Marcel Chelba The Consolation of Philosophy? Comments on an article by Lawrence M.

Krauss in Scientific American, April 28, 2012: The Consolation of Philosophy. An update by the author of A Universe from Nothing on his thoughts, as a theoretical physicist, about the value of the discipline of philosophy.

First Comment April 28, 2012 Is a typical example of arrogance and lack of reverence, not only for philosophy, but also for physics. Source of misunderstanding is that physics and philosophy are placed in two different epistemological perspectives. Epistemological problem in physics is what we know?. Epistemological problem in philosophy is how do we know?. Knowledge in physics is positive. Knowledge in philosophy is apophatic (ie critical, as Kant might say). Physician, usually, thinks he knows something. Philosopher says: What physicist knows is just what he imagines there is, judging by the impressions he receives in the experience. And this situation will always remain unchanged, as many devices will interpose between himself and the measured objects. Physical reality (thing itself, such as Kant said) will always remain hidden from physicist. That is, if you will, the epistemological paradox of scientific knowledge. Knowledge in physics is just a hermeneutics of empirical experience. That is what the philosopher known with certainty. When Bohr says It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out about nature. Physics concerns what we can say about nature he is a philosopher, in more authentic sense of the word, not a physicist, in the classic sense of the word. To be understood, I do not conceive this epistemological conflict as a conflict between two professions, but between two perspectives of thought, which, as Kant showed, can be reconciled when viewed in a critical perspective. I marvel that they can discuss today epistemology without mention no word about Kant the philosopher who received the ultimate confirmation just by the appearance of quantum mechanics and relativity theory. The consolation of physics is that, unlike philosophy, has some extra toys and that she can always build a bomb to reduce all others to silence. Philosophys products are not salable stuff. Its ideas are usually plagiarized and used free of priests and kings, politicians, engineers and scientists. Philosophical knowledge is the purest, most authentic and most free knowledge possible. Perhaps these distinctions are not useful for a physicist today, but I'm sure will soon be very useful for physics. This is my theory in my book, Critical Introduction. About the possibility of Metaphysics as Science in the critical philosophy of Kant (2004): http://www.scribd.com/doc/17474184/Marcel-Chelba-Kantian-tetralogy-Vol-I-Critical-IntroductionAbout-the-possibility-of-Metaphysics-as-Science-in-the-critical-philosophy-of-Kant http://www.scribd.com/doc/10039681/Marcel-Chelba-Tetralogia-kantian-Vol-I-Introducere-CriticDespre-posibilitatea-Metafizicii-ca-tiin-in-perspectiva-filosofiei-critice-kant

(Looking for a translator from Romanian into English.)

Second Comment April 30, 2012 What physicists want? They want to find the root of the world the primordial clay the absolute zero from which emerge all, the universe, galaxies, stars, planets, up to this mirror of the world, which seems to be the man and his conscience. Why? Because, in that primordial vacuum, the man still thinks he will find something, namely, the inflection point of Creation, the magic switch by which he could manipulate the world through which he could reconfigure or rebuild the world on other foundations possible because, basically, once arrived there, man would be able to replace God as Creator. Founding myth of physics is the usurper disciple the son who tries to usurp his own father the man who dreams to go back to the roots of his ontogeny, with a sort of time machine, to become his own father and choose his own genetic characteristics. But always is a mother, who we can not choose. But, on their way toward the atom (as the Greeks called generic the original brick of the world), physicists will always find, not the Nothing itself (the One, as Parmenides said, or the pure Undeterminate, as Kant says), but a contingent something, that is made in turn from something else any elementar brick will always discovered to be made from other two or more elementar bricks, which will be linked by a mortar, which, in it's turn, they will find that is made from other elementar bricks, which again will be welded with another mortar. Then physicists will discover that this material scaffold of the world has an antisymmetric counter candidate, which, again, can aposteriori be empirically proved. Then physicists will discover that these two systems of elementary particles must be connected through a third system of particles which, again, may be proved empirically. And so on. In short, physicists, seeking primordial brick of the world, only reiterate on an empirical level the algorithm of becoming surprised by Hegel in his Phenomenology of spirit and Logic. But which physicist read Hegel? But Kant? Without some illustrious exceptions, neither mathematics can not say that they know too much. They know only to take measurements and then make some analogies between measurements graph and the graph of certain mathematical functions set earlier by mathematicians. Without progress of mathematics, physics's progress is impossible, no matter how many experiments physicists would do in laboratories. Let alone about philosophy, whose progress is essential for the progress of whole human knowledge. Philosophers are explorers of thought and knowledge bases. Physicists do nothing but to rediscover them implicitly from some special cases. But because their results are marketable, and not those of philosophers, they have the luxury to ignore the philosophical tradition and qualify it as unnecessary. But, say again, this is not a conflict between two professions, but between two perspectives of thought who sometimes meet and are in perfect harmony, in the mind of a single man. You can not truly be a researcher in physics, if you do not have some philosophical skills, abstract (speculative) thinking, and some creative imagination. The real scientist is driven by metaphysical curiosity the desire to see what is beyond the current paradigms of knowledge. Mediocre researchers are motivated only by immediate practical interest they never risk to contradict existing doctrines they are just users who benefit from the true pioneers of knowledge. These pragmatic researchers, from behind the front of scientific knowledge always confuse the concept of value with the concept of price. In the laboratory, they make more economic policy than genuine scientific research. If physicists (and others) would have a thorough philosophical education, the speed of our scientific and technological progress would increase exponentially. But their philosophical readings

