The effect of concrete expansion at Owen Falls power station, Uganda

P. J. Mason, BSc , MPhil , PhD , CEng , FICE and J. D. Molyneux, BEng , CEng ,
MICE
Cracking of concrete at Owen Falls power station, Uganda, was diagnosed as being due to concrete expansion caused by alkaliaggregate reaction. Resulting structural movements had caused local overstressing and also deections of installed plant and equipment. The degree of expansion varied according to the dierent cements used during construction. The processes of detecting and clarifying the implications of the various movements are explained, together with measures taken to mitigate immediate problems and provide adequate monitoring to areas of longer-term concern. Lessons are drawn for the guidance of others investigating similar phenomena. Keywords: dams, barrages & reservoirs; power stations (non-fossil fuel); rehabilitation, reclamation & renovation levels. The level rises increased both the loading and the uplift on the power station and other works. The fact that the cracks were rst noticed in the same year that the rises occurred, led to the inevitable suspicion that some form of structural distress due to increased loading had taken place. As this seemed, at the time, to be limited to machine No. 4, no changes were made to arrangements for the subsequent installation of machines No. 9 and 10. 3. The power station and associated works deteriorated rapidly during the 1970s as Uganda passed through a period of political instability, rstly through the Amin regime (197179) and then through the Obote regime (198085). The works were not inspected in detail again by the original designers until 1983. By this time most turbines were operable only at reduced load. This was largely due to lack of spares and maintenance, although there were also some machine misalignments and clearance losses. The cracking in the power station had also increased signicantly to include a major crack up to 25 mm wide through the machine hall oor and running the length of the power station (see Fig. 4). The cracking at machine No. 4 had increased signicantly and was mirrored at all other machines. It should be noted that when the inspections took place in 1983, general social and security conditions in Uganda were still quite dire with no local hotels available and little infrastructure. Visiting engineers slept in the power station. 4. Refurbishment works started in 1988 and these included rewaterproong the roof, making underwater repairs throughout the works, carrying out considerable amounts of stressed anchoring in the power station to stabilize the civil structure and generally refurbishing all the mechanical and electrical equipment. As part of this refurbishment the generators were uprated from 15 to 18 MW, increasing the total capacity of the station to 180 MW. Details of the stressed anchoring which was carried out are given elsewhere. 1 5. During 1990, continued monitoring of the cracks indicated that movement had not ceased and that the underlying cause might be other than simple structural overload. Indeed, the crack monitoring results showed a broadly linear trend of crack opening since 1973 which did not, for example, seem to vary with changes

Proc. Instn Civ. Engrs Wat., Marit. & Energy, 1998, 130, Dec., 226237 Paper 11726 Written discussion closes 15 April 1999

&

Introduction

Construction of the Owen Falls dam and power station complex in Uganda started on site in 1951. The works comprised the damming of the Victoria Nile a short distance downstream from its source at Lake Victoria. A right ank main dam and sluice structure is separated by high ground from a left ank power station with ten Kaplan turbines. The turbines were commissioned in stages, the rst two in 1954 and the last in 1968, giving a total installed capacity of 150 MW. The power station has provided the overwhelming majority of the power in Uganda, plus additional power for export, right up to the present day. The location of the works is shown in Fig. 1. A downstream view of the power station is shown in Fig. 2 and an internal view along the machine hall in Fig. 3. A chronology of events and principal characteristics of the schemes are given in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. 2. In 1964 cracks were noticed in the concrete around the generator housing on machine No. 4. Also in 1964, Lake Victoria, by then eectively impounded by the dam and power station, reached record levels with a rise of more than 2 m above the levels which had been carefully monitored since 1896. The Nile Waters Agreement required additional releases to be made through the sluices to reect the level rise, leading also, therefore, to higher tailwater

Peter J. Mason, Director, Binnie, Black & Veatch, Redhill (formerly Director, GIBB Ltd)

