EXHIBIT 2

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http://www.orlytaitzesq.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Liberi-v-DOFF-filed-reply-by-Orly-Taitz.pdf
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Case Nos. 11-56079 and 11-56164
(Consolidated on February 3, 2012)
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Lisa Liberi, et al.,
Plaintiffs/Appellees,
v.
Orly Taitz, Defend Our Freedoms
Foundations, Inc., et al.,
Defendants/Appellants.
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Appeal from the United States
District Court for the Central
District of California
Civil Action No.:
8:11-CV-00485-AG (AJWx)
REPLY BRIEF BY APPELLANT,
ORLY TAITZ
(Submitted with Appellants Supplemental Excerpts of Record and Reply Brief by
Appellant, Defend Our Freedoms Foundations, Inc., in Consolidated Appeals)
KimSchumann, Esq., CSBN 170942
Jeffrey Cunningham, Esq., CSBN 151067
SCHUMANN, RALLO & ROSENBERG, LLP
3100 S. Bristol St., Suite 400
Costa Mesa, CA 92626
(714) 850-0210 - telephone
(714) 850-0551 - fax
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant,
Orly Taitz

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION PAGE NO.
I. Summary of Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. Appeal May Be Taken from the Order Denying Defendants Anti-SLAPP
Motion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
A. The Order Denying Defendants Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike is
a Final, Appealable Order under California Coae of Civil Proceaure
section 425.16 and Related Federal Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
III. As Determined in the District Courts Order, the Granting of Plaintiffs
Motion for Leave to File Their First Amended Complaint is Independent
From and Irrelevant to its Denial of Defendants Anti-SLAPP Motion . . . 5
A. Jeri:on Delaware, Inc. v. Covaa Comms. Co., 377 F.3d 1081
(9
th
Cir. 2004) is Inapposite, and Plaintiffs in Citing it Attempt to
Raise a New Argument Not Raised in the District Court . . . . . . . . 5
B. Jess v. Ciba-Geigv Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097 (9
th
Cir. 2003)
Is Inapposite, and Plaintiffs in Citing it Attempt to Raise a New
Argument Not Raised in the District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
C. Greensprings Baptist Christian Fellowship Trust v. Cillev, 629
F.3d 1064 (2010) Does Not Support Plaintiffs Argument,
Plaintiffs in Citing it Attempt to Raise a New Argument Not
Raised in the District Court, and Plaintiffs Admit That Greensprings
Requires That Defendants Be Allowed to Challenge Their First
Amended Complaint Via Anti-SLAPP Motion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

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IV. The District Court, as a Matter of Law, Erred in Concluding that
Defendants Did Not Meet Their Burden Under Section 425.16(b) to Show
that Plaintiffs Complaint Arises Out of Defendants Acts in Furtherance
of Their Rights of Petition or Free Speech in Connection with a
Public Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A. Plaintiffs Have Represented to the District Court that this Case
Presents Issues of Great Public Interest, Concerning the Birther
Movement, and Related Rights of Petition and Free Speech in
Furtherance of That Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
B. Defendants Met Their Burden Under section 425.16(b) Where
Plaintiffs Complaint Clearly Arises Out of Defendants Alleged
Acts in Furtherance of their Rights of Petition and Free Speech
In Connection with Public Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Plaintiffs - by their silence in their brief - admit that
Defendants allegedly made written or oral statement[s] or
writing[s] made before a legislative, executive, or judicial
proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by
law... as required by section 425.16(e)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2. Plaintiffs - by their silence in their brief - admit that
Defendants allegedly made written or oral statement[s] or
writing[s] made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or
judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized
by law... as required by section 425.16(e)(2) . . . . . . . . . . 17

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3. Plaintiffs - by their silence in their brief - admit that
Defendants allegedly made written or oral statement[s] or
writing[s] made in a place open to the public or a public
forum in connection with an issue of public interest... as
required by section 425.16(e)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4. Plaintiffs - by their silence in their brief - admit that
Defendants allegedly engaged in any other conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of
petition or the constitutional right of free speech in
connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest
as required by section 425.16(e)(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5. Plaintiffs argument that the Anti-SLAPP statute does not
apply to invasion of privacy, defamation or similar claims
is incorrect as a matter of law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
V. Appellant, Orly Taitz, Incorporates By Reference Certain Portions of the
Related Reply Brief of Appellant, Defend Our Freedoms Foundations,
Inc., in These Consolidated Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
VI. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

87

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Federal Cases
Bat:el v. Smith (9
th
Cir. 2003)
333 F.3d 1018, 1026 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 3
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimitea (1972)
404 U.S. 508, 510 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Collins v. Citv of San Diego (9
th
Cir. 1988)
841 F.2d 337, 339 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 21, 22
Greensprings Baptist Christian Fellowship Trust v. Cillev (2010)
629 F.3d 1064, 1067 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 4, 9
Intl Union of Bricklavers & Alliea Crafsman Local Union No. 20, AFL-CIO v.
Martin Jaska, Inc. (9
th
Cir. 1985)
752 F.2d 1401, 1404 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 7, 10
Kline v. Johns-Manville (9
th
Cir. 1984))
745 F.2d 1217, 1221 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 7, 10
Meehan v. Countv of Los Angeles (9
th
Cir. 1988)
856 F.2d 102, 106 n.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 18, 21, 22
Minavs Cosmetics, Inc. v. Dakar (9
th
Cir. 2010)
611 F.3d 590, 595 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
N.A.A.C.P. v. Button (1963)
371 U.S. 415, 445 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Trov Group, Inc. v. Tilson (2005)
364 F. Supp.2d 1149, 1153 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 20
Unitea States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheea Missiles & Space Co. (9
th
Cir. 1999)
190 F.3d 963, 971, 973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 14
Jeri:on Delaware, Inc. v. Covaa Comms. Co. (9
th
Cir. 2004)
377 F.3d 1081, 1091 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 6
Jess v. Ciba-Geigv Corp. USA (9
th
Cir. 2003)
317 F.3d 1097 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 8
State Cases
Ampex Corp. v. Cargle (2005)
128 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1576 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 20
Annette F. v. Sharon S. (2004)
119 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1160 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 20
Briggs v. Eaen Council for Hope & Opportunitv (1999)
19 Cal.4th 1106, 1113 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 14, 15, 17, 23

