Jos Mara Candau Morn | Francisco J. Gonzlez Ponce Antonio L.

Chvez Reino (editores)

PLUTARCO TRANSMISOR
ACTAS
DEL X SIMPOSIO INTERNACIONAL DE LA SOCIEDAD ESPAOLA DE PLUTARQUISTAS
SEVILLA, 12-14 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 2009

Jos Mara Candau Morn Francisco J. Gonzlez Ponce Antonio L. Chvez Reino (editores)

PLUTARCO TRANSMISOR
ACTAS
DEL X SIMPOSIO INTERNACIONAL DE LA SOCIEDAD ESPAOLA DE PLUTARQUISTAS
SEVILLA, 12-14 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 2009

SEVILLA 2011

Plutarch of chaeronea and the Gnostic WorldvieW: Middle PlatonisM and the naG haMMadi library
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In evaluating Plutarchs contacts with the world of Gnosis, scholars have not so far reached consensus. In fact, it is possible to distinguish two polarized groups, namely those who reject any trace of Gnostic thought whatsoever and those who recognize Gnostic, or at least Dualistic, Gnosticizing views in Plutarch. Instead of simply siding with one or the other position on the basis of the analysis of this or that motif, the present paper proposes a systematic analysis of Plutarchs thought on theology, cosmology, anthropology, epistemology and ethics that may allow a better comparison between his views and the world of Gnosticism as reflected both by the heresiologists and by several texts of the Nag Hammadi library.
To call Plutarch a gnostic, then, is, I think, meaningful, if the term is carefully qualified1.

In their evaluation of the so-called Gnostic or Gnosticizing ideas in Plutarch of Chaeronea, scholars of the last century or so failed to provide a definitive answer regarding meaning, provenance and goal of these views. In fact, the numerous studies on the issue can be divided into two main groups: those that firmly claim a Gnostic background for Plutarchs ideas and those that vigorously reject any Gnostic affiliation whatsoever. What is lacking in this controversy is a consistent definition of Gnosticism and more clarity concerning its origins, namely whether or not one can speak of a pre-Christian Gnosticism2.
J. dillon, 1990, XIII, p. 216. On the early discussion of the issue, see E. M. YaMauChi, Pre-Christian Gnosticism. A Survey of the Proposed Evidence, Michigan, 1973, pp. 1328, who comments upon both the wide and narrow definitions of the term Gnosticism and upon the question of the existence of a preChristian Gnosticism. For a more recent discussion of the issue, see M. A. WilliaMs, 1996, and K. L. KinG, What is Gnosticism, London, 2003, both of whom question the term as a category. For different points of view, see M. MeYer, Gnosticism, Gnostics and the Gnostic Bible, in W.
2 1

J. M. Candau Morn, F. J. Gonzlez PonCe & a. l. Chvez reino (eds.), Plutarco transmisor, Sevilla, Secretariado de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Sevilla, 2011, pp. 401-417 (ISBN 978-84-472-1352-8)

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Given that up to the present neither problem has been completely resolved, a new attempt to approach these Plutarch passages from the same perspective would be at least as sterile as the preceding efforts. Therefore, rather than looking for a genealogical dependence between Plutarch and Gnosticism, or vice versa, in the following pages I intend to survey Plutarchs testimony, highlighting the points of contact with the world of Gnosticism as we are able to judge it today on the basis of both heresiological works and the Nag Hammadi library. Given that numerous previous approaches to the subject have randomly focused on this or that motif, I will attempt a systematic exposition of Plutarchs views that focuses on theology, cosmology, anthropology, epistemology and ethics. This systematic approach intends to show that Plutarchs Gnosticizing views are not the result of haphazard influences, and that their coherence demands a better explanation of their significance in his worldview. Theology Plutarchs theology of De Iside et Osiride and De animae procreatione in Timaeo reveals clear dualistic undertones3. In addition to the first positive principle and matter, Plutarch posits, and this is his novelty when compared to Plato, a second, negative principle, coeval with the One, which is responsible for both evil and disorder4. This is, of course, Plutarchs evil world soul. Plutarch believes there is support for the idea in Plato, who asserted that there were two principles, one is the origin of good () and the other the producer () of the opposite effect5. As far as the former principle is concerned, it is the rational principle of the Good, of order and of identity6. The negative principle in turn is responsible for evil and disorder. In dealing with the issue U. Bianchi asserts that this dualism is pre-cosmic, not anti-cosmic, and that it has a clear dialectical nature, since the principles of

Barnstone & M. MeYer (eds.), The Gnostic Bible, Boston, 2003, pp. 116; id., The Gnostic Gospels of Jesus, New York, 2005, p. xiii; and B. Pearson, Gnosticism as a Religion, in id. (ed.), Gnosticism and Christianity in Roman and Coptic Egypt, New York, 2004, pp. 201223. 3 On the issue, J. ries, Plutarque historien et thologien des doctrines dualistes, in J. ries, Y. Janssens & J. M. sevrin (eds), Gnosticisme et monde hellnistique. Actes du Colloque de Louvain-laNeuve, 11-14 mars 1980, Leuven, 1982, pp. 146-163. 4 J. turner, Sethian Gnosticism and the Platonic Tradition, Qubec, 2001, p. 373. 5 In a reference to Pl., Lg. 896d; see Plu., Is. et Os. 370f, when he (Plato) had grown considerably older, he asserts, not in circumlocution or symbolically, but in specific words, that the movement of the Universe is actuated not by one soul, but perhaps by several, and certainly by not less than two, and of these the one is beneficent, and the other is opposed to it and the artificer of things opposed. See F. Ferrari, 1995, p. 77. 6 Is. et Os. 373a, ; 373e, .

