Socit qubcoise de science politique

Integration before Assimilation: Immigration, Multiculturalism and the Canadian Polity Author(s): John C. Harles Source: Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Dec., 1997), pp. 711-736 Published by: Canadian Political Science Association and the Socit qubcoise de science politique Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3232254 Accessed: 14/05/2010 10:51
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before Assimilation:Immigration, Integration Multiculturalism the CanadianPolity and

JOHN C. HARLES Messiah College

Integration is not synonymous with assimilation. Assimilation implies almost total absorptioninto anotherlinguistic and culturalgroup. An assimilated individual gives up his culturalidentity, and may even go so far as to change his name. Both integrationand assimilationoccur in Canada,andthe individual must be free to choose whicheverprocess suits him, but it seems to us that those of other than French or British origin clearly prefer integration..... Canadiansociety, open and modem, should be able to integrateheterogeneous elements into a harmonioussystem, to achieve "unity in diversity." - Reportof the Royal Commissionon Bilingualism and Biculturalism'

1 National integrationis a fundamentaltask of any political system. The reason is clear: periodicallythe state requiresits membersto make sacrifices for the good of the whole; without a sense of collective destiny, individualswould find it difficultto subordinate privateinterestto public welfare. The call to military service is the most dramaticand elementaryexample of the general point, but the issue of sacrifice applies to more mundanematters,too, taxationfor instance. Not even the most doctrinairecapitalistwill readily argue that the marketcan provide all desired social goods and services; the state must undertakesome of the requiredfunctions that the marketcannot or will not do. At the very least, provision must be made for domestic security, though the public catalogueof services is likely to be far more extensive. And all of these must be funded in large measureby tax revenues collected from individuals whose remittancesmay be quite disproportional the personal to benefits they bring. Belief in a common national identity, and conse1 Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Vol. 4 (Ottawa:Queen's Printer,1969), 5, 7.

John C. Harles, Departmentof Political Science, Messiah College, Grantham,Penn., USA 17027. E-mail:jharles@messiah.edu
Canadian Journal of Political Science/ Revue canadienne de science politique, XXX:4 (December/ d6cembre 1997). C 1997 Canadian Political Science Association (I'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Sociti qubbcoise de science politique.

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quently an acceptance of mutual civic obligations, is one reason to forego individualinterestsfor diffuse public goods. From the perspective of the citizenry this sense of a sharedpolitical fate may be termed polity, and from the perspectiveof the state,national integration. It is a commonbelief amongstudents theCanadian of politicalsystem is and thatCanada not a well-integrated unifiedpolity.Titlesin the bibliogof politicalstudiesareindicative this.Overthe last few raphyof Canadian have included: The Roots of Disunity; Mosaic Madness; years they Deconfederation;The Unmakingof Canada; Canada at Risk; Reimagining Canada;andperhapsmost directly,The Collapseof Canada?2 Scholarly assessments are equally forthright. For example, Anthony Birch asserts that "the level of national integrationin Canada... may be lower than any other advanced democratic state";3 Carolyn Tuohy observes that "Canadianambivalence extends to the very legitimacy of the state itself and to the identificationof the political community";4 R. Kenneth Carty and W. Peter Wardremarkthat "this continuing ambivalencehas perpetrateda set of conflicts about the essence of Canadiannessthat lies at the heart of the political system. Canadiansdivide between anglophoneand francophone,old and new, immigrant and aboriginal, partly because there is no common ;5 meeting ground, no agreementon what constitutes a Canadian" and Charles Taylor maintainsthat, "A basic fact about Canadawhich we often have trouble accepting is that we are still far from achieving a universally agreed definition of our country as a political community."6 Even the British newsweekly, the Economist, weighs in: "It
2 DavidV. J. Bell, TheRoots of Disunity:A Studyof CanadianPoliticalCulture (2nd OxfordUniversity ed.; Toronto: Press, 1992);ReginaldW. Bibby,MosaicMadness: The Povertyand Potentialof Life in Canada (Toronto: Stoddart,1990); David Jay Bercusonand BarryCooper,Deconfederation: Canada withoutQuebec (Toronto: and The Key Porter,1991);RobertChodos,Rae Murray Eric Hamovitch, Unmaking J. of Canada:TheHiddenThemein CanadianHistorysince 1945 (Toronto: Lorimer, 1991); G. Bruce Doern and Byrne B. Purchase,eds., Canada at Risk: Canadian Public Policy in the 1990s (Toronto: D. Howe Institute,1991); JeremyWebber, C. Reimagining Canada: Language, Communityand the Canadian Constitution (Montreal:McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994); and R. Kent Weaver,ed., The Collapse of Canada? (Washington: The BrookingsInstitute,1992). A. H. Birch, Nationalism and National Integration (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 178. Ambivalence CarolynJ. Tuohy, Policy and Politics in Canada: Institutionalized (Philadelphia: TempleUniversityPress, 1992), 5. R. KennethCartyand W. PeterWard,"The Making of a CanadianPoliticalCitizenship,"in R. Kenneth CartyandW. PeterWard,eds., NationalPoliticsand Communityin Canada (Vancouver: Universityof BritishColumbiaPress, 1986), 76-77. Charles Taylor, "Alternative Futures: Legitimacy, Identity and Alienation in Late Twentieth Century Canada," in Alan Cairns and Cynthia Williams, eds., Constitutionalism,Citizenship and Society in Canada (Toronto:University of TorontoPress, 1985), 221.

3 4 5 6

in Abstract. As a strategyof immigrantinclusion, official multiculturalism Canada is based on the premise that national integrationis possible, even preferable,without assimilation.This articleconsiders whethersuch an approachcan be successful. Drawing on a qualitativestudy of Lao immigrantsin Ontario,it is suggested that newcomers can in fact be disposed to high levels of political commitment,specific mechanismsof political assimilation aside, as a result of the process of immigrationitself. At least in the short term, though perhapsmainly in the short term, the Canadianpolitical order does not seem to sufferfor lack of an assimilativeemphasis. Resume. Comme strat6gied'inclusion des immigrants,le multiculturalismeau Canada est construit sur la pr6misse voulant que l'int6gration nationale soit possible, sinon pr6f6rable,sans assimilation.Cet article examine si cette d6marchepeut r6ussir. A partird'une 6tude qualitativeeffectuee aupres d'immigrantsLaotiens en Ontario, cette etude propose que les nouveaux venus peuvent, en fait, 8tre enclin d'afficherun niveaux 616v6 d'engagement politique compte-tenu du processus d'immigration les mecanismes d'assimilationpolitique. Au lui-mame lorsque ne sont pas consid6rrs a moins a court terme, voire meme principalement court terme, I'ordrepolitique canadien ne semble pas souffrirde l'absence de pressionsassimilationnistes.

seems unlikely that Canada'sfuture is going to be as a countrywith a strong national purpose. The glue that holds the place together is no more adhesive than maple syrup, and there is little prospect of replacing it with somethingstickier."7 Canada's commitment to multiculturalismas a strategy for incorporatingimmigrantscan be understoodin the context of such insights. Introducedas governmentpolicy in 1971 and constitutionally entrenchedin 1982 in section 27 of the CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms, the dominant view of multiculturalismhas been that it "should assist and encourage the integration(but not assimilation) of all immigrants."8 a formerfederal secretaryof state for multiculturAs alism and the status of women affirmed: "One can choose how one wants to live [in Canada]and there is no need to be assimilated.It is a matterof integration."9 Consideringwhat is typically considered to be the indeterminate natureof Canadiannationhood,it could hardlybe otherwise.Assimilation indicates conformityto the pre-existingculturalnorms-political normsincluded-of a dominantsocial group.It nearsits endpointwhen outsiderscome to identifymost closely with the imperatives thatgroup of and are acceptedas equalparticipants grouplife.' Thatsaid, assimilain tion appearsan unlikelyprospectfor newcomersto Canada. The ambiguof Canadiannesssuggests that conceptuallythere is little for immiity grantsto assimilateinto, and no certainfocus for theirpolitical identity.
7 8 9 10 "ForWantof Glue: A Surveyof Canada,"Economist,June 29, 1991, 19. MultiCanada,House of Commons, Standing Committee on Multiculturalism, culturalism:Building the CanadianMosaic (Ottawa:Queen's Printer,1987), 47. Sheila Finestone, "I Don't Enjoy Neil Bissoondath," The Globe and Mail (Toronto),February7, 1995. Raymond H. C. Teske and BardinH. Nelson, "Acculturationand Assimilation: A Clarification," AmericanEthnologist 1 (1974), 359-61.

