 emplacement idal pour un poste de veille, car elle comniaiidait tout le chenal hdri. II g) Le 29 janvier, la colline de Limione, o se trouvait un ancien emplacement de batterie italien, fut reconnue. II h) Il tait dit dans le rapport des experts du S janvier 1949 qu'il y avait un seul feu pour guider la navigation dans le Dtroit de Corfou. De fait, un seul feu se trouve indiqu sur la carte de l'Amiraut. Mais le feu de Saranda fut trouv en activit le 28 janvier 1949. Il ne pouvait cependant servir pour un relvement si le mouillage des mines avait commenc du Sud, tant donn la configuration de la cte au cap Denta. Ce feu aurait t utile si les mines avaient t inouillSes en partant du, Nord. Etant donn cependant que, d'aprs les autorits albanaises, aucun registre ou autre document d'information n'tait disponible, il ne fut pas possible d'tablir si le feu de Saranda fonctionilait au mois d'octobre 1946. On fieut tirer les conclusiots sidit3antrs: A. Une opration de mouillage de mines pouvait etre es6cute dans le canal de Corfou en partant :

a) soit du Nord ; ou b) soit du Sud. B. Par une nuit claire, dans les deus directions, se trouvaient des points de repre terrestres suffisants pour permettre de prendre un relvement. C. A condition qu'il y ait eu des postes d'observation au cap Kiephali, au cap Denta et au monastre Saint-Georges ; que le temps ait t normal pour la rgion ; et que les mines aient t nlouilles eri partant du Nord vers le Sud, i) l'opration pouvait Cchapper l'attentioii du poste en faction au pied du monastre Saint-Georges, parce que la (( position of sight. The distance \vas then calculated from a cro~s~bearintga,k en at 22.50, from Saranda light and a promontory south of the Monastery, and the distance at 22.47 hours was found to be approximately 1,900 metres. Noise of motor was heard at 1,800 metres distance ; Ship was obserl-ed for the first time at 670 ,metres distance ; Ship was again clearly seen at 800 metres distance ; Ship was followed for a distance of 1,900 metres. -Voir.-This motor ship was only So feet long, had no bridge, wvheelhouse or fu~inela, nd w\?as very lo\v on the wvater. II (1) On January 29th, a general survey \vas made of the coast between Saranda and Cape Kiephali. Xothing extraordinarp was observed. Here and there were look-out posts which seemed to be deserted. Pill-boxes were also noticed. At Cape Kiephali, a house was sighted which would be an ideal place for a look-out, commanding the whole Medri channel. II (g) On January ~ g t ha, w-isit was paid to Limion Hill, where an old Italian battery was situated. II (II) In the Experts' Report of January Sth, 1949, it was stated that only one light existed to guide navigation in Corfu Strait. In fact, onlr one light is indicated on the -1dniiralty chart. But Saranda lighthouse \vas found to be working on Jaiiuary ~ S t h , 1949 ; it could not, however, be used for a cross-bearing if the minelaying began from the South, owing to the configuration of the land at Denta Point. This lighthouse \vould Iiave been of service if the mines were laid from the Yorth. But as no log-book or other documentary information was available, according to the Albanian authorities, it \vas not possible to state whether the Saranda light \vas in working order in October 1946. 1. -1 minelaying operation could be carried out in Corfu Channel, starting : (a) from the Xorth ; (b) from the South. B. On a clear night, on either course, tliere would lia\-e been