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good and evil are opposed to each other from the beginning7. There are however, certain passages that seem to raise some doubts about Bianchis statement regarding the absence in Plutarch of a hypostasierter Demiurge a lesser divine figure in charge of the imperfect world. Thus, for example, Plutarchs short exposition on Zoroastrism in De Iside et Osiride (369d-370c) in the context of his attempt to give a foundation to his dualistic view of the universe8. Indeed, he refers to the view of the wisest of men that there are two gods, rivals as it were, the one the Artificer of good and the other of evil, but he also asserts that There are also those who call the better one a god and the other a daemon9, assertion which seems to subordinate the latter to the former. The same thesis seems to lie behind De E apud Delphos, which distinguishes the character and activity of Apollo as unity and the only Artificer, while the world of change is attributed to the control of some other god, or rather to some demigod, whose office is concerned with Nature in dissolution and generation10. Plutarch goes on to describe their antithetical nature by means of the names of both and the association of the former with unity, light and visibility and the latter with multiplicity, darkness and invisibility11. In this context, it is interesting that De genio Socratis (591a), perhaps in a Xenocratic vein12, equates the earth with Hades (590e), and the region between the earth and the moon with the allotted domain of Persephone (591a, ). More important is the fact that Plutarch explicitly states that the element of disorder that acts on matter and originates the irrational motions in the sublunary world is driven here from the region above13. Not only Torhoudt, but also Griffith and Dillon have expressed their bewilderment for the fact that Plutarch comes here as close as possible to the world of Gnosticism14. It is therefore perhaps not out of place to compare Typhon, the irrational part of the world soul and the disturbing element that alters matter, which is conceived of as confused and stupid (1014c, ; 1015e; 1016c) and that alone can only produce appearances, with Yaldabaoth, the malignant and stupid demiurge of the ApJohn. Typhons descriptions as irrational and truculent, violent and
U. BianChi, Plutarch und Dualismus, ANRW, II 36.1 (1987). pp. 350-65, p. 354. See also P. thvenaz, Lme du monde, le devenir et la matire chez Plutarque avec une traduction du trait De la Gense de lAme dans le Time (1re partie), Paris, 1938, pp. 124125. 8 J. hani, Plutarque en face du dualisme iranien, REG, 77 (1964) 491525. 9 Is. et Os. 369d-e. 10 E ap. Delph. 393394. As J. dillon, 1996, p. 191 and 1990, XIII, p. 218, suggests, Plutarchs dualism may be due to the influence of his teacher Ammonius, whom he mentions in this section of E. ap. Delph. 11 E ap. Delph. 394a. 12 See R. M. Jones, The Platonism of Plutarch, Chicago, 1916, p. 57, n. 147, who refers to Xenocrates; see also H. Cherniss, 1968, p. 195, n. d. 13 Is. et Os. 373a.13-14, ... . 14 A. torhoudt, 1942, Chapter II; J. G. GriFFiths, 1970, p. 504; J. dillon, 1996, pp. 204-205.
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obstructive15 and, more importantly, as ignorant and self-deceptive16 recall Yaldabaoths characterization in numerous Nag Hammadi writings. As the Hypostasis of the Archons puts it: Their chief is blind; [because of his] power and his ignorance [and his] arrogance he said, with his [power], It is I who am God; there is none [apart from me]17. Note, moreover, that as Plutarch explicitly states in De Iside people assign to Typhon the most stupid of the domesticated animals, the ass, an animal with which the archontic realm is also related18. Consequently, even if, as has repeatedly been pointed out, Plutarch in general does not go as far as ApJohn, since the world ultimately does attain perfection19 once the external intervention awakens the intellectual faculty from its slumber20, this and other cases do seem to allow us to speak of a given devaluation of material reality and of an hypostasized figure in charge of it in Plutarch. He not only attempts to separate everything that could diminish the perfection of the divinity by attributing it to a subaltern god, but also explicitly says that it comes from above ( ), thus subordinating it to the higher realm. Cosmology As far as cosmology is concerned, there are conspicuous similarities between Plutarchs cosmological model, as it emerges both from De animae procreatione in Timaeo and from De Iside et Osiride, and the cosmology of the Apocryphon of John 21. As mentioned above Plutarchs cosmological model includes three principles, with the principle of matter () being added to the positive productive

15 Is. et Os. 371b, 371c, 371d, respectively. On Typhon, see J. BouloGne, Typhon: une figure du mal chez Plutarque, in M. Watthee-delMotte & P.-a. deProost (eds), Imaginaires du mal. Actes du colloque de Louvain-la-Neuve, 19-21 mars 1998, Leuven, 2000, pp. 43-53. 16 Is. et Os. 351f, . 17 HypArch (NHC II 4) 86.27-30; 94.19-21; other similar examples in OrigWorld (NHC XIII 2) 103.11-14; GosEg (NHC IV 2) III 58.24-59,1; TestTruth (NHC IX 3) 48.4f; TreatSeth (NHC VII 2) 64.19-26; TrimProt (NHC XIII 1) 43.35-44.2. See G. P. luttiKhuizen, 2006, p. 2. 18 See J. G. GriFFiths, 1970, p. 409, with references to C. Bonner, Studies in Magical Amulets, London, 1950, pp. 135-136. Note, however, that the object referred to by Griffith with the letters includes a cock-headed god. For an ass-headed god with the same inscription see pages 238239. See also ApJohn (BG) 41.19-20 and parallels in which not Yaldabaoth but another archon named Eloaios is said to have a donkey face (ApJohn [NHC II] 11.28 even uses the Greek term instead of the Coptic eiw as the other three versions). 19 A. H. arMstronG, 1978, p. 105. 20 See Plu., An. procr. 1014c; on which J. dillon, 1990, XIII, p. 218; Z. Plee, 2006, pp. 261-263. 21 The Apocryphon of John is known in four versions: NHC II 1-32; NHC III 1-40; NHC IV 1-49 and BG 8502.1977, on which G. P. luttiKhuizen, 2006.