88

Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club (2000)
85 Cal.App.4th 468, 479 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 20
Kibbler v. N. Invo Countv Local Hospital Dist. (2006)
39 Cal.4th 192, 196-198 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 17
Rivero v. AFL-CIO (2003)
105 Cal.App.4th 913, 923 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Rosenaur v. Scherer (2001)
88 Cal.App.4th 260, 274 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 2
Sipple v. Founaation for Nat. Progress (1999)
71 Cal.App.4th 226, 236-238 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 14, 15, 17, 23
Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unifiea Port Dist. (2003)
106 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1233 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Federal Statutes
28 U.S.C. 1291 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Feaeral Rule of Civil Proceaure 8 (a)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Feaeral Rule of Civil Proceaure 8 (a)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Feaeral Rule of Civil Proceaure 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Feaeral Rule of Civil Proceaure 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Feaeral Rule of Civil Proceaure 15(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
State Statutes
Coae of Civil Proceaure 425.16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 14, 25
Coae of Civil Proceaure 425.16(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Coae of Civil Proceaure 425.16(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Coae of Civil Proceaure 425.16(b)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Coae of Civil Proceaure 425.16(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,2, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22
Coae of Civil Proceaure 425.16(e)(1)-(4)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24
Coae of Civil Proceaure 425.16(j) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Coae of Civil Proceaure 904.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

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-1-
I.
Summary of Argument
The order denying the anti-SLAPP motion by Defendants and Appellants,
ORLY TAITZ (Taitz) and DEFEND OUR FREEDOMS FOUNDATIONS, INC.
(DOFF) (collectively Defendants), under California Coae of Civil Proceaure
section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute) should be reversed. Defendants clearly
met (and in fact exceeded) their burden under section 425.16(b)(1) to show that
Plaintiffs' Complaint arises out of Defendants' alleged acts in furtherance of their
rights of petition and free speech in connection with public issues. Defendants
demonstrated protected activity coming within each subpart of section 425.16(e)
describing "act[s] in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech...."
Plaintiffs and Appellees herein are LISA LIBERI (Liberi), LISA
OSTELLA (Ostella), PHILIP J. BERG, ESQ. (Berg, who is also Plaintiffs
counsel), GO EXCEL GLOBAL and the LAW OFFICES OF PHILIP J. BERG
(collectively Plaintiffs).
The burden thus shifted to Plaintiffs to demonstrate a probability of
prevailing on their Complaint. Section 425.16(b)(1). Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the
two prongs of their burden: (1) to show that their Complaint is legally sufficient,
and (2) to make a prima facie factual showing via competent and admissible
evidence supporting each claim of the Complaint. Rosenaur v. Scherer, 88
Cal.App.4th 260, 274 (2001). Notably, Plaintiffs made a dispositive judicial
admission that the Complaint was legally insufficient and, thus, that they could not
meet their burden. Plaintiffs also failed to satisfy their burden to present competent
and admissible evidence making the required factual showing.

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-2-
In their Answering Brief (AB), Plaintiffs admit by their silence that
Defendants demonstrated protected activity coming within each subpart of section
425.16(e). Plaintiffs also fail to substantively address their burden under section
425.16(b), including their failure to demonstrate that their Complaint is legally
sufficient. Rosenaur, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at 274.
Taitz thus respectfully submits that the District Court as a matter of law
erred in misinterpreting and misapplying Defendants and Plaintiffs burdens
under the anti-SLAPP statute and that its order should therefore be reversed.
II.
Appeal May Be Taken from the Order Denying Defendants Anti-SLAPP
Motion
A. The Order Denying Defendants Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike is
a Final, Appealable Order under California
section 425.16 and Related Federal Law
Plaintiffs erroneously argue that the District Courts order [Volume 1,
Excerpts of Record (ER), pages 4-9] is not a final, appealable order. (AB, 15-
21.)
As a matter of law, denial of an anti-SLAPP motion under California law is
an appealable final decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1291. Bat:el v.
Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003). Minavs Cosmetics, Inc. v. Dakar, 611
F.3d 590, 595 (9th Cir. 2010). In California state courts, denial of an anti-SLAPP
motion is immediately appealable. California Coae of Civil Proceaure
425.16(j) and 904.1.
Bat:el provides the controlling law in the Ninth Circuit:

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-3-
We are presented with the threshold question whether we
have jurisdiction over Cremers's interlocutory appeal of the
district court's denial of his motion to strike... The issue
before us as a federal court is whether a district court's
denial of an anti-SLAPP motion is an immediately
appealable "final decision" under 28 U.S.C. 1291, so that
we have jurisdiction to address Cremers' appeal. We
conclude that we have jurisdiction to review the denial of
an anti-SLAPP motion pursuant to the collateral order
doctrine. Bat:el, supra, 333 F.3d at 1024; emphasis added.
Therefore, the denial of Defendants motion is regarded as the final word
as to whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies herein. That the Court allowed
Plaintiffs leave to file their First Amended Complaint (FAC) is irrelevant, and
has no relation to, its denial of the anti-SLAPP motion. In fact, the Court
subsequently denied Defendants request for leave to file an anti-SLAPP motion
as to the FAC. [See, June 29, 2011 order denying Defendants request to file an
anti-SLAPP motion as to the FAC; Defendants Supplemental Excerpts of Record
(SER), 1-2.] In the words of Bat:el and Gulfstream, the order appealed from is
conclusive and the final word notwithstanding the filing of Plaintiffs FAC.
Plaintiffs cite several cases for their argument that the order is somehow not
a final, appealable order. They principally rely on Greensprings Baptist Christian
Fellowship Trust v. Cillev, 629 F.3d 1064 (2010). (AB, 17-20.) Greensprings
involved an appeal from an order under Fea. R. Civ. P. 15(a) granting leave to
amend and thus does not support Plaintiffs position.
In Greensprings, plaintiff sued defendant attorneys for malicious
prosecution. The District Court granted the attorneys' anti-SLAPP motion to
strike, but granted leave to amend under Fea. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Defendants
appealed from the order granting leave to amend. There was no appeal from the
order granting the anti-SLAPP motion.

