Pavli Nov 11

ISSN 2079 0864, Biology Bulletin Reviews, 2011, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 6078. Pleiades Publishing, Ltd., 2011.
. Original Russian Text I.Ya. Pavlinov, 2011, published in Zhurnal Obshchei Biologii, 2011, Vol. 72, No. 1, pp. 326.
Concepts of Rational Taxonomy in Biology

I. Ya. Pavlinov
Zoological Museum, Moscow State University, Moscow, 125009 Russia igor_pavlinov@zmmu.msu.ru
Received April 10, 2010
AbstractProblems related to the development of concepts of rational taxonomy and rational classifications (taxonomic systems) in biology are discussed. A rational taxonomy is based on the assumption that the key characteristic of rationality is the deductive inference of certain partial judgments about the reality under study from other judgments taken as more general and a priori true. Two forms of rationality are distinguished: ontological and epistemological. The former implies the inference of classification properties from general (essential) properties of the reality being investigated. The latter implies the inference of partial rules about classification from more general (formal) rules. DOI: 10.1134/S2079086411030078
The following principal concepts of ontological rational biological taxonomy are considered: the crys tallographic approach; inference of the orderliness of organism diversity from the general laws of nature; and inference of the above orderliness from the orderliness of ontogenetic development programs, based on the concept of natural kind and Cassirers series theory, grounded in the systemic concept and the idea of peri odic systems. Various concepts of ontologicalratio nal taxonomy can be generalized by the idea of causal taxonomy; that is, any biologically sound classification is founded on a content based model of biological diversity that includes an explicit indication of the general causes responsible for that diversity. It is asserted that each category of general causation and respective background model may serve as a basis for a particular ontologicalrational system as a distinctive research program. Concepts of epistemologically rational taxonomy and classifications (taxonomic systems) can be inter preted in terms of the application of certain epistemo logical criteria of substantiation of the scientific status of the taxonomy in general and of taxonomic systems in particular. These concepts include consideration of tax onomy consistency from the standpoint of inductive and hypotheticdeductive argumentation schemes; such fundamental criteria of classifications naturalness as their prognostic capabilities; and the foundation of a theory of general taxonomy as a general logic, including elements of the axiomatic method. The latter concept constitutes the core of the program of general classiology; it is inconsistent due to the absence of any thing like general logic. It is asserted that elaboration of a theory of taxon omy as a biological discipline, based on the formal principles of epistemological rationality, is not feasi ble. Instead, it must be elaborated as an ontological
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rational one, based on biologically sound meta theo ries about the causes of biological diversity. European science is rational in its foundations, which represents one of the widely accepted criteria of its scientific nature (Gaidenko, 2003; Ilin, 2003). However rationality might be interpreted, its main fea ture is the deductive inference of certain partial judg ments about the reality singled out as the object of study from other judgments that are deemed more general and a priori true. Two forms of rationality are distin guished: ontological and epistemological. Ontological rationality implies the derivation of the essential prop erties of some objects from the properties of others, which are considered fundamental. The emphasis here is on ontological reduction: the explanation of proper ties of a biological organism by its being an element of a biota (reduction of a part to the whole) or the reduction of its properties to those of inert matter (reduction of the whole to its parts). In the case of epistemological rationality, we purport formalized procedures of infer ence per se, or the Method in the general sense, the implied truth of which is a guarantee that the partial judgments about the surveyed objects will also be true. It is a sort of epistemological reduction, the reduction of the essential (substantial) consideration of the object to the formal. The formalaxiomatic method of theory construction is an obvious example. Because, by virtue of ontological relativism (Quine, 1969), the ontological and epistemological components of a cognitive situation are interrelated, the strict distinction of the respective forms of ratio nality is hardly possible. Thus, the framework of onto logical rationalization is limited by its dependence on certain general epistemological criteria: for instance, sometimes only objects available to direct observation can be considered part of cognizable reality. On the
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other hand, epistemological rationalization, taken at its foundations, clearly or covertly appeals to some ontological basis: thus, the possibility of working out general scientific criteria for the truth of knowledge about any objects implies a certain equivalence of the latter in the capacity of cognizable phenomena (essences) regardless of their nature. All the above said is related directly to biological taxonomy. Its ontological rationality means the justifi cation of particular classifications by reference to cer tain general properties of the structure of organisms diversity and its causes. Its epistemological rationality means the construction of the theory of taxonomy on the basis of some general criteria of scientific nature. Their relationship means that the adoption of univer sal tenets of development of classification implies the equivalence of living and nonliving bodies as elements of the integrated classifiable diversity. Many prominent taxonomic systems of plants and animals of the 16th18th and part of the 19th centu ries were to one or another extent rational in the above sense: their common properties were derived from some fundamental laws of the universe (e.g., nature as a superorganism) and/or intellection (e.g., Aristote lian logics). This first of all pertains to the earliest period of taxonomy development, which can be called scholastic: starting from Cesalpino and ending with Linnaeus, the major goal was the working out, on gen eral grounds, of the natural method, or the totality of rules for the construction of a Natural System, which was understood as the general concept of orga nization of nature (Lesch, 1990). When one considers the development of modern ideas about rational taxonomy, the following impor tant aspects should be taken into account. This ratio nality takes the shape of a system of regulative princi ples; some of them are related to the object under study (reality, causality, systemacy, etc.), and others, to the methods of development and arrangement of knowledge about it (cognizability, observation, test ability, and principles of compliance, simplicity, etc.) (Mamchur and Illarionov, 1973). The said principles do not exist in themselves and are not given once for all time: they are developing in history alongside the development of science. At each stage of this develop ment, there is a certain range of variants, and their choice is related, after all, with the theoreticalcogni tive stance taken by the scientist (Mamchur, Illari onov, 1973; Gaidenko, 1991; Ilin, 2003). Multiple interpretations and estimations of the sig nificance of such principles lead to the conclusion that rational taxonomy deals with two fundamental prob lems that are well known from the history of science: (a) the impossibility of unambiguously defining the universal ontology of the classified diversity of organ isms; and (b) the potential multiplicity of general theories of classification. Both problems are resolved rationally via this or that system of postulates (Lyubishchev, 1975, 1982). Therefore, in spite of the
BIOLOGY BULLETIN REVIEWS Vol. 1 No. 3 2011
classical ideal, one can hardly count on the construc tion of such a universal (and, hence, single) theory of rational taxonomy, on the basis of which one might develop a universal (and single) classification of living organisms, claiming for it a naturalness that would be accepted by everyone. In this article, I consider in brief the contemporary ideas about possible methods of constructing rational taxonomies (theories of classification) in biology. Having in mind the mismatch between the scale of the task and the limited volume of the publication, I had to refrain from considering some important themes that are tangential to the reviewed problem, for instance, the ratio of rational to empirical approaches to taxonomy. ONTOLOGICAL RATIONALITY Ontological rationality is deeply rooted in natural philosophy, dating back as far as prescientific mythol ogy about the structure of the world and its causes. In the above mentioned nonclassical science, it is expressed by the idea that any empirical knowledge is consistent from the scientific viewpoint only in a cer tain theoretical substantial context, which sets up the general understanding of an object under study (Ilin, 2003; Moiseev, 2008). In the case of taxonomy, this means that every specific classification has a specific biological meaning to the extent it is meaningful (the tautology is appropriate) in a certain general biological theory (Bock, 1974; Pavlinov, 2007a, 2010). Most consistent onto rationalists go even farther and demand that properties of the classified diversity of organisms be deduced from fundamental physical properties (laws) of the material world. Thus, any tax onomic doctrine in which the content and/or form of classifications are justified with reference to some gen eral ideas about the structure of the universe or at least animated nature (the Divine Plan of Creation, the Stairs of Perfection, Nature as superorganism, self developing biota, etc.) can be considered rational to this or that extent. In the early 19th century, O.P. de Candolle was probably the first to use the notion of rational taxon omy (Candlle, 1813): it is based on the analysis of intrinsic properties of organisms and develops natural and artificial systems, in contrast to empirical taxon omy, which deals with nonintrinsic characteristics (for example, with names of organisms). According to Candolle, the rationality (in this case, ontological) of a natural system is the establishment of the symmetry of the initial plan of the organisms structure and the inference of all the observed variants from it, like crys tallography, which derives configurations of crystals from major types of their symmetry (Sachs, 1906). E. Haeckel developed this idea and, similarly to Candolle, built a version of the rational system, albeit he did not mention this notion (Braidbakh, 2004). He believed that the diversity of all natural bodies is gov