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principle and to the negative one the latter being identified with the bad world soul of Platos Laws (896d)22. In what regards Plutarchs former work, it contains a detailed discussion of the Timaeus 35a.1-36b.5 that exposes the authors literalist approach to Platos cosmogony23. According to our author24, in the Timaeus Plato distinguished two stages in the formation of the world, namely a pre-cosmic stage before the world came to be (Ti. 52d.2-4), and the resulting ordered universe (Ti. 50c.750d.1)25. In his interpretation, the simple soul plays an important role during the pre-cosmic stage, as it functions as an intermediary between motionless forms and unqualified matter, in which the soul disperses the images from that world yonder26 in order that it may become perceptible and corporeal (1013c). What interests us here is that in spite of its central role the soul cannot produce order by itself, as a result of which it induces only a disorderly motion on the corporeal forms. The fact is that up to this point the only capacity proper to the soul is sense perception (1024c); its intellective faculty appears to be only in a potential state, which is described as immobile and impassive27.
See, Is. et Os. 369e; 370f. On Plutarchs as a harmonization of Aristotles prime matter yearning for form moving by itself in the Metaphysics (1034b.5-6) and of Platos pre-cosmic material principle, the mother of becoming of the Timaeus (53b) in Is. et Os. 370f-371a, see Z. Plee, 2006, p. 147 note 9. 23 In the controversy regarding the literalist and allegorical interpretation of Platos cosmogony in the Timaeus, Plutarch sides with Aristotle who, against Xenocrates and Speusippus, insisted that the literal was the only possible interpretation (De coel. 279b.22). For ancient and modern references to the controversy, see P. Merlan, Greek Philosophy from Plato to Plotinus, in A. H. arMstronG (ed.), Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge, 1970 [1967], p. 48 n. 1. See also J. dillon, 1996, pp. 242-244, who quotes John Philoponus, On the Eternity of the World 145.13ff Rabe, which preserves Calvenus Tauruss rsum of the four standard interpretations of Platos (in Timaeus 28b) to defend the allegorical interpretation. On Plutarch literalist approach, see H. Cherniss, 1976, pp. 137-149; M. Baltes, Die Weltentstehung des platonischen Timaios nach den antiken Interpreten 1, Leiden, 1976, pp. 38-45; id., La dottrina dellanima in Plutarco, Elenchos, 21 (2000) 245-270; F. Ferrari & L. Baldi, Plutarco, La generazione dellanima nel Timeo, Naples, 2002. 24 An. procr. 1014. 25 See F. Ferrari, 1995, p. 87. 26 An. procr. 1024c, . That this is, strictly speaking, Plutarchs own interpretation of Plato has been sufficiently pointed out by H. Cherniss, 1976, p. 232, n. c. On the relationship of Plutarchs elements with the Platonic Timaeus, F. Ferrari, 1996, pp. 47-48. 27 An. procr. 1024c-d, ... and what he calls becoming (...) is nothing other than that being involved in changes and motions which, ranged between what makes impressions and what receives them, disperses in this world the semblances from that world yonder. For this very reason it was called divisible and also because it is necessary for that which is perceiving and that which is forming mental images to be divided in correspondence with what is perceptible and with what is imaginable and to be coextensive with them, for the motion of sense-perception, which is the souls own, moves towards what is perceptible without but the intelligence, while it was abiding and immobile by itself upon having got into the soul and taken control makes her turn around to him and with her accomplishes about that which always remains fixed the circular motion most closely
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The soul therefore is able to transmit ideas, but in spite of its inherent inclination towards the intelligible it cannot engage by itself in an intellectual motion to attain it28. It is at this point that similarities between Plutarch and the myth of Sophia in the ApJohn become apparent29: in the same way that in the latter text Sophias or male partner transforms her into a rational soul30, Plutarch affirms that an intervention from above, from the superior principle ( ), is neccessary for the soul to activate its dormant intellective activity (1026e31). After being made rational due to their reunion with their male consorts, they both achieve similar goals: while Sophia is restored to the ninth heaven in ApJohn32, Plutarchs world soul finally accomplishes its goal of moving in a circular motion around that which always remains fixed, a motion that is most closely in contact with real being (1024c-d). Further support for this comparison comes from Plutarchs Is. et Os., where Isis and her evil brother Typhon represent both faculties of the pre-cosmic world soul, the impassive intellectual and the irrational, respectively, while Osiris represents the external intellect. As a result of her unconsummated love of Osiris, originating in the womb of Rhea, Isis gives birth to Horus the Elder, in Plutarchs words only an image and an apparition of the world to come33. Due to the lack of a male element, the result could only be a failure: the parallels with Sophias story in the Apocryphon of John are evident34. As is also the case in De animae procreatione in Timaeo, the ordered world will only come into existence when the impassive intellectual faculty is turned towards the intellect, namely when Isis is transformed by reason and receives all corporeal and spiritual forms35. We see then that Plutarch applies the same model to Isis and Osiris that he applied to the relationship between the world soul and the intellect: there is a relationship between potential intellect and actual intellect and related to these there are also two stages, namely the pre-cosmic stage and the ordered universe.
in contact with real existence. For the relationship between soul and matter in this pre-cosmic stage, see F. Ferrari, 1995, pp. 86-104. 28 On the difficulties of this assertion in Plutarch, see F. Ferrari, 1996, pp. 50-51. 29 G. C. stead, 1969, p. 101. Contra A. H. arMstronG, 1978, p. 104. 30 See below, n. 32. 31 See also An. procr. 1024c and 1023c. 32 ApJohn (NHC II 1) 13.32-14.13. 33 Is. et Os. 373a-c. On the relationship between this imperfect son of Isis and the world of becoming, see A. torhoudht, 1942, pp. 3739. 34 See ApJohn (BG) 37 and parallels; G. P. luttiKhuizen, 2006, pp. 43-49 rightly points out that this idea reflects a Hellenistic rather than a Jewish background; on Aristotelian influence on the notion, see ibid. p. 87 and n. 31; see also below. 35 Is. et Os. 372e, ,

