Contextualizing and Critiquing the Poliheuristic Theory Author(s): Eric Stern Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Conflict

Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 1, The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making (Feb., 2004), pp. 105-126 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3176271 . Accessed: 18/03/2012 07:37
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Conflict Resolution.

http://www.jstor.org

Contextualizingand Critiquingthe PoliheuristicTheory

ERIC STERN
SwedishNational Defense College CRISMART, Uppsala University

The poliheuristictheoryof decision (PH) is placed in its properhistoricalcontext througha brief diachronicoverview of the evolutionof the foreign policy decision-makingtraditionfrom Snyder,Bruck,and Sapinto the present.The PH programis examinedand contextualizedin synchronicfashion via juxtaposition with threeparallellines of theoreticalandempiricalforeignpolicy decision-making research: cognitive and are institutionalism, problemrepresentation, decision units.These approaches foundto exhibitdifferent methodologicalstrengthsand weaknesses and to emphasizedifferentaspects of the decision-makingprois cess. Substantial exist, suggestingthatthe potentialfor synergyandcross-fertilization complementarities great. problem Keywords: Poliheuristictheory;decision making;foreignpolicy; cognitive institutionalism; decision units representation;

THE CONTEXT1 The study of foreign policy decision making-the traditionto which the poliheuristictheoryof decision makingclearlybelongs-has been characterized alterby natingperiods of feast and famine since its beginnings in the 1950s. A first wave of studiesbeganwith Snyder,Bruck,andSapin's(1963) programmatic manifesto,which outlined an alternativeto the post-WorldWarII realist orthodoxy(e.g., Morgenthau 1948; see also Vasquez 1983) and ended with Paige's (1968) landmarkstudy of the Koreancrisis. A second wave of pioneeringstudies came in the 1970s, bringingthe organizationaland psychological foundationsof foreign policy making into sharper focus (Allison 1971; Janis 1972; Steinbrunner1974; Halperin 1974; Cottam 1977). (e.g., George 1980; Lebow 1981; Smith and Despite many noteworthycontributions Clarke1985; Larson 1985; Janis 1989; Hermann,Kegley, and Rosenau 1987) during the 1980s, it is fairto say thatmuchof the attentionof the scholarlyinternational rela1. This section depicts the evolution of the discourseon foreign policy decision making in political science and international relations.For reviews of the psychological literature decision making,see, for on example, Abelson and Levi (1985) and Dawes (1998). AUTHOR'SNOTE:Severalsections of this articledrawon a workingpapertitled "Emerging Theories of ForeignPolicy Decision Making,"coauthoredwith Margaret Hermann. G. JOURNAL CONFLICT OF ol. 2004 RESOLUTION, 48 No. 1,February 105-126 DOI:10. 177/0022002703261052 ? 2004SagePublications 105

106

JOURNAL CONFLICT OF RESOLUTION

tions community was directed elsewhere, and not least at the neorealist-neoliberal debate(e.g., Baldwin 1993). However,fromthe vantagepointof the firstdecadeof the new millennium,it is clearthata thirdwave of foreignpolicy decision-makingstudies was launchedduringthe 1990s (e.g., Vertzberger1990; 't Hart 1994; Khong 1992; Lebow and Stein 1994; 't Hart, Stem, and Sundelius 1997; Farnham1997; Haney 1997; Garrison1999). A furthersignal of the mountinginterestin the topic is the republicationand/orrevision of severalof the seminalworksmentionedabove (Allison and Zelikow 1999; Snyder,Bruck and Sapin 2002; Steinbrunner 2002). Much progress has been made, and significantaccumulation takenplace (Ripley 1993; Hudhas son 1995;Carlsnaes2002). Therecan be no doubtthatwe now have a moredifferentiated (Lawrenceand Lorch 1969; Suedfeld and Leighton2002) pictureof the foreign policy-makingprocess thanever before. Some scholarshaverespondedto this mountingdifferentiation embracingit and by attemptingto turn it into a methodological virtue. The multiperspectivist approach consists of identifyingseveralalternative decision-making(or policy-making)models from the literature considershow well each illuminatesand accountsfor a given and empiricalcase (or cases). Allison's Essence of Decision, initiallypublishedin 1971, is to one of the most widely cited contributions the foreignpolicy analysisliterature and an important exemplarof this approach.This monograph'simpactderivedat least as much from its juxtapositionof three ways of theorizingabout how and why foreign policy decision are made as from its relativelyearly (9 years afterthe fact) empirical work on the Cubanmissile crisis. Allison's researchdemonstrated both the questhat tions posed andthe explanationsfound changeddramatically the analystshifts peras (rationalactor,organizational process,andgovspectiveacrossthe three"paradigms" criticizedon both empiricaland ernmental[cabinet/bureaucratic] politics). Although theoretical grounds (see, e.g., Krasner 1972; Bendor and Hammond 1992; Welch 1992; Ster and Verbeek1998), Allison's work has proveninfluentialin termsof its models researchdesign. A numberof scholarssince have attemptedto pit alternative in or paradigmsagainsteach other,often expecting one to come out the "winner" the cf. Parkerand Stern2002).2 race (see, e.g., Steinbrunner 1974; competitive A particularly noteworthysuccessor to Allison and an importantmethodological is exemplarin this tradition MariekeKleiboer's(1998) studyTheMultipleRealitiesof InternationalMediation. Kleiboer bridges the gap between foreign policy analysis conflict (power andinternational relationsby developingfour models of international which can humanneeds, andstructural determinist), political,politicalpsychological, intervention. Kleiboer's be used to explainandevaluateempiricalcases of third-party study is exemplaryin its systematic derivationof the models from an "ontological vulnerableto one of the main critiIn matrix." so doing, her study is not particularly cisms of Allison's work-namely, the idiosyncratic selection of and overlapping that among the models. Kleiboer'sstudyconvincinglydemonstrates much of the dishistoricalcases (such as the agreementamongempiricalanalystsassessing particular first CampDavid Accords and the Falklands/Malvinas conflict) stems from a lack of
2. Multiperspectivism also been successfullyappliedin neighboring has fields, such as organizational (see, e.g., Morgan1986; Bovens and 't Hart 1996). sociology and public administration

THEORY 107 Stern/ CONTEXTUALIZING POLIHEURISTIC

clarityregardingnormativeand ontological framesof reference,which are often left implicitin the empiricaldiscourse.Kleiboer'sstudyalso suggests thatinsteadof viewto ing the alternative perspectivesas competitors,it might be more appropriate view them as complementary. The multiperspectivistchallenge not withstanding,much of the half century of researchon foreign policy decision makinghas been characterized the impulse to by identify and integratethe variablesand processes that shape policy formulationand execution-an impulse clearly visible in the work on the poliheuristictheory (see below). Snyder,Bruck, and Sapin's (1963) original frameworkcontained an oftencited (and occasionally ridiculed)figure schematicallydepicting"anactorin a situavariablesrelevant tion,"which combineda broadrangeof domestic and international to the policy-makingprocess.Deridedby some as overlycomplex, inadequately specthe was, in fact, successfullydeployed ified, anddifficultto operationalize, framework in a pioneering analysis of the Koreanconflict (Paige 1968) and has been a major to sourceof conceptualand methodologicalinspiration severalgenerationsof foreign policy analysts(M. G. Hermann2001; Hudson2003). In the decades thatfollowed, a to frameworks numberof scholarshave attempted formulateintegrative depictingthe partsof it. policy-makingprocess as a whole or focusing on particular For example, one influentialattemptcombined elements of Easton's (1953) systems theory of politics and political psychology, positing a so-called input-processand outputmodel of the foreignpolicy-makingprocess(e.g., Brecher,Steinburg, Stein 1969; Brecher 1974). This body of researchwas noteworthyin severalrespects, not least due to its emphasison contextualanalysisof the settingsin which policy making takes place, the emphasison processtracing, the dynamicnotionof multiple and policyThe researchby Brecherand associates, which came to emphasize making"cycles." crisis management,continthe challenge of crisis decision makingand international Crisis Behavior project (e.g., ues in modified form to this day in the International conBrecher1993, 1999; BrecherandWilkenfeld1997). Otherimportant integrative contributionsinclude work done under the auspices of the Comparative ceptual Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) project (e.g., East, Salmore, and Hermann1978; Callahan,Brady,and Hermann1982), work on integrativetaxonomies of explanation(Carlsnaes1986, 1992), and the nearlysimultaneousencyclopedic, integrativemonographson foreignpolicy decision makingby Vertzberger (1990) and Maoz (1990). Although these lattertwo works have made significantconceptual contributions,they have not yet spawned a large and cumulativebody of empirical research(but see Vertzberger 1998). It seems thatthe complexity and scope of these frameworksmay have posed somethingof an obstacle to empiricalapplication. Having looked back at the context of foreign policy analysis that spawned the poliheuristictheory,let us now focus our attentionon the poliheuristictheory itself beforemoving on to examinethreeadjacentbodies of emergingtheoreticalandempirical research.In fact, it can and should be arguedthatthe poliheuristictheory and its intellectual"cousins"complementeach otherand togetherform a relativelyrich conceptualand empiricalbasis for reflecting on the processes of foreign policy decision making.

