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Derek Shupe ICP114 Procesos Polticos en Amrica Latina Pierre Ostiguy An Analysis of Various Latin American Political Regimes and Their Effects INTRODUCTION The political landscape of Latin America in the last 120 years has been anything but stagnant. Throughout this time there have been changing national political scenes with social movements and political systems that were unheard of in previous eras. In fact, in the thirtyseven nations that comprise Latin America, there were a total of 314 changes of governments between 1930 and 1990, 111 of which took place through military intervention (Valenzuela, Latin Americas, 9). This essay is broken into two sections. The first section breaks down the broad trends in Latin American systems into six political regimes. Although some countries more directly match up with these regimes than others, there is no denying that there were similar political transformations that took place in regions of the American continent. The second section more closely examines and analyzes the democratic government of Chiles Salvador Allende and his removal from power via coup. SECTION I: POLITICAL REGIMES OLIGARCHIC LIBERALISM Near the end of the 19th century in the years following the reign of the caudillos, industry was booming in Europe and the US. This sparked an increased demand for exports from regions such as Latin America. Due to the extremely unequal land distribution in Latin America, the massive profits generated from the sale of these agricultural exports went mostly to the landowners and rural elites. Naturally, this group of increasingly powerful terratenientes used

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its newfound influence to shape a political regime that would enhance and protect its ability to generate profit from agricultural exports. This led to the regime known as oligarchic liberalism that was generally found in the wealthier nations of Latin America and lasted from approximately the 1880s to the 1910s. Clearly, the economic model associated with oligarchic liberalism was based almost solely on agricultural exports. It was not by mistake that within a few years ninety percent of Latin Americas wealth came from what was sold in US or European markets (Chasteen, 182). The idea was to maximize the agricultural exports, whose profits went primarily to the landowners and those involved in the export business. These profits were then typically used to import various products from the US or Europe. As the economy was based on exports, it was particularly volatile to market forces in foreign markets, matching up quite well with the dependency theory mentioned in Skidmore and Smiths Modern Latin America (9). With regards to the political conditions, in general, there were public and civic liberties, and the government would not oppress those who criticized it. However, the popular sectors were not included in the political process. This regime was restricted in that it did not remove the popular sectors right to participate but rather continued a tradition of not including this majority of the population. In Brazil, where only a male, literate landowner had the right to vote, approximately ninety-seven percent of the population was excluded (Chasteen, 192). Nevertheless, the outnumbered oligarchy was constantly wary of a peasant revolt, and had no qualms with maintaining its political dominance. Even as time progressed and in certain nations such as Argentina where workers were able to vote, the inexistence of a secret ballot made the rural poor relative puppet voters for their employers. This system worked in the particular time

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period, because, as ODonnell claims, the popular sector had yet to be politically activated (Collier, Types of). These oligarchic, liberal regimes justified themselves and the restricted political participation through a belief that they were bringing progress to Latin America. Not only were they importing the sophisticated European culture, but were also modernizing society. They would often point to the construction of modern cities that spawned as a result of their economic success. As Chasteen suggests, the oligarchy adopted a positivist mindset in which democracy took second place to said progress (Chasteen, 193). Oligarchic liberalism was more or less a puppet government for the rural elite and obviously highly favorable for them. In stark contrast, the campesinos received little if any of the export-based profits and actually may have been made worse off due to the increased labor necessary to satisfy foreign demand. Poet Jos Mart in his Eramosde nuestra Amrica clearly demonstrates the difference between the sophisticated, imported lifestyle of the oligarchy and the humble life of the lower classes. The middle class was a more complicated matter. Whereas it often benefited economically from the influx of foreign capital via agricultural exports, it was excluded from political participation. The middle classs discontentment with political exclusion would become the catalyst for the reform period that would convert the regimes of nations such as Argentina to relative liberal democracies. NEO-PATRIMONIAL DICTATORS Whereas certain South American nations experienced oligarchic liberalism in the early years of the 20th century, many of the smaller, poorer Central American and Caribbean nations were occupied by US Marines deployed to protect US economic interests. Those Marines were