sufficient landmarks to take a fis. C. Pro\-ided a look-out was kept at Cape Kiephali, Denta Point and San Giorgio Afonastery, and under normal weather conditions for this area, and if the mines were laid from the Xorth towards the South : (i) the operation might not be seen by the look-out post at the foot of San Giorgio lfonastery, because "position 22.47 160 22 h. 47 )) est celle de la mine qui a t trouve le plus au Sud (voir annexe III l) ; ii) les mouilleurs de mines auraient cependant t aperus du cap Kiephali ; et iii) ils ont d tre observs du cap Denta car, en passant devant ce cap, ils se trouvaient dans la zone de visibilit indique dans le rsum sous II d). D. Si le mouillage de mines tait effectu en partant du Sud (solution des plus vraisemblables, les navires n'ayant pas ainsi traverser leur propre champ de mines s'ils allaient vers le Nord), les navires auraient t observs du cap Kiephali, du cap Denta et du monastre Saint-Georges. On doit se souvenir que, dans ce cas, les navires seraient passs deux iois devant les points ci-dessus mentionns. Les experts considrent comme indiscutable que, si des postes de veille normaux taient maintenus au cap Kiephali, au cap Denta et au monastre Saint-Georges, si ces postes taient munis de jumelles, comnze on l'a dclar, et si les conditions atmosphriqz~es avaient t normales 9our cette rgion, les oprations de mouillage de mines relates dans l'annexe g du -Mnzoire du Royaume-Uni, ont dl2 tre obsenies par ces postes de veille de la cdte. Lors de la visite des esperts au monastre Saint-Georges, les autorits albanaises dclarrent qu'elles ne disposaient pas actuellement de jumelles ce poste. ,4u cours de l'examen gnral de la cte entre la colline de Limione et le monastre Saint-Georges le 28 janvier, entre la colline de Limione et le cap Kiephali le 29 janvier, les experts ont observ que la roche Barchetta n'tait pas un point aussi facile reprer que le phare de Tignoso. Mais il se trouve que, dans les rapports relatifs a l'opration Retail (Mmoire du Royaume-Uni, p. 117), les positions de toutes les mines dragues le 13 novembre 1946 sont donnes en relvement et en distance partir de la roche Barchetta. Les experts ont par consquent consult les rapports sur l'opration Retail pour contrler les positions en question. Ils sont arrivs aux conclusions suivantes : I. chacun des navires participant a l'opration peut avoir individuellement choisi quelque repre ctier trs apparent pour relever la position d'une mine drague ; 2. ces positions ont pu lors'tre reportes plus tard sur la carte

indiquant toute la surface drague ; 3. la roche Barchetta, tant le repre le plus proche de la zone de dragage la plus l'Ouest, fut alors choisie comme point de rfrence pour servir de base au calcul de toutes les positions indiques la page 117 du Mmoire du Royaume-Uni ; ' Non reproduite. 161 hours" coincides with the most southerly mine which was cut (see Annex III l) ; (ii) the minelayers would, however, be seen from Cape Kiephali ; and (iii) must have been noticed from Denta Point, as the distances while passing it are within the limits of visibility shown in summary under II (d). D. If the minelaying were done from the South (which is most feasible, as the ships would not have to cross their own minefields if returning to the North), the minelayers would have been observed from Cape Kiephali, Denta Point and San Giorgio Monastery. It must be borne in mind that in this case the ships would have passed the above-mentioned points twice. The experts consider it to be indisputable that if a normal look-out was kept at Cape Kiephali, Denta Point, and San Giorgio Monastery, and if the look-outs were equipped with bi~wculars as has been stated, under mrmal weather conditions for this area, the minelaying operations shown in Annex g to the United Kingdom Memorial must have been noticed by these coast-guards. On the occasion of the experts' visit to San Giorgio Monastery, the Albanian authorities stated that no binoculars were now available at that post. GENERAL. During the general survey of the coast from Limion Hill to San Giorgio Monastery on January 28th and from Limion Hill to Cape Kiephali on January zgth, the experts noticed that Barchetta Rock was not so easy a point to distinpish as Tignoso lighthouse. But it happens that in the Reports on Operation Retail (United Kingdom Memorial, p. 117)~th e positions of al1 the mines swept on November 13th, 1946, are given by bearing and distance from Barchetta Rock. The experts therefore consulted the Reports on Operation Retail in order to check the positions in question. They reached the conclusion that : I. individual ships taking part in the Operation may have selected any obvious landmark in plotting the position of a swept mine ; 2. these positions would then be plotted later on a chart of the whole area of the sweep ; 3. Barchetta Rock, as being the closest landmark to the most westerly lap of the sweep, was then selected as a dahm dan

