UPPSALA UNIVERSITY Department of Government D-level Thesis 2011

Rethinking Groupthink
Developing a New Approach to the Academic Goatsucker

Author: Hkan Tallgren Supervisor: Stefano Guzzini

Table of Contents
Revolutionizing a Field .............................................................................................................. 2 Aim, Research Questions and Delimitations .............................................................................. 3 Groupthink ................................................................................................................................. 3 Antecedents ............................................................................................................................ 4 Cohesiveness ...................................................................................................................... 4 Structural Faults of the Organization ................................................................................ 4 Provocative Situational Context......................................................................................... 5 Symptoms ............................................................................................................................... 5 Towards a New Approach: Critical Discussion ......................................................................... 6 Methodological Problems ...................................................................................................... 6 Confirmation Bias .............................................................................................................. 6 Measuring Antecedents ...................................................................................................... 8 Cohesiveness .................................................................................................................... 10 Theoretical Problems............................................................................................................ 11 Similarity of Symptoms ..................................................................................................... 11 Stress ................................................................................................................................ 12 Pressure on Dissenters and Conformity........................................................................... 13 Stereotypes ....................................................................................................................... 15 Methodology and Operationalization ................................................................................... 15 Examining the New Approach .................................................................................................. 21 A Most Likely Case.............................................................................................................. 21 Source Material .................................................................................................................... 22 The Iraq Process and Antecedents........................................................................................ 23 Group Homogeneity ......................................................................................................... 23 Cohesiveness .................................................................................................................... 24 Decision-Making Procedures ........................................................................................... 26 Leadership Practices ........................................................................................................ 27 Group Interaction with Experts........................................................................................ 28 Stress Level ....................................................................................................................... 29 The Iraq Process and Outcomes ........................................................................................... 30 View of Group Power ....................................................................................................... 30 Attitude towards Group Morality ..................................................................................... 31 View of Enemy .................................................................................................................. 32 Individual Handling of Adverse Information ................................................................... 34 Handling of Personal Doubt and Disagreement .............................................................. 35 Reaction to Dissent........................................................................................................... 36 Perceived Agreement ........................................................................................................ 37 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 38 Works Cited .............................................................................................................................. 41

Revolutionizing a Field
This study is located within the field of Foreign Policy Analysis. This is normally seen as a subfield of International Relations and deals in particular with decision-making aspects of foreign policy behaviour of states. Rather than treating states as unitary actors, as in traditional International Relations theory, the black box of the state is opened up. The focus is often on the decision-making process and the subjective view of actors. This should be seen in contrast to rationalist approaches in which the analysis takes the form of examining states as value-maximizing rational actors (see Allison and Zelikow, Hudson).

Irving Janis theory of groupthink, first developed in the early 1970s and then expanded in 1982, was developed in reaction to the large number of foreign policy fiascos by US governments. Groupthink ignited an interest in small group decision-making almost singlehandedly (Hudson 17). The volume became a pioneering work in the study of foreign policymaking by questioning the prevailing wisdom about the nature of group dynamics (Garrison 178). Janis approach is psychological, but he focuses not on individual cognition, as others do, but on groups. He suggests that under certain circumstances, group dynamics can have a negative, even devastating effect. When suffering from stress and low self-esteem, group members may engage in concurrence-seeking to bolster each others confidence in a perceived group norm in favour of certain policies. They do so out of a sense a strong affiliation with the group and to avoid disrupting its wellbeing.

Groupthink had a massive impact and is still a standard item in textbooks in social psychology, organization and management, and public policy-making. It is so popular that it is sometimes confused with small group decision-making as such (t Hart et al. 11). This is a serious misconception but one that points to its entrenched position in the popular conception of group dynamics. Janis work, which sought to describe, explain, and prevent groupthink, was ambitious and promising. Over the years, however, groupthink has been the target of serious criticism. As we shall see, scholars have proposed re-defining, augmenting, or deleting some of Janis variables. Some writers have even suggested that, in light of conceptual confusion and weak empirical support, groupthink should be abandoned altogether. The striking contrast that one of the most prominent Foreign Policy Analysis theories is also one of the most criticized, is the starting point of this investigation.