108

JOURNALOF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

THE POI,IHEURISTIC THEORY OF DECISION One of the most significant,fruitful,and cumulativeempiricalresearchprograms in the area of foreign policy decision making is the poliheuristictheory of decision (PH). This researchprogramattemptsto drawon and integrateinsightsfrom both the cognitive and rationalisticapproachesto the study of (foreign policy) decision making. Growing out of pioneering work reportedin Mintz (1993, 2003), Mintz et al. (1997), Mintz and Geva (1997), and Redd (2002), the PH programhas generatedan impressiveandrapidlygrowingbody of publishedworkthatmakesuse of a varietyof to methodologiesand empirics.For our presentpurposes,it is important note thatPH focuses on what we have termedthe backend of the decision-makingprocess, thatis, options development and choice (cf. Mintzberg, Raisanghani, and Theoret 1976; Burstein and Berbaum1983).3 What, then, are the key researchquestions, concerns, and assumptionsof the PH researchprogram? Redd (2002, 336) has recently describedit as follows: Thepoliheuristic of the theory decision incorporates conditions surrounding foreign polas with In associated thesesurroundings.... icy decisions wellasthecognitive processes otherwords,it concentrates the "why" the "how" decisionmaking, on and of which makes theory the relevant boththecontents processes foreign to and of policymaking.4 The termpoliheuristic is inspiredby the prefixpoly (an elegant play on words referof ring both to manyand to the politicized character foreign policy making)and heuristic (shortcuts).The latterdenotes the various cognitive means used to cope with complexity(Redd2002, 336; MintzandGeva 1997, 82, 84). Simplifyingsomewhat,it can be arguedthatthe core questions of the PH programare as follows: * Howdo decision makers makedecisions and (Mintz Geva1997,81)? actually * Howdo decision makers choosea certain of (Mintz policyfroma portfolio alternatives andGeva,1997,81)? Decision making is conceptualizedas consisting of two stages. The first is a cognitively based screeningof alternatives,serving to simplify and reducethe "decision matrix." second is a morerationalistic The treatment the remainingalternatives of and dimensionsandtendsto be basedon analytic,expectedutilityor lexicographicrulesof choice (Redd 2002, 336). PH focuses on five distinctive process characteristicsthat are thought to reflect settings(MintzandGeva high-level decision makingin natural(as well as laboratory) 1997, 84-88; Redd 2002, 338):
* Nonholisticsearch:Decision makingderivesnot from"evaluation comparisonof all and

but decision acrossdifferent dimensions" rather fromtheuse of "heuristic alternatives of detailed complicated and rulesthatdo notrequire alternatives, comparisons relevant

the 3. Despite its "back-end" orientation, poliheuristictheoryof decision (PH) has thusfarnot explicitly focused on implementation(cf. Allison and Zelikow 1999; Smith and Clarke 1985). 4. This passage is adaptedfrom Mintz et al. (1997, 554).

/ Stern CONTEXTUALIZING POLIHEURISTIC THEORY 109 andadoptsor rejectsundesirable alternatives the basis of one or a few criteria" on (Mintz 1993, quotedin Mintz and Geva 1997, 85). Dimension-basedprocessing: So-called "attributes" (values or aspects) of a problem drivethe searchrather thanalternatives. Alternatives fail to meet minimumstandards that on key dimensions are discarded. Dimensions tend to be applied sequentially; the in sequence is heavily influencedby the availabilityof informationthat is interpreted a mannerthat directs analytical attentionto a particulardimension or triggersa shift of emphasisto another(Mintz and Geva 1997, 85). decision rules: Low scores on salient dimensionscannotbe compenNoncompensatory satedby high scores on another.Minimumstandards mustbe fulfilled, or the alternative is discarded(Mintz and Geva 1997, 85-86).5 Satisficingbehavior: The searchends when an acceptablealternativesurvives scrutiny on the key dimensions.Ambiguity,uncertainty, value complexity-as well as cogand nitive and practicalconstraints-tend to rule out "maximizing"(Mintz and Geva 1997, 86-87). search: Unlike rationalisticmodels, which assume thatvariationsin the Order-sensitive mannerin which alternativesare describedandthe orderin which they are presenteddo not affect decision makers'preferences,the poliheuristictheorysuggests thatsuch variations may in fact have profoundeffects on preferencesand choices (Mintz and Geva 1997, 87; cf. McDermott1998).6

Like the emerging research on problem representation (see below), PH has been characterized by a pragmatic, interdisciplinary multimethod approach to empirical research and theoretical development. Researchers associated with the PH perspective have made use of a variety of methodologies and research designs, including case studies (Mintz 1993, 2003), large-N comparative studies (DeRouen and Sprecher 2004), formal modeling (Goertz 2004), and a series of experimental simulations, many of which have made use of variants of the innovative "decision board" methodology. The decision board is a matrix-based platform for the controlled manipulation of information provided to subjects and the monitoring of the choices they have made (Mintz and Geva 1997, 90-93). The potential external validity of the experimental findings has been heightened by the use of policy practitioners (especially military officers) in addition to university students. Unlike the research on problem representation (see below), PH has been characterized by a clear and consensual commitment to variable centric, positivistic social science research. PH stands out as a thriving research program, which (like the other three perspectives emphasized in this article) serves as a useful complement and alternative to the rational choice perspective. In fact, it should be noted that one of the key features that qualifies PH as an integrative approach is its relatively successful effort to bridge the gap between cognitive and rationalistic paradigms (e.g., Mintz 2003; cf. Steinbrunner 1974; Lepgold and Lamborn 2001).

5. Fora parallelanalysisof noncompensatory behaviorin politics,publicpolicy,and decision-making privatelife, see Fiske and Tetlock(1997) on taboo trade-offs. 6. PH thusalso bearsa family resemblanceto the varioussocial contingencytheoriesof judgmentand decision makingthatemergedduringthe 1980s and 1990s in social andorganizational psychology.See, for (1997) and Chaikenand Trope(1999) for overviews. example, Farnham

110

JOURNALOF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Despite the considerable theoretical merits of the PH approach and a mounting body of empirical evidence (especially from the laboratory setting) to support the basic contours of the model, the perspective has some blind spots and limitations. 1. PH tells us relativelylittle abouthow problemsare detected, how decision makersare activated,and how decision units are formed in real-worldsettings (cf. Brecher 1993; Ster 1999; Ster and Sundelius 2002; M. G. Hermann2001). This probably stems in large measure from the relatively heavy emphasis on experimentalsimulation in which the experimenters themselves select, motivate,anddelegatetasksto the decision makers.7 2. Although the notions of dimension-basedsearch and elimination by aspects do contributeto ourknowledgeof how problemsare"represented" "framed," or contextualand institutionalvariableshave not been emphasized,with the significantexception of the domesticpolitical constraints, which are,as we will see, heavily if not overemphasized. For example, PH can tell us little aboutwhy policy makersframe a given problemas a crisis or noncrisissituation,which tends to have a dramaticimpacton the natureof the decision-makingprocess (C. F. Hermann 1963; Brecher 1993; Stem 1999; Eriksson 2001). Nor has PH been of muchhelp in understanding why a given decision problemis framedin termsof gains or losses-a factorthoughtby prospecttheoriststo be closely linked to the risk-takingpropensitiesof foreign policy decision makers(cf. Farham 1997; McDermott1998). 3. The PH researcherscorrectlynote and emphasizethe multiple constraintsthatoperate on foreign policy decision makers.In particular, they have arguedand found some degree of experimentalsupportfor the notion that domestic political considerationsare on very close to an absoluteconstraint policy making.The logic is at firstglance compelto ling. Politiciansmustmaintainpoliticalsupport stayin power.Therefore,theywill not take any course of action that is incompatible with domestic political imperatives. BarbaraFarham (1997, 233-34) has reached similar conclusions on the basis of her detailed historical case study of FranklinD. Roosevelt's decision making duringthe Munichcrisis. However,this argumentoverstatesthe case somewhat.First of all, historical evidence suggests that policy makersdo indeed sometimes embarkon foreign policy projectsin the face of heavy (even preponderant) political opposition.Woodrow Wilson's ultimatelyfutile crusadefor the U.S. membershipin the League of Nations to (which cost him his healthandmost likely contributed not only his politicalbutphysical demise) is perhapsthe classic example (Georgeand George 1964; Walker1995). In Profilesin Courage,JohnF. Kennedy( 1961)providesa numberof inspiringexamplesof political figures who daredto swim againstthe dominantpublic and political tides of their times. A more recent (and somewhat less extreme) example was the Clinton administration's decision to supportandsubsequentfailureto secureSenateratification of the ComprehensiveTest Ban Treaty(Jones 2002). 4. The sensitivity of policy makersto the domestic political context should be seen as a contingentratherthana generalphenomenon.A substantial body of empiricalresearch that clearlydemonstrates decision makersdiffergreatlyin theirsensitivityto anddegree of autonomywith respectto the domestic political context (see the discussion of decision units above). Pragmatists(generally high self-monitors)tend to be highly sensitive to such cues, whereascrusaders(generallylow self-monitors)tend to ignore such
7. The recent (re-)emphasison case studies and large-Ncomparativestudies of decision making in naturalsettings (e.g., DeRouen and Sprecher2004) is likely to further compensatefor the externalvalidity to simulationsand suggest ways of extendingthe PH approach cover these dimenlimitationsof laboratory sions (cf. Mintz 2003). 8. For importantrecent exceptions that suggest that the PH researchershave become awareof this oversightand are well on their way to remedyingit, see Mintz and Redd (2003).