(reference point) for tabulating al1 the positions shown on page 117 of the United Kingdom Memorial ; Not reproduced. 161 4. mais tout autre point de rfrence aurait aussi bien pu tre employ, par exemple, le phare de Tignoso ou le monastre Saint-Georges. Le prsent rapport a t tabli en anglais, en un exemplaire, dpos au Palais de la Paix, La Haye, le huit fvrier mil neuf cent quaranteneuf. (Sign) ASD. FORSHELL. (Sign) S. ELFFERICH. CORFU CHANNEL CASE (MERITS) (ANNEX 2) 162 4. but any other reference point could just as well have been used, e.g., Tignoso lighthouse or San Giorgio Monastery. This Report was drawn up in EngIish in one copy, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this eighth day of Febmary, one thousanid nine hundred and forty-nine. (Signed) AND. FORSHELL. (Sig- S. ELFFERICH. QUESTIONS POSES PAR TROIS MEMBRES DE LA COUR LE IO FVRIER 1949 a) Par M. ZoriCit. 1. - A la page 15 l du texte franais (p. 14 l texte anglais) le rapport arrive aux conclusions. Au point C il est dit que, moyennant certaines conditions : I" I'opratim pouvait chapper l'attention du poste en faction au pied du monastre Saint-Georges ; 2" les mouilleurs de mines auraient cependant t aperus du cap Kiephali ; et 3" ils devaient tre observs du cap Denta. Au point D on parle aussi des navires qui auraient t observs. De ce texte il ressortirait que ce que les postes auraient pu ou d observer taient les mouilleurs de mines, donc les navires eux-mmes, et il parat que le terme cc opratim )) au point 1" se rfrerait aux mouvements et manoeuvres des navires. Or, la fin de la page a il est dit que, condition que des postes de veille normaux fussent maintenus au cap Kiephali, au cap Denta et au monastre Saint-Georges, ainsi que sous rserve d'autres conditions : (( les opkrations de mouillage de mines . . . . ont d tre observes par ces postes de veille de la cdte . On parle donc ici des n oprations de mouillage de mines )) et il est important de savoir ce que les experts ont voulu dterminer par ces mots, en d'autres termes : I" le sens de la conclusion est-il que les navires mouilleurs euxmmes ont d tre observs par les postes, ou 2" le sens des mots oprations de mouillage des mines )) est-il

que les postes ont d voir non seulement les navires et leurs manoeuvres, mais bien aussi le mouillage, donc le lancement des mines dans la mer ? II. - La vue qu'on a du cap Denta permet-elle de voir certaines parties du Dtroit ou de la baie de Saranda que l'on ne pourrait voir ni du cap Kiephali, ni de Saranda, ni de la tour de veille du monastre Saint-Georges ? En d'autres termes, n'est-il pas possible de voir,. de ces postes, tout ce que l'on peut voir du cap Denta ? b) Par M. Krylov. I. Les maisons la pointe Denta taient-elles habites ? Pourquoi - la plus grande maison n'a-t-elle pas t visite ? Ces maisons Voir pp. 160-161. a p. 161. 163 QUESTIONS PUT BY THREE MEMBERS OF THE COURT ON FEBRUARY roth, 1949. (a) By Judge ZoriZiC. 1.-On page 15 of the French text (page 14 of the English text) the Report amves at certain conclusions. Under heading C it is stated that, subject to certain conditions: 1. the @eration might not be seen by the look-out post at the foot of San Giorgio Monastery ; 2. the minelayers would however be seen from Cape Kiephali ; and 3. they must have been noticed from Denta Point. In paragraph D mention is also made of the mifielayers which would have been observed. From this text it would appear that what the guards might have, or should have, observed was the minelayers, i.e., the ships themselves, and it seems that the word "operation" in sub-paragraph I refers to the movements and manoeuvres of the ships. At the end of the page (and top of next page in English text) it is stated that if a normal look-out was kept at Cape Kiephali, Denta Point, and San Giorgio Monastery, and if certain other conditions were fulfilled : "the minelaying operations . ... must have been noticed by the coast-guards". These passages mention "minelaying operations", and it is therefore important to know what meaning the Experts attach to these words ; in other words : (1) Does the conclusion mean that the minelaying ships themselves must have been observed by the coast-guards, or (2) Do the words "minelaying operations" mean that the coastguards must have seen not only the ships and the manoeuvres which they carried out, but also the actual minelaying, Le., the launching of the mines into the sea ? II.-Does the view which is obtainable from Cape Denta enable one to see certain parts of the Strait, or of Saranda Bay, which would not be visible either from Cape Kiephali, or from Saranda, or again

from the tower of the old Monastery of San Giorgio ? In other words, is it not possible to see, from these look-out posts, everything which would lx visible from Cape Denta ? (b) By Judge Krylov. I. Were the houses at Denta Point inhabited ? Why wai the big house not visited ? Had these houses been recently built ? ' See pp 160-161. 1 ,, p. 161. taient-elles nouvellement construites ? Veuillez donner une description plus complte du vieux btiment visit (page II du rapport). 2. La ligne de tranches et les postes de mitrailleuses au cap Denta taient-ils de date rcente (p. II l) ? 3. Queile tait la direction du vent pendant les observations du 28 janvier ? Une lgre brise a t constate (p. 12 a). 4. La maison aperue au cap Kiephali est-elle nouvellement construite ? tait-elle utilise comme un poste de veille ? (P. lqS.) 5. A la page 15 les experts utilisent deux fois l'expression normal E en parlant des conditions atmosphriques. Quelle est la dfinition des conditions (( normales ? 6. Pourquoi les experts ont-ils cru ncessaire de prsenter la Cour des remarques se rapportant au relvement de la position des mines pris de la roche Barchetta (p. 16 $) ? 7. Pourquoi les navires qui ont pos les mines devaient-ils passer deux fois devant la cte albanaise (p. 15 ') ? c) Par M. EEer. Quelle rponse les experts peuvent-ils donner aux objections faites par M. Cot leur rapport du 8 janvier 1949 (Distr. 4915) en ce qui concerne l'audibilit de l'opration? (Page 1111, de la Distr. 435 ter.) ' Vo8. ir p8.. 115589.. 160. pp. 160 et 161. 8 p.161. Please give a fuller description of the old hoiise which was visited (page II l of the Report). 2. \Vere the infantry line and the machine-gun posts at Denta Point of recent construction (page IO l, English text) ? 3. \Vhat was the direction of the wind during the observations on January 28th ? Mention is made of a slight breeze (page II 2, English text). 4. Had the house that was seen at Cape Kiephali been recently constructed ? Had it been used as a look-out post ? (Page 13 3, English text.) 5. On page 14' (English text) the Experts twice make use of the term normal" with reference to weather conditions. What is the definition of "normal" conditions ? 6. \Vhy did the Experts think it necessary to submit observations

