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Defense & Security Analysis Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 6778, March 2005

The Security and Defense Matrix: Concepts Matter in Defense Analysis?*


Salvador G. Raza
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters Building, 2100 Second Street SW, Suite 4118, Washington, DC 20593-0001

The new problems of scale and scope of defense analysis present a double bind. At precisely the time when defense sectors are more difcult to manage, the demands for effective performance have become a great deal more serious. The familiar parameters of modern defense the widespread application of advanced technology, increasing specialization in the labor force, the integrative effects of rapid communications, etc. all serve to increase complexity in defense analysis. Defense analysts are now under pressure to frame problems that they did not worry about twenty years ago, and many of these problems seem decidedly greater in their inherent difculty. The most telling basis for judging the complexity of todays defense analysis is the higher degree of uncertainty in the defense mission objective, dened in terms of a varying political culture, evolving technological possibilities and resource allocation priorities within the context of defense reviews. Nothing is more mistaken than to assume that a defense review is a sort of autonomous movement with an implacable will of its own, that the variable elements interact so as to determine the outcome, that the participants are dominated by the system in such a way that their moves are either mere responses to its dictates or exercises in irrelevance or self-defeat when they go against the systems logic.1 While the term defense review sounds to some like budget cutting, to others it foreshadows an aggressive approach for achieving military superiority and an organizational build-up. In the best sense of the term, it is neither; rather, it is simply an attempt (often driven by necessity) to break out of a stagnant situation, generally reecting the recognition that one has fallen behind. In this case, the measure of behind is not limited to ones neighbors. It can simply reect the realization of ones inability to
* The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reect the ofcial policy or position of the National Defense University, the US Department of Defense, or the US Government. ISSN 1475-1798 print; 1475-1801 online/05/010067-12 2005 Taylor & Francis Ltd DOI: 10.1080/1475179042000305804 67

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accomplish previously acknowledged goals or aims with respect to national defense in light of todays technology and/or uncertainties. The edging power of the evidences for defense reviews confronts facts that defense analysis everywhere are currently at a loss as to the best approach for regulating defense demands against security assessment. There are few established assessment guidelines from which agreement might be reached, and those are based on an insufcient knowledge of what defense and security are.2

DEVELOPING THE MATRIX


The security environment is a socially built political reality. Transaction costs in this environment vary according to the valuation of interests in the conict and the plasticity of its attributes (perceived threats and opportunities). These attributes are placed into hierarchical order and prioritized in terms of the perceptions of the possibilities and probabilities that indicate a given acceptable defense alternative threshold at each stage of this hierarchy. For policy formulation purposes, a state of security can be dened simply to mean a perceived or intended state of equilibrium between the desired way of life of a society and predicted threats to statecraft, organizations and means that afford the feasibility of the maintenance of that desired way of life.3 Defense alternatives are the possible array of human, material, organizational and information resources developed, sustained and used by the state to maintain a desired state of security. In short, a state of security exists when a state of equilibrium can be maintained for a desired way of life. It must be recognized that any perceived or intended state of security is a transitory condition about which there is a collectively agreed-upon recognition and expectation. The expression of a nationally intended state of security is arrived at in the political arena and (generally) pertains monopolistically to the currently empowered government. It is a matter of politics that some states of security are preferred (prioritized) above others and it is also a matter of policy whether or not certain defense alternatives are to be banned entirely in the context of the intended state of security. Alan K. Simpson explains the nature of the politics, which informs policy formulation: In politics there are no right answers, only a continuing series of compromises between groups resulting in a changing, cloudy and ambiguous series of public decisions, where appetite and ambition compete openly with knowledge and wisdom. Thats politics.4 The denition of defense alternatives in association with possible states of security reflects a mutually complementary relationship: as each sought-after defense is measured, it changes security goals, whereas each state of security exists in the present and extends into the future, subject to the feasibility of capabilities and the acceptability of risks5 derived from the selected defense alternative. Defense analysis seeks to assess the extent to which defense alternatives are in accordance with a states political goals and priorities, as reected in its intended state of security. The nature of the security goals and the instrumental effects of defense alternatives nd a common denominator in the democratic political process, a process that measures the coherence of purpose each time the populace makes a choice that grass roots assessment that ordains the defense.