J. Dominic Molyneux, Senior Project Engineer, GIBB Ltd, Reading

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CONCRETE EXPANSION AT OWEN POWER STATION

Mediterranean
Cairo Egypt

Victoria Nile
J To inja

Re dS ea
Tailrace n Power statio Headrace

Sudan

Khartoum

Sluices

R. Nile

Road bridge

Main dam

Kampala

Owen Falls Lake Victoria

K To

am

pal

Victoria Nile

50

100

150

Scale: m

in lake level. The present lead author became involved at this stage and the following paper broadly outlines the review and work that was subsequently carried out to clarify and diagnose the cause of distress and to put in place appropriate mitigating and monitoring measures. 6. During the initial inspections in 1983, samples of spalled concrete had been obtained and were examined for potential distress such as that caused by alkaliaggregate reaction (AAR). This included analysis by thin section. At that time no such distress could be detected. The review in 1990 therefore focused on taking a broad overview of what visible signs of movement had occurred in order to visualize overall patterns and see if this could shed further light on underlying mechanisms. 7. It was noted that the patterns of cracking and movement were very similar at most machines, although focused more heavily on machines No. 5 to 10. The pattern was therefore initially viewed from a two-dimensional perspective as superimposed on a cross-section through the power station, arbitrarily taken on the centreline of machine No. 8 (see Fig. 5). 8. Monitoring the absolute and vector directions of crack movements in various parts of the power station indicated that the downstream wall of the station was rotating downstream about a hinge point immediately above the draft tube (see Fig. 6). It should be noted

Analysis of movements

that the power station was initially cast with just the upstream and downstream walls as rst-stage concrete and with the latter heavily reinforced to resist tailwater levels. This permitted the machines to be erected and concreted at a subsequent, second, stage. 9. It should also be noted that this downstream rotational movement was compatible with two other observations. One was the main longitudinal crack along the machine hall oor. This was up to 25 mm wide and, together with other minor cracks, indicated a downstream movement at that level of 32 mm. Secondly, the overhead gantry crane rails were also known to

Fig. 1. Location plans

Fig. 2. Downstream view of Owen Falls power station

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Table 1. Owen Falls dam and hydropower complexa brief chronology Date 1935 1947 1948 1949 1951 1954 1955 1957 1958 1959 1964 1966 1968 1971 1973 1978 1979 Event River Nile examined for hydroelectric potential Further survey of hydropower potential by Ugandan government Uganda Electricity Board formed Owen Falls hydroelectric complex planned First concrete placed at Owen Falls Machine No. 1 commissioned in January and No. 2 in April Inauguration ceremony by HM the Queen on 29 April Machine No. 3 commissioned in January and No. 4 in August Machine No. 5 commissioned in January and No. 6 in February 50-year power agreement reached with Kenya Machine No. 7 commissioned in May Machine No. 8 commissioned in July Lake Victoria reaches unprecedented levels in May First awareness of concrete cracking around machine No. 4 Machine No. 9 commissioned in May Machine No. 10 commissioned in July Idi Amin seizes power in Uganda in a military coup Crack gauging commenced in power station by local sta Targets installed to monitor downstream wall movements Idi Amin ousted by rebel forces Milton Obote returned to power Reinspection of power complex by team of UK engineers Milton Obote overthrown Start of refurbishment works on site

Fig. 3. View down the machine hall

1980 1983 1985 1988

Table 2. Owen Falls dam and hydropower complexprincipal characteristics Description Lake Victoria: Catchment area Lake area Lake mean depth Turbine generators: Total number Design head range Originally installed output per machine Original ow per turbine (now uprated to 18 MW with corresponding ow increase) Sluices: Total number Size per sluice Design discharge per sluice Principal dimensions: Dam crest road level Upstream max. water level Upstream min. storage level Max. tailwater level Min. tailwater level Nominal min. dam foundation level Nominal min. power station foundation level Length of gravity dam Length of machine hall (excluding loading bay) Width of machine hall asl = above sea level. Dimensions 267 000 km 2 67 000 km 2 40 m 10 17522 m 15 MW 96 m 3 /s