to the Court relating to the fixing of the positions of mines by bearing and distance from Barchetta Rock (page 15 =, English text) ? 7. IVhy would the ships which laid the mines have had to pass the Albanian Coast talice (page 14 5, English text) ? What reply can the Experts give to M. Cot's objection to their Report of January 8th, 1949 (Distr. 491.9, as regards the audibility of the operation ? (Page 1111 of Distr. 435 ter.) 1 See p. I 56. ,, .a 139. ,. ,, 160. 4 ,, pp. 160 and 161. ,, p. 161. RPONSES DES EXPERTS, EN DATE DU 12 FVRIER, 1949, AUX QUESTIONS POSES PAR TROIS MEMBRES DE LA COUR [Traduction.] dsigns par l'ordonnance de la Cour du 17 dcembre 1948 et qui, en excution de la dcision de la Cour du 17 janvier 1949, se sont rendus Sibenik et Saranda, ont l'honneur de rpondre comme suit aux questions qui leur ont t transmises par lettre du Greffier en date du IO fvrier 1949. 1. Questions poses par M. le Juge Krylov. a) Maisons du cap Denta. Les experts n'ont pas jug utile de visiter la plus grande de ces maisons, ni de demander si la maison est habite ou quel usage elle est destine. En effet, les constatations faites quant l'existence du poste d'observation leur paraissent suffire aux fins de leur enqute. Si, dans leur rapport, ils ont fait incidemment mention de cette maison, c'est pour confirmer que le cap Denta n'est pas inaccessible. b) poque de la construclion. Par (( vieux btiment )) (btiment situ au poste d'observation), les expurts ont entendu une construction i~lcontestablement antrieure 1946. II leur parait supenu de rechercher une prcision plus grande. Quant la plus grande maison, les experts n'ont pas jug ncessaire d'en estimer ou d'en demander l'anciennet, pour les raisons indiques sous la lit. a. Ils peuvent cependant ajouter que, vue de la mer, elle parait plus rcente que le btiment situ au poste d'observation. c) Description d~ (( vieux baiment )). Le (( vieux btiment )) a environ les dimensions suivantes : longueur, IO m. ; largeur, 2,50 m. ; hauteur, 2,50 m. Il sert d'curie. Devant la porte, qui est situe sur la faade troite oriente vers Ie Sud-Ouest, se trouve un emplacement pour faire du feu. Les experts ont estim inutile de s'attarder tudier le (( vieux btiment )I avec plus de dtails. Les lignes de tranches et postes de mitrailleuses du cap Denta. sont en excellent tat, mais sans pour cela tre rcents. En effet, la

