Whats In A Name?

EU Foreign Policy Through the FYRM By Cassidy Henry

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of The Wilkes Honors College In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Arts and Sciences With a Concentration in International Studies And a Minor in History

Wilkes Honors College of Florida Atlantic University Jupiter, Florida May 2011

Whats In A Name? EU Foreign Policy Through the FYRM by Cassidy Henry This Thesis was prepared under the direction of the candidates thesis advisor, Dr. Christopher Ely, and has been approved by the members of her supervisory committee. It was submitted to the faculty of the Honors College and was accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Bachelors of Arts in Liberal Arts and Sciences. SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE:

Dr. Christopher Ely

Dr. Timothy Steigenga

Dean, Wilkes Honors College

Date

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Acknowledgements

This thesis would not have been possible with the help of many people at Florida Atlantic University. Specifically my thesis advisor, Dr. Christopher Ely; all of the librarians at the Jupiter library who helped me request and receive the countless books I needed to write this thesis; the FAU Undergraduate Research Grant that provided funding to attend the European Union Studies Association conference in Boston, MA; and Ashley Coats, who kept me sane through the whole process.

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Abstract Author: Title: Institution: Thesis Advisor: Degree: Concentration: Year: Cassidy Henry Whats In A Name? EU Foreign Policy Through the FYRM Wilkes Honors College of Florida Atlantic University Dr. Christopher Ely Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Arts and Sciences International Studies 2011

The European Union (EU) is a unique political/economic body in the world that has created a more integrated union of European states. Yet the structure of the EU remains under debate, as does the existence of the EU itself. Conflict about possible member states, such as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM) is especially contentious. By examining the FYRMs arduous process of gaining admission to the EU this thesis evaluates the effectiveness of the current EU foreign policy.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page

Abstract ..........................................................................................................................iv List of Tables and Illustrations ......................................................................................vi List of Abbreviations .....................................................................................................vi Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 1: The European Union ................................................................................................... 6 Common Foreign and Security Policy ................................................................ 6 Enlargement ...................................................................................................... 18 2: A Lost Country ......................................................................................................... 26 Ancient History ................................................................................................. 27 Macedonian Language & Church Life ............................................................. 30 National Awakening ......................................................................................... 32 3: Connections .............................................................................................................. 26 Rocky Road to Independence ........................................................................... 36 In Search of EU Recognition ............................................................................ 43 The Name Dispute ............................................................................................ 46 4: Enlargement Fatigue ................................................................................................. 52 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 64 Bibliography ................................................................................................................. 68

List of Charts Chart 1: Institutions of the EU ..................................................................................... 27 Chart 2: Census Data 1981-2002 .................................................................................. 37

List of Illustrations Map 1 .......................................................................................................................... 26 Map 2 .......................................................................................................................... 27

List of Abbreviations CFSP EC ECSC EEC EPC EU EURATOM FYRM OPEC SAA SAP SEA TEU UN USIP Common Foreign and Security Policy European Community European Coal and Steel Community European Economic Community European Political Community European Union European Atomic Energy Community Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Stabilisation & Association Agreement Stabilisation & Association Process Single European Act Treaty on the European Union (AKA Maastricht) United Nations US Institute of Peace

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Introduction What can a small country in the Balkans tell the world about a much larger conglomeration of economically and politically stronger countries? Quite a lot actually. The Republic of Macedonias-or Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM)1 as it is known to the European Union (EU)-accession track to the EU reveals much about the functioning of the EU. In fact, the FYRMs progress towards gaining admittance to the EU highlights many problems that the EU is currently facing. Not only is the EU undergoing a currency crisis with the Euro, but it is also undergoing a political crisis. The EU is in a critical part of their development in a supranational economic and political body, as the choices they make now will determine the future of the body. Since the failed constitutional treaty in 2005, the determination of what sort of organization will the EU be has been a hot topic of discussion, more-so than it was before the constitutional treaty or the last enlargement. Is the EU to move forward on enlargement and become a wider union while maintaining its current political organization? Will the EU move forward, but change the political organization? Will the EU stop enlarging and work towards becoming a stronger political union at the expense of its territorial size? Current politicians in the EU are facing these questions as they move forward on the project of European integration. While all of these questions are fundamental to an organization that consists of individual sovereign states, the EU states that it wants to be
1

The EU acknowledges Macedonia as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia per Greeces outrage over Macedonias use of the term Macedonia. The European Council even stated that they were willing to recognize the republic (on the condition that the word Macedonia did not form part of the regions official name) (European Parliament Working Papers Positions taken by the European Council and the European Parliament on external relations (1991-1995). Pg 21). As this paper is working to analyze the admissions process of Macedonia to the EU, I will use the acronym FYRM to acknowledge that as the name that Macedonia goes by in its dealing with the EU. By using FYRM and its associated long form I do not wish to take a position on the political dispute between Greece and Macedonia.

different. It wants to create a single voice in foreign and domestic policy. With this goal in mind, the steps that the EU takes in the next few years in foreign policy and enlargement will have as much importance as the steps they took in the 1950s. The EU began to form back in 1951 with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The ECSC was an economic union of, at the time, the means of war: coal and steel. In the beginning, forecasting did not predict a political union. Actually, no one knew exactly what this community was to become. Through different eras of expansion to include new states as well as a deepening of political integration, the European Union has emerged. The EU is the only fully integrated political and economic supranational regional body of individual member states in the world. While there are other bodies that bring many different nation-states together to help solve issues diplomatically, such as NATO, the G-20, or OPEC, none of these organizations combines political and economic issues. Nor do the other organizations grant a body that is not composed of the leaders of the states the ability to create legislation, like the EU Parliament that the citizens of the EU directly elect currently does. According to the EU, it is a unique economic and political partnership between 27 democratic European countries. [Whose aims are] peace, prosperity and freedom for its 498 million citizens in a fairer, safer world.2 One way of achieving peace, prosperity, and freedom is expanding the union to more states. Currently there are five candidate countries (Turkey, Croatia, FYRM, Iceland, and Montenegro) and four potential candidate countries (Albania, Bosnia and

The EU at a Glance, http://europa.eu.abc.panorama/index_en.htm, Accessed 7 December 2010. Emphasis mine.

Herzegovina, Serbia, and Kosovo [under UN Security Council Resolution 1244]) to the EU.3 Every state of the Western Balkans is either a candidate country or a potential candidate country. A candidate country is one that is currently applying for EU membership, meaning that they have submitted an application to the EU to begin accession negotiations and the EU has accepted the application.4 A potential candidate country is one that is seeking membership in the EU, but has not yet applied or the EU has not yet accepted the application. Many of these countries see no other alternative than to eventually join the EU. Another way to increase the peace on the European continent is to strengthen the common foreign policy of the EU. The EU has increasingly sought to integrate the foreign policy of individual member states into one foreign policy so to better project their influence in the world. Many member states resist the releasing of their sovereignty to a supranational body that they do not have total control over. The EU addresses these concerns in their treaties as well as the speeches that the leaders often make. The EU has tried to create a common foreign and security policy (CFSP5) over the years. However, the importance of the CFSP in top-level discussions has not been living up to the expectations created through the Lisbon Treaty. The FYRM offers a unique case study for the EU. Politicians and scholars often laude the FYRM as the most advanced Balkan country to emerge from the Former

3 4

European Commission on Enlargement. David Akast, EU Enlargement, in The Students Guide to European Integration, Ed Jorge Juan Fernandez Garcia, Jess Clayton, and Christopher Hobley (Oxford: Polity Press, 2004), 268. 5 CFSP is the acronym that the EU uses when referring to their common foreign and security policy, thus I will use it in this thesis.

Yugoslavia.6 They are the only country to secede from Yugoslavia without bloodshed or war. They are also the only country not to descend into a civil war at any point since secession, although they did come close in 2001. Due to many disputes over the chosen name of the country, the Republic of Macedonia, and the claim to a Macedonian nationhood, the FYRM has problems with two of its neighbors, both of whom are EU members. This situation highlights one problem with the EU CFSP- the lack of clear and commonly shared goals. An important part of understanding the EU, is understanding exactly how it functions and what makes up its parts. There are six main institutions of the European Union: the Parliament, Council, Presidency, European Commission, Court of Justice, and Court of Auditors.7 There is also the European Council composed of the Presidents and Prime Ministers of the member states and the President of the Council and European Commission. The European Council holds summit meetings that help to set the overall policy of the EU and resolve issues that could not be settled at lower level council meetings.8 Chart One provides an overview of the different institutions of the EU including what institution, who is part of the institution, and what their duties are in that organization.

6 7

Note that Balkans does not refer to Slovenia. See later. Europa.eu, Institutions of the European Union http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/index_en.htm, accessed 28 March 2011. 8 All information in the following chart is taken from either the institutions website, the Europa.eu website or The Students Guide to European Integration edited by Garcia, Clayton and Hobley

Chart One
Name of Institution Who? Representatives elected by the citizens of Europe every 5 years. People are able to vote wherever they live in the EU. They sit in 7 EU wide political groups rather than national groupings. One minister from each national government, dependent upon meeting agenda (environmental ministers will attend a meeting on the environment, etc.). Rotating Presidency every 6 months. Financial Affairs; Justice & Home Affairs; Employment, Social Policy, Health & Consumer Affairs; Competitiveness; Transport, Telecommunications & Energy; Agriculture & Fisheries; Environment, Education, Youth & Culture. Undertaken by a member state's national government rotates every 6 months, but retains the previous two countries to retain continuity in the process One person from each country who is appointed every 5 years, within 6 months of Parliament elections Duties Partially pass EU laws, exercise democratic supervision over other EU institutions. Approve commissioners, censure commission, partial authority over budget.

Parliament

Council

9 different configurations, representing the member states. Pass European laws, coordinate broad economic policies of member states, conclude international agreements between EU and other countries/international organizations, approve EU budget. Develop CFSP, coordinate co-operation between national courts/police in criminal matters.

Presidency of the Council

Organize and chair meetings of the Council. Agenda setting powers (what meetings to call) Should represent the interests of the whole EU. Drafts proposals for laws, which it presents to the Parliament. Manage, implement, enforce policies and the law. Manage the budget Make sure that EU legislation is applied in the same way in all EU countries, that member states/institutions follow the law, settle legal disputes Check that EU funds are properly collected and spent legally, economically and for intended purpose.

European Commission

Court of Justice

One judge from each member state. Usually sits as a Grand Chamber of 13 judges or in chambers of 3 to 5 One member from each country appointed by Council for renewable term of 6 years.

Court of Auditors

In chapter one, I provide a background on the EU. This chapter includes information on how the EU formed as well as the creation of a CFSP. In chapter two, I
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provide an overview of the history of the FYRM. Chapter two includes information that stretches from the time of Greeks Ancient Macedonia to the end of Yugoslavia. Chapter Three is about the interaction between the EU and the FYRM. Chapter three also includes information about the different disputes that the FYRM has had over its history, highlighting the current name dispute with Greece. In chapter four, I present my argument- that the EU is facing a problem of definition and it is affecting its foreign policy. The case of the FYRM highlights the nature of the crisis. This case shows the differences in speaking with one voice and speaking with many voices and how that can harm the future of the EU. The thesis ends with my conclusions about EU foreign policy and how the candidate countries, specifically the FYRM, fit into the future of the EU.

Chapter One: The European Union Common Foreign Policy Why has the European concept lost a lot of its force and initial impetus? I believe that over the years the European public has lost a guiding light, namely the political consensus between our countries on our reasons for undertaking this joint task and the characteristics with which we wish to endow it. We must first of all restore this common vision if we wish to have European Union. Leo Tindemans, Report on the European Union These words written in 1975 have as much import now as they did then. The EUs common foreign policy has lost its force for change in recent years, as has the ability of EU to act collectively. Given that the EU is a unique body, part of what makes it unique is the CFSP. While Tindemans was discussing the make-up of a community of nine nations compared to todays community of 27 nations, the same thing is occurring. The impetus for the European concept has run into numerous problems over the years. The EU began to form in 1951 with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which would control coal and steel production, by the leaders of Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, and Italy. Without coal and steel war could not occur, so essentially these countries wanted to control war on the continent. To control war was critically important to a continent recovering from two world wars, genocide, and an endemic lack of trust between two of the powers controlling coal and steel (France and Germany). While they officially created the ECSC in 1951, no major steps were taken until 1958 when they moved to create the European Economic Community (EEC),9 which hastened trade integration in Europe throughout

World Regional Geography, 156.

the early 1960s.10 The creation of the EEC is also the first step that the leaders of Europe took that narrowed the future options of leaders for political or economic integration.11 Before they created the EEC, the leaders could have taken one of many paths to promote further peace and prosperity on the continent that did not lead to further integration. The EEC established the community model as the basic institutional framework for international relations on the continent.12 Throughout its evolution, the leaders of the European Community (EC) continued to make decisions that supported a community-based model of integration. There were, and are, many disagreements over the technical aspects of the community, or duties of different organizations, and the possible powers of these supervisory organizations.13 However, most no longer dispute the community model. In the beginning of integration in Europe, to accomplish things at a supranational level, the member states had to focus on the economic questions rather than the political aspects of integration. The member states were not willing to give up their sovereignty to a body they could not control and most are still not.14 Thus, economic integration occurred at a much faster rate than political integration. Soon the member states realized, however, that by only focusing on economics and trade, they did not accurately reflect the power they sought to wield internationally. The community was not taken as seriously as it had hoped to be. The Heads of State/Government began discussing the possibility of a more political union than existed before in order to exert their influence over a much larger area. The first official comment
10 11