6 3 m 6 51 m high 212 m 3 /s 113615 m asl 113500 m asl 113190 m asl 111435 m asl 111280 m asl 110800 m asl 110000 m asl 726 m 1676 m 165 m

Fig. 4. View of the longitudinal crack in the machine hall oor

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CONCRETE EXPANSION AT OWEN POWER STATION

Power station Roof truss

Overhead crane

Generator Lower bracket Draft tube deck

Columns Turbine runner Spiral casing Intake dam Suction cone Tailrace

Draft tube

be moving apart. Some years earlier, the overhead crane had in fact jammed and crane movement was reinstated by machining 95 mm o the bosses on one set of wheels to allow them greater axle oat. 10. It was also known that the power station oor had risen in a number of locations. Again these were concentrated between machines No. 6 and 10 but rises were as much as 76 mm (see Fig. 7). Another indication of movement at several locations was diagonal cracks in the draft tube side walls (see Fig. 6). 11. After a reassessment of the evidence, the 1990 review concluded that all these eects could be broadly explained by an expansion of the concrete around the machines. This would exert a load on the downstream wall which was one part of the structure relatively free to move. It would also tend to cause cracking in the original rst-stage concrete. Diagonal shear cracking in the draft tube side walls would be due to the force couple developed by the expansive thrust downstream being resisted by the draft tube foundations. 12. At this stage a simple two-dimensional nite element model was undertaken to assess

Initial modelling

the eects of second-stage concrete expansion around the turbines and their spiral casings when viewed in the plan. The results are shown in Fig. 8. It can be noted that for any single machine, the concrete is unable to move laterally as it is restrained by neighbouring blocks, nor can it move upstream. Movements are therefore concentrated vertically and downstream. The downstream movement is amplied on the centrelines of the machines due to arch action around the spiral casing. The model therefore indicated the potential for the development of voids downstream of the spirals and also for vertical cracks between the rst- and second-stage concrete in the stair wells between the machines. Such vertical cracks were in fact present on site. When the steel spiral casings were subsequently drilled through downstream, gaps between the steel and concrete of up to 15 mm were found. 13. The model also predicted that the magnication of upstream/downstream movement, coupled with the lateral restraint against expansion, would tend to produce ovality in the water passages. This was also conrmed by clearance measurements around the tips of the turbine blades, to the surrounding suction cone.

Fig. 5. Typical crosssection through the power station

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14. A remaining concern was why dierent areas of the station had developed movements in dierent ways. This applied not only to the power station proper but also to other parts of the associated works such as the main dam and intake structures. 15. In order to clarify this issue, the historic records of concrete pours were examined for various parts of the work. It was noted that midway through construction the cement type changed from imported Rugby cement from the UK, to Tororo cement from Uganda's rst cement factory which was commissioned in 1953. Fig. 9 shows patterns of level rise with areas where Tororo cement was used. The relationship between level rise and cement type is clearly apparent. 16. An analysis of the Tororo cement indicated that it had been produced from the local volcanic material carbonatite which is very rich in both alkalis and potash. This was certainly a contributory factor to the accelerated eects of alkali-aggregate reaction in those areas where the local cement was used. Another factor was that the coarse aggregate, though originally classied by the Uganda Geological Survey under the broad generic name amphibolite, was in fact amphibol-schist. This contains small particles of reactive materials such as strained quartz in a non-reactive matrix. 17. Typically, with this form of reaction, symptoms are not seen in the early days after construction. Gradually, alkali pore water seeps from the cement paste into the large aggregate. This aects any reactive particles, producing silica gel and leading to internal splits and expansion. The resultant local cracks eventually join, giving the appearance of structural cracking, rather than random crazing. This process is known as alkalisilicate reaction (ASR) or `slowlate' reaction. It was discovered much later than the more common AAR, generally associated with reactive sand. 2 The eects of ASR, or slowlate reaction, are typically not seen until ve to ten years after construction. 18. The rst- and second-stage concretes in the power station are described on record drawings as 5/1 mixes. These in turn were originally specied as ratios of 5 cwt (254 kg) of cement to 12 cu. ft (034 m 3 ) of sand to 20 cu. ft (057 m 3 ) of coarse aggregate of maximum size 1 in. (38 mm). This is dicult to interpret precisely in modern terms without knowing original bulking factors and densities. An analysis of concrete core samples from the power station, however, revealed cement contents averaging 300 kg/m 3 of concrete, plus or minus about 50 kg/m 3 . Water/cement ratios were back-analysed as between 052 and 060. More importantly, the analyses revealed exceptionally high, equivalent alkali (sodium oxide)

