The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping Author(s): Marrack Goulding Reviewed work(s): Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute

of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 69, No. 3 (Jul., 1993), pp. 451-464 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2622309 . Accessed: 17/04/2012 07:20
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of The evolution United Nations peacekeeping

MARRACK

GOULDING

Thefollowing an edited is textof theCyrilFoster*lecture delivered Marrack by at on Goulding theExamination Schools,OxfordUniversity, 4 March 1993. The textrepresents MarrackGoulding's viewsonly,and in no way commits United the Nationsor its Secretary-General. Goulding Mr ceasedto be Under-Secretaryon overthepost Generalfor Peace-keeping Operations 1 March 1993 before taking The lecture a personal was PoliticalAffairs. of Under-Secretary-Generalfor statement. valedictory The title,'The evolutionof peacekeeping',was chosenabout a yearago. At the time, it seemed to make sense; with the phasing out of the Cold War, the United Nations had been given new opportunities help controland resolve to As new tasksand new methodshad evolved fromwhat had conflicts. a result, previously been a fairly homogeneous activity. The biological metaphor seemed an accurateway of describingwhat was going on. However, the word evolution implies a comparativelyleisurelyprocess in which,by trialand error,organisms develop more efficient ways of responding to a changingenvironment. yearlater,themetaphorseemslessapt. I992 saw A an almost five-fold increasein United Nations peacekeepingactivity;we had some II,OOO militaryand police personneldeployed at the beginning of the year; by its end the total was over 52,000. Today 'the forceddevelopmentof peacekeeping' mightbe a bettertitle. I propose first analyse what peacekeeping had become by the time the to Cold War ended; thento classify different the to types(I would have referred 'species' if the evolution metaphor was still appropriate) of peacekeeping operationswhich are currently deployed or being planned; thento discussthe it current trendfrompeacekeepingto peace-enforcement the implications and has for the United Nations ability to develop into an effective system of to collectivesecurity;and finally draw some briefconclusionsabout theheavy
* CyrilFoster was a retired confectioner who, in I956, left estate OxfordUniversity his to withthe

thatit be usedto enable'a prominent sincere request and speaker'to deliver once a yeara lecture on theelimination war and thebetter of understanding thenations theworld. of of

International Affairs 3(I993) 69,

45I-464

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MarrackGoulding responsibilities which bear upon the Secretary-Generaland the Security Council.

What is peacekeeping?
Peacekeeping is a techniquewhich has been developed, mainlyby the United Nations, to help control and resolve armed conflicts.There is no agreed of definition it nor even agreementon when the first peacekeepingoperation Alan James,in a carefully was set up. Professor researched work publishedin iggol, traces its origins back to the delimitationcommissions which were in established theearly1920S to redrawa numberofEuropean frontiers after the FirstWorld War. The official view in the United Nations is that the United Nations Truce United Nationspeacekeeping SupervisionOrganization(UNTSO) was thefirst operation. It consisted of unarmed military observers who were sent to Palestinein June I948 to supervizea trucenegotiatedby Count Bernadottein the firstwar between Israel and its Arab neighbours.It stayed on when, a month later,the SecurityCouncil, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 'ordered' a ceasefire.A similar group was deployed a few months later in Kashmir.A major stepforward was takenwhen thefirst armedUnited Nations force- theUnited Nations EmergencyForce (UNEF)-was deployedin Egypt following the Anglo-French-Israeli attackon that countryin October I956. The key role played by UNTSO in the difficult the task of implementing of Arab-IsraeliArmistice Agreements I949 and UNEF's successin defusing the Suez crisis to further led demandsforthe Organization'speacekeepingservices. The golden age dare I say the firstgolden age?-of United Nations peacekeepingwas from I956 to I974, though therewas a hiatusfor six years afterthe disaster thatbefellUNEF in I967. Those I8 yearsgave birthto I0 of the I3 peacekeeping operationsestablishedbefore the revival of demand for peacekeepingin the late I980s. On thewhole theysucceededwell in helpingto controlregionalconflicts, especiallyin the Near East, at a time when the Cold War made it difficult the Security for action to resolve Council to takeeffective them. The Congo operation (I960-64) deserves special mention. It is often but in factit succeeded in its objectives,albeit at a very describedas a failure, high cost,includingthe lifeof Dag Hammarskjbldand a major constitutionalcrisisat the United Nations. It is interesting the contemporary in cum-financial context for three reasons. First, it was deployed in a country where the institutionsof state were collapsing-the firstcase of what the Foreign Secretaryrecentlycalled 'painting a countryblue'. Second, it was the first civilianelements.Third, it peacekeepingoperationto include very substantial was initiallydeployed as a peacekeepingoperation; but when it became clear
1