Parson, 27. Parson, 31 12 ibid, 31 13 ibid, 50 14 ibid, 89.

on political integration was made at a meeting at The Hague on 1 and 2 December 1969 when the Heads of State/Government told their Foreign Ministers to study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification, within the context of enlargement of the European Communities.15 Following that discussion, the Foreign Ministers of the Member States published the Davignon Report from Luxemburg on 27 October 1970. In this report, they found that tangible form should be given to the will for a political union which has always been a force for the progress of the European Communities.16 The report suggested that more be done so that one day Europe [could] speak with one voice.17 The objectives of further cooperation, as the Foreign Ministers saw it, was to ensure greater mutual understanding with respect to the major issues of international politics, by exchanging information and consulting regularly and to increase their solidarity by working for a harmonization of views, concertation of attitudes and joint action when it appears feasible and desirable.18 They also proposed a framework of how to enact this cooperation including Ministerial meetings, a Political Committee, and consultations between member states.19 The member states adopted the Davignon report to form European Political Cooperation (EPC). In a profile about EPC, the journal Europe called it the process of information, consultation and common action among the 12 E.C. member states in the field of foreign policy. Its aim is to maximize their influence in international affairs

15

Davignon Report (Luxembourg, 27 October 1970), in Bulletin of the European Communities. November 1970, No 11, pp 9-14. Http://www.ena.lu/davignon_report_luxemburg_27_october_1970-2-881, 2 16 ibid, 2 17 ibid, 3 18 ibid, 3 19 Ibid, 3-5

through a single coherent European approach.20 EPC had a presidency (which was to be the same country as the EC presidency). The EPC was not based on the treaties establishing the European Communities and it [had] quite a separate institutional structure.21 EPC opened the way for the first enlargement of member states by increasing cooperation that allowed the community to take a joint stand to increase membership.22 A few years later in 1972, the Heads of State/Government again met to discuss the possibility of further political integration. They confirmed their wish to step up their political cooperation and to give Europe the means whereby it could act as a coherent political entity on the international scene.23 Then in 1973, after the admission of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom the year before, the Nine24 reconfirmed the importance of a European identity in the EECs external relations.25 By a European identity, the nine meant presenting a united front to the world on social and foreign policy.26 The next major step forward took place in 1986 with the signing of the Single European Act (SEA). The SEA was the first major amendment to the treaty establishing the EEC. According to the summary of the SEA published by the European Union, the chief objective of the SEA was to add new momentum to the process of the European

20 21

European Political Cooperation, Europe, Oct 1988, 280, 26 Europe, 27 22 http://europa.eu/abc/12lessons/key_dates/index_en.htm 23 tienne Deschamps. How European Political Cooperation Worked in Practice. Translated by CVCE. Centre Virtuel de la Conniassance sur lEurope. www.ena.lu/european_political_cooperation_worked_practice-2-6191. Accessed 6 November 2010, 2. 24 The states were called the Nine for the 9 countries that made up the community. 25 Deschamps, 2 26 Ibid, 2

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construction.27 The SEA institutionalized the EPC and the member states formally agreed to inform and consult each other on any foreign policy matters of general interest so as to ensure that their combined influence is exercised as effectively as possible.28 The member states agreed to work to avoid any action or position that impairs their effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations or to impede any consensus. 29 The EU continues to see the SEA as a stepping-stone for the Treaty on the European Union. The meeting at Maastricht in 1992 resulted in the Treaty of Maastricht on European Union (TEU). The TEU is the result of external and internal influences from the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe to the desire to supplement the progress of the SEA with more reforms.30 It is a clear statement of the EC trying to create a Europe that is more than just an economic union with a little political cooperation, as it had been up until 1992. The TEU created what is commonly known today as the European Union, and is often seen as the founding date of the EU, which consists of three pillars: European Communities (consisting of the EEC, EURATOM31, and ECSC); CFSP; and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Within the CFSP pillar, an intergovernmental decision-making process which largely relies on unanimity exists.32 Most CFSP decisions require all member states to agree 100%, at least at this time.

27

Single European Act Summary, accessed 13 November 2010, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/ institutional_affairs/treaties/ treaties_singleact_en.htm 28 Single European Act, Title III, Article 30, 2 (a) 29 SEA, Title III, Article 30, 2 (d) and SEA, Title III Article 30, 3 (c) 30 Summary on Treaty of Maastricht on European Union, accessed 13 November 2010 31 EURATOM is the European atomic energy community that originally was to coordinate the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and todays helps to pool knowledge, infrastructure, and funding of nuclear energy. (ec.europa.eu/energy) 32 Summary on the Treaty of Maastricht on European Union

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In the TEU, the Member States agreed that the union should project its identity to the world mostly through a CFSP.33 The TEU specifically defines that the objectives of a CFSP would be: - to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union; - to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways; - to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter; - to promote international cooperation; - to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.34 In addition, the treaty requires Member States to support the Unions external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.35 By including this statement, the members wanted to create a united front to better display the power they thought they deserved. They thought that the new front would not only increase their presence on the world stage, but also create a more unified internal cooperation. The TEU also requires member states to conform their national foreign policy to that of the EU and act as a representative of the EU on the world stage. They would do this through coordinating action at international conferences and joint actions on the world stage. 36 There were many concerns over the transfer of sovereignty to Brussels, since it would be the largest transfer of sovereignty in the ECs history and a

33 34

TEU, Title 1, Article B TEU, Title 5, Article J.1, (2) 35 TEU, Title 5, Article J.1, (4); emphasis mine 36 TEU, Title 5, Article J.2, 1-4

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large political battle ensured.37 Many states were able to hold up the progress to gain support for their political goals, or wrest an exclusion of some part of the treaty from the other members. Eventually, the Member States of the EC signed the TEU on 7 February 1992 and thereby creating the EU. As agreed upon at Maastricht, the governments would meet again in Amsterdam in five years (1996) to reform the TEU. The years between 1991 and 1995 were not quiet years for a CFSP. In fact, this period was one of the most critical in the formation of a CFSP. During this time, the European Council stated that the fundamental goal of an EU foreign policy was to maintain and promote peace and stability throughout the world. 38 In addition, they stated that they wanted to support democratic structures, respect for rights and principles, promote global prosperity, prevent conflict, and combat crossfrontier problems (such as terrorism, crime and pollution).39 However, it is generally accepted that they failed at these goals. During the beginning of the first steps of a European CFSP, Yugoslavia was breaking apart as a socialist republic as was the USSR. It was fragmenting into many different separate nation-states based upon ethnicity and national identity. As Yugoslavia was disintegrating, Germany quickly recognized Croatia and Slovenia in June of 1991 for its own internal political reasons without consulting any other member of the EU.40 Germanys rapid recognition pressured the rest of the EU and its member states into

37

George Brock and Philip Webster, Britain may veto federalist treaty, The (London) Times, http://docs.newsbank.com/s/InfoWeb/aggdocs/AWNB/0F91EF1EF6E3AA2B/0D0CB4F5C0EA43AA?p_ multi=LTIB&s_lang=en-US 38 European Parliament Working Papers Positions taken by the European Council and the European Parliament on external relations (1991-1995). W-28, 06-1997, Political Series. PE 166.803. Pg 7 39 European Parliament Positions (1991-1995), 7 40 James Caporaso, The European Union: Dilemmas of Regional Integration, 126.

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recognizing the individual states, sometimes against the will of its leaders. Yet in June of 1991, the Community sent some foreign ministers on a mission to Serbia that provided visibility to the EUs foreign policy despite over disagreement on what to do. Simply sending diplomats proved that they had a CFSP and that other nations should take it more seriously.41 As James Caporaso points out, the EU contributed effectively to helping in Yugoslavia through NATO led forces rather than through its own separate peacekeeping forces.42 It is important to note that it was through NATO rather than through the EU that contribution occurred because the EU was attempting to distance itself from needing NATO. The EU was simply not equipped to handle the demands put on their infantile system. While the Unions main task [must] obviously be to restore peace, with the priority being a global, lasting solution to the conflict, Parliament only suggested stepping up humanitarian aid while not letting the new aid be an alibi for failing to take the necessary political and diplomatic steps to find a solution.43 During the crisis, all EU countries helped to alleviate problems in Yugoslavia, but they did so through unilateral national ways rather than through the EU, thus negating the possible influence of acting with a CFSP. After the utter failure of the CFSP as written in the early 1990s, according to many different sources the TEU needed a revision, but no one agreed upon what was needed. The European Parliament had consistently been advocating for CFSP to fall under their jurisdiction rather than through extra-institutional procedures, as they

41 42

Caporaso, 127 ibid, 128 43 European Parliament Working Papers Prospects for a Common Foreign and Security Policy-Preliminary Review, W-7, 1-1995m Political Series, PE 165.082, 24

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believed that this set up weakened the EUs ability to act for a CFSP as well as the legitimacy of the EU.44 Part of the impetus for the revision, besides the requirement of the TEU to meet again, was the failure of the CFSP to prevent conflict in the FYRM. The Community had been presented with a common challenge and failed. Although this challenge technically emerged before the signing of the TEU, it persisted past the signatory date and at this point the EU failed to take a critical step towards their states goal of a CFSP. After signing the TEU, the EU failed to prevent further bloodshed and eventually had to wait for the US and NATO to take over and solve the crisis. The main change in the Treaty of Amsterdam was the idea of absenteeism. Constructive absenteeism allows member states who abstain to be able to not apply the decision on the national level, or be present as they are performed; 45 however, the member states are not to act in a way that contradicts the common action taken by the EU.46 For constructive absenteeism to count no more than 1/3 of all votes can be absent in this way. Critically, Article 23, which includes both constructive absenteeism and qualified majority voting, does not apply to defense or military actions. This treaty also established the principle of enhanced cooperation which allows those member states that wished to do so to cooperate more closely through the Unions institutions and means for taking action, without harming the process of European integration as a whole.47 Part of this extra cooperation is now taking place within the Eurozone community as part of the larger EU community.

44 45

European Parliament Working Papers Positions. 30. Treaty of Amsterdam, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html#0131010021 46 ibid. Title V, Article 23 (1) 47 The Treaty of Amsterdam, www.ena.lu, accessed 14 November 2010

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While the 2000 Treaty of Nice revised the TEU and the Treaty of Amsterdam, it did not revise any of the CFSP sections. Then in 2004, the EU attempted to adopt an EU level Constitution. The constitution would have revised all of the previous treaties and started from scratch by creating a new legal foundation for the EU by incorporating all previous treaties into one constitution. The constitution was to make the EU more democratic, more transparent, and more efficient. However, it failed in referendums in both France and the Netherlands in 2005.48 Most scholars agree that the no votes were not an outright rejection of the constitution, but rather a rejection of the direction that the EU was taking.49 Directly after the failed constitution50 the Heads of State/Government backed off further deepening of both political and economic integration. However, they did realize that they needed to reform the EU somehow if it was to function with a much larger group of commissioners. Essentially the EU still functioned under the same sort of considerations with 27 commissioners as it did with six. Therefore, they decided to reform the exiting treaties with a new treaty rather than creating an entirely new constitution. The reform occurred in the Treaty of Lisbon that was signed on 13 December 2007.51 The Lisbon treaty, as it is commonly known, essentially contains all of the same important reforms of the failed

48

"The Netherlands: decisive no vote on European constitution." World Socialist Web Site. http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/jun2005/neth-j02.shtml (accessed March 27, 2011). 49 Anca Pusca, Is the Constitutional Project Dead? An Introduction, in Rejecting the EU Constitution?: from the Constitutional Treaty to the Treaty of Lisbon, ed Anca Pusca, 1-14 (New York: International Debate Education Association, 2009), 4. 50 The constitution failed because all states had to ratify it for it to go into effect. 51 Anthony Cowgill & Andrew Cowgill, Background to the Treaty of Lisbon, in The Treaty of Lisbon in Perspective: The European Reform Treaty- Consolidated Treaty on European Union and the Consolidated Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, xv-xxvi (Gloucestershire: British Management Data Foundation, 2008), xx

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constitution, but does so by revising the existing treaties rather than throwing them out. 52 In part, the Lisbon Treaty was to prepare the EU for enlargement and address the fears of member states of a larger union actually functioning in the same makeup of the one created for six nations.53 Additionally, the Heads of State/Government wanted to enhance the efficiency of the EUs external action and increase its visibility overseas.54 The Lisbon treaty renumbers previous treaties and includes the charter of fundamental rights as a legal entity. It also creates the post of High Representative of Foreign Affairs, which merges three functions: acting as the foreign policy envoy of the European council, acting head of the external relations for the European Commission, and Chairman of the EU foreign Minister meeting.55 This post also is in charge of the External Action Service (EAS), the EU version of a diplomatic corps.56 The Lisbon Treaty also created the post of a permanent President of the European Council, compared to the rotating presidency of before. The new post of President will hold a twoyear term and be able to be reelected.57 There is an important new clause in the treaty that did not exist in any other treaty. Called the solidarity clause, it requires all member states to act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a
52

Thomas Christiansen, The EU Treaty Reform Process since 2000: The Highs and Lows of Constitutionalism in the European Union, in Rejecting the EU Constitution?: from the Constitutional Treaty to the Treaty of Lisbon, ed Anca Pusca, 29-40 (New York: International Debate Education Association, 2009), 37. 53 Cowgill, xv. 54 Ibid, xxi-xxii 55 Charlemagne, Waiting For the Big Call, The Economist, 16 September 2010. 56 New York Times, Treaty of Lisbon, 25 February 2010, www.nytimes.com/info/treaty-of-lisbon (accessed 27 March 2011). 57 General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, Background: President of the European Council, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/111298.pdf, November 2009, accessed 27 march 2011.