mme vgtation pauvre que l'on trouve partout sur cette cte rocheuse 16s EXPERTS' REPLIES, DATED FEBRUAKY u t h , 1949, TO QUESTIONS PUT BY THREE MEMBERS OF THE COURT. who were appointed by the Court's Order of December 17th, 1948, and who visited Sibenik and Saranda in pursuance of the Court's decision of January 17th, 1949, have the honour to reply as follows to the questions which were put to them in the Registrar's letter of February ~ o t h ,1 949. 1. Questions put by Judge Krylov. (a) The houses at Denta Po&. The experts did not see any advantage in visiting the bigger of these houses, or in asking if it was inhabited, or for what use it is intended. In truth, the facts they had ascertained in regard to the existence of the look-out post appeared to them sufficient for the purposes of their enquiry. The only reason why they referred, incidentally, to this house in their report was in order to confirm the fact that Denta Point is not inaccessible. @) Date of co?zstrz~ction. By the term "old house" (building situated at the look-out post) the experts meant that it was certainly built earIier than 1946. It seemed to them unnecessary to seek for greater accuracy. In regard to the bigger house, the experts thought it unnecessary to estimate or to make enquiries in regard to the date of its construction, for the reasons given above in paragraph (a). They are, however, able to state that, as seen from the sea, it seemed to be of more recent construction than the building situated at the look-out post. (c) Description of the "old house". The dimensions of the "old house" were approximately as follows : Length : IO m. ; width : 2.50 m. ; height : 2.50 m. It is used as a stable. In front of the door, which is situated in the narrow face of the house looking towards the South-West, there is a place used for fires. The experts considered it useless to spend time in examining the "old house" in closer detail. The infantry trenches and the machine-gun posts at Denta Point are in an excellent state, though that does not mean that they are of recent construction. In truth, the same poor vegetation which 165 166 AFFAIRE DU DTROIT DE CORFOU (FOND) (ANNEXE 2) pousse galement sur le parapet de la tranche, lequel est constituk par les dblais. Au surplus, il a t dclar aus esperts que ces lignes de dfense avaient t construites par les troupes italiennes. Ad 3. La brise, trs lgre, venait du N.-E.

Ad 4. Les experts n'ont pas jug utile de prolonger leurs investigations en demandant a dbarquer au cap Kiephali. Les constatations faites par eux au cap Denta, ainsi que les remarques relates dans leur rapport sous le no II f ) , leur ont paru suffire aux fins de leur enqute. Ad 5. Selon le Mediterranean Pilot, volume III, on peut considrer comme normales les conditions mtorologiques suivantes : a) Rgime des vents. Les vents prdominants sont, en t, ceux du Nord-Ouest et, en hiver, ceux du Sud-Est. En t, quand le temps est au beau fixe et que la pression baromtrique est leve, de mme que souvent en hiver, ce sont les brises de terre et de mer qui prdominent. Le vent de terre est lger, et, dans la rgion du Dtroit de Corfou, il vient du Nord au Nord-Est. Il se lve deux trois heures aprs le coucher du soleil et sa force va augmentant jusqu'aprs minuit ; ce moment, il diminue et s'arrte au lever du soleil ; il se ranime au fur et mesure que le soleil monte, virant de quelques points en direction de l'Est jiisqu' environ neuf heures du matin : aprs quoi il tombe et est remplac par la brise de mer. b) Mbzslosit. Lorsque ce sont les brises de terre et de mer qui prdominent, la nbulosit est plutt faible. Le vent du Sud-Est peut s'accompagner de pluie et l'on peut s'attendre un ciel couvert. En octobre, la nbulosit est en moyenne de 40 %. C) Visiilit. La visibilit est d'habitude bonne dans l'Adriatique, sauf quand souffle la bora, qui provoque des chutes de pluie. Souvent, il J- a au large de la cte dalmate une visibilit exceptionnellement bonne. Yote. - La bora est un vent rgional qui peut souffler trs fort, du Nord-Est, pendant environ 15 20 heures. Elle provoque par intermittence de forts grains, du tonnerre, des clairs et de la pluie. Elle a d'habitude pour effet de dissiper la nbulosit ou le brouillard et, lorsqu'elle souffle avec violence, le temps est trs clair. d) Comlusiow. Lorsqu'ils ont parl de conditions atmosphriqiies normales sous la lettre D de leur conclusion, page 15 di1 teste franais, les esperts l Voir p. 161. 166 one finds everywhere on this rocky coast grows also on the parapet of the trench, made of the excavated soil. Moreover, the experts were informed that these defence lines had been constructed by the Italian troops. Ad 3.