Aim, Research Questions and Delimitations

In light of the serious criticism levelled against groupthink, the aim of this study is to attempt to see whether problems associated with this theory can be countered by developing a new approach. Criticism may also prove irrelevant. These questions will be answered:

What theoretical and methodological problems are associated with groupthink? Can these problems be remedied by theoretical reformulation and methodological innovation?

These questions will be addressed theoretically as well as empirically. The essay begins with a brief description of groupthink. This is followed by a critical reading of the theory, criticism levelled against it, and previous research. Here, problems and remedies are discussed as the first step. This is followed by a proposed methodology and operationalization that follows from the critical discussion. This approach is then examined, further problems discussed, and the approach developed through a case study. Finally, remaining problems and additional thoughts are discussed.

Not all groupthink research will be possible to cover. Given the scope of this investigation, and since it seems crucial to actually determine the value of the original formulation before moving on, focus is on Janis 1982 formulation and the subsequent research building on his work. Discussions on additional variables suggested by others are left aside. So too are normative aspects such as how to avoid groupthink, and the proposed causal connections between groupthink, poor decision-making, and policy failure.

Groupthink
Groupthink, in short, refers to a concurrence-seeking tendency that interfere[s] with critical thinking. It is a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action (Janis 9). Groupthink is an extensive theory, consisting of several proposed causal relationships. The full model holds that antecedents cause a concurrence-seeking tendency that can be observed as number of

symptoms. These cause defective decision-making procedures and, in turn, a likely policy failure. This study centres on antecedents and symptoms, the core of the theory.

Research on groupthink was prompted by Janis fascination with the Bay of Pigs plans to help Cuban exiles invade Cuba: How could bright, shrewd men like John F. Kennedy and his advisers be taken in by the CIAs stupid, patchwork plan? (vii). Janis found that a concurrence-seeking tendency was manifest during the groups deliberations, just as during the escalation of the Vietnam War by Johnson, Trumans decision to invade North Korea, the failure to be prepared despite serious warnings before Pearl Harbor, and the Watergate coverup by Nixon. Two counterexamples, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Marshall Plan deliberations, demonstrate that groupthink is a contingent and avoidable phenomenon. The following section briefly outlines the theory. Many issues are discussed in detail later.

Antecedents
Cohesiveness
The central components of the groupthink theory consist of the antecedents and its resulting symptoms. The most central antecedent is high cohesiveness. Cohesiveness refers to the degree to which the members value their membership in the group. Janis mostly refers to amiability and esprit de corps among the members as cohesiveness, but also discusses various other aspects such as friendship (245-247). The suggestion that cohesiveness leads to groupthink is the idea that is most impressive in its counter-intuitive power (t Hart 31). This is because one would expect tight-knit groups to function more properly than noncohesive groups dominated by conflict. With high cohesiveness, members trust each other and tolerate disagreement, which should invite dissent. Herein lies the paradox. While members of a cohesive group feel much freer to deviate from the majority, their desire [] to match their opinion with each others [] inclines them not to (Janis 246-247). High cohesiveness, though, is not inherently negative (Janis 4-5). High cohesiveness is a necessary but insufficient predictor of groupthink. The question then arises when groupthink occurs.