Institute for in for politics AlanJames, Peacekeeping international (London: Macmillan International I990). Strategic Studies,

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The evolution United of Nationspeacekeeping thatthe peacekeepingmode would not enable it to achieve its objectives,the SecurityCouncil authorizedit to use force on a considerablescale to end the secessionof Katanga-the first, and until Somalia the only, case of a transition frompeacekeepingto peace-enforcement. The Near East war of October I973 gave rise to two other remarkable achievements: interposition thesecond United Nations EmergencyForce the of between the Egyptian and Israeli armies in an exceedingly dangerous and complicated militarysituation;and, eight monthslater,the deploymentof a United Nations force (UNDOF) to control an agreed buffer zone between Israeli and Syrian forces on the Golan Heights in Syria. That force is still there-unpublicized because it does itsjob so well. Afterthose two successes,the line went almost dead until in I988 the new readinessof the United Statesand the Soviet Union to work togetherrevived for and opportunities resolvingregionalconflicts createda reneweddemand for peacekeeping. During the intervening I4 years, only one new operation was set up-UNIFIL in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL also is interestingin the contemporarycontext. It is an operation about whose viability the then and had doubts.It was nevertheless Secretary-General his senioradvisers pushed through the SecurityCouncil by the United States for pressing,if passing, which were political reasons: PresidentCarter was launchingthe negotiations to lead to the Camp David Accords and did not want thatprocessderailedby the Israeliinvasion of Lebanon which had just taken place. UNIFIL has not been able to carry out its mandate because it has never enjoyed the necessarycooperation from all the parties concerned. But its presence has brought succour to the people of southern Lebanon and its It withdrawalwould certainly lead to an intensification hostilities. has thus of become a quasi-permanent fixture. illustrates It how much easierit is to get into -apeacekeepingoperationthanto get out of it-and the need therefore the for Council to satisfy itself thatconditions existforsuccessful Security peacekeeping beforetakingthe decision to set up a new operation. The I 3 operationsestablished duringthe Cold War (of which fiveremainin existence)fostered gradualevolutionof a body of principles, the proceduresand practices for peacekeeping. Few of them were formally enacted by the a legislativeorgans of the United Nations. But theycame to constitute corpus of case law or customarypractice which was by and large accepted by all concerned,though untilthe mid-ig8os Moscow continuedfromtime to time to grumbleabout peacekeeping'slack of legitimacy because it was not explicitly provided for in the Charter. The established principlesof peacekeepingcan be summarized under five headings. First,peacekeeping operationswere UnitedNationsoperations.Their United Nationsnessderivedfromvarious factors:theywere established one of the by legislativeorgansof the United Nations (unlikethe enforcement operationsin
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MarrackGoulding Korea or (subsequently) Kuwait and Somalia where the Security Council's role has been only to authorizecertainmember statesto undertakemilitary action for a specificpurpose); they were under the command and control of the Secretary-General, who acted with authority delegatedto him by the Security Council and reported regularlyto the Council; and their costs were met collectivelyby the member states as 'expenses of the Organization' under Article I7 of the Charter-a principle which was establishedwith much difficulty during the I96os. It was this United Nationsnesswhich had made United Nations peacekeeping operations acceptable to member states who would not otherwise have acceptedforeign troopson theirterritory. Suspicions that peacekeepers were acting as instruments their governments'policy, of rather thanof the collectivewill of theinternational community, could be fatal forthe credibility an operation.It had been learntthehard way thatit could of also-literally-be fatalfor the peacekeepersthemselves. Second, it had become establishedover time that peacekeeping operations in could be set up only with the consent theparties theconflict question. It of to had also been learntthattheycould succeed only with the continuingconsent and cooperationof thoseparties.This had turnedout to be both a strength and a weakness. in It was a strength that,fortheparties, made peacekeepinglessthreatening it and more acceptable.For the troop-contributing countries, reducedto a very it low level the risk of combat casualties. It was supposed also, in theory,to improve the chances of success; the partieswould have agreed in advance to what the peacekeeperswere going to do. In practice,the consentprinciplehad sometimesturnedout to be more of a weakness than a strength.Consent once given could later be withdrawn. President Nasser'swithdrawalof Egypt's consentto thepresenceof UNEF I on in Egyptian territory May I967 had been the classic example. It tragically illustrated perennialtruththatif one of the partiestakesthe decisionto go the to war thereis very littlethat peacekeeperscan do to preventwar. In other cases, cooperation promised was later reduced or withheld. This could be for especiallydifficult the peacekeeperswhen theyfound that they,not those who had brokentheirpromises, were blamed fortheresulting human suffering and/or humiliationof the United Nations. Third, it had been established that the peacekeepers must be impartial between parties. the of They were not thereto advance the interests one party againstthose of the other.It was not like Korea where the United Statesand itsallieshad been authorizedby the Security Council to use forceagainstNorth Korea forthe benefit South Korea. This principleof impartiality arose from of the fact that peacekeeping operations were interimarrangements up, as set UNEF had been, withoutprejudice to the claims and positionsof the parties. Of course, the peacekeepers had to criticize, use pressure, mobilize international support,even in certaincircumstances take more forceful action when a partyviolated agreed arrangements. But, beyond that,theycould not take sides. Otherwise they themselveswould violate the termson which the 454