Different concretes

Pronounced shear cracks, hairline to 2 mm

10

20

Crack vector scale: mm

Note: Arrows indicate the direction and magnitude of crack opening

contents of 25% of the cement and 75 kg/m 3 of the concrete. 19. The reinforcement used in the power station concrete was mild steel throughout. The average reinforcement density was 46 kg/m 3 . Interestingly, the second-stage concrete around the machines was completely unreinforced. Years later this too was considered to be a possible contributory factor towards the cracking, although with hindsight, nominal reinforcement would have done little to restrain the expansive forces that were subsequently generated.

Fig. 6. Cross-section through the power station showing downstream rotation based on the vector measurement of cracks, also shear cracking in the draft tube side walls

Power station stability

20. Once the general eects of expansion had been diagnosed, it was felt important that the overall stability of the basic structural shell be re-examined. This was done by a simple structural model with superimposed movements, and incorporated a standard roof truss (see Fig. 10). It was clear that movements had

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CONCRETE EXPANSION AT OWEN POWER STATION

50 mm vertical movement scale

E Set 8 D Fd (Fu shown dotted) ine ch e Ma relin t n ce

Downstream

D F

Upstream

Set 1

Set 2

Set 3

Set 4

Set 5

Set 6

Set 7

Set 9

Set 10

Note: 1. Fu - Immediately upstream of main floor crack 2. Fd - Immediately downstream of main floor crack

Key section

Fig. 7. Isometric view of machine hall oor rises

generally started in the mid-1960s. This allowed a rate of movement to be assumed of approximately 1 mm per year horizontally at machine hall oor level. Overall stability and structural adequacy were checked assuming a further 30 years of expansion at the same rate. 21. Inherent stability of the overall structure was conrmed but two local eects were noted. One was that certain lower elements on the roof trusses showed potential long-term over-stress, depending on the potential yield of structural connections on the upper wall. Secondly, it could be seen that the slender underwater columns supporting the downstream deck above the draft tubes were subject to rotation. Diver examination had revealed that many of these columns were severely distressed with cracking, exposed reinforcement and considerable degradation of the concrete. 22. Measures to repair these columns were discussed at some length and underwater trials were carried out using epoxy repair techniques. Dewatering by limpet coerdams was also considered. Eventually, however, the best way forward emerged as a result of a focused, value engineering study. 23. The value engineering study initially considered various ways in which the downstream columns could be repaired but then, alternatively, what other measures might be available to give deck support. It was quickly realized that drilling through the deck and installing alternative circular steel columns

with structural connections to the tops of the existing columns was a much more secure and cost-eective way to proceed. Not only were the repairs rapid but underwater diving time was minimized. This was particularly important given that the power station was in continual use, with the client loath to cut back on generation at any time unless absolutely essential. The repairs were successfully completed to time and budget and at approximately half the estimated cost of repairing the original columns under water (see Fig. 11). 24. A visual inspection of the roof trusses with regard to line, condition of paintwork, rivets, etc. revealed no obvious signs of distress. With the evidence of expansion from measurements of the crane rail gauge, and the numerical modelling, this left the status of the trusses uncertain. Therefore, before any possible strengthening works were initiated, extensometers were installed along the main, lower truss elements to monitor movements and provide evidence to justify any further expenditure. 25. Invar steel, bar extensometers, 5 m long, were attached by clamping to the central lower elements of the trusses 15 m above the machine hall oor. The instruments are read by trained local monitoring sta using a portable dial gauge with the overhead gantry crane as a mobile platform. Temperature is recorded along with the dial gauge readings so that measurements can be adjusted for the thermal expan-

