NEG 1 A government exists for its people.

Its sacred duty is to the protection of its citizens, and it should act only to achieve that end. It is never permissible for a government to act in a way that would hurt the very people it is meaning to protect. Because targeted killing is a counterproductive terrorism tactic and ultimately ends up hurting even more people in the long run, I negate the resolution: RESOLVED: TARGETED KILLING IS A MORALLY PERMISSIBLE FOREIGN POLICY TOOL VALUE MORALITY My value in todays debate as prescribed by the resolution is Morality. The purpose of this debate round is to decide which side creates a world which is more morally correct. VALUE CRITERION PROTECTING LIVES My value of morality will be defined, measured, and upheld by the value criterion of protecting lives. Because you must have life to enjoy any other rights, life is the key to establishing morality. Because governments exist to protect the lives on its constituents, the only constraint on the morality of a government should be whether or not its actions are protecting lives. If I can prove in this debate that targeted killing hurts more lives than it saves, then it must be considered a morally impermissible action and you must vote neg.

Resolved: Targeted killing is a morally permissible foreign policy tool.

NEG 2 CONTENTION I TARGETED KILLING CAUSES IMMEDIATE BACKLASH When targeted killing is used against the charismatic leader of a terrorist group, it provokes a dramatic wave of backlash from the terrorist group in the form of increased attacks. Blum. 20101. An immediate consequence of eliminating leaders of terrorist organizations will sometimes be what may be called the Hydra effect, the rise of moreand more resoluteleaders to replace them. The decapitating of the organization may also invite retaliation by the other members and followers of the organization. Thus, when Israel assassinated Abbas Mussawi, Hezbollahs leader in Lebanon, in 1992, a more charismatic and successful leader, Hassan Nassrallah, succeeded Mussawi. The armed group then avenged the assassination of its former leader in two separate attacks, blowing up Israeli and Jewish targets in Buenos Aires, killing over a hundred people and injuring hundreds more. This backlash immediately harms the protection of lives by increasing the threat from terrorist groups. This immediate effect should be evaluated first because its going to be the first to occur. More empirical data is provided by: Morehouse 20112: Since 2004, there has been a dramatic and steady increase in the number of terrorist attacks carried out in the theater of operations (see Table 12). In fact, according to this studys dataset, there has only been one week during the period under observation in which no terrorist attacks were carried out in the region. The week in question was the week of 2004. The increase in the yearly total of attacks has been dramatic. For example, there were 303 terrorist attacks in 2004, compared to 4,042 attacks in 2009. This means that there was more than a 13-fold increase in the number of terrorist attacks between 2004 and 2009. In addition, the number of fatalities from terrorist attacks has increased alongside with the increases in terrorist attack incidents. For example, there were 561 fatalities from terrorist attacks in 2004, whilst by 2009 this figure reached a total of 5,449. This represents an almost 10-fold increase in the number of fatalities from terrorist attacks in theater from 2004 to 2009. Furthermore, taking into account that there was only one week since 2004 in which there was no terrorist attack carried out,
it becomes apparent that the terrorists conduct their operations year-round, and therefore are not necessarily hindered by changes in seasonal weather conditions. In addition, it is interesting to note that the terrorists were consistently willing to carry out attacks during Ramadan during the 2004-2009 period (see Table 13). There were terrorist attacks carried out during every single week of Ramadan during the period under observation. Hence, it becomes apparent that the terrorists are still very much active in the region. Furthermore, it appears that the terrorists are unconcerned with drawing the ire of their fellow Muslims for conducting attacks during the month of Ramadan.

Furthermore,
The first regression ran measured the influence of targeted killings (lagged by one week) upon the number of terrorist attacks (in the week following the targeted killing)(See Tables 14-16). The variables for Ramadan, US president, and season were added as controls in the regression. The R-square value of the model was .464, meaning that 46.4% of the variation in the number of terrorist attacks per week is explained by the variables

it was found that for every one-unit increase in targeted killings per week, there was an increase of over 5 terrorist attacks in the following week. This result was statistically significant,
entered into this model. The B coefficients for this regression found several interesting results. For the lagged targeted killing variable, with the p-value being .000. However, the scatter plot for this model shows that there is an outlier, which was the 51st week of 2009, in which 11 targeted killings occurred. In regards to the seasonal variable, it appears that the further into the year the season under observation is, there are approximately 3 less targeted killings per week. This variable is statistically significant, with the p-value being .003. The results for the Ramadan were statistically insignificant, with the p-value equaling .586. Finally, the presidential variable suggests that, under the Obama administration, it was likely that there would be an increase of 43 terrorist attacks per week compared to the Bush administration. This variable was statistically significant, with the p-value being .000. A second regression was run, in which the sole change from the previous model was in the dependent variable. In this model, the number of fatalities in terrorist attacks served as the dependent variable (See Tables 1719). In this case, the R-square for the model was .326, meaning that 32.6% of the variation of the dependent variable was explained by changes in the independent variables under observation. Several interesting

for every one-unit increase in targeted killings in a week resulted in approximately 8 more fatalities from terrorist attacks in the following week. This variable was statistically significant, with a p-value of .000. However, as
observations can be made from these data. For example, the lagged targeted killing model found that in the previous model, the incident in which there were 11 targeted killings in the 51st week of 2009 serves as an outlier once more. Again, the seasonal variable was statistically significant, with every increase in the season of the year correlating with a decrease of approximately 3 fatalities in terrorist attacks per week. This variable was statistically significant, with a p-value of .044. The Ramadan variable was again statistically insignificant, with a p-value of .122. The presidential variable found that, under the Obama administration, there was likely to be approximately 58 more fatalities from terrorist attacks per week, than under the Bush administration. This variable was statistically significant, with a p-value of .000