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The range of states of security and associated defense alternatives establishes two spectrums of possibilities, dened by their logical extremes. These spectrums, logically, are not a hypothesis and therefore can be neither true nor false, but rather valid or invalid depending on their utility for understanding reality.6 This means that they have their own conditions for possibility; contains their own principle of constitution, encapsulating a conjunct of dened concepts created accordingly to the necessity of the investigation, that can be used or not as an example with which to compare empirical data drawn from reality.
Table 1: Security and defense spectrum Security states spectrum This spectrum of possibilities is dened as falling between the Broad Security and Narrow Security states. Broad Security Describes a state of equilibrium where individuals perceive themselves as having the freedom to access information, products and processes they consider proper for fostering their development, expressing their political preferences and deciding about the social and economic organization required to produce it, feeling satised with the results. Narrow Security Describes a state of equilibrium not menaced by the eminent possibility of having to wage an external war or confront an internal convolution for its maintenance. Defense alternatives spectrum This spectrum of possibilities is dened as falling between Broad Defense and Narrow Defense. Broad Defense Encompasses all available human, material, organizational and information resources, everything that a state can use to protect itself from external attacks and domestic insurrection, including but not limited to the Armed Forces instrumentality.

Narrow Defense Restrictively denes the instrumental capability of the Armed Forces to conduct wars only in the pursuance of the intended state of security.

The typology expressed in Figure 1 provides a framework for plotting the choices and actions of any state (or a range of states) with regard to defense alternatives and political goals, based on measured estimates. The following pages present notional charts that characterize the countries within this hemisphere, circa 1970 and 2002. Security goals are plotted on the x-axis; defense alternatives are plotted on the y-axis. To facilitate discussion, it would be useful to contrast the range of security and defense positions shown in the logical extremes found within two of the four quadrants depicted in Figure 1. Quadrants (1) and (4) are the logical extremes of security and defense, contrasting the exclusiveness and inclusiveness criteria in their relationship. Exclusiveness narrows the state of security to one qualifying criterion only, namely the absence of war (hence the term narrow security). Inclusiveness broadens the state of security to include a perhaps imprecisely dened and/or all-encompassing common good (hence the term broad security).

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Thus it can be seen that in Quadrant (1), Broad Defense alternatives are inclusive of everything that contributes to obtaining security, whereas security is everything that renders defense unnecessary. In contrast, within Quadrant (4), the Narrow Security state is exclusive of any parametric variable other than war. The Narrow Defense alternative is dened exclusively in terms of the armed forces required to provide an understanding of the security with which it is associated. It is particularly relevant to note an additional overriding aspect of these two extreme positions. Within both Quadrants (1) and (4), the distinction between military functions and responsibilities becomes implicitly blurred into national governance, despite the fact that they appear to be at polar opposites on the graph. That is, in Quadrant (1), defense merges into security; and in Quadrant (4), security merges into defense. The result is a surprising degree of socio-political similarity, despite different choices made regarding states of security and defense alternatives. By the same measure, the choices that move a state into either Quadrant (2) or Quadrant (3) do not share a common socio-political consequence. In Quadrant (2), the instrumental role of the military comes dangerously close to national governance, which in the extreme, entails the military control of politics. Quadrant (3) produces the opposite effect, distancing the military role in politics to meanness. Despite marked differences, force design theories can be applied in every case (the term force design refers to the systematic and reective process of translating defensespecific goals into planning requirements for the composite of materials, skills, activities and information resources that makes defense capabilities). On the left side of the diagram (along the y-axis), where Broad Security is the common denominator, force design leans toward the role of support in military capabilities; on the right side (Narrow Security), the combat role (making war and preventing war) is the dominant variable to consider in force design. Similarly, within the upper portion of the diagram, where Broad Defense is the common denominator, the tendency is to balance the functions of