231

MASON AND MOLYNEUX sion of the trusses. In fact, since the average daytime temperature in Uganda varies little during the year and the temperature in the power house tends to be regulated even more, corrections tend to be minor. 26. To date, results have been inconclusive but suggest that, although movements may occur, they could be subject to relief elsewhere. Indeed, visual inspection did reveal some cracking in the concrete columns supporting the trusses. Another factor which may have helped to relieve the build-up of stress in the trusses is that the power station roong was replaced after the 1983 inspections. The original precast concrete slab covering was replaced with a thin synthetic membrane which has substantially reduced the dead load carried by the trusses.
Expanded profile

Lateral restraint with downstream sliding

Fixed Stairwell

2D finite element expansion study Downstream wall

Mass concrete

27. A remaining aspect, critical to the longterm reliable operation of the station, was understanding how historic and future expansion might aect the turbines and generators. It was noted, for example, that the rise in machine hall oor level had caused the turbine runners to lift by as much as 76 mm compared to their original elevation. A number of alternative means to allow this situation to be redressed were considered, including breaking out supporting sole plates and generally lowering them. There was, however, concern that this might damage the structural integrity of the concrete support. 28. It should be noted that in the same way that the concrete was arching downstream in plan between machines (see Fig. 8), it was also arching vertically above each machine (see Fig. 12). This had led to horizontal cracking around the turbine pits. This in turn meant that for many years the generators had, in fact, been sited on structural arches, or domes, founded between the sets, rather than with the principal load passing vertically down through the turbine stay vanes. The fact that operation had continued for most of the station's life in this situation suggested that it was in fact acceptable. Moreover, the situation is undoubtedly reproduced in many of the other hydropower stations in the world, similarly aected by AAR. Attempts to grout such cracks would have little eect, given that movements would inevitably continue. 29. It was decided to produce a threedimensional model of a turbine block (see Fig. 13) and model the expansion using various parameters for concrete and for restraint of associated neighbouring concrete and steel elements. This was done by varying the parameters and correlating them against measured site movements on various concrete levels around the turbines, notably those for the stator, lower bracket and stay ring sole plates

Turbine movement and threedimensional modelling

Differential expansion downstream leading to crack in stairwell between downstream wall and mass concrete

Boundary of idealized finite element model shown hatched

Upstream

Key plan on spiral

(see Fig. 13). Detailed reference levels were available for all three of these from the original construction records. It was established that the best correlations occurred with the Poisson's ratio for the concrete, increased from 017 to 049, in eect allowing incompressible uid, rather than elastic, movement of the concrete. Reductions in moduli were made elsewhere where concrete was in tension and the structural restraint therefore provided by internal steel reinforcement. The only machine restraint found to be signicant was that provided by the heavy, steel, lower bracket. 30. The model was essentially linear and therefore somewhat of an approximation to the inevitable non-linearity of the stress condition actually occurring. It did, however, give a very good indication of stress values, which were broadly permissible, and also of patterns of movement which replicated the downstream rotation (see Fig. 14), machine hall oor rises and ovality of spiral casing and turbine passages, all predicted and measured earlier. 31. In order to restore machine operation and to ensure future reliability, it was decided

Fig. 8. Twodimensional nite element model of concrete expansion in plan, on the centreline of a turbine spiral casing