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erned by simple mechanistic laws of nature that are manifested by the orderliness of major symmetry types and structural layouts (Haeckels promorphology). The orderliness is realized in the process of evolution: the successive emergence and change of said layouts and types. On these grounds, Haeckel argues in one of his last works (Kristalseelen, 1917; cit. from Braid bakh, 2004) that a classification of living forms must reflect changes in general symmetry types; he voices the structuralgenetic principle of constructing classi fications as the universal principle for any natural objects, from minerals to highly organized animals. Remarkably, this crucial element of Haeckels general classification doctrine, in contrast to the overpopular ized phylogenetic one, has been ignored and is not mentioned by authors of novel versions of both ratio nal taxonomy (Webster, 1996; Webster, Goodwin, 1996) and phylogenetics (Hennig, 1966). RATIONALITY ACCORDING TO DRIESCH In spite of a proneness to ideas of vitalism, H.Drie sch, who proposed the contemporary general notion of rational taxonomy in its common ontological interpre tation, thinks that the ideal of description of the variety of organic forms should be laws similar to, e.g., those accepted in geometry for geometric forms or in chemis try for chemical elements (Driesch, 1908). The onto logical nature of this rationality lies in the fact that it @{is based on the concept by means of which the universality of specific forms can be understood. Any system claiming rationality provides us with a key, and using it we cognize either that there cannot be more than a definite number of forms of a definite sort or that there can be their indefinite number that follows a cer tain law pertaining to peculiarities of differences between them (Driesch, 1908, p. 243).}@ According to Driesch, in rational taxonomy any classification as an orderly diversity is a species rel ative to a genus, i.e., the underlying rational con cept (law). Respectively, in the rational system, @{the so called genus embraces its entire spe cies so that all peculiarities of the species are repre sented in the properties of the genus, albeit in a more general form, in the form which is not yet realized. The genus is richer than the species both by volume and content, though as a covert possibility but it can be realized by its own means, without external aid (Driesch, 1908, p. 244).}@ In contrast to this, in the natural (Linnaeuss) classification, which according to Driesch has the meaning of a catalog, the genus is richer in volume but poorer in content than species. The genus is transformed in the species via simple addition of single peculiarities and not via develop ment of latent properties that are intrinsic to it (Dri esch, 1908, p. 244). Driesch believes that however much the natural classification is improved, nev ertheless we do not understand the true foundation of this system; we cannot say at all that these very classes
or orders, or families, and not others must exist, and that they must be such as they are (Driesch, 1908, p. 247). N. Zarenkov agrees with him in absentia (1976), saying that sets of taxonomic explanations cannot be inferred from each other (p. 26). In order to understand the meaning of Drieschs rational taxonomy and its relationship with other parts of taxonomy, it is important to have in mind its obvi ously typological preconditions. Driesch assumes that the concept of what is called the type, thanks almost exclusively to Cuvier and Goethe, is most important of all provided by classification (Driesch, 1908, p. 247). Two great typologists hold essentially different typo logical concepts (Kanaev, 1976; and Svasyan, 2001), but the reference to Goethe clearly indicates the char acter of genera and species Driesch implied. This is about rational morphology: some general causal the ory of morphogenesis, transforming the diversity of forms into a holistic system of their ideal conversions (Ho, 1988, 1992; Beklemishev, 1994; Resnik, 1994; Webster, 1996; and Webster and Goodwin, 1996). This can be considered a more general concept relative to the modern transformational typology (Zakharov, 2005): both imply the construction of a system in which the diversity of biological forms is subordinate to certain general laws of their transformation, e.g., metamorphoses by Goethe. From this viewpoint, the question about rational taxonomy is a particular case of a more general question about the logics of mor phology (Webster and Goodwin, 1996, p. 9). Gener ally speaking, this means the reduction of taxonomic principles to principles of morphology: for example, in the book Methodology of Taxonomy by morphologist typologist V.N. Beklemishev (1994), there is little said about taxonomy, per se; it is entirely devoted to ratio nal morphology. Like other biologists of the 20th century, A.A. Lyubishchev also discussed the idea of ontological rational taxonomy. With reference to Driesch, he wrote that the rational system should be thought as that all elements of which are inferred on the basis of some gen eral principles, the definite theory (Lyubishchev, 1975, p. 165; 1972, 1982). Both Driesch and Lyubishchev oppose the rational system to the natural one, although on different grounds. Driesch considers Linnaeuss system natural, i.e., that answering the criterion of the greatest predictive value (see the section on epistemo logical rationality below). Whereas Driesch ranked the rational system higher than the natural one, Lyubish chev initially thought that the natural system was more preferential than the rational one. The latter might be in the fields where mathematics is applicable (crys tallography) [Therefore] the natural system is com pletely irrational (Lyubishchev, 1923, p. 103; 1982, p. 28). Later, however, he would recognize their nearly equal rights and write about the purposefulness of designing not only natural, but also rational systems (Lyubishchev, 1975, p. 162).
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TAXONOMY OF NATURAL GENERA One of the later schools to develop rational taxon omy accentuates the structural orderliness of epigenetic processes of individual development (Ho, 1990; Ho and Saunders, 1993, 1994). This establishes the rational taxonomy of biological forms and natural system of classification, based on dynamics of processes of these forms generation (Ho, 1998, p. 112). It develops within the framework of process structuralism, which considers law like transformations of biological forms (Ho, 1998, 1989; Webster, 1989). In this case, the key idea is that development is the orderly hierarchic pro cess par excellence, which generates the hierarchic structure of [diversity of] definitive organization of liv ing creatures (Ho and Saunders, 1993, p. 291). Mech anisms originating this structure are timeless and uni versal. The timeless nature means independence of history, and universality means independence of the substrate; altogether, this provides a certain universal taxonomy (Ho, 1988, p. 19), in which the taxon is a class of individuals united by the similarity of the pro cess of development (Ho, 1992, p. 199). It seems evident that the statement of said authors about the timeless nature and universality of mecha nisms of ontogenetic development is rather erroneous, as it contradicts the fundamental understanding of historical development of life as the evolution of onto geneses, including mechanisms of ontogenesis (Shish kin, 1988). The so called ontogenetic taxonomy is based on this understanding that also studies the orderliness of ontogeneses and defines the system of taxa via the system of regular historic transformations of ontogenetic cycles (Martynov, 2009). This taxo nomic concept serves as a nexus between ontological rational and evolutionally interpreted taxonomies. A hierarchy of pure forms, germinated by the laws of their transformation, is a certain natural order [which] is close to the ideal or dynamic archetype of Goethe (Ho, 1988, p. 19). From this point of view, Goethes archetype as the integrating origin of the taxon is as fundamental a generalization for the latter as a law in physics: organisms relate to the type in the same manner as events relate to the law they manifest (Naef, 1919, p. 7). Thus, a parallelism between the law in physicalchemical sciences and Goethes arche type in biological taxonomy is established in this way (Lyubarskii, 1996). The fundamental similarity between them is also that neither the law (in physics) nor the type (in taxonomy) is observed directly, and in this sense they are naturalphilosophical construc tions, similarly cognized by the mind. Formally speak ing, the difference is only in terms of volume of the totality of objects (organisms within a taxon) put into order by this law (archetype) (Meiien, 1978). Taking into account the said parallelism of the laws and archetypes, one may think that taxa, identified by a rational taxonomy, are natural genera in the ontolog ical sense (Quine, 1969; Dupre, 1981; Mahner, 1993;