Structural Faults of the Organization

Janis remaining antecedents belong to two groups, each increasing the risk of groupthink. One group contains structural faults of the organization. The first of these is insulation of the group, which means that the group members are not subjected to information from associates outside the group. Even if such associates are experts on the subject, they are not consulted on

the basis that they are outsiders (176, 249). A second structural fault is lack of tradition of impartial leadership. In the absence of such a tradition, there is no organizational norm prohibiting the leader from pushing for a preferred policy. This has the effect of discouraging an open assessment of alternatives. A similar effect is created if there are no established norms requiring methodical procedures, such as listing pros and cons of available options (244, 249). These structural antecedents, if present, represent the absence of a potential source of organizational constraint [against] uncritical conformity (249, emphasis removed). The last structural fault concerns homogeneity of members social background and ideology. This makes members find it easier to concur with the suggested proposals, with disparate views less likely to be voiced (244, 250).

Provocative Situational Context

The last type of antecedent conditions pertains to the situational context. Janis is somewhat ambiguous here, but the basic suggestion is that stress makes group members dependent on the group for emotional support Janis central explanation for the occurrence of groupthink (255). The first condition is the somewhat curiously defined high stress from external threats with low hope of finding a better solution than the leaders (250). The second situational factor is internal sources of stress causing low self-esteem, which Janis suggests can be the effect of a number of reasons, like recent policy failures or moral dilemmas (254-256). The two aspects of stress thus relate to stress from a generally threatening environment and to the difficulties of decision-making.

Symptoms
The concurrence-seeking tendency manifests itself as eight symptoms. Two symptoms relate to the groups overestimating itself. An illusion of invulnerability creates excessive optimism and risk-taking, so that members ignore warnings and embark on risky ventures. A belief in the groups inherent morality leads them to ignore moral consequences of their policies. Two symptoms signal the closed-mindedness of the group: collective rationalization of warnings that challenge any of their assumptions, and stereotyped views of enemies as evil, weak or stupid, which makes negotiation attempts seem futile. The third category deals with pressure towards uniformity. Self-censorship means that members abstain from raising doubts challenging the norms of the group. Because of self-censorship and the assumption that silence implies agreement, an illusion of unanimity on the majority view develops. Members expressing doubt are subjected to direct pressure to remain silent, like shown that dissent is disloyal. Self-appointed mindguards keep adverse information that might damage group 5

members belief in the soundness of the policies or their morality from reaching the group (Janis 40-41, 174-175). Many of the symptoms reinforce each other, and the underlying psychological function that Janis proposes is that they work to counter doubts about the group norm among members (256-259). We will now shift perspective to a discussion of the theory, its application, and the criticism it has provoked.

Towards a New Approach: Critical Discussion

This section identifies methodological and theoretical problems associated with groupthink through a critical reading of Janis critics, the theory, and additional groupthink research. Remedies are also discussed. We begin with the most fundamental aspects.

Methodological Problems
Confirmation Bias
The harshest criticism aimed at groupthink suggests that it is not merely a flawed theory, but a myth that continues to thrive despite conceptual inadequacies and weak empirical performance, overshadowing other research agendas. Fuller and Aldag compare it to an imaginary Central American animal called the goatsucker, which is blamed for attacking animals and humans, believed to be sucking the blood out of them. Beneath the humorous metaphor lie serious charges: groupthink has come to symbolize all that is bad about group decision making, and flawed decisions are quickly dissected for signs of groupthink. In this way, groupthink has become the unsighted academic goatsucker of decision-making, blamed for all bad policies. They lament that the theory refuses to die (Fuller and Aldag 164-165).

At the centre of their criticism are two crucial points. First, assessing previous research, they conclude that there is little support for the full groupthink model (Aldag and Fuller 539). They take the common position that experimental groupthink research is problematic, but also note that after decades of groupthink research, support comes mostly from case studies. Notably, and this is the second point, they even view such affirmative findings with considerable suspicion, arguing that groupthink is accepted mostly for its intuitive appeal, and that empirical support is often anecdotal (Aldag and Fuller 537, 547). They propose that groupthink research is plagued by what I broadly refer to as a confirmation bias, leading to positive but unconvincing findings. They find that the negative framing of groupthink contributes to the flawed application. Terminology such as victims of groupthink, and a