The evolution United of Nationspeacekeeping operation had been accepted by the parties. This requirementfor absolute impartiality sometimesobliged peacekeepersto maintainnormalrelations with a party whose behaviour was being censured by most of the international communityand thusexposed themto the chargeof condoningthatbehaviour. The fourth principle related to the troopsrequired for United Nations peacekeeping operations.It was recognizedthatit would not be practicablefor the United Nations to maintaina standingarmy. National armies and police forces could be theonly sourcefortheuniformed personneltheUnited Nations required. The Charter provided for member states to enter into binding agreements with the Security Council under which they would commit themselves provide it with troops. There had been no agreementbetween to the major powers on the conclusion of such agreementsfor peacekeeping operations-or indeed for peace enforcement. Successive Secretaries-General had perforce,therefore, rely on member statesto provide the necessary to personneland equipment on a voluntarybasis. Member stateshad responded readilyto the call. The fifth concernedtheuseofforce. principle More thanhalftheorganization's peacekeeping operationsbefore I988 had consistedonly of unarmed military observers.But when operations were armed, it had become an established and principlethattheyshould use forceonly to the minimumextentnecessary thatnormallyfireshould be opened only in self-defence. in had been deemed to include situations However, since I973 self-defence which peacekeeperswere being preventedby armed persons from fulfilling their mandate. This was a wide definitionof 'self-defence'. In practice commandersin the fieldhad only veryrarelytakenadvantageof the authority to open fireon, forinstance, soldiersat a roadblock who were denyingpassage to a United Nations convoy. This reluctancewas based on sound calculations related to impartiality, theirreliance on the continued cooperation of the to partiesand to the fact that theirforce'slevel of armamentwas based on the assumption that the parties would comply with their commitments.The peacekeeperscould perhaps win the firefight that firstroadblock. But, in at lands of the vendetta,mighttheynot findthemselves out-gunnedin the third or fourthencounter? On the basis of theseprinciplesestablishedduring the first four decades of a definition peacekeepingcould perhapsread of United Nations peacekeeping, as follows: of Field operations established the UnitedNations,withthe consent the parties by and under to helpcontrol resolve conflicts between UnitedNations concerned, them, and with commandand control, the expensecollectively the memberstates, of at and equipment and otherpersonnel military providedvoluntarily them,acting by between parties usingforce theminimum and the to extent impartially necessary.

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Six typesof peacekeeping operation