Mahner and Bunge, 1997). It is in this sense that Web ster develops the concept of rational taxonomy (Web ster, 1996; Webster and Goodwin, 1996). Webster intensely uses ideas from Cassirers logic about the series as a reflection of Goethes law of metamorpho sis (Cassirer, 1923). In this case, the taxon as a natural genus represents a totality of objects, related by the definite law of transformation: the form of series. Web ster underlines that this genus is not what is absolutely given: this is a theoretical construction, which depends on the selected aspect of consideration of the variety of forms. These laws of transformations form a certain hierarchy function of their level of generality. As each law defines its natural genus of a given level of general ity, we obtain the hierarchy of such genera, forming the sought for rational system, which, by definition, includes maximally natural taxa (Mahner, 1993; Web ster, 1993; Mahner and Bunge, 1997). Similarly, with reference to Cassirer, B. Zakharov (2005) designs the ontology of transformationaltypological taxonomy. Evidently, in the above understanding, the ontolog icalrational taxonomy is a tool for working out clas sifications of thinkable forms: one of the ideals of the theoretical taxonomy of the rational trend (Drie sch, 1908; Lybishchev, 1969; Lyubishchev, 1972, 1982; Webster and Goodwin, 1996). In this sense, it may be considered one of the versions of nomothetic taxonomy, which reveals general regularities of the diversity of organisms and puts them, when possible, in the form of classification (Meiien, 1978); these words, however, are attributed by S.V. Meiien to typology as under stood in the most general sense, but it seems possible to attribute them to taxonomy per se. In this sense, classification may be considered to be law like gener alization (Rozova, 1986; Zabrodin, 1981, 1989; Sub botin, 2001). The general foundation for such an interpretation could be the concept of the nomolog ical space of states, developed within the framework of so called nomological essentialism (Bunge, 1979; Mahner and Bunge, 1997). This makes rational taxon omy clearly theory dependent (Webster and Good win, 1996): here we are dealing with the manifestation of the above mentioned ontological relativism as one of the canons of nonclassical scientific epistemology. TAXONOMY AND SYSTEMACY Thinking of classification (Natural System) from the general theoreticsystemic point of view can be considered grounds for designing quite another ver sion of ontologicalrational taxonomy: in this case, the principle of systemacy is fundamental (Chernykh, 1986; Epshtein, 2003). It is concretized by laws of the composition of complex systems, a mani festation of which is the orderly structure of taxonomic diversity (Urmantsev, 1978; Zakharov, 2005). The inference of some fundamental properties of the struc ture of organisms diversity from the synergic model of development and organization of a biota as an unbal
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anced complex system is close to this in spirit (Pavli nov, 2005), which provides, in the general case, the synergicinertness concept of taxonomy. Interpretation of the natural system as a fractal (Burlando, 1990; Pavlinov, 1996; Pozdnyakov, 2005) can be attributed to similar methods of designing a rational taxonomy; the taxas being subordinate to the ranking law of Zipf Willis (Meiien, 1978; Kafanov and Sukhanov, 1995; Pavlinov et al., 1995) is considered a probable manifestation of the fractality of this system (Pozdnyakov, 2005). A remarkable consequence of this way of thinking is the totality of the following statements: the system of taxa is a nonstrict fractal; its ability to split (in contrast to a mathematical fractal) is not infinite; and its lower limit may be the rank at which Zipfness is observed regarding the spread of signs by their significance. As the species does not meet this criterion, the lowest unit of the natural sys tem should be regarded as the genus (Pozdnyakov, 2005). It is presumed that strict observance of this law can evidence a certain optimality and harmony of the relevant variances (Dunaev, 1984); i.e., it may be deemed one of the quantitative criteria of naturalness of rationally inferred classifications of this kind. PERIODICAL SYSTEMS With some concessions, a classification approach aimed at the development of periodical systems of organisms can be referred to the ontologicalrational taxonomy, which appeals to general causes of the structure of diversity of natural bodies. In this case, Mendeleeevs system of chemical elements is taken as a model: of course, the orderliness of chemical ele ments does not cause the orderliness of biological elements, but both orderly systems are governed by a certain natural system forming law (Driesch, 1908; Lyubishchev, 1923, 1966, 1982; Lyubishchev, 1969; Chaikovskii, 1990; Popov, 2002). This is a particular case of a parametric system, because it implies the fix ation of a certain property of the organisms as a key parameter, relative to which the entire system is designed (Zeleev, 2007). Lyubishchev was a champion of the development of such systemsclassifications, and for this reason A.P. Rasnitsyn (2002; Rasnitsyn, 1996) termed the parameter defining the values of other taxon features by their position in the system as Lyubishchevs. Today, several versions of constructing such a sys tem are proposed (Pavlov, 2000; Zeleev, 2007; Popov, 2008). In I.Yu. Popovs system, the said parameter is the complexity level, and the elements are archetypes; this results in a specific analog of the Stairs of Perfec tion, which is preset by a gradient of archetypes growing more and more complex. The difference is that, if in the initial version these stairs are linear, in the periodical system the orderly series of forms is convolved into a sort of solenoid (one of the initial variants of Mendeleevs concept visualization), At
each complexity level, archetypes are designed so that they form key sets of structure complications for organisms that embody these archetypes. As is seen, this taxonomic concept is to some extent like the con cept of homological and heterological sets by Cope, who derived these sets from an analogy with the peri odic system of organic compounds (Cope, 1896). Classification, as in the case of chemical elements, takes the shape of a table showing the periodic law of diversity of biologic archetypeselements. The periodic system of taxonomic diversity of organisms must evidently imply the reality (objective character) of the classification archetypes as some biological elements. Otherwise, their analogy with chemical elements proves excessively perfunctory for the periodic law in biology, based on their diversity, to be able to claim generalizability from the stance of the above nomological essentialism. In connection with this, the question arises of whether one may consider hierarchically organized archetypes of high ranking taxa to be elements. It seems that, because of the structural complexity of organisms, which is much greater than that of chemical elements, one would fail to build such a strict periodic table as that of Men deleev. Such classification can serve only as a rough sketch of the roughly understood periodic law in biol ogy, if any (Popov, 2008). Therefore, one should remember that one cannot merely transfer the already known natural classification to a new sub ject field and obtain the natural classification there as well (Zabrodin, 1989; p. 71; 2001, p. 111). Lyubishchevs parameter is not necessarily the organisms (biological elements) own property: it may also characterize certain basis relationships among them. Thus, Rasnitsyn (2002; Rasnitsyn, 1996) believes this parameter to be kinship (in its strict cla distic understanding), defining both the place of the organisms in the phylogenetic classification and the meaning of features related to kinship. From this per spective, the classification can be considered paramet rical, but hardly periodical. CAUSAL TAXONOMY Though, taken as such, laws of nature do not explain anything and are a convolved description of the surveyed diversity of forms (Kordonskii, 1989, p. 54), the foundations of any ontologicalrational sys tem suggest the existence of causes of this develop ment of diversity. Hence, taxonomy claiming theoret ical status can explain a certain totality of phenom ena, described in definite terms, only if these terms divide these phenomena, reflecting specific causal forces which generate it [division] (Rosenberg, 1985, p. 182); such totalities of phenomena are the above mentioned natural genera in the understanding of Quine. In a similar manner, N.A. Zarenkov (1976) argues that the basic function of a taxonomy as an academic discipline is explanation (p. 17) within the
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limits of its specific instruments. This circumstance permits the terming of ontologicalrational taxonomy as explanatory or causal (Subbotin, 2001; Hitchcock, 2006; Pavlinov, 2007a, 2010): it deals with essences underlying the phenomena. In this capacity the prod uct of rational (natural) taxonomy is opposed to the artificial classifications dealing with accidentals. According to the rationalist doctrine of Driesch, Lyubishchev, Webster, and others, the latter include phylogenetic classifications that rely on reconstructed series of historic events rather than on general laws of form generation. However, such opposition is not quite correct: it omits the circumstance that, in the Aristotelian ontological system, initial causes of the forms of diversity are as fundamental as material or efficient. This means that, for any developing system, the historic causation cannot be excluded from the general understanding of ontological rationality, in this case from the totality of causes for the diversity of biological forms (Pavlinov, 2010). It is the reference to initial (historic) causes that makes the classification meaningful within the framework of the evolution par adigm expressed by the well known aphorism by F. Dobzhanskii: in biology, only that which is inter preted evolutionally makes sense (Dobzhanskii, 1973). It is important to note here that the general tenets of biological evolution can be inferred rationally from the notions of synergetics about the laws of devel opment of complex, unbalanced macrosystems (Brooks and Wiley, 1986; Barantsev, 2003). Because these principles serve the ontological justification of evolutionally interpreted taxonomy, this provides the latter with at least some attributes of nomothetics (Brooks and Wiley, 1986; Pavlinov, 2005). Today, ontological rationalization of causal taxon omy takes the shape of development of substantial quasi axiomatic systems, the statements of which are originally provided in the language of a certain sub stantial theory. The latter distinguishes the systems of this type from those being implied by epistemological rationality, where the issue is strictly formal axiomatic systems (see the relevant section below). Each system of this sort represents a substantial basic model in terms of M. Vartofskii (1988), which describes the studied taxonomic reality and is the preconditional knowledge of ontologicalrational taxonomy. Thus, in the case of evolutionally interpreted taxonomy, the basic model contains the following indication: (a) of key properties of evolution, generating a certain struc ture of the taxonomically surveyed diversity of organ isms; and (b) of key properties of the taxonomic sys tem, stemming from the said properties of evolution (Gaffney, 1979; Wiley, 1981; Queiroz, 1988; Pavlinov, 1998, 2005, 2007b). There are a few examples of devel opment of this type of systems, and they differ in both content and detail of elaboration (Loevtrup, 1975; Bonde, 1976; Wiley, 1981; Pavlinov, 1990, 2005; Epsh tein, 2009); generally speaking, none of them was val idated for completeness and noncontradiction.