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Although my intention is not to state a relationship of dependence between Plutarch and ApJohn, there does seem to be a common background behind the idea that the dormant or potential intellectual element of the soul or Sophia cannot by itself produce something resembling the divine model36. As to the former, the idea of the dormant soul to describe the world-souls lack of intellectual activity and its actualization by an external source, be it the Intellect, the Father or the , is frequent in Nag Hammadi texts, witness the Authoritative Teaching s metaphorical description in which the works as a medicine on the soul or the Teachings of Silvanus in which, more literally, the heavens light enlightens the in order that this may turn itself toward the light of heaven37. In the context of Middle Platonism, the motif also appears in Alcinous. Perhaps in a reference to Platos Cratylus (400a.8-10), in which Intellect and Soul confer order upon the bodily nature, Alcinous describes the Father as rousing up the soul of the world and turning it to himself 38. Commenting upon the common notion in Plutarch and Alcinous, John Dillon proposes the influence of the Platonic Politicus (269 ff.), but such a background, as he also admits, produces more problems than solutions39. In fact, this motif cannot be explained without Aristotles famous passage in De Anima 2.1 on the two modes of the soul as entelechy40. Aristotle indeed affirms in this passus that the soul is the entelecheia of the body and distinguishes two senses in which this entelechy manifests itself. There is the entelechy, which he compares to the exercise of knowledge and waking; but there is also the souls first entelechy, which is compared to knowledge and sleep. In what regards the idea of the souls (or Sophias) incapacity to produce something resembling the divine model by itself, we have the notion, also of Aristotelian provenance, that the female role in procreation provides the material substrate only. As has been pointed out, Aristotles description of unruly
36 On Plutarch, J. dillon, 1990, IV, p. 121, affirms that Isis, it seems, produced a sort of foreshadowing of the cosmos of her own, before being filled with by Osiris. For Plutarch, this only indicates her desire for Form and order, but it has a curious resemblance to Valentinus myth. On the ApJohn, see G. P. luttiKhuizen, Traces of Aristotelian Thought in the Apocryphon of John , in H. G. BethGe, S. eMMel, K. KinG & I. sChleChter (eds.), For the Children, Perfect Instruction, Boston, 2002, pp. 181-202. 37 See AuthTeach (NHC V I,3) 22.24-29 and Teach Silv (NHC VII 4) 103.8-11. 38 Alcinous, Didask. 164.42-165.4 (the father fills the cosmic soul with his forms and rouses, in this way, its intellect. Once the Cosmic souls intellect has been actualized, it confers order on the material world), ,

J. dillon, 1996, pp. 205-206. Arist., De An. 412a-413a; on which, see A. P. Bos, The Unanimity of Aristotles On the Soul and his Eudemus, forthcoming.
40

, .
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matter in De Generatione Animalium as originating the deformity () that is likely to appear in human reproduction41 might be the background of Sophias futile attempt at parthenogenesis [which] results in a miscarriage, of the discharge of dark matter (that is her menstrual fluid), the only thing that Sophia can contribute to generation42. This conception seems also to be behind a couple of passages of the Corpus Hermeticum, witness the Poimandres, where Physis or Nature is fecundated by the Anthropos (in fact, by the Logos of the highest Intellect dwelling in him), or Kore Kosmou where it unites with Ponos43. Interestingly, the idea already appears in Philo of Alexandrias De migratione Abrahami. After distinguishing three elements in a human being, namely body, soul and intellect, and affirming the intimate relationship between the nous and the divine intellect, Philo stresses that the former only produces good results when inspired by the latter. Otherwise human reason produces imperfect thoughts or ideas, abortions (), in the words of Philo44, imperfection which also characterizes Sophias offspring45. In addition to these major parallels, there is another issue that might be dealt with in this cosmological section. I am referring to Plutarchs use of the motif, rather widespread in Gnostic texts, of the archons or doorkeepers who exert a controlling force in the planetary sphere, impeding the souls free passage to the divine region. It is well known that according to De genio Socratis there are four principles () of all things. Life (), movement (), birth () and corruption ()46 are clearly located in the four regions the universe consists of and the links () between them are described in the following manner: the first is linked to the second by Unity at the invisible, the second to the third by the Mind at the sun, and the third to the fourth by Nature at the

, , on which L. CerFaux, Un thme de

41 Arist., GA 767b.9-30, comments upon three different levels of unsuccessful reproduction: as producing either a more general type of human, namely a female, an offspring not resembling its parents or monstrosity. 42 Z. Plee, 2006, p. 116. 43 C.H. 1.12-15 at 14, ,

, , , .
45 46

mythologie gnostique dans le De Iside et Osiride de Plutarque, CE, 11 (1936) 42-43. See also C.H. 23.10-13 (Kore kosmou) as a result of the union of Physis and Ponos Heuresis is born, who will invent the ordered Universe. On the role of Heuresis and its comparison with Isis described as , see A. D. noCK & A. J. FestuGire, 1954, p. 27 n. 46. 44 Philo, De migratione Abrahami 33-34, .

ApJohn (NHC II 1) 10.2-7; BG (2) 37.13-18. Gen. Socr. 591b. A complete analysis of the myth in W. haMilton, The Myth in Plutarchs De genio (589F-592E), CQ , 28 (1934) 175182.