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the armed forces along multiple axes. Within the lower portion of the chart, designated as Narrow Defense (along the x-axis), restricted combat capabilities become the dening factor in achieving the denitions of armed forces roles and missions. Inside these four quadrants, a spectrum of transitory states is dened. Each of these states gains its individuality and relative permanence through an assemblage of defense objectives that translate political will into pragmatic intention (missions). The potential tasking of defense missions, therefore, requires that force design integrates those objectives representative of a states position as it denes and accepts a security and defense matrix. From this analysis, it becomes apparent that the social implications of a states choices within the security and defense matrix have a far-reaching (and sometimes unforeseen) impact. When the relationship between a defense alternative and an intended security state is broadened into Quadrant (1), military capabilities become an instrument of a national development toward the envisioned common good with the perhaps unintended result of forcing military capabilities to carry the weight of social goals, as in disaster relief or other tasks in which a combat role is generally not required. When those objectives move relationships near Quadrant (4), military capabilities have no alternative but to become oriented toward war. It can be seen that the variety of possible relationships between defense alternatives and states of security can be reduced to a single point that can be plotted on a twodimensional matrix. Equally, it can be seen that there are consequences both within and without the politicalmilitary context from the choices that are made. Like a metal ball attracted simultaneously by four pulsating electro-magnets drawing it toward the various quadrants, a states security/defense posture follows the combined effect of politico/military relations and interagency dynamics, as well as the national will. The military is a political actor within the defense policy formulation process. However limited, it has both political identity and prerogatives. Nonetheless, the interagency process is the larger stage on which it is but a player. The policy formulation arena is an organizational culture with interests that shape the very process it is said to serve. Without the tools provided by the perspicacity afforded through the policy-formulation process, the voice of the military can be lost or muffled by interagency bureaucratic interplay that imposes redundant planning, assessment and reporting requirements on regulated parties (occasionally in conict, thereby imposing uncertainties) and engage them in compliance enforcement in isolation from one another. Civilmilitary relations and interagency co-operation are specic elds of study, each with its own analytical framework and working hypotheses, intermingled with various concepts of force design in terms of its ability to explain and predict defense objectives, outcomes and trends. Civilmilitary relations and interagency co-operation endeavor to explain and anticipate possible tendencies in defense policies in a web of competitive priorities, alternatives, attitudes and preferences. In this context, the true task of force design is to structure and manage itself so as to mesh with, reinforce and enhance defense capabilities. It must have the capability to direct thought towards priorities since, at any time, when resources are diverted to low-priority objectives, other, necessary capabilities will be neglected.

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The political environment continually forces countries to re-evaluate their understanding of security and the concept of defense, and to adjust their priorities in force design accordingly. Understanding national preferences and their implications for decision patterns (and biases) in the formulation of defense objectives is a prerequisite to realizing the full potential of the security and defense matrix.

APPLYING THE MODEL


Figure 2 shows two notional charts that plot the estimated position of Hemispheric countries in this diagram in early 1970 and 20027. Contrasting these two charts, it would be possible to correlate the position of those countries in the early 1970s in reaction to the conuence of, inter alia, the Soviet threat, border disputes and internal conicts. These were primary forces shaping the concept of security and defense toward the right side of the security and defense matrix, where Narrow Security is dominant. In early 2002, Colombia is isolated in the upper-right corner of the chart, struggling to solve an internal conict by using not only the military but also every other resource available, as reected in Plan Colombia. Costa Rica and Panama, formally without armed forces, tend explicitly and emphatically toward a concept of wider defense. Paraguay still has a strong perception of the inuence of its armed forces in providing security goals, although moving rapidly toward a wider concept of defense. Brazils declaratory posture of Do not directly involve the military in functions and roles other than its professional combat orientation, keeps it in the lower part of the security and defense matrix, where Narrow Defense is the predominant theme. Moving distinctly toward the Broad Security/Narrow Defense quadrant since the 1970