As is seen from the above, the understanding of ontologicalrational taxonomy as causal introduces into its problematic the mandate for stating the causes that structure the diversity of the organisms. It is clear that there are many such causes, and they can hardly be reduced to one most general cause. This means that the task of working out a single possible rational (nat ural in the classical sense) taxonomic system cannot be deemed correct, as causal taxonomy is necessarily plu ralistic (Subbotin, 2001; Pavlinov, 2007a, 2010). This stance agrees well with the concepts saying that any natural law, regardless of interpretation, is necessarily local: the natural genus it defines is extensionally lim ited (Laudan, 1990; Bunge, 2003). Thus, different natural laws can be laid at the foundation of different rational taxonomies: reference to them leads to the identification of differing natural genera in the general totality of biological forms. This means that a partial causal (ontologicalrational) taxonomy may be referred to each category of more or less general origi nating causes for the diversity of biological forms. EPISTEMOLOGICAL RATIONALITY Epistemological rationality is called upon to incar nate one of the key ideas of classical science, i.e., the unity of general tenets of obtaining and organizing natural scientific knowledge (Gaidenko, 1991). As it seems, this idea stems from quite a specific ontological assumption: regarding some basic properties, the structure of diversity of animate and inanimate bodies of nature is integral and, therefore, allows for a unified and universal method of description of this diversity. This is a common foundation for recognizing the gen eral scientific criteria of knowledge consistency as top ical for taxonomy; for instance, these criteria may be those of the natural system, which are generally signif icant for disciplines engaged in classification (Mille, 1900; Lyubishchev, 1923, 1975, 1982; Gilmour, 1940, 1961; Rozova, 1986). This is equal to epistemological rationalization of the taxonomy, or working out its grounds by way of reference to general tenets of orga nization of scientific knowledge. Before the beginning of formation of the ideals of empirical science in the Modern Era, i.e., prior to the 16th century, the genusspecies layout of dividing notions rooted in Aristotles syllogistics was consid ered the general scientifically consistent method of diversity. After that, the pathways of natural science diverge: for natural philosophy, the Neo Pythagorean program with Galileos motto the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics; and for nat ural history and taxonomy as part of it, the genusspe cies scheme remained the basis (Ogilvie, 2006). Beginning from works by A.Cesalpino, it was incar nated in the idea of the natural method in biological taxonomy (Staufleu, 1969): in the mid 18th century, M. Adanson, a founder of modern taxonomy, said that there can be only one natural method and it must be
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universal or all embracing; i.e., there must be no exceptions from it (Adanson, 1966, p. clv). The nat ural system as the goal of taxonomy and the natural method as a means of its achievement prove to be related by the understanding that the degree of natu ralness of the system depends on the naturalness of the method (Foucault, 1994). Thus, epistemological rational taxonomy, to this or that extent, develops in the mainstream of instrumentalism as an extreme form of epistemology of a positive trend: it is rooted in a quite metaphysical belief in the natural method. Theoretical studies in this field can be divided, with some concessions, into two schools. Some researchers try to select, within the framework of the very taxo nomic tradition, certain general epistemological prin ciples, finding appropriate matches and assessing the scientific consistency of the emerged principles of classification and classifications per se from this view point. This stance includes the discussion of a possible interpretation of classification as a scientific hypothe sis (Pavlinov, 1995) or attracting such principles to jus tify particular classification approaches, e.g., the prin ciple of economy in cladistics (Farris, 1983). Biolo giststaxonomists addressing epistemology get the hang of the concept centrism as they look for a gen eral justification of a specific taxonomic position (Hull, 1983). Other more decisive scientists consider the major goal to propose a taxonomy of certain epistemological requirements, generally worked out by rational sci ence in order to set the goal and design the taxonomic procedure in accordance with these requirements (Lyubishchev, 1923, 1972, 1982; Kozhara, 1982, 2006). Attempts at the application, in taxonomy, of such criteria of scientific character as heuristicity, sta bility, testability, etc. have the same point (Lyubish chev, 1923, 1972, 1982; Gilmour, 1940; Lyubishchev, 1969; Kluge, 1997). Some attention is drawn to the basics of taxonomy in the language taken from formal axiomatic systems like set theory, and design of taxon omy as a formalized classification theory (Woodger, 1937; Gregg, 1954; Voronin, 1985; Mahner and Bunge, 1997). Such rationality is inherent first to numerical tax onomy (Smirnov, 1923, 1938; Sneath, 1961; Sokal and Sneath, 1963), whose main idea can be described as the progress of the above mentioned Neo Pythagorean pro gram. Another example is the formation of experimen tal taxonomy, for which the physical experiment is a methodological landmark (Hall and Clements, 1923; Rozanova, 1946; Hagen, 1984). CRITERIA OF SCIENTIFIC CHARACTER Science is engaged in the search for generaliza tions, in this or that form imposing order on empirical data. From this general point of view, taxonomy is a synonym of theoretical science, as it deals with bring ing into order concepts about the diversity of organ isms (Simpson, 2006). This means that taxonomic
knowledge is scientific due to its very nature, and clas sification as a form of the existence of such knowledge is a special theory or theory like generalization (Rozova, 1986; Zabrodin, 1989, 2001; Subbotin, 2001). However, from the stance of stricter operational criteria of scientific character, which may differ in dif ferent epistemological doctrines, this general conclu sion may be consistent or impugned. For example, within the framework of the physicalist paradigm, tax onomy, contrary to Simpsons opinion, may not be considered science equal to physics in terms of its value, and its classifications are not scientific general izations of natural phenomena; they are a narrative, a sum of single judgments about totalities of single events or facts. Thus, one should speak not of declar ing the scientific status of biological taxonomy but of constructing its epistemological rationality with the help of different criteria of scientific character. There is a sufficient number of such criteria, and they are differently assessed in different epistemologi cal (in a broader sense, gnoseological) doctrines; for the purpose of our study, they can be reduced to the ideas of physicalism, mathematism, instrumental thinking, and naturalism (Ilin, 2003; Stepin, 2003). Biological taxonomy has not been considered in this broad aspect, save, probably, a paper by G. Lyubarskii (1996) in which the ideas are interpreted in terms of cognitive styles. Most often, one speaks of some partial criteria that are most topical within the framework of this or that scientific approach. Thus, of the criteria falling under the idea of physicalism, the observability of objects of a taxonomy and empirical testability (especially experimental) of its results are often con sidered. Mathematism, in combination with instru mentalism, requires the clear formalization of rules of inference of taxonomical knowledge, e.g., in the form of quantitative methods that (like experiments) ensure the precision and repeatability of the taxonomic pro cedures and, hence, their results. These ideas were at the center of debate in the first half of the 20th century in connection with biology (and taxonomy as part of it) mastering the gnoseological systems of positivism and early post positivism: experimental and numeri cal taxonomy were developing in this manner. Their basis is the inductive scheme of argument as the basic tool of any empirical science. In the second half of the 20th century, the ideas of nonclassical epistemology, as well as its criteria of sci entific character, started to be mastered by taxono mists (Pavlinov, 2006). Significant change that occurred in both natural science and the philosophy of science has become its precondition: on the one hand, they legalized scientific metaphysics and nonobserv able essences (in taxonomy, macrotaxa), and on the other hand, they deprived largely physicalist criteria (e.g., observability) of their universal status and admit ted the right of scientists in different subject fields to work out more or less specific criteria of scientific character (Hull, 1969; Lsaudan, 1990; Lakatos, 2003;