Stern/ CONTEXTUALIZING POLIHEURISTIC THEORY 111

cues-sometimes like Wilson, to their peril (Stoessinger 1979; Preston2000; Kowert contextualfactorssuch as the natureof the 2002; M. G. Hermann2001). Furthermore, regime and political situation (and degree of leader autonomy,dependence on coalition partners, ratings,etc.) areoften highly significant. high/low generalpublic approval Finally,a factoras simple as proximityto elections can have a majorimpacton the degree of political autonomy perceived by the decision makers.For example, they are with a successful likely to perceivea greaterdegreeof freedomfrompoliticalconstraints electionjust behindthem (as opposed to when a personallysalientone is approaching). A "lameduck"U.S. presidentmay perceivehimself to have been liberatedfromdomestic political constraintsand free to seek his place in history or make a contributionto forging a new, but not necessarilydomesticallypopular,new worldorder,as GeorgeH. the in W. Bush probablydid when he contemplated intervention Somaliaafterhis defeat at the hands of (butbefore handingover the reins of power to) Bill Clinton. 5. In a similarway, political constraintsshould be conceptualizedin dynamicratherthan static terms, as Alexander George (1980) and Irving Janis (1989) have convincingly can Constraints sometimes be shifted throughthe efforts of leaders (and their argued.9 policy or political allies) to change them (cf. Byman and Pollack 2001). Decision makers can lead public andelite opinion as well as follow it. They can use theirpolitical resources and "bullypulpits"in attemptsto educate,persuade,cajole, coerce, or buy the necessarysupport(Neustadt1990;Hargrove1998). Such attemptsarelikely to be politically risky and consume large quantitiesof scarce resources, such as leaders' time, energy, resources, and political capital. Although such "transformational leadership" (Bass 1997) may be less common thansome observersof foreign (anddomestic)policy Bums andSorenson2000), it is possible andshould makingwouldlike (e.g., MacGregor not be overlookedwhen conceptualizingthe natureof the domesticpolitical constraints on policy making.

COMPLEMENTARY

COUSINS?

Let us now turn to some of the other emerging bodies of research that should be seen as complements to the poliheuristic theory: cognitive institutionalism (CI), problem representation (PR), and decision units (DU).
COGNITIVE INSTITUTIONALISM

Cognitive institutionalism (CI) takes as its point of departure an emphasis on dynamic subjectivity and the processes of framing/representation, which characterize the social psychological literature on social cognition and naturalistic decision making (Fiske and Taylor 1991; cf. Klein 2001) and several strands of the so-called new institutionalism (Kingdon 1984; Anderson 1987; Peters 1999) in sociology and political science (Stern 1999; Stern and Sundelius 2002; Stern et al. 2002; Brandstrom and Kuipers 2003). Essentially, the approach suggests that problem setting and problem solving by individuals, groups, and organizations are heavily influenced by experiential and contextual factors that can best be uncovered through relatively detailed or "thick" process tracing and structured, focused comparison (cf. George 1997). The path-dependent context in which policy making takes place shapes propensities
9. See also Farnham(1997, 39-43).

112

RESOLUTION JOURNALOF CONFLICT

toward problem perception as well as identification or construction of particular courses of action. This approach examineshow beliefs, expectations,andorganizational culturesand agendas shape the ways in which policy makersperceive and frame problems (cf. Vertzberger1990; Rochefortand Cobb 1994; Eriksson2001). The limited information-processingcapacityof these policy makersleadsthemto takeshortcutsandto use heuristicsto define theirenvironmentsand currentproblems.Such perceptualbiases may lead policy makersto deny or exaggeratethreatsand, in some cases, respondin a as rigid fashion (Staw, Sandelands,and Dutton 1981). Furthermore, Janis and Mann views the decision maker (1977, 15) have observed,cognitive institutionalism notas a cold-blooded butas a warm-blooded not calculator fish, mammal, as a rational to but decision maker-besetby ready workoutthebestsolution as a reluctant always with incongruous and conflict,doubts,and worry,struggling longings,antipathies, loyalties. Thus, political cognition can be, and often is, "hot"as well as "cold" (Crawfoord 2000). CI closely examines the factions, groups, networks, and organizationsin which affect the flow of inforpolicy makersare located, arguingthatthese mesostructures and dispositions toward mation, the distributionof political administrative power, cooperation and conflict within a given policy-making system ('t Hart, Ster, and Sundelius1997). This neoinstitutional focus acknowledgesthe pervasivenessof rules, and routines in the modern governmentalapparatusand examines how they roles, structurepolicy discourse, shape the policy agenda, and influence coordinationbetween and within organizations. The cognitive-institutional has approach been used most often in the studyof crisis decision making(butsee Sundelius 1995 on the Swedishdecision tojoin the European Union [EU]). Well over 100 cases have been subjectedto process-tracinganalysis inspiredby this approach,and dozens more arecurrentlyin progress.These cases are drawnfrom a wide range of nationalsettings (e.g., Sweden, Denmark,Norway,Finland, Iceland, Spain, France, Austria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Albania,Bulgaria,Rumania,Argentina,the United States,China,and New Zealand). Other studies have been focused on international policy crises in various (Gronvall2001; Olsson 2001) and the United partsof the EU institutionalapparatus Nations system. It shouldbe notedthatCI focuses on policy decision making(in both the domesticandforeignpolicy domains),enablingsystematiccomparisonof patterns across policy sectors and types of cases. Some key conceptual and comparativeempirical findings include the following points:
* As cognitivisttheoriespredict(cf. Larson1985;Khong 1992;Rosati2001; Dawes 1998), cues. Forexample,falloutfrom problemdefinitionsarehighly sensitiveto circumstantial the nuclear accident at Chernobylin 1986 was initially framed as a possible Swedish fromwarningits neighborsthatthe nuclearaccident(largelybecausethe USSR refrained was accidenthadoccurred),andthe radiation firstdiscoveredat a Swedish nuclearpower

Stern/ CONTEXTUALIZING POLIHEURISTIC THEORY 113

plant (Stem 1999, 202). This plant promptly(and unnecessarily)evacuatedsome 800 persons before it became clear that the emerging environmentalcrisis was of international ratherthan domestic origins. FindingsfromCherobyl andmanyothercases similarto those studiedby CI researchers (e.g., Stern and Sundelius 1997; Ster and Hansen 2001; Gronvall2001) suggest that strong versions of the so-called threat-rigidityhypothesis (in which decision makers cling rigidly to established problem frames or courses of actions) underestimatethe capacity of crisis decision makersto shift cognitive gears underpressureundercertain favorablecircumstances(cf. Staw,Sandelands,andDutton 1981; Billings and Hermann 1998; Klein 2001). CI findingssuggest thatdecision makersdifferin theircapacityto makeuse of historical analogy as a policy-makingheuristic. Some deploy history in a rigorousand effective fashion, makinguse a relativelywide rangeof analogiesand maintainingsensitivitynot only to situationaland contextual similarities but also to differences (cf. Vertzberger 1990; Khong 1992; Bynander 1998; Houghton 2001), as was the case in the French responseto the terrorbombingsof 1995. By contrast,the responseof the 14 EU heads of government to the prospect of Jorg Haider's right wing extremist party FPO (FreiheitlicheParteiOsterreichs)taking a place in Austria'sruling coalition revealed a strikinginsensitivityto the lessons of the Waldheimcase duringthe 1980s, when Austrians ralliedto theircontroversialpresident(andformerUN secretarygeneral)in the face of foreign criticism (Larsson and Lundgren2003). Although decision makers cannot transcend the individual limitations of human cognition (Vertzberger1990; Khong 1992), they can indeed be encouraged,even taught,to use history in a somewhatmore balanced and effective manner(Neustadt and May 1986; Bobrow 1989). However, it shouldbe keptin mindthathistoryis used not only as a problem-solvingheuristicbutalso for a numberof other purposes. Thus, history may serve not only as a metaphorical "teacher" the (providinglessons fromthe pastandtemplatesfor appreciating present)but also as "filter," "blindspot,"and rhetorical"weapon"(Brandstr6m, "prison," Bynander, and 't Hart,forthcoming). National contexts (and particularadministrations) differ widely in the extent to which crisis decision making is an institutionalizedpolicy-makingfunction (cf. Paige 1968; Haney 1997). For example, Swedish foreign policy (and domestic) crisis decision makhave entaileddeparing have tendedto takeplace on an ad hoc basis andnot infrequently turesfromexisting legal frameworks Successfulcrisis (e.g., Stem andSundelius1992).10 innovations,includinga numberof quasi-legalbehaviors,have often been subsequently formalized and ratifiedpost hoc (Sundelius, Stem, and Bynander 1997). By contrast, Estonia(like the United States,which servedas a model in developingthe Estoniansystem) has aspiredto a more institutionalized"crisiscommittee"system for the management of crises (Haney 1997). National contexts differ substantiallyin their capacities and propensitiesto learn and reformon the basis of crises experience.For example, the generic and relativelybroad crisis conceptdevelopedin Estonia(which encompassesnot only foreignpolicy andmilitary security crises but also naturaldisasters,environmentalcatastrophes,severe economic turbulence,andterrorism) encourageda succession of Estoniangovernments has to attemptto draw lessons and make reforms after majorevents (Ster and Nohrstedt 1999; Stem 1997). In practice, this impulse has resulted in tendencies towardhyperllearing in which reform efforts are undertakenprematurelyand without systematic analysis of the performanceand potentialof any given set of institutionalarrangements for crisis management.However,the experiences from Latvia, Lithuania,Russia, and Poland suggest that this patternis not typical of all transitionaldemocracies. In these countries, the evidence from most of the 1990s is suggestive ratherof a patternof

10. It should be noted that a numberof importantsteps towardinstitutionalizing system for crisis a managementin Sweden have been takenin recent years by the Perssongovernment.