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moon47. What is interesting about this view, however, is that the three Moirai, daughters of Ananke, have an important role to play in controlling these links between the different regions. It is significant that, as H. Drrie has pointed out, they are no longer conceived of as spinning goddesses, but as holders of keys () and, consequently, in charge of the custody of the whole region to which they are ascribed48. Admittedly a doorkeeper is not the same as a ruler in the Gnostic sense, but that Plutarch echoes a widespread notion can be seen in an interesting passage of Origens Contra Celsum, in which Celsus appears to have used a similar term to describe the Gnostic powers in charge of the astral region, namely divine doorkeepers ()49. Anthropology Some scholars point out a similar Gnostic background to Plutarchs anthropology, or, at least, to the most developed form of his various anthropological schemes. In fact, the famous passage of De facie in orbe lunae confidently allows Sulla to assert the tripartite composition of man, in a way that resembles the anthropological frame we repeatedly find in Nag Hammadi texts50. Admittedly, the first steps towards this view can already be seen in De genio Socratis (591d), in De sera numinis vindicta (564c) and, perhaps, in De virtute morali (441d), but a clear and distinct separation of the three parts has not yet been fully achieved in these texts51. In line with Aristotles thought on the issue, De facie in orbe
Gen. Socr. 591b, in which the order of the Moirai is Atropos, Clotho and Lachesis. Even if the order is the same, Fac. lun. 945c places them not in the invisible, the sun and the moon, respectively, but rather in the sun, the moon and the earth. On Plutarch being inspired by Xenocrates, see below next note. 48 H. drrie, 1981, p. 107 and notes 61-64. On the origin of this idea in Xenocrates and on its further history in the Neo-Platonic doctrine of the hypostases, see H. drrie, Zum Ursprung der Neuplatonischen Hypostasenlehre, Hermes, 82 (1954) 331-342, especially pp. 338-339, which summarize Plutarchs combination of tradition and innovation: as to the former, Xenocrates already used them as symbols of the Stufung der Seele und der Welt, associated them to the different levels of the universe and equated these levels with epistemological modes. As to the latter, Plutarchs innovation can be seen in the fact that the Moirai are no more connected to reason, opinion and perception as in Xenocrates. Consequently, they are no more related to the sun, moon and earth, but have been rather removed to the invisible region beyond them. According to F. E. BrenK, An Imperial Heritage: The Religious Spirit of Plutarch of Chaeronea, ANRW, II 36.1 (1987), pp. 249-349, p. 275, differently, Plutarchs fantasy comes from Stoic-Poseidonian cosmology and contemporary Platonic speculation. 49 Origenes, Cels. 7.40; cf. 6.30. 50 Fac. lun. 942e. 51 In spite of W. haMilton, The Myth in Plutarchs De facie (940F-945D), CQ , 28 (1934) 24-30, and, more recently, of Y. vernire, Symboles et Mythes dans la pense de Plutarque, Paris, 1977, p. 126, who both consider that De genio presents exactly the same trichotomy as De facie, W. deuse, Untersuchungen zur mittelplatonischen und neuplatonischen Seelenlehre, Mainz, 1985, pp. 46-47, is right in interpreting Timarchus myth as a first step towards the theory exposed in De facie. See
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lunae clearly distinguishes nous, soul and body52 and asserts that mans intellect is his most divine element53. Most interesting concerning Plutarchs anthropology, however, is that he connects it with the motif of the ascent of the soul54. After associating mans three constitutive elements with the sun, moon and earth, respectively, Plutarch introduces the motif of mans first and second death (943a-b). Given that the intellect is mans only immortal part, De facie in orbe lunae 944-945 describes how it leaves behind both bodily and psychic accretions: the body remains on earth, the soul continues its journey to the moon, while the intellect, our true self, speeds off to the sun 55. Both aspects of Plutarchs anthropology have clear parallels in Gnostic thought. The tripartite anthropology is ubiquitous in Nag Hammadi texts such as the ApJohn, the ApJames and the Tripartite Tractate 56. At the same time, the idea of the ascent of the soul is the obverse to the conception of the souls descent into the world of movement, as the Three Steles of Seth asserts, echoing Heraclitus (B 90), The way of ascent is like the way of descent57. The ascent of the soul is the core of Gnostic eschatology and as such it appears in the story of Simon and Helena58, in the Hymn of the Pearl in the Acts of Thomas, in the

also, in the same line, H. Cherniss, 1968, pp. 200201, n. a. The same is true of the passage in Virt. mor. (441d), sometimes referred to as another example of tripartite anthropology (see H. drrie, 1981, p. 109, n. 70), but which in fact implies only a bipartition of the soul without referring to the separation of soul and intellect. 52 On the Aristotelian background to Plutarchs anthropology in De facie, see A. P. Bos, The Distinction between Platonic and Aristotelian Dualism Illustrated from Plutarchs Myth in de facie in orbe lunae , in a. Prez JiMnez & F. Casadess (eds), Estudios sobre Plutarco. Misticismo y religiones mistricas en la obra de Plutarco, Madrid-Mlaga, 2001, pp. 5770, passim; id., 2003, p. 280. 53 The Nicomachean Ethics provides enough testimony on it: see Arist., EN 1177b.26-1178a.2 for the idea that the intellect is mans divine element and that by which he achieves complete happiness; in EN 1178a.2-7 the intellect is mans true self; according to EN 1179a.22-32, he who lives according to his intellect is the most beloved of the Gods. Similarly, the Eudemian Ethics state that the intellect is mans highest element and is connected with God: EE 1248a.24-29. See also De An. 430a.23-25; Metaph. , 1072b.23-26; PA 656a.8; 10; 686a.27-28; GA 736b.28; 737a.8-11; Protr. fr. 108 Dring. See P. Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen. Von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias, I, Die Renaissance des Aristotelismus im I Jh v. Chr., Berlin-New York, 1973, p. 230, and additional bibliography in note 24. 54 On the issue, F. E. BrenK, The Origin and Return of the Soul in Plutarch, in Relighting the Souls: Studies in Plutarch, in Greek Literature, Religion and Philosophy, and in the New Testament Background, Stuttgart, 1998, pp 3-24; see especially pp. 13-16. 55 Fac. lun. 944f, , , . 56 See ApJohn (NHC II 1) 25.17-27.30; ApJames (NHC I 2) 11.35-12.13 and TriTrac (NHC I 5) 119.16-122.12. See also, the same view in TreatRes (NHC I 4) 46.22-24; GosMary (BG 1) 10.14-16; TeachSilv (NHC VII 4) 92.23-26, on which L. roiG lanzillotta, Acta Andreae Apocrypha: A New Perspective on the Nature, Intention and Significance of the Primitive Text, Genve, 2007, pp. 222226. 57 Steles Seth (NHC VII 5) 127.20-21. 58 Iren., Adv. haer. 1.23,2-4.

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Naassene homily as preserved by Ps.-Hippolytus59, in Valentinianism60 and the Corpus Hermeticum I and X61, and it also lies in the background of numerous Nag Hammadi texts62. The similarities between Plutarchs version of the ascent of the soul, and the tripartite anthropology behind it, with Gnostic conceptions are so obvious that scholars attempted to furnish an explanation. H. Drrie, for example, claimed that Plutarchs view, in spite of an unverkennbare Affinitt, had nothing to do with the world of Gnosticism and, in fact, it might proceed from Posidonius fragments 108 and 110e-k. Admittedly, both fragments deal with the intellects power of divination when freed from the influence of the senses, but the idea exposed in them is too general to be seen as the impulse behind Plutarchs motif 63. As has been pointed out, the origin of the motif of the ascent of the soul as we find it in Plutarch and parallel texts should perhaps rather be sought in Aristotles lost writings, Eudemus or De philosophia 64. Moreover, parallels are not exclusively from the Gnosis, as tripartite anthropology is rather widespread in late antiquity65, and the ascent of the soul also appears in Philo of Alexandria66 and other Middle-Platonists such as Alcinous67 and Maximus of Tyre68. Under the influence of this conceptual world, it even reached Clement of Alexandria, who, as Lilla has demonstrated, seems to echo this view69.