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-4-
Plaintiffs misrepresent that Greensprings involved appeal from an order on
an anti-SLAPP motion (it did not), and that the Court of Appeals found that there
was no appellate jurisdiction on appeal from an order on an anti-SLAPP motion (it
did not so hold). (AB, 18.) Plaintiffs do not cite to any portion of the Greensprings
opinion, because the purported holding does not exist.
Greensprings followed the law established in Bat:el that an order denying
an anti-SLAPP motion is immediately appealable:
In Batzel v. Smith, however, this court answered the
related question of whether the denial of an anti-SLAPP
motion to strike is immediately appealable as a collateral
order. 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003). In Batzel, we found
that all three conditions for collateral appeal were satisfiea
because the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion (1) is
"conclusive as to whether the anti-SLAPP statute required
dismissal of Batzel's suit"; (2) "resolves a question separate
from the merits in that it merely finds that such merits may
exist, without evaluating whether the plaintiff's claim will
succeed"; and (3) forces a defendant "to incur the cost of a
lawsuit before having his or her right to free speech
vindicated." Id. at 1025. Accordingly, we held that we
possessed jurisdiction. Greensprings, supra, 629 F.3d at
1067; emphasis added.
The Court of Appeals held: we have continued to rely upon Batzel for the
proposition that we have jurisdiction over appeals of denials of motions to strike
under California's anti-SLAPP statute. Greensprings, supra, 629 F.3d at 1067;
emphasis added. Thus, as a matter of law under Bat:el and Greensprings, the order
is appealable.

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-5-
III.
As Determined in the District Courts Order, the Granting of Plaintiffs
Motion for Leave to File Their First Amended Complaint is Independent
From and Irrelevant to its Denial of Defendants Anti-SLAPP Motion
A. , 377 F.3d 1081 (9
th
Cir. 2004) is Inapposite, and Plaintiffs in Citing it Attempt to
Raise a New Argument Not Raised in the District Court
Plaintiffs argue that they had the right to amend their Complaint, even
though an anti-SLAPP motion was pending. (AB, 16.) Plaintiffs cite Jeri:on
Delaware, Inc. v. Covaa Comms. Co., 377 F.3d 1081 (9
th
Cir. 2004) for this
argument. (AB, 16.)
Plaintiffs did not raise this argument, nor cite to Jeri:on in the Court below.
[1 ER, 107-154.] Thus, Plaintiffs are barred from raising this new argument for the
first time in this appeal. Intl Union of Bricklavers & Alliea Craftsman Local
Union No. 20, AFL-CIO v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir.
1985). Kline v. Johns-Manville, 745 F.2d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1984).
The Court, also, did not rule that Plaintiffs motion had any effect on, or
provided a basis for opposition to, the anti-SLAPP motion. Although the Court in
its tentative ruling on Defendants motion was prepared to deem it moot, in light
of Plaintiffs motion, its final ruling provides the opposite; the Court explicitly
applied both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute to the Complaint to deny said
motion on its merits. [1 ER, 4-9 and 25-29.] The Court did not find Defendants
motion to be premature in any respect, including under Jeri:on.
Plaintiffs acknowledge their argument relying on Jeri:on is premised on the
Courts tentative ruling:

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-6-
The District Court issued its tentative ruling granting
Appellees (sic) Leave to Amend their Complaint; Denying
Appellants (sic) Motion to Strike and Motion to Dismiss;
and placed filing restrictions on the parties. The Court
found that Appellants (sic) Motions were premature in
light of Appellees filing their PFAC. (AB, 15; emphasis
added.)
Thus, based on the Courts final order, its denial of the anti-SLAPP motion
was completely independent from and irrelevant to its granting of Plaintiffs
motion for leave to file the FAC.
Moreover, Jeri:on does not apply to the denial on the merits of Defendants
motion. Jeri:on did not address denial of an anti-SLAPP motion, but instead
granting a defendant's anti-SLAPP motion to strike a plaintiff's initial complaint
without granting the plaintiff leave to amend.... Jeri:on, supra, 377 F.3d at 1091.
Jeri:on anticipates that plaintiff in response to an anti-SLAPP motion will
improve his or her claims in an amended complaint, and concomitantly, guarantees
defendants due process rights to challenge the amended complaint via anti-
SLAPP motion: Moreover, the purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute, the early
dismissal of meritless claims, would still be served if plaintiffs eliminated the
offending claims from their original complaint. If the offending claims remain in
the first amended complaint, the anti-SLAPP remedies remain available to
defendants. Ibia.; emphasis added.
Plaintiffs have submitted their FAC (consisting of 203 pages), with its
exhibits (consisting of more than 1,000 pages), with their Supplemental Excerpts
of Record. The FAC and its voluminous exhibits exceed 1,200 pages. The FAC is
not a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction [or]... a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.... as required by Fea. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1) and (2). The FAC is not an
improvement over the Complaint, in form or substance; the FAC is less legally