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natural or man-made disaster.58 The solidarity clause requires other members to help the attacked member state (if it requests the help) in the aftermath. While this is a drastic increase in a commonality, it is included in the external action area of the treaty of Lisbon.59 However, in the train of the treaties that came before, the Lisbon treaty makes sure that national security is stated as remaining the sole responsibility of the member states.60 Yet, the member states will increasingly work towards a converging CFSP.61 In addition, the EU hoped that the Treaty of Lisbon would, in the words of Jos Manuel Duras Barroso, the European Commission President, reinforce the Unions cohesion, coherence and effectiveness in external affairs.62 The only part of the previous treaties that remained as written was the CFSP pillar- the other two pillars were revised into a single treaty that did not mention pillars. The Lisbon Treaty mentions, for the first time, the option of withdrawing from the union.63 This step is critical in light of the reasons, mentioned above, that the EU started out to create the Treaty of Lisbon-further integration and enlargement. In addition, between the years 2014-2017, the EU will implement a new commissioner system, according to the Treaty of Lisbon. It will rotate the commissioners around so that the individual member states will have a member on the commission every 10 out of 15
58 59

The Treaty of Lisbon, Title 7, Article 22 Stephen Sieberson, Dividing Lines between the EU and Its member States: The Impact of the Treaty of Lisbon, (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2008), 50. 60 Cowgill, xxiii 61 ibid, xxiii 62 Jos Manuel Duras Barroso, The E.U. After the Lisbon Treaty, SPEECH/07/795,4 December 2007, in The Treaty of Lisbon in Perspective: The European Reform Treaty- Consolidated Treaty on European Union and the Consolidated Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, (Gloucestershire: British Management Data Foundation, 2008), 295 63 Anca Pusca, Treaty of Lisbon: Taking Europe into the 21st Century, in Rejecting the EU Constitution?: from the Constitutional Treaty to the Treaty of Lisbon, ed Anca Pusca, 159-174 (New York: International Debate Education Association, 2009), 160.

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years.64 These two portions are some of the fundamental changes to the previous treaties in a CFSP. Throughout the treaty, statements recognize the supremacy of the nation over the supranational body of the EU, while carefully balancing the new positions/goals of the EU that require more transfers of sovereignty than before. While different Member States were able to get exemptions on certain areas of the treaty, mostly relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, new members will not be able to get permanent exemptions.

Enlargement The first enlargement of the European Community (EC) was in 1973 when the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland joined the EC bringing membership to nine from the original six. Norway had signed a treaty of accession with the EC, but its voters had not agreed to join in the referendum. Then in 1981, Greece joined the EC. In the Eurobarometer65 poll number 15, taken in 1981, the first after Greece joined, found that 69% of peopled surveyed favored efforts being made to unify Western Europe.66 However, 43% of that 69% only agreed to some extent rather than very much so. In addition, the report went on to say that for all nine countries where a medium- or longterm comparison is possible, the tide of support has never been lower.

64 65

Treaty of Lisbon The Eurobarometer is a series of surveys taken twice a year throughout the EC/EU since 1973 on behalf of the European Commission. The surveys report on public opinion relating to any aspect of the EU. 66 Eurobarometer 15, 1981

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Then in 1986, Spain and Portugal joined the EEC. After they joined, 60% of the community viewed membership to the EEC as a good thing.67 However, the number is slightly misleading. Spain and Portugal had support from over 56% of their population, while only 40% of English citizens thought membership was a good thing.68 The high level of support from Spain can be seen as a belief that Europe was a symbol of the freedom and progress [Spain] aspired to during the Franco dictatorship; they were still in the honeymoon phase of their relationship with the EU.69 Some analysts believed that by enlarging the EEC (widening) rather than forming a more involved economic union (deepening) that the EEC chose the easier course to increase influence.70 After the EU officially formed in 1992, Austria, Finland, and Sweden were the first new states to join in 1995.71 The EU had a 56% approval-rating overall in the first poll after these countries joined. A wide range of people stated that membership is a good thing, from the UK with the low of 40% to the high of Greece with 60%. Overall, two out of three EU citizens viewed the 1995 enlargement as positive. 72 Norways voters once again chose not to join the EU, by almost the same margin as in 1972.73 The Times suggests that the refusal comes from the fact that Norwegians are internationally-minded

67

Eurobarometer 25, 1986. From now on any reference to how the country/community views membership to the EC/EU is based on the Eurobarometer question, Generally speaking, do you think that (your countrys) membership to the European Community (Common Market) is? (1) A Good thing, (2) A Bad thing (3) Neither good nor bad (4) Dont know 68 Eurobarometer 25, 1986 69 Peter Strafford, Special Report on Spain (1): A nation returns to Europe King Carlos and Queen Sofia begin a four day state visit to Britain. The (London) Times, 21 April 1986. 70 David Smith, Finance and Industry: Threat of more failure in the growing EEC - The impact of Spanish and Portuguese accession The (London) Times, 6 January 1986. 71 Treaty of Accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden. Europa 72 Eurobarometer 43, 1995. 73 A free no The London Times, 30 November 1994

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Europeans with a robust attachment to open government and decentralised, accountable power structures,74 which they feared they would have to give up if they joined the EU. After this enlargement, there was a 9-year interval before any new states joined the EU. In 2004, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungry, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined the EU, bringing the number of member states to 25. The adding of 10 new states was the biggest enlargement that has ever taken place and the first to expand to Eastern Europe. After this enlargement, EU approval was at 54%. While this number was lower than the poll immediately before the accession of the new states, it was one of the highest since 1994.75 Even 55% of those interviewed believed that EU membership provided benefits for their country (compared to 33% who did not believe this).76 Then in 2007, Bulgaria and Romania joined, bringing the member states to 27. According to Heather Grabbe, EU enlargement has been generally positive for the entire EU, but unless there is a marked change in EU policy, enlargement will also have negative impacts for the wider region.77 Referring to all of the candidate countries, Grabbe points out that working towards EU membership, while an impetus for domestic reforms, can also cause problems with internal reform and foreign direct investment (FDI) if the chance of joining is perceived by many as far in the future.78 For example, FDI did decrease to Bulgaria and Romania when they found out they would not be

74 75

A free no The London Times, 30 November 1994 Eurobarometer 63, first results 10 76 ibid, 12 77 Heather Grabbe, Implications of EU Enlargement in Developments in central & Eastern European Politics 3, ed. Stephen White, Judy Batt, Paul G. Lewis. Durham: Duke University Press, 2003) pg 266. 78 Grabbe, 260

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joining in 2004.79 Often politicians justify harsh restructuring as a prequalification for joining the EU to convince those in their country that might not be as supportive to go along with the reforms. The EU provides consistent external pressure for reforms on successive governments, but slower reform in some countries has had an adverse effect on performance and FDI.80 One thing that makes exporting the EU system difficult is that there are a large variety of different democratic processes within the current EU member states.81 Many candidate countries do not know which system to follow, so often they try to combine many different systems. Ambassador Erwan Fouere, currently the EU Special Representative to the FYRM, stated that Europe is united in diversity.82 United in Diversity is now a theme of EU CFSP- through diversity the EU is a stronger Union- in a way they are celebrating a fundamental challenge to the EU. In 2000, Martin Walker argued that the EU was not yet a federal system but far more than a confederation of independent nation-states.83 That the EU is not a federal system, but also not just a group of states, highlights the debates on the makeup of the EU. On one side there are those advocating a wide/broad union that includes as many member as possible, but is politically weak. On the other side are those who want a deep union that is characterized by authoritative and

79 80

Grabbe, 260 ibid, 262. 81 ibid, 259. 82 Erwan Fouere, Where is Europe 23 September 2010. This is also the motto of the EU. 83 Martin Walker, Enlargement of the European Union: How New EU Members will change the shape of the EU in Europe in the New Century: Visions of an emerging Superpower. Ed Robert Guttman. Colorado: Lynne Rienne Publishers, 2001. 65

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demanding political institutions as well as detailed policies across many issue areas.84 The UK is an example of a broad member while Germany is a deep member. Broadening the EU could create problems of cohesion in voting and collective action. Within voting, many of the CFSP questions, as well as other vitally important areas of the EU, are determined by unanimous voting not qualified majority voting.85 For collective action, be it in CFSP or in other policy areas such as the environment, member states are supposed to work together, or at least not block the other states collective efforts. In addition, with more states the process would take even longer and be more complicated that it currently is with 27 states. Deepening also has its own problems with nation states giving more and more sovereignty to the EU rather than maintaining it on their own, which is the major fear of many euroskeptics. Many states worry about the loss of their sovereignty to a supranational body in Brussels. Sir Major, the UK Prime Minister, said that the Treaty of Amsterdam could create a further threat to Britain's already diminished sovereignty.86 Deepening could also potentially create a fortress Europe with a flourishing state inside the fortress, and the states outside the fortress languishing without EU trade or support. Gaining entrance to the EU is not an easy step by any measure. All new applicants have to accept the acquis communautaire. The acquis, which is French for acquired material of the community,87 refers to everything that the EU has achieved since its

84 85

Caporaso, 97 ibid, 97 86 Michael Jones, Whisper who dares: ministers are saying their Euro-prayers - Inside Politics The (London) Times, 11 December 1994. 87 acquis communautaire. Dictionary.com. Collins English Dictionary - Complete & Unabridged 10th Edition. HarperCollins Publishers. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/acquis communautaire (accessed: March 27, 2011).

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early origins in the ECSC.88 It includes everything from treaties to court judgments and the rules of EU governance. In addition, to the acquis, at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, the EU laid out four conditions for membership: the candidate country has [1] achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, [2] the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union [3] the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. [4] the Union's capacity to absorb new members89 Usually around 35 chapters of negotiation for accession to the EU cover the above criteria.90 The European Commission,91 which oversees the Enlargement of the EU, has a large amount of discretion on whether a country fulfills a chapter or not, since it is very difficult to pinpoint exactly when each of the accession conditions has been met.92 In addition, the targets are essentially moving as more and more legislation or decisions are made that increase the acquis that new members have to absorb. The FYRM, Iceland, and Montenegro have not opened any chapters, Croatia has eight chapters left open, and Turkey has closed only one chapter, but opened negotiations on eight.93 Croatia is hoping to finish negotiations by June 2012.

88 89

Caporaso, 109 European Council in Copenhagen 21-22 June 1993 Conclusions of the Presidency, pg 13 90 EUROPA. "The policy - The process of enlargement." European Commission on Enlargement. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/process-of-enlargement/mandate-and-framework_en.htm (accessed March 27, 2011). 91 The European Commission initiates most new programs and is responsible for implementing them once they are enacted. (Charles Hauss, Comparative Politics: Domestic Responses to Global Challenges (Belmont, CA: Thomson and Wadsworth: 2006, 187). 92 Grabbe, The Implications of EU Enlargement pg 255 93 Valentina Pop, Croatia moves closer to EU membership, Turkey stalls, euobserver.com, 20 April 2011, accessed 24 April 2011, http://euobserver.com/9/32216/?rk=1

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After the last enlargement in 2007, the EU is suffering from Enlargement fatigue as it is called by writers and has become common reference in the EU. EU officials deny that enlargement is slowing down. When they meet in December 2006 a few days before the official enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania, the leaders/commissioners agreed to put the brakes on future expansion of the bloc in order to streamline decision-making in an enlarged Europe.94 While at this summit, the 25 heads of government/state endorsed a partial freeze to Turkeys membership talks.95 The Commission finally seemed to agree with the Parliament that they needed to revise the rulebook of the EU to work effectively with 27 members compared to the original 6 or even the 12 that created the EU. Prominent leaders went so far as to acknowledge, We need a Europe with borders.96 However, UK Prime Minister Tony Blairs spokesperson stated, We do believe the candidates for membership should meet the criteria set down. We do not believe that any new criteria should be imposed on them.97 Bronwen Maddox of The Times, points out that the EU will have a hard time convincing the applicant countries, such as Turkey or states in the Western Balkans, that this step back is just temporary and not a permanent no.98 Maddox goes on to point out that it is not just letting in Turkey, which would become the most populous, poor and Muslim member of the EU if admitted, but that is also relates to all other countries.

94

Stephen Castle and Andrew Grice, The Independent: EU endorses tough new stand on membership. The Independent, 15 December 2006. Brussels 95 ibid 96 ibid 97 Castle & Grice 98 Browen Maddox, EU pulls up drawbridge leaving hopefuls outside-World Briefing The (London) Times. 15 December 2006, London.

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Fears against enlargement are tied up in unemployment, new cheaper workers, and Europes global competitiveness.99 However, those who are naysaying the expansion seemingly forget the success that expansion has brought to the EU.100 Alexander Stubb, Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs, argues, Integration capacity is an issue for the EU, but it cannot be a condition for enlargement. Integration capacity is the responsibility of the member states, not the candidates. It is up to the EU to sort itself out before it takes on board new members.101 There is also a theory that impedes enlargement that candidate status is more conducive to reform than actual membership.102 The EU wanted to focus on its own house before allowing more members into it. The Treaty of Lisbon was negotiated partially to help alleviate fears about enlargement. After the Lisbon Treaty in 2008, the Commission of the European Communities laid out its view of the future of the Balkans. The Commission believes that for the EU, Europe and the countries themselves that the region should go ahead as rapidly as possible with political and economic reform, reconciliation among peoples and progress towards the EU.103 In this communication, the Commissioners reaffirmed their desire to see the Balkans become members of the EU,104 which is a turnaround from their earlier statements right before Bulgaria and Romania joined.