Ps.-Hippol., Ref. 5.7,2-9; 36. Iren., Adv. haer. 1.6,7; 7.1,5. On the Valentinian myth of Sophia, see G. C. stead, 1969, pp. 75104. 61 See C.H. 1.24-26; 10.16. See A. D. noCK & A. J. FestuGire, 1954, p. 131, n. 57, with references to its appearance among the Valentinians (Iren., Adv. haer. 1.7,1 and Clem. Al., Exc. Theod. 64) and Marcosians of Irenaeus (Adv. haer. 1.21,5). 62 See ApJohn (NHC II) 26.31; GosMary (BG 1) 17.4-5; GosPhil (NHC II 3) 119.13-15; GosTruth (NHC I 3) 24.11-20; 40.30-33; 41.28-29; 42.32; ThomCont (NHC II 7) 139.28-30; ApPaul (NHC V 2); SopJesChr (III 4) 124.1-9. 63 H. drrie, 1981, pp. 97-98, 110. In this he seems to follow W. Bousset, Die Himmelsreise der Seele, Darmstadt, 1960, pp. 59-62, who, in his turn following R. heinze, Xenokrates, Leipzig, 1892, p. 127, already points to the possible influence of Posidonius. Against the possibility that F 108 deals with the immortality of the soul, see I. G. Kidd, Posidonius, II, The Commentary, I,Testimonia and Fragments, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 431432. 64 See A. P. Bos, 2003, Chapter X: The Souls Bondage according to a Lost Work of Aristotle, which includes a thorough and convincing analysis of the issue. 65 See on the influence of the tripartite anthropology on Early Christianity, L. roiG lanzillotta, One Human Being, Three Early Christian Anthropologies. An Assessment of Acta Andreae s Tenor on the Basis of Its Anthropological Views, VChr, 61 (2007) 414444. 66 Ph., On dreams 22; On giants 2; De plantatione 4. 67 Alcinous, Didask. 180.18-19. 68 Max. Tyr., Diss. 11.10; cf. 9.6; 10.2. For his precedents see Pl., Phdr. 246d-247e; Tht. 173e. 69 Clem. Al., Strom. 6.108,1, cf. 7.57,5, on which S. lilla, Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism, Rome, 1971, pp. 181-189.
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Gnosis or knowledge occupies a central place in Plutarchs thought. The opening chapters of De Iside et Osiride bear sufficient testimony to the fact that for him knowledge of the divine, so far as it is attainable by men, is the most urgent issue. On the basis of Plutarchs scanty use of the term, R. Reitzenstein has surmised that our author here uses the term in a special mystical sense70 and, as a matter of fact, in this text the character, means and goal of knowledge are clearly similar to the world of Hermeticism and Gnosis. To begin with, as for the character of knowledge, it is interesting that in spite of the cultic context, knowledge is presented here in clear philosophical terms, seemingly expressed in Plutarchs assertion that the effort to arrive at the Truth, and especially the truth about the gods, is a longing for the divine71. As the text advances, ritual, myth and philosophy intermingle to such an extent that one wonders whether final contact with the divinity results from the Isiatic initiation or from philosophy72. As for the means of attaining the knowledge of Him who is the First, the Lord of All, the Ideal One, Isis is presented as a helper and guide who leads the mystes along a laborious path to counteract and annihilate the work of Typhon, namely the attachment to the body and the senses: by abstinence from many kinds of food and from the lusts of the flesh, [which] curtails licentiousness and the love of pleasure, and induces a habit of patient submission to the stern and rigorous services in shrines73. In spite of the apparent differences between the Isiac cult as presented by Plutarch, in which observance of the rituals brings the individual into contact with the divinity, and Gnosticism, in which revelation plays the most important role74, there are still clear similarities: once the Gnostic receives the call from above he must continue his preparation to attain the knowledge of God by leading a pious life, detached from the body and controlling the influence of the irrational aspects of his soul by means of reason. (See below, section on Ethics.) As for the goal of knowledge, Plutarch presents this as the apperception of the conceptual, the pure, and the simple, shining through the soul like a flash of lightning, [which] affords an opportunity to touch and see it but once75. In this direct contact with divinity we see the mystical aspect again coming to the