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-7-
sufficient than the Complaint, admitted by Plaintiffs to have been legally
insufficient. In the words of Jeri:on, the offending claims remain in the first
amended complaint.... Ibia. All defenses under the anti-SLAPP statute remain,
and apply with equal or greater force, as to Plaintiffs FAC.
Thus, if Jeri:on applies herein (and it does not), as a matter of law and as
required by due process the anti-SLAPP remedies remain available to
defendants. Ibia.
If Jeri:on applies herein (and it does not), it would require the Court below
to allow Defendants to challenge the FAC via anti-SLAPP motion. If Jeri:on
applies herein, it is clear that the Court violated Defendants due process rights
under Jeri:on to bring an anti-SLAPP motion to the FAC and, should the order be
affirmed, the Court should be instructed to allow Defendants to bring an anti-
SLAPP motion challenging the FAC.
B. , 317 F.3d 1097 (9
th
Cir. 2003)
is Inapposite, and Plaintiffs in Citing it Attempt to Raise a
New Argument Not Raised in the District Court
Plaintiffs cite to Jess v. Ciba-Geigv Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097 (9
th
Cir.
2003) for the argument: As Jess implicitly suggests, granting a Defendants Anti-
SLAPP motion to strike a Plaintiffs initial complaint without granting the
Plaintiff leave to amend would directly collide with Fea. R. Civ. P. 15(a)s policy
favoring liberal amendment. (AB, 17.)
Plaintiffs did not raise this argument nor cite to Jess in the Court below. [1
ER, 107-154.] Thus, Plaintiffs are barred from raising this new argument. Intl
Union of Bricklavers, supra, 752 F.2d at 1404. Kline, supra, 745 F.2d at 1221.
Plaintiffs admit that the Jess court was not specifically considering the
propriety of allowing a plaintiff to amend its complaint before ruling on an Anti-

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SLAPP motion.... (AB, 16; emphasis in original.) However, Plaintiffs argue that
the posture of that case is similar to the present case. (AB, 16.)
Plaintiffs misrepresent the posture presented in Jess. In Jess, three
defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs initial complaint under Fea. R. Civ. P. 9,
as well as under California's anti-SLAPP statute. Without ruling on the motions,
the District Court granted plaintiff leave to file a first amended complaint.
Defendants then renewed their motions as to the first amended complaint,
including under the anti-SLAPP statute. The District Court granted without
prejudice all defendants' Rule 9 motions to dismiss the amended complaint.
Plaintiff then declined to amend his complaint. The District Court
dismissed all defendants with prejudice under Rule 9, and granted their anti-
SLAPP motions to strike. Plaintiff appealed.
The Court of Appeals reversed in part, and affirmed in part, including to
affirm the dismissal of two defendants on their anti-SLAPP motions in light of the
statutory directive that the statute be "construed broadly." (Section 425.16(a).)
Jess, supra, 317 F.3d at 1110.
Thus, Jess did not consider the propriety of allowing a plaintiff to amend its
complaint in connection with ruling on an Anti-SLAPP motion. The anti-SLAPP
motion in Jess was granted well after plaintiff was allowed leave to file an
amended complaint; the decision on the anti-SLAPP motion was therefore
independent from and irrelevant to plaintiff being allowed leave to file an
amended complaint.
In this sense, Plaintiffs argument that the posture of that case [Jess] is
similar to the present case is correct - here (as in Jess) denial of Defendants anti-
SLAPP motion had nothing to do with Plaintiffs being allowed to file their FAC.
Therefore, if Jess applies herein, it would require reversal of the Courts order.

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Jess stands for the further proposition that if an anti-SLAPP motion may be
deemed moot vis a vis a pending Fea. R. Civ. P. 15 motion, and an amended
complaint is then filed, that defendants due process rights under Jess and Jeri:on
require that it be allowed to challenge the amended complaint via anti-SLAPP
motion. By application of Jess and Jeri:on, the Court was required to allow
Defendants to challenge the FAC via anti-SLAPP motion. The Court violated
Defendants due process rights under Jess and Jeri:on to bring an anti-SLAPP
motion challenging the FAC and, should the order be affirmed, the Court should
be instructed to allow Defendants to bring an anti-SLAPP motion challenging the
FAC.
C. ,
629 F.3d 1064 (9
th
Cir. 2010) Does Not Support Plaintiffs
Argument, Plaintiffs in Citing it Attempt to Raise a New
Argument Not Raised in the District Court, and Plaintiffs
Admit That Requires That Defendants Be
Allowed to Challenge Their First Amended Complaint Via
Anti-SLAPP Motion
Plaintiffs argue that Greensprings supports the Courts denial of
Defendants anti-SLAPP motion by treating it as moot in connection with
Plaintiffs motion for leave to file their FAC. (AB, 42.) For the reasons explained
above - namely that Greensprings did not arise out of an appeal from an order on
anti-SLAPP motion - that case does not support Plaintiffs argument.
As with Plaintiffs reliance on Jeri:on and Jess, they did not raise this
argument in opposition to Defendants anti-SLAPP motion and did not cite to
Greensprings below. [See, 1 ER, 107-154.] Thus, Plaintiffs are barred from raising

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this new argument for the first time herein. Intl Union of Bricklavers, supra, 752
F.2d at 1404. Kline, supra, 745 F.2d at 1221.
Moreover, Plaintiffs in relying on Greensprings admit that a Court allowing
amendment in the face of an anti-SLAPP motion is required to allow defendant to
challenge the amended pleading via an anti-SLAPP motion: The Ninth Circuit [in
Greensprings] held that the Order granting leave to amend, allowing the Plaintiff
to plead additional facts, was in essence the District Court indicating that it would
revisit the impact of the Anti-SLAPP statute in light of the amendment. (AB, 20;
emphasis added.)
Plaintiffs thus admit that Greensprings (as well as Jeri:on and Jess) require
a Court granting leave to amend must allow defendant to revisit the impact of the
Anti-SLAPP statute in light of the amendment. Therefore, as agreed by Plaintiffs,
should the order be affirmed, the Court should be instructed to allow Defendants
to bring an anti-SLAPP motion challenging the FAC.
IV.
The District Court, as a Matter of Law, Erred in Concluding that Defendants
Did Not Meet Their Burden Under Section 425.16(b) to Show that Plaintiffs
Complaint Arises Out of Defendants Acts in Furtherance of Their Rights of
Petition or Free Speech in Connection with a Public Issue
A. Plaintiffs Have Represented to the District Court that this Case
Presents Issues of Great Public Interest, Concerning the Birther
Movement, and Related Rights of Petition and Free Speech in
Furtherance of that Movement
The bulk of Plaintiffs AB is devoted to distancing themselves from the
political dissident movement, including a component known as the Birther
Movement, by those challenging the qualifications of President Barack Obama.