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Indeed, the question of a consolidatingpolitical identity in Canadais regularlyframed in terms of the need for a "pan-Canadian"nationalism, suggesting thatto the extent nationalsentimentexists in Canada,it does not predominantly accrueto the Canadianstate." Should a countrylack a clear understanding its nationalcharacof ter, it would seem also to lack the ability to equip immigrantswith the collective convictions that mark a cohesive political community. Yet Canada's absence of a precise nationalsense is often judged as no bad thing. Foreshadowingthe logic of integrationwithout assimilation, a generation ago W. L. Morton observed that "there is no process in becoming Canadianakin to conversion, there is no pressure for uniformity, there is no Canadian way of life."'12 On Morton's reading, "the society of allegiance [Canada]admitsof a diversitythe society of compact [the United States] does not, and one of the blessings of Canadian life is that there is no Canadianway of life, much less two, but a unity underthe crown admittingof a thousanddiversities."13 Following Morton, contemporarymulticulturalistsfind a single to integrativenational identity too confining and static, inappropriate realities.14 In fact, proponentsof multiculturalism postmodernpolitical sometimes argue that it may be easier to integrateimmigrantsinto a Canadian political community that is not already well formed, that immigrantsmay more readily commit to a polity if they believe they can make some contribution to its character.'5What is required, accordingto this analysis, is a constitutionalprovisionfor deep cultural diversity, official recognitionthatcitizens can, and do, maintainmultiple political commitments within the boundaries of a single state.16 Hence the integrativevision of the architectsof Canadianmulticulturalism-an ethnically responsive and equitable procedureof political decision making, the public approvalof which might be transferred to
11 12 13 14 15 See, for example, Sylvia Bashevkin,TruePatriot Love: The Politics of Canadian Nationalism (Toronto:OxfordUniversityPress, 1991), 1-28. W. L. Morton, The Canadian Identity (2nd ed.; Toronto:University of Toronto Press, 1972), 85. Ibid., 111. Pluralism: See, for example,Crawford Young, "The Dialecticsof Cultural Concept and Reality," in Crawford Young,ed., The Rising Tideof CulturalPluralism:The Nation-Stateat Bay? (Madison:Universityof WisconsinPress, 1993), 3-35. See, for instance, William Kaplan, "Who Belongs? ChangingConcepts of Citizenship and Nationality," in William Kaplan,ed., Belonging: The Meaning and Future of Canadian Citizenship (Montreal:McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), 255-56. See, for example, James Tully, "The Crisis of Identification:The Case of Canada," Political Studies 42 (1994), 76-94; Gilles Paquet, "The Political Philosophy of Multiculturalism,"in J. W. Berry and J. A. LaPonce, eds., Ethnicityand Culture in Canada: The Research Landscape (Toronto:University of Toronto Press, 1994), 60-80; and also Webber, ReimaginingCanada, 185-206.

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and Multiculturalism the CanadianPolity Immigration,

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those institutionswithin which the proceduretakes place. By removing discriminatorybarriersto, as well as expanding opportunitiesfor, the social, economic and political inclusion of ethnic minoritiesin Canaseeks to create the necessary conditions for dian life, multiculturalism At the limit, multiculturalism itself offers an immigrantincorporation. the Canadianidentity: integrativeidentity, is Multiculturalismnotonlycommensurate Canadian with socialnorms. More is Canadian to the point,multiculturalism the quintessential value.It constifeature ourcelebration of as tutesa distinctive (however understated) a people, anddistinguishes fromthemelting of theUnitedStates.As thecornerus pot stoneof Canada's nation-building process,multiculturalism shapesouridenwitha national unitesus in a distinct us vision,andinvigorates as tity, society a peoplewitha destiny.17 Of course, not all Canadiansare persuaded.In Quebec, multiculturalismis disparagedas an attemptto underminethe province's status as a distinctsociety by makingFrenchCanadiansappearas merely one of any numberof equal contributors a Canadianethnic mosaic. For to connotes the fragmentation too, multiculturalism many anglophones, of the social structureand the impossibilityof establishinga single Canadian identity, even less a viable object of immigrantassimilation.'8 On this appraisal,in the official account immigrantsare perceived as members of the discrete groups constitutingthe Canadianpolity-as '9-not as individuals who might be coa"everlasting immigrants" lesced into some greaterpolitical totality. Students of politics routinely regard assimilation as the primary vehicle for congealing into a stable political whole the culturaldiversity that immigrationpromises to introduce,albeit on the presumption that the immigrants will come from countries with relatively wellestablished national identities.20 Among democratic theorists, John
17 18 19 20 Augie Fleras and Jean LeonardElliot, Multiculturalismin Canada: The ChalNelson Canada, 1992), 125 (emphasis in origilenge of Diversity (Scarborough: nal). For instance, Leslie A. Pal, Interests of State: The Politics of Language, Multiculturalism and Feminism in Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993). Neil Bissoondath, Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalismin Canada (Toronto:Penguin, 1994), 116. See, for example, Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 150-54; Myron Weiner, "Political Integrationand Political Development,"Annals of the AmericanAcademyof Political and Social Science 358 (1965), 55-57; and Louis Hartz,The Foundingof New Societies (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1964), 14. For the American perspective, see John C. Harles, Politics in the Lifeboat: Immigrantsand the American Democratic Order(Boulder:Westview, 1993), 51-63.

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StuartMill provides the prototypicaldiscussion: in Considerationson RepresentativeGovernment,Mill maintainsthat "it is in general a necessary condition of free institutionsthatthe boundariesof free governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities."21 If, for reasons of geography, the creation of distinct nationalgovernmentsis not possible, Mill instructs, "experience proves that it is possible for one nationality to merge and be absorbed in another.... Whatever really tends to the admixtureof nationalities,and the blending of their attributesand peculiarities in a common union, is a benefit to the humanrace."22 Mindfulof such assessments, this articleconsidersa centralquestion: can the Canadianapproachsuccessfully wed immigrantsto the political system-can immigrantsto Canadabe politically integrated without assimilation?Because immigrantloyalties can be forged in the process of migrationitself, shaped by the circumstancesof an immigrant's departurefrom the homelandas well as the reception afforded that individual in the country of destination,it will be suggested that immigrants can be disposed to high levels of political commitment, specific processes of assimilationaside. In Canadathis may mean that for immigrants,at least in the shortterm,thoughperhapsmainly in the short term, the political order does not suffer for any lack of assimilative emphasis.The claim is intentionallytentative.Anythingmore conclusive would require a study of future generations, and not enough time has elapsed since the introductionof official multiculturalism to be completely confident of its consequences. Still, if it is not possible to say decisively that immigrants can achieve integration without assimilation,it does seem that they can, and do, achieve a measureof before assimilation. integration A qualitativestudy of Lao immigrants23-specifically, testimony derived from "intensive" interviews conductedwith 30 membersof a Lao community in southern Ontario24-furnishes preliminary evi21 22 23 John StuartMill, Considerationson Representative Government (1867; rpt.London: J. M. Dent, 1972), 362. Ibid., 363-64. On qualitativemethodology in general and on the intensive interview approach in particular,see John and Lyn H. Lofland,Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to Qualitative Analysis (2nd ed.; Belmont: Wadsworth, 1984); also Betty H. Zisk, Political Research: A Methodological Sampler (Lexington, D.C.: Heath, 1981). The interviewsessions took place in southernOntarioduringthe summer of 1992. Respondentswere selected by means of a snowball sample. In an effort to keep the testimony more representativethan exhaustive, only 27 of the 30 intervieweesare cited in the presentessay. According to statistics compiled by Employment and Immigration Canada, between 1979 and 1990, 16,297 immigrantsfrom Laos were resettledin Canada, over 5,800 of those in Ontarioalone (Employmentand ImmigrationCanada,Immigration Statistics [Ottawa:Supply and Services Canada, 1989], 20; and Em-