See R. reitzenstein, 1910, p. 125; as quoted by H. D. Betz, 1972, p. 347. Is. et Os. 351e, , ; see also Alcinous, Disdask. 153.3-9. 72 See Is. et Os. 371a, where Plutarch affirms that Platonic philosophy is the hermeneutic key to the Egyptian myth of Isis and Osiris. See H. D. Betz, 1972, pp. 347354. 73 Is. et Os. 352a. 74 M. Malaise, 1982, pp. 58-60. 75 Is. et Os. 382d.
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fore76, for which Plutarch claims the support of Plato77 and Aristotle78, who, in his view, call this part of philosophy the epoptic or mystic part, inasmuch as those who have passed beyond these conjectural and confused matters of all sorts by means of Reason proceed by leaps and bounds to that primary, simple, and immaterial principle; and when they have somehow attained contact with the pure truth abiding about it, they think that they have the whole of philosophy completely, as it were, within their grasp79. It is evident that this fusion of the subject and object of knowledge is also a well-known goal in Gnostic texts80. In Plutarchs theosophical exposition, consequently, the spheres of Typhon, Isis and Osiris are presented as the progressive steps of phronesis, episteme and theoria. Once the individual, by controlling irrational impulses by means of reason and abstinence, distances himself from ignorance and self-deception and he is then able to focus on understanding in order to finally achieve knowledge, namely union with the divinity81. The knowledge provided by the mysteries of Isis presupposes the principle of like knowing like82, in other words, the similitude of the subject and object of knowledge which excludes all those who are not in the know83. This obviously implies an elitism with respect to knowledge that draws the line between kin () and alien () that was well known in Gnostic milieus. The fact that this knowledge is in a way concealed by the divinity, who only grants it to some happy few who really make the effort to attain it, is also close to the esotericism of the Gnostic worldview84. As the GosTruth puts it, the Father, or God, retains within himself the knowl76 For the Middle Platonic background of the notion, see F. E. BrenK, Darkly Beyond the Glass: Middle Platonism and the Vision of the Soul, in s. Gersh & C. KannenGiesser (eds.), Platonism in Late Antiquity, Notre Dame (University of Notre Dame Press), 1992, pp. 39-60. 77 As possible inspiration for Plutarch, Ph. Merlan, 1963, p. 33 note, refers to Platos Smp. 210a; Ep. VII 344b; Phaedr. 250a-251a and Phad. 69c-d. 78 Arist. fr. 10 Ross. The fragment was first claimed as Aristotelian by J. Croissant, Aristote et les mystres, Paris, 1932; see also E. BiGnone, LAristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro, II, Firenze, 1936, p. 76. 79 Is. et Os. 383d-e. On this passage, see the interesting commentary by Ph. Merlan, 1963, pp. 32-35; see also L. roiG lanzillotta, Bridging the Gulf between Transcedence and Immanence in Late Antiquity, in a. a. MaCdonald, M. tWoMeY & G. J. reininK (eds.), Groningen Studies in Cultural Change, V, Learned Antiquity: Scholarship and Society in Near East, the Greco-Roman World, and the Early Medieval West, Leuven, 2003, pp. 37-51. 80 GosTruth (NHC I 3) 24.28-25.19; 42.25-38; StelesSeth (NHC VII 5) 127.12-26; Zost (VIII 1) 131.14-132.14; Marsanes (NHC X 1) 9.29-10.7; see also C.H. 7.2; 10.5; OrChald. 1.5-9. 81 Is. et Os. 351f and 375c. 82 See C. W. Mller, Gleiches zum Gleichen, Wiesbaden, 1965. 83 h. drrie, 1981, p. 30. 84 Is. et Os. 351d, God gives to men the other things for which they express a desire, but of sense and intelligence He grants them only a share, inasmuch as these are His special possessions and His sphere of activity.

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edge that might make perfect those who came from him. In doing so, he retains within himself their perfection, granting it to them as a return to him and a perfect unitary knowledge85. Admittedly, the idea of concealment is an old one. Heraclitus had already pointed out that the lord whose is the oracle at Delphi neither speaks nor hides his meaning, but gives a sign86. True, the Delphic motto also suggested a striving for a self-knowledge conceived of as a first step on the path towards acquaintance with the divine. This acquaintance, however, was intended to be a reminder that the distance between god and man was unbridgeable. In Plutarch, knowledge is instead the knowledge of the divine, and this with a view to self-divinization. In a similar way, the tenth Hermetic tract, called the Key affirms ... 87, or as the opening words of the Gospel of Thomas state: These are the hidden sayings which the living Jesus spoke and which Didymos Judas Thomas wrote down. And he said, Whoever finds the interpretation of these sayings will not experience death88. Ethics The view of the material world as a prison is a well-known motif in Plutarch. On divine vengeance refers to this in a quasi-Gnostic fashion, asserting that this life is a prison-house affording no removal or escape, although it allows in the interval much feasting... as when prisoners play at dice or draughts with the rope hanging overhead89. One of the possible ways of improving this situation comes from ethics, insofar as it allows, by tempering all irrational inclinations in the soul, a detachment from externality that represents a first step towards complete liberation by means of the intellect. De virtute morali offers an interesting passage dealing with the internal structure of the soul, consisting of rational and irrational parts, which assesses in Peripatetic fashion the need for rational control and the way in which this takes place90. In the previous section we referred to Plutarchs view of Isis as providing the guidance that helps the individual to supersede Typhon, namely that part of the soul which is impressionable, impulsive, irrational and truculent (371b). The combination of a rational life (phronesis) and abstinence from certain foods and sexual intercourse in order to limit Typhons realm of influence,

GosTruth (NHC I 3) 19.3-5. Heraclit., VS 22 B 93. 87 See C.H. 10.9; on which R. reitzenstein, 1910, p. 298. 88 GosThom (NHC II 2) 32.15-19. 89 Ser. num. vind. 554d, on which H. D. Betz, P. A. dirKse & E. W. sMith, De sera numinis vindicta (Moralia 548A-568A), in H. D. Betz (ed.), Plutarchs Theological Writings and Early Christian Literature, Leiden, 1975, pp. 181-235, p. 206. 90 Virt. mor. 441d. See above note 51.
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seems to openly facilitate the work of reason the realm of episteme with which Isis was connected. This step was necessary in order to be able to focus on the only existent, on the One, the knowledge of which comes, as we saw above, by direct apprehension. This ethical progress towards the knowledge of god also has clear parallels in the Corpus Hermeticum. The Hermetic palingenesis, so well described by Festugire more than fifty years ago91, also provides the individual with preliminary doctrinal preparation to become detached from the body such that the nous or intellect is able to receive divine illumination92. As a matter of fact, in spite of the black and white reports of the heresiologists93 ethics also played a central role in Gnosticism94. In addition to the scintilla animae and the external call, ethics was also essential during this life, as a means to supersede the obstacles posed by both body and soul and thus to finally achieve redemption, as the Teaching of Silvanus or the Sentences of Sextus clearly show95. As the Authoritative Teaching illustrates, Gnostics many a time saw life as a contest in which they had to learn to despise the delusion of externals in order to focus on a higher level of reality: He, then, the Father, wishing to reveal his wealth and his glory, brought about this great contest in this world, wishing to make the contestants appear, and make all those who contend leave behind the things that had come into being, and despise them with a lofty, incomprehensible knowledge, and flee to the one who exists. Asceticism and the rejection of the world was a central issue in fact, of which the Acts of Peter and the Twelve Apostles 96 or the GosThom (21b; 58) provide enough testimony97. Conclusions It is time to draw some conclusions. It seems clear that labelling Plutarch a Gnostic seems to be overstating the case, but it is undeniable that the points of contacts with the world of Gnosis are too numerous to be dealt with as erratic influences or contacts. Indeed, the preceding systematic analysis of Plutarchs thought intended to show that Gnostic or Gnosticizing ideas were not isolated