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As demonstrated in Defendants briefs, Taitz is a political dissent leader who,
individually and through DOFF, has been and remains the leader of this
movement.
As the Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno, Judge succinctly summarized
Plaintiffs and Defendants history in his December 23, 2010 Memorandum:
In sum, Plaintiffs and Defendants are part of the birther
movement, which is comprised of individuals who believe
that President Obama is ineligible to be President of the
United States because he was born in Kenya. At one time,
Plaintiffs and Defendants worked together to attempt to
prove President Obamas illegitimacy but infighting among
them led to this lawsuit.
[1 ER, 238.]
Despite Plaintiffs attempt to portray this case as not about any political
issue (AB, 31), in fact, per Plaintiffs, it is squarely concerned with control over
the Birther Movement. In this regard, Plaintiffs at an August 2009 hearing before
Judge Robreno represented the following:
THE COURT: Okay. See, what Im trying to
understand is other than this individual infighting, whether
there is a difference between the simple Taitz position, or
the defendants position, and the plaintiffs position on the
issue of the Obama presidency?
In other words, whether all this involves a disagreement on
a substantive issue, or all of this infighting seems to
obscure the basis purpose of which all of you are involved
in.
MR. BERG: Well, it appears, Your Honor,
supposedly were on both the same course.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. BERG: However, and theres been - and, if I
can supply them to the Court later and copies to counsel by
letter or memorandum, in the past few days theres been
several articles written, independent of me, which basically
brings out what Ive said for months, that Orlv Tait: if in
here reallv to unaermine evervthing - and her goal was -
she set out months ago to bring me down, which makes no

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sense, because I have three pending lawsuits in Federal
Court, and it doesnt make sense.
But, now other people are writing it looks like shes
reallv working either airectlv for Obama, or people
relatea there, even though shes supposedly working
against it by all of her wild actions.
I call her, and Ive quoted her in the paper, as a loose
cannon, but her actions, Your Honor, are detrimental to
this cause, and even theyve had her on TV in the past
few days, and she makes a fool of herself, because she
doesnt really know what shes talking about.
Therefore, I think it makes sense that shes trving to
bring us aown. Bv bringing us aown, it woula close out
the whole effort. So, I think thats what it is.
THE COURT: Okay, I follow that, okay.
[SER, 60-61; emphasis added.]
Therefore, according to Plaintiffs, this case is really about their efforts to
purge the Birther Movement of Taitz whom they portray as a type of double-agent
or saboteur working 'either airectlv for Obama, or people relatea there and a
'aetriment to this cause. Per Plaintiffs, Taitz is seeking to 'close out the whole
effort (i.e., the Birther Movement).
In reality, of course, Taitz is not seeking to destroy the Birther Movement.
She is protecting its integrity and advancing its goals by, among other things,
acting as a whistleblower against Plaintiffs to resist their efforts to corrupt and
usurp control of this political movement.
Therefore, per Plaintiffs, this case is directly about a political issue of the
greatest importance - the rights of political dissidents such as Taitz to exercise
their free speech rights and petition for redress of grievances without fear of being
sued because of such activities.

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B. Defendants Met their Burden Under Section 425.16(b) Where
Plaintiffs Complaint Clearly Arises Out of Defendants Alleged
Acts in Furtherance of their Rights of Petition and Free Speech in
Connection with Public Issues
1. Plaintiffs - by their silence in their brief - admit that
Defendants allegedly made written or oral statement[s] or
writing[s] made before a legislative, executive, or judicial
proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by
law.... as required by section 425.16(e)(1)
An action may be a SLAPP suit under subparts (1) and (2) of section
425.16(e) without any separate demonstration by defendant that its speech or
petition concerned an issue of public significance. Briggs v. Eaen Council for
Hope & Opportunitv, 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1113 (1999). Sipple v. Founaation for Nat.
Progress, 71 Cal.App.4th 226, 236-237 (1999).
Plaintiffs argue: In order to prevail on an Anti-SLAPP motion, the
Defendant is required to make a prima facie showing that the Plaintiffs (sic) suit
arises from an act by the Defendant made in connection with a public issue in
furtherance of the Defendants right to free speech under the United States or
California Constitution. (AB, 38; emphasis added.) Plaintiffs are plainly wrong as
to section 425.16(e)(1) and (2), which do not require a separate demonstration by
defendant that its speech or petition concerned an issue of public significance.
Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 1113. Sipple, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at 236-237.
Plaintiffs cite Unitea States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheea Missiles & Space
Co., 190 F.3d 963, 971 (9
th
Cir. 1999) for their erroneous argument. (AB, 38.) In
Newsham, qui tam plaintiffs brought an anti-SLAPP motion against counterclaims.