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mostly withdrawn from said nations once the Great Depression hit in the early 1930s, and often left US military trained individuals in charge of the nation. These individuals frequently transformed into neo-patrimonial dictators who ruled selfishly throughout the second third of the 20th century. To remain in power, they formed extensive patronage networks, using state funds to keep crucial figures from revolting. Also, the dictators disassembled the military to prevent any possible coups. There was no semblance of political participation or system, but rather decisions made solely by the dictator. In addition, civic or public liberties were nonexistent, and any attempt to speak out was often quashed with violence. An example of this from La fiesta del chivo was when a crazy man in the streets was killed for talking ill of Trujillo (Llosa). This created an element of fear that kept citizens from standing up to the regime. The masses were clearly not involved in the political decision-making process, and as there were generally not social protests or political inclusion prior to the arrival of the dictators, it seems safe to say that neo-patrimonial regimes had restricted political inclusion. This combination of political restriction and a lack of public or civic liberties suited the neo-patrimonial dictators quite well. Not only did they have free reign to do what they pleased in government, but also were able to quell any forms of public denouncement and avoid what they feared most: losing their power. These dictators justified their rule with their desire for power and their inflated opinions of themselves, often believing that they were the country. In terms of economic models, these neo-patrimonial regimes generally were based on US aid, nationalized industries, and often, as in the case of Batista, agricultural exports. As Juan Linz asserts, it was crucial for these economies to avoid crises as the government would not be able to finance their patronage networks, and the dictators would fall (Linz, Sultanistic Regimes).

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Also, public funds were seen as synonymous with the dictators personal finances. This along with the positioning of political allies as opposed to knowledgeable officials in important positions led to a highly inefficient economic system. In contrast to the typical model, in some of the more resilient regimes, US aid was not considered paramount. As Snyder suggests, leaders such as Papa Doc of Haiti avoided subservience to the US by surviving without US aid, and Stroessner of Paraguay brought in aid from a rotation of countries to avoid any real accountability to foreign nations (Snyder, 390). This extended the life of these regimes and avoided the crisis that occurs if US aid is stopped. These neo-patrimonial regimes were generally supported by the US as well as those involved in the patronage system and benefited by neo-patrimonial rule. Although opponents were unable to publicly voice their opinions due to the repressive measures of the regime, they were still existent. Exiles were obviously very critical of the regime as well as the members of the upper and middle classes left out of the patronage system. As Goodwin and Skocpol assert, members of the upper and middle class were opposed to the monopolized industries of the state and the placing of political allies in positions traditionally reserved for these upper and middle class members (Goodwin and Skocpol, 499). POPULISM When the Great Depression ravaged the export-focused Latin American economies of the 1930s, discontent with the highly unequal system began to grow, especially within the working sectors. In addition, the wheels of industrialization had started to turn, new types of media had become available, and increasing urbanization had contributed to a feeling of culturelessness in cities like Buenos Aires. As Michael Conniff claims, the latter three characteristics contributed a

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setting favorable to the rise of populism in generally the more industrialized Latin American nations during the years after the Great Depression (Conniff, 9). The populist leaders often came to power through coups but once installed proved remarkably adept at winning elections. These highly charismatic personas justified their actions with nationalism, anti-imperialism, and consistent electoral victories. They linked the prevalent socioeconomic problems such as inequality to imperialism and the aforementioned power structures. These regimes were incorporating and were geared toward including, mobilizing and promising a better life to the popular urban and working sectors, and in the case of Mexico the peasantry. This generated substantial conflicts with the established powers but gave the populists a substantial base of voters. As for public and civic liberties, this varied by regime. On one hand, Getulio Vargas Brazil and his Estado Novo had highly restricted liberalism. He censored the mass media and denied the state-controlled unions the right to strike. He used nationalism as his rational, claiming that strikes hindered industrialization and thus the transformation into a more powerful nation (Chasteen, 233). On the other end of the spectrum, Mexicos Lzaro Crdenas granted more liberalism. When Mexican oil workers went on strike against powerful multinational oil corporations, Crdenas dangerously supported the workers. When the oil companies refused to give into the demands of the workers, Crdenas nationalized the oil companies, signifying the extent to which he was behind the liberal rights of the workers. The economic model was characterized by ISI policies or the idea of substituting products created domestically for products previously imported. By protecting domestic industries from foreign competition, they initiated a first stage of industrialization that focused on lighter consumer goods and created self-sustaining markets. These markets were further