99

Shada Islam and Leon Mangasarian, EU leaders meet amid discord over further expansion Deutsche Press, 14 December 2006. Agentur 100 Alexander Stubb, Comment: Let us stop crying doom at the Unions expansion, Financial Times, 8 December 2006. London. 101 ibid 102 Zoltan Dujisin, Can EU anchor in Romania, Bulgaria, Stabilize Balkans? Inter Press Service 28 December 2006. 103 Commission of the European Communities. Western Balkans: Enhancing the European Perspective communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Brussels 5 March 2008. COM (2008) 127 final, SEC(2008) 288, 2 104 ibid 3

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Of the candidate countries, the FYRM has not yet started negations to join, while three of the other four have. Montenegro just became a candidate country in November 2010. Albania and Serbia had applied for membership, but the European Commission has not yet replied.105 On 9 November 2010, the Commission released the new Progress Reports for the candidate and potential candidate countries. Commissioner Fle states, in the newest report on the FYRMs progress, "This report confirms that the country is ready to start accession negotiations. These negotiations will help to tackle a number of important challenges such as strengthening the rule of law and public administration as well as increasing competitiveness and reducing unemployment.106 Yet history often stands in the way of progress.

105 106

Europa Key Findings on the progress reports on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 9 November 2010. Brussels. MEMO/10/556

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Chapter Two: The history of the Republic of Macedonia, as the republic is constitutionally known, has been rocky. Macedonia has been struggling for international recognition since the inception of its nation in the mid-1800s. As Aleksandar Panev writes, the name Macedonia refers to what is probably the most contested geographical entity in Southeastern Europe.107 The problems range from claims of territorial aspiration by Greece to claims that their language is merely a dialect of Bulgarian.108 Geographically, Macedonia is composed of three parts: one in Greece, one in Bulgaria, and one composed of the Republic of Macedonia as seen in Map 1.109 The most commonly accepted geographical definition of Macedonia follows the borders, seen in Map 2: the Shar Mountains to the north, Pindos Mountains to the west, and Mount Olympus to the south. The Vardar River cuts through the center of geographical Macedonia, forming a delta at Thessalonki/Salonica into to the Aegean Sea. The Western boundary passes through Lake Ohrid and Prespa. The eastern border follows the Rhodope Mountains and the Mesta/Nestos River.

107

Aleksandar Panev, Macedonia. Eastern Europe: An Introduction to the People, Land, and Culture. Vol 3, ed Richard Fruht. Denver: ABC CLIO, 2005. 583. 108 Panev, 583 109 "Map of Geographic Macedonia in relation to surrounding states." Macedonian Heritage. http://www.macedonian-heritage.gr/Maps/MapRegionToday.html (accessed February 3, 2011).

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29

Ancient History110 The problems of forming the state, recognized as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia by the United Nations and the EU, pre-date the creation of the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. There has been conflict over the name and history of Macedonia since the mid-1800s when the Slavs who migrated in the 6th or 7th century AD to the Balkans began calling themselves Macedonians and using Macedonia as their national appellation. 111 Their migration took place long after the Ancient Macedonians had died off or possibly merged with the new invaders.112 The name Macedonia traces its history to an ethnic group that lived in present northwestern Greece in the seventh and eighth century B.C.113 They were known as being from Macedon, not specially Macedonians at first, and include figures such as Phillip II and Alexander the Great. Ancient Macedonians were not Greek, despite current Greek claims to the contrary. Greek claims on the term Macedonian, focus on the time period of Alexander the Great due to his influence in spreading Hellenic culture to Asia.114 There are arguments on the Grecian side that Ancient Macedonians were Greek, because they spoke the Greek language.115 However, more researchers find that the opposite is true. While the Ancient Macedonians might have used Greek officially and
110

Writing about the history of the area known as Macedonia, and specifically the area known today as the FYRM is extremely problematic. Different national historians with political agendas at one point in time or another have twisted almost all of history since the time of the Ancient Macedonians. I have tried to be as unbiased and take information from all sources both those with an obvious leaning and those without. 111 Stoyan Pribichevich, Macedonia: Its People & History (London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1982), 2. 112 John Shea, Macedonia and Greece: The Struggle to Define a New Balkan Nation, (London: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1997), 14 113 Pribichevich, 3; Panev, 583; Ivan Mihailoff, Macedonia: A Switzerland of the Balkans (St. Louis, Mo: Pearlstone Publishing Company, 1950), 28 114 Shea, 23 115 Kariophile Mitsakis, Macedonia Throughout the Centuries (Thessaloniki: Institute For Balkan Studies, 1973) 7-8.

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when talking to the Greeks (who were the historians of the time), but they would use their language at home.116 Many Ancient Greeks referred to the Ancient Macedonians as barbarians.117 Historians agree that Alexander the Great united all of Greece under one Greek banner, but that unity fell apart after he passed away.118 Greece also currently claims a linear descent from Ancient Macedonians, but this claim is not supported by research. What more likely occurred was that during the Great Migrations, other Ancient peoples who moved into the area absorbed the Ancient Macedonians, or they simply died off during the Roman era.119 After the Ancient Macedonians disappeared, Rome took over the geographical area of Macedonia.120 From roughly 171 AD to 235 BC, the Romans were in control of Macedonia.121 The geographical area either was an imperial province or under Roman Senate control.122 The period directly after 235 AD was followed by the breakdown of the Roman Empire and led to the control of Macedonia by the Byzantines. Byzantium identified a Macedonian province that usually encompassed the greater part of Southeastern Europe, greatly beyond the border of geographic Macedonia.123 During the Byzantine period in the sixth century, the Slavs appeared in Macedonia.124 Ironically, the Slavs were seen as either peaceful nomads or violent invaders when they first appeared in
116

See Kyril Drezov Macedonian identity in The New Macedonian Question, 47-59, ed James Pettifer (New York: St. Martins Press, Inc, 1999) 48. 117 Shea, 25 118 Pribichevich, 37. 119 ibid, 3 and Shea, 14 120 Michael Cosmopoulos, Macedonia: An Introduction to its Political History (Winnipeg, Manitoba: Manitoba Studies in Classical Civilization, 1992), 47. 121 Cosmopoulos, 45-51 122 ibid, 50 123 Nadine Lange-Akhund, The Macedonian Question, 1893-1908 From Western Sources (New York: East European Monographs, 1998) 4 124 Pribichevich, 2 and Mitsakis, 19.

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the Balkans due to differing contemporary reports.125 Many settled as peasants in geographical Macedonia, both in the areas of the FYRM and the Grecian province of Macedonia.126 There was much infighting while the area was under Byzantine control, including the short kingdom of Samuel. King Samuel ruled from Ohrid from roughly 976 to 1014 AD.127 His kingdom included most of geographic Macedonia.128 Samuels kingdom is one of the historical areas that receives much attention for later nationality struggles: Was Samuel Bulgarian, as he often called himself? Or was he Macedonian, but used Bulgarian for ease? Is his kingdom the beginning of the struggle for international recognition of the down-trodden Macedonian people?129 Adding to the confusion, Samuels kingdom fell to the Byzantine Empire under Basil II,130 and afterwards Serbia briefly gained control of the area of Macedonia and established its capital in Skopje. However, the Serbian kingdom also fell to the Byzantine Empire.131 After the fall of the Byzantine Empire in the early 1300s, the Ottoman Empire took over control of geographic Macedonia.132 The area got the name of Balkans under the Ottoman Empire. Balkan originally meant the area of Turkey that was located in Europe.133 During the time when the area was under the control of the Ottoman Empire,

125 126

Mitsakis, 18. Pribichevich, 65 127 Panev, 589 128 Shea,58; Panev, 590 129 Panev, 589-590; Cosmopoulos, 57; Shea, 58 130 Elizabeth Barker, Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950), 14; Cosmopoulos 58; Panev, 590 131 Barry Turner, Macedonia in The Statesmans Yearbook 2011: the Politics, Cultures, and Economies of the World (New York: Palgrave, 2011), 813. 132 Panev, 593; Turner, 813; Cosmopoulos, 65; Mitsakis, 34-35 133 Harvey Pekar and Heather Robinson, Macedonia: What Does It Take To Stop a War? (New York: Villard Books, 2007), 25.

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the Empire did not identify anything as Macedonian.134 Instead, the Ottoman Empire identified subnational groups by religious affiliation: Muslim, Greek Orthodox, Bulgarian Orthodox, etc. The Bulgarians were eventually able to gain recognition as a nationality from the Ottomans while the Macedonians were not. The Ottoman Empire ruled geographical Macedonia until roughly WWI.135 Critical to the development of a national consciousness, the Ottoman Empire inadvertently promoted the Orthodox Church that governed the social and religious life of most inhabitants of geographical Macedonia.136

Macedonian Language and Church Life Like every part of the history of the FYRM (or geographical Macedonia), the history of the Macedonian language is greatly disputed. It is difficult to know the origins of the Macedonian language because not only did the alphabet change over time, but so did the grammar of a language that was not codified. Stoyan Pribichevich claims that the first Slavic language was Macedonian and written as Church Slavonic by Cyril in roughly 862 AD.137 Others claim that Macedonian did not develop as a literary language until 1945.138 All sides claim whatever is pertinent to their national heritage and ignore any other possible scenarios. For example, both Bulgaria and the FYRM claim the creation of the first church in what is today the FYRM.

134

Panev, 584; also Victor Roudometof, Nationalism, Globalism, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of the Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans, Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001), 142 135 Turner, 813; Pekar, 25; Panev, 597 136 Panev, 593; Mitsakis, 37; Barker, 14-15; Poulton, 2 137 Pribichevich, 70 138 Poulton, 50

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Cyril and Methodius, who were Macedonians, created the first Slavonic alphabet in the 9th century.139 Their disciples later revised their alphabet in roughly 885.140 By the end of the 19th century, the Balkans were speaking one language that was Slavic. 141 Cyril and Methodiuss disciples, Clemant and Naum, went on to found the first Macedonian Orthodox Church in the beginning of the 10th century in Ohrid under the rule of King Samuel.142 After the conquering of Macedonia by the Byzantine Empire in 1018, the Greek clergy took over the archbishop.143 The Patriarch of Constantinople attained full authority over the Macedonian Orthodox Church, but he allowed them to maintain their own archbishop.144 While its highest priest was only an archbishop, the church was also autocephalous (self-governing), which allowed it to develop its own schools and religious training in comparison to the teachings that came out of Constantinople.145 The schools taught the missionaries in Slavonic,146 and they completed their missionary work among the people in the local language.147 The Christianization of the Balkans (and some even claim the Christianization of Russia) originated from Ohrid.148 However, under pressure

139

Mary Lee Knowlton, Cultures of the World: Macedonia (New York: Benchmark Books, 2005), 91. Cosmopoulos, 56-57 140 Shea, 57 141 Hugh Poulton, The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict (London: Minority Rights Publications, 1991), 1. 142 Knowlton, 85 & 91 and Macedonian Wedding; Risto Lazarov, This is the Reublic of Macedonia (Skopje: NIP Nova Makedonija, 1993), 20. Bulgarians claim that this was the first Bulgarian Orthodox Church. 143 Knowlton, 85-86 144 Panev, 591 and Knowlton, 85 145 George Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1969), 311. 146 Which was at this time a form of Macedonian, the generic Slavic language that Cyril and Methodius had created. 147 Pribichevich, 107-109 148 Cosmopoulos, 56-57; Lazarov, 20.

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from outside groups, in 1767, the Ottoman Empire abolished the Archbishop of Ohrid and total authority reverted to Constantinople.149 The different local dialects of a Slavonic language diverged after this point in time, with Macedonian often falling by the wayside because Macedonia was never in a position of power. Much later, in the 20th Century, the communists in the Yugoslavia Socialist Federal Republic of Macedonia formed a committee to codify the language in 1945.150 The committee accepted the alphabet on 3 May 1945, established the correct spelling on 7 June 1945, and created a grammar in 1952.151 While the Bulgarian language and the Macedonian language are close, Bulgarian is based on an eastern dialect and, Yugoslavia claimed, Macedonian is based on a western dialect with enough differences to constitute a separate language. Bulgaria disagreed then and still disagrees about this point, claiming that Macedonian is a dialect of Bulgarian.152 This disagreement will eventually cause more problems for the FYRM when they actually join the EU. Will Macedonian be added as an official language of the EU, or will Bulgaria have enough weight that it will not?