The very slight breeze was blowing from the N.-E. Ad 4. The experts saw no purpose in prolonging their investigations by asking to go on shore at Cape Kiephali. The observations the'; had made at Denta Point, together with the remarks given in their report under No. II (f), seemed to them sufficient for the needs of their enquiry. Ad 5. According to the Mediterranean Pilot, Volume III, one can consider the following weather conditions as being normal. (a) Wind. During surnrner, north-westerly winds are most prevale,nt, but in winter those from the South-East. In settled summer weather, when the barometer is high, and often in winter, land and sea breezes prevail. The land wind is light and, near the Corfu Channel, it blows from North to North-East. It begins to blow two or three hours after sunset, and increases in force until after midnight, when it decreases, falls calm at sunrise, freshens again as the Sun gets higher, veering some points eastward until about g a.m., after which it dies away and is succeeded by the sea breeze. (b) Clouds. When land and sea breezes prevail, there is little cloud. South-east wind may be accompanied by rainfall, and an overcast sky may be expected, the average for October being 40 % covered with clouds. (c) Visibility . Visibility is usually good in the Adriatic, except when the Bora blows and causes rainfall. Ex,ceptionally good visibility often occurs on the Dalmatian coast. Note.-The Bora is a local wind which can blow very strongly from the North-East for about 15 or 20 hours, with heavy squalls. thunder, lightning and rain at intervals. It generally dispels any hovering clouds or fog, and when it blows with great force the weather is very clear. (d) Conclz4sions. The experts when mentioning "normal" weather conditions under paragraph D of their conclusions on page 15 l (English text) have ' See p. 161. r 66 167 AFFAIRE DU DTROIT DE CORFOU (FOND) (ANNEXE 2) ont envisag les conditions mtorologiques suivantes : nbulosit 3-4/10e - bonne visibilit (20 milles) - pas de brouillard ni d'averse - lgre brise de l'Est. Des emplacements de mines indiqus dans le Mmoire du RoyaumeUni, la roche Barchetta n'est pas suffisamment visible pour permettre de prendre un relvement. Comment alors expliquer que, dans ce

Mmoire, la position des mines soit calcule partir de ladite roche ? Les experts ont cru devoir chercher la rponse cett question. Ils l'ont trouve, et l'ont consigne dans leur rapport, dans le dessein de prvenir toute contestation. Ad 7. Selon le rapport des experts du 8 janvier 1949 (voir no 8 i)), il y a quatre faons de procder pour mouiller un champ de mines dans le Dtroit de Corfou, savoir : 1. Aborder le secteur par le Nord et repartir vers le Nord ; II. Aborder le secteur par le Nord et repartir vers le Sud ; III. Aborder le secteur par le Sud et repartir vers le Sud ; IV. Aborder le secteur par le Sud et repartir vers le Nord. Pour excuter les oprations suivant les faons de procder mentionnes sous 1 et III, les navires auraient eu traverser deux fois la rgion surveille. Si les oprations taient excutes suivant les mthodes II et IV, les navires traverseraient seulement ne fois la rgion surveille. Si les navires abordent la zone d'opration soit du Nord, soit du Sud, pour la quitter soit vers le Nord, soit vers le Sud, une fois l'opration termine, ils peuvent adopter deux mthodes pour mouiller les mines : a) en partant du Nord ; b) en partant du Sud. Dans le rapport des experts du 8 fvrier 1949, sous les conclusions A D de la Section II, la faon de procder 1 a t commente et.en ce qui est de la mthode a) et en ce qui est de la mthode 6). Si la faon de procder III avait t suivie, soit selon la mthode a), soit selon la mthode b), les conclusions contenues dans le rapport des experts du 8 fvrier auraient t les suivantes : Conclusions A et B. - Inchanges. Colaclusion C. - Si l'on suppose qu'un poste d'observation tait maintenu au cap Kiephali, au cap Denta et au monastkre Saint-Georges, que les conditions atmosphriques taient normales pour la rgion et que les mines aient t mouilles en partant du Nord vers le Sud, i) l'opration pouvait chapper l'attention du poste d'observation situ au pied du monastre Saint-Georges; ii) l'opration n'aurait pas t observe du cap Kiephali; iii) les mouilleurs de mines ont d tre observs du cap Denta. Conclusion D. - Si le mouillage de mines tait excut en partant du Sud vers le Nord, les mouilleurs de mines auraient d prendre un relvement et indiquer ce relvement sur la carte, au Sud du point therefore in mind the following weather : clouds 3-4110th-visibility good (20 miles)-no fog or rainfall-slight easterly breeze. Ad 6. From the position of the mines indicated in the United Kingdom Memorial, Barchetta Rock is not sufficiently visible to be used for

