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CHS.

2, 3

427 a 6

427 a 27
indivisible unity,
i
-

121

this impossible?
tiality J
.

For the same


,
.

though

in poten-

each of two opposites, in the order of thought and Objection. being is not so, but in actual operation is divided it is impossible that it should be at the same time both white and black, and hence impossible that it should receive at the same time the forms of white and black, if reception of the forms constitutes sensation and thought. Rather is the case parallel to that of 15 the point, as some describe it, which is divisible in so A Analogy of the Well then, in so far far as it is regarded as one or two. P m as the faculty which judges is indivisible, it is one and judges instantaneously but, in so far as it is divisible, it is not So far as one, for it uses the same point at the same time twice. it treats the boundary-point as two, it passes judgment on two separate things with a faculty which in a manner is separated into

.,..,,..
:

two so far as it treats the point as one, it passes judgment on one thing, and that instantaneously. So much, then, for the principle
;

in virtue of which

we

call

There are two


;

different characteristics

the animal capable of sensation. by which the soul

is

princi-

firstly, motion from place to place and, secondly, pally defined and judging and perceiving. Both thought and intellithinking gence are commonly regarded as a kind of perception, since the soul in both of these judges and recognises something existent, anc i ents at an 7 rate identify intelligence and persensa " tion and Wisdom ception thus, in the words of Empedocles to that which is of old for mankind is increased according

^e

>

>

identified.

p resent
also

to

them": and again "Whence they have


:

continually
fact,

meaning, men." In
transl.
tvl,

too, is the

Homer's a shifting succession of thoughts." same when he says " Such is the mind of all of them conceive thought to be corporeal 2

Bek. Trend. Torst.,


Christ
|!

&

om. pr. 15. alffB^riK^v clvai rk


||

U, J

ft kvl apa,
II

omisso

Kal,

etiam Soph.,

fort,

jf

de

&ov ST U

opla-du

(Bek., etiam Bhl.) bpttrBw

rb Kplveiv Kal voelv W, Kal rG> voetv Ka.1 rw tppoveiv (Rr.), 8iupt<r6w Soph. rf Kplveiv Kcd voelv Torst., vulgatam tuentur etiam in interpr. Simpl. 202, 8 sq. Philop. al(r0dvecr6(u deesse videntur, 489, 13 Soph. 115, 1 8 19. anno tat in margin e Bas.: post

E2

18.

Acai

E SUV,

[|

quae Argyropylus reddidit his verbis


ac sentire.

considerandum

est, si

quid

intersit inter intelligere

quicquam Bon., stud. Arist. II, III, 131, qui cum Plutarcho, Philopono, Simplicio apodosin, quam iam Alex, apud Philop. 489, 9 desiderayerat, ab 427 b, 6. STL ptv o$v incipit; in interpungendis singulis membris, praeeunte Biehlio, secutus sum Bon. 19. 8] ybp coni. Susemihl H icol post 8t om. L T 20. ^dp] re ybp E S U, re om. etiam Soph, KpLvei re T] fax*] T, ^ \J/VXTJ 21. ye corr. E, KptveL rt S U VWy, ^ ifrvxh Kptvci re X, vulgatam tuetur etiam Soph. re S U V 23. ^a^eroc Ej, nunc atferai (Bhl.), d^erctt etiam Them. Philop. 485, 24 25. rd S* aro...b, 6. ^ a^rr; etvai in parenth. ponenda putat Susemihl, Oecon., Soph. 25. /SorfXcrat rotrots STUVWy, rb a^ra TQVTO sed post o rasura Eg (Bhl.) P* 35
cui opinioni assentitur Torst., negat excidisse
||
i|
||

||

||

||

II

||

W.

wcrirep xal

TO

StTV.

CH. 3
like sensation like

427 a

28427 b

26

123

and hold that we understand, as well as perceive,


as

by

like:

we explained

at the outset of the

discussion.

This view
refuted.