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Stepin, 2003). This constitutes the justification of the specificity of biological knowledge relative to physical knowledge, which was many times highlighted (Mayr, 1988). The statement that any partial empirical generali zation is meaningful as part of scientific knowledge only in the context of some basic substantial (meta physical) theory is key to all nonclassical epistemol ogy, which is Kantian in essence. For the epistemolog icalrational building of taxonomy, this means that, as was stressed above, the development of epistemologi cal foundations for rational taxonomy is impossible out of the context set by its ontological grounds. From this point of view, only those taxonomic approaches developed on the basis of the clearly set natural scien tific model of the studied taxonomic reality are scien tifically consistent (Pavlinov, 2006, 2007b, 2010). In the general case, the statement above raises doubts about the natural scientific consistency of the school of taxonomys rational development, which sets the development of formal classification approaches as the major task (see about classiology below). On these grounds, all of those empirical taxonomic concepts that exclude preconditional knowledge from a cogni tive situation can hardly be deemed scientific in the nonclassical sense. In particular, this pertains to phe netic taxonomy, which is developed on a strictly empirical basis without such prior knowledge (Sokal and Sneath, 1963; Colless, 1967). However, develop ment of the phenetic concept, implementing the ideas of positive epistemology, showed that the rejection of this knowledge is more an unrealizable ideal than an operational point of any specific research program (Sneath, 1995). In fact, the metaphysical constituent is an important part of the concept of homology, with out which it is in principal impossible to single out fea tures (Brigandt, 2002). Moreover, the general idea of similarity, on which the entire phenetic notion is built, cannot be considered substantially determined with out this component (Tarskii, 1977): as philosophers grasped long ago, similarity is empty without a [sub stantial] theory (Sober, 1984, p. 336). The nonclassical principle of constructing natural science knowledge is implemented by two schemes of argument, hypotheticdeductive (Popper, 1983, 2000) and abductive (Webster, 1996; Fitzhugh, 2006, 2009), which consider the basic element of scientific knowledge the hypothesis and not theory. According to this stance, a classification is scientific (a taxonomic system) if it may be thought of as a hypothesis, pursued and validated for truth (plausibility) in agreement with a certain set of normative principles. They include, first of all, (a) clear designation of such a basic model, which defines the substantial context of the entire tax onomic study; and (b) fixation of general rules for stat ing and testing the classificationhypothesis. This important aspect of nonclassical epistemology legal izes the hypothetical nature of taxonomic knowledge at the expense of classification gaining the status of a
hypothesis, understood not in the everyday sense (Mayr, 1971) but in a quite strict scientific sense (Wiley, 1981; Pesenko, 1991; Panchen, 1992; Pavlinov, 1995, 1996). At the present stage of mastering the epistemologi cal rationality of the nonclassical trend, the main problem is that, in the opinion of physicalism, scien tific hypotheses can be only strictly universal state ments about classes, including the above mentioned natural genera. This criterion is largely met by the taxa identified by the ontologically rational taxonomy of the typological trend (see above): statements about them are universal at least in quantitative terms. In the phylogenetic interpretation, the taxa are considered quasi individuals (Wiley, 1981; Brooks and Wiley, 1986); hence, the statements about them, from this viewpoint, cannot be deemed testable hypotheses (Kitts, 1977; Ball, 1982). Seemingly, the solution is to single out two categories of hypotheses having equal status in the natural sciences but differing in the con dition of satisfiability of this principle. The first of them are physical (physicalist), containing strictly universal statements about logical classes; the others are taxonomic hypotheses, formulated as quantita tively universal statements about taxa in terms of bio logical classification (Panchen, 1992; Pavlinov, 1995). These statements are of quantitatively universal char acter due to the fact that they do not relate to single taxa, but pertain to classifications in general. The lat ter are the natural genera, extensionally defined by the totality of the organisms they embrace, and intension ally, with their relations (Mahner and Bunge, 1997). In the hypotheticdeductive scheme of argumen tation, the major method of validating a hypothesis is determined by the principle of falsifiability: this means that the hypothesis should not be proven (as this is impossible for universal statements), but it should be impunged (Popper, 1983). In general, each hypothesis is considered true, other things being equal, until it is not impunged (falsified). Vast literature is devoted to this aspect of the taxonomic hypothesis, especially the phylogenetic interpretations, which it makes no sense to consider here; it is sufficient to refer to several important publications (Bock, 1974; Pesenko, 1989; Szalay and Bock, 1991; Pavlinov, 1995, 1996; Ras nitsyn, 2002; Kluge, 2009). In the orthodox (Pop pers) interpretation of this principle, it is deemed inapplicable in the phylogenetic taxonomy, as it deals with nonstrictly universal statements (Kitts, 1977; Ball, 1982; Rieppel, 2003; Rieppel et al., 2006). How ever, such interpretation is inconsistent per se: it is built on the basis of the logical principle modus tollens, operating with a binary truefalse opposition, whereas natural science knowledge is probabilistic; hence, any hypothesis would be assessed only as more or less plau sible relative to the competing hypothesis (Ilin, 2001; Lakatos, 2003) Also, there seem to be few strictly uni versal statements in the natural sciences (Quine, 1969; Laudan, 1990; Bunge, 2003). From this point of view,
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the taxonomic hypothesis cannot be finally rejected: fal sification only decreases its plausibility or narrows the domain of its applicability (Bonde, 1976; Pavlinov, 1995; Rasnitsyn, 2002; Rieppel, 2003, 2008; Loevtrup, 2008). The mild version of the hypotheticdeductive argument allows for the possibility of corroboration of the hypothesis as a means of increasing its plausibility (Popper, 1983, 2000). This position leads to the fact that, in modern taxonomy, the principle of total evi dence has gained popularity considered from different viewpoints (Kluge, 1997, 1998; Rieppel et al., 2006; Rieppel, 2007, 2008). This principle, introduced by R. Carnap as part of an inductive scheme of argument, states that the plausibility of the hypothesis is defined by the degree of its confirmation with all currently available facts. As is seen, the principle introduces elements of inductivism in the scheme of argumenta tion; in essence, it coincides with the classical (that of Adanson) understanding of naturalness of the taxo nomic system as a generality by many properties. The most significant principles for the develop ment of the taxonomic hypotheses include the princi ple of economy (also simplicity or parsimony), which has two interpretations: epistemological (method ological) and ontological. The former means the economy of thinking, dating back to ideas of the Middle Age theologian W. Occam, who voiced the motto of One should not multiply essences without necessity (not sunt entia multiplicanda praeter necessi tatem) when explaining cognizable reality. In this case, there is no reference to ontology: it is merely noted that the most economic description of diversity per se is desirable, which permits the minimum number of repetitions of features within the framework of the rel evant classification (Lyubishchev, 1923, 1975, 1982; Rozova, 1986). The source of the second interpreta tion is the thesis of one of the early positive philoso phers, D. Hume, about the simplicity of nature. In the early 20th century, it took the shape of mature pos itivism: the world is simple, and for that reason allows for simple descriptions (Hill, 1965). There is a covert appeal to ontology: economy means a certain mini mality of the properties of the surveyed diversity per se (Farris, 1983; Kluge, 1984; Pavlinov, 1990, 2007a; Pesenko, 1991). An example here may be the concept of minimum evolution. In accordance with the hypotheticdeductive scheme of argumentation, the methodologically eco nomic taxonomic hypothesis is preferable: it has fewer initial assumptions (according to Popper, it has lesser dimensionality). It is therefore potentially more fal sifiable and has a greater match with one of the criteria of scientific character, testability. However, there is a serious problem: the interconditionality of ontological and epistemological interpretations of the principle of economy. Therefore, at the operational level, both interpretations can actually coincide; this problem is considered relative to cladistic taxonomy (Bonde,