National Awakening At the turn of the 1800s, western influences and nation-state aspirations inspired the modern national definition of Macedonia to emerge.153 Parts of these aspirations were linked to the millet system, or religious political units with control over certain areas of
149 150

Panev, 593 Hupchick, 430 151 Poulton, 50 152 ibid, 49-56 153 Panev, 584

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land, under the Ottoman Empire.154 The creation of the Orthodox millets, helped to create a national consciousness. It was not until the mid-1870s that a Macedonian movement, organized by Macedonian communities, attempted to form a distinct Macedonian church, or rather to re-separate from the Greek Orthodox authority.155 During the Russo-Turkish War of 187778, the territory of geographical Macedonia was under the control of the Ottomans. Thus, the Treaty of San Stefano ending the war affected who controlled geographical Macedonia. Under this treaty, the whole of Macedonia, excepting Salonica and the Chalcidice peninsula, was included in the newly-formed Principality of Bulgaria.156 Shortly thereafter, the Great Powers of Europe could not stand that Russia would be granted greater access, or control, of the Turkish Straits, and called for a real treaty to end the war in Berlin. The European nations gathered to emphasize the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire157 as a way of ending the Russo-Turkish War. They created the Treaty of Berlin, which almost entirely reversed the Treaty of San Stefano, and left Macedonia under Turkish administration while Bulgaria retained its newfound independence in a much smaller form, stroking nationalist desires for many years to come.158 At these conferences, the Great Powers did not consult even one of the actual Balkan states. The treaties also ignored the nationalist sentiment in the area, helping to inspire the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) to form in 1893 with the purpose of full political

154 155

Panev, 593 ibid, 595 and Pribichevich, 114 156 Christ Anastasoff, The Tragic Peninsula: A History of the Macedonian Movement for Independence Since 1878 with 10 maps, 36 illustrations and a research bibliography on the Balkans (St. Louis, MO: Blackwell Weilandy Co, 1938), 9 157 Pribichevich, 115 158 Anastasoff, 9

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autonomy or independence of Macedonia, to be acquired through a revolution of the people as well as opposing the partition or division of Macedonia.159 The IMRO promoted the creation of a state encompassing the entire geographical Macedonia.160 When politicians, after the break-up of Yugoslavia, claimed to be pursuing the IMRO objectives, the idea of country of geographical Macedonia angered the Greeks. The IMRO helped organize the1903 St. Elijahs Day Uprising in Kruevo, located in the central-south-west part of the country. The people of the town declared a Socialist Republic, which lasted 10 days.161 Turkish troops crushed the rebellion quickly with a troop ratio of 16:1.162 The temporary republic inspired dissent that lasted for about three months.163 The Turks were unable to stop the Republic from sending a declaration to Europe asking for help to stop the bloodshed of Christians in Macedonia.164 Their plea led to the creation of the Mrzsteg Reforms. There were six main conditions of these reforms. The Chief Inspector was to have two helpers, one from Austria-Hungry and one from Russia to help direct his attention to the needs of the Christian population and to the ill doings of the local authorities. There was to be a foreign general and officers for the gendarmerie. The Ottoman Sultan was to reform the administration and allow civil servants to be Christians. There would be a mixed Christian/Muslim investigative team for the recent disturbances. Turkey would pay indemnity to the Christian refugees for reconstruction. Finally, any irregular troops were to be disbanded.165 The reforms were to

159 160

Lange-Akhund, 5, 38, 236. Barker, 16; ibid 161 Knowlton, 122 and Pribichevich, 127 162 Pribichevich, 129 and Knowlton, 122 163 Lazarov, 23 164 Pribichevich, 129 165 ibid, 132

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stop the persecution of the Christians by the Muslim police. In a weird twist, the IMRO rejected the compromise because it consolidated Turkish rule by trying to make it more tolerable.166 However, since they were not actually involved in the negotiations, their vote or lack of support did not matter. A few years later, the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 led to the re-partition of Macedonia in the Treaty of Bucharest among Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece. The Macedonians first attempt to gain international recognition took place in March of 1913 when a group of Macedonian supporters, the Macedonian Colony, submitted a Memorandum for the Independence of Macedonia to the Russian government.167 Russians did not help the Macedonians at this time, probably due to the belief held by many Russians that Macedonia was Greek.168 The IMRO followed up the memorandum by working at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 with the same pleaindependence for Macedonia. The IMRO was so unsuccessful that the peace conferences resulted in the division of the area known as Macedonia among Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria.169 From the end of the Balkan Wars to the end of WWII, Macedonians in all three regions were subject to violent campaigns of assimilation and denationalization whose goals were to deprive them of their true Macedonian identity and convince them that they were actually Serbs, Bulgarians, or Greeks.170 All three nations commenced violent campaigns of assimilation to ensure their domination over the new area of control.

166 167

Pribichevich, 133 and Anastasoff, 115-120 Panev, 597 168 Anthony-Emil Tachiaos, The Bulgarian National Awakening and its Spread into Macedonia (Thessaloniki: Society For Macedonian Studies, 1990), 34. 169 Panev, 597 170 Loring M Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in Transnational World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 51

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In fact, the first, and for a long time only, international organization to recognize Macedonia as a separate nationality was the Communist International in 1934. Between WWI and WWII, the area of geographical Macedonia that is currently known as the FYRM, was joined with Yugoslavia in late 1918171 and placed under Serbian control.172 Yugoslavia of the interwar years denied the existence of Macedonians, and thus refused to adopt that they were under treaty obligations to protect them.173 The Serbians in charge in Yugoslavia continued to treat Macedonians with the same campaign of assimilation to become better Serbs before WWII as they did before WWI. It was the Nazi occupation during World War II that finally led to a cohesive nationalist movement in the area of Macedonia due to the further oppression that the area suffered at the hands of the Nazi army. The Macedonian Separatists created the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation of Macedonia, which declared, on the basis of the inviolable, permanent, and inalienable rights of the people to self-determination the establishment of the Macedonian state on 2 August 1944 in an area smaller than the current FYRM.174 They did not gain any international recognition, and thus this state is not considered recognition of the Macedonian nationality. However, after WWII in 1945, Macedonia was promptly considered part of Yugoslavia again, this time under communist control as a socialist federation. Tito, the communist ruler of Yugoslavia, realized that the Macedonian nation did exist and that it

171 172

December actually Barker, 20 173 Barker, 22-23 174 Panev, 598

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had a right to statehood.175 Tito created a federal republic in Yugoslavia that consisted of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia, and Serbia (which consisted of two autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo).176 Though in reality a double-edged sword that would lead to more problems later, Macedonian appeared as an official nationality for the first time when recognized as a republic in Yugoslavia.177

175 176

Pribichevich, 151 Poulton, 6; Barker, 94 177 Dennis Hupchick, The Balkans from Constantinople to Communism (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002), 430.

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Chapter Three: Connections Rocky Road of Independence In 1963, per regulations in Yugoslavia, the Parliament changed the name to the Socialist Republic of Macedonia. The Yugoslav constitution accorded republics the right to independence, and in 1991 Macedonia held a referendum in which they voted for independence.178 Before declaring independence, Macedonia had a weak economy and was dependent on the other republics for a market. In addition, it was a multinational republic that was established only half a century ago. Yet it was the only republic to establish its independence from Yugoslavia without bloodshed.179
Chart Two 19811 Total Macedonians Albanians Serbs Moslems180 Romanian Turks Vlachs181 Bulgarians Other 1,912,257 1,281,195 377,726 44,613 39,555 47,223 86,691 7,190 1,984 26,080 19911 2,033,964 1,314,000 427,313 NA NA NA NA NA 39,555 6 others unlisted 20021 2,022,546 1,297,981 509,083 35,939 NA 53,879 77,959 9,695 NA NA

The first hints of the many future challenges, besides the name issue,182 came in the vote for independence. Ethnic Albanians (the largest minority in the FYRM) boycotted the referendum while ethnic Macedonians voted for independence.183 There were

enough turnouts for the vote to count, but the votes left a feeling of distrust in many
178

Elizabeth Pond, Rescuing Macedonia, in Endgame in the Balkans: Regime Change, European Style. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006. 169 179 Nina Dcbrkovic, Yugoslavia and Macedonia, in in The New Macedonian Question, 79-94, ed James Pettifer (New York: St. Martins Press, Inc, 1999), 90. 180 As spelled in the census. 181 Roman descendants in the area 182 See below 183 Pond, 169

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ethnic Albanians. Census data, while often unreliable in the FYRM, provides a little information on the ethnic composition of the FYRM since 1981. Many political scientists consider 1981 the last year for reliable census data before politics took over the census in the FYRM. The distrust that appeared during the referendum on independence would simmer until it flared up in 2001. On 11 January 1991, the Badinter Commission184 recommended that based on the political, social, ethnic, and judicial situation in the republic Macedonia deserved international recognition.185 Nevertheless, the EU did not recognize Macedonia, but instead recognized Slovenia and Croatia. Greece continued to block the EUs recognition of the Republic of Macedonia for two years, and was able to do so due to the TEU that needed Greeces signature to come into effect and was under consideration at the same time as the FYRMs statehood. In fact, Greece explicitly promised to recognize Maastricht in exchange for EC support on the Macedonian issue.186 In 1992, the CIA World Factbook first included Macedonia in its country profiles, with the note that although Macedonia has proclaimed independent statehood[, it] has not been formerly recognized as a state by the United States.187 The US did not recognize the FYRM until 1994.188 Then in 2004, the US decided to use the name the

184

This is the common name of the Arbitration Committee that was chaired by Robert Badinter, the President of the French Constitutional Council, which was to evaluate the requests of the Yugoslav republics that requested EC recognition during the early 1990s. (Allain Pellet. The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples, European Journal of International Law 3, (1), 1992, 178-185. 185 Panev, 605 186 Danforth, 150 187 CIA World Factbook 992, Macedonia, Office of Public and Agency Information, Washington, DC, 1992, 207 188 http://www.b-info.com/places/Macedonia/republic/WhiteHouse_Recogn.shtml, accessed 9 February 2011

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Republic of Macedonia, in diplomatic relations.189 The Factbook classified Macedonia as an emerging democracy in its government type.190 The 1992 Factbook points out the economy will suffer from the seclusion of being a breakaway republic unless the economic ties are reformed. In fact, Macedonias geographic isolation, technological backwardness, and political instability place it far down the list of countries of interest to Western investors.191 The US Institute of Peace (USIP), which is a nonprofit organization funded by the US Congress whose goals are to help prevent and resolve violent international conflicts and promote post-conflict stability and development,192 highlighted many of the problems that the FYRM faced (or would face in the 2001 conflicts) in its reports, yet still remained optimistic. A report issued on 27 March 2000, stated that the FYRM needed to focus on economic development and incorporating Albanians into the democratic structure.193 The USIP states that the FYRM represents an apparently successful model of preventive diplomacy and improving inter-ethnic and inter-state relations.194 They note the success of FYRM to stay out of the interstate and ethnic clashes that highlighted the break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Yet, they also note that there is a danger of parallel development between ethnic groups that could erupt in civil war.195

189

Xinhua . "Bush reiterates US recognition of Macedonia's constitutional name." China View. http://news3.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-12/11/content_2320096.htm (accessed February 9, 2011). 190 CIA World Factbook 1992, 207 191 CIA World Factbook 1992, 208 192 United States Institute of Peace website, www.usip.org/about-us, accessed 3 January 2011 193 USIP, Macedonia: Prevention Can Work, Washington DC: USIP, 27 March 2000, 1 194 Ibid, 2 195 ibid, 5

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Yet, despite the challenges that the FYRM faced as a new emerging democracy, they persevered. The votes in the first election in the country divided along ethnic lines, with Macedonians voting for Macedonian parties and Albanians voting for Albanian parties. The ethnic tensions seen in the elections erupted in violence first in 1995 when ethnic Macedonians physically blocked the opening of an Albanian language university in Tetovo.196 The violence resulted in 1 death and 18 injured.197 It was not until 2000 that the government finally recognized the university.198 Then, when tensions rose in Kosovo in 1999, many refugees fled to Macedonia. They numbered more than 300,000 or 1 refugee for every eight citizens of the FYRM.199 Most of these refugees were of Albanian ethnic origin. The influx of more ethnic Albanians stressed the tensions even more. In addition, the ethnic Albanian birthrate is rising at a faster rate than the ethnic Macedonian birthrate, bringing the Albanian portion to 25.17% in 2002 compared to 12.5% in 1953.200 In 2001, these ethnic tensions seemed to have been solved to such a point that Macedonia became the first western Balkan country to sign a Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) with the EU on 9 April, but this notion was false.201 A SAP is the first step in becoming a member of the EU.202 Interestingly enough, the SAP was signed while the Macedonian forces were dealing with sporadic ethnic rebel activity in

196 197

Pond, 170 David Binder, Balkan College for Albanians Fights to Stay Alive, New York Times, 14 Feb 1996, pg B

12
198 199

Pond, 172 ibid, 171 and Jane Cowen, Macedonia: the Politics of Identity and Difference, (London, Pluto Press, 2000) 200 Panev, 615 201 Pond, 172; Europa.eu, Key Dates in the Countrys Path towards the EU 202 See more below

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the northern part of their country. A group of Albanians, believing that their political parties had abandoned them began to fight for more rights and greater equality between ethnicities.203 It became clear that the FYRMs security forces would be unable to handle the challenges they faced. Their forces were undersupplied and did not have the numbers to put the rebellion down. The EU and NATO stepped in, four months later in early July, to help mediate a cease-fire between the rebels and the government forces.204 While there are conflicting claims about the numbers of dead both civilian and military, the most reliable figures claim that the Macedonian forces lost 63 while the ethnic Albanian forces lost 64. About 30 civilians were killed by the conflict while 2,000 refugees had left the cities by one month into the conflict.205 The parties in conflict finally reached a framework agreement at Ohrid in August. The Ohrid Framework Agreement, as it was called, was a landmark agreement that was to promote the development of the FYRM and make sure that the state was acting in the best interests of all the citizens of the FYRM. There are five basic principles that were agreed upon in the framework: 1) 2) 3) 4) To reject the use of violence for political means To reject territorial solutions to ethnic issues The multiethnic character of the citizens must be reflected in public life. The constitution must meet the needs of the citizens and the highest standards of the international community (which are evolving, as the constitution must also) 5) Local self-government is essential206

203 204

Pond, 172; Paul Wood, The rebels agenda (London: BBC, 11 March 2001) accessed 24 April 2011. Panev, 616 205 What Do the Casualties of War Amount to? AIM Press, Skopje, 30 December 2001, Accessed 24 April 2011 206 Ohrid Framework Agreement, http://faqs.macedonia.org/politics/framework_agreement.pdf, 13 Aug 2001, accessed 30 Dec 2010, 1.