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CONCRETE EXPANSION AT OWEN POWER STATION to insert spacers in the main turbine/generator shafts coupled with packing over the main sole plates. The spacers were designed to accommodate future movement, over the next 2530 years, with the compensatory packing under the sole plates being progressively removed as expansion continued. This is discussed in more detail elsewhere 3 and was developed jointly by the civil and mechanical consultants. 32. Another result from this phase of the work was establishing from surveys the actual rises for the stator, lower bracket and stay ring sole plates. It became clear from the values obtained that the rises could be extrapolated down to zero at approximately the base level of the second-stage concrete around the machines. This was a particularly useful nding as it highlighted that the primary expansive force was probably from the second-stage concrete and was being exerted on the comparatively less aected rst-stage concrete. The eect is highlighted in Fig. 9 where the lower gallery, founded on rst-stage concrete, has remained close to design level whereas the upper gallery, founded on second-stage concrete, has shown a marked stepped rise from machines No. 6 to 10. 33. In view of the likelihood of continued concrete expansion, it was decided to use the three-dimensional nite element model to assess possible stress build-up in the stressed anchors. Appropriate model node point separations were checked against the expansions needed to calibrate the model against turbine embedded part movements. The stress increases that were predicted using this approach were checked by carrying out lift-o tests on 24 representative anchors, out of a total of approximately 170 installed. 34. The loads measured in the lift-o tests were generally lower than those predicted by the nite element model. This result has been found elsewhere in similar cases, although the reasons are unclear. It may be related to strain relief movements in the concrete immediately under the end anchor plates, given the nature of the AAR-aected concrete. 35. On six selected anchor heads, the cables were completely de-stressed, permanent load cells incorporated and the anchors re-stressed. These will give a constant future record of stress movements which can be used to assess the likely condition of the anchors throughout the station. 36. As described previously, monitoring at Owen Falls began in 1973 with crack gauges. Since then, as the potential problems were recognized, a rather ad hoc monitoring regime evolved. During 1994, with the newly acquired understanding of movement causes, an eort
Set 6 40 20 'Rise' in millimeters 0 20 Set 9 Set 5 Set 10 Set 8 Set 7 Set 4 Set 3 Set 1 Set 2 Upper gallery

Lower gallery 20 0 20 Set 9 Set 10 Set 7 Set 8 Set 6 Set 4 Set 1 Set 3 Set 2 Set 5

2nd stage concrete with Tororo cement

2nd stage concrete with imported cement

Upper gallery 111953 Stage 2 111526 111709

Stressed anchor monitoring

111161 110917

Stage 3

110749 Lower gallery Stage 1

Future monitoring

was made to rationalize all the existing instrumentation. A monitoring scheme was designed to provide the information necessary to monitor the concrete expansion and conrm the safety and serviceability of the dam and hydroelectric power station. The scheme was implemented in 1994 as part of a contract to improve drainage at the dam and also to investigate concrete condition throughout the works. 37. A new network of thermally balanced, double-skinned survey pillars and geodetic survey targets was constructed. The geodetic survey network is used to locate the power station and draft tube deck to within an accuracy of 2 mm. Such accuracy is deemed sucient to monitor drift movements caused by the expanding concrete or any indication of structural distress. 38. Survey points for a precise levelling traverse through the power station were also installed. These will enable monitoring of the concrete and the machines and help evaluate

Fig. 9. Level rises in relation to cement type (elevations in m)