1976; Cartmille, 1981; Ball, 1982; Pavlinov, 2005, 2007a). Thus, in one of the cladistic schools, the econ omy of the hypothesis is defined as the minimum number of independent repetitions of the features in the cladogram of the relevant hypothesis about phylogenesis (Wiley, 1981; Farris, 1983; Pesenko, 1989; Pavlinov, 1990, 2005). Evidently, this hypothesis suggests the min imization of events in the phylogenesis per se. CRITERIA OF NATURALNESS In the classical taxonomy, the notion of the natural system is central; therefore, the criteria of the scien tific character are considered there as criteria of natu ralness, allowing one to distinguish the said system from other classification versions. In the ontology ori ented approaches (such as typology and phylogenet ics), these criteria are addressed to ontology (adequate reflection of typological transformations, results of phylogenesis, etc.); they are described earlier in the present paper. In the epistemology oriented rational taxonomy, the criteria are not oriented at nature per se, but rather at judgments about it. Sometimes, the natural and rational systems are opposed to one another at the ontological level (Driesch, 1908; Lyubishchev, 1923, 1975, 1982). However, the justifi cation of naturalness with reference to some general epistemological criteria is rational as such, which makes the natural taxonomy epistemologically ratio nal from this point of view. The criterion, which was among the most popular in the 20th century, dates back to the first half of the 19th century and is connected with the names W.Whewell and D. Mille. According to the former, a system claiming the status of natural must be estab lished so that the arrangement obtained via one totality of the features coincides with the arrangement obtained via another totality (Whewell, 1947, p. 539; italicized in original). This criterion, which Whewell introduced with reference to Candolle (it would be more appro priate to refer to Adanson), complies with the princi ple of congruence accepted by some modern schools, as one of images of the principle of economy (Pavlinov, 2005). Mille gave a more general formula: the associ ation of objects in groups, relative to which one can make more general judgments, suits best the purposes of scientific classification, and these judgments are more important than those that can be made in rela tion to any other groups in which the same objects may be integrated. The classification constructed in this manner is scientific or philosophical per se, and it is what is called Natural, as opposed to technical or arti ficial classification (Mille, 1900, p. 573). Lyubish chev, the champion of classical rationalism, repeats this statement (1923): the system where the number of the objects properties, put in a functional relation ship with its position in the system, is maximal should be called natural (p. 103; Lyubishchev, 1982, p. 28). According to the operational definition, the most
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natural classification is that which describes the distri bution of features on the basis of the minimum num ber of statements (McNeill, 1982, p. 337): this evi dently coincides with one of above described interpre tations of the principle of economy. Nowadays, the criterion of the classifications naturalness is under stood as predictive value, the ability to foresee (prog nosticate) unknown properties of the living organisms and unknown organisms themselves on the basis of such classification (Zabrodin, 1981, 1989). This crite rion is often deemed a key to the identification of nat ural groups and natural classifications (Lyubishchev, 1923, 1982; Vermel, 1931; Remane, 1956; Meiien and Shreider, 1976; Rozova, 1986; Starobogatov, 1989; Subbotin, 2001). It should be stressed that the criterion of predictive value is not free from a certain basic ontological assumption: generally speaking, the predictive value is possible only provided that the determinist concept of nature is feasible, which is underlain by the principle of the general cause (Sober, 1988). In the evolutionary worldview, the process of phylogenesis is considered one such cause (Eldredge and Cracraft, 1980; Sober, 1988; Sneath, 1995; Pavlinov, 2005, 2007a). In the sta tionary worldview, it may be the systemic character of diversity, manifested in the interrelation (intercorrela tion) of many properties of objects in the general sense and organisms in particular (Chernykh, 1986; Epsh tein, 2003). That is why, at the empirical level, the above assumption is reduced to the following: the maximum correlation of properties allows us to make the maximum number of conclusions about the objects being classified (Blackwelder, 1967, p. 361). In this sense, Lyubishchev believes that the correlative system is the best (most natural) one, as, in it, it is sufficient to determine functional dependencies of all elements of diversity on independent variables (Lyubishchev, 1982, p. 31). One of the most prominent versions of such strictly epistemological justification of a classifications natu ralness belongs to J.S. Gilmour, whose paper Taxon omy and Philosophy (Gilmour, 1940) became a man ifesto of the logical positivist concept of taxonomy. With reference to the ideas of the Vienna circle, he argues that, in some fundamental sense, natural classi fications are no more natural than artificial, both being generated by the human mind. Echoing Mille, he thinks that the natural classification must be consid ered that allowing for the maximum number of inductive statements regarding the groups that compose it, and that, eo ipso , is most generally useful for the study of living bodies (Gilmour, 1937, p. 1042). Stem ming from his criterion of general utility, Gilmour thinks that the understanding of natural classification as general is only logically correct in any branch of knowl edge (Gilmour, 1937, 1940; Turrill, 1938). On this basis, Gilmour introduced basic notions of general purpose and special purpose classifications instead of the notions of natural and artificial systems
of the orthodox taxonomy, respectively (Gilmour, 1940, 1961). Later the classifications of the first type started to be termed Gilmour natural (Sokal and Sneath, 1963; Sneath, 1989; Atran, 1981; Heywood, 1989); they were also called general reference classifi cations, and this meaning was included in the thesau rus of phenetics (Sneath and Sokal, 1973) and cladis tics (Hennig, 1966; Williams and Ebach, 2009). Such classifications are purely descriptive: packing to the maximum extent all available information about the clas sified diversity, they solve the service information task rather than that of scientific search (Rescigno and Mac cacaro, 1961). Therefore, the step in the development of rational grounds for general purpose classifications, at which the criterion of the predictive value is replaced with that of information value, looks quite lawful (Sokal and Sneath, 1963; Sokal, 1967; Sneath, 1995). The development of MilleLyubishchevGilmour rational epistemology in taxonomy has led to an attempt to design a certain general and logically strict system of criteria of naturalness, which must be satis fied by any classification claiming the status of natu ral (Zabrodin, 1981, p.22). V.Yu. Zabrodin divided the criteria into strong and weak: the former must con tain necessary and sufficient conditions of natural ness, and the latter, only necessary ones. He thinks the strong criterion to be that matching the ontological understanding of rational taxonomy: the natural clas sification expresses the natural law and serves as a form of its representation (Zabrodin, 1981, 2001). Weak cri teria are basically epistemological, being the predictive value, multitasking, repeatability, and resistance to changing classifying features or paradigms. Due to the weakness of the criterion of predictive value, it may be met by classifications that are essen tially different in their original assumptions and con tent. In fact, champions of the relevant concepts believe that the largest predictive value is found in rational classifications in Drieschs sense (Driesch, 1908; Ho, 1992; Ho and Saunders, 1993), Mille nat ural (Lyubishchev, 1923, 1972, 1982), systems of bio morphs (Aleev, 1986), phylogenetic (Bock, 1974), or typological (Lyubarskii, 1996). Generally speaking, this situation reflects the fact that the predictive value of the classification, if it is designed as causal, can be assessed only within the framework of that partial sub stantial model of the studied aspect of diversity that is laid in its foundation (Pavlinov, 2007b, 2010). This imposes quite definite restrictions on the predictive value: if a classification is phylogenetic, one can hardly count on its high predictive value in the sphere of bio morphic diversity, and vice versa. LOGICAL TAXONOMY Generally speaking, classical taxonomy, rooted in scholastics, was initially designed as a certain logic, because the underpinning universal genusspecies scheme is purely logical (see above). Mille (1900) fixed
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this interpretation for the rational science of the Mod ern Era: according to him, classifying is in essence a logical process, whereas, e.g., the biological definition of a species or feature means no more than attributing to a relevant logical term a partial sense within the framework of a particular science. According to cham pions of classical rationalism, it is the pursuance of logical principles that makes taxonomy a true science (Thompson, 1952; Zimmermann, 1954; Lyubishchev, 1966, 1982). In Hennigs book, one can find refer ences to the confidence of some biologists of the first third of the 20th century that taxonomy is doubtlessly a logical relationship (Hennig, 1966, p. 84). On this basis, Lyubishchev (1966, 1982) considers that, for taxonomy, the task of its agreement with the logic of cognitive activity is most topical; linking logic with nomothetics, he believes that the general logic of tax onomy might be its general theory and proposes con sidering this theory general taxonomy. As the general theory of formal (logical) classifica tion, classiology is most consistent in developing this idea. In its initial design, classiology is applicable to the diversity of any objects regardless of their nature (Kozhara, 1982, 2006; Barantsev, 1989; Pokrovskii, 2002, 2006a, 2006b); it is also called universal taxon omy (Wilkins, 1998). The underpinning postulate of classiology is that, in the classifying disciplines, sub stantial theories are impossible without classifications, and the quality of theories depends on the quality of classifications (Kozhara, 2006, p. 15). The goal of classiology is seen first of all in the identification of universal conditions of classifiability of diversity and basic operations over it, which would generate the generalizations in the form of classifications (Mili tarev, 1988). This stand on the whole matches the idea about the independence of the taxonomy from any causal models (Meiien and Shreider, 1976; Brady, 1985), which radically distinguishes the epistemiolog ically rational concept of taxonomy from ontologically rational. According to V.I. Kozhara (1982, p. 4), clas siology is called to invent classification as a totality of procedures, conducted pursuant to scientific rules. Probably, such classification will differ greatly from that given to us by nature, as a technical device incar nating the idea of nature from the bearer of this idea. The idea of constructing classiology or general tax onomy as general logic in modern taxonomy dates back to scholastic notions about self evidence and, therefore, the single possibility of the classical (Aristo telian) logical system. Regarding biological taxonomy in its brief form, its principles (axioms) may be expressed as follows (Gorskii, 1983). The logical divi sion of the genus into species is carried out on a single basis (the use of features providing for different divi sions is ruled out), it must be exhaustive (the genus is divided into species without any leftover), and it must provide discrete classes (members of divisions must mutually exclude each other) and be continuous (the genusspecies hierarchy must be complete). The sec