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In addition to recognizing the essential role of local self-government, the agreement went on to state the powers of local government: they shall have power over issues relating to public service, urban and rural planning, environmental protection, local economic development, culture, local finances, education, social welfare, and health care.207 The framework also stated that any laws made relating to the culture, use of language, education, personal documentation, and use of symbols must receive a majority of votes208 including a majority of the minority in the legislature. The agreement also finally consented to instruction in the native language of the minority, but required those who do not speak Macedonian also to have Macedonian language instruction.209 The years between 2001 and 2004 were filled with recovery and rebuilding. Eventually the legislature passed laws that allowed the Albanian flag to fly next to the Macedonian one in 2005.210 In the 2005 EU Commission report on the FYRMs progress, they commended Skopje for its progress while noting that much more needed to be done.211 Freedom House noted in their 2009 report that much further progress has been made in increasing ethnic Albanian civil servants; in 2007 alone there was a 3.75 percent increase.212 However, in the 2008 elections, key international standards were not met for free and fair elections. In addition, an amendment that lowered of the threshold for the election of the president by 10% points to 40 percent passed, which decreased democracy

207 208

Ohrid Framework Agreement, 1 ibid, 2 209 ibid, 3 210 RFE/RL Newsline, Macedonian Government Takes on the Flag Question, June 1, 2005 in Pond, 183 211 European Commission, Analytical Report for the Opinion on the Application from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for EU membership (November 9, 2005), p 19. Quoted in Pond, 186 212 Zhidas Daskalovski, Macedonia, Freedom House Nations in Transit, Freedom House: Washington, D.C., 2009, 348

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in the country.213 Yet despite all of the problems that the FYRM faced, Freedom House still gave it a rating of 3.86 on a scale of one to seven with one representing the most democratic, which was a positive change of 0.07 over the previous year214 However, as part of Ohrid and EU requirements, the highly centralized government needed to decentralize and provide more representation to the ethnic Albanians. In order to pass the decentralization requirement on to the people, the government did not try to convince them that it was a good thing for the country, but only stated that it was necessary for joining the EU, which was the only way to gather support for the unpopular initiative.215 Since a majority of the republic was ethnically Macedonian, they needed convincing that the ethnic Albanians could have a part in a decentralized rule without breaking up the republic, which was the main fear- that they would want to separate to form a Greater Albania. Seemingly addressing these fears, the ethnic Albanian leader, Ali Ahmeti, has stated [Macedonia] is my country. I have no other country.216 By June 2008, 59 of the 85 municipalities marked for decentralization had entered the second phase of that process.217 Those that did not pass into the second phase had large debts and corresponding legal proceedings, which is why they did not proceed.218

213 214

Daskalovski, 348 ibid, 1 215 Pond, 183 216 Peter Beringer, Return to Europe: Macedonian Wedding, (First Foundation, 29 May 2009) found at http://derstandard.at/1242316121241/Doku-Reihe-Balkan-Express-Mazedonien?_artikelIndex=2 (accessed 31 March 2011). 217 Daskalovski, 349 218 ibid , 359

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In Search of EU Recognition On 16 December 2005, the European Council decided to grant the FYRM candidate status based on the progress made with respect to the legislation regarding the Ohrid framework.219 Yet having granted the FYRM candidate status, in the next paragraph the Council stated that the FYRM had much to work on before it could ever be admitted. The council also mentioned that the absorption capacity of the union needed to be taken into account.220 In March 2008, the Commission adopted the Communication on the Western Balkans which provided an outline for the next steps in the accession process for the states in the western Balkans. In this communication, the Commission stated multiple times that the EU is the best location for the western Balkans in the future.221 Specifically for the FYRM, the Commission held that reform had been slow, but were picking up speed, which was good for their future EU prospects.222 The commission stipulated that the FYRM needed to meet certain benchmarks before undertaking accession negotiations.223 The report further noted that visa liberalization was very important to the people in the Western Balkans and that both the EU and the individual countries need to work towards fulfilling these wishes.224 When you do not need a visa to travel to a country, in this case the EU, this is known as visa liberalization. Visa liberalization began in 2007/8 with visa facilitation that reduced the costs for obtaining a visa, and simplified the procedures for receiving a visa
219 220

European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 30 January 2006, 15914/1/05 REV 1, 7 ibid, 7 221 Commission of the European Communities, Western Balkans, 2-3 222 ibid 4, 21 223 ibid 21 224 ibid 8

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to the EU Schengen Area.225 Full visa liberalization occurred on 19 December 2010. The visa waiver only applied to holders of biometric passports. Those without biometric passports had to still apply for a visa. Biometric passports contain an electronic chip of information about the holder. The chip inside the passport contains information about the holders face such as the distances between eyes, nose, mouth and earsThe chip also holds the information that is printed on the personal details page.226 In 2010, the European Commission reiterated its 2009 recommendation that the FYRM begin accession negotiations with the EU.227 The Commission recognized that there are sufficient legal and institutional protections for human, minority, political and civil rights228 in the FYRM to begin negotiations. The fact that the FYRM has these protections shows their progress since the 2001 conflicts. In order to further support their recommendation that the FYRM open accession negotiations, the commission points out that there has been progress in many areas, from foreign, security and defense policy, that is now closer aligned with the EUs declarations/acquis, to the fact that the FRYM was the least affected by the financial crisis.229 While some policies do need to be improved, much of this can occur in negotiations. The Central & Eastern Europe Countries (from

225

Commission of the European Communities Western Balkans 8; The Schengen Area is an area of no internal borders within the EU. An example is that if you flew from Paris to Germany you would not have to pass through customs. 226 What are biometric passports? Directgov, http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/TravelAndTransport/Passports/Applicationinformation/DG_174159, accessed 5 January 2010 227 EU Commission, Enlargement Strategies & Main Challenges 2010-2011, Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament and The Council, 9 November 2010, Brussels, COM(2010)660, 15 228 Ibid, 36 229 Ibid, 41 and 14

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the 2004 enlargement) took roughly 14 years to gain admittance to the EU.230 The FYRM has been seeking to gain admittance to the EU since 1991 when it became a country, but more realistically since 2001, or 10 years. Progress towards EU integration has been a long road for the FYRM. On 9 April 2001, the EU and the FYRM signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). The SAA is part of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) whose goals are to stabilize the countries involved by pushing them towards a market economy that is supported by regional cooperation.231 The whole purpose is to help the countries under a SAA build their abilities to accept the acquis.232 The FYRMs SAA agrees to examine the progress that the FYRM makes on the chapters through the annual progress reports, which will identify the priorities for further work.233 As the FYRM worked on maintaining progress on the SAA, it applied for EU membership on 22 March 2004, a week after their president died in a plane crash.234 Soon after, they faced a new presidential election, which formed a new government. This new governments task was to further fulfill the Ohrid agreement, creating new legislation that the EU was demanding to advance the FYRMs candidacy, while completing the EUs country

230

Mary Anne Normile and Susan E. Leetmaa. "A Historic Enlargement: Ten Countries Prepare to Join the European Union." USDA Economic Research Service. http://www.ers.usda.gov/Amberwaves/April04/Features/AHistoricEnlargement.htm (accessed March 31, 2011). 231 European Commission on Enlargement, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu /sap/index_en.htm, accessed 5 January 2011 232 ibid 233 European Council, 2008/212/EC, Council Decision of 18 February 2008 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia repealing Decision 2006/57/EC, 19 March 2008, p 32-45, accessed online no pages provided 234 Pond, 182

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readiness survey.235 The country readiness survey is a series of questions the EU puts to incoming candidates to test their readiness to join the EU. The FYRM completed the EU country readiness survey within four-and-a-half months and presented the 14,000-page document to Brussels.236 Immediately after the FYRMs acceptance of candidacy later that year, they received unlimited duty-free access to the EU market for virtually all of its products [and] increased EU [financial] assistance.237

The Name Dispute On 7 June 1991, the Macedonian National Assembly deleted the designation Socialist from their name through a constitutional amendment, thus creating the present constitutional name: the Republic of Macedonia.238 Their choice of name would become the source of a 20-year disagreement with Greece, a disagreement that still has no end in sight. The Republic of Macedonia has been forced to use the nomenclature of FYRM because Greece thought that by using the name Macedonia it implied illicit claims on the Greekheld portion of the old geographic Macedonia.239 The Badinter Commission recommended that the states of the Former Yugoslavia prove that they held no further territorial aspirations. In response, on 6 January 1991, the FYRM passed two constitutional amendments renouncing any future territorial aspirations.240 The Badinter Commission also stated, however, that the name Republic of Macedonia, did not imply

235 236

Pond, 182 ibid, 185 237 ibid, 185 238 Panev, 598 239 Pond, 170 240 Panev, 605

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territorial aspirations.241 Yet, as Misha Ghenny points out, How this tiny impoverished and effectively unarmed nation intended to invade Greece, a member of both NATO and the EU, was never explained.242 Most importantly, Greece feels that the name Macedonia rightly belongs only to Greeces national history and thus no one else should be allowed to use this name.243 The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is exercising a policy of irredentism and territorial claims fuelled by the falsification of history and the usurpation of Greeces historical and national heritage.244 The FYRM argues that every state has the right to determine its own name, no matter the connections to other states.245 The cultural heritage part of Greeces argument goes back to the ancient history discussed earlier. On 10 December 1992, the Republic of Macedonia added (Skopje) to its official name so that in international organizations the official name would be the Republic of Macedonia (Skopje).246 Yet, this did not appease Greece, which originally demanded that the phrase Macedonia not be used in any part of the name of this new republic.247 Greece in fact had so much influence in the EU that the Lisbon Commission, on 27 June 1992, commented on how they would only recognize

241

Dimitar Mirev, Foreign Policy of Macedonia, in The New Macedonian Question, 201-225, ed James Pettifer (New York: St. Martins Press, Inc, 1999), 208 242 Misha Ghenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers 1804-1999, (New York: Penguin, 1999), 656 243 Panev, 605 244 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia name issue, (Athens, Greece: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 2010), Accessed 24 January 2011, www.mfa.gr 245 Fotis Mavromatidis, The Role of the European Union in the Name Dispute between Greece and FYR Macedonia, in Journal of Contemporary European Studies, vol. 18, No 1 (March 2010: 49 246 Jens Reuter, Policy and economy in Macedonia, in The New Macedonian Question, 201-225, ed James Pettifer (New York: St. Martins Press, Inc., 1999), 42 247 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece

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Macedonia if Macedonia was not included in the name used by the country.248 Greeces position has since changed and they are willing to include the term Macedonia in a name if it has a geographical qualifier. The next year, a few days before the Danish Foreign Minister, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, was to leave office, he published a statement that included a scathing commendation of Greeces, and the EUs, actions. He claimed that Greece was holding the EU hostage and the failure to recognize the Republic of Macedonia only because of demonstrating understanding for Athens was a dark stain on the Communitys foreign policy, which had to be removed.249 Whether the Danish Foreign Ministers speech was the deciding factor or not, by the end of 1994, all EU member states, except for Greece, had set up bilateral diplomatic relations with the FYRM (some using the FYRM others using the Republic of Macedonia).250 The Republic of Macedonia gained UN recognition on 8 April 1993 under the name of the FYRM rather than their constitutional name.251 In 1995, Greece and the FYRM signed an Interim Accord, which established diplomatic relations and a code of conduct between the parties.252 The Accord, which confirmed existing borders, established diplomatic relations, and recognized the FYRM as an independent and sovereign state. However, the FYRM was immediately expected to change its flag.253 In addition, the Republic of Macedonia agreed to use the Former

248 249

Mirev, 212 Reuter, 43 250 Mirev, 218 251 Panev, 606 252 Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs 253 Mirev, 219. Note: The original flag that the FYRM had decided to use for the national flag used the sunburst that the Ancient Macedonians are expected to used/had been found next to the grave of Phillip II, which had 16 points. The new flag uses a different type of sunburst pattern, which uses 8 points. It maintained the same colors of a yellow sun on a red background.

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Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM) when seeking recognition in international organizations until a mutually acceptable negotiated name could be agreed upon under UN guidance. In the agreement, Greece promised to refrain from objecting to the application or membership of the FYRM to international, regional or multilateral organizations, unless Macedonia applies under a name other than the one referred to in [United Nations Security Council] Resolution 817-1993.254 In April 2008, the FYRMs application for membership in NATO was heard in Bucharest. Greece vetoed the application, stating that Greece wished to resolve the name issue as an essential precondition to NATO membership.255 Since all states agreement is required for membership to NATO, the FYRMs application was denied. The FYRM claims that this is a clear violation of [Greeces] obligations under the Interim Accord and sued Greece in the International Court of Justice (ICJ).256 The FYRM further alleges in their argument to the ICJ that Greece has made it clear they will continue to prevent both NATO and EU membership based on the name alone.257 Since for both the EU and NATO, all member states have to agree to admit members, the negotiations have stalemated. Published documents prove the validity of the FYRMs claim against Greece. In 2007, in a televised debate, Greek Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis stated that Greece will veto the FYRMs application if the name dispute is not solved.258 The Greeks are in agreement with the Prime Ministers policy with an overwhelming 83% of Greeks

254 255

Mirev, 219. The name is the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Mavromatidis, 50 256 ICJ application, 14 257 ibid ,14 258 Maramanlis: Greece to veto Macedonias EU, NATO bids if name issue not resolved, Southeast European Times, 09 July 2007, www.setime.com accessed 8 February 2011.