deterioration of mental efficiency (Janis 9) risks making researchers not approach their material with an open mind and should be avoided. Researchers tend to look for confirmatory evidence and the risk is that the theory is never seriously tested: Disconfirmation is the stuff of science (Aldag and Fuller 539-540, 548). The common focus on policy fiascos may make researchers infer a negative process (Aldag and Fuller 540). Experimental research supports the idea that retrospective sense-making of this kind is likely (Henningsen et al.). A focus on negative outcomes is hardly surprising from an empirical point of view, but case studies used only to solve empirical puzzles do not necessarily advance our theoretical knowledge.

Fuller and Aldag deem research focused on groupthink a waste of time and suggest abandoning groupthink per se. They opt for a much broader way of approaching decisionmaking that incorporates variables from decades of decision-making research, such as stage of group development (Fuller and Aldag 174-181, Aldag and Fuller 541-547). We will try to address groupthink flaws by working from the theory as such.

Clearly, many groupthink studies fail to meet high research standards. Janis, though working inductively, set a poor precedent with anecdotal evidence, theoretical discussions without empirics, and empirics without direct connection to theory. He admits (130) that some of his groupthink interpretations are tentative, and they may even be mistaken. He is also vague or inconsistent about definitions of his variables (like mindguarding, see 232-233). Later questionable research includes an article on the Iranian hostage mission, which Smith calls an almost classic case of groupthink (120). He provides only rudimentary support and it is unclear what his demands are for confirmation as the symptoms are grouped together and not properly defined. Hensley and Griffins study relies on anecdotal evidence, and an article on the Gulf War exemplifies another tendency. Yetiv confirms groupthink despite ambiguity surrounding at least four symptoms (429-431). It seems reasonable to suggest that he desired to find groupthink to pursue his argument that it need not cause policy failure (437), hardly a revolutionary idea. This weak interpretation, demanding only some factors for confirmation, is often presented when results are inconsistent with the theory (Aldag and Fuller 540). It should be noted, though, that all symptoms cannot always be expected. If there is no dissent, for example, there is little need for pressure. Hence, while one cannot carelessly confirm groupthink, always demanding all symptoms makes little sense. Instead, one should discuss the consequences of missing ones in light of the case. The critique discussed here along with

the above examples of previous research question the basic validity of the theory as even confirmatory research is considered unreliable. We will build on these insights but keep focus on groupthink. It is clear that Janis writings inspire a search for any indications of his factors and quick confirmation. This puts a heavy burden on the researcher as regarding objectivity. One might contrast this with traditional political science research. Often, one uses a dichotomy like Realism/Liberalism to analyze texts or events, and is forced to choose whether one fits better than the other. The classic groupthink strategy would be to look for liberal ideas only and base confirmation on any indication of such. The point of departure here is that the weakness of the theory is grounded in theoretical formulation and traditional methodology. Consequently, we should not abandon it before attempting to remedy such deficiencies through reformulation, operational definitions, and by developing categories that make researchers search for tendencies and alternative hypotheses rather than cherry-pick confirmatory observations. This is done below.

Measuring Antecedents
Some puzzling aspects of the theory concern the antecedents lack of tradition of impartial leadership, insulation, and lack of norms for methodical procedures. Janis reasoning here is partly based on negation. Since he finds that certain practices counteract groupthink, he argues that lacking a norm of them would not act as a constraint against groupthink (Janis 234, 249). This raises questions on their status as antecedents. One wonders why Janis defined them in such an indirect way rather than, say, focusing on the leadership practices in each case. Researchers treat this differently. Some, like Yetiv, look at practices in the specific case or use a mixture of pre/during case behaviours. Others argue that Janis means historical factors, and that in groups with a tradition of partial leadership, group members are aware of the leaders propensity and await his position even if he tries to be impartial (Schafer and Crichlow 418-419). All variants raise methodological questions.