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MASON AND MOLYNEUX the need to change the sole plate packers installed to accommodate this movement. As the refurbishment is completed and the need for expert expatriate sta diminishes, it is intended that all future monitoring work will be carried out by local personnel. A comprehensive manual was written describing the monitoring requirements and outlining the history and purpose of each of the 16 types of monitoring required. 39. Monitoring generally is intended to prevent events developing to undesirable levels by giving warning in time for preventative action to be taken. In order to serve this purpose, monitoring data must be analysed and interpreted promptly after instruments have been read. It is no comfort to analyse data after a disaster and be able to show that warning signs were given; in fact, it may merely demonstrate negligence. 40. At Owen Falls, two levels of alert have been specied for each type of monitoring. At the (rst) warning level, monitoring results should be double-checked, frequency of readings increased and a general increased level of vigilance instigated. Depending on the circumstances, for instance if a number of independent instruments demonstrate similar unusual trends, it may be appropriate to notify the power station management. At the (second) alarm level, immediate action is required. All instruments which could provide supporting information should be rechecked and advice should be taken on any action required to safeguard the works. 41. The alert levels are assigned to pick up short-term problems. Long-term trends of data must be assessed annually and alert levels adjusted accordingly. The actual values assigned alter from instrument to instrument depending on the usual scatter of results. Some scatter is unavoidable due to seasonal uctuations, vibrations, accuracy of instruments, human factors, etc. but they can be minimized with careful procedures. The scatter of results for any instrumentation scheme dictates the minimum warning levels that can be set. Wider bounds may be set if structural considerations govern. 42. As a default case at Owen Falls, warning levels were set at values more than 164 standard deviations above or below the trend line in question. Assuming a normal distribution, such values can be expected 10% of the time. Alarm levels were set at 196 standard deviations above or below the trend line in question, representing 5% of the time. Supplementary criteria were set for extensometer and crane gauge readings. Piezometer readings were related to margins above tailwater level. Drainage ows were considered to require judgmental assessment on an individual basis.

Deflected frame (exaggerated) Original line of power station frame

Expanding concrete

Deflection scale 50 100

43. For new instruments there is no scatter of past readings to use to determine the minimum alert levels. In order to evaluate the expected scatter it was proposed that readings were initially taken frequently. Several readings in an hour would be necessary to establish scatter due to vibration, hourly readings would establish variation due to movements of the sun, daily readings might be required to measure variations due to reservoir level, and monthly readings would be necessary to evaluate seasonable changes. A knowledge of these inuences is important in subsequently assessing individual readings. 44. The long-term frequency of monitoring must be a balance. Too frequent, and the collected data will be overwhelming. Too sparce and important movements could be missed. At Owen Falls there are over 260 crack gauges. These instruments provide the longest history of movements in the complex but on the other hand do not necessarily provide the best measure of deformation in the short term because of periodic stress build-up and sudden relief. These instruments are therefore monitored infrequently so that the history of move-

Fig. 10. Structural frame model of the power station with a 32 mm horizontal displacement downstream at machine hall oor level

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CONCRETE EXPANSION AT OWEN POWER STATION ment is continued, but they are not used for day-to-day monitoring. Measurements of the overhead crane gauge combine all the crack movements for any individual set and provide a much easier way of assessing overall expansive movements.

45. The development and diagnosis of AAR, or ASR, at Owen Falls power station, followed on remarkably parallel lines to the similar diagnosis at Mactaquac power station in Canada. 4 In both cases, movements and cracking were noticed. In both cases, initial conclusions featured structural movements and loadings or foundation movement. In both cases, initial assessments of alkali-aggregate reaction proved negative. In both cases, longterm ASR or slowlate reaction proved to be the case. The Mactaquac power station started operation in 1968, problems were noticed in 1979, and the ASR eventually diagnosed in 1986. 46. In such cases, the rst signs of distress are often maloperation of equipment and/or some form of cracking. These cracks are then monitored. The long-term trend of crack development may be broadly linear; however,

Conclusions and lessons learnt

it will often appear as a stepped pattern due to normal measuring errors and due to the build-up and release of pressure as silica gel is formed. Furthermore, movement of one crack may temporarily halt while the movement is accommodated instead by an adjacent crack.