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supporting the veto if the name issue is unresolved.259 Greece counters that the FYRM violated the interim agreement long before Greece did, do Greece is justified in denying membership. Hearings for the ICJ case began in March 2011, but have not reached any conclusions at the time of publishing. To this day, Macedonia and Greece have not resolved the name issue. Greece maintains that it has approached the UN-led negotiations in a constructive way, and ma[de] every effort to reach a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue.260 Greece claims that no significant progress has been made due to the FYRMs bad faith and provocative irredentist actions, and this is their counter-argument to the ICJ case.261 The FYRM, via the Prime Minister Nikola Gurevski, comments, I believe that Greece, for now, is not prepared to make a compromise. Twenty years since our independence and one year since the start of frequent meetings, our interlocutors still face a serious obstacle to accept that Macedonians live in this country who speak Macedonian.262 Gurevski has also said, We are ready to discuss changes. But to change our name, our identity? The citizens are not ready.263 Poll data back up Gurevskis claims. In 2010, Macedonians were polled on the name issue; 66.5% backed the constitutional name Republic of Macedonia. Even further, only 26.2% think that accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures is more important than their constitutional name.264 Currently, 131 countries

259

Michael Seraphinoff, Dimensions of the Greek-Macedonian Name Dispute (Greenbank, WA: MacedonianLit, 2008), 2. 260 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece 261 ibid 262 Emphasis added. PM Gruevski: I wish a name solution with Greece to be found, Idivi, Skopje: 20 January 2011, www.idividi.com/mk/English accessed 20 January 2011. 263 "Macedonian Wedding." Return to Europe. 264 Constitutional Name more important than EU, NATO accession: polls, Vmacedonianews.com, 14 July 2010, Accessed 20 January 2011.

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use the name Republic of Macedonia, 18 use the FYRM in diplomatic relations.265 Of the UN Security Council Permanent Members, only France uses the FYRM as the designation, all the others use the constitutional name. In the EU, 14 states recognize the state by its constitutional name, 11 by FYRM, and 2 are unknown/unclear in their usage.266 The EU Commission on Enlargement states, Maintaining good neighbourly relations, including a negotiated and mutually acceptable solution to the name issue, under the auspices of the UN, remains essential267 to the possible admittance to the EU. Dimitris Droutsas, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, says, The name issue must be solved before we can even think of opening accession negotiations with Skopje.268 The FYRM has continued to work towards EU accession and continues to promise joining the EU to its citizens, despite Greeces decision to not precede with accession negotiations.

265 266

www.makdenes.org, Id # 2279371, accessed 20 January 2011 Macedonian Naming Dispute, www.ask.com 267 European Commission, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2010-2011, Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. COM(2010) 660. Brussels: European Printing Office, 9 November 2010. 37 268 Greece Again Challenges Macedonia on EU accession, Athens: RFE/RL, 28 October 2009

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Chapter Four: Enlargement Fatigue The previous three chapters addressed the history of the EU and the FYRM, but did little to link their stories together to the larger goals of this thesis. Let us go back to the original question of this thesis: what can a small country in the Balkans tell the world about the much larger conglomeration of economically and politically stronger countries? The FYRM admissions process to the EU highlights the problems that the EU is currently having. The EU is facing a critical discussion of its own definition on what sort of union it will be. Currently every member state has the same amount of power and say in the Union. While differences have been allowed for in monetary policy and the expansion of the Euro, all countries have at least one commissioner that has a say over the start of new accession negotiations or expansion of the Unions CFSP.269 While this is an important feature of the EU- it prevents any one state from dictating the direction of the EU- it also limits the effectiveness of the EU. The EU states that it wants to be heard with one voice in the world.270 An example of the problem that the EU faces in speaking with one voice, unrelated to the Balkans, is the Copenhagen Climate Talks in 2009. While the EU has led the way in going green, at the Copenhagen summit, it was sidelined and ignored in the process of global discussion. The EU does not have the political influence to guarantee its desired outcomes.271 Although it has often times created or been the first to pass

269

Common Foreign and Security Policy; As noted before, this will change in 2014-2017 to a rotating basis. It is still required to have unanimity in CFSP, and thus might still apply to enlargement negotiations. 270 European Commission, The EU in the World: The Foreign Policy of the European Union, http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/move/67/en.pdf, June 2007 (accessed 26 October 2010) 271 James Kanter. "Europe Stews As Its Clout Diminishes On Climate: [Foreign Desk]." New York Times, December 3, 2009, Late Edition (east Coast), http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed March 20, 2011).

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legislation for climate change, other countries ignored the EU at the Copenhagen Summit. In Copenhagen the EU diplomat as well as representatives from every major state, including France and Germany, represented the EU. Too many agents from the EU diluted its influence as the world was unsure whom to look towards for guidance in climate change discussions.272 Too many agents also can backfire when viewing the overall credibility of the EU. When one or two states hold the progress of the EU hostage to accomplish their own political goals, the credibility of the EU is in danger.273 In fact, the case of Macedonia, Duan Relijic argues, has already indicated that the EUs political considerations-which have little to do with the actual achievements of particular countries within the SAP-have a strong influence on the EUs decisions.274 The political considerations mentioned can often be boiled down to the discussion between a wide and deep union as mentioned earlier. A broad union can be defined as that of the intergovernmental view of separate nation states acting together where appropriate and in a free market; while a deep union would refer to a single political entity operating under the principles of a European social market with members having a subordinate role.275

272

Pamela Barnes, Too Many Presidents Spoil the Broth the Role of the commission in Global Climate Change Politics Paper presented at the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Conference, Boston, MA, March 3-5, 2011. 273 Danish Foreign Ministers words about Greece and the progress in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) 274 Duan Relijic, A Long Way to EU accession?: Membership Perspectives and the Stabilization & Association process for the Western Balkan Countries, in State Building & Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans: Europes engagements 12 years after Dayton Foreign Policy in Dialogue Vol. 8 Issue 23, pg 16-23, ed Marco Overhaus, et al. (Trier, Germany: deutsche-aussenpolitik.de, 2007), 20. 275 Anthony and Andrew Cowgill, The Treaty of Lisbon in Perspective: The European Reform TreatyConsolidated Treaty on European Union and the Consolidated Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Gloucestershire: British Management Data Foundation, 2008), viii.

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The EU has grown significantly since the 1950s, but an odd characteristic of the EU is that it has grown so significantly without ever settling the question of its own nature.276 A critical aspect of the question what sort of union should the EU be? involves enlargement. If the EU is to be wide and not deep, it must further expand to other countries. If it is to be deep and not wide, enlargement must stop now. If it can be both, expansion must proceed and political union must increase. Both sides have supporters and detractors. Supporters of integration argue that the EU has done the job it was set up for, fostering partnership amongst nations andhelping to prevent Europe from descending into the kind of continent wide conflagration that killed so many during the 20th century277 and thus should continue expanding to help stabilize the Balkans which are in danger of descending into a region wide conflict that emerged in Western Europe in the 20th Century. The original idea behind the ECSC was to stabilize Europe and to ensure further peace by connecting key industries of previously warring nations and this has been a success. However, currently, when enlargement could once again serve as a tool for promoting stability further east and south, some of the original beneficiaries seem preoccupied with securing the possibility of an exit strategy.278 The Lisbon Treaty includes the first mention of leaving the EU, and member states demanded that this clause be in the treaty. The EU Commission believes that the enlargement process
276

Nicolas se Boisgroiller, The EU Disunion, in Rejecting the EU Constitution?: from the Constitutional Treaty to the Treaty of Lisbon, ed Anca Pusca, 90-97 (New York: International Debate Education Association, 2009), 93. 277 Gordon Kerr, A Short History of Europe: From Charlemagne to the Treaty of Lisbon, (Harpenden, Herts: Pocket Essentials, 2009), 150. 278 Jana-Hynkova-Dvoranova, The Lisbon Treaty and the Future of EU Enlargement, in Rejecting the EU Constitution?: from the Constitutional Treaty to the Treaty of Lisbon, ed Anca Pusca, 71-87 (New York: International Debate Education Association, 2009), 85.

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contributes to stability in Europe and to the security and well-being of its citizens.279 In addition, one of the main impetuses behind the Treaty of Lisbon was to prepare the EU for enlargement, in particular that the institutions of the Union would be organized to be able to operate on a more efficient basis.280 Yet enlargement has often taken a backseat to many different concerns in the years since the Lisbon Treaty. Others argue that by trying to make the EU a deeper union it will undercut one of Europes greatest recipes for success,281 which is competition and trade. The Economist, notes, There is nothing wrong in principle with the idea of some EU countries going farther and faster towards political integration than others.282 While The Economist is referring to current member states rather than potential member states, it is necessary to consider how the process of enlargement will change towards candidate countries if some members move towards closer integration while others move away, even while all still theoretically support expansion. Complications will arise when some countries desire deeper, closer integration and others wider integration when discussing enlargement, since the two ideals are often at odds with each other. Yet The Economist also notes, The more [the EU] speaks as one, the more they can hope to be heard.283 Put another way, the more the member states recognize that they are more powerful as one entity, the sooner that they will accept a CFSP.284

279 280

EU Commission, Enlargement Strategy, 2 Anthony and Andrew Cowgill, xv 281 Matt Peterson, What Made Europe Great? Euobserver.com, 30 June 2010. 282 Pact of uncompetitiveness, The Economist, 12-18 February 2011, 16. 283 Charlemagne, Out of the Limelight, The Economist 5-11 February 2011, 64. 284 Silvia Kofler, The Frontiers of Europe, presented at the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Conference, Boston, MA, March 3-5, 2011.

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By joining, the EU the member states have opted, freely and democratically, for membership [in] a community in which sovereignty is partially transferredto common institutions established in Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxembourg for the benefit of all [member states.]285 However, during the past 7 years of enlargement that almost doubled the size of the EU, member states have begun to question the validity of expansion, and to a lesser extent the Union itself. While the prevailing view is that the EUs borders are not final, the belief is that only the Western Balkans stands a realistic chance.286 A recent Eurobarometer poll displays conflicting views of the future of the EU in which 43% of all EU respondents believe that the EU in 2030 will go far beyond the limits of the European continent, compared with 37% who do not believe this, and 20% who are not sure.287 A contrast exists in the idea that other countries will apply to an organization in which its own members are not currently happy holding memberships. The potential and candidate countries find more worth in joining the EU than in staying out, while the member states question the benefits of staying in. While in the past, Euroskepticism has mostly been a fringe event, many more mainstream politicians are beginning to express skepticism about the value of staying in the EU. The President of the Czech Republic and many nationalist parties are examples. When members such as Greece or Cyprus block a candidate countrys accession, the faade of EU unity cracks. If the member states are supposed to present a united front to the world, then when any one state acts differently than the rest, the union is exposed
285

Brian Nelson & David Roberts, Introduction in The European Community in the 1990s: Economics, Politics, and Defense, Ed Brian Nelson, et al (Oxford: Berg, 1992), ix 286 Ahto Lobjakas, Top EU Official Draws Line Between Enlargement, Neighborhood Policies Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2 June 2010 287 Eurobarometer 71, Future of Europe 2009; these statistics were taken from the EU wide averages.

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as being divided. The threat is especially real in the case of the FYRM, which has consistently made progress towards every benchmark that the EU has placed in its way. While not ready for immediate accession, the process of negotiating can often solve many of the problems that the candidate countries face in adopting the acquis. Negotiations have acted as this sort of catalyst in the past, especially with the new Central-Eastern European states. In addition, negotiations will give the FYRM concrete steps, goals, and timelines to reach for rather than the blanket term the acquis that currently exists. Negotiations will also let the FYRM know which goals are critical to EU accession and which they may have a bit more leeway in working towards. While the EU claims to want to speak with one voice, many of its policies towards the Western Balkans are disjointed.288 The confusion relating to the Balkans is representative of the confusion in all of the EUs CFSP. Despite progress made towards creating a CommonFSP, many member states struggle to maintain a semblance of unity289 when creating foreign policy or interacting with the world. The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in the 2009 Annual Report, stated, coherent implementation of the renewed consensus on enlargement based on consolidation of commitments, fair and rigorous conditionality, better communications and the EUs capacity to integrate members continues to form the basis of EU actions.290 The Treaty of Lisbon was to bring coherence between the different strands of EU

288

Roberto Belloni, European Integration and the Western Balkans: Lessons, Prospects, and Obstacles, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern States 11, 3 (2009):314 289 ibid, 325 290 Council of the European Union,2009 Annual Report from the High representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Main Aspects and Basic Choices of CFSP, 1831-9033 (Belgium: EU Publishing, 2009), 17

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external policy.291 Since the Lisbon Treaty has only been in effect for 1 year and four months (1 December 2009), to evaluate the effect on CFSP is difficult. Little to no scholarly research currently exists on the effect of the treaty for CFSP except in speculation. However, as noted before, the purpose of the treaty was to refine EU institutions to address the concerns that many member states had over enlargement under current terms. When taking the next steps to further enlarge the community, it should be kept in mind that part of the revision of the treaties was intended to facilitate enlargement. Therefore there should be little surprise or rejection of enlargement at least for the candidate and potential candidate countries. Of course, there will be dissent on members where dissent already exists such as Turkey, the FYRM, or Serbia. No concrete steps toward enlargement have occurred since the passing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. In fact, the opposite has occurred. The EU and individual member states have hardened their position by placing more barriers to enlargement. Greece has come out and publically stated that until the FYRM changes its name, Greece will not begin accession negotiations. Cyprus is currently blocking Turkeys negotiations due to the border dispute.292 The financial crisis has also put a damper on the possibility of enlargement due to fears of the increased problems with new, smaller unstable states. Many states, such as Germany, are worried about the financial stability of new states before they join the union. While a valid concern, it does not mean that all enlargement

291

European Commission Reforming Europe for the 21 st Century COM 2007 412 Final, in The Treaty of Lisbon in Perspective: The EU Reform Treaty Consolidated Treaty on European Union and the Consolidated Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, ed Anthony and Andrew Cowgill, 309314 (Gloucestershire: British Management Data Foundation, 2008), 313. 292 The EU member State of Cyprus controls part of Cyprus and the other part is controlled by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus which is recognized only by Turkey. Cyprus refuses to extend negotiations until Turkey recognizes Cypruss supremacy on the island.