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Multiculturalism the CanadianPolity and Immigration,

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dence in supportof this assertion. Although the authorwas interested in, and had contact with, the Lao communitybefore the researchproject commenced, there are two furtherreasons thatrecommendthe Lao as a good test case of integrationwithout assimilation.First,beside the culture into which they majorityAnglo-Canadianor French-Canadian are received, the Lao are clearly exotic-the sort of immigrantswho might be expected to have the most difficulty adaptingto the new society, and so the most unlikely to become integrated.Second, the overwhelming majorityof Lao have enteredCanadaas refugees. Individuals whose migrationwas not of their own choice, the urgency of flight not having allowed much premeditation,might be imagined to have only limited enthusiasmfor the new society. In other words, although refugees experience more acutely the uncertainty confrontingall immiand thus may exhibit a heightenedgratitudefor the sanctuaryof grants, the host society, this may be outweighed by the involuntarynatureof the act of migration.For both of these reasons, the Lao might be imagined to show an ambivalentcommitment to Canada. As it happens, based on the evidence of this study, the Lao enthusiasmfor Canadais anythingbut guarded. So that readersmight be able to associate a particular interviewee with his or her basic social characteristics, biographicalschedule has a been provided (Table 1). After each quotationrelating narrativein the text, a respondentnumberappearsin parentheses.By referringto the same respondentnumberin the schedule, it is possible to formulatea demographicsketch of the source of the quotationwithout betraying confidentiality. 2 Perhaps the most profound mark of a well-integrated polity is the strong sense of belonging felt by its members.A fundamentalintegrative question about immigrants,then, is whether the newcomers' understandingof themselves- their idea of "us"- includes Canada.Do immigrants in any way "feel" Canadian? Ideally, such sentiments should extend beyond nominal attributionsof citizenship, though a readinessto undertakecivic duties is at least a partialindicatorof integration. But deeper conceptions of personal identity are also at issue,
ployment and ImmigrationCanada,Annual Report, 1990-1991 [Ottawa:Supply and Services Canada, 1991], 50). These figures do not strictly distinguish individuals on the basis of ethnicity-rather, all individualswhose origins are somewhere in Laos are regardedfor statisticalpurposesas Lao. Neither do they differentiate "highland" Lao-most prominently Hmong and Mien tribespeoplefrom "lowland," or ethnic, Lao. It is the political orientationsof this lattercontingent, historically the politically and culturally dominant group in Laos, that the presentstudy explores.

TABLE 1
BIOGRAPHICAL SCHEDULE Yearsof Reeducationbe- Formal spond- Gen- Age at Yearof Canadian fore coming education ent der interview arrival citizen to Canada in Canadaa Occupation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 M M M M M F M M M F F M F F 31 39 39 58 26 50 38 26 36 27 42 32 34 34 1980 1979 1979 1980 1979 1980 1980 1990 1979 1981 1980 1981 1980 1980 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 9 11 18 8 6 3-4 7 11 15 1 11 6 4-5 15

Vocational Assembly line worker Vocational Generalmachinist/ Clergyman Vocational Computerprogramm Artisan None University Mechanicaldesigner None Assembly line worker Vocational Welder Vocational Assembly line worker None Assembly line worker Vocational Assembly line worker Vocational Assembly line worker None Unemployed None Assembly line worker None Unemployed

TABLE 1-Continued
Yearsof Reeducationbe- Formal spond- Gen- Age at Yearof Canadian fore coming education to Canada in Canadaa Occupation ent der interview arrival citizen 8 None 15 F 35 Yes 1979 Assembly line worker None F 8 16 50 Yes Housewife 1984 None M Yes 6 Pressoperator 17 39 1980 10 None Farmlabourer 18 M 35 Yes 1980 M Yes 18 51 19 1979 University Clergy 12 Vocational Machineoperator 20 M 45 Yes 1979 None 33 M Yes Machineoperator 21 1980 11 17 Some univ. Social worker 22 M 35 Yes 1983 13 23 M 37 Yes 1979 University Insuranceagent None 8 24 F 42 No 1980 Assembly line worker None 6 25 F 40 Yes 1980 Assembly line worker 12 Vocational Student M 26 No 26 1989 12 Some univ./ Hotel kitchen staff M 22 No 27 1989 vocational 8 None F 24 No 28 1989 Housecleaning None M 28 No 1990 29 11 Unemployed Yes None F Housewife 30 39 1979 11 and courses. of a Exclusive English language anycitizenship Allowance. b Excluding Family

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those typically expressed in terms of love for, and loyalty to, one's countryas well as solidaritywith one's fellow citizens. If the litmus test of nationalintegrationin Canadais the degree to which a given ethnic group aspires to comprise part of the Canadian "collective conscience,'"25 to borrow Emile Durkheim's evocative phrase, the Lao interviewedfor this study clearly evince signs of integration. In the Lao view, to be a Canadianmeans that "you belong to this society-you understandits people-and you can adjust to it" (22); thatyou "feel like a Canadian... and are partof the countryand its government"(4); thatyou "belong to this country,you are one with its people... and you are a person who loves their neighbour" (11). For many Lao, the character of the receiving society quickens this sense of being Canadian: Do I feel Canadian? muchso. I tryverymuchto be partof thiscommuVery nitybecauseI wantto help out in any way I can.Thatis the bestway to put yourselfintothe societythatyou arelivingin. I cannotlook at myselfas different from[Canadians] because accepted as oneof them.(17) us they Several Lao equate the security of being "at home" with being Canadian-understandable given the circumstances of Lao history. When asked whetherhe thoughtof himself as a Canadianin any way, one respondentrelated, "When I travel outside Canada,I feel unsafe. When I reach the border,and I cross, I feel that I am now at home. I have asked many Lao people about this and they say they have the same feeling" (19). At the extreme, such sentiments verge on the maudlin: I considermyselfa trueCanadian. Sometimes whenI am awayfromhome, from Canada-like I used to go on businesstripsto Detroitor New away York-I feel insecure, whenI crossthe border Canada, feel safe. and into I LastyearI wentto a conference NewYork-my company me therein sent andwhenI heard Canadian the started anthem, tears my comingdown.(23) For many Lao, the assumption of Canadiancitizenship, a step taken by all eligible immigrantsin the present study, is the apotheosis of theircommitmentto Canada.26 doubtthe Lao understand No citizen25 26 Emile Durkheim,The Division of Labor in Society (1893; rpt.; New York:The Free Press, 1984), 60-61. According to the 1991 Census, 10,000 Lao are Canadiancitizens-more than67 per cent of the total Lao populationin Canada.The Lao also appearto obtaincitizenship at a fasterpace thando immigrantsin general.For example, among individuals receiving citizenship in 1991, the Lao waited an average of 5.07 years before being naturalized;the average interval for all immigrantswas 7.1 years (Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada, Canadian Citizenship Statistics, 1991 [Ottawa:Supply and Services Canada,1991], 22).