The revival of peacekeepingsince I988 has officially seen the establishment of I3 new operationsso far.My personalcount is i6. One of the I3, the United Nations ProtectionForce (UNPROFOR) in theformer Yugoslavia, thelargest operationyet fielded,is in facta conglomerateof threeseparateoperations.I would also add the electoral mission in Haiti in I990. At the request of the Haitian authorities, was not called a peacekeeping operation, nor was it it numbersof military established financedas such, but it included substantial or and police personneland operatedin accordancewith peacekeepingprinciples. During thesehecticfiveyearsof forceddevelopment,the Secretary-General and his staff have applied the established principles, proceduresand practicesof peacekeeping.On the whole theyhave stood the testwell and have been able to accommodate a much wider range of activitiesthan-with one or two exceptions-peacekeepers had undertakenduringthe Cold War years. Peacekeeping operationshad previouslybeen largely militaryin task and composition.Their principaltask was to help the partiesstop fighting and to preventany resumption hostilities, of in thushelpingto createconditions which the peacemakerscould negotiatea lastingsettlement. Apart fromthe Congo, the only major exception to this model was the operation in West Irian in I962-3, whose task was to help implementa settlement alreadynegotiated. Since I988 this emphasis on the militaryhas changed and peacekeeping civilianelements.This is mainly operationsfrequently now containsubstantial because the United Nations is more ofteninvolved in internal conflicts thanin inter-state ones. As it had alreadylearnedin the Congo, theseare messyaffairs in which successis hard to achieve and more than military skillsare required. Helping to end a civil war is likely to involve a thirdpartyin a whole range of civilianactivities which are less oftenrequiredin theinterstate context.Such settlements almostalways, forinstance, include some electoralact which needs to be impartiallymonitored. In some cases reformor replacementof state institutions can also be a part of the settlement. Even in interstate conflicts, experiencehas shown thatthereis a greaterrole forcivilianpeacekeepersthan had been apparentin earlieryears. Before I988, peacekeepinghad been regarded,not entirely accurately,as a rather homogeneous activity.It is now possibleto identify leastsix different at types of peacekeeping. This taxonomy is based on the functions the from the taxonomy in Professor peacekeepersperformand is thus different in James'sbook which is based more on analysisof the political circumstances which each operationwas set up. of Type One is the preventive deployment United Nations troops before a conflicthas actually begun, at the request of one of the parties and on its territory only. The troops' functionis partly early warning but mainly to increasethe politicalprice thatwould be paid by the potentialaggressor.This idea, which came originallyfrom Mikhail Gorbachev, was adopted by the 456

The evolution United of Nationspeacekeeping presentSecretary-General his reportAn agendafor in peace. It is currently being applied for the first time in Macedonia. The is Type Two is traditional peacekeeping. function to supportpeacemaking efforts helping to create conditions in which political negotiation can by proceed. It involves monitoringceasefires, controlling buffer zones, and so on. These are supposedto be interim arrangements theycan lastfora verylong but time if the peacemaking efforts are slow to succeed: UNTSO has been deployed in the Near East foralmost45 yearsand UNFICYP in Cyprus for29 years. Slow progressin peacemaking does not necessarilycreate a case for ending the peacekeeping; a long-standing peacekeeping operation may sometimesbe the least bad option available to the international communityif renewed war is to be avoided. There are threesub-types:unarmedmilitary in observergroupsas currently the Near East, Kashmir and Western Sahara; armed infantry-based forces which are deployed in cases where the taskis to controlterritory, in Cyprus, as Syria, southernLebanon (in theoryonly, alas) and Croatia; and operations, armed or unarmed,which are established an adjunctof, or sequel to, a peace as enforcement operation,as on the Iraq-Kuwait border. This thirdsub-typeis arguablya typein its own rightbecause, being deployed underChapter VII of the Charter,it does not formally requirethe consentof the partiesconcerned; in practice,though,it cannot succeed without theircooperation. Type Three consists of operations set up to support implementation a of settlement which has alreadybeen agreed by the parties.This has comprehensive been the area of most rapid growth since I988, largelybecause the end of the Cold War and the new effectiveness the SecurityCouncil have made it of of possible to negotiatepartial or comprehensivesettlements several regional conflicts. the case of comprehensive In the settlements, peacekeepershave had to undertake a wide range of functionsold and new. These can include: monitoring ceasefires,the cantonment and demobilization of troops, the destruction weapons and the formationand trainingof new armed forces; of monitoring existingpolice forcesand forming new ones; supervizing, even or in Cambodia controlling, for existing administrations; verifying respect human rights; observing, supervizing or even conducting elections; undertaking information it the campaignsto explain the settlement, opportunities offers the people concernedand the role of the United Nations. The paradigm is the very successful operationin Namibia in i989-90. The United Nations is currentlyconducting similar operations in El Salvador, Angola, Cambodia, and Mozambique. It will do so in WesternSahara also, if conditionscan be agreed for holding the planned referendum. There is one respectin which therehas been some difficulty applyingto in thesetypeThree operationsthe principles established before I988. It relatesto theprincipleof impartiality. I have said, thatprinciple As fromthe fact resulted thatpeacekeepingwas an interimactivityestablished withoutprejudiceto the 457
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MarrackGoulding claims and positionsof the parties,which would, it was hoped, be resolved througha processof politicalnegotiation. Type Three operations, however,are the negotiatingprocess has been completed. The claims and deployed after positionsof theparties will have been reconciledin a comprehensive settlement one agreedbetweenthem.Suppose thatthereafter of thepartiesfailsto comply fullywith its obligationsunderthe agreed settlement. Can the United Nations remainimpartialbetween thatpartyand the other? Should it not take action against offending the partyto persuadeor compel it to honouritscommitments? Perhapsso. But ifit takesthatcourse and allows itself become the perceived to adversary of the offendingparty, does it not risk forfeiting that party's cooperation,on which the successof the whole enterprise may well depend? Fortunately-or perhapsunfortunately-thedilemma is veryrarelyas stark as I have just describedit. The normalpattern thatall partiesfail,to a greater is lesserextent,to comply perfectly or with the agreement theyhave signed.The United Nations therefore to chastiseeveryoneto some extent.But even if has one partywas wholly virtuous,the United Nations would stillhave to think beforemakingtheotherpartyitsenemy.Formallyspeaking,that verycarefully mightbe a justifiable course.But it would not be the rightcourseif,as a result, it became more difficult achieve the overall objective of implementing to the agreed settlement. Non-confrontational persuasionmight offer betterresults. Such dilemmas cannot be resolved through formal interpretation the of mandate. They require carefully judged political decisions-by the Chief of Mission on the ground and the Secretary-General and, sometimes,by the SecurityCouncil itself. Type Four (a new one) consists of operations to protectthe deliveryof humanitarian relief suppliesin conditionsof continuingwarfare.This has been triedin recentmonthsin Somalia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Somalia it failed. This was not, as is often alleged, because of inadequate rules of engagement. It was mainly because of the absence of recognized political authorities with whom theUnited Nations could reliablyconclude agreements for the deployment and activities of the peacekeepers, and because the to unrecognizedpretenders power who controlleddifferent parts of Somalia were not willing or, in some cases,able to provide the cooperationneeded for the United Nations to succeed. When the Secretary-General recognizedthatpeacekeepingwas not going to work in Somalia, he recommendedto the SecurityCouncil thatmore forceful methodsbe employed. The Council thenauthorizedvarious states, by the led United States, to field what was called the Unified Task Force. This was supposed to establisha secure environmentfor humanitarianoperationsand thenhand over to a United Nations peacekeepingforce.It subsequently became clear that the Unified Task Force would not succeed in establishing secure a of environment the kind envisagedby the SecurityCouncil and thata degree of compulsionwould continueto be required.The Secretary-General therefore recommendedto the SecurityCouncil that it set up a new United Nations 458