It may be correct that leaders that are traditionally partial cause group members to become passive concurrence-seekers (though not mentioned by Janis). Yet it is also possible that a traditionally impartial leader that is suddenly partial has the same effect. Janis makes it seem as if groupthink is always to be expected of certain groups, with only stress varying. But other antecedents might vary too, thus differentiating between occurrences of groupthink within one group. The Bay Pigs and Missile Crisis cases, and additional research, support this suggestion (Neck and Moorhead 539, 552). A similar problem concerns the insulation antecedent. It is

not obvious that a group that is traditionally insulated but in a specific case is not, should be deemed as insulated or expected to be connected to groupthink because of it.

We may understand the antecedents as consisting of two steps. They represent the absent of constraint against concurrence-seeking, but that does not mean that they cause groupthink. What Janis is partially saying is that traditions and norms may produce the same result in each specific case, which in turn causes groupthink. Regarding leadership, for example, he implies that practices in the case are central, since a lack of tradition of impartial leadership increases the likelihood that the leader will [] induce the members to conform (249).

Two different readings of the antecedents are hence possible. Either one looks at them before the start of deliberations. This makes causal claims possible, but the finding may not be directly relevant to the case. Alternatively, one looks at them during deliberations, which seems more relevant but makes causal claims uncertain since antecedents and symptoms are blurred. In the only case study where Janis indirectly addresses this, he mixes these strategies. He says that the group was insulated long before Watergate, but looks at procedures and leadership practices during the cover-up deliberations. He seems to infer that norms and traditions were lacking due to the absence of them during Watergate (234-235). Possibly, they were the same before and during the case, but this need not be the case. Also, Janis blurs antecedents and symptoms, which is problematic.

This is a trade-off between relevance and being able to make causal claims. It seems appropriate to look at leader impartiality both as tradition and in the specific case, since both may be sufficient to cause groupthink, but we will keep them apart. A blurring of variables is less problematic if leadership practices are measured only at the outset of discussions.

As for insulation, while tradition may have an effect, the outset of each case would seem most important. A perceived group norm may develop unless the group is subjected to critical information. A problem concerning when to stop measuring is that Janis says that insulation means no outside information until a final decision is made (249). This implies an extremely short process, unless one keeps measuring and blurs variables. Since many issues are deliberated over a long period, there is also the problem that if one only examines early insulation, one may deem a group insulated even if they consult with outsiders later on. This must be accepted though, since we cannot otherwise separate it from symptoms. As regarding 9

decision-making procedures, only traditional procedures can be an antecedent. They cannot be separated from symptoms during deliberations since they practically constitute them.

Cohesiveness
One of the enduring discussions on groupthink concerns cohesiveness, which Janis deemed central. Research on the connection between cohesiveness and groupthink has yielded weak support of a link. McCauley finds that cohesiveness does not discriminate between cases of occurrence and non-occurrence of groupthink in Janis original cases (250), but this is actually in line with Janis view that cohesiveness is a necessary but insufficient cause of groupthink. Many studies, however, even suggest that cohesiveness is unrelated to groupthink (Park 236, Turner and Pratkanis 108). This brings us to the crux of the issue, for it is not obvious whether the findings indicate that cohesiveness should be deleted from the theory, or that there are problems of measurability. Laboratory research suffers from the impossibility to create group dynamics similar to political settings, while case studies tend to view cohesiveness as a broad general concept, much like Janis. This opens for various interpretations, and either confirmation bias or random disconfirmation.