114

JOURNALOF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

transitional decline andneglect-a reactiveratherthana pro- or hyperactivestancewith to crisis management regard institutionalizing capacity(PorfirievandSvedin2002). This is partlythe result of sectoral fragmentationin the absence or late arrivalof a generic crisis managementconcept (Stem and Hansen 2000; Stem et al. 2002). *The EU has had greatdifficultyin makingcrisis decisions but has graduallybeen developing its capacity to respond more effectively and legitimately to critical foreign and domestic challenges (Lintonen 2002). The relatively secretive EU institutionsare not immune to process tracing. Strenuousefforts to open the black box of Brussels have proved worthwhileand revealedthat the intragovemmental politics and organizational with those takingplace in largeWestprocessestakingplace therearelargelycomparable ern nation-states(Gr6nvall2001; Olsson 2001; cf. Verbeekand Reinalda 1998). The data-gathering and analysis activities taking place under the banner of cognitive institutionalism have thus yielded results directed toward both scientific and more practically oriented discourses. They have been regularly used to develop training tools (teaching cases and crisis simulations) that are widely used to train government officials in Sweden and abroad. However, this research and training program also has its limitations and shortcomings: 1. Heavy reliance on qualitativemethods:Virtuallyall of the researchconductedto date has employedqualitative, and methods(George process-tracing, structured comparative use 1979; George andMcKeown 1985; cf. Kaarboand Beasley 1999). Complementary of quantitative techniquesfor coding and analyzing empiricalfindings would add anotherelement of rigor (cf. Brecher 1993; Brecherand Wilkenfeld 1997; DeRouen and Sprecher2004). In a similarway,because an interestin crisis communication(domestic and international) supplementsthe focus on crisis decision makingthat is the focus of this study(e.g., Newlove, Ster, and Svedin 2003), quantitative analysisof public opinion dataor media discourseswould be helpful in calibratingshifts in the perceptionsof variousstakeholders regardingthe credibility,legitimacy,and political supportfor forfactorsand worthyobjects of research eign policy makersand theirpolicies. Important in theirown right,credibility,legitimacy,and political supportare crucialcomponents of the context of foreign policy making (cf. Goertz 1994; Farnham1997; Stern 1999). Althoughcrisis simulationsand scenarioexercises have frequentlybeen conductedfor the purposesof trainingpractitioners students(Ster andSundelius2002), these sesand in sions thus far have not been structured a fashion suitablefor social scientific experimentation.Clearly, cognitive-institutionalresearch would benefit from application of the experimental simulation techniques developed by the poliheuristic theory researchers. 2. Interanalystreliability:Centralto the cognitive-institutional approach(like that of the decision unitframework discussedbelow) is the notionof dissectingpolicy making(especially,butnot exclusively,crises) into occasions for decision. However,extensive ex(Ster 1999) suggeststhatthereis periencewith empiricalapplicationof the framework significant variabilityin the ways analysts choose to "slice" a given crisis (Lindgren to 2003). Althoughthis criticismhas motivatedtheresearchers attemptto makemoreexplicit the criteriafor identifyingandselecting decisions occasions (Ster and Sundelius 2002), the problemhas been minimizedbut not completely eliminated. Reconstruction the problemframes,options,choices, and of 3. Heavy data requirements: of implementation multipledecision occasions for a given crisis is highly dataintensive. Properlydocumentingand analyzing a crisis generallyrequiresfinding a large and diverse body of empiricalmaterialrangingfrom governmentdocuments,interviews,oral histories, and participantmemoirs to journalistic and social scientific secondary acit counts.Amassingthe material,subjectingit to sourcecriticism,andintegrating tendto

THEORY 115 Stern/ CONTEXTUALIZING POLIHEURISTIC

consume amounts timeandresources-expenditures maynotappeal the of that to large On moreparsimoniously inclined. the otherhand,suchrichcase descriptions be can and addedto the growing "casebank" usedfor a variety research training CI and of 2002). (StemandSundelius purposes
PROBLEM REPRESENTATION

The growingbodies of researchon problemrepresentation CI sharea focus on and the subjectivedimension of foreign policy makingand shine the analyticalspotlight on how problemsareinterpreted depicted.Yet,the two approaches and emphasizedifferent dimensions of problemframing. As we have seen, CI's relatively contextual approach poses the questionof why decision makerscome to frameproblemsin a parin ticularfashion (cf. Garrison2001; Mintz and Redd 2003). Furthermore, CI, problem frames have a dual role. On one hand, proto-framesare critical determinants affectingresponsibilityallocation.Perceptionsas to the natureof the problemstrongly influence the compositionof the decision unit andthe balanceof power among advocates withinit (Stern 1999;GeorgeandSter 2002). On the otherhand,framesarisein the mindsandcommunications(some would say discourses)of institutionally embedded actors.As such, the framesmay be seen as both dependentvariablesproducedby endogenouspsycho-organizational processes and as independentvariablesthatstructure and guide choice. Over the course of the past decade, a sustained researchprogramon the broad theme of foreign policy problem representation coalesced aroundthe work of has Donald SylvanandJamesVoss (1998). The workof these scholarsandtheirmanycolleagues stronglysuggeststhatthe subjectivespecificationanddepictionof problemsis a fundamental aspect of foreign policy makingand one thatsets the stage (and, some would argue,largely stacksthe deck) for choice (Sylvan, Ostrom,and Gannon 1994). As Sylvan (1998b, 341) circumspectlyclaims, "Systematically studyingproblemrepresentationcan provide insights into foreign policy decision-makingthat would not necessarily be forthcomingwithout such systematic study."Although some of this workexaminesproblemrepresentation a dependentvariable(Sylvan 1998a;Taber as the main thrustof this eclectic body of work has been aboutexploring 1998, 29-38), the causal impactof problemrepresentation foreign policy behavior. on One innovativeline of researchin this traditiondraws inspirationfrom the jury studiesof PenningtonandHastie (1981, 1988), which havegiven rise to a storymodel of decision making.Sylvan andHaddad(1998) arguethatpeople thinkin termsof stories thatsimplify andfocus theirperceptionsof foreignpolicy problems.These stories imbue particularfacts with salience and meaning and propose causal relationships. Stories highlightcertaindimensionsof problemswhile obscuringothers.They make some optionsappearplausibleandattractive while hidingor tendingto discreditothers (cf. Khong 1992). Although individualsare perceivedas thinkingin termsof stories, their function is not limited to individuals. Sylvan and Haddad(1998, 188) suggest that stories focus the cognitive efforts of policy-makinggroupsas well, becoming "acomposite of the group'scommon social and substantivemeanings that helps to delimit the group's problemspace" and thus

116

JOURNAL CONFLICT OF RESOLUTION

in on imposinga kindof structure policy problemsthatareill structured theirrawform (Voss 1998, 11-14). As Charlick-Payleyand Sylvan (2000, 699) put it: Thestorybecomes guideforinferencing, as it develops a members' and, through group is in the new interactions, information understood a waythatwill accommodate story. source Aftersometime,thestory than becomes primary the for (rather newinformation) decisions. Although much of this line of researchhas been based on laboratoryexperiments using undergraduate subjects(Sylvan and Haddad1998), therehave been attemptsto make use of quasi-experimental designs drawingon empiricalmaterialfrom natural settings. For example,Charlick-Payley Sylvan (2000, 702-6) conducteda comparative and narrative contentanalysisof the storiestold by militaryofficersin France(1945-1962) and the Soviet Union/Russia (1980-1996) about the imperativesand, subsequently, and the decline of empires.The hypothesisof the study(Charlick-Payley Sylvan2000: 707) was that the officers formulate new will a whena military empire, experiences loss of its state's of in The new the storythat justifies change its status. newstorywill motivate patterns in era. relations thepost-imperial civil military They found thatin both countries,imperialdecline resultedin both significantnarrathe tive shifts andbifurcationbecause the officer corps interpreted new developments in differentways. One factionclung to the old imperialnarrative, arguingthatpolitical elites had abandonedand betrayeda vital and viable nationalmission. Othersmade more far-reaching changes in the imperialstory,arguingthatelements of the old mission (which included preparing"colonies"for a more autonomousfuture)had been fulfilled or had become anachronisticand that the withdrawals were a sensible response to resource constraintsand environmentalchanges. Charlick-Payleyand Sylvan(2000,721-24) foundthatthe frameshifts andsplitshelpedto explainnew (and generally more conflictual)patternsof civil militaryrelationsafterimperialdecline. This body of researchhas produceda numberof key findings and claims that are worthyof furtherscientific and practicalexamination: as to narratives a mustattend "prevailing 1. Students foreignpolicydecisionmaking of and of et crucial of thecognition leaders" Charlick-Payley Sylvan (Sylvan al. 1996; part deterthe a "of 2. Knowledge theoperative and/or wayto 'weave' story bemajor may story and minants successful of (Charlick-Payley Sylvan attempts" foreign policyinfluence
2000, 725). 2000, 725).