Blum, Gabriella [Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School], Philip Heymann [James Barr Ames Professor of Law, Harvard Law School]. Law and Policy of Targeted Killing. Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 1. June 27, 2010.

Morehouse, Matthew [University of Nebraska]. Hellfire and Grey Drones: An Empirical Examination of the Effectiveness of Targeted Killing. Political Science, Department of Political Science Department . Theses, Dissertations, and Student Scholarship. 2011. http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=poliscitheses&sei-redir=1#search=%22moorehouse%20dave%20targeted%20killing%22

Resolved: Targeted killing is a morally permissible foreign policy tool.

NEG 3 CONTENTION II TARGETED KILLING REDUCES DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS Blum 20103. The political message flowing from the use of targeted killings may be harmful to the attacking countrys interest, as it emphasizes the disparity in power between the parties and reinforces popular support for the terrorists, who are seen as a David fighting Goliath. Moreover, by resorting to military force rather than to law enforcement, targeted killings might strengthen the sense of legitimacy of terrorist operations, which are sometimes viewed as the only viable option for the weak to fight against a powerful empire. If collateral damage to civilians accompanies targeted killings, this, too, may bolster support for what seems like the just cause of the terrorists, at the same time as it weakens domestic support for fighting the terrorists. CONTENTION III DECAPITATION INCREASES TERRORIST LONGEVITY Eliminating the leadership of a terrorist organization is an ineffective way to combat terrorism. Jordan 094 tells us that decapitation actually causes terrorist groups to survive for a longer time:
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of decapitation, it is essential to understand the sources of organizational decline. Martha Crenshaw proposes three possible explanations for the decline of terrorist organizations:

the removal of leaders from positions of power does not always cause the defeat of a terrorist organization. Destroying its organizational structure, causing large-scale
physical defeat of the extremist organization by the government, the groups decision to abandon the terrorist strategy, and organizational disintegration. Crenshaw argues that attrition, or blocking recruitment are also largely ineffective counterterrorism measures. She argues that, decisive defeats are rare in the absence of other contributing factors, such as organizational disintegration. Furthermore, groups can experience disunity and disagreements over strategy. Power struggles can also reduce group cohesiveness. Crenshaw suggests that terrorist organizations may experience cycles of strength and weakness. Audrey Kurth Cronin also examines the decline and demise of terrorist organizations. She examines seven broad explanations for decline in order to evaluate U.S. counterterrorism policies toward al Qaeda: decapitation, failure to transition to the next generation, achievement of group goals, transition to legitimate political process, undermining of popular support, repression, and transition from terrorism to other forms of

I find that overall organizations decline at a higher rate absent decapitation. Decapitation was successful in 17 percent of the 298 cases. However, in order to understand the significance of this success rate and to assess fully the effectiveness of decapitation it is necessary to establish a baseline rate of decline for groups that did not have their leaders targeted. Thus, I looked at the patterns of decline for groups that did not undergo decapitation. Utilizing terrorist group (as opposed to incident of decapitation) as the unit of analysis, 53 percent of decapitated terrorist groups fell apart, while 70 percent of groups that have not experienced decapitation are no longer active. The rate of decline is almost 20 percent less for decapitated organizations. However, in order to understand when decapitation is likely to be effective and to identify the conditions
violence. Her study illustrates the need for understanding sources of organizational decline in formulating counterterrorism policies. of organizational decline, I will look at the marginal utility of decapitation for different values of the independent variables. It is thus necessary to look at differences in the rate of decline for groups that have and have not had their leaders removed. The previous section evaluated the effect of key variables on individual incidents of decapitation, thus identifying the tactical consequences of targeting certain types of organizations. This section looks at terrorist organizations more broadly in order to determine the marginal effect that decapitation has over an organizations otherwise expected lifespan. This data can provide important information regarding which organizations states should and should not try to target. I consider the effect that an organizations size, age, and type have upon its lifespan and whether decapitation changes this rate of collapse. The

decapitation is not a productive counterterrorism strategy. It is actually less effective than not targeting a groups leadership. While decapitation is still successful against certain types of groups, in many cases, organizations that have not had their leaders removed have a higher rate of collapse. Decapitation is actually counterproductive against large, old, and religious groups.
data in this section shows that

Because decapitation allows terrorist groups to last longer, giving them time to inflict more harm upon more people, the targeted killing of terrorist leaders in the long run actually endangers more lives. The only way to prevent perpetual warfare with terrorists is to refrain from using targeted killing. CONTENTION IV Targeted Killings Harm Critical Intelligence Gathering Ability. Blum 20105 The threat of being targeted will drive current leaders into hiding, making the monitoring of their movements and activities by the counterterrorist forces more difficult. Moreover, if these leaders are found and killed, instead of captured, the counterterrorism forces lose the ability to interrogate them to obtain potentially valuable information about plans, capabilities, or organizational structure.
Targeted killing may also interfere with important gathering of critical intelligence.