Janis discusses different group dynamics under cohesiveness. All of them need not be central. Consequently, one way to move forward is to separate various components of cohesiveness, a largely unexplored aspect. We will break down Janis conception of it into two. This seems natural, as he often defines it as amiability and esprit de corps (245). He probably favours the first dimension. There is genuine friendship (99) among Johnsons group, and Kimmels group frequently spent time together off duty (77). Hogg and Hains make a similar reading, and conclude that Janis views cohesiveness as friendship (325). This, however, does not seem quite accurate, since he never suggests that all members of all groups are personal friends. An informal atmosphere, possibly flowing from friendship, seems to be more to the point. The friendly chatter, [and] joking (215-216) among Nixons in-group seems typical of the clubby atmosphere that Janis emphasizes (247). The second dimension, esprit-de-corps, should correspond to high group morale. From a military point of view, one can conceptualize this vague concept corresponding to something like maintaining fighting spirits under pressure. While there is no immediate political equivalent, strong loyalty to the group or its leader under heavy stress or in spite of doubt of the policy is similar and should be relevant. It must be recognized, though, that loyalty to foreign policy teams is probably to be expected because of their status. Still, while support for loyalty but not for informality in future

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research would perhaps not significantly decrease the number of potential cases of groupthink, at least the importance of amiability could be questioned.

Theoretical Problems
Similarity of Symptoms
In order to avoid repetition, this section addresses a theoretical confusion that is reinforced by methodological problems.

Janis was working inductively and not always with conceptual clarity. The number of groupthink variables is quite staggering, and contributes to the difficulties of testing it. One might hence, as Hensley and Griffin, hope [to] make the theory more parsimonious by eliminating or combining various conditions or symptoms. In the end, they find each one important and distinct (528-529). t Hart, however, finds some symptoms so similar that it is unclear how to treat certain empirical findings (255). He does not specify the similarities, but his comment echoes my own thoughts when reading a Bay of Pigs section. Janis discusses pressure on dissenters and describes how Robert Kennedy tells Schlesinger not to voice his discontent but to support the president, before the decision had been made. Janis then notes that Kennedy was a mindguard (40). It can hence be difficult to distinguish mindguarding from pressure. Hensley and Griffin employ the rule that a piece of evidence can only apply to one specific condition or symptom, and demand at least two empirical observations for confirmation (501). This prevents over-verification based on single observations, but a better methodological solution than to quantify ones research is to focus on tendencies. Also, there is no reason to choose whether Kennedy was mindguarding or pressing dissenters if he did both. While operational definitions should generally counter such problems, the basic dynamics of the symptoms are different and they overlap under certain circumstances only.

More pressing similarities concern illusion of invulnerability and collective rationalization. Janis discusses how groups react to warnings or adverse information in both of these (174, 220). Ignoring warnings is, apparently, a sign of illusion of invulnerability, whereas rationalizing warnings is a different symptom. The dynamic would seem to be similar. They are also difficult to keep apart, as ignorance might have been preceded by rationalization. Indeed, Janis once uses the same empirical example to illustrate both symptoms (224-226). The overlapping becomes apparent when one creates open categories for each symptom, as discussed below. If warnings are not ignored and not rationalized but considered, the result

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applies to both symptoms. Also, it is not apparent that a group that ignores and rationalizes warnings suffers from more groupthink than one that ignores all warnings. The key is handling of challenging information.

This similarity is particularly noteworthy because investigating illusion of invulnerability empirically seems difficult due to the general focus on optimism and risk-taking (Janis 174). Clearly, one cannot infer illusion of invulnerability just because a group decides on a policy that fails and hence seems risky now. This would be tautology. The solution employed here is to combine these symptoms into one focusing on the groups view of its power. Ignoring and rationalizing warnings entails an unquestioned belief in the power of the group (unless the warnings are completely unreasonable). The groups view of group or leader power is included as well, even though this is more subjective, because it is the central dynamic of this symptom and corresponds with the view of groupthink as indicating a group mentally shut off from reality. Janis once discusses maintaining such views when troubles arise (220) for the group, and by linking such optimism specifically to warnings, we have a point of reference and can avoid merely looking for optimism, as is often the case (t Hart 249, Janis 35). Combining the symptoms in this way, we can avoid conceptual confusion from similar symptoms, lessen the need for value-based indicators, and simplify measurement.