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The District Court refused to apply the anti-SLAPP statute on the grounds that it
was unavailable to qui tam plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
qui tam plaintiffs could seek that relief:
Only two aspects of California's Anti-SLAPP statute are at
issue: the special motion to strike, Cal. Civ. P. Code
425.16(b), and the availability of fees and costs, Cal. Civ.
P. Code 425.16(c).
***
For these reasons, we hold that the district court erred in
finding that subsections (b) and (c) of California's
Anti-SLAPP statute could not be applied to LMSC's
counterclaims. Becausethe district court concluded that the
Anti-SLAPP statute was inapplicable, it did not rule on the
relators' motion to strike, nor on their motion for fees and
costs. We remand to the district court so that it may rule on
these issues. Newsham, supra, 190 F.3d at 971, 973.
There is no discussion in Newsham of the requirements of section
425.16(e)(1)-(4). It thus cannot be determined under what subparts of section
425.16 qui tam plaintiffs proceeded. Newsham does not support Plaintiffs
argument which, in any event, is clearly incorrect as to section 425.16(e)(1) and
(2). Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 1113. Sipple, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at 236-237.
Defendants clearly met their burden to demonstrate statements made before
a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding
authorized by law.... as required by section 425.16(e)(1). Plaintiffs Complaint
recites a litany of such statements including that Taitz wrote to the U.S. Supreme
Court Justices seeking help in an investigation regarding a criminal complaint she
had filed with the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding hacking into her
websites and tampering of her PayPal accounts... Taitz sent this same letter to the
Secret Service and other Governmental Law Enforcement Agencies. [1 ER, 262.]
Taitz also allegedly contacted Liberis probation officer in New Mexico, and the

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San Bernardino County District Attorney, informing them of Liberis violation of
the terms of her probation, including that Liberi could not possess nor use any
credit card without permission of the probation officer, all for the purpose of
seeking redress for Liberis violation of her probation in connection with
Plaintiffs interference with Defendants websites and diversion of donations. [1
ER, 268 and 275-279.]
Defendants alleged statements were thus unquestionably made before a
legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding
authorized by law.... as required by section 425.16(e)(1) and thus per se protected
activity under the anti-SLAPP statute.
Defendants alleged statements were also exercises of their constitutional
right to petition which includes the basic act of filing litigation or otherwise
seeking administrative action." Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 1115. California
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimitea, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972).
Plaintiffs AB is devoid of any citation to or discussion of section
425.16(e)(1). Plaintiffs fail to cite or discuss, much less attempt to distinguish, any
of the controlling decisional law under section 425.16(e)(1) cited and discussed in
Defendants briefs. (This includes but is not limited to the controlling cases Sipple,
and Kibler v. N. Invo Countv Local Hospital Dist., 39 Cal.4th 192, 196-198
(2006).)
In fact, there are a mere three references in the AB to section 425.16(e),
none of which discuss the requirements of its subparts (1) - (4). These references
provide:
1. The District Court properly found that Defendants-Appellants failed
to make a prima facie showing that the acts Plaintiffs-Appellees

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complained of fall into any of the four [4] categories outlined in CCP
425.16(e). (AB, 2.)
2. The District Court denied the Anti-SLAPP Motion finding Taitz and
DOFF did not meet their burden under Cal. Civ. Coae 425.16(e),
failing to make a prima facie showing that the acts complained of fall
into any of the four categories of 425.16(e). (AB, 15-16; emphasis
in original.)
3. See also 425.16(e) (defining act in furtherance of a persons right
of... free speech.). (AB, 38.)
Plaintiffs paltry three references to section 425.16(e) (including to a non-
existent California Civil Coae section) are superficial, without analysis of the
requirements of its subparts (1) - (4). Plaintiffs thus admit by their silence that
Defendants met their burden under section 425.16(e)(1).
Arguments or issues that are not supported by pertinent legal argument or
proper citation of authority are waived. Meehan v. Countv of Los Angeles, 856
F.2d 102, 106 n.1 (9th Cir. 1988). Collins v. Citv of San Diego, 841 F.2d 337, 339
(9
th
Cir. 1988).
Plaintiffs fail to address the requirements of section 425.16(e)(1). Therefore,
Plaintiffs have waived any argument that Defendants alleged statements do not
come within section 425.16(e)(1). Defendants have met their burden to show
statements protected under section 425.16(e)(1). Thus, the District Courts
conclusion that Defendants failed to make a prima facie showing that the acts
complained of fall into any of those four categories of 425.16(e) is clearly
erroneous under section 425.16(e)(1). [1 ER, 8.]

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2. Plaintiffs - by their silence in their brief - admit that
Defendants allegedly made written or oral statement[s] or
writing[s] made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or
judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized
by law.... as required by section 425.16(e)(2)
The requirements of section 425.16(e)(2) are construed broadly. Kibler,
supra, 39 Cal.4th at 198. As with a SLAPP suit under section 425.16(e)(1),
subpart (2) does not require any separate demonstration by defendant that its
speech or petition concerned an issue of public significance. Briggs, supra, 19
Cal.4th at 1113. Sipple, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at 236-237.
Defendants clearly met their burden to demonstrate statements made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive,
or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.... as required
by section 425.16(e)(2). Plaintiffs Complaint recites a litany of such statements
listed above with regard to section 425.16(e)(1). Taitzs alleged statements,
including to several Governmental Law Enforcement Agencies, is the very
definition of statements within section 425.16(e)(2). [1 ER, 262, 268, 272 and
275-279.]
Plaintiffs fail to discuss section 425.16(e)(2). (See, AB, 2, 15-16 and 38,
discussed above.) Plaintiffs fail to cite or discuss, much less attempt to distinguish,
any of the controlling decisional law under section 425.16(e)(2) cited and
discussed by Defendants. (This includes but is not limited to the controlling cases
Sipple and Kibler.)