and Multiculturalism the CanadianPolity Immigration,

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ship's legal and effectual value. The ability to travel on a Canadian passportwas mentionedby almost all of the interviewees as a primary motivationfor taking out citizenshippapers-a benefit not to be gainsaid as Lao families are commonly separatedby countryof residence. But the Lao are equally awareof the affective importanceof becoming a citizen-citizenship as a matterof identifyingwith, and belonging to, the Canadian polity.27 Given that Canadian citizenship entitles the bearerto few privileges thatpermanentresidence does not (mainly the right to vote and to run for office in federal and some provincialelections, priority in hiring for certain jobs, and the right to leave and re-enterthe country on a Canadianpassport),the emotive reasons for should not be underestimated.Several individualstestinaturalization fied that they became Canadiancitizens because they "wanted to be like everybody else" (9), or "because we are stateless and we feel we want to belong" (19). "I like this country and I wanted to live here," relatedan interviewee, "and it made us feel like... ratherthanbeing a refugee that we were more important,thatwe were now Canadiancitizens" (14). Expressionsof readinessto take up armson Canada'sbehalf, possibly the gravestdemandof citizenship and the most severe measureof a newcomer's nationalidentity, are submittedby the Lao as tokens of their political commitment. "I'd be willing to fight," avowed one respondent,"We are living here in our countryand we have to love and protectit" (25). "The way I think about it is that this countrygave me freedom, the right to come here and live peacefully.... So I have a responsibility.Whateverhappensto this country,I know for sure thatI am one of them. I will fight side-by-side to protectthis country" (17). Considering the political violence that many Lao families endured in theirhomeland,assertionsof fidelity to Canada-of the need to defend "our country''-are all the more poignant. Largelyfor culturalreasons, ties to the homelanddie hardand the is process of political transformation not in all cases complete. This may explain why several of the interviewees periodicallyrefer to Lao people as "us" and Canadiansas "them." (Althoughthe same individual might speak of Canadain termsof both us and them- see the testimony of respondent3 [722]; 17 [720]; and 19 [721 and 725].) When one considers that official multiculturalism may have the effect of legitimatingand entrenchingsuch differences, and thatbecause of immigration alone many Lao-especially the more recent arrivals-still
27 On the affective potential of Canadian citizenship, see Kaplan, "Who Belongs?"; and also James S. Fridereset al., "Becoming Canadian:Citizen Acquisition and National Identity," Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 14 (1987), 105-21.

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thinkof themselves as the guests of a host society, one begins to understandwhy Lao identificationwith Canadamay not always be complete. Yet as proponents of multiculturalismmight hope, most Lao believe Canadianidentity is permeable.Even those Lao with the most resilient cultural identities contend that they can yet be good Canadians: I haveno doubtaboutit, I am veryproud be a Canadian. be a Canadian, to To thatmeans havea newlife.... I want build Canadian to to a to society according Canadian doesnotmean we haveforgotten that ideas,nottheideasof Laos.That thatwe areLao;we arestillLao,butwe arehappy be Canadian to citizens.... I want respect to Canadian traditions be a goodcitizenof thepeopleof Canand we of ada,eventhough don'twantto forgetourcountry Laos.(3) Though the process of political identificationmight take longer for the older generation,no one has any doubt that their children, with fewer of the culturalimpediments-language primeamong them-confronting them, will be fully Canadian.Concerned with the erosion of Lao culturaltraditions,particularlyfilial obedience, a Lao mother related, "I remindmy childrenall the time thatthey are Asian, but they tell me 'I am a Canadian.I was born here and I live here and I go to school here, and I'm completely Canadian'" (14). In their generalized supportfor the structuresof Canadianpolitical authority,the Lao also bear the marks of an integratedpeople.28 Faith in the Canadiangovernment,the institutionalexpression of the Canadianpolitical community,is a consistentfeatureof Lao testimony. Not that the Lao are undiscriminating. Instances of perceived government shortcomingsare noted, if regularlyqualified.29 guess our gov"I ernmentsays thatthey will serve Canadians,"observedone individual, "and they do actually serve us but sometimes they make mistakes and they don't accept the mistakes they make.... The politicians try to be honest, but sometimes they try to handle mattersbeyond their capability or understanding. They pretendto do somethingfor the people because the people demand them to do something" (5). This particular response, authoredby one of the youngest interviewees in the study and an individual for whom the balance of formal education-and,
28 See Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government:Models of Political Communication and Control (New York: The Free Press, 1966), 126; and Edward Shils, Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 4-5, 66ff. The fact thatthe supportof the Lao for the nationalpolitical communitymight be more complete than for the Canadiangovernment or for specific occupants of political office is consistent with findings on the political supportof the Canadian citizenry at large. See Alan Kornbergand Harold D. Clarke, Citizens and Community: Political Support in a Representative Democracy (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1992), esp. 107ff. and 254-55.

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Multiculturalism the CanadianPolity and Immigration,

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arguably,political socialization-has takenplace in Canadaitself, may well be a sign of accommodationto a Canadiandemocraticculturethat encourages civic vigilance. Among Lao respondentswithout such credentials (the overwhelming majority) unreserved affirmationsof the goodwill and benevolence of the Canadiangovernment are far more typical. "I trust the government," declared one interviewee. "Since I have been here I have seen them help the poor, and for people who lose theirjobs and don't have any money, they can collect unemployment insurance" (4). "I think the policy of the Canadiangovernment is a good policy," anotherrespondentconcurred."I have nothing to complain about here. I know otherpeople complain,but I have no problem living in Canada.The governmentis providing what I need and I am satisfied" (2). Paternalismis not an infrequentfeature of the Lao orientationon this point-unsurprising if one remembersthat paternalismand patriotism, the lattera sentimentthe Lao seem to have in ample supply, are of the same etymological tree. "Withouta government,"remarkedan interviewee, "we wouldn't have anybody taking care of us or helping us. It would be like a family without any parents" (24). Occasions when the governmentmight not be completely forthcomingare viewed from a similar perspective. One individualexplained, "The Canadian governmentmay not always tell the truthbecause they have to keep some things to themselves. You have to understandhow they are governing the country.The same as the fatherof a kid. You cannot tell the kid everything-there are some things he does not need to know" (17). As might be anticipated,among the Lao the natureof the Canadian government is usually-though given a sceptical minority of respondents for whom all politics is corrupt,not always-contrasted with that of the homeland. That the "Canadiangovernmentlistens to the people" (1) is frequentlycited as one of the virtues of the country of resettlement: I see thatthe government is verydifferent here becauseit is consciousof the in of people.Thegovernment Laoswas notconscious thepeople.Here,if the it government passesa law,theypublish andtheylet thepeopleknowaboutit. Whichis different thanin Laos,becausethe government theretriedfor the mostpartto keepthepeoplefromknowing whatwasgoingon. (24) Whereas the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) is frequentlycriticized for its intrusiveness,the Canadiangovernmentis not thoughtcapable of similarbehaviour,especially in light of the Lao disposition to be obedient citizens. "I think the [Canadian]government has rules and we have to obey those rules," reflected one individual, "then we get along fine with the government.If we don't obey the law,
then the government comes down on us and it creates problems. But