Stress
Investigating the various sources of stress has been difficult. Yetiv simply skips the low hope part on external stress, and speculates on the issue of self-esteem (427-428). Hensley and Griffin infer low self-esteem from the questionable causes suggested by Janis, like recent failures (512). This section examines the theoretical roots of these methodological problems.

The provocative situational context is somewhat confusing. Janis groups several variables stress and its causes, leader impartiality, and faith in leader into one antecedent, high stress from external stress with low hope of finding a better solution than the leaders. A close reading reveals that he explains the low hope part in somewhat different ways. The low hope of finding a better solution is either the result when a leader has shown that he prefers a specific policy, since protesting would cause disapproval from the group (250). This would make the second part of this antecedent redundant, since it flows automatically from leader impartiality, which is central to groupthink and another antecedent. Alternatively, the low hope of finding a better solution is because group members have faith in the leaders wisdom

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and trustworthiness (254). This interferes with cohesiveness, and hardly needs to entail a low hope of finding a better solution; this makes it sound as if group members go along with a policy because they deem it the best one, which rules out the necessity of concurrenceseeking. Janis here suddenly tries to explain when concurrence-seeking stops, as during Watergate. This is an interesting but different discussion. The low hope part can be removed from the theory on groupthink causes.

The difference between internal connected to low self-esteem and external sources of stress is not apparent. They seem to overlap, since Janis talks of policy alternatives as external sources of stress, and decision-making difficulties and moral dilemmas as internal sources. This is no conceptual reason for removing low self-esteem from the model, as it might induce group members to rely on the group for social support, as Janis suggests. But the overlapping shows that Janis is primarily thinking of various types of stress, regardless of origin. This may forgive leaving out the low self-esteem factor, for which there are methodological reasons discussed below.

Pressure on Dissenters and Conformity

It has been suggested that pressure on dissenters should be deleted from the list of symptoms: Concurrence-seeking is a distinctive type of group dynamics, not to be confused with [] conformity pressure on [] wavering members (George 39-41). But that pressure on dissenters does not fit conceptually with groupthink is not obvious. This depends on the nature of pressure. Empirically, there are examples of dissent in Janis cases, and a theory on concurrence-seeking should be able to address group handling of it. It seems reasonable to suggest that, generally speaking, in groups without groupthink, expressing misgivings would be seen as a way of strengthening the quality of the decision, while in a group plagued by groupthink, doubt would be unwelcome.

The question of pressure is intimately linked to the question of conformity, or why members go along with a policy without raising their doubts. It must be decided whether the theory only deals with members keeping silent because of a non-deliberate drive not to disturb the consensus, or if it also covers self-censorship because of fear of reprisals, like threats to ones career (which could flow from overt pressure). Most researchers make no distinction, and theoretical writers actually support such blending. McCauley discusses this in terms of internalization, private acceptance of the group norm, versus compliance, public without

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private agreement. He argues that compliance is related to groupthink because it is likely to increase when a group becomes more cohesive (250-253). t Hart provides a similar discussion (chapter 3). McCauley also shows that Janis own case studies involve compliance (253-258). A problem here, however, is that McCauleys internalization is not exactly what Janis is discussing. A member may abstain from raising doubt without fully internalizing, agreeing with, the norm.

Janis is not entirely consistent on these issues. Some empirical examples resemble overt pressure (40). He also mentions that the threat of [] losing access to the seats of power [] inclines its victims to suppress [] criticisms (115). This sounds like deliberate conformity out of fear of reprisals. The position taken here, though, is that only subtle pressure and non-deliberate self-censorship relate to groupthink. There are several reasons for this. First, this is probably what Janis primarily had in mind. Pressure may have been misunderstood. He emphasizes subtle dynamics, and stresses that pressure should be rare in cohesive groups (115, 247). President Johnsons calling a dissenter Mr Stop-the-Bombing (115), a joking rather than threatening derogatory epithet, exemplifies more subtle pressure