Figure 2: Comparative charts, 19702002

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measure, the United States could be said (in terms of the analysis above) to have introduced a greater degree of inclusiveness (broadening the state of intended security, i.e., Broadening Security) while restricting the capability of its armed forces (narrowing defense alternatives toward that of conducting war, i.e., Narrowing Defense). (See the discussion on the socio-political ramications associated with quadrant (3), above.) One can easily dispute the relative position of any two countries on either chart. However, two aspects are indisputable: rst, each states understanding of security and concept of defense have evolved over the periods contrasted, pressed by, among other things, its perception of the treaty environment and concomitant reassessment of threat. Venezuela is a remarkable example, with its 1999 Constitution imposing upon its armed forces a signicant role in the development of the country. Second, there is a marked clustering of countries that are widening their concept of defense to include other roles and functions for the armed forces, adjusting the design of their military capability, accordingly. The latter aspect provides an indication of a possible convergence of a group of countries toward the Broad Defense/Broad Security alternative. Whether or not this implies the possibility of a more peaceful world may be arguable. Nonetheless, it can be said that Broad Security shifts the emphasis of force design from a war-oriented role for the armed forces to one of supporting functions and activities, such as disaster relief and law enforcement (a constabulary role). The 19 September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States presents an excellent opportunity to illustrate an additional use of the security and defense matrix, expanding it from a simple explicative (past-oriented) role to one of prediction. Figure 3 plots further US movement in the direction of Broad Security as it faces and meets the challenges (and opportunities) of the twenty-first century. The US strategy promises to use every tool in our arsenal from better homeland defense and law enforcement to intelligence and cutting off terrorist financing (Introduction, paragraph 4) against terrorism, assuring that once the regional campaign localizes the threat to a particular state, we will help ensure the state has the military, law enforceFigure 3: Plotting US movement in the security and defense matrix

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ment, political, and nancial tools necessary to nish the task (Part III, Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends, paragraph 5). The US intention of transforming its military forces in order to ensure their ability to conduct rapid and precise operations capable of achieving decisive results can be expected to guide the development of its defense capabilities in tune with its newly dened overall security strategy goals. Nonetheless, a central theme of this paper is that systems generally lack an institutional capacity to look at new ideas, assuring, therefore, that past practices tend to maintain ownership and control over the mechanisms for evaluating new goals. From a US perspective, success will depend on attaining a common vocabulary and set of meanings about the specialized terms of defense and security, both as the Executive stands before the Legislature in search of the resources required for achieving its goals and as it announces the ranges of programs to its Defense Department and its subparts. Success will take the form of adaptation, modernization and transformation if the power of effective communication is sufcient to dislodge the inertial malaise of a bureaucratic structure. Ultimately, success will be measured by the efciency, efcacy and economy of defense resource allocation or, by way of a negative alternative, the degree of withering of the national will regarding the desired state of security of the nation that the White Paper describes.

EXPLORING THE MODEL: DEALING WITH THE FORMULATION OF DEFENSE OBJECTIVES


The security and defense matrix looks beyond the traditional bounding-threat scenarios in order to determine newly emerging trends that underscore heightened sensitivity for the need to have capabilities. The pay-off for using the security and defense matrix is a recognition of the full dimension of uncertainties embedded in the changing denition of security- and defense-practiced concepts, without being constrained by the particular understanding embedded in previous defense policies. With the diffusion of threat perception in a post-Cold War ambiance and in a globalized world, however, defense policy development based upon a states geographic position with the lingering inertia of past border disputes no longer rests upon a valid criterion. Because of this trend, it has become clear that the geographical/regional approach increasingly becomes an inadequate criterion for defense policy formulation. Furthermore, there are cases where the use of force for non-regional goals is ordained as an acceptable defense/security alternative, such as in a potentially contradictory defense alliance situation where the conict is rooted beyond what was once considered a states regional sphere. In such cases, it can be seen to threaten the national, indigenous perception of a states desire for self-determination. Whether or not good or bad, the clustering tendency of countries on a plot depicting their security and defense matrix imposes changes (and therefore challenges) to defense policy formulation. It is not the clustering aspect, however, that is paramount to a states force design. It reects an evolution in the spectrum of desired defense alternatives and states of security, an evolution that implies that country after