724

JOHNC. HARLES

ordinarily the government doesn't bother us" (24). Even taxation, while by no means relished, is often seen in terms of its benefits to the Canadianpolitical communityand thus rarelyan unreasonableimposition. Personalizingthe issue, a respondentremarkedthat "they spend taxpayer money wisely because, for instance, if I lost my job then I know thatthe governmenthas collected money and would use it to pay my unemploymentinsurance" (27). In truth,that many of the Lao are themselves the beneficiaries of social assistance may be a tangible reminderof the meritsof redistributive governmenteconomic policies. Professions of positive commitmentto Canadaare supplemented by political behaviourthroughwhich the Lao seek to show themselves committed. To be sure, they do not have overly participatory political inclinations. As with all immigrants,language, low social-economic status, disparity between the homeland's political conventions and those of Canada,and consequentlya limited sense of politicalefficacy, are the most-often-citedbarriersto sustainedinvolvement.But a desire to present oneself as a dutiful member of the host society might also diminish activist inclinations, opportunitiesfor democratic participation in Canada aside. One respondent allowed that "democracy is a good thing-unless someone goes beyond what they are permittedto do in a democracy.If they use theirfreedomtoo much, and disobey the laws of the country,then democracyis not good" (9). In the opinion of another respondent, governmentis not even a subject that should be pursued: "I don't discuss politics with my family or my friends because as a newcomer I just feel gratefulto the people who brought me here" (2). Political participation be reducedby a variableeven morefuncan damental. For many Lao, the very idea of politics is tainted by the homeland experience. "When I was growing up in Laos," one interviewee recalled, "we did not discuss politics and our parentsdid not tell us anything about it. Most of us were just afraid when we talked about politics.... The rulers in our countryhad too much power. And if they did somethingwe didn't like, we just kept quiet aboutit because we were afraid" (24). The expatriateview that Lao politics are corrupt is an additionaldisincentive: I don't like politicsbecauseI don't wantto be disturbed upsetby anyor The reasonI don'tlike politicsis because saw so muchhappen I in thing.... Laos whenI was there.For instance, beforeI got married, worked the I in in policedepartment Laos.I sawall thegraftandthemoney.Also I knowthat the American a for government granted lot of moneyto the Laogovernment themto buildthisbig building. wasneverbuilt; money wentintothe It the just
pockets of the politicians. And so I don't like politics and politiciansbecause I saw how they stole money thatwas supposedto benefit the country.(6)

and Immigration,Multiculturalism the CanadianPolity

725

Any involvementin Canadianpolitics thatmight be viewed by the host society as at all untowardis absolutely ruled out by the overwhelming majorityof Lao. For some individuals,fear of punishment, is including repatriation, at issue. When questioned about the inclination of Lao people to seek to influence the Canadiangovernment,one interviewee claimed that "they would be afraid that they would be arrested.They would be afraid that something might happen to their jobs and that they wouldn't have enough food to eat, or wouldn't be able to live here" (30). A fellow refugee agreed: "They would have fear, fear of being sent home. They have fear in their own country, in the camp, even here. They fear the authorities.My kids, when they were young, they saw the SalvationArmy and ran away. It gave them bad memoriesof the police in the camps" (19). Gratitudefor the solace received in the countryof resettlementis also a motivation.Asked whether she would feel free to demonstrate againstthe policy of the Canadiangovernment,a respondentdemurred, "I think that for Lao people, we have come here and we should be grateful-we should respect and obey the laws of the country. If we wanted to demonstrateagainst the Lao government,that's a different thing. But we shouldn't do it here" (10). Anotherrespondentaffirmed that "as a Canadian citizen, if something wrong was being done, I would have the right to demonstrate.But as far as I am personallyconcerned, I would never do that.I wouldn't be brave enough. I came here as a refugee. I'm in their country, and I would never want to offend them-ever" (16). By contrast,when it comes to acts with symbolic political significance the Lao declare themselves to be eager participantsin Canadian public life. Voting is often seen in this regardas primarilya means of identifying with the host society, and thus exercised more for its ritualistic than its instrumentalvalue. Although few Lao follow Canadian politics in any more than a cursory way, for those eligible, voting is considered virtuallymandatory.In fact in the case of several respondents there was some confusion as to whetherone was legally bound to vote. "They sent a letter that I have to vote," rememberedone interviewee. "I don't know who I voted for-I saw four or five names on the paperand I just picked one" (15). No doubtthis is hardlythe democratic ideal, nor, debatably,is it the integrativeideal. But such lack of electoral discernmentmight be forgiven if it is recognized that for the Lao voting is most immediately a gesture of political allegiance. An individual related, "I voted because I felt it was my obligation to a countrythat has helped us a lot. I can't rememberwhich party I voted for.... I just chose the old governmentbecause I was satisfied with
that" (16). Indeed, civic rectitude often appears the major criteria of the voting decision: "I supported the party that is the proper party, the party that goes by what the people want" (4).

726

JOHN HARLES C.

In sum, althoughCanadadoes not possess a well-defined national identity, and hence that the processes of assimilationwhich elsewhere are believed to be necessary to coalesce newcomers into a cohesive political whole seem to be foreclosed, neverthelessthe Lao immigrants interviewed for this study reveal an impressive level of nationalcommitment.Broad statementsof Lao political devotionto Canadaare supplementedby expressions of trust in the Canadiangovernmentand in supportivepolitical behaviours.Even without the benefit of assimilation, there can be little doubt that the Lao understandthemselves as partof a decidedly Canadiannation. 3 In view of the received wisdom of much social science, the fact thatthe Lao give strongevidence of achievingintegration before assimilationis an unanticipatedfinding. One explanationfor this may be in the circumstances of Lao immigration,that is, the reasons the Lao left their homelandas well as the natureof theirreceptionin Canada. When students of immigrationanalyze transnationalpopulation movements,they often employ the vocabularyof push and pull.30Push factors are those forces present in the country of origin that motivate individuals to emigrate; pull factors are those characteristicsof the receiving society that attractimmigrants.In any migratorystreamboth push and pull factors will have an effect, thoughthe initial impetusfor immigrationwill come more from one of these sources thanthe other. This frameworkis useful in interpreting political orientations the of the Lao in Canada.As the greatmajorityof Lao immigrantsarerefugees fleeing the turmoilof southeastAsia, push factors-what is perceived as an unbearablepolitical and economic existence in the homeland-are of primaryimportance.Pull factors are not irrelevant,however. The Lao may be convinced of the meritsof the countryof adoption that they had little direct hand in choosing, a country which has qualitiesthatmight persuadethem againstthe need to move elsewhere, to the United States, say. Lao immigrantshave been forced out of their homeland,in effect, rejectedby theircountryof birthor by the government thatclaims to representit. It would not be so surprisingif, in turn, the Lao repudiatetheir homeland and redirecttheir political commitments to the countrythathas offered them haven.Therefore,the pull of Canadiansociety-be it the availabilityof tangiblesocial welfare benefits or, more broadly, the conviction that it is a place of freedom and security-serves to solidify a political commitment to Canada that most Lao are alreadymore than willing to make. If this is so, Lao im30 The seminal work in this regardis E. G. Ravenstein, "The Laws of Migration," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society (1889), 241-301.