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Therefore, Plaintiffs have waived any argument that Defendants alleged
statements do not come section 425.16(e)(2). Meehan, supra, 856 F.2d at 106 n.1.
Collins, supra, 841 F.2d at 339. Defendants have met their burden to show
statements protected under section 425.16(e)(2). Thus, the District Courts
conclusion that Defendants failed to make a prima facie showing that the acts
complained of fall into any of those four categories of 425.16(e) is clearly
erroneous under section 425.16(e)(2). [1 ER, 8.]
3. Plaintiffs - by their silence in their brief - admit that
Defendants allegedly made written or oral statement[s] or
writing[s] made in a place open to the public or a public
forum in connection with an issue of public interest.... as
required by section 425.16(e)(3)
Web sites where the public may read views and information posted, and
post their own opinions, as a matter of law are a public forum for purposes of
section 425.16(e)(3). Ampex Corp. v. Cargle, 128 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1576 (2005).
The term public forum includes forms of public
communication other than those occurring in a physical
setting. Thus the electronic communication media may
constitute public forums. Web sites that are accessible free
of charge to any member of the public where members of
the public may read the views and information posted, and
post their own opinions, meet the definition of a public
forum for purposes of section 425.16. (ComputerXpress,
Inc. v. Jackson, supra, at p. 1007.) Thus the Yahoo!
message board maintained for Ampex was a public forum.
(Ampex, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at 1576; emphasis added.)
Ninth Circuit cases interpret public forum under section 425.16(e)(3) to
include websites. (See, Trov Group, Inc. v. Tilson, 364 F.Supp.2d 1149, 1153
(2005).) Thus, Defendants met their burden under section 425.16(e)(3) on its
public forum component.

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Defendants alleged statements were made in connection with an issue of
public interest.... as required by section 425.16(e)(3). This language is interpreted
broadly. Annette F. v. Sharon S., 119 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1160 (2004). Under
California law, to constitute or concern a public issue, the involved conduct must
either impact a broad segment of society or affect a community in a manner similar
to that of a governmental entity. Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club, 85
Cal.App.4th 468, 479 (2000). Defendants alleged statements, all made in
furtherance of the political dissident movement and its Birther component,
certainly impact a broad segment of society by stirring important public debate
regarding the qualifications of highest political leaders to hold office as well as
generate considerable media coverage. This broad segment includes, but is not
limited to, thousands of adherents of the Birther Movement, as well as millions
who follow media coverage of such political debate.
Defendants clearly met their burden to demonstrate statements and writings
made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue
of public interest.... as required by section 425.16(e)(3). Plaintiffs Complaint
recites numerous such statements and writings including that Taitz engaged in
whistleblowing via publishing statements on various websites and internet blogs
reporting that Plaintiffs interfered with Appellants websites and internet blogs,
created misleading websites and diverted donations from DOFF to entities
controlled by Plaintiffs. [1 ER, 264.] Plaintiffs also allege that Taitz published
statements on various websites and blogs regarding the criminal record of Liberi.
[1 ER, 268.]
Defendants alleged statements were squarely made in a place open to the
public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest.... as
required by section 425.16(e)(3) and thus per se protected activity.

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Defendants alleged statements were also exercises of their constitutional
right to free speech, including political speech in furtherance of the Birther
Movement challenging the qualifications of President Obama. N.A.A.C.P. v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963). This case directly implicates control over that
movement, particularly as to crucial fund-raising activities, including over its
primary method to achieve its goals, litigation challenging President Obamas
qualifications. It presents the strongest possible set of facts squarely presenting
free speech and petition activity protected per se under section 425.16(e)(3).
Plaintiffs fail to discuss section 425.16(e)(3). (See, AB, 2, 15-16 and 38,
discussed above.) Plaintiffs fail to cite or discuss, much less attempt to distinguish,
any of the controlling decisional law under section 425.16(e)(3) discussed by
Defendants. (This includes but is not limited to the controlling cases Ampex, Trov
Group, Annette F., Damon and Rivero v. AFL-CIO, 105 Cal.App.4th 913, 923
(2003).)
Compounding Plaintiffs admissions are their numerous references to
Taitzs and DOFFs alleged statements and writings within section 425.16(e)(3)
including but not limited to the following:
Taitz through DOFF repeatedly published on her website,
on the Internet, repeatedly mass emailed to millions of
individuals and businesses, posted on Social Networksites,
Tweeted it, posted it as a reporter on Before Its News....
Taitz publicized... repeatedly on the internet, through mass
emailing to millions of individuals and businesses, through
RSS feeds, posting it on Social Network sites, discussing
it on radio, TV interviews, YouTube videos, in articles,
etc.... (AB, 5-6.)
Making statements and writings on the Internet, mass email to millions of
individuals, posting on social network websites, acting as a reporter on Before
Its News and discussing it on radio, TV interviews are the very essence of

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statements made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection
with an issue of public interest.... under section 425.16(e)(3).
Plaintiffs fail to address section 425.16(e)(3). Therefore, Plaintiffs have
waived any argument that Defendants alleged statements do not come section
425.16(e)(3). Meehan, supra, 856 F.2d at 106 n.1. Collins, supra, 841 F.2d at 339.
Defendants have met their burden to show statements protected under section
425.16(e)(3). Thus, the District Courts conclusion that Defendants failed to
make a prima facie showing that the acts complained of fall into any of those four
categories of 425.16(e) is clearly erroneous under section 425.16(e)(3). [1 ER,
8.]
4. Plaintiffs - by their silence in their brief - admit that
Defendants allegedly engaged in any other conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of
petition or the constitutional right of free speech in
connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest
as required by section 425.16(e)(4)
Defendants alleged statements qualify as conduct in furtherance of the
exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free
speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest under
section 425.16(e)(4) for the same reasons, explained above, that they are protected
activity per se under section 425.16(e)(3).
The meaning and application of public interest under section 425.16(e)(4)
is the same as that under section 425.16(e)(3). Tuchscher Development
Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unifiea Port Dist., 106 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1233
(2003).