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country has transformed their concept of defense to reect how they perceive the nexus of threats surrounding their desired state of security. Threats, therefore, are the parametric variable in force design. They are the anticipated relationship of possible events to the capabilities required so that an undesirable result or consequence does not happen. Hence, force design begins by identifying and assessing threats in order to nd out whether or not they have sufcient signicance to warrant modifying military capabilities in order to preserve a states ability to attend to defense objectives. There are, of course, no abstract principles for designing defense objectives, and this craft cannot be reduced to enforceable rules. This is historys warning to those practitioners who search for objective-dening principles; it is a precaution to those who try to conceptualize the relationships between their component processes. The possibilities exist for transforming the rules for interaction and for the security environment to change the context of choices, creating casual mechanisms that try to relate defense alternatives that meet political preferences within this transformed environment and reduce the costs of legitimization of these choices by using interaction rules that are compatible with new perceptions of functionally excellent explanations and vindications. The developmental dynamics of defense objectives are characterized by an explicit bargaining process in an ambiance dominated by inter-agency co-operation and conict. The same values, ideologies and interests that have created political pluralism also create relatively independent and specialized agencies that make collaboration difcult in the formulation of defense objectives. Actors in this process are aware that the resulting defense objectives will convey decisions over resource allocation and strategic choice. In short, this is a policy formulation process eshed out from political bargaining. Described in this way, bargaining and interagency co-operation are natural aspects of the policy formulation process.8 In this context, the adequacy of the policy formulation process can be judged according to its functional sufficiency for providing guidelines for force design. This is a strong statement, yet reective of the fundamental fact that any policy formulation process that is not up to the task of providing adequate guidelines for defense and security objectives leaves defense ministries as a rudderless ship in rough waters, facing strong winds and an unfriendly shore. Unfortunately, policy formulation seems forever destined to be driven by the legacy of past practices; inertia orients its conceptions and this environment tends to direct its attention and purpose. These characteristics of the policy process show that preferences for defense objectives are built as soon as the policy-making process for designing defense alternatives is developed. Moreover, these alternatives incorporate implicit theories about how to meet the goals they establish, thus are similar to conceptual systems involving priorities and perceptions of casual relations, of the political environment, and of the possibilities of transformation. The development of these policies, in accordance with these characteristics, demands a huge amount of co-ordination, and encourages the reformulation of causality architecture between:

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1. Events external to the defense domain (changes in economic conditions, for example). 2. Relatively stable parameters (a system of values) used in problem formulation, building and evaluation of solution alternatives. 3. Norms and procedures ruling the dynamics of operating processes developed in a decision-making subsystem. These basically focus on changes in the system of values of political decision-makers and their inuence in the translation of national policy guidelines into concrete decisions regarding budgetary programs and demands. This process calls for a critical review: of the nature of technical and operational information; of processes and mechanisms; and of intra- and inter-institutional co-ordination for the determination of the magnitude and form of the problem, its causes and probable impact on various defense alternatives. This is the case, for example, when reconsidering the relative importance of economic development versus environmental protection, when reconsidering the perception of attributes of problems (with the involvement or not of the armed forces in ghting illicit drug trafcking), and when reconsidering the sharing of functional duties and responsibilities and their causal relationship with the availability of other political instruments. Along the same lines, one of the core aspects of these policies lies in the denition of security and defense concepts and the relationship between them, keeping in mind that these denitions imply a cutout of the scope of competence between defense responsibilities.

FINAL COMMENTS
The Security and Defense Matrix provides a code that can be used to compare and contrast defense objectives and provides the general elements that any defense analysis methodology relevant to the same purpose would need to include. It thereby helps to generate questions that need to be addressed in order to diagnose problems, explain its processes and predict outcomes. It allows, therefore, precise assumptions to be made about a limited set of parameters and variables that simplify the process of multiple, interacting cycles involving numerous decisions at multiple organizational levels. They also provide a stable conceptual environment in which stability and change coexist or when alternated with either a number of modest adjustments having the same attributes used in structuring a choice or major changes in choices, with a radical departure from the past. They permit parallel processing within the defense system so that operational process can be conceptualized as being linked to outcomes, thus allowing the decision-making process to move outward, from the crafting of a narrow list of alternatives from which a choice is to be made, to the actual choice itself. Bearing in mind that the task of policy formulation carries the bulk of the weight for creating and prioritizing stable, viable defense objectives, those tasked with such a responsibility must be able to capture the position and trend of each country in terms of its understanding of security and the concept of defense. Whatever compromises this process might entail, those charged with engineering defense objectives cannot fail to

