Joe Page Dr.

Murphy PHIL 172

Does Being A Person Necessitate Embodiment?

What it means to be a person is a question that could be endlessly debated. Philosophers from the ancient Greek times up until the present have all grappled with the issue of what makes the notion of person separate from simply human. One important issue comes up when delving into the issue of what a person is, is whether a person is mind, body, or both. Yes, a human being has a physical body which separates it from other species, but what accounts for the distinction of person? The notion of person implies a non-physical part of us, and for the purpose of this paper, it shall be called the mind-soul, and we will treat is as part of the notion of person. The mind-soul is that part of the person which can have thoughts, ideas, and think in abstract terms. It allows us to picture the painting in our head that our hand then puts on the canvas. One question we are left with is whether or not the notion of person necessarily means that one is embodied. It is hard to imagine that you could exist without your physical body, but it also seems that our thoughts, beliefs, and desires shape much more if not all of who we are as a person. There are arguments (like Aristotles Dualism) that support the claim

that to be a person is to be embodied, but there are also counter-arguments (Descartes) to that claim. Materialism is one of the more radical arguments that support the claim that persons are necessarily embodied. This system of thought holds the view that a person is purely physical, that is, we are our bodies. Materialists are interesting in that they do not even have to acknowledge the existence of the mind-soul. However, they can also take into account that the mind-soul does exist, but that it is identical to ones brain. Hasker uses the example that a human brain is a self operating computer (Hasker 70). This is to say that while a person does have mental properties, those mental properties are caused by physical properties. The complex make up of the brain allows for the person to have ideas or to create. The materialist line of thought reduces creation of music or art into a simple brain function. The problem with this is that it is merely suspicion. There is no way of proving whether or not performing an algebraic function is simply a brain event that would occur in the same pattern if the function is performed again (Murphy, Person 1). It is simply not measurable. Even they reduce person to the physical body, materialists still cannot get rid of mental properties (Hasker 71). In its search for simplicity, materialism brings up more questions. Namely, how can physical reactions lead to a sense of self, or an original idea? The best answer is that right now, we do not

know if they can. Materialism will perhaps never be able to fully explain the notion of person. And perhaps even more importantly, no one will want to accept materialism. It seems dismal to accept that our thoughts and ideas are just reactions in our brains. People want to believe that there is something more to them than our bodies, they want to believe in a mind-soul. Another argument for the necessary embodiment of person is called emergentism. Emergentism is a quasi-scientific view of the relationship between mind and body. To an emergentist, the mind would be heavily dependent on the biological body/brain, but in a way where the mind-soul is still present and separate (Murphy, Person 1). This is because the emergentist view recognizes the development of the brain as the cause of the mind-soul. Basically, as the human race has evolved, our capabilities have evolved as well. And because our brains developed with such sophistication, we now have the mind-soul. Emergentism states that although our brain now allows us to create music and imagine things, but we did not start that way. Our mind-soul has come about through biological processes and is therefore tied to the body. In order to have a mindsoul, one must have a body. Emergentism goes quite far in the sense that it seems to proclaim that only humans can be persons, but could be expanded to other species if they develop in the same ways. This claim is actually not as far out as it is unpopular.

People tend to stay away from classifying anything other than a human as a person. All in all, the emergentist ties the mind-soul to the body, arguing essentially that there is a duality to person which necessitates its embodiment. Aristotles dualism is another theory that argues for the necessity of a person to be embodied. Aristotle takes mind-soul and body to be form and matter, and thus nonseparable dimensions of one substance. (Murphy Person 2). The soul may give meaning to the body, but a person must have both. A person could not live without a body, it would be dead. In order to be a person in the first place, one must be alive and able to make decisions, have beliefs, or create art. Aristotle also believes in the mortality of the mind-soul, closing the gap between the body and mind-soul (Murphy Person 2). The mind-soul cannot survive without the body, so the body must be an essential part of the person. His belief in the mortality of the soul seems to cause a view of person as embodied, which is the opposite of his teacher, Plato. Plato is a very interesting character when speaking of whether or not to be a person is to be embodied. He holds many beliefs that coincide with Aristotles dualism, but shaped in such a way to hold that person need not necessarily be embodied. In direct opposition of Aristotle, Plato believes in the immortality of the mind-soul. If we accept that the mind-soul is immortal, we are accepting that to be a person one need not be