They ought, however, at the same time to have discussed error, a state which is peculiarly characteristic

of animal life and in which the soul continues the greater part of its time. It follows from their premisses that either all presentations of the senses must be true, as some affirm, or contact with what is unlike must constitute error this being the converse of the position that like is known by like. But, as the knowledge of contraries is one and the same, so, too, it would seem, is error with respect to contraries one and the same. Now it is clear that perception and intelligence are not the 3 same thing. For all animals share in the one, but only a few in the other. And when we come to thinking, which includes right
;

thinking and wrong thinking, right thinking being intelligence, knowledge and true opinion, and wrong thinking the opposites of For perception these, neither is this identical with perception. of the objects of the special senses is always true and is found in all animals, while thinking may be false as well as true and is found in none which have not reason also. Imagination, in 4 fact, is something different both from perception and from thought, and is never found by itself apart from perception, any more than is belief apart from imagination. Clearly thinking is not the same as believing. For the former is in our own power, whenever thing we please for we can represent an object before our eyes, as do those who range things under mnemonic headings and picture them to themselves. But opining is not in our power, for the opinion that we hold must be either false or true. Moreover, when we are of opinion that something is terrible or alarming, we at once feel the corresponding emotion, and so, too, with what is reassuring. But when we are under the influence of imagination we are no more affected than if we saw in a picture the objects which inspire terror or confidence. There are also different forms even of belief; know- 5 But the difference ledge, opinion, intelligence and their opposites. between these species must be reserved for another discussion.
:

textum recepit Biehl in ecL alt., reliqui codd. vtrrjo-is, etiam Simpl. Philop. 19. <m n E, receperunt Biehl Rodier, om. U, <m n etiam Soph., rt om. reliqui omnes 20. $ om. 21. 5of<'/' LSUW, 8o^dff(afjL&f etiam Philop. Soph. leg. Soph. 22. *&>] xai tev Ty, K&V TJ L, Kal ikv % S U V X Soph., K&P etiam. Them. U 23. c] ol T Bek. Trend. Torst., <rirep &v el etiam Simpl. 221, 3 Soph. 118, 32, uxrirep Bedftevoi " vet. transl,, el recepit ird<rxflf*'v in paraphr. Them., "sicut si essemus considerantes Biehl ettrl $... 26. \6yos ab hoc 24. 4} E Simpl. 221, 4 et Soph., reliqui codd. KO\ loco aliena et fort, spuria esse putat Susemihl ical aMjs] atfrip /cai Essen 25. xoii rotfrwv unc. incl. Essen X #<rrai X. 26. ra fravrla S U V
|| |j

STUWXy,

||

||

||

\\

II

||

||

||

CH.

427 b 27
turn to thought
an<3
:

428 a 21

125

To
imagination.

since it is different from sense-perception seems to include imagination on the one hand and conception on the other, we must determine the nature of

If, then, 6 imagination before we proceed to discuss conception. imagination is the faculty in virtue of which we say that an image presents itself to us, and if we exclude the metaphorical use of the term, it is some one of the faculties or habits in virtue of which we

judge, and judge truly or falsely.


Not
sensation

Such

faculties or habits are sensaIt


is

tion, opinion, sensation, for

knowledge,

intellect.

the following reasons.

Sensation

clearly not 7 is either

a faculty like sight or an activity like seeing. But we may have an image even when neither the one nor the other is present for
:

example, the images in dreams. Again, sensation is always present, but not so imagination. Besides, the identity of the two in actuality would involve the possibility that all the brutes have imagination. But this apparently is not the case for example, the ant, the bee and the grub do not possess it. Moreover, sensations are always true,, but imaginings prove for the most part false. Further, it is not when we direct our energies closely to the sensible object, that we say that this object appears to us to be a man, but rather when
;

it \then the term true or false is said before, visions present themselves even And, applied}. if we have our eyes closed.

we do

not distinctly perceive


as

we

nor

Neither, again, can imagination be ranked with the faculties, like knowledge or intellect, which always judge truly it opinion, may a i $o b e false. It remains, then, to consider whether
:

be opinion, as opinion may be true or false. But opinion is attended by conviction, for it is impossible to hold opinions without being convinced of them but no brute is ever convinced,.
it
:

quamquam
scribit

suspicionem movet vocabulum


67, 2
:

De An.
:

rd re derTpe&dii T&V verba habet fju&pfM}%i Kal


S Kal pviat...7)
otf

tbrws, quod addidit 90, 8, et fort. Alex., qui Kal a&r0^<rews fitv irdvra. /jer^xei ra f$ a <pa.vTcurLas 5 otf 5oKi9 u?r QaXawltov xal ol (rKd>\rjKe$, et Soph, alieno loco, p. 55, 27, haec