Fig. 11. Detail of a typical bracket connection between old and new draft tube deck support columns

Sole plate loads

Generator

Turbine pit crack Probable (arching) load path

Suction cone

Draft tube

Fig. 12. Longitudinal section through the power station showing structural arching support to the generators and stators, and horizontal cracking around the turbine pits

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Stator sole plates Lower bracket sole plates Stay ring

Spiral

Suction cone

Draft tube

Fig. 13. Cut-away isometric view of the mesh for the three-dimensional nite element model

Deflected profile Original profile

Downstream

was also noted that one end of the power station, at the loading bay beyond machine No. 1, was completely uncracked and could be taken as an original datum. Measurements of crane rail separation on the machine centrelines taken both proceeding down the station and back and then averaged, gave a remarkably good and consistent pattern of overall longterm movements. These could be viewed against global strains measured elsewhere, for example overall dam height increases above foundation. 48. It can be seen that the diagnosis of alkaliaggregate reaction, eventually conrmed by concrete analysis, was accompanied by a considerable amount of structural detective work and intuitive analysis in which the skills of the engineer were used to guide mathematical modelling rather than vice versa. This must always be recommended as the way to proceed. 49. Above all, the analyses were carried out fully to understand the nature of the structure both in its present state and how it would continue to develop over the next 2530 years, which represents the economic life of the installed turbines. They conrmed that, with regular monitoring, maintenance and adjustment, the power station could continue to operate eectively.

Acknowledgements
Suction cone

Draft tube

Fig. 14. Section through the three-dimensional nite element model demonstrating downstream rotation and oor rise with second-stage concrete expansion

47. Apart from indicating whether the movement is stable, accelerating or decelerating, the absolute monitoring of such cracks does not always provide much useful information. Inevitably, they are a secondary eect due to expansion of concrete elsewhere. Of far more immediate use and guidance is the overall measurement of broad dimensions such as height above foundation. In the case of Owen Falls the amplied width, as measured at the crane rail, is probably the best indicator of overall movement. The main gantry crane is used as a stable, though temperature-dependent, measuring bar and plates at either end are xed and used to measure osets to the rails. It

50. The works described in this paper were carried out between 1990 and 1997 when the present lead author was a technical director and subsequently director of GIBB Ltd with responsibilities for the hands-on direction of the contract at Owen Falls on behalf of GIBB. The second author led investigation work at site during 1994 including coordination of the monitoring system and rechecking stressed anchor loads. Particular mention should be made of Mark Henning of GIBB who so ably carried out the nite element analyses; also of Peter Murray, the GIBB inspector on site. Peter's career started in Scotland with the manufacture of some of the rst Owen Falls turbines. In the 1960s he was based on site with the turbine Contractor for the installation of later sets. Before retiring in 1996 he spent eight years at Owen Falls supervising their refurbishment. The experience and knowledge of such men is invaluable. 51. Mention should also be made of Dr Bill French of Queen Mary and Westeld College who so ably carried out the analysis of concrete specimens taken from the site. 52. The work was carried out in conjunction with Kennedy and Donkin Ltd of the UK who were the lead consultants and particularly responsible for the electro-mechanical aspects. Richard Meileniewski of Kennedy and Donkin

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CONCRETE EXPANSION AT OWEN POWER STATION carried out the detailed appraisal of turbine movements from the electro-mechanical perspective. Electro-mechanical work in the power station was funded principally by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), formerly the Overseas Development Administration (ODA). Other works were funded by the World Bank and the Commonwealth Development Corporation. Lastly, the authors would like to express their appreciation to the Uganda Electricity Board, and in particular to Mr Alex Mugoya, for their cooperation throughout the period of the authors' involvement, and for their agreement to the publication of this paper. References

1. A R C A N G E L L I E. and S T E L L A C. The use of prestressed anchors at the Owen Falls refurbishment. Water Power & Dam Construction, 1993, 45, 23 30. 2. ICOLD. Alkali-aggregate Reaction in Concrete DamsReview and Recommendation. International Committee on Large Dams, Bulletin 79, Paris, 1991. 3. M U G O Y A A. Keeping hydro units aligned. Hydro Review Worldwide, 1994, 2, No. 4, winter. 4. H A Y W O O D D. G., T H O M P S O N G. A., R I G B E Y S. J. and S T E E L E R. R. Engineering and construction options for the management of slow/late alkaliaggregate reactive concrete. International Committee on Large Dams, Proceedings of the 16th Congress, San Francisco, 1968, Q62, R33, 575588.

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