usually stop to a few pages of Aristotle and Descartes. They often rely on intermediaries on some commentators who do not understand to much, either in philosophy or physics. That happened with Kant, for example, that after a century when he received the ultimate confirmation even in the realm of science, he is still considered to be exceeded.

Third Comment May 16, 2012 I agree with you, Gecko, and others who have posted here. Now to return to the topic of this article, I would add only that: the concept of "Nothing" is a synthetic a priori concept (in Kant's terms), so, a pure construction of our productive imagination, which ever can not be connected to some empirical intuition (an object of our empirical experience). But suppose there is such an object: "Nothing". Which are its predicates? 1. If we try to empirically determine the predicates of "Nothing", we will fall into the vicious circle of the physicists, who, after each determination of ?Nothing's particle" will find that this "Nothing" is "Something", that can be further divided into other particles. 2. If we try to theoreticaly (a priori) define the predicates of "Nothing", we will fall back into the dilemma of Parmenides, in his attempt to define the One. What are doing modern physicists: start with some theoretical goals, of mathematical or philosophical origins, and then they try to prove them empirically (experimentally). However, this is exactly Kant's epistemological scheme, in which our faculty of representation and our faculty of judgment, amplified by our productive imagination, prevail over sensitivity and empirical experience. Theoretical knowledge (transcendental knowledge) is a priori knowledge. Empirical knowledge is a posteriori knowledge. But, says Kant most clearly, this is not a dispute between these two perspectives of knowledge, because no one is infallible and may not function properly without the other. All is to know which are the "ontological skills" and "heuristical responsibilities" of each. To bet only on empirical experience or philosophical reflection is a proof of ignorance as much. In fact, all in physics is "equal with zero". Any physical law is reducible to a mathematical equation who says that "something" is equal with "nothing". By this, any physical law is in essence a conservation law. When physicists raise the demand that the universe must have been born, somehow, out of nothing, they merely put forward a philosophical goal, namely that "something" objectively given (independent of our consciousness) must subsist in itself and for himself, must be eternal, must not be able to experience the change in a part thereof without other changes in another part of it, so that the total amount of changes to be zero. The physical universe must be eternal (of inertia) and equal with zero (by virtue of a conservation law), becouse there is no outer world and no external forces who disturb it. Epistemological paradox of physics is that, just as far as physicists approach the shape of a perfectly consistent model of the universe, they lose the dimension of movement (of change), and then have to postulate again a DEUS EX MACHINA to give the original flick, the spark to trigger the primordial Bang. Nature walk ALTERNAM PATEM, I like to say. These are the two steps of knowledge: we first impose some goals of consistency and symmetry to our ontological models (not only to our physical models), then, to justify the change, movement, accidents, approximations and errors of interpretation, we impose some goals of paraconsistency,

quasi-absurd, irrational or paradoxical, to meet the completeness requirement of our ontological models. So-called scientific knowledge (of which only those who do not understand make a kind of religion) is just the ash that remains after the game of our productive imagination and empirical experience. I have discussed these ideas in my book ? ?Critical Introduction. About the possibility of Metaphysics as a Science, in light of Kantian critical philosophy? (Crates, 2004) ? but unfortunately can not give more than a few pages in English. I am looking further a translator and money to do this. I do not know if relevant: but I would like to mention that I am licensed in physics, in Romania, to the University of Tim?oara, and I a doctorate in philosophy (still unfinished), on a subject of Metaphysics. You can see all my comments on this topic at: http://www.scribd.com/doc/91632125/Marcel-Chelba-The-Consolation-of-Physics-Comment-onan-article-by-Lawrence-M-Krauss-The-Consolation-of-Philosophy See also: http://www.scribd.com/doc/17474184/Marcel-Chelba-Kantian-tetralogy-Vol-I-CriticalIntroduction-About-the-possibility-of-Metaphysics-as-Science-in-the-critical-philosophy-of-Kant and: http://www.scribd.com/doc/16640613/Marcel-Chelba-The-Antinomy-of-Pure-Reason-and-LogicalParadoxes-Kantinomus