/xeXtrrcus xctl rots 6fioloL$...avdyKy Trapewai fiavracrlav..,, <na&XijKer

&x*w $ d^vSpdv rtva, similiter Philop. ad 413 b, 22. et ad 414 b, 33. (258, 32), hoc vero loco diserte vulgatam lectionem agnoscit et interpretatur, quare neque ex Philop. neque ex Soph, lectionem a Torst. receptam confirmari posse iudicat Biehl ; vulgatam tuentur praeter omnes codd, etiam Simpl. hoc loco et p. 308, 19* 12. S-Treir'] ri T et com E, et vet. transl. et Barco, p. 62; cf. ad hunc locum 434 a, 4 grrecra leg. etiam Soph. 14. tvepyQs E, frapy&s etiam Them. Soph. 15. 17] om. pr. E,. Kal U, Kal $ Ty, xal TJ SV rbr $ dX. # ^. unc. inclusit Torst., quod TJ] Kal % S V probat etiam Madvig, leg. Soph, et vet. transl. H 8% S T U V X y Soph. By water, p. 56
SOKOVO-W fiXws
|j
||

||

||

||

!J

19.

dXXd...24

S*

otf

e duab. ed. contain, iudicat Torst., cui assentitur Freudenthal,


rt 7rdcnj...24.
5*
otf,

Rhein. Mus. 1869, p. 405, pr. 22.


21. SoKet] dogdfri

LUW

post.

tp.

dXXct...22. iroXXots

||

Philop. 500, 20, 8oKei etiam

Them. Soph.

CH. 3

428 a 22

428 b 17

127

though many have imagination. Further, every opinion implies conviction, conviction implies that we have been persuaded, and persuasion implies reason. Among brutes, however, though some
have imagination, none have reason.
is

It is evident, then, that 9 neither opinion joined with sensation nor opinion imagination through sensation, nor yet a complex of opinion and sen-

opinion

combined with
sensation*

sation,
is

both on these grounds and because nothing- else ^ the object of opinion but that which is the object of .. T -,-,1 /--, I mean, it is the complex of the opinion of sensation
i

/-

white and the sensation of white, not surely of the opinion of good with the sensation of white, which alone could constitute imagination. To imagine, then, will be on this supposition to opine directly, not indirectly, that which we perceive. But there are false imagin- 10 ings concerning things of which we hold at the same time a true For example, the sun appears only a foot in diameter, conception. but we are convinced that it is larger than the inhabited world in this case, therefore, either, without any alteration in the thing and without any lapse of memory on our part or conversion by argument, we have abandoned the true opinion which we had about it; or else, if we still retain it, the same opinion must be both true and It could have proved false only in the event of the object false. having changed without our observing it. It is not, then, either one of the two, opinion and sensation, singly, or a combination of the two, which constitutes imagination. Now when one thing is moved, something else can be moved And imagination is thought to be a species of motion and it. by not to arise apart from sensation, but only in sentient beings
:

and with the


.

objects of sense for its objects. Motion, again, may be produced by actual sensation, and such motion must

resemble the sensation which caused it. From all this it follows that this particular motion cannot arise apart from sensation nor be found anywhere except in sentient and in virtue of this motion it is possible for its possessor to do beings: and experience many things imagination, too, may be both true and
movement
subsidiary to sensa:

6.

r^v atirrp om, pr. E, ante tod-yKij ponunt L y 8. tytvero E, sed in litura Essen III, p. 23 Torst., eyfrero reliqui ante Torst. omnes, etiam Susemihl, B. J. {Trend.), XXX, 47 dXXd.,.9- TrpayfJ-a. Torst. suspecta sunt, non legisse videntur Them. Simpl. n. ad verbal 5e... 10. route Soph., leg. etiam Philop. 9. oti/c #pct 12. afo6i)<ris tcrnr annotat Torst. vereor ne, etsi sunt Aristotelis, in posteriore edit, non fuerint scripta, leg. etiam Simpl. Philop. 12. ato-B^a-ex elarlv T U V et, omisso verbo, S,
Tri\av9av6jJ.voi>
eivtu
H

LT UVWX

7.

|{

post

addendum

iruTrebeiv censet

||

LSUVXy
||

||

ELTWy
||

||

SUVy

||

numerum singularem
15.
afa-Tjs
||

afoQvjrts leg. etiam Philop. 512,

||

6. tHrdpxei

||

ICCCT&

rwfir^v

EL,

KCLT

24 SimpL 215, 3 Soph. 119, 34 atiTty etiam Them. Simpl. Philop.

|[

Soph.

*oi

om.

TVXy,

tuentur etiam

Them. Soph.

CH. 3
false.

428 b 18

429 a 9

129

The reasons for the last conclusion are as follows. Perception 12 of the objects of the special senses is true, or subject to the minimum of error. Next comes the perception that they are attributes and As to the whiteness of an object at this point error may come in.
:

sense

is

never mistaken, but

it

may

be mistaken as to whether
else.
is,

the white object is this thing or something is perception of the common attributes, that
for

Thirdly, there the concomitants


:

of the things to which the special attributes belong

mean,
of

example, motion

and

magnitude, which
that
is

are

attributes
is

sensibles.