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should stop. It is as if current strong member states choose to ignore the fact that the member states which joined before 1984 are facing the worst of the current financial crisis.293 None of the 2004 or later members are facing bailouts by the Union. This scenario suggests that perhaps the candidate countries could bring vitality, rather than a challenge, to the union. In response to fears and doubts about enlargement in 2010, the EU reaffirmed their commitment to the Balkans and dismissed fears of enlargement fatigue.294 Yet no real steps have been taken. While the EU has extended candidate country status to other states, only Iceland has progressed towards negotiations. Yet the larger question about whether the EU wants to expand also provokes a further question- what benefits do the candidate countries bring to the EU? Enlargement should not only benefit the candidate countries but also the EU. Some scholars argue that the consideration of benefit to the EU is the most important consideration of all. There is little obvious benefit to the EU from the smaller states in the Balkans. They have small economies, with little to no markets and almost no competitive marketable goods. The main benefit of enlargement towards the Western Balkans is the increased safety and security of the EU. The benefit should not only be to the safety and security of the EU citizens. However, due to the Lisbon Treaty and the solidarity agreement, for the EU, that security agreement might just be enough in the current political atmosphere. The security of the EU is mentioned often in relation to the Balkans. In addition, enlargement may increase the prestige of the EU as a global player [and] enhanc[e] its visibility in

293

Antoine Blua WU Commits to Opening Door to Western Balkans, But Warns Progress Still Needed, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 02 June 2010 294 ibid

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global trade agreements.295 Other benefits could include economic trade and efficiency gains. Almost all scholars agree on the fact that without the Western Balkans inside of the EU, the EU has the potential to be unstable due to the geographical position of the Western Balkans surrounded by the EU.296 In fact, the question of Macedonian statehood was a major problem of the 20th century and a contributor to all major wars since 1878.297 The Balkans is an important element in the overall security of the continent. Stability and security in Europe as a whole cannot be achieved and sustained if this part of the continent is dragged into economic and social turmoil.298 However, the EU is currently reluctant to accept all of the Balkans or Turkey. 299 A minister of Foreign Affairs in Serbia has stated, The Western Balkans is without a doubt already a part of the EU.300 Yet their admission is far from clear. In its current form, the stringent conditionality imposed upon the Western Balkans is adding to the stress of already stressed systems;301 for the FYRM, overwhelming the civil service.302 However, if this conditionality does not exist before the countries join the EU the goals set to meet the acquis will not be met.
295 296

Akast, 263. For example, see John McCormick, Jorge Juan Fernandez et al. 297 Andrew Ressors, The Disintegration of Yugoslavia, Macedonias independence and Stability, in Europe in the New Century: Visions of an Emerging Superpower, ed Robert Guttman (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 111. 298 Guner Oztek, Opening remarks in Proceeding of the International Conference on the EU Enlargement Towards South-East Europe, 15 Dec 2005, ed Ozan Erzden, YTU Aud/Yildiz Campus, 17-20: 18. 299 Ozan Erzden, EU Enlargement Towards the Balkans as a Problem of Physics: Quantum Mechanics vs. Newtonian Mechanics in in Proceeding of the International Conference on the EU Enlargement Towards South-East Europe, 15 Dec 2005, ed Ozan Erzden, YTU Aud/Yildiz Campus, 21-27, 24 300 Sasa Ojdanic, Future Development of the European Union (2010-2020): challenges and perspectives of EU Enlargement. Paper presented at the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Conference, Boston, MA, March 3-5, 2011. 301 Conditionality is the benchmarks and other goals that the candidate countries have to meet to open accession negotiations, or move forward in the process. 302 Milda Anna Vachudova, roundtable participant Deepening or Widening? Debating the European Unions Agenda for the Next Decade, at the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Conference, Boston, MA, March 3-5, 2011.

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One only has to look towards Bulgaria and Romania to see what could occur if the acquis is not fulfilled before admission- the EU has lost most of its bargaining power over fulfillment of EU policies that were not met before admission to the EU. 303 Bulgaria and Romania have continued to fall behind in progress towards goals to meet the acquis after they were admitted.304 From fear of the same happening in the Western Balkans, the EU is imposing a much stricter conditionality on the potential candidate countries than ever before. Once there is no longer a carrot guiding and justifying the harsh policy changes, countries often lose their political will to implement the often severe policies to bring their country in line with EU policy. If the EU does expand into this hotbed of confrontation, it has a chance of quelling the dissent and ethnic nationalism that could rise up to haunt Europe again. In fact, if the EU accepts that it is unable to enlarge due to its absorption capacity, then the opposite will occur- a radical or nationalistic agenda could be bolstered by the EUs inaction.305 There is current academic discussion of how the lack of a credible possibility of admission has slowed marked progress towards EU benchmarks in candidate countries.306 Confidence in the EU is consistently falling both outside of and within the organization.

303

Zoltan Dujisin, Can EU anchor in Romania, Bulgaria, Stabilize Balkans? Inter Press Service 28 December 2006; Stephen Castle With Romania and Bulgaria joining the EU, how much bigger can it get? The Independent. 29 December 2006. London; Vessela Sergueva Bulgaria, Romania enthusiastic to squeeze into EU Agence France Presse. 30 December 2006. 304 Irina Angelescu, Punching Below its Weight: Romanian Foreign Policy and the Impact of its European Integration, paper presented at the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Conference, Boston, MA, March 3-5, 2011. 305 Biljana Gaber, The Republic of Macedonias Way To The European Union in Proceeding of the International Conference on the EU Enlargement Towards South-East Europe, 15 Dec 2005, ed Ozan Erzden, YTU Aud/Yildiz Campus, 103-108: 108. 306 Gergana Noutcheva and Senem Aydin Duzgit, Lost in Europeanization? Turkey and the Western Balkans Paper presented at the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Conference, Boston, MA, March 3-5, 2011.

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The Balkans is one area where confidence is slipping fast. Essentially, the same thing is occurring with the Balkans as occurred with the Copenhagen Climate talks, particularly with the FYRM. The EU itself, in the form of the Commission, is offering the FYRM membership and congratulating them on their progress. The Council refuses to make a decision, always delaying it until the next presidency. Greece refuses to allow the FYRM to progress until it reaches a result on the name issue. The UK is trying to support the membership application to no avail.307 These challenges, along with others that the EU faces, such as dealing with the current crisis in the Middle East, require a strong EU CFSP. Currently, however, such unity is missing due to fears over loss of sovereignty to a supranational governing body.

307

Sandrino Smeets, The Yellow Brick Road from the Balkans to Brussels. An Analysis of Ten Years of Council Negotiations on the Balkans, Paper presented at the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Conference, Boston, MA, March 3-5, 2011.

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Conclusion The EU is a unique body; an organization created out of the devastation of WWII has morphed into the largest economic body in the world. While its political heft is vastly inferior to its economic heft, the EU is trying to rectify the difference. Often, due to the unequal economic and political power, the EU will use economic external policies as tools for political ends308 rather than using political methods, such as diplomacy. Humanitarian aid, such as that provided to the FYRM in 2001 to prevent a civil war, is a way that the EU uses economic policy to influence political events. The economic aid to candidate countries is tied up in the conditionality imposed upon them. However, Danijela Dolonee notes EU conditionality has an effect, but not to the extent that [member states] expect.309 All but one of the candidate countries is from the Balkans; since they see the EU as a moving target,310 admission is beginning to lack legitimacy.311 The further conditionality imposed upon the Western Balkans, especially in the form of different policies of member states, highlights cracks in the unity of EU foreign policy. Throughout the years since 1951, the EU has consistently enlarged to include more states while also joining in a deeper political fashion with the states that were current members. Since the fall of communism, there have been doubts about whether the EU should enlarge to include many former Soviet states. Accompanying the fear of enlargement is the fear of a union that has a higher political authority than the nationstate. In order to quell some of these fears, the EU has constructed treaties that continue
308

Isabelle Welpe, External Policies, in The Students Guide to European Integration, Ed Jorge Juan Fernandez Garcia, Jess Clayton, and Christopher Hobley (Oxford: Polity Press, 2004), 263. 309 Danijela Dolonee, Deepening or Widening? Debating the European Unions Agenda for the Next Decade, at the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Conference, Boston, MA, March 3-5, 2011. 310 Dolonee 311 Noutcheva and Aydin Duzgit

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to recognize both the need for a common foreign and security policy and member states desires to retain the bulk of their sovereignty in foreign policy. Yet when states retain their sovereignty, it can create 27 different foreign policies trying to merge into one common policy. Not only does this sound impossible, it has proved impossible. The Treaty of Lisbon, the most recent of all EU treaties, established a careful balance between members who preferred a broader union and those which preferred a deeper union. Yet the Treaty of Lisbon was based on the ideals enshrined in the many previous treaties that created the closer cooperation of the EU. It also maintained the multiple EU institutions that had formed over the years to help the it function, giving some of them the first legal basis. The Treaty of Lisbon was created partially to address fears about enlargement. The EU has morphed from a limited institution with six members to a massive institution with 27. Currently five candidate countries and four potential candidate countries are waiting to join this institution. This list does not mention the other countries that have expressed a desire to join, but their cases are too politically unstable to make them acceptable candidate at present. The enlargement process is especially critical to the Western Balkans, since every country is either a candidate or a potential candidate. The candidate status of these countries also changes the foreign policy of the EU towards these countries. Their geographical location, surrounded by the EU, is another factor that leads to a different policy towards the Western Balkans than other EU neighbor states. The EU cannot treat them the same as they would Ukraine or Belarus, which only share one border with one, maybe two, EU countries. A policy that would effect transportation of good from Bulgaria to Slovenia on the shortest way possible goes through the
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candidate countries; this is just one example of how geography can affects the policy of the EU towards the Western Balkans. The country that highlights the difficult choices that the EU is facing is the FYRM. The FYRM is located in one of the most historically contentious hotspots in the Balkans. Everything from the countrys name, to its nationality, to its language is questioned by the surrounding states. The area of geographic Macedonia has been known as Macedonia since the time of the Ancient Macedonians. However, the land has changed hands numerous times, and the original inhabitants no longer have any decedents living in the area. This lack of direct decedents makes the current political situation that much more unstable, because of conflicting claims over the term Macedonia. Greece is the main country that opposes the term due to the supposed territorial and cultural claims on the true Macedonia, which is located only in Greece. Despite the stumbling blocks that Greece and the EU have enacted on the way to international recognition, the FYRM has continued on, often achieving textbook success by consistently working towards goals despite internal chaos. The FYRM has met almost every goal that the EU has set in its search for accession. While there are ethnic problems that the FYRM has to still address, the country is working towards fixing the problems. While this thesis has addressed the problems in EU foreign policy, highlighted by the admissions case of the FYRM, many research questions have been left unanswered. Will the financial crisis change the CFSP? Or the admissions process? Will the financial bailout of Greece affect their ability to control accession negotiations with the FYRM? How will the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty affect the CFSP and enlargement process? Will some states give up on EU membership due to the lack of a credible
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accession? These questions are unable to be answered at this point, but offer insights to the future direction of the EU. The EU needs to figure out what sort of state/governing body/organization it wants to be. There needs to be leadership at the highest levels, as was required before when the EU was created, to guide the EU in determining what sort of policy it will formulate as it moves on. 312 Until the EU learns to speak with one voice, its joint economic power will always be more powerful than its political power. If the EU wants to broadcast its desires, or political needs, to the world and be on an equal footing with emerging superpowers, it needs to speak with one voice through one person (at most two). While this is not the case with economic policy, the EU economic unit as a single market has more weight than the combination of political actions. Ideally, it would be the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and the EU President, the two positions set up to project EU power abroad. However, until the EU creates a degree of true common foreign and security policy, enlargement will come to a standstill. Since enlargement is a form of foreign policy in the EU, as it figures out its foreign policy outlook, enlargement will slow. The FYRM continues to highlight the problems that the EU is facing due to the unique process of admissions to the union. Through the admissions process, one sees the main problem that the EU has yet to solve: what kind of political cohesion will the EU manage to achieve? Through arguments about whether the EU will expand to a larger union, or integrate policies more in a deeper union, or do both, the foreign policy of the EU is deeply unresolved. Since the EU cannot make a decision over foreign policy or
312

Parsons

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enlargement without solving the issues of its makeup, both have essentially ground to a halt. While technically both are continuing, enlargement has slowed considerably as benchmarks, usually only made after negotiations have begun, have been placed as goals prior to the opening of negotiations. Foreign policy is impaired as the High Representative tries to juggle 27 different foreign policies by creating one foreign policy. The CFSP is beginning to show progress, but many hurdles exist in the future. The EU may never solve this dilemma, as it is built into the design of an organization made up of many sovereign states. However, the EU states that it wants to become a stronger actor with a CFSP. If this is truly its goal, and member states support this goal, then something will have to give in the struggle over a wide or deep union in order to support the future of the union.

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