A. J. FestuGire, La Rvlation dHerms Trismgiste, IV, Le Dieu inconnu et la gnose, Paris, 1953, pp. 200-257. 92 M. Malaise, 1982, p. 58. 93 See Iren., Adv. haer. 1.13,3; 1.6,3-4; 1.25,3. 94 See already F. Wisse, Die Sextus-Sprche und das Problem der gnostischen Ethik, in a. BhliG & F. Wisse (eds.), Zum Hellenismus in den Schriften von Nag Hammadi, Wiesbaden, 1975, pp. 55-86; see also, K. rudolPh, Die Gnosis: Wesen und Geschichte einer sptantiken Religion, Gttingen, 19903, pp. 261-293; M. desJardins, Sin in Valentianism, Atlanta, 1990; M. A. WilliaMs, 1996; and, now, P. L. tite, Valentinian Ethics and Paraenetic Discourse: Determining the Social Function of Moral Exhortation in Valentinian Christianity, Leiden, 2009. 95 See TeachSilv (NHC VII 4) 113.33-114.6. 96 Acts Pet. 12 Apost. (NHC VI 1) 5.19-6.8. 97 See also AuthTeach (NHC VI 3) 26.8-26.

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motifs in his work. The recurrent appearance of Gnostic elements in the five aspects of his thought analysed in this paper, namely theology, cosmology, anthropology, epistemology and ethics, shows, in our view, that they occupy a more fundamental place in Plutarchs thought than scholars are ready to admit. On the other hand, it has also become apparent that for most of Plutarchs so-called Gnosticizing views there is always a precedent in Greek philosophy, mainly in Plato or Aristotle, and that Plutarchs interpretation has often parallels in the context of Middle Platonism. In order to evaluate Plutarchs relationship to the world of Gnosticism we should therefore rather pay heed to the context in which these views appear and to the way he deals with them. From this perspective it is interesting to note, for example, that the Gnosticizing application of philosophical ideas especially turns up in Plutarchs allegorical interpretation of myths be it Plato or the Isiatic cult, and this might, to a certain extent, be seen as a first step toward the situation we find in Gnosticism, namely the creation of myths in order to expose philosophical and theological tenets. In the case of Plutarch, consequently, the line between the labels pre-gnostic or proto-gnostic coined more than forty years ago at the Messina conference is more tenuous that has been traditionally accepted: true, his dualistic conceptions might be seen as pre-gnostic, but his systematic application thereof in the allegorical interpretation of myth seems to prefigure attitudes toward myth and philosophy which we find in a developed fashion in second century Gnosticism. It seems undeniable that in general Plutarch always remained a Platonist philosopher strongly influenced by Aristotle and that he never went as far as Gnostics in denying the status of being to visible materiality. However, the efforts by scholars to demonstrate this point, already show that there is something important going on in Plutarchs thought which we should try to unveil. The right evaluation of Plutarchs testimony is essential, not only for an understanding of several important issues in Middle-Platonism but also for a better understanding of the formation and first development of Gnosticism, which we only know from its mature products98. references
arMstronG, A. H., Gnosis and Greek Philosophy, in B. aland (ed.), Gnosis: Festschrift fr Hans Jonas, Gttingen, 1978, pp. 87-124.

I would like to express my gratitude to the several colleagues that read different drafts of this paper. Especial thanks are owed to G. P. Luttikuizen and A. P. Bos, who enriched it with numerous comments and suggestions.

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Betz, H. D., Ein seltsames mysterientheologisches System bei Plutarch, in C. J. BleeKer, S. G. F. Brandon & M. siMon (eds.), Ex orbe religionum: Studia Geo Widengren, Leiden, 1972, pp. 347-354. Bos, A. P., The Soul and its Instrumental Body: a Reinterpretation of Aristotles philosophy of Living Nature, Leiden, 2003. Cherniss, H., The Face on the Moon, in Plutarchs Moralia, XII, Cambridge, Mass., 1968. , On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus, Plutarchs Moralia, XIII, Cambridge, Mass., 1976. dillon, J., The Golden Chain. Studies in the Development of Platonism, Aldershot, Hampshire, 1990. , The Middle Platonists, New York, 19963 [1977]. drrie, H., Gnostische Spuren bei Plutarch, in R. van den BroeK & M. J. verMaseren (eds.), Studies in Gnosticism and Hellenistic Religions Presented to Gilles Quispel on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday, Leiden, 1981, pp. 92-116. Ferrari, F., Dio idee e materia. La struttura del cosmo in Plutarco di Cheronea, Naples, 1995. , La generazione precosmica e la struttura della materia in Plutarco, MH, 53 (1996) 44-55. GriFFiths, J. G., Plutarchs De Iside et Osiride, Cambridge, 1970. luttiKhuizen, G. P., Gnostic Revisions of Genesis Stories and Early Jesus Traditions, Leiden, 2006. Malaise, M., Isisme et gnosticisme, in Gnosticisme et monde hellnistique. Actes du Colloque de Louvain-la-Neuve, 11-14 mars 1980, Leuven, 1982, pp. 47-60. Merlan, P., Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsiousness. Problems of the Soul in the Neoaristotelian and Neoplatonic Tradition, The Hague, 1963. noCK, A. D., & A.J. FestuGire, Corpus Hermeticum, IV, Fragments Extraits de Stobe, Paris, 1954. Plee, Z., Poetics of the Gnostic Universe: Narrative and Cosmology in the Apocryphon of John, Leiden, 2006. reitzenstein, R., Hellenistische Myterienreligionen, ihre Grundgedanken und Wirkungen, Berlin-Leipzig, 1910. stead, G. C., The Valentinian Myth of Sophia, JThS, 20 (1969) 75-104. torhoudt, A., Een onbekend gnostisch systeem in Plutarchus De Iside et Osiride, Leuven, 1942 WilliaMs, M. A., Rethinking Gnosticism: An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category, Princeton, NJ, 1996.