turn The latterpoint,whichresonateswith the so-calledargumentative in policy analyof sis (FischerandForester1993;Weldes 1998), suggeststhatskill in the manipulation be a criticalfactorin competitivepolitical andpolicy-makingsettings. narratives may the This may help us to understand seemingly anomaloussuccess of leaders such as

POLIHEURISTIC THEORY 117 Stern CONTEXTUALIZING

Ronald Reagan, whose alleged deficiencies in other areas were compensatedby his masteryof political narrative (Hargrove1998). Reflecting more criticallyon this body of work, one can point to some limitations and tensions:
1. Much of the researchto date has focused on artificiallaboratorysettings and subject populationwhich differ in importantrespects from top-level decision makersin realworld settings. This raises some importantexternalvalidity issues, which researchers workingin this area are workingto address. 2. Many of the studies that do use empiricaldata gatheredfrom real-worldsettings (e.g., Charlick-Payleyand Sylvan 2000) focus on discoursein public arenas,which (as they acknowledge)makesit difficultto disentanglesincerereflectionfrom"strategic" justification (cf. Khong 1992; Tetlock 1985). More work makinguse of (historical)processtracingmethods,such as archivalmaterials,interviews,andso forth,would improveour In knowledge of problemrepresentation "backstage." fact, to the extent thatfuturecircumstancespermit,it would be useful to explore the possibility of using anthropologically inspireddirectobservationmethodsto monitorand analyze the stories (and other forms of problemrepresentation) employedby policy makers. It may well be the case thatsuch methodscould be field tested in alternative settings(nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], local politics, or even in the nationalbureaucracies smaller counof tries, such as Sweden or the Netherlands),where access may be more forthcomingthan in the foreign policy-makinginstitutionsof greatpowers. 3. It is bothan advantageanda disadvantage the communityof researchers that workingon problemrepresentation conceptualizedecision making in significantlydifferentterms and work accordingto a variety of metatheoreticalprescriptions(Sylvan 1998b, 333335, 341). Some focus on information processing (e.g., Voss and his associates), whereasothersemphasizestories(Sylvan andhis associates). Some use positivisticcriteria in designing and implementingresearch;others (e.g., Rubino-Hallman1998) use discourse analysis conducted according to "postpositivist"epistemological stances. Still others(Taber1998; Young 1998) explore the potentialof artificialintelligence and automatedcontent analysis as heuristicsand researchfacilitators.Although this diversity is certainly a potential source of creative inspirationand one that has alreadyresultedin the developmentandapplicationof a wide rangeof investigativetechniquesto the empirical domain under study, it also raises issues of interparadigmatic communicationand commensurability, which have yet to be fully addressed.
THE DECISION UNITS FRAMEWORK

Anothersustainedbody of integrative foreignpolicy decision-makingresearchthat clearly complementsPH is the decision units (DU) project(Hermann,Hermann,and Hagan 1987; Hermannand Hermann1989; Stewart,Hermann,and Hermann1989; Hermann 2001). The decision unitsprojectfocuses on specifying the conditionsunder
which alternative decision unit configurations are likely to be involved in committing

the resourcesof the governmentor rulingbody.The framework acts as a theoryselector that synthesizes the nearly 50 years of research in foreign policy analysis that has explored the effects of leaders, groups, and coalitions on the policy-making process.
11. The Projecton International Negotiation(PIN) is a good exampleof a researcheffortthathas successfully used such political anthropologicalmethodsto good effect. For a descriptionof the projectand its numerouspublications,see the home page of the International Institutefor Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA): http://www.iiasa.acat/Research/PIN.

118

JOURNAL CONFLICT OF RESOLUTION

The DU framework views policy makersas respondingto foreignpolicy problems (1) andoccasions for decision; (2) focuses on threetypes of authoritative decision unitsleaders,groups,andcoalitions;(3) defines the key factorsthatset into motionalternative decision processes in each of these types of decision units; and (4) links these alternativedecision processes to particularforeign policy outcomes. The research focuses on elaboratinghow the theory selector works by describingthe key contingency variablefor each type of decision unit(sensitivityto thepoliticalcontextfor predominantleader,identificationwith the group for single group, and presence of establishedrules for coalitions), the theories that are exemplified by changes in these key contingencies, and the processes that are likely to result for each of these key contingencies. To its credit,the DU projecthas drawnon multiplemodes andmethodsof analysis in its study of foreign policy decision making. Conceptualizationand operationliteratures alizationare explicit, rigorous,and groundedin the vast multidisciplinary G. Hermann2001). In designing and conductingthe empiricalresearch,generic (M. expertiseon the foreignpolicy-makingprocesshasbeen complementedby areaexpertise on the specific contexts in which foreign policy makingtakesplace. The DU project demonstrates a sincere commitment to cross-national comparative research designedto compensatefor whatthe projectleadersperceiveto be a U.S.-centricbias permeatingmuch of the literature(M. G. Hermann2001, 49). In vivid contrastto its and the precursor, CREON,the DU projectmakesuse of both quantitative qualitative methodologies (cf. Brecher 1999) and reveals a shift of emphasis from extensive congruence-basedprocedurestowardintensive process-tracingresearchprocedures (cf. George 1979; Callahan,Brady,and Hermann1982; Khong 1992). of Accordingto the leadingpractitioners this perspective,key lessons learnedfrom to the decision unitsframework 65 cases from31 countriesareas follows: (1) applying the natureand composition of the decision unit often changed across the course of a kind of case; (2) there was no one type of decision unit associatedwith a particular or type of domestic political system; (3) 83%of the time, therewas subgovernment stantialcongruencebetween what happenedin the historicalcase andthe outcome of the applicationof the decision units framework;(4) decision units tended to either or reinforcedomestic, international, culturalconstraintsand, as a consequence, amof the importance the constraintson choices, or they discountedsuch constraints plify of and reinforcedthe unit's own interpretations what was occurring;(5) it is possible, to the framework, specify which types of decision units will engage in which of using these types of behaviorand when; and (6) the frameworkcan be used to examine not only single point decisions but also patternsof participation,reconsideration,and policy change over time (M. G. Hermann2001). to contributions the stateof our Althoughthe DU projectalso has made important decision making, some criticalobservationsare knowledge regardingforeign policy in order: is of units 1. Botha strength a weakness thedecision and approach. project itscontingency an to his use selector enables analyst leverage orhereffortsand Making of thetheory model.When and focus to quickly systematically on whatappears be themostrelevant

Stern/ CONTEXTUALIZING POLIHEURISTIC THEORY 119

2.

3.

4.

5.

used effectively, this strategycan providea modicumof parsimonyto the complex task of tracingforeignpolicy decision making.However,this procedure does pose risks.Anselect out a varietyof nestedcontextualdynamics alysts may be inducedto prematurely thatmay,in fact,play a crucialrole in determining outcomes.Forexample,a preliminary analysisof the failureof the U.S. governmentto respondvigilantlyto the threatposed by Al Qaedapriorto 911 was found to be the resultof interlockingpsychological, institutional,andpolitical leadershipfactorsnot likely to be adequatelycaptured any one of by the three decision unit models (cf. Parkerand Stem 2002). Despite considerableeffortto identifyso-called controlvariables(which indicatewhich variantof the threemodels is indicated)andan elaboratedecision tree-basedoperationbetween a numberof the diagalization,it has provendifficultto specify the boundaries nostic categories. For example, it proved difficult to determinewhetherChamberlain actedas a predominant leaderor a leadingmemberof an internally"loyal"single group in the Munichcrisis, given a high degree of scholarlydissent on the natureof the process taking place within the British inner cabinet (Beasley et al. 2001, 228; cf. M. G. Hermann2001, 63-64). Some of the key variablesthat shift the analyst'sattentionfrom one type of unit to anotherare relativelyempiricallyintractable.For example, the differencebetween a predominantleaderunit (with advisoryconsultation)and an autonomousgroup may ultimately rest on the leader's subjectiveperceptionof what is happening:"As long as the leaderretainsthe authority makethe choice he or she prefers,the decision unitis a preto dominantleader.If, however,the leaderviews the advisers as membersof a decisionof makingteam,the decision unittakeson the characteristics a single groupthatis interactive and collective in its decisionmaking"(M. G. Hermann2001, 63). From a source-criticalperspective,it is clear thatboth interviewsand variousforms of documentaryevidence may not fully capturethe leader'sview of the mode of decision makingon any given occasion. Neither leadersnor advisersmay be fully conscious of these distinctionsand are likely to differ in their perceptionsand recollections of the mode of decision making.Furthermore, both leadersand advisersmay have incentives to misrepresent theirrespectiveroles in andconceptionsof the decision-makingprocess (George 1980). The suggestion that the analyst should look to previously established interaction(M. G. Hermann2001, 63) as a clue is useful but patternsof leader-adviser and under neglects the variabilityof leader-adviserdynamics within administrations varyingdegrees of generic and issue-specific stress (C. F. Hermann1963; Lebow and Stein 1994; Haney 1997; Kowert2002). The decision units projecttends to focus our attentionsquarelyon the leader,the single group,or interactiveautonomouscoalitions.Yet,modem social andinstitutionaltheory suggests thatmuch of the "action"determiningforeign policy outcomes takes place in the interfacesbetweenindividualand group,groupand organization,and organization and the wider policy-making(sub)system(George 1980; 't Hart,Ster, and Sundelius 1997; Stem 1999; Preston2000; Kowert2002).

PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER What, then, is the result of this contextualized overview of the poliheuristic theory and some of its peers? These bodies of research tend to emphasize and illuminate different aspects of the policy-making process. Cognitive institutionalism and problem representation direct our attention to the manner in which problems are discovered, perceived, and framed. Like the poliheuristic theory, they emphasize the subjective nature of foreign policy decision making and the need to cope with the informational

120

JOURNAL CONFLICT OF RESOLUTION

has complexity of the problemsand contexts understudy.Cognitiveinstitutionalism devoted attentionto examining framingas a dependentvariableand poses the question, "Wheredo frames come from?" Problem representationscholars, like those working with prospect theory (Levy 1997; McDermott 1998), have tended to treat framingas an independentvariablethat affects policy dispositionsand choices. Neither PH nor PR tells us much aboutthe formationof the decision unit. CI and DU focus moreheavily on this aspect,following in Snyder,Bruck,and Sapin's(1963, 2003) footsteps and correctingchronic neglect of this fundamentalprior question. Clearly,the question of who chooses precedes and affects choice processes and outcomes. In fact, the relationshipbetween problem framing and choice is complex. Proto-framesare crucialin determiningwhich officials and agencies "own the problem,"thushelping to determinethe compositionof andpecking orderwithindecision units. Yet, once they have coalesced, deliberationswithin decision units tend to drive framingand reframingprocesses (Ster 1999; Ster and Sundelius2002, 75). in Viewing themselves, in part,as a correctiveto a choice-centricmainstream economics and political science, cognitive institutionalistsand problem representation scholarshave tendedto gloss over the mechanics of choice. Clearly,betterspecified andmorerigorousrenderingsof choice andtypologies of outcomes areto be found in the poliheuristicanddecisionunitprojects.A particularly promisingcandidatefor furand therempiricalexamination,in both laboratory naturalsettings,is the notionof the two-stage process. Accordingto this conception,decision problemsare quickly simplified and many alternativeseliminatedin the first stage. This enables a subsequent in choice processresembling"maximizing" considerationof a limitednumberof sur(MintzandGeva 1997, 82-83). This theoreticalaccountof the deciviving alternatives psychological conceptionsof sion-makingprocess is compatiblewith state-of-the-art the decision-makingprocess and has been supportedempirically(Mintz et al. 1997). In addition, this conceptualizationhelps to bridge the gap between cognitive and to rationalisticapproaches decision makingin a constructivefashion (cf. Lepgoldand Lamborn2001). So-called "stagemodels"of the policy-makingprocesses generally include treatment of implementationas a key factor that affects policy outputs and outcomes (Allison 1971; George 1980; Khong 1992). Of the four bodies of work examinedin this study, only cognitive institutionalismhas emphasizedthe importanceof implementation.In fact, results from many of the CI case studies clearly demonstratethat to implementationis a crucialfactorthataffects policy outcomes. Yet it is important on implementation in mind thatboth "top-down" "bottom-up" and perspectives keep areneeded.The formercalls ourattentionto the problemof fidelitybetween strategiclevel choice and operational-levelaction. The latter emphasizes the autonomy and informationaladvantages that sometimes enable implementersto improve on the can productsof top-level decisions. Vigilantimplementation serve to detect and corcan rectflaws in strategic-leveldecisions, whereassloppy implementation turneven a sound decision into a fiasco (Sabatier1993; Bovens and 't Hart 1996). strategically Both PH and DU view foreign policy makingas a multilevelgame centeredon the decision-makingprocess (cf. Peterson 1996). In starkcontrastto realist renderings, PH assertsthe primacyof domesticpolitics but tends to overstatethe case in its heavy

Stern/ CONTEXTUALIZING POLIHEURISTIC THEORY 121

emphasis on the applicationof the noncompensatoryprincipleto this dimension. In contrast,DU highlightsthe contingentnatureof domestic (and, for thatmatter,international)constraints,convincinglyarguingthatindividualand collective characteristics of the decision unit can either serve to amplify or to mute the impactof external constraints, helpingus to understand why some leaders(andgroups)allow themselves to be paralyzedby domestic political constraints,whereasothersignore or transcend them (Bass 1997). The thirdwave of foreignpolicy decision-makingresearchthatbeganin the 1990s is still going strong.Furtherprogresswill requireintensifiedcommunicationacross disciplines, subfields, and foreign policy decision-makingresearch sects. Different have been accumulatingimportant groupsof researchers pieces of the foreign policy The best way to maintainthe momentumthathas been built decision-makingpuzzle. up is to put the pieces on the table togetherand see what emerges. Althoughour subfield has alreadybenefitedgreatlyfrom such professionalcross-pollination,the complementaritiesand synergies among the various schools of foreign policy decision makinghave yet to be fully exploited.

REFERENCES
Abelson, R. P.,andA. Levi. 1985. Decision makinganddecision theory.In Handbookofsocial psychology, 3d ed., edited by G. Lindzeyand E. Aronson,231-309. New York:RandomHouse. Allison, G. T. 1971. Essence of decision: Explainingthe Cubanmissile crisis. Boston: Little, Brown. Allison, G. T., and P. Zelikow. 1999. Essence of decision: Explainingthe Cubanmissile crisis. 2d ed. New York:Longman. Anderson,P. A. 1987. What do foreign policy makersdo when they make a foreign policy decision? The implicationsfor the comparative studyof foreignpolicy.InNew directionsin the studyofforeignpolicy, edited by C. F Hermann,C. W. Kegley, and J. N. Rosenau,285-308. Boston: Allen & Unwin. debate.New York:ColumbiaUniverBaldwin,D. 1993. Neorealismand neoliberalism:Thecontemporary sity Press. Bass, B. M. 1997. Transformational leadership:Industrial,military,and educationalimpact.Mahwah,NJ: LaurenceErlbaum. Beasley, R., J. Kaarbo,C. F. Hermann,and M. Hermann2001. People and processes in foreign policymaking.InternationalStudies Review3 (2): 217-50. Bendor, J., and T. Hammond. 1992. Rethinking Allison's models. American Political Science Review 86:301-22. Billings, R., andC. F Hermann.1998. Problemidentificationin sequentialpolicy decision making:The reof representation problems. In Problem representationin foreign policy decision making, edited by D. Sylvan and J. Voss. Cambridge,UK: CambridgeUniversityPress. Bobrow,D. B. 1989. Stories rememberedand forgotten.Journal of ConflictResolution33 (2): 187-209. Bovens, M., and P. 't Hart. 1996. Understanding policyfiascoes. New Brunswick,NJ: Transaction. Brandstrom, F Bynander,and P. 't Hart.Governingby looking back: HistoricalAnalogies and Crisis A., 82 Management.Public Administration (forthcoming). incidents"to politicalcrises:Understanding selecthe Brandstrom, andS. Kuipers.2003. From"normal A., tive politicizationof policy failures.Government and Opposition38 (3): 279-305. Brecher,M. 1974. Theforeign policy system of Israel. New Haven,CT: Yale UniversityPress. . 1993. Crises: In worldpolitics theoryand reality.New York:Pergamon. studies in the 20th centuryandbeyond:Flaweddichotomies,synthesis,cumu.1999. International lation. InternationalStudies Quarterly43 (2): 213-64.