And

it

is

concerning them

sense

most apt

to

be deceived.

But the motion which

the result of actual 13

sensation will be different according as it arises from one or other of these three kinds of perception. The first kind, so long as the sensation
is

present,
is

is

true

the other kinds

may be

false,

whether
object

the sensation

present or absent, and especially

when the

perceived
Imagination
defined.

a long way off. If then, imagination possesses no other characteristics than the aforesaid, and if it is what
is
it

has been described to be, imagination will be a motion

generated by actual perception. And, since sight is the 14 principal sense, imagination has derived even its name (<j>avrao-ia) from light (<ao?), because without light one cannot see. Again, 15

because imaginations remain in us and resemble the corresponding sensations, animals perform many actions under their influence
;

some, that
that
is,

is,

the brutes, through not having intellect, and others,


intellect is

men, because
suffice.

or disease or sleep.

Let

this

sometimes obscured by passion account of the nature and cause of

imagination
TJ]

Rodier, "si igitur nihil aliud habet ea quae dicta 77 ^ vj phantasia" vet. transl. , rj /J.TJ Bek. Trend., secuti edit. Sylburgianam, vel potius eiusdem typothetarum errorem, tf ^ <f>avraffia unc. incl. Torst., non legisse Philop. el ctiv Qavrafftav S Bek. Trend. ; scriptum fuisse ab Aiist. 514, 32 idem Torst. censet y^Qkv fj.fr d*\Xo #xet Ttt ^tpfjiJ^va, rouro 5' x et % ffxuTcurta SLV efy /cherts coni. Torst.
solus E,

LSTUVXy,
||

sunt

quam

|(

429 a,

i.

rouro

5*

&rri Biehl, etiam

2. yvyvofj&ni pr. E (Trend.) transl. Trend. Torst., quod etiam "W probat Zeller, p. 545, yiyvo^vrjs reliqui codd., etiam Bek. 3. 4<m om. S T Them. Simpl. vet. transl. Torst., fytofwy 5. 6/^olas E, sed as in rasura (Bhl.), 9 ai5rds etiam Them. Simpl. /card ratfras El/y, /car reliqui ante Torst. omnes
||

Them. 93, 22 ra#r6 S' Ly Them. Philop. Simpl. vet.


||

<rrl

sive xatfrd 5*

x et coni.

Christ H

TUX

UV

(|

||

[|

irp&rreiv 121, 20.

[|

7.

vfou

TUV,

v6(fois

etiam Them. Simpl. 221, 12

|[

9.

di6rt

E
Q

Soph.

H.

CH. 4

429 a 10

429 b 7

131

As
intellect or Mind.

to the part of the soul with which it knows and understands, whether such -part -be separable spatially, or not

sider

what

separable spatially but only in thought, we have to conis its distinctive character and how thinking comes about.

if thinking is analogous to perceiving, it will consist in a 2 acted upon by the object of thought or in something else of being this kind. This part of the soul, then, must be impassive, but recep- 3 tive of the form and potentially like_this form, though not identical with it and, as the faculty of sense is to sensible objects, so must mEEltect 'be related to intelligible objects. The mind, then, since it thinks all things, must needs, in the words of Anaxagoras, be
:

Now,

tmmbc^_with_ any, if it is to rule, that is, to know. For by 'intruding its own form it hinders and obstructs that which is alien to it ; hence it has no other nature than this, that it is a
Thus, then, the part of the soul which we call (and by intellect I mean that whereby the soul th^piace of forms." thinks and conceives) is nothing at all actually before it thinks. Hence, too, we cannot reasonably conceive it to be 4 mixed with the body for in that case it would acquire some particular quality, cold or heat, or would even have some organ, as the perceptive faculty has. But as a matter of fact it has none. Therefore it has been well said that the soul is a place of forms or ideas except that this is not true of the whole soul, but only of the soul which can think, and again that the forms are there not in actuality, but potentially. But that the impassivity of sense is different from 5

poten-

capacity.