Forth Comment May 18, 2012 I agree with you, jctyler, but I did not want to dwell here with too many details. I have analyzed this topic in my book (Critical Introduction. About the possibility of Metaphysics as a Science in the perspective of Kant's critical philosophy). It give here only the content, to convince yourself of the importance I have given this subject. If you are interested on my book please find a publisher to handle the translation and publication, because here in Romania, no one seems interested in this subject. Thanks for the reply.

Marcel Chelba Critical Introduction About the possibility of Metaphysics, as a Science, in the perspective of Kant's critical philosophy. Crates Publishing, Resita, Romania, 2004.

Contents:

Foreword Argument Appendix Critical Introduction: I. A strategic step back I.1. Antithetic of pure reason: the incandescent core of the Critique of Pure Reason. A strategic retreat behind the sensitive experience (within the transcendental). The need for discovery of a transcendental topic and a discipline of pure reason. I.2. The cardinal concepts of pure reason and their possible ontological significance. II. For the sake of peace II.1. A conflict of interests and a compromise solution. The substitution of transcendent censorship with a transcendental self-censorship. Formation of a critical system of Pure Reason as a perspectives of thought reconciliation system. II.2. Transcendental idealism instead of empirical idealism. Totality argument instead of the majority argument. Practical success instead of pragmatic success. Titanic-waltz. II.3. Metaphysical certainty rather than empirical certainty. Metaphysical approval instead of public approval. Consistency truth the prototype of the correspondence truth. II.4. Pragmatic truth, moral competence and judicial competence. Metaphysics in the service of peace. II.5. Redefining the metaphysics as a science of its own possibility. II.6. Ethical reconstruction of nature. Kant's meeting with Socrates. II.7. A system of wariness a bridge of reconciliation between being and beings. Technology and moral two orthogonal perspectives of beings. III. Towards a new paradigm of science. III.1. From the tree of the predicates to the theory of ramified types: same problem same solution. III.2. Empirical confirmation of Kantian transcendental idealism: non-Euclidean geometry, quantum mechanics and relativity. 1. Copernican revolution of Lobacevski, Bolyai and Gauss. 2. Short intermezzo on a similar theme in the philosophy of culture (Lucian Blaga). 3. The dilemma of classical geometry and transcendental solution of modern geometry. 4. Einstein's Copernican Revolution 5. Copernican revolution of quantum mechanics. III.3. Constitutive relativity of experience and unfinished project of Kant. IV. In search of a better ensured certainty IV.1. How is it possible to know from our inward what's out there? How is it possible the Transcendent? IV.2. Our transcendental myopia and overcome it by recognizing and rational integration of its constituent uncertainty in a antinomic system of possible world (experience). Escape from illusion by illusion recognition. IV.3. Ontological surprise the essence of any possible object (as Gegenstand).

V. Blind paradigm. V.1. Kant's man Cheselden's blind. V.2. Empirical disappointment. Impossibility of evidency. Paraconsistent awakening of metaphysics after consistent (dogmatically) sleep of reason. Rational bases of faith and morals. VI. Dilemma and the method of metaphysics. VI.1. The dilemma of metaphysics Gdel's dilemma. Transcendental logic an applied logic of paraconsistency. Paradigmatic unit of Critique and modern fundational research. VI.2. Mole's dilemma. Metaphysics a priori model of a possible reunited theory of nature. Ontological antinomy. VI.3 Perspective of the divine intellect the ideal model of an possible absolute certainty. VI.4. Recognition of transcendental illusion and overcoming them by overturning the historical and psychological perspective on knowledge. Transcendental logic the last opportunity to save metaphysics. VI.5. Towards a future system of metaphysics within the bounds of science. Transcendental methodology, science of uncertainty and geometrization of thought. End of Introduction Notes Bibliography

Fifth Comment Jun 2, 2012 However, how big is the gap, the difference of views between this article and Boethius's "De Consolatione Philosophiae"!