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Plaintiffs fail to discuss section 425.16(e)(4). (See, AB, 2, 15-16 and 38,
discussed above.) Plaintiffs fail to cite or discuss, much less attempt to distinguish,
any of the controlling decisional law under section 425.16(e)(4) cited and
discussed by Defendants, including but not limited to Tuchscher.
Therefore, Plaintiffs have waived any argument that Defendants alleged
statements do not come section 425.16(e)(4). Meehan, supra, 856 F.2d at 106 n.1.
Collins, supra, 841 F.2d at 339. Defendants have met their burden to show
statements protected under section 425.16(e)(4). Thus, the District Courts
conclusion that Defendants failed to make a prima facie showing that the acts
complained of fall into any of those four categories of 425.16(e) is clearly
erroneous under section 425.16(e)(4). [1 ER, 8.]
5. Plaintiffs argument that the anti-SLAPP statute does not
apply to invasion of privacy, defamation or similar claims is
incorrect as a matter of law
Plaintiffs only argument regarding whether Defendants alleged statements
come within the anti-SLAPP statute provides:
A Motion filed to Dismiss a Case under the Anti-SLAPP
statute will not prevail in actions filed as a result of
Invasion of Privacy, Defamation, violations of the
Information Practices Act, California Civil Code... 1798,
et seq., Harassment, Stalking, and similar causes, nor
should they....
Likewise, false allegations, accusations, invasion of
privacy, violations of the privacy laws are not Free Speech
protected by the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution. As explained in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250, 72 S.Ct. 725, 96 L.Ed. 919 (1952), libelous
speech is not protected by the United States Constitution....
(AB, 1-2; emphasis in original.)
Plaintiffs argument is grossly superficial and simply wrong. It is
completely lacking in any legal analysis relevant to anti-SLAPP motion, including

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(crucially) whether Defendants alleged statements come within any of the four
defined categories of statements and writings set out in section 425.16(e)(1)-(4).
The essence of Plaintiffs argument is that, simply because they allege
Defendants engaged in defamation and other illegal behaviors and actions, this
somehow immunizes their Complaint from challenge via anti-SLAPP motion. This
argument, on its face and as a matter of law, is erroneous. Plaintiffs also cite no
case law supporting their position (because there is none).
Two seminal anti-SLAPP cases - Briggs and Sipple - illustrate why
Plaintiffs are wrong. In Briggs, Plaintiffs sought damages for defamation,
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and harassment. Briggs,
supra, 19 Cal.4th at 1109. Plaintiff (as required) alleged that the defamatory
speech was false. The California Supreme Court found that the lower Court
properly granted defendants anti-SLAPP motion where the alleged conduct came
within section 425.16(e)(1) and (2). Ia. at 1117.
In Sipple, plaintiff sought damages for libel, intentional interference with
contract and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. Sipple,
supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at 231. As in Briggs, plaintiff in Sipple necessarily alleged
that the defamatory speech was false. The Court of Appeal concluded the
allegedly false statement made in the context of a separate lawsuit clearly comes
within section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1) as it is . . . a legislative, executive, or
judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law... and
respondents need not separately show that these statements concern an issue of
public interest." Ia. at 237-238.
Therefore, as a matter of law, that alleged statements are false is irrelevant
to the application of the anti-SLAPP statute.

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Likewise, Plaintiffs reliance on Beauharnais is misplaced. It is obviously
not an anti-SLAPP case, having been published forty years before Californias
anti-SLAPP statute was enacted in 1992. Whether allegedly libelous or otherwise
false speech is regarded as free speech under the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution is irrelevant to whether alleged statements, including allegedly false
statements, come within the anti-SLAPP statute. The only relevant inquiry is
whether Defendants alleged statements come within any of the four defined
categories of statements and writings set out in section 425.16(e)(1)-(4).
If Plaintiffs argument was correct (and it is not), then every anti-SLAPP
motion would be immediately defeated by a plaintiffs contention that alleged
statements are false or otherwise illegal behaviors and actions. That simply is
not, and cannot be, the law.
The applicable legal standards, having nothing to do with whether the
alleged statements are false or otherwise wrongful, are set out in section
425.16(e)(1)-(4). Where Plaintiffs AB is devoid of any citation to or discussion of
section 425.16(e)(1)-(4), they admit by their silence that Defendants met their
burden to show statements protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.
V.
Appellant, Orly Taitz, Incorporates By Reference Certain Portions of the
Related Reply Brief of Appellant, Defend Our Freedoms Foundations, Inc., in
These Consolidated Appeals
The appeals by Taitz and DOFF from the District Courts order denying
their joint anti-SLAPP motion have been consolidated. Accordingly, for the sake
of efficiency and convenience of the Court of Appeals, Taitz incorporates herein
by this reference as though fully set forth the following portions of DOFFs reply
brief:

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DOFFs Section II. The District Court, as a Matter of Law, Erred in
Concluding that Plaintiffs Met Their Burden Under California Code of Civil
Procedure Section 425.16(b)(1) to Demonstrate a Probability of Prevailing as
Against Appellants; and
DOFFs Section III. Contrary to Plaintiffs Unsupported Contentions,
Defendants Opening Briefs Are Not Based on New Arguments, New Statements,
and New Defenses, Nor Do the Opening Briefs Contain Improper Citations to
the Record.
VI.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein and in Defendants opening briefs, the District
Court, as a matter of law, erred in denying their anti-SLAPP motion to strike under
California Coae of Civil Proceaure section 425.16. Taitz thus respectfully submits
that the order denying that motion should be reversed and an order granting said
motion be entered.
Alternatively, if said order is affirmed, Taitz pursuant to Jeri:on, Jess and
Greensprings respectfully requests that the Court should be instructed to allow
Defendants to bring an anti-SLAPP motion challenging the FAC.
Dated: April 19, 2012 By: /s/ - Jeffrey P. Cunningham, Esq
Kim Schumann, Esq.
Jeffrey P. Cunningham, Esq.
Attorneys for Appellant,
ORLY TAITZ

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
This brief contains 6,775 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed.
R. App. P. Rule 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).
This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. Rule
32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. Rule 32(a)(6) because
this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using WordPerfect
in Times New Roman font size 14.
Dated: April 19, 2012 By: /s/ - Jeffrey P. Cunningham, Esq.
Kim Schumann, Esq.
Jeffrey P. Cunningham, Esq.
Attorneys for Appellant,
ORLY TAITZ

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