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supported by raising the wages of workers, allowing more consumers access to these markets. They funded such initiatives through high taxes on agricultural exports, and when economic crisis struck, through the printing of more money. The domestic business class, the urban popular class, and the working class were some of the strongest supporters of populist leaders as they were often favored with protection, inclusion, and increased wages. These ties were especially strong in places like Argentina where even an exiled Pern only had to call upon his followers for them to take to the streets. These ties are evident in the lyrics of the Peronist March, where Pern is portrayed as a grandiose but close friend of the masses. Agricultural interests, multinational corporations, foreign capital, and the upper class were all highly opposed to populism for disrupting the preexisting order. Once in power, the populists established corporatist links with unions in differing ways. In the more authoritarian Brazil that lacked a particularly strong labor movement, the union link was one of state incorporation, where the government sought to depoliticize and preempt any major labor demonstrations (Colliers, Incorporation:). Unions were highly restricted and not incorporated into a party movement. Using the vocabulary of the Colliers, there were more constraints than inducements. In Argentina, the labor movements were more mobilized and powerful and were incorporated into the Peronist movement in what is referred to as labor populism by the Colliers, usually through a generous offer of inducements with relatively less constraints. In Mexico, using a radical populism party incorporation, the situation was similar to that of Argentina, but was more radical in that it incorporated the peasants and required significant land reform (Colliers, Incorporation:). REVOLUTIONARY SOCIALISM

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In many of the smaller, poorer nations of the Caribbean and Central America in the second half of the 20th century such as Cuba, dictators ruled with an iron fist, and inequality was particularly evident. It was in such an environment that the revolutionary movement of Fidel Castro and Ernesto Che Guevara came to fruition in the late 1950s. Through an armed, guerrilla struggle beginning in the rural areas such as the Cuban Sierra Maestra, these revolutionaries gained the support of the people, established regional, alternative governments and, hastened by the termination of US aid for Batista, took control of the central government. These revolutionaries justified themselves by indicating the neglected poor and promising to institute significant initiatives to improve literacy and public health and set into motion an ideological movement that spread throughout Latin America. The guerillas fought primarily for social revolution and were committed to ideals such as transcendence, struggle, and a commitment to a movement greater than themselves. A key concept described by Wickham-Crowley was the establishment of an alternative government in the regions loyal to the movement. In the Cuban case, the revolutionaries were aided by the clear violations of the social contract and the resulting loss of legitimacy by the Bautista government through violence against the rural population, and the subsequent assumption of the social contract by the revolutionaries, through initiatives such as providing needed healthcare and the protection of said communities (Wickham-Crowley, The Rise). In such a revolution based on focus, the support of the people is paramount for the strength of the revolution. In terms of liberties and political inclusion, revolutionary socialist regimes are relatively difficult to define. It seems that although the policies of these governments incorporate the needs of the masses, in countries where the regime is truly established through revolutions such as

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Cuba there are no real elections in which the citizenry are included. However, it is true that the Nicaraguan Sandinistas came to power with a multiclass popular backing. As for public and civic liberties, they do not exist. In Lockwood Lees interview with Castro, Castro expresses that he believes that elective democracy serves the interests of the bourgeoisie and that liberties cannot be permitted while the nation is in a state of war (Lee). The economic model of this regime was socialist in nature. There was a focus on a major redistribution of wealth and equality as well as a desire for industrialization. Assets of foreign companies were often nationalized, and agrarian reform was one of the crucial concepts of the movement. These countries pursue socialist ideologies in the context of the Cold War. Thus they are often hindered economically by the immense power of the United States, as opposed to their predecessors who received US aid, and in the case of Cuba, turned to the Soviet Union for trade. Revolutionary socialist regimes pursue an egalitarian society. Thus, they are supported by the previously repressed masses, left-wing ideologists and, in the case of Central America, the liberation theology wing of the Catholic Church. The typical enemies of such a regime include the United States, foreign capital and businesses. Although the coalition against Somoza in Nicaragua encompassed the lower, middle, and upper classes after the assassination of Chamorro, generally the upper and middle classes are not in favor of socialist regimes. BUREAUCRATIC-AUTHORITARIANISM In the 1960s and 1970s, the wealthiest nations of South America were facing significant instability. On the economic side, there was often high inflation and foreign currency crises. Also, popular sectors were mobilized and making demands that the government could not or would not fulfill. Promising order and a cure to a sick society overrun with crises and