ond and third principles are the explications of a more general principle of the excluded middle, making this logical system binary. Simultaneously with the construction of modern science, substantial change began in understanding methods of designing logical systems. It reached its apogee in the second half of the 19thearly 20th cen turies, when both self evidence and the uniqueness of Aristotelian logic were called into question (Berkov and Yaskevich, 2001). Most brilliantly, this was expressed in the mathematization of logic: its design on the basis of set theory replaced the Aristotelian logic of essences (the foundation of Linnaeuss para digm in taxonomy) with the logic of classes (the foun dation of the positivist paradigm in taxonomy) (Shu man, 2001). The development in this direction has created preconditions for forming nonclassical logic, which is currently a rather branched totality of formal systems. They address differently the rules of inference of some true statements from others, and some of them do not include separate Aristotelian axioms (Ivlev, 1992; Shuman, 2001). Clearly, these changes did not pass biological tax onomy by. Lyubishchev (1972) wrote about two logics, deductive and inductive; the opposition of intensional (definition of the taxon by the statement of its fea tures) and extensional (definition of the taxon by the statement of its composition) logics (Meiien and Shreider, 1976); there is a much greater number of log ical systems topical for the purposes of classification (Pavlinov, 2006). Based on the definitions and assumptions developed by them, appropriate formal theories of classification may be designed. Judging by analogy with the development of different variants of the general theory of sets (Fraenkel and Bar Hillel, 1966), it is possible to presume that there might be rather many partial logical classification theories, to an equal extent realizing the general idea of classiol ogy. It can be seen from this that calls for constructing a rational taxonomy on certain generallogical foun dations, without specifying what logic matters, looks rather native. By way of illustration of this general provision, it is enough to provide a simple list of versions of non Aris totelian logical systems that are intensively used in tax onomy. The multivalued logic of Lukasiewicz is opposed to the binary logic recognizing only true and false statements. The most famous version of the former is ternary logic, which permits indefinite state ments inevitably present in any taxonomical designs (Zarenkov, 1988, 1989; Pavlinov, 2007b). Another ver sion is probabilistic logic, related to the calculation of probabilities of taxonomical judgments. It implies two forms of probabilities, statistical (frequency based) and logical, which have different meanings: the former is implemented in statistical methods of classification, and the latter is accounted for in the deduction and estimation of the plausibility of taxonomic (mainly phylogenetic) hypotheses (Siddall and Kluge, 1997;
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Pavlinov, 2005, 2007b). Differences between these log ics are of such order that they allow one to question the applicability of statistical methods in the resolution of taxonomical problems, based on logical probabilities (Fitzhugh, 2006). A nonclassical logic related to the theory of fuzzy sets seems promising (Zade, 1976): it eliminates the condition of discreteness of taxa, while allowing for their partial overlap and generating the so called overlapping classifications (Gordon, 1999). Finally, the one valued logic of N.A. Vasilev (1989) is used in cladistic taxonomy (Pavlinov, 2005). The principle of continuity of the taxonomical hierarchy is one of the crucial tenets in Linnaeuss classification paradigm. It requires putting taxa in order in accordance with a single rank scale, set by fixed taxonomic categories. These ranks are absent in the logical genusspecies scheme; they were intro duced in taxonomy in the 18th century (Kupriyanov, 2005), and they are currently deemed an important part of the Linnaeus paradigm (Simpson, 1961; Ereshefsky, 1997, 2001; Vasileva, 2007). The taxa of each given hierarchic level, forming a class of equiva lence, prove to be comparable in terms of ranks: in some sections of the classical taxonomy, this is consid ered an important and biologically meaningful prop erty of classification (Simpson, 1961; Simpson, 2006). Within the intensional logic, dealing with the content of notions, this principle is established with the rank ing of taxa via ranking features (Starobogatov, 1989; Shatalkin, 1995; Vasileva, 1998, 2007; Vasileva, 1999). The extensional logic, which defines the taxon via its volume, puts the condition of this principles fulfillment as the symmetric division of the taxa at each step of hierarchy (Voronin, 1985). Recently, this principle was severely criticized, and nowadays the idea of so called nonrank classifications is being developed (Ereshefsky, 2001). There are few biological classifications directly and overtly voicing an appeal to purely logical foundations of taxonomy. G.M. Meshcheryakov (1990) proposed one version of a logical classification of the animate world. However, in spite of the intent, he failed to design a pure logic: his approach is not free of the ontological justification of the choice of classifiers features. It is a macroevolutionary model postulating the historic origination of some groups from others at the expense of aromorphous innovations. At the theoretical level, the apogee of epistemolog ical rationalization of universal (general) taxonomy as the general logic is attempts to design it as a more or less formalized axiomatic system. The precondition for this is advances in the application of the axiomatic method in mathematics and formal logic, in particu lar, the demonstration by D. Gilbert of the possibility of algebraic (logical) building of formal geometries (Rybnikov, 1994). For taxonomy, the first large work of this type was the book The Axiomatic Method in Biol ogy, characterized by its author, J. Woodger, as an experiment in the application of methods of exact sci
ences to biology (Woodger, 1937, p. vii); in one of its sections, a certain formalized language of taxonomy is developed. Woodger founds his considerations on the famous book by Whitehead Russell Principia Mathe matica and proceeds from the fact that the formal (abstract) axiomatic system, interpreted in terms of routine language may be termed the theory of natural science, the language of which has been used (Woodger, 1937, p. 5). The problem is that, having a general image of taxonomy as a natural science and possessing axiomatic theory, the rudiments of such a theory should be created. Woodgers consideration of formal properties of the taxonomic hierarchy has become important for biological taxonomy. The proposed division of notions of the taxonomical category as an abstract class of same ranking taxa and of the taxonomical group = taxon as a concrete totality of objects became one of most significant proposals by Woodger; currently, it seems self evident. Of great significance is his formal interpretation of the phylogenetic hierarchy as a D hierarchy (division hierarchy) (Woodger, 1952). It is likened to the hierarchy resulting from the successive division of cells and is defined via relationships between parts of the whole in contrast to the set theory hierarchy, which is defined by the integrity of attributes of the sets subsets. In this interpretation, Hennig accepts the taxonomic hierarchy in his version of the phylogenetic taxonomy. A small book of logic by J.R. Gregg, The Language of Taxonomy, which was devoted to the development of the language of biological taxonomy on the basis of Cantors set theory (Gregg, 1954), was the continua tion of Woodgers line of investigation. His concept is famous for the so called Gregg paradox, meaning the senselessness (within the framework of the adopted assumptions) of the usual biologicaltaxonomic prac tice of singling out monotypic taxa. In Greggs opin ion, these taxa extensionally coincide; hence, all of them save the embracing one are excessive (Gregg, 1954; Needham, 1986). It is clear that this paradox is topical only for Linnaeuss hierarchy with fixed taxo nomic ranks and with the fulfillment of the principle of the hierarchys continuity. To overcome the controversy identified by Gregg, two general approaches have been proposed: one implies preservation of fixed ranks, and the other, the rejection of them (Buck and Hull, 1966; Shatalkin, 1988, 1995; Ereshefsky, 1997, 2001; Mavrodiev, 2002). In the first case, the substantial solution aimed at pres ervation of the fixed ranks and their comparability constitutes the rejection of extensional logic and, as intensional logic requires, taxa ranking via the ranking of features (Simpson, 1961; Shatalkin, 1988, 1995; Lyubarskii, 1991; Simpson, 2006). The formal version of the solution may be considered a set theory version of the logical taxonomy, in which the definition of the taxon as an equivalence class included the specifica tion of its rank (Jardine, 1969). In the second case, the