The evolution United of Nationspeacekeeping force,under Chapter VII of the Charter,with the mandate and armament necessaryto enforce secure conditionsfor humanitarian operations. In Bosnia and Herzegovina United Nations peacekeepershave had more operations. successthanis generallyacknowledged in protecting humanitarian But theretoo local warlordshave denied themaccessto manyareasof need and have continuously harassed and obstructed their efforts.Their rules of but forreasons engagementpermitthem to use forceagainstsuch obstruction already explained their commanders have judged that 'fighting the aid through' is not a practicableproposition. A feature common to Somalia and Bosnia is the difficulty making of peacekeeping work vis-a-visarmed groups outside the control of recognized with whom the United Nations can conclude thenecessary politicalauthorities This problem will grow as the organization politicaland practicalagreements. becomes involved more frequently internal in conflicts. is one of theimpulses It in pushingit strongly the directionof a greaterreadinessto use force. Type Five is arguablynot peacekeeping at all because it is likely to involve It enforcement. will also involve peacemaking (that is the fashioningof a has political settlement) and what the Secretary-General called post-conflict where peacebuilding.This is thedeployment a United of Nationsforce a country in theinstitutionsstate lawlessness abound, the of have largely collapsed, anarchyand breakup of the countrymay be imminentand some externalagency is needed to put it togetheragain. It is Foreign Secretary Hurd's scenarioof 'painting a countryblue'. It requires an integratedprogramme including humanitarian relief,a ceasefire,demobilization of troops, a political process of national reconciliation, the rebuilding of political and administrativestructures, economic rehabilitation and so on. As alreadymentionedthe United Nations undertookthis task successfully the Congo in the I960s. The new United in in in Somalia will have the same taskand, like itspredecessor the Nations force Congo, is likely to have to use forceto achieve it. Type Six is, again, not really peacekeeping but I include it because it is currentlyunder active discussion in the Bosnian context and because it illustrates extentto which, in the public and the politicalmind at any rate, the peacekeeping's evolution is taking it across the threshold into peacea enforcement. can be called ceasefire It enforcement is essentially forceful and as variantof the traditional peacekeepingwhich I have classified Type Two. A had been reached United Nations forcewould be deployed,after agreement an between the parties, with the authority and armamentto use forceagainstany The arrangements. partywhich violated the ceasefire otheragreed military or mandate would be analogous to peacekeepingin thatthe partieswould agree in to the initialdeploymentof the force and the force would act impartially the But it would differ frompeacekeepingin enforcing agreed arrangements. for thatthe forcecould open firein situations otherthanself-defence, example to silence guns thatpersisted violatingthe ceasefire. in 459