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political demonstrations, Latin American militaries led a series of US backed coups against the established governments. Once established, these governments sought to completely exclude and depoliticize the popular sectors. The masses had no say in the government and their civic and public liberties were highly restricted. These regimes often waged a dirty war, using brutal tactics such as torture or disappearances. These governments, generally ruled by military juntas, expected what ODonnell refers to as a tacit consensus, where depoliticized, apathetic citizens lived their daily lives with a fear of stepping out of line (ODonnell, Tensions In). The logic was to install a rational government of technocrats operating in an unemotional, systemic way that followed a specific set of internal rules. Such a government would lead to the modernization and stability that was not present in the previous regimes. Along with this rationality, the bureaucratic authoritarian regime justified itself by claiming to be a temporary government that would stabilize and modernize the nation. They often fed on the fear that the conventional, capitalist model was under attack by a resurgence of populism or the threat of socialism. Nationalism and a desire to modernize was also a force manipulated by BA regimes. Once the nation had been cured and stabilized, they were to aid in the transition to democracy. The first steps of such a transition were often accomplished in the 1980s under pressures from the international community through aperturas or slowly granting rights back to the citizenry. The economic models of these regimes converged in that they were pro-business and attempted to attract foreign capital. However, there was a relative split in their economic design. Brazil and Argentina attempted to use the foreign capital to deepen their industrialization and

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gain the capacity to produce heavy machinery and durable goods, while still relatively protecting domestic industries. Chile on the other hand pursued more drastic, neoliberal policies. The group that supported the regime was a relatively small portion of society. It included the upper class, upper-middle class, and foreign capital that benefited from the regimes probusiness stance, as well as the technocratic right that wanted to pursue a more modern society in which they could play more important roles. There was a broad opposition coalition that included groups such as the repressed popular sectors, intellectuals, university students, at times the domestic business sector and other groups who had initially supported a coup. LIBERAL DEMOCRACY Although scattered periods of liberal democracy had existed in Latin America throughout the century, this regime became pervasive in the region in the 1980s, albeit less established in the poorer and less developed nations. With the end of the Cold War in sight and the US emerging as a victor, liberal democracy became hegemonic, and the political Left was scattered and weakened. It was often the result of a transition from bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes such as in Chile or other transitions such as peace treaties between warring factions as in El Salvador. Although the transitions often led new groups such as the popular sector to be incorporated into the political system, once liberal democracy is established, it is generally considered to be an inclusive regime. In terms of political and civic liberties, they are generally relatively thorough. The logic behind this combination is to allow different philosophies into the political system. Having a government that represents the population should bring some stability and justifies the regime. In addition, the relatively systemic nature of seems to demonstrate Max Webers definition of traditional authority (Weber).

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Economically, liberal democracy in Latin America can be broken down into two distinct periods: neoliberalism and the left turn. Although many of the political leaders of the late 1980s and early 1990s were elected as anti-liberalist, they often adopted neoliberal policies to deal with the debt crises and inflation that arose. These policies were often urged by the IMF and led to reductions in social spending, the privatization of state businesses, and various measures to facilitate international trade such as abolishing the protection of certain industries or the creation of trade blocs such as NAFTA or MERCOSUR. As a result of said policies, the inflation and debt crises were brought under control, Latin America became a major target for foreign direct investment, economies grew at strong and steady rates, and lowered tariffs brought lower prices for a broad range of goods. At first, a broad, multiclass coalition of the citizenry was satisfied with the results, and the electoral dominance of politicians who had implemented successful neoliberal policies demonstrated this. However, as time passed, the unequal effects of neoliberalism became evident. The major beneficiaries of neoliberalism were foreign capital, multinational corporations, and those who remained in the middle and upper classes. However, the decreases in social spending, the dismantling of trade barriers, and the race to the bottom in wages to attract foreign capital had highly negative effects on the poor, the working classes, and the previously protected domestic businesses. In addition, historian Greg Grandin refers to the massive privatization products undergone by these nations as the third conquest, comparing the shady, under-the-table sales of state industries to the exploitation of the indigenous Americans for gold during the colonial era and the opportunism of corporations such as the United Fruit Company of the early 20th century (Grandin, 285).