embodied. This is because if our mind-soul lives on, which contains all of our beliefs and desires, we do not need a body to still hold these values. This, however, is more speculation than actual logic. There is no way one can come close to proving (at least right now) whether our mind-soul is immortal or not. However, one of his more simple arguments is the argument from use of the body (Murphy, Person 1). This states that because our mind-soul uses our body to accomplish or act out its thoughts and desires, they must be separate. He argues that because the mind-soul uses the body, it cannot be the body. Following from this, a person is their mind-soul, which just happens to have a body. This argument seems to coincide closely with those of the modern philosophers like Descartes and Hume. Descartes presents yet another type of dualism that allows for persons not to need to be embodied. His conclusions are similar to those of Plato, but his reasoning is much different. Part of his theory almost seems to rest on the claim that we can only be sure that our mind-soul is in existence. His famous conclusion is I think, therefore I am. In the context of his Discourses, Descartes can doubt everything except for his mindsoul, so therefore it must be real. We can doubt anything physical: our senses, things around us, and even our bodies. For example, I can see my foot, but I can also doubt its existence. Yes, I may be able to feel it as well, or even smell it for that matter, but sense

information does not necessarily qualify something as existing. However, you cannot doubt the existence of the mind-soul. This is because by doubting its existence, we are acknowledging that we are thinking of something. Whether it is our bodys existence or what we want for breakfast, we cannot doubt that thoughts arise, so therefore there must be a mind-soul where those thoughts come from. The body can be seen as merely a vehicle, or platform, for the mind-soul to express itself. To Descartes and philosophers like him, persons are made up of desires and beliefs, therefore persons (in the Cartesian) view are bodiless. (Murphy, Person 2). The thoughts and desires of the mind-soul exist independently of the body. These thoughts and desires may be expressed physically by the body, but they still exist before the body reflects them. Philosopher Lynne Ruder Baker makes a similar claim in her theory of person. Ruder Baker believes that persons are constituted by (but not identical to) their bodies (Murphy, Person 4). She is saying here that yes, our body does make us up physically, but it is not actually who we are. A body is more important to us than most other things, but it does not decide who we are and who we will become. She also states that person has causal powers that a body would not have if it did not constitute a person (Murphy, Person 4). This is to say that a person sets their body in motion, gives their body cause to move. Without the psychological (mind-soul) aspect of person, the body would serve

little to no purpose. It seems to follow that because our body is merely a vehicle for expression, that actual person does not exist in the body. The imagination and creativity are the evidence of the person, not the physical expression of the persons body. These philosophical frameworks provide a guideline for finding out some of what it means to be a person: if embodiment is necessary or not. Sometimes these frameworks seem to arrive at different conclusions through some of the same steps. Plato and Descartes both have dualist theories, but interpret the physical as unnecessary. Some philosophers seem to avoid the question altogether. Philosophers that were not mentioned like Hume or Kant view a person as a bundle of perceptions, desires, and beliefs. This line of thought seems to be influenced by Eastern religion/philosophy. They believe that there is no real self, just a bundle of perceptions. Therefore, they dont seem to really recognize person at all. It is good practice to look at every argument that pertains to a metaphysical issue in order to broaden our perspectives. Many of these philosophers grew up reading Plato and Aristotle, and now today we read them in conjunction with Descartes, Hume, or Locke. The frameworks they provide are especially important for learning the language of metaphysics. At the end of the day, each one of us may have a separate definition of person. Although we all may believe that persons have mind-soul and body, some believe that the mind-soul completely makes the per-

son. Materialists believe the opposite, that person is merely body. These vastly different concepts shed light on different sides of the original question: must person be embodied? Frameworks like emergentism even try to bring science into the debate. For now, however, the argument is a metaphysical one. Although there may be no true, discernible answer, it is important that we as a species reflect on our existence and understand ourselves and our place in the world.