and Multiculturalism the CanadianPolity Immigration,

727

migrantsmay not require,at least not immediately,mechanisms of assimilation to help them identify with the Canadianpolitical community; their allegiance to Canada may be a function of the process of immigrationitself. Based on the oral testimony collected for the present study, it appearsthat something like this dynamic is in fact at work. With respect to push factors, the Lao intervieweeshave experiencedintensely the fear thatmotivatesmuch immigration,whetherit be the gentlerfear of lost economic opportunityand social status or the more brutalfear of political persecution. Several individualsrecounted what they perceived to be the severityof the communistgovernmentthattook power in Laos in 1975: was over so Afterthecountry turned to thecommunists, manythingschanged. so muchpressure fromthecomMostof thiswaspolitical change. Peoplegot So munists. Therewas no longerany democracy. peoplegot scaredanddecidedtheycouldno longerlive in Laos,andtheytriedto escape.Firstof all weretrying tried the [thenewgovernment] to arrest peoplewho theythought Morethan to escape-people who didn'teven know whatwas happening. in the nighttime.Families notknowwhat did that,theytriedto arrest people was goingto happen them.Whentheytookpeopleawayandnobodysaw to themagain,thatwasvery,veryscary.(3) Economic hardship,the reason for most immigrationto Canada,is less relevant to the Lao immigrationbut not inconsequential. To be sure, political and economic motivationsare intertwined,and the policies of the LPDR areheld responsiblefor a low standard living: of Someof thethingsabout communists probably right. as faras all the were But ourlivingis concerned, therewasn'tenoughfood to eat, therewas no livelihoodforus there. Alsotherewasno goodcareforourchildren-the hospitals In wereno good.Therewasn'tanything-not evenanymilkforthe children. or at Laos,thingshavenotprospered progressed all. (14) Such accounts are inescapablysubjective.Yet even if the adversities of life underthe LPDR are exaggerated(and they may not be), the refugees' declarations are pertinent. Emigr6s may well magnify the deficiencies of the homeland,as the decision to leave is so momentous that the reasons for leaving must be extraordinarily convincing. This does not make the Lao unreliablesources, merely human ones. What must be recognized is that the testimony of refugees-or of immigrants in general-cannot be viewed as objective portrayalsof virtue or vice. The importanceof the testimony lies not in what it depicts but in the fact of depiction.Whatis of value is what the Lao say abouttheir political world. And what they say about Laos is that theirfuturein the countrywas so dismal thatthey had no choice but to leave.

728

JOHN HARLES C.

Harsh evaluations of the LPDR in place, Lao political identities appearavailablefor recasting.That is not to suggest thatLaos has been forsaken-cultural affinities are too durable for that. As one interviewee remarked, "Sometimes I think about going back there, if the governmentchanged. It is my homeland. It is more comfortablethan here. I was born there-I am used to it" (21). Nevertheless, it is clear thatfor the majorityof respondentsthe homelandcommandsno particular political attraction.In part,fear of communistmischief is too pronounced: As faras I knownow,I'm notso sureI will trust[theLPDR] again.... They to it say it's all rightfor everyone go backto Laos,buttheydon'tsaywhether is to live,to stay,or to visit.Forme, I stillfearcommunist ideas-I will never trustthem.... Rightnowtheyareopening country everyone the to who used to live there,to come backandrebuild country. according whatI the But to the to understand, don'thavelawsto protect peopleor a constitution prothey tect the country.I don't believe anybodythere becausethings could be (17) any changed minute. But neither is the prospect of one day resettling in a non-communist Laos of any great attraction.Several Lao simply relatedthat they were "not particularlyinterestedin what is going on in Laos-that's their countrynow and this is [ours]" (12), or that they were not much concerned with the homeland "because it is far away-because it is in the past" (19). Other respondentsindicated the futility of any attemptto unseatthe LPDR: that Manyof thepolitical groups werein Laoshavetriedto formin theUS and in Canada order go backandfight.Therearethirty fortypolitical to or parties a here, each with a different direction, different policy. Thatdoesn'tmake sense.Theyare repeating history. don'twantto hearit anymoreLao We turns to be true.Maybesomepolitical out that nothing party wantsto go back collectsmoneyfrompeopleto helpto fight.Nothing happens, just spend they themoney.... Theyhavenocommitment Laos.(2) to Among the Lao of the presentstudy, thereis little evidence of a "myth of return"'31 might deflect political allegiances away from Canada. that If, according to Lao immigrants,the LPDR is the source of the unease that promptedtheir migration,Canadais regardedin precisely the opposite manner-as a repositoryof hope and security.32 Accord31 32 See Barbara Schmitter Heisler, "Immigrant Settlement and the Structureof EmergentImmigrantCommunitiesin WesternEurope,"Annals of the American Academyof Political and Social Science 485 (1986), 76-86. Otherresearchhas noted that immigrantstend to have a special affinity for their countryof adoption. In circa 1970s surveydata,for example,David Elkins found

and Multiculturalism the CanadianPolity Immigration,

729

ingly, Lao respondentsoften claimed there was nothing that distressed them about their new life (save the weather), several placing their remarks comparatively. "Canada is peaceful-there is no war here" of (18), is the most fundamental its perceivedadvantages.Testimonyto the freedom thatCanadaaffordsis similarlyphrased: in to how I like how the government organized Canada, theygive freedom is thepeople.Likepeoplearefreeto talk-you arefreeto giveideasaboutwhat peopledidn'tagreewithwhat you like anddon'tlike.... In Laos,sometimes it thegovernment buttheyjustkeptquietbecause wasa communist said, govthe When someonedisagreedwith the government, government ernment. to wouldtakethosepeopleto a seminar33 learnaboutpolitics-the newpolicameback.(26) fora longtime;somenever tics.Someweretaken away Between 1975 and 1985 over 98,000 Indochinese were resettled in Canada. As a proportionof its total population, Canada received twice as many refugees as did the greatestaggregaterecipientof Indochinese during the same period-the United States. Since 1979, the Lao have been the beneficiariesof special legal provisions to facilitate the entry of Indochineseimmigrantsto Canada.34 Consideringthatthis recruitmenthas been undertakennot only by the Canadian refugee governmentbut by thousands of private sponsors as well (in certain years privateresettlementefforts have actually outpacedpublic ones), it is not difficult to make the case that Canadahas displayed a good in degree of humanitarianism its admission of the Lao. Maybe for that reason, certainLao intervieweescited an openness to refugees as being what they especially appreciatedabout their country of resettlement. "Canadahas opened its doors to a lot of people who have had trouble in other countries," attestedone respondent. "I think that people outside of Canadashould know that Canadais a countrythat shows love" (12). General sentimentsof approvalare often augmentedby praise for specific social benefits. What the sociologist Edward Shils has called "allocative integration,"35 the idea that provision of a certain standard
that feelings of "warmth"towardsCanadawere the least strong among nativeborn Canadians, stronger among long-term immigrants (those arriving before 1945) and strongest of all among short-termimmigrants (those arriving after 1945). See David Elkins and RichardSimeon, Small Worlds:Provinces and Parties in CanadianPolitical Life (Toronto:Methuen, 1980), 12-13. "Seminar"-the name given by the LPDR to labourre-educationcamps. See the discussion in HowardAdelman, "CanadianRefugee Policy in the Postwar Period: An Analysis," in Howard Adelman, ed., Refugee Policy: Canada and the UnitedStates (Toronto:YorkLanes Press, 1991), 210-14. Also see Freda Hawkins, Critical Yearsin Immigration:Canada and Australia Compared(2nd ed.; Montreal:McGill-Queen'sUniversityPress, 1991), 174-85. Shils, Centerand Periphery,66.