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This disillusionment with the disparate effects of neoliberal policies led to what has been referred to as the left turn. Starting around at the beginning of the new millennium, a series of new center-left leaders were elected that have pledged to put more emphasis on social issues, evidenced by programs such as Lulas Bolsa Familia program. These movements often spawned from a moderation of the previously Marxist left, and many politicians from these movements remain in power today. ADDITIONAL INPUT While it is true that economic policies that favor large corporations and foreign capital were products of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, such policies can occur within other regimes as well. A crisis situation, such as inflation, within a liberal democracy framework is one good example. Assume that passing legislation that favors large corporations or foreign capital will stem or slow inflation. If the electorate believes that the benefits of stemming inflation outweigh the costs of favoring large corporation and foreign capital, the elected officials will be likely to put such economic policies into effect. Another example within the liberal democratic system is the case of many political leaders in the late 1980s and early 1990s, who claimed to be against such policies but enacted them once in office and then were reelected in the cases where inflation was stemmed. There are many other possible scenarios as well including a neo-patrimonial dictator who believes that crucial foreign aid is contingent on such policies.

Although Kurt Weyland suggests that Latin Americas brief stint with neopopulism within the democratic framework actually hastened the decline of clientelism and curbed the privileges of special elites, improving Latin American democracy in the process, the question whether populism can coexist within liberal democracy in the long run is a quite complex issue

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(Weyland 190). First, there are various instances that suggest that the power that neopopulism brings leads neopopulists to take markedly undemocratic actions. Obvious examples include Fujimori granting himself dictatorial powers and shutting down Congress or the harassment of reporters by Menems government. Also, neopopulism often leads to the disassembling of political institutions: In the most extreme case, Peru, neoliberal neopopulism created an organizational wasteland (Weyland 190). As institutions are often seen are crucial for democracy, a sustained neopopulist presence within a liberal democracy could undermine the democracy and lead to authoritarianism. However, hypothetically speaking, if a neopopulist working within a liberal democratic regime had a strong sense of respect for democratic institutions and his role within the democratic system, these two seemingly different political systems could coexist in the long run. SECTION II EXAMINING THE COLLAPSE OF ALLENDES VIA CHILENA AL SOCIALISMO The election of Salvador Allende to the Chilean presidency marked a pivotal moment in Cold War history, when despite US claims that citizens in communist nations were repressed and unhappy, the populace of a democratic country had chosen to elect a president who would pursue a route to socialism. However, as history has shown, Allendes six year term ended after only three years due to the especially violent military coup on September 11, 1973. This section presents four factors that were missing from the Allende government and that seemed to contribute significantlyt to its collapse: total control over the movement, a moderate electorate and party, a strong electoral mandate, and a sufficient amount of time to see results. First, as Peter Winn asserts, Allende lacked the total control of the movement necessary to orchestrate a successful transition to socialism. He claims that once Allende won the 1970

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election, his supporters believed this victory to be a signal to take matters into their own hands (Winn). This set in motion a series of events such as the toma of the Yarur cotton mill in April 1971, where the workers demanded that the state nationalize the mill. This not only forced Allende to nationalize firms faster than desired, but also showed that Allende did not have complete control of his follows. This alienated any moderate voters who were in favor of the movement but wary of a full revolution. In addition, a series of unplanned nationalizations most likely led to adverse economic effects as the government would be even less prepared to manage a firm and surely would suffer additional inefficiencies. The proper course of action for Allende should have been to stress to both his supporters and the public, that the transformation would take place in a methodical, incremental way and that he would be in complete control of the situation. Set in a nation where a coup could be validated by order, the appearance of Allende as in control of the movement would surely attract more moderates to his cause. In addition, by the time the coup took place, there was no substantial moderate party. One important aspect of the Chilean political system is the decline of the centrist Radical Party and the rise of the more right-leaning Christian Democrats. Although this happened prior to the 1970 election, it had serious consequences for his government. It further divided the electorate into the Right and the Left. In addition, if the Christian Democrats had been more of a middle ground between the two sides of the ideological spectrum, the last minute concessions by Allendes government to the Christian Democrats could have been more substantive and avoided the coup. Furthermore, Allendes government did not have a strong electoral mandate. In the April 1973 congressional elections, Allendes coalition only received forty-four percent of the vote