MarrackGoulding This is a concept which is currently under discussionin the context of the Vance-Owen plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina where it would formpart of the implementation a wider settlement. is assumed thateven though the of It leaders of the three factionswould have accepted the plan, various of their partisans might(to put it generously) turna blind eye to instructions comply to with it. In such circumstances forcewould have to be used if the plan was not to suffer fate of the dozens of other agreementsconcluded between the the various combatantsin the formerYugoslavia.

From peacekeeping to peace-enforcement:desirable,practicable?

During the lastfiveyearsthe established principles, proceduresand practices of peacekeepinghave, as I have said,stood up remarkably well to an unprecedented increasein the demand for United Nations peacekeeping services. In spiteof thebudgetarydifficulties createdformemberstates thesize and by of unpredictability demands for peacekeeping funds,and in spite of the fact that certain large member states owe several hundred million dollars for previousyears'assessments, flow of fundshas been sufficient, to enable the just, the Secretary-General carry out the tasks given to him by the Security to Council. The costs of peacekeeping increased five-foldduring I992, to an annual rate of about $2.8 billion. But the increasein unpaid dues that year, expressedas a percentageof the increasein peacekeepingcostsduringthe year, was only 28 per cent, much less than the 74 per cent which was the corresponding figure in I99I. This shows that, contrary to the general perception,member stateshave respondedwell to the increaseddemands for peacekeepingfinance.The backlog of arrears, currently some $670 million,is nevertheless major complicationwhich impactsdirectly the organization's a on abilityto reimburse the troop-contributing to the countries sums due to them. The increasein activityhas nevertheless in highlighted some shortcomings existing arrangements. By common consent, the departments concerned at United Nations Headquartersin New York need to be strengthened theyare if to have the planning and command and control capability to support operationson the scale currently deployed. Financial and logistic procedures need to be streamlined.There needs to be a working capital fund for peacekeepingand a reserve stockof basic peacekeepingequipmentto enable the to Secretary-General respondmore quicklywhen the SecurityCouncil decides to establish new peacekeepingoperations. Presentarrangements which a few by memberstates committhemselves have troopson stand-by servewith the to to United Nations at specified termsof notice need to be refined and extendedto many more countries.The United Nations needs to do more to help member statestraintheirpersonnelfor peacekeepingserviceand perhapsto undertake more trainingitself. Much work is in hand in New York on all theseissues, spiteof thecrushing in of pressure theday to day managementof existingoperations.I believe thatthe
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The evolution United of Nationspeacekeeping wind standsfairfor peacekeeping to continue as an effective United Nations instrument the controland resolutionof conflicts. for However, in recent months governmentsand public opinion in many countrieshave increasinglyquestioned whether peacekeeping is enough. Its relianceon the consentand cooperationof thepartieshas, it is said, shown it to be incapable of taking the forceful action required in situationslike those in Bosnia and Somalia. Perhaps that is partlydue to the fact that the Security Council may sometimeshave deployed peacekeeping operationsin situations where it was not entirelyclear that conditionsactually existed for successful peacekeeping.Be thatas it may, the current tendencyin the SecurityCouncil is to give peacekeeping operations more muscle. Last month the Council decided to add infantry UNIKOM, the militaryobservermission on the to Iraq-Kuwait border,despitethe factthatits unarmedpersonnelhad promptly alertedthe Council to Iraqi incursions and had thusenabled the Council to take effective counter-measures. Later thesame monththeCouncil decided to move UNPROFOR, the very large operation deployed in the formerYugoslavia, fromChapter VI to Chapter VII of the Charter,thoughonly in the contextof the protectionof its own personnel. Creatingthiskindof greyarea betweenpeacekeepingand peace-enforcement can give riseto considerabledangers.In political,legal and military and terms, in termsof the survivalof one's own troops,thereis, on the one hand, all the difference the world between being deployed with the consent and in cooperation of the parties to help them carry out an agreementthey have reachedand, on theotherhand,being deployed withouttheirconsentand with powers to use force to compel them to accept the decisions of the Security Council. To take thatview, however,is not to say thattheUnited Nations should not if use force. On the contrary, the organizationis to evolve into an effective it systemof collectivesecurity, must,as was recognizedin the Charter,have an In readiness theinternational of enforcement the capability. thatcontext, greater action by the United Nations is to be communityto contemplateenforcement a welcomed and could represent decisive moment in the developmentof the organization.It nevertheless gives riseto a numberof questionswhich need to be urgentlyaddressed.
i. By what criteriadoes the SecurityCouncil decide to use force,which in effect means going to war, against countriesor groups which fail to comply with its decisions? There may be sound reasons why it is rightto use force againstIraq and the Bosnian Serbs,but not againstothermember stateswhich continue to occupy their neighbours' territorycontrary to the Security Council's wishes,or againstothermovementswhich failto heed the Council's decisions.But ifthe Security Council is to escape thechargeof double standards it-and especiallyits Westernmembers-need to be more carefulin defining arisesin thosereasonsand gettingthemaccepted. The same questionof criteria relation to forcefulinterventionfor humanitarianpurposes. Why Bosnia, 461