33 34

35

730

JOHN HARLES C.

of living can be a vehicle for political incorporation-a claim not infrequently advanced by social scientists whose focus is Canada36seems to be borne out by this type of testimony. Thus, a respondent enthusedthatone of the best things aboutCanadais "the medical programmethey have here. If anybodyis sick andhas to go to the hospital, they are taken care of-you don't have to pay for it" (7). A Lao woman observed: We are well takencareof here.... I havea verypeacefulheartbecauseour to havetheopportunity studyandto go to goodschools.Thegovernchildren a mentprovides lot of thingsthatmakelife easyfor us here.I'm a widowand for have children,and I receivehelp from the government takingcare of and andmychildren, alsoformyhousing. (11) myself As factors of integrationsuch estimationsof materialwell-being may have greaterweight among immigrantslike the Lao, who tend to measure their level of satisfaction against the impoverishedcircumstances of theirarrival. Nonetheless, the Lao are not unambiguouslysupportiveof governmentwelfare provisions. Although the majorityof respondentshad received some form of public assistance otherthanfamily allowance,a numberconcurredwith a relatively well-to-do respondentwho argued that "the governmentshouldn'tgive so much welfare. I mean, welfare is fine but we get to a point where people become lazy and live off welfare. And then we hard-workingpersons have to supportthem" (5). This attitudemay well be relatedto anotherfeatureof much of the Lao testimony, an opinion voiced by respondentseven of modest meansto thatCanadaprovides significantopportunities become prosperousif individualsare sufficientlydiligent. A respondentwho arrivedrelonly atively recently in 1989 maintained,"In CanadaI have a new chance. I can do anythingI want. If I want to learn something,and I have the talent or ability, I can do that.I startedwork as soon as I came here, to try and make a good life for my family" (27). Others went so far as to blame the plight of the poor on an absence of industriousness:"Forthe most part,people are poor because they don't want to work, or they are poor because they spend their money on things like drinks and cigarettes or gambling.... If people would live right and spend their money in the right way, and help each other, they would probably advance. They have the opportunityto do so" (11). In the context of their homeland, for many Lao, governmentinterventionmight imply the constructionof barriersto prosperity,not their removal. But, more
36 See, for example, Bibby, Mosaic Madness, 158ff.; Mildred A. Schwartz,Public Opinion and Canadian Identity(Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1967), 248-52; and Keith Banting,The WelfareState and Canadian Federalism(Montreal:McGill-Queen'sUniversityPress, 1982), 119.

and Immigration,Multiculturalism the CanadianPolity

731

importantly, regardless of personal economic circumstances, Lao immigrants may be hesitant to expect that the Canadiangovernment interveneon theirbehalf, because they believe thatsuch a desire would be inappropriate. Consideringthemselves guests of a host society, the Lao may have no wish to wear out theirwelcome by makingunseemly demands. As a means of offering cultural freedom and by removing obstacles to the full economic and social participation ethnic minoriof ties in Canadianlife, one might expect thatthe policy of multiculturalism itself operates as a pull factor for immigrantsto Canada.The Lao eases the culgenerally voice approvalfor the way multiculturalism tural transitionof immigrantsto Canada and encourages appreciation for ethnic diversity.Multiculturalism means "thereare equal rightsand equaljustice for the differentgroups who come to live in this country" (14). "Canadarespects us, it doesn't expect us to throw away our old customs" (18), allowed a respondent."I thinkmulticulturalism very is good," remarkedstill another, "and I think that Canada has a very open heart,a very generous spirit,to invite all of these differentpeople from differentcountrieswho are refugees to come to this country and live here" (16). The Lao seem to find multiculturalism effective in combattingdiscriminationagainstvisible minorities.Granted,not all the interviewees are certainthat Canadais void of prejudice,or believe that Lao people are on an equal footing with Canadiansof Europeandescent. Upwardly mobile Lao, perhapsanticipatinga "glass ceiling," appearparticularly circumspect: Yes, I thinkthereare manyopportunities the here, but the Canadians, real a Not Canadians, wantto separate littlebit sometimes. all of them,but they some.... RealCanadian-thatmeanstheywerebornin Canada. notlike It's theChinese, likepeoplewithyellowskin;theyhaveto havewhiteskin.... not if Sometimes Canadian people-white people-push a littlebit,theywill get thejob. Peoplewithanother color,theyhaveto makesuretheyhavethe skin Thentheproblem speaking is rightaccent. (3) English. Nevertheless, most respondents maintainedthat they experienced no evidence of prejudicein Canada.One intervieweeinsisted that in Canada "it doesn't matterif we are a refugee, or whetherwe have yellow skin, white skin, or black skin" (28). "I've seen a lot of people come into Canada," averredanother, "and I've never seen that it made any difference what colour their skin was, they were still able to get a job" (15). Moreover,in the opinion of several Lao, what may first appearto be discrimination to cremay in fact be attributed a lack of appropriate
dentials:

732

JOHN HARLES C.

... Overhere,I believe,theydon'thaveanydiscrimination. WhenI haveconto But tactedothersaboutwhatI wanted do, theyhaveneverrefused. someThat timesyou needto havea requirement. doesn'tmeanit is discrimination. whenyou comefromfaraway,you don'thaveanydiploma any or Sometimes So certificate. theyrequire to go to schoolto get thatbeforeyoucanconyou tinue.Butin thiscountry giveeveryone no whatyour they opportunity, matter skinis. (17) For all that, the Lao give multiculturalismpointedly mixed reviews. Althoughproponentsof official multiculturalism often maintain that its solicitousness of culturaldiversity is appealing to immigrants, that newcomersto Canadaactuallypreferintegrationwithoutassimilation to integrationwith assimilation,37 Lao express serious reservathe tions aboutthe wisdom of tryingto retaina separateculturalidentity: In my heartandin my thinking amstilla Lao.I havebeenheresucha short I time.I wasin LaosfromthetimeI wasborn,andateLaofoodandliveda Lao life. ButI haveto be verydiligent aboutstudying Englishlanguage. I the And mustalso watchandbe careful I observe themanners characteristhat all and ticsof thepeoplearound andtryto assimilate them.(29) me to As Laopeoplewe can'tkeepouroldcustoms hereverywell because livea we different thanwe didathome.... Wehaveto change ways life our completely when we come to Canada do thingsmorelike Canadians them.We and do can'tjust bringour traditions this country expectto workhere.We into and haveto be morelikeCanadians. (13) Despite being exactly the sort of immigrantsthatmulticultural policy is to accommodate-individuals who by an Anglo-Canadian or designed French-Canadian standardare culturallyexotic and who are a visible minority-the Lao seem to prefer, or say that they prefer, integration with assimilation. When asked what one must do to be a "true" Canadian,the Lao offer indeterminateanswers. The great majority respond simply in terms of the legal proprieties involved in naturalization."There is nothing particularyou have to do," related one individual. "You just have to come here and live and be willing to obey the laws of the country, and then later on you can become a citizen" (24). "You would have to know something about the laws of Canada and be willing to obey them," echoed anotherinterviewee, "and you couldn't have any recordwith the police. Otherwise,you could be just like you are" (14).
37 the Councilof Canada, New Facesin the Crowd: See, for example, Economic

Economic and Social Impacts of Immigration (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada,1991), 31ff.

and Immigration,Multiculturalism the CanadianPolity

733

Committed multiculturalists may find comfort in the openendedness of such observations;individuals searching for more positive statementsof Canadianidentity will not. Nor will sceptics among the latter be dissuaded from believing that what newcomers like the Lao desire most from the host society is a clear statementof an integrative nationalidentity,one establishingthe criteriaof social and political acceptance for discrete immigrant communities-something into which they can be assimilated. If that is so, Lao respondents might even lamentthe passing of the Anglo-Canadian political heritage: WhenI came to Canada heardaboutmulticulturalism, thought] is and it [I because leastwe hadourownculture clingon to. Butas time at to reallygood went by... I thinkthe government takena different has direction apand it a proached in a totallywrongway.Forexample, coupleof yearsago, [Prime BrianMulroney it wasokayfor anRCMP said officerto weara turMinister] ban.I thinkthattook awayourpatriotism, symbolfor Canada.... I can our see thatwe promote multiculturalism keeppeopletogether to becausethat's all we are-a groupof different nations. we wentoverboard faras my But as opinion goes. (5) Social scientists have sometimes suggested that a desire for economic mobility, and for participationin a political economy's central marketplace,exerts strong pressureson ethnic minoritiesto assimilate to the norms of the culturalgroup that dominatesthis activity.38 When the Lao indicate wariness about multiculturalism, however, their fundamentalconcern is not thatthe policy might serve to marginalizethem economically but that it will isolate them socially and underminethe unity of theiradoptedcountry: I thinkfor the most part that multiculturalism very difficult.[Cultural is all havetheirdifferent beliefsanddifferent and groups] opinions, therearetoo to try andbecomeone. It wouldbe betterif the peoplewho all came many herewouldjust becomeCanadians-theywouldbecomeone unitedcountry andtherewouldnotbe too manygroups fromeachother. separate (4) Multiculturalism meansthatpeoplearesupposed studytheirowncommuto But they shouldacceptCanada, shouldbuildCanada-that's the nity. they first. point. Even if you have your own culture,you have to be Canadian Wherever live,youhaveto support country. that you (3)

38

lation in AmericanLife: The Role of Race, Religion and National Origins (New York:OxfordUniversityPress, 1964).