*'

intellect

that of intellect is clear if we look at the sense-organs and at sense. The sense loses its power to perceive, if the sensible object has been too intense thus it cannot hear sound after very loud noises, and after too powerful colours and odours it can neither see nor smell. But the intellect, when it has been thinking on an object of intense thought, is not less, but even more, able to think of inferior objects. For the perceptive faculty is not in:

dependent of body, whereas

the sense in intellect has to be so (which which one who actually is a scholar is said happens so soon as he can exercise his power of himself), even

intellect is separable. thus become everything in

But when the

T Soph. Susemihl, Oecon. p. 86, K<d U V X 29. on 8 ...30. Essen III, p. 38 429 b, i. oTov rov $. S T VXy, oTov K rov ^. E, e/c IK om. E, otov i^6ef>ov IK r&v -rov ^&4>ov rov peyAXov [77] T&V [UKpCov tybQw Them. 104, 34 etiam Soph. 4. verba dXXa /caijLtaXXop interpolata esse censet Torst., Jahrb. f. Phil. Atey. ^. et in interpr. Soph., om. vovs etiam 1867, p. 246, leg. etiam Them. 5. 6 te vovs x<*P- y 6 ante Them. 105, 4 6. 6 post ws om. S Theoph. ap. Prise. 31, 8 Bek. Trend. om. S U V Theoph. ap. Prise. 31, 9.
26.

*a*>]

Kal K&V S, K&V

[|

yoTjrucov unc. incl.

||

||

||

||

||

'

WX

||

92

CH. 8

431 b 20

432 a 14

145

us sum up what has been said concerning the soul 8 by repeating that in a manner the soul is all existent summary of results. For they are all either objects of sensation or things. of thought and knowledge and sensation are in a manner objects
;

And now let

identical with their respective objects.

How this is so requires

to be

explained.

Knowledge and

correspond to the things.

sensation, then, are subdivided to 2 Potential knowledge and sensation

answer to things which are potential, actual knowledge and sensation to things which are actual, while the sensitive and the cognitive
I mean, object of ; sensation and object of cognition respectively. It follows that the faculties must be identical, if not with the things themselves, then with their forms. The things themselves they are not, for it is not the stone which is in the soul, but the form of the stone. So that there is an analogy between the soul and the hand for, as the
;

faculties in the soul are potentially these objects

the instrument of instruments, so the intellect is the form ^ f rms anc sensation the form of sensibles. But, since, 3 inteiiectu from sensible magnitudes there is nothing, as it apart would seem, independently existent, it is in the sensible prius in forms that the intelligible forms exist, both the abstractions of mathematics, as they are called, and all the qualities and attributes of sensible things. And for this reason, as without sensation a man would not learn or understand anything, so at the
is
*

hand

very time when he is actually thinking he must have an image before him. For mental images are like present sensations, except that they are immaterial. Imagination, however, is distinct from affirmation and negation, for it needs a combination of notions to constitute truth or falsehood. But, it may be asked, how will the simplest notions differ in character from mental images? I reply that neither these nor the rest of our notions are images, but that they cannot dispense with images.
Chandler, rb
fjiev
||

tuetur etiam vet. transl.

rb tirLffryrbv rb 8t rb aivOyTov etdos Essen, p. 72, vulgatam Soph. Bek. Trend. Torst., om. 29. yhp ante

^ STUX

etiam Philop.
tvrlv

et

vet. transl.

SVy,

vovs

TW

|J

om. E L Them. Philop., elSos om. E, tffrlv eXSos marg.


||

leg.

Soph.
||

||

E
||

5.

&

432 om.

a, 2.

voOs-

ELSUV

Them.

8. wfy 7. alffdavh^evov L et E (Trend.) Philop., leg. Simpl. Philop., w/oi reliqui codd. Trend., ZweLij Bek. Torst. dt T X, (pavrda-fAOLra S V 0cu>r(o7x,aTi E, t in rasura, etiam Them. Philop., scripsit Biehl, reliqui ante Biehlium
|| ||

UV

LSXy

||

omnes 0dvrao>d rt, etiam Simpl. vet. transl. Bek. Trend. Torst. 9. alo-dtffta.Td] 10. et 11. xcd diro<f>d<rec )s om. SUV, leg. etiam Soph. alo-djird coni. Kampe, p. 101 ii. 12. rlvi EL, reliqui rL etiam Them. Philop. 569, 21 et ad <rn j>07}jui,dTwv SUV 13. roXXa] raura <f>dvra<rjj,a E, ^avrd^ara, etiam Them. Philop. 403 a, 8 (45, 22) Them. 116, 18 (sed raXXa ex Arist. scripsit Hayduck) Aid. Torst. Freudenthal, p. 13,
||

||

[]

|]

||

||

rSXXa vel rk flXXa etiam Simpl.


H.

et Philop. 569,

28

et

ad 403

a,

8 (45, 23).

10