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recognize that its practical achievement will run the gauntlet of civilmilitary relations and the inter-agency bargaining process. When policy formulation does not play its functional role in identifying adequate defense objectives, the results are defective capabilities, inarticulate strategies and inadequate organizational structures that not only do not provide the required jointness, but also mirror its own lack of functionality in the defense structure it created and prioritized. One hypothetical chain depicts a sequence of events when a defective defense policy results from a lack of internal and external coherence and sufciency when defense purposes are not clearly dened and provoke vague and even conicting objectives. The following scenario unfolds: without clearly dened objectives, the responsibilities of the states agencies become blurred. Inter-agency conicts tend to stovepipe processes according to their own operational procedures and institutional goals. The resulting products of these stovepipe processes become inarticulate and even conicting. Democratic political institutions, however desirable, suffer similarly from a tendency toward deciency in the expression of their defense mission, because the more vague the policy guidance, the more that autonomy ows to the armed forces. In the absence of the benet of being able to see threats to survival dened and prioritized through the workings of political processes, defense ministries are left with only the broadest definition of threat and must prepare accordingly. They then often misallocate resources away from those needed to meet a states ideal perception of threat.

NOTES
1. Stanley Hoffman, Gullivers Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy, New York: MacGraw-Hill, 1968, p. 12, cited in R. Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997, p. 103. Jervis refers to Hoffman in order to explain choices in the international relations arena. The structure of these choices resembles defense reform decision-making key variables. The epistemological question of what defense and security are is an ontological problem, being outside the realm of this paper. The answer to this question would provide an explanation for its nature. For the functional purposes of force design, the relevant idea is the concept of defense as practiced by each country (each one being a particular manifestation of a general phenomenon), how it evolves, and how this evolution inuences the conceptualization and development of military capabilities. Other disciplines deal with these ontological questions, establishing a theoretical and practical relationship between force design and other areas of study. Another common denition of security indicates the policing role of the provision of material and individual safety, commonly referred to as public security. This restrictive and limited meaning of security is specically not addressed in this paper. Alan K. Simpson, former US Senator from Wyoming, and Lombard Chair at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. http://globetrotter. Berkeley.edu/conversations/Simpson/simpson4.html (24/11/01). For a discussion on the term state of security, see W. Lippman, US Foreign Policy, Boston: John Hopkins Press, 1943, p. 51. Wolfers uses Lippmans concepts to review the Defense Policy of the US, see A. Wolfers, American Defense Policy, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965, p. 3. For the application of the term in the context of policy formulation, see D. Proena, and E. Diniz, Poltica de Defesa no Brasil: Uma Anlise Crtica, Braslia: UNB, 1998, p. 55.

2.

3.

4.

5.

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8.

P. Bruyne, J. Herman and M. Schoutheete, Dinmica da Pesquisa em Cincias Sociais: Os Polos da Prtica Metodolgica, (ed. Ruth Jofly), Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Alves, pp. 48, 182. In developing these notional charts, the following aspects were considered: a) type of government; b) extent of military forces deployed abroad; c) degree of internal conict involving military forces or policy; d) presence of active and latent border disputes; e) the inclusion/exclusion of police forces within the structure of the armed forces; f) choice of a civilian or a military ministry of defense; and g) the attribution of constabulary tasks to the armed forces or police (federal police/gendarmerie/coast guard). All variables were equally weighted from 5 to +5 for defense and security (5 Narrow, +5 Broad). Aggregated results were plotted, using the standard deviation (the center of the matrix = 0,0 defense 0,0 security). The analytical value of the results is circumscribed to its notional purpose only, limited by the analytical limits of a single valuator and the arbitrary aggregation criteria used. The longer two arrows represent varying forms of thought over the period from 19702002 that (over time) resolved themselves into the state of thought represented by the 2002 matrix. The single, shorter arrow, of course, represents time. To further explore interagency issues, see E. Bardach, Getting Agencies to Work Together: The Practice and Theory of Managerial Craftsmanship, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998. For the bargaining process see B. Mesquita, et al., An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace, American Political Science Review, Vol. 93 No. 4, 1999, pp. 791807. For an application of the bargainning model, see J. D. Fearon, Rationalist Explanation for War, International Organizations, Vol. 49 No. 33, 1995, pp. 379414.

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