See the discussionin Leo Dreidger, EthnicFactor:Identityin Diversity The McGraw-Hill Assimi(Toronto: 1989),50-65;andalsoMiltonGordon, Ryerson,

734

JOHNC. HARLES

of is into The mainpurpose the government to haveall immigrants integrate is thecommunity, thereality thatis notreallythecase.Everygroup-like but In has the Lao-they still keepto themselves. a sense,the government failed. into of It doesnotreallyhelppeopleintegrate themainstream society.(22) Given that Lao immigrationhas been impelled by the disruptions of the homeland, and conscious of the esteem in which the countryof adoptionis held, it is not remarkablethat the Lao are especially sensitive to the need for social solidarity in Canada.The Lao embrace an ardent Canadianism.Policies that risk national division are received with considerablyless enthusiasm. 4 As this article has argued, an uncertain national identity influences Canada's approachto integrationand assimilation.Political assimilation in Canada,in the sense of being socialized to the defining beliefs and values of a cohesive polity, is a process difficult to conceptualize. If, for generous motives, Canadahas implementeda policy of official as multiculturalism, a means of consolidatingimmigrantsinto a unified Canadianpolitical community, multiculturalism-integration without assimilation-may be the only policy that Canadacan in fact pursue. All the more reason, then, to consider whether integration without assimilation has a chance of success. As this article indicates, advocates of multiculturalismhave some reason for optimism. Notwithstandingthe lack of explicit mechanismsof assimilation,the process of immigrationitself, perhapscombined with policies of multiculturalism aimed at easing the transitionfor newcomers to Canada, can have a politically integrative effect. Despite lingering cultural affinities, the Lao immigrantsinterviewed for this study attest to the dissipationof their formerpolitical identities.In word and deed, the Lao are eager to identify with the Canadianpolitical community and with the government that is the expression of that community.Regardlessof any difficulties experiencedin Canada,accordingto the Lao it is a far betterlife than in Laos. As long as the memory of the homeland and the flight from it endures,the Lao should continueto demonstrate steadfastfidelity to the Canadianpolity. No doubt this explanationof immigrantcommitmentto Canada, one centring on the forces of migrationalone, needs refinement.Further research might explore the ways in which socio-economic status bears on an immigrant'spolitical identity. In this investigation,though such observations are largely impressionistic,class does not seem to
have an obvious effect. All the aforementioned signs that the Lao are

being integratedinto the Canadianpolitical community-their general sense of belonging to Canada, their belief in the beneficence of the

and Multiculturalism the CanadianPolity Immigration,

735

Canadiangovernment, their eagerness to display supportivepolitical behaviour,theirconviction thatCanadais a place of freedom and prosperity, their wariness of multiculturalismbecause it may jeopardize nationalunity-are testified to by members of diverse income, occupational and educationalstrata.That the sample populationis, on balance, of low socio-economic status relative to other Canadians (see Table 2) makes it all the more strikingthat the Lao display a marked absence of criticism towardsthe host society, nor do they demonstrate alienationfrom the Canadianpolity. TABLE 2 OFRESPONDENTS CHARACTERISTICS SOCIO-ECONOMIC (1992) annual income Average
Household full-yearworker)a rateb

Individual (full-time,Poverty of schooling

< Grade9

Highest level

Laorespondentsc $36,800 All Ontarians $52,225

All Canadians $46,137

$23,475 $36,031
$33,714

36.6% 13.3%
16.1%

33% 12%
14%

a Data for Ontariansand Canadiansare drawnfrom the 1991 Census of Canada. b Data are drawn from the National Council on Welfare, Poverty Profile, 1991 (Ottawa:Supply and Services, 1994), 7, 24. c All data are self-reported.Only 25 of the 30 interviewees supplied informationon household income.

Implicit in these observations is a rejoinder to public concerns aboutthe supposed drag of recent immigrantson the cohesion and stability of Canada-that immigrantvalues and traditionsare potentially at odds with what it means to be a Canadian.Not only are immigrants unlikely to threatenor destabilizethe Canadiandemocraticorder,since they are devoted to it, but they may be an asset to Canadianintegration. Indeed, an eccentric though real implication of this research is that a constant flow of immigrantsmay help preventthe break-upof a minimally integratedpolity. Because the research method for this study cannot establish causal relationships, an inquiry which in any case examines only a single immigrantgroup, such argumentsare tentatively offered. Those taking part in the study cannot be said to represent the Lao population from which they are drawn in any statistical sense, let alone all immigrantsto Canada(althoughone might well ask who the representativeimmigrantgroup is). Yet qualitativeresearch consciously sacrifices mathematicalprecision for a density of evidence. For that reason, if quantitativeassurances are not appropriate, informedconjectureand qualified conclusions are. Allowing that fundamentallythe Lao immigrationexperience may in fact parallelthat of

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JOHN HARLES C.

other newcomers, in the short term at any rate, immigrantsto Canada would seem to be a source for integrationin a political system commonly regardedas having an integrationdeficit. At the risk of ending on a cautionarynote, it must be said thatthe long-termprognosis is more uncertain.Loyalties createdby the immigrantexperience will not last forever. As the years pass and memories of difficulties in the homelandbecome less vivid, the countryof adoption will be evaluatedless and less on comparativegrounds. Because the act of migrationis so psychologically compelling, it is likely that memories will endure-possibly two or more generations will pass before the legacy of flight and subsequentsanctuarycompletely vanishes. Political values can stick across generations,especially if those values have been fashionedaccordingto subjectiveimpressionsof economic scarcity.39Considering the economic and political status of many immigrants,their belief that Canadaoffers deliveranceand thus meritstheircommitmentmay have a certaindurability.Nevertheless,if the standard insights of social scientists are correct,this may only delay the forces of assimilationthatultimatelymust secure the integrationof immigrantsand theirprogeny.Barringsignificantchanges in Canada's national self-conception, multiculturalismwill have to bear the full weight of the integrativetask, functioning not just as a facilitatorof integration,but as its object. And yet, as this study shows, multiculturalism is a focus for identityaboutwhich many Canadians,foreign-born or not, are ambivalent. One wonders what the political destiny of immigrantsto Canada will be. Although the circumstances of immigrationmay induce the terminationof old political allegiances and dispose newcomersto view the host society in the most favourable light, without the relevant assimilative mechanisms will new political commitments develop to replace the old ones? Or to put it another way, while immigrantsto Canadamay be preparedfully to integrate,is there anythingdefinite to which they can finally be integrated?How Canadaresolves that question may determinewhether,in terms of unadornedpolitical commitor ment, a Canadianwill be an "immigrantwith seniority"40 an immigrantwithoutseniority.
39 40 See Ronald Inglehart,CultureShift in AdvancedIndustrialSocieties (Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1990), 56ff. Louis Melosky, National Director, Canadian Multiculturalism Council, as quoted in Alan C. Cairns, "Political Science, Ethnicityand the CanadianConstitution," in David P. Shugarmanand Reg Whitaker,eds., Federalismand Political Community: Broadview Essays in Honour of Donald Smiley (Peterborough: Press, 1989), 123.