Blum, Gabriella [Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School], Philip Heymann [James Barr Ames Professor of Law, Harvard Law School]. Law and Policy of Targeted Killing. Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 1. June 27, 2010.

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Jenna Jordan [PhD Political Science Candidate at the University of Chicago.]. When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation. Security Studies. 2009. http://cpost.uchicago.edu/pdf/Jordan.pdf Blum, Gabriella [Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School], Philip Heymann [James Barr Ames Professor of Law, Harvard Law School]. Law and Policy of Targeted Killing. Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 1. June 27, 2010.

Resolved: Targeted killing is a morally permissible foreign policy tool.

NEG 4 CONTENTION I IF WE FAIL TO USE SUCCEED IN COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS, THE CONSEQUENCE IS THE DEATH OF BILLIONS SUBPOINT A TERRORISTS ARE LIKELY TO USE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION WITHIN THE NEXT FEW YEARS Bohon 20106:
The official report from a blue-ribbon panel warns that terrorists with weapons of massive destruction (WMD) are likely to attack somewhere in the world in the next three years, and the United States could be a prime target.

According to the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, the likelihood is high that by 2013 terrorists will use WMDs in an attack somewhere in the world, and while several nations with terrorist ties are now in a race to produce nuclear weapons, the commissions report says that an attack using biological weapons is the more
likely scenario, with potentially devastating consequences. Among its recommendations, the commission said it believes that the U.S. government needs to move more aggressively to limit the proliferation of biological weapons and reduce the prospect of a bio-terror attack. The commission, co-chaired by former U.S. Senators Bob Graham (D-Fla.) and Jim Talent (R-Mo.), originally reported its findings in December 2008. During a June 10 press conference to announce legislation aimed at addressing dangers from terrorism, members of the commission joined with members of the House Homeland Security Committee to address the commissions findings.

The consequences of such a[n] biological attack are almost beyond comprehension, said former Senator Graham. It would be 9/11 times ten or a hundred in terms of the number of people who would be killed. Noting the millions of Americans who died as a result of the epidemic flu virus of 1918, Graham predicted that a lab-generated
biological agent in the hands of terrorists could prove far worse. Today it is still in the laboratory, he said, but if it should get out and into the hands of scientists who knew how to use it for a violent purpose, we could have

[at least]multiple times the 40 million people [would be] who were killed 100 years ago. In December 2008, at the same time the commission presented its findings, former Director
of National Intelligence Mike McConnell offered a similar assessment of the likelihood of a biological attack, telling a Harvard University audience, With weapons of mass destruction that could result in the death of many people chemical, biological, nuclear we assess biological as the more likely, adding that its better than an even chance in the next five years that an attack by one of those weapons systems will be conducted in some place on the globe. While emphasizing the likely scenario of a biological attack, the commission also warned of the danger that exists of nuclear attacks, and cited efforts by both Iran and North Korea to produce a nuclear weapon. It also cited the specific danger that Pakistan poses to the United States, warning that while the country is officially an ally of the United States, the next terrorist attack against the United States is likely to originate from within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, which has been identified as a haven for terrorists. Were one to map terrorism and weapons of mass destruction today, all roads would intersect in Pakistan, the report stated. Said Graham, We think time is not our ally, warning that the United States needs to move with a sense of urgency.

SUBPOINT B AN ATTACK WITH A WMD WOULD PROVOKE NUCLEAR RETALIATION, LEADING TO GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR Speice 20067: A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. (49) Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. (50) In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and
The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. (51) This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States or its allies by hostile states, (52) as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. (53)

If we fail to reduce terrorism in time, these effects will be felt by every person in the world. If terrorists are allowed to obtain and use weapons of mass destruction, the results will be disastrous. Over 40 million people would die in the initial attack. The ensuing nuclear exchange would destroy entire countries and resultant radiation would make growing crops and raising livestock impossible. The vast majority of the human race, 7 billion individuals, would be killed. Because targeted killing encourages, perpetuates, and increases terrorism while decreasing our ability to fight it, it is leading directly towards the terrible use of WMD. As such, the use of targeted killing is a direct threat to not only the citizens of the attacking state, but also to all other people on the planet.

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Dave Bohon, Government Panel Predicts WMD Attack by 2013, New American, 6/ 15/2010, http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/usnews/politics/3788-government-panel-predicts-wmd-attack-by-2013

Patrick F. Speice Jr. "Negligence and nuclear nonproliferation: eliminating the current liability barrier to bilateral U.S.-Russian nonproliferation assistance programs." William and Mary Law Review 47.4 (Feb 2006): 1427(59). Expanded Academic ASAP

Resolved: Targeted killing is a morally permissible foreign policy tool.