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rejection of Linnaeuss taxonomical ranks is proposed (Sokal and Sneath, 1963; Hennig, 1966; Meshcherya kov, and 1990), as well as adoption of the above con cept of nonrank classifications (Queiroz and Gauthier, 1992, 1994; Ereshefsky, 1997, 2001). The latter actu ally revives the genusspecies scheme of scholars (without its purely logical understanding), which lacks the Gregg paradox for obvious reasons. The problem of the proportion between the logical and D hierarchies, set by Woodger, is fundamental because, strictly speaking, the statements belong to and be part of relate different logics, and efforts to match them in one approach make the classification procedure inconsistent and intrinsically controversial (Woodger, 1952; Chebanov, 2007). Here, such signifi cant taxonomic issues are touched upon as the sense of the very taxonomic system (classification) as a method of description of organisms diversity; the ontological or logical status of the identified taxa; the relationship between the definition and description (diagnosis) of the taxon as the class or quasi individual; the insignif icance of the similarity of organisms as a condition of their membership in the taxon in its latest sense; etc. (Buck and Hull, 1966; Hull, 1978; Mahner, 1993; Webster, 1993; Mayr and Bock, 2002; Rieppel, 2006a, 2006b). In the general case, the problem may be expressed as a controversy between the status of classi fication as (by definition) an operation with logical classes and the real (objective) status of natural groups as natural bodies localized in space time (Mahner, 1993; Mahner and Bunge, 1997; Oskolskii, 2007; Chebanov, 2007). In agreement with this is the oppo sition of two methods of imposing order on the diver sityclassification and systematizationin a stricter logical sense, not in the traditional sense of Linnaeus (Griffiths, 1974; Kavanaugh, 1978; Wgele, 2005). S.V. Chebanov (2007) thinks that, generally, champi ons of the natural system conception (in any of its interpretations) have not and do not deal with classifi cation; the product of their activity may not be deemed classification in the strict sense of the word. The latter is most evident in the case of taxa in phylo genetic taxonomy, seen as some integral bodies: his torical groups, holons, etc. (Queiroz and Donoghue, 1990; Shatalkin, 1995). Starting from the idea that classification must deal with classes (e.g., natural genera as nomological classes), followers of logical rationalism (Mahner, 1993; Mahner and Bunge, 1997) offer to make a solid distinction between the ontology of taxa as parts of a certain natural system and as objects of classification. In particular, the authors stress the principal ontolog ical difference of a metaphysical bio species and logical species (Mahner, 1993): the former is the species in Nature, seen as the individual or quasi individual; the latter is the species in classification, the class, or the natural genus (see also Shatalkin, 1983; Pavlinov, 2009). Based on this is quite another highly formalized version of the logical taxonomy
described in Foundations of Biophilosophy (Mahner and Bunge, 1997). A specific logical system, mereology by Lesnevsky, allows a different look at the problem. It takes the rela tionship of the whole to its parts, which is quite differ ent in character from the relationship setsubsetele ment, which is traditional for classical taxonomy (Shuman, 2001; Guizzardi, 2005; Chebanov, 2007). This logic has been mentioned by S.V. Meiien and Yu.A. Shreider (1976) in connection with the problem of partitioning the archetype into merons; currently, objects of taxonomy per se (Meiien taxonomy) are rarely considered in this manner (Ereshefsky and Mat then, 2005; Rieppel, 2006a). In the taxonomical con text, sometimes the notion of holon is mentioned, which is meaningfully close to whole (Shatalkin, 1995; Ghiselin, 1995). As it seems, the appeal to the language of mereology allows for a more thorough consideration of the formal controversy between descriptions of orderliness of classes (sets) and their elements in the taxonomical system, on the one hand, and orderliness of integral bodies (quasi individuals) and their parts in nature, on the other hand. It is important to highlight that peculiarities of formaliza tions offered by the logic of set theory and mereology initially depend on prior knowledge at the level of ontology; therefore, the former should not be consid ered without the latter. INSTEAD OF CONCLUSIONS: BIOLOGICAL TAXONOMY AND BIOLOGIC The logical analysis of biological taxonomy as it has been formed historically allows one to identify certain discrepancies that are significant from the viewpoint of the theory of this discipline. Such studies facilitate a clearer understanding of such fundamental issues as the meaning of the taxonomical hierarchy, the status of the taxon and its relationship with subtaxa, and different classifying meanings of similarity and difference. It is very important but hardly sufficient to consider the develop ment of epistemologicalrational foundations of biolog ical taxonomy as a section of a certain general taxonomy as part of the mainstream progress of this discipline. Any partial logical system is solely a tool or totality of rules for defining the logical truth of some state ments relative to others that are a priori accepted as true within the framework of this system. However, logic has nothing to say about the truth of these state ments relative to the surveyed reality (Shuman, 2001). Therefore, the logic may not claim to be the tool of discovery: the process of discovery is not formalizable and may not be subjected to algorithmization; no purely logical mechanisms of obtaining principally new knowledge from knowledge are provided (Ilin, 2003, p. 111). This is one of the major dispatches of post positivist scientific epistemologies, which is ignored by followers of epistemological rationality. Inter alia, each new classification of a certain fragment
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(aspect) of the organisms diversity, claiming some truth in its classical realistic understanding, is no doubt the new knowledge facing the specific empir ical reality. Hence, there may be only an insight into natural classification; it may not be built using a known program The natural classification is not folded in the theory of classifying (Zabrodin, 1989, p. 72); A.K. Timonin (1998) agrees on this point with V.Yu. Zabrodin. All the history of classification research confirmed many times the thesis that natural classifications mark the priority of nature over logic, while artificial classi fications mark the opposite (Subbotin, 2001). The pri ority of nature is first of all expressed in the fact that the grounds of interpreted logical systems, considered in the context of biological taxonomy, are confined to some partial ontology, i.e., are not quite formal. The reason is that foundations of taxonomy are rooted in ontology, not in subjective epistemology (Griffiths, 1974, p. 7; Pavlinov, 2007b, 2010). The fundamental sense of the general concept of ontologicalrational taxonomy lies in the recognition of it. The above examples are the ontological justification of the divi sion of spheres of applicability (interpretation) of Cantors set theory and mereology as the plea for natures priority or, on the contrary, of the integrity of classiology as the plea for logics priority. The problem that requires awareness here is that different ontologies may precondition the specificity of interpreted formal systems that are adequate with them, including logical systems (Berkov and Yaskevich, 2001; Shuman, 2001). That is why the role of logic, the adequacy of logical categories with the structure of the studied reality essentially changes depending on the character of the subject field (Subbotin, 2001, p. 23). It is indicative that M. Beckner ends the analysis of some basic notions of tax onomy with the conclusion that taxonomical catego ries and taxa are par excellence specifically biological concepts These are the concepts whose signifi cance may not be understood outside the context, in which they lay; seemingly, there is no clear sense in applying them in physicalchemical contexts (Beckner, 1959, p. 79). As there is no general logic as the underpinning of general taxonomy, though there are numerous partic ular logics, we face the fundamental problem of the justified choice of concrete logical systems, which are adequate to concrete aspects (fragments) of the classi fied diversity. Evidently, such a choice in any given case requires a special study on substantial (not for mal!) grounds. In this regard, the principle of incom pleteness, one of the key principles in nonclassical sci entific epistemology, deserves special attention. According to it, no partial theory (as a system of notions) may be exhaustively defined by means (notions) of this very theory (Antipenko, 1986; Permi nov, 2001). To define it, a certain meta theory is
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ISSN 2079 0864, Biology Bulletin Reviews, 2011, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 6078. Pleiades Publishing, Ltd., 2011.

Concepts of Rational Taxonomy in Biology

CONCEPTS OF RATIONAL TAXONOMY IN BIOLOGY

CONCEPTS OF RATIONAL TAXONOMY IN BIOLOGY

CONCEPTS OF RATIONAL TAXONOMY IN BIOLOGY

CONCEPTS OF RATIONAL TAXONOMY IN BIOLOGY

CONCEPTS OF RATIONAL TAXONOMY IN BIOLOGY

CONCEPTS OF RATIONAL TAXONOMY IN BIOLOGY

CONCEPTS OF RATIONAL TAXONOMY IN BIOLOGY

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