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while the Partido Nacional received fifty-four percent of the vote. Although one could argue that congressional elections are not indicative of presidential elections, in the highly politicized state of Chile in the time up to the 1973 coup and the possible watershed scenario in which the Chilean government was situated, it seems reasonable to assume that the majority of presidential voters would participate in the congressional election. This signified that more people were actually against the Unidad Popular than were for it. This seems to indicate that the electorate was not quite ready for such a movement left, and Allende should have focused on less radical reforms to attract more of the electorate. Such moderation could have both given Allendes regime an electoral mandate that surpassed fifty percent of voters and instilled doubts in some the coups more moderate supporters. Finally, Allende only had three years to begin to implement his va chilena al socialismo. It is relatively ludicrous to expect that positive results from such a major transition could be seen in such a short time. Furthermore, throughout the entirety of his presidency, Allende was constantly confronted with acts of sabotage against his regime by radical and most likely USbacked members of the Right. Such sabotage will further delay progress and require more time to accommodate it. In addition, his lack of control over the Leftist movement added further difficulty to the situation. THE USEFULNESS OF ODONNELLS MODEL OF ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL ODonnells model of the rise of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Argentina and Brazil seems to be relatively useful to examine the September 11 coup in Chile. These coups although set in different settings and regimes share a large number of characteristics. For example, the nature of the demands of the popular classes is very similar. Both are making increased demands in the context of diminishing economic growth. As a result they are viewed

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are proposing changes that would require a reshaping of society that was too radical to be viable. In addition, before each of their respective coups, the upper class feels that the social balance, characterized by skewed distributions of resources, is being threatened by said popular sectors. Broad sections of the middle class, on the other hand, are negatively affected by the deteriorating economy and often seek out law and order to protect their interests as a result. However, despite the many similarities within the class structure of these tumultuous national landscapes, the model must be approached with relative care. There are different national elements that distinguish the Chilean bureaucratic-authoritarian regime from those of Brazil and Argentina. For example, ODonnell suggests that bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes are the result of the complexity of expanding industrialization past the production of consumer goods (Collier, Overview of, 26). However, in Chile, there was never a major emphasis on the deepening of industrialization and a bureaucratic regime still emerged. In short, the model presented by ODonnell does pertain significantly to Chile as well as Brazil and Argentina, although there are some minor issues such as ODonnells claim that bureaucratic-authoritarianism largely results from a desire to deepen industrialization. CASTROS ALTERNATIVE PATH In Castros La segunda declaracin de la Habana, the communist leader of Cuba delivers a long-winded assault on the evils of US imperialism, but concludes by urging the repressed popular sectors to unify, to harness the powers of the masses, to strike out against years of repression, to create the conditions for revolution themselves instead of waiting for material conditions to bring them to power (Castro, 325-326). In the case of Allendes Chile, this idea of implementing a popular uprising could be looked upon as a safeguard to a coup. Allende grew increasingly desperate as his term

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progressed and seemed to have a decent intuition that he would soon face the possibility of a coup. His concessions to the Christian Democrats near the end of his time in power were evidence of this. One clear advantage of at least having the ability to initiate a public uprising is that he could at least have a chance to extend his time in office, albeit during a time of virtual civil war. He would be able to continue at least partially implementing his policies and buy himself some time for the benefits to become clear. Also, although the neutral institutions had reached a highly weakened state, his electoral mandate could possibly unite the remaining institutions against the military. Finally, if Allende amassed enough possibly militant support, he might have been able to make the military reconsider due to the negative effect such a coup would have on the strength of the military. On a related note, if there was enough popular support that the coup would lead to civil war, this could diminish the support for such a coup. However, the limits to such a scenario are numerous, and such an uprising to defend Allende against a coup would likely not succeed. First, it is not clear how many of Allendes supporters would actually fight in his defense. Next, there is the logistical problem of how to arm the popular sectors. Establishing a paramilitary organization is likely to anger the military and put them on alert, and arming a major portion of the population is not something that can be done surreptitiously. In the case that the coup did not completely crush the uprising, Chile would be engulfed in a civil war. Set during the middle of the Cold War, the US under Nixon would definitely give as much military support as politically viable to the Chilean military. With the popular sectors highly outmatched, the Leftist uprising would be crushed.