122

JOURNALOF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

for Journal Brecher,M., B. Steinburg,andJ. Stein. 1969. A framework researchon foreignpolicy behavior. of ConflictResolution 13:75-101. Brecher,M., and J. Wilkenfeld. 1997. A studyof crisis. Ann Arbor:Universityof MichiganPress. Burnstein,E., and M. Berbaum.1983. Stages in groupdecision making:The decompositionof historical narratives. Political Psychology4:531-61. Byman, D. L., and K. M. Pollack.2001. Let us now praisegreatmen:Bringingthe statesmanbackin. International Security25 (Spring): 107-46. submarinehunt:A decision-makinganalysis. Cooperationand Bynander,F. 1998. The 1982 Harsfjarden Conflict33 (4): 367-407. Callahan,P., L. Brady,and M. G. Hermann.1982. Describingforeignpolicy behavior.Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Carlsnaes,W. 1986. Ideology andforeign policy. Oxford,UK: Blackwell. .1992. The agency-structure problemin foreign policy analysis. InternationalStudies Quarterly 36:245-70. .2002. Handbookof internationalrelations.London:Sage. Chaiken,S., and Y Trope,eds. 1999. Dual process theories in social psychology.New York:Guilford. T., Charlick-Payley, andD. Sylvan. 2000. The use andevolutionof storiesas a mode of problemrepresentation: Soviet and Frenchofficers face the loss of empire.Political Psychology 21 (4): 697-728. Press. Cottam,R. 1977. Foreignpolicy motivation.Pittsburgh: Universityof Pittsburgh N. Crawfoord, 2000. The passion of worldpolitics: Propositionson emotion.International Security24 (4): 116-56. Dawes, R. 1998. Behavioraldecision makingandjudgment.In Gilbert,Fiske, andLinzey eds. Handbookof Social Psychology,4th ed., vol. 1, edited by O. Gilbert,S. Fiske, and G. Lindzey,497-548. New York: McGraw-Hill. 2004. Initialcrisisreactionandpoliheuristic DeRouen,K., andC. Sprecher. theory.Journalof ConflictResolution 48 (1):56-68. East, M., S. A. Salmore,and C. F. Hermann.1978. Whynations act. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Easton, D. 1953. The Political System.New York:Knopf. Eriksson,J., ed. 2001. Threat Aldershot, politics: Newperspectiveson security,risk,andcrisis management. UK: Ashgate. Farnham,B. 1997. Roosevelt and the Munichcrisis: A study of political decision-making.Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress. turn in policy analysis and planning. Durham,NC: Fischer, F., and J. Forester.1993. The argumentative Duke UniversityPress. the Reactionsto transactions transgress spheresof justhat Fiske, A., andP.Tetlock. 1997. Tabootrade-offs: tice. Political Psychology 18 (2): 255-97. Fiske, S., and S. Taylor.1991. Social cognition. 2d ed. New York:McGraw-Hill. Garrison,J. 1999. Games advisersplay. College Station:Texas A&M UniversityPress. in his .2001. Framingforeignpolicy alternatives the innercircle: PresidentCarter, advisers,andthe strugglefor the armscontrol agenda.Political Psychology 22:775-807. focusedcomparison.In The George,A. L. 1979.Case studiesandtheorydevelopment: methodof structured, New approachesin history,theoryand policy, edited by P. Lauren,43-68. New York:Free Press. .1980. Presidentialdecisionmakinginforeign policy: Theeffectiveuse of informationand advice. Boulder,CO: Westview. edited by P. 't Hart, to . 1997. Fromgroupthink contextualprocess analysis. In Beyondgroupthink, E. Stern,and B. Sundelius,35-54. Ann Arbor:Universityof MichiganPress. Wilsonand ColonelHouse:A personalitystudy.New York: George,A. L., andJ. L. George. 1964. Woodrow Dover. decisionmaking.In George, A. L., and T. J. McKeown. 1985. Case studies and theories of organizational Advancesin information processing in organizations,vol. 2, editedby R. Coulamand R. Smith,21-58. Greenwich,CT:JAI. George, A. L., and E. Stern.2002. Harnessingconflict in foreign policymaking:Fromdevil's to multiple advocacy.PresidentialStudies Quarterly32 (3): 484-508.

POLIHEURISTIC Stern/ CONTEXTUALIZING THEORY 123

Goertz, G. 1994. Contextsof internationalpolitics. Cambridge,UK: CambridgeUniversityPress. . 2004. Constraints,compromises, and decision making. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (1): 14-37. crisis management. ManagingcriIn Grinvall, J. 2001. Madcow disease:The role of expertsandEuropean sis: Threats,dilemmas, opportunities,edited by U. Rosenthal, R. A. Boin, and L. Comfort, 155-74. Springfield,IL: CharlesC Thomas. Halperin,M. 1974. Bureaucratic politics andforeign policy. Washington,DC: Brookings Institution. Haney,P.J. 1997. Organizingforforeign policy crises: Presidents,advisersand themanagement decision of making.Ann Arbor:Universityof MichiganPress. E. Hargrove, C. 1998. Thepresidentas leader:Appealingto the betterangels of our nature.Lawrence:University Press of Kansas. C. Administrative Hermann, F. 1963. Some consequencesof crisis which limit the viabilityof organizations. Science Quarterly8:61-82. Hermann,C. F., C. W. Kegley, and J. N. Rosenaueds. 1987. New directionsin the studyofforeign policy. Boston: Allen & Unwin. Hermann,M. G. 2001. How decision units shape foreign policy: A theoreticalframework.International Studies Review3 (2): 47-81. Hermann,M. G., and C. F. Hermann.1989. Who makes foreign policy decisions and how? An empirical inquiry.InternationalStudies Quarterly33 (3): 361-87. Hermann,M. G., C. F. Hermann,andJ. Hagan. 1987. How decision units shapeforeignpolicy behavior.In New directionsin the studyofforeignpolicy, editedby C. F. Hermann, W. Kegley,andJ. N. Rosenau, C. 309-38. Boston: Allen & Unwin. Houghton,D. 2001. USforeignpolicy and theIranhostagecrisis. New York: Cambridge UniversityPress. Studies Hudson,V. 1995. Foreignpolicy analysis:Yesterday, (Mershon)International today,andtomorrow. Review39:209-38. .2003. Foreignpolicy decision making(revisited).New York:Palgrave. Janis, I. 1972. Victimisof groupthink:A psychological study of policy decisions and fiascoes. Boston: HoughtonMifflin. 1989. Crucial decisions: Leadershipin policymakingand crisis management.New York:Free Press. Janis, I., and L. Mann. 1977. Decision making:A psychological analysis of conflict, choice, and commitment. New York:Free Press. TestBan Treaty: The politics of ratification. ContemIn Jones,C. M. 2002. Rejectionof the Comprehensive to porarycases in U.S.foreignpolicy: Fromterrorism trade,editedby R. C. Carter,160-95.Washington, DC: CQ Press. case study methodin political psyKaarbo,J., and R. Beasley. 1999. A practicalguide to the comparative chology. Political Psychology20 (2): 369. Kennedy,J. F. 1961. Profiles in courage. New York:Harper& Row. Khong, Y. F. 1992. Analogies at war.Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress. Kingdon,J. P. 1984. Agendas, alternativesand public policies. Boston: Little, Brown. Kleiboer,M. 1998. The multiplerealities of internationalmediation.Boulder,CO: Lynn Rienner. Klein, G. 2001. Sourcesofpower: How people makedecisions. Cambridge,MA: MIT Press. or Kowert,P. 2002. Groupthink deadlock?New York:State Universityof New YorkPress. Krasner,S. 1972. Are bureaucracies important(or Allison's Wonderland)? ForeignPolicy 7:159-79. A Larson,D. W. 1985. Theoriginsof containment: psychologicalexplanation.Princeton, Princeton NJ: University Press. Larsson, S., and J. Lundgren.2003. The 14 against Austria. Stockholm:CRISMART/SwedishNational Defense College. and Lawrence,P.R., andL. Lorch. 1969. Organization environment: and Managingdifferentiation integration. Homewood, IL: Irwin. Lebow,N. 1981. Betweenpeace and war: Thenatureof internationalcrises. Baltimore:JohnHopkinsUniversity Press. Lebow, N., and J. Stein. 1994. Weall lost the cold war.Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress.

124

JOURNALOF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

2001. Locatingbridges:Connectingresearchagendason cognitionandstrateLepgold,J., andA. Lamborn. gic choice. InternationalStudiesReview3 (3): 3-29. debate.In Decision-makingon war andpeace, edited Levy, J. 1997. Prospecttheoryandcognitive-rational by N. Geva and A. Mintz, 33-50. Boulder,CO: LynneRienner. och i kriser" Lindgren,K. 2003. "Vad styr lederen? Om beslutsfattare policyfiirdndring sdkerhetspolitiska [Whatguides the leader?On decisionmakersand policy change in securitypolicy crises]. Ph.D. diss., Peace and Conflict Studies, UppsalaUniversity. Lintonen,R. 2002. Finlandand the crisis managementin the EU yearbookof Finnishforeign policy. Helsinki: Finnish Instituteof International Affairs. Burs, J., andG. Sorenson.2000. Dead center: Clinton-Gore MacGregor leadershipand theperils of moderation. New York:Scribner's. Maoz, Z. 1990. National Choices and InternationalProcesses. New York:CambridgeUniversityPress. in politics: ProspecttheoryinAmerican McDermott,R. 1998.Risk-taking international foreign policy. Ann Arbor:Universityof MichiganPress. to Mintz,A. 1993. The decision to attackIraq:A non-compensatory approach foreignpolicy decision making. Journal of ConflictResolution37:484-503. .2003. Integratingcognitive and rationaltheories offoreign policy making.New York:Palgrave. Mintz, A., and N. Geva. 1997. The poliheuristictheory of decision of foreign policy decisionmaking.In Decision makingon war andpeace: The cognitiverationaldebate,editedby N. Geva andA. Mintz, 81102. Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner. Mintz, A., N. Geva, S. Redd, and A. Carnes. 1997. The effect of dynamicand staticchoice sets on political decision making:An analysis utilizing the decision boardplatform. AmericanPolitical Science Review 91 (September):533-66. relations.Synthese 135 (2): 193-213. Mintz, A., and S. Redd. 2003. Framingeffects in international decision processes. Mintzberg,H., D. Raisanghani,and A. Theoret. 1976. The structureof unstructured Administrative Sciences Quarterly21:246-75. Morgan,G. 1986. Images of organization.London:Sage. H. Morgenthau, 1948. Politics among nations: The strugglefor power and peace. New York:Knopf. Neustadt,R. 1990. Presidentialpower and the modernpresidents.New York:Free Press. Neustadt,R., andE. May. 1986. Thinkingin time: Theuses of historyfor decision makers.New York:Free Press. Newlove, L., E. Stern,and L. Svedin. 2003. Aucklandunplugged:Managingcritical infrastructure failure. Lexington, MA: LexingtonBooks. Olsson, E. K. 2001. The EU and the dioxin crisis. Stockholm:Swedish NationalDefense College. Paige, G. D. 1968. The Koreandecision. New York:Free Press. PoliticalPsychology23 Parker, andE. Stern.2002. September11 andthe originsof the strategicsurprise. C., (2): 601-30. Pennington,N., andR. Hastie. 1981. Jurordecision makingmodels: The generalization gap. Psychological Bulletin 89 (2): 246-87. decision making:Effects of memorystructure on Pennington,N., and R. Hastie. 1988. Explanation-based judgement.Journalof ExperimentalPsychology 14 (3): 521-33. London:Pinter. Peters, B. G. 1999. Institutionaltheory in political science: The new institutionalism. Peterson, S. 1996. Crisis bargaining and the state: The domesticpolitics of internationalconflict. Ann Arbor:Universityof MichiganPress. Porfiriev,B., and L. Svedin, eds. 2002. Crisis managementin Russia. Stockholm:CRISMART/National Defense College of Sweden. Preston,T. 2000. Thepresidentand his inner circle. New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress. Redd, S. 2002. The influenceof adviserson foreignpolicy decision making.Journalof ConflictResolution 46 (3): 335-64. relationstheory.Political Psychology 14(3): Ripley,B. 1993. Psychology,foreignpolicy, and international 403-16. Rochefort,D., and R. Cobb, eds. 1994. Thepolitics of problemdefinition:Reshapingthe policy agenda. Lawrence:UniversityPress of Kansas.