taking fixes. Why, then, it may be asked, does the Memorial calculate the positions of the mines with reference to that rock ? The experts thought they should seek an answer to that question. They found it, and gave it in their report, in order to fqrestall any question about it. Ad 7. As stated in the Experts' Report of January 8th, 1949, under (8) (i), there are four operational possibilities for laying mines in the Corfu Strait. They are : 1. Approach from the North and leaving towards the North ; II. Approach from the North and leaving towards the South; III. Approach from the South and leaving towards the South ; IV. Approach from the South and leaving towards the North. In order to carry out the operations mentioned under 1 and III the ships would have had to pass the area of vigilance twice. If the operations under II and IV were carried out, the ships would pass the area of vigilance only once. If the area of operations is approached from either North or South and the ships carrying out the operations leave again either to the North or South, they can adopt two methods of laying the mines: (a) from the North ; (b) from the South. Operation 1 is discussed as regards method (a) and as regards method (b) in the Experts.' Report of February 8th, 1949, A to D of Section II. If operation III was carried out by method (a) or by method (b) the conclusions contained in the Experts' Report of February 8th would have been as follows : Conclusions A and B.-No change. Colzclusiort C.-Provided that a look-out was kept at Cape Kiephali, Denta Point and San Giorgio Monastery, and under normal weather conditions for this area, and if the mines were laid from the North towards the South (i) the operation might not be seen by the look-out post at the foot of San Giorgio Monastery ; (ii) the operation would not be seen from Cape Kiephali ; (iii) the minelayers must have been noticed from Denta Point. Co?iclzcsim D.-If minelaying was carried out from the South towards the North, the minelayers would have to take a fix and plot this fix south of a point at which the actual minelaying operation would start. 167 168 AFFAIRE DU DTROIT DE CORFOU (FOND) (ANNEXE 2) o l'opration proprement dite du mouillage des mines aurait commenci. Ce relvement, tant le point de rfrence employ pour cette opration de mouillage de mines, devait se trouver dans l'alignement de la range de mines. Par consquent, ce relvement devait tre beaucoup plus rapproch du monastre Saint-Georges que ne l'tait la mine la

plus au Sud, telle que la position de celle-ci a t indique dans l'annexe g du Mmoire du Rovaume-Uni. En ce cas : i) les navires ont d tre aperus par des postes d'observation se trouvant au monastre Saint-Georges et au cap Denta ; ii) l'opration n'aurait pas t observe du cap Kiephali. Il faut se souvenir qu'en ce cas les navires seraient passs deux fois devant les points ci-dessus mentionns, l'exception du cap Kiephali. Comparaison des faons de procder I et I I I : Faolz de procder I. Faon de procder I I I . a) Mouillage des mines en part'int a) Moz~illaged es nilses en partant du Nord : du Nord : I. L'opration pouvait chapper l'attention du poste d'observation du monastre Saint-Georges. 2. Les mouilleurs de mines auraient t aperus du cap Kiephali. 3. Le mouilleur de mines a d tre observ du cap Denta. I. L'opration pouvait avoir chapp l'attention du poste d'observation du monastre Saint-Georges. 2. L'opration n'aurait pas t aperue du cap Kiephali. 3. Le mouilleur de mines a d tre observ du cap Denta. b) Moztillage des nsifles efi fiartc~iit b) Bfozrillage des mines en partatlt dzl Sud : dzl Sud : I. Les mouilleurs de mines au- I. Les n~ouilleurs de mines ont raient t aperus du poste d tre aperus du poste d'observation du monastre d'observation du monastre Saint-Georges. Saint-Georges. 2. Le mouilleur de mines a d 2. Le mouilleur de mines a d tre observ du cap Denta. tre aperu du poste d'observation situ au cap Denta. 3. Les mouilleurs de mines au- 3. L'opration n'aurait pas t raient t aperus du cap Kie- observCe du cap Kiephali. phali. La diffrence entre la faon de procder 1 et la faon de procder III est qu'un navire qui aborde le secteur par le Sud chapperait l'attention d'un poste d'observation situ au cap Kiephali. Dans les deux cas, le poste d'observation du cap Denta doit avoir aperu les mouilleurs de mines, en d'autres termes, les mouilleurs de mines n'ont pu chapper a l'attention des postes d'observation du cap Denta. Si le mouillage

des mines a cornmeii'c en partant du Sud, cette opration doit, dans les deux cas, avoir t observCe du monastre Saint-Georges. 168 CORFU CHANNEL CASE (MERITS) (ANNEX 2) 168 As this fix was the reference point for this particular minelaying operation, it had to be in line with the row of mines and consequently much closer to the San Giorgio Monastery than the position of the most southerly mine, as indicated in Annex 9 of the United Kingdom Memorial. In this case (i) the ships must have been observed by look-out posts from San Giorgio Monastery and from Denta Point ; (ii) the operation would not be observed from Cape Kiephali. It must be borne in mind that in this case the ships would have passed the above-mentioned points twice, with the exception of Cape Kiephali. A comparison of operations I and I I I : Operation I. Operation I I I (a) Minelaying from the North : (a) Minelaying from the North : I. Operation rnight not be seen I. Operation might not be seen by the look-out at San Gior- by the look-out at San Giorgio Monastery. gio Monastery. 2. Minelayers would be seen 2. Operation would not be seen from Cape Kiephali. from Cape Kiephali. 3. Minelayer must have been 3. Minelayer must have been seen from Denta Point. seen from Denta Point. (b) Minelaying from the South : (b) Minelaying from the South : I. Minelayers would be seen by I. Minelayers must have been the look-out at San Giorgio seen by the look-out at San Monastery. Giorgio Monastery. 2. Minelayer must have been 2. Minelayer must. have been seen from Denta Point. seen by the look-out from Denta Point. 3. Minelayers would have been 3. Operation would not have seen from Cape Kiephali. been seen from Cape Kiephali. The difference between operation 1 and operation III is that when a ship approached the area from the South, she would not be observed by a look-out post situated at Cape Kiephali. In both cases, the look-out posts at Denta Point must have seen the minelayers ; in other words, the minelayers could not have escaped the notice of the look-out posts at Denta Point, and if the minelaying were started from the South, it must in both cases have been seen from the San Giorgio Monastery. 168 II. Questions poses par M. le Juge ZoriiS. En employant, dans la conclusion C i), le terme (( l'opration ,