MarrackGoulding KurdishIraq and Somalia, but not Angola, or Liberia or southern Sudan where equally atrocioussituations exist? How can the SecurityCouncil ensurethatitsuse of forcewill succeed? The credibility the organizationalready suffers of when a peacekeeping operation fails.During the Reagan era the inabilityof UNIFIL, throughno faultof its in own, to implement its mandate was used remorselessly Washington to the United Nations. Think how much greaterthe damage will be if discredit resortto forceby the SecurityCouncil does not succeed or if it gets bogged down in an interminable conflict like Britain'sin NorthernIrelandor India's in Kashmir (which seem more appropriate analogies than the often quoted Vietnam). The answer to that question must lie, first,in very careful military appreciation of the task to be performedand, second, in deployment of sufficient forcesto ensureits accomplishment. to Equally, it is necessary define a credibleand practicableend-game, so thatthe United Nations forcecan be withdrawnwithoutleaving behind chaos, tyranny some otherresultwhich or causes continuedsuffering otherwisediscredits United Nations. or the These are demanding requirements. They mean that,in the face of public pressure forceful for and intervention, governments, especiallythoseof theFive Permanent Members,will oftenhave to explain thatconditionsdo not existfor the successful of forceand that othersolutionsmust be tried. use
2.

This is 3. Is theinternational communityreadyto pay forpeace-enforcement? a vastlymore expensiveactionthanpeacekeeping.During Desert Storm,on the basis of press estimatesof its cost, we calculated that one day's expenditure on that operation would have been more than enough to finance United Nations peacekeeping for the whole of I99I. There is also the question of whether the costs of peace-enforcement operationsshould, as in the case of Kuwait, be borne by the governments contributing troops,with financial the support from their friendsand allies, or whether they should be borne collectivelyby the member statesas a whole. The latterprinciplewas, with great travail, established for peacekeeping during the I96os. If pfaceenforcement to strengthen credibility the United Nations as a world is the of system of collective security,it is desirable that it too should be financed collectively. to 4. Will enough member statesbe willing to contribute peace-enforcement operationswith the increasedrisk of casualtieswhich they entail? And how many of those who are willing will have the armamentand training necessary to engage in combat operations unfamiliar in so terrain? Member states farhave been admirably willing to contributemilitaryand police personnel to the in organization's peacekeepingoperations, whichalmost40 per centof themare If the credibility effectiveness the United Nations currently represented. and of are to be strengthened, is desirablethat peace-enforcement it operations,like peacekeeping,should include a wide enough spreadof memberstatesto reflect the compositionof the organizationas a whole.
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The evolution United of Nationspeacekeeping be 5. How should command and controlof peacekeepingoperations organized in the future? alreadymentioned,peacekeepingoperationstake place under As the command and controlof the Secretary-General, who is responsibleto the in SecurityCouncil. Existingstructures New York have found it increasingly to difficult plan, command and control the greatly increased peacekeeping activities recentyears.When the SecurityCouncil authorizedthe despatch of of additionaltroops to protectthe deliveryof humanitarian suppliesin Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was decided to take 'off the shelf' elementsof a NATO headquartersto establishthe new command in Bosnia. This has not been an A entirely happy experiment. bettersolution may lie in greatlystrengthening in the staff New York, and especiallythe military staff, give it the resources to not only to plan new operationsbut also to provide the core elementsof their headquarters.This would both enhance the Secretary-General's control of United Nations operations and ensure the uniform application to all such operations of the establishedprinciples,procedures and practices of peacekeeping. The command and control demands of war are immeasurablygreaterthan those of peacekeeping. No enforcement operation has yet taken place under United Nations command and control. Instead, in Korea and Kuwait and, initially, Somalia, the SecurityCouncil has authorizedcertainmemberstatesto use force to ensure compliance with its decisions. However, the SecretaryGeneral recommended that the new United Nations operation in Somalia, which is under Chapter VII of the Charter,should be under United Nations command and control,though using elementsfrom the headquarterswhich had alreadybeen established theUnited States-led by forcein Somalia. But, like the command in Bosnia, thisarrangement may raisequestionsabout the extent to which the operation is-or is perceived to be- really under the United Nations and not controlledin realityby the memberstatescontributing the to bulk of its troops. It is to be assumed thatthe SecurityCouncil will continueto move in the directionof more forceful action,especiallyin responseto civil wars involving intolerablehuman suffering. There is therefore likely to be continuingdebate about whetherthisis betterdone by national forcesand coalitionsauthorized by the SecurityCouncil or by forcesunder the command of the SecretaryGeneral,and about how such operationsshould be financed.The outcome of thisdebate will have major implications the future for evolution of the United Nations as a systemof collectivesecurity.