THEORY 125 Stern/ CONTEXTUALIZING POLIHEURISTIC

StudiesReview2 Rosati,J. 2001. The powerof humancognitionin the studyof worldpolitics.International (3): 45-75. in S. Rubino-Hallman, 1998. When gendergoes to combat:The impactof representations collective decision making. In Problem representationin foreign policy decision making,edited by D. Sylvan and J. Voss, 261-78. New York:CambridgeUniversityPress. P. to research.In Thepolicyprocess:A Sabatier, 1993.Top-downandbottom-up approaches implementation Wheatsheaf. reader,edited by M. Hill, 266-93. New York:Harvester London:Allen & Unwin. Smith, S., and M. Clarke,eds. 1985. Foreignpolicy implementation. Snyder,R. C., H. Bruck,and B. Sapin. 1963. Foreignpolicy decision making.New York:Free Press. .2002. Foreignpolicy decision making(revisited).New York:Palgrave. and effects in organizational behavior: multilevel A Staw,B., L. Sandelands, J. Dutton. 1981.Threat-rigidity Science Quarterly26 (4): 501-24. analysis.Administrative J. Steinbrunner, 1974. The cybernetictheoryof decision. Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress. 2002. The cybernetic theory of decision: New dimensions of political analysis. Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress. Ster, E. 1997. Crisis and learning:A conceptualbalancesheet. Journalof Contingenciesand Crisis Management5 (2): 69-86. A .1999. Crisisdecisionmaking: cognitive-institutional approach.StockholmStudiesin Politics 66. Stockholm:StockholmUniversity. Stern,E., and D. Hansen,eds. 2000. Crisis managementin a transitionalsociety: TheLatvianexperience. Stockholm:National Defense College of Sweden. . 2001. Framingthe Palme assassination.In Threatpolitics: New perspectiveson security,risk,and crisis management,edited by J. Erikssoned,164-88. Aldershot,UK: Ashgate. Stem, E., and D. Nohrstedt,eds. 1999. Crisis managementin Estonia: Theoryand practice. Stockholm: Swedish Agency for Civil EmergencyPlanning. Stern,E., and B. Sundelius. 1992. Managingasymmetricalcrisis: Sweden, the USSR, and U137. International Studies Quarterly36:213-39. 1997. Sweden'stwin monetary crises of 1992:Rigidityandlearningin crisis decisionmaking.Journal of Contingenciesand Crisis Management5 (1): 32-48. .2002. Crisis managementEurope:An integrated regionalresearchand trainingprogram.International Studies Perspectives3:71-88. Stem, E., B. Sundelius,D. Nohrstedt,D. Hansen,L. Newlove, and P. 't Hart.2002. Crisis managementin transitional democracies:The Baltic experience.Government and Opposition37 (4): 524-50. A Stern,E., andB. Verbeek,eds. 1998. Whitherthe studyof governmental politics in foreignpolicymaking? symposium.(Mershon)InternationalStudiesReview42:205-55. and Stewart,P.,C. F. Hermann, M. G. Hermann.1989. Modellingthe 1973 Soviet decision to support Egypt. AmericanPolitical Science Review83 (1): 35-59. Stoessinger,J. 1979. Crusadersand pragmatists:Movers of modernAmerican foreign policy. New York: Norton. in An comSuedfeld,P.,andD. Leighton.2002. Earlycommunications the waragainstterrorism: integrative plexity analysis. Political Psychology23 (3): 585-600. Sundelius, B. 1995. A decisionmaking approachto integration.In Europeanforeign policy, edited by W. Carlsnaesand S. Smith. London:Sage. Sundelius,B., E. Stem, andF.Bynander.1997. Krishantering svenska:teori ochpraktik[Crisismanagepa ment the Swedish way: Theory and practice].Stockholm:Nerenius & Sant6rusforlag. In Sylvan, D. 1998a. Introduction. Problem representationin foreign policy decision making,edited by D. Sylvan and J. Voss, 3-7. New York:CambridgeUniversityPress. . 1998b.Reflecting on the studyof problemrepresentation: How arewe studyingit andwhat arewe in learning?In Problemrepresentation foreign policy decision making,editedby D. Sylvan andJ. Voss, 333-42. New York:CambridgeUniversityPress. in Sylvan,D., andD. Haddad.1998. Reasoningandproblemrepresentation foreignpolicy: Groups,individin uals, and stories. In Problemrepresentation foreign policy decision making,edited by D. Sylvan and J. Voss, 187-212. New York:CambridgeUniversityPress.

126

JOURNALOF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Sylvan,D., M. Diascro,andD. Haddad.1996. Stories,ledgers,andBayesiancalculations:Studyingproblem in representation foreign policy. Paperpresentedat the Annual Scientific Meeting of the International BC. Society of Political Psychology,June, Vancouver, styles of reaSylvan,D., T.Ostrom,andK. Gannon.1994.Case-based,model-based,andexplanation-based soning in foreign policy. InternationalStudies Quarterly38 (1): 61-90. in Sylvan, D., and J. Voss, eds. 1998. Problemrepresentation foreign policy decision making.New York: CambridgeUniversityPress. in 't Hart,P. 1994. Groupthink government.Baltimore:Johns HopkinsUniversityPress. Political groupdynamicsandforeign 't Hart,P., E. Ster, andB. Sundelius,eds. 1997. Beyondgroupthink: policymaking.Ann Arbor:Universityof MichiganPress. of C. Taber, 1998.The interpretation foreignpolicy events:A cognitiveprocesstheory.In Problemrepresentation inforeign policy decision making,editedby D. Sylvan andJ. Voss, 29-52. New York:Cambridge UniversityPress. The neglectedsocial contextof judgmentandchoice. In Researchin orgaTetlock,P. 1985. Accountability: nizational behavior,vol. 7, edited by K. L. Cummingsand B. M. Staw,297-332. Greenwich,CT:JAI. Vasquez,J. A. 1983. Thepowerofpowerpolitics: A critique.New Brunswick,NJ:RutgersUniversityPress. Verbeek,B., andB. Reinalda,eds. 1998.Autonomous organizations.London: policymakingby international Routledge. Y. processing, cognition,andperceptioninforVertzberger, I. 1990. Theworld in theirminds:Information eign policy decisionmaking.Stanford,CA: StanfordUniversityPress. .1998. Risk taking and decisionmaking:Foreign military interventiondecisions. Stanford,CA: StanfordUniversityPress. of Voss, J. 1998. On the representation problems:An informationprocessing approachto foreign policy in decisionmaking.In Problemrepresentation foreign policy decision making,editedby D. Sylvan and J. Voss, 8-28. New York:CambridgeUniversityPress. Walker, S. 1995. Psychodynamic processes and framing effects in foreign policy decision-making: WoodrowWilson's operationalcode. Political Psychology 16 (4): 697-717. and Welch,D. 1992. The organizational bureaucratic Retrospectandprospect.Internapolitics paradigms: tional Security 17 (2): 112-46. Studies assessment.(Mershon)International Weldes,J. 1998.Bureaucratic politics:A criticalconstructivist Review42:216-25. in In problemrepresentation. Problemrepresentation foreign policy decision Young,M. 1998. Representing making,edited by D. Sylvan and J. Voss, 213-48. New York:CambridgeUniversityPress.