les experts ont entendu l'ensemble des oprations de mouillage de mines (c'est--dire tant les navires que l'action mme du mouillage des mines). En employant, sous C ii) et C iii), le sujet (( les mouilleurs de mines , les experts ont voulu indiquer que ce sont les navires employs au mouillage des mines qui, dans le cas vis sous C ii), auraient t aperus par les postes d'dxervation et qui, dans le cas vis sous C iii), devaient tre aperus par les postes d'observation. Ad 2. Du cap Kiephali, la vue s'tend sur l'ensemble du Dtroit, mais non sur la baie de Saranda. De Saranda. la vue s'tend sur la baie, mais non sur l'ensemble du Dtroit. Du monastre Saint-Georges, elle s'tend sur l'ensemble du Dtroit et sur la plus grande partie de la baie. Mais le cap Denta, plus avanc que les autres promontoires, commande la fois l'ensemble du Dtroit et l'ensemble de la baie. L'enqute a confirm la conclusion tire de l'tude de la carte : l'endroit est tout indiqu pour un poste d'observation. iiI. Qpestion pose par M. le Juge EEer. Dans leur rapport du 8 janvier 1949, les experts ont conclu que, 1% l'insuffisance des renseignements touchant les conditions dans lesquelles les mines ont t poses, il n'tait pas possible de donner une rponse prcise sur la possibilit d'entendre l'opration du mouillage. Aprs leur mission Saranda, les experts n'ont rien ajout ce sujet : ils confirment n'avoir rien ajouter. Les constatations faites, relativement la possibilit de voir l'opration, leur paraissent retirer toute importance la question de savoir si elle pouvait tre entendue. Dans ces conditions, ils estiment inutile de rpondre aux objections, faites sur ce sujet, leur rapport du 8 janvier 1949, mais sans pour cela admettre en aucune faon le bien-fond de ces objections. Fait en anglais, en un exemplaire, au Palais de la Paix, La Haye, le douze fvrier mil neuf cent quarante-neuf. (Sig&) AND. FORSHELL. (Signed) S. ELFFERICH. II. Qpestions put by Judge Z o r i E i O . Ad 1. Bv the term "the operation" in conclusion C (i) the experts meant the whole of the minelaying operation (i.e., both the manoeuvres of the ships and the actual launching of the mines). By employing the term "minelayers" in paragraphs C (ii) and C (iii), the experts intended to indicate that the ships which were used for the minelaying operation would in case C (ii), or must in case C (iii.) have drawn the attention of the look-out posts. From Cape Kiephali the view extends over the whole of the Strait, but not over Saranda Bay. From Saranda the view extends over the bay, but not over the whole of the Strait. From the San Giorgio

Monastery the view extends over the whole of the Strait and over the greater part of the bay. But Denta Point, which projects further than the other promontories, commands both the whole of the Strait and the whole of the bay. The investigation has confirmed the conclusion which was derived from a study of the map : this spot is very suitable for a lookout post. III. Qpesdon put by Judge EEer. In their Report of January 8th, 1949, the experts concluded that, having regard to the insufficiency of the information available as to the conditions under which the mines were laid, it was not possible to give a precise opinion concerning the possibility of hearing the minelaying operations. After their visit to Saranda, the experts added nothing further on this subject. They confirm that they have nothing to add. The conclusions which they have drawn in regard to the possibility of seeing the operation appear to them to deprive the question whether the operation could be heard of any further importance. In these circumstances, they think it unnecessary to reply to the objections on this subject that have been made in regard to their report of January 8th, 1949 ; at the same time, thev do not for a moment admit that these objections are justified. Done in English, in one copy, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twelfth dav of February, one thousand nine hundred and forty-nine.