Conclusion
The future development or evolution of peacekeeping-and peaceenforcement-lies in the hands of two of the principalorgans of the United Nations: the SecurityCouncil and the Secretary-General. They carrya heavy responsibility. fourdecades of the United Nations' existence, During the first peacekeeping
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MarrackGoulding evolved in a less than benign environment.The Cold War blighted the organization'sability to performmany of the tasks envisaged for it in the Charter; and the Soviet Union maintainedconsiderablereservations about the legitimacyof peacekeeping.On some occasions,notablyin I956 and I973, the establishment and efficient functioningof a peacekeeping operation clearly served Soviet national interests and objectionswere not raised. But therewas always hesitation about the Secretary-General's politicalrole and oppositionto his acquiring a military let staff, alone any stock of military equipment. During those yearsRalph Bunche and thenBrian Urquhart, togetherwith the Secretaries-General whom theyservedwith such distinction, the nurtured evolution of peacekeeping and, with resourcefulness, and even stealth established credibility a United Nations techniqueforconflict its sometimes, as control and resolution. These days, as the Secretary-General observed,the United Nations has has almost too much credibility. On some recentmornings,every singleitem on the BBC World Service news has related to a situationin which the United Nations is engaged in peacemakingor peacekeepingor humanitarian relief. The problem now is often not to persuade the Security Council to set up a peacekeepingoperation,but to dissuadeit fromrushing into doing so when the conditionsfor successdo not yet exist. This places a greatburden of responsibility the Secretary-General. is on He nurturedresource,whose the guardian or trusteeof a precious and carefully usefulness thatcredibility no is dependson itscontinuing credibility. Preserving has easy task: on the one hand, the Secretary-General to try to ensure that are is peacekeepers not deployedin conditionswherefailure likely; on theother hand, he has to avoid appearingso cautious as to createdoubts about the real usefulness the United Nations or provide a pretextfor member statesto of returnto the bad old ways of unilateralmilitary action. This is not a responsibility which the Secretary-General should be asked to bear alone. The power of decision in these mattersrestswith the Security Council. It is important thatthe membersof the Council should,if necessary, standup to theclamourof domesticor regionalpressures takecare to satisfy and themselves in advance that conditions do really exist for a proposed peacekeepingoperationto succeed. Those conditionsare well known, but theybear repeating.The mandate or task must be clear, practicableand accepted by the parties; the partiesmust to and theirpledgesmustbe pledge themselves cooperatewith thepeacekeepers of credible;and thememberstates theUnited Nations mustbe readyto provide thehuman and materialresources needed to do thejob. On any particular day, of in unfortunately, only a minority the actual or potentialconflicts the world fulfil thoseconditions.It is oftenfrustratingly to necessary wait untila conflict is ripefortheUnited Nations peacekeepingtreatment. when theconditions But are fulfilled, thereis almost no limit to what peacekeeping can achieve.

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