Second, it is necessary for the coherence of the theory. Including overt pressure and fear, or a climate of toughness (t Hart 61), does not fit with Janis friendly, uncritical groups. While members feel freer to deviate from the majority, their desire for genuine concurrence [] inclines them not to (247). This is because members minimize their doubts to themselves or are swept along with the apparent consensus of the group: ones impulse to blow the whistle on this nonsense was simply undone by the circumstances of the discussion (Janis 75, 39, emphasis removed). Hence, even if Janis is not entirely consistent, the core of groupthink does not depict bullying, coercion or fear of reprisals. Pressure and self-censorship form a logical pair if viewed this way.

There is also a third, normative reason for this position: it counters the tendency of conceptual stretching. When deliberate compliance and overt pressure are included, as is often the case, the theory covers more ground yet loses its defining characteristics and, possibly, relevance. The risk is that it becomes a watered down concept in the all-encompassing vain that some writers warn of.

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That deliberate compliance may take place in groupthink-like situations is no reason for including it conceptually. Different group dynamics may operate simultaneously. And while members raising doubt outside the group may indicate deliberate conformity, as McCauley suggests (253-254), it could also indicate groupthink. Conceivably, doubtful members may slip into the habit of uncritical conformity in the presence of the others.

Stereotypes
Critics have noted that some groupthink characteristics, such as convergence towards the majority viewpoint, appear in various situations (and may be beneficial). As some put it, characteristics common to most problem-solving groups [cannot be] supportive of [] groupthink (Aldag and Fuller 540). Indeed, one would not be impressed by such findings. More specifically, a symptom that is criticized for this reason is stereotypes, which appear in many situations without relation to groupthink (George 42). Most of the symptoms, however, with mindguards perhaps being an exception, were not invented by Janis. Several of them, like ignoring warnings, could be removed from the list based on the critique that they can also be found in non-groupthink situations unless one specifies them.

There is also another pressing concern regarding stereotypes. Because stereotypes are often shared by members of a society and predate decision-making, they could be the cause, not effect, of groupthink. Janis Korea case supports such a reading:

[The] group[s views] concerning Red China[] were based on ideological presuppositions [] shared with all other leading members of the administration and with [] a large proportion of common citizens. (58)

Janis, however, emphasizes that it is the perseverance of unquestioned stereotypes that is of interest because challenging stereotypes is anathema to concurrence-seeking groups (37, 59). Merely finding indications of a stereotype is not enough. This does not solve the problem that stereotypes may be an antecedent, but repeated and unchallenged stereotyping as a symptom fits with the view of groupthink as an uncritical mode of thinking and a drive to overcome doubts about the group norm.

Methodology and Operationalization

This section builds on the previous one, proposes a groupthink methodology, and discusses operationalization of the variables. Following or conceptual discussion, groupthink research 15

should focus on tendencies rather than isolated incidents. We therefore need an open and more rigorous approach than is usually the case, to make results more robust. For example, rather than looking only at whether there is self-censorship, we look at Handling of personal doubt and disagreement. This opens for the possibility that, generally, doubts are not selfcensored. Traditionally, each antecedent and symptom has only one category, since only the variables specified by Janis are investigated. A neutral approach demands that at least two categories for each. One way would be to have groupthink factors simply complemented by a not category; Partial leadership or Not partial leadership. Having the opposites included, like impartiality, however, pushes for testing alternative hypotheses. It also has the advantage of allowing for more detailed insights since results may clearly contrast the groupthink hypothesis. It is noteworthy if groupthink symptoms are at work even if antecedents do not at all correspond to expectations. Three categories will with two exceptions, see below hence be used here. This means that there is a neutral or mixed results category available. This is not without problems since the risk is that this category will be used excessively. The idea to force the researcher to take a stand between different dynamics would become fruitless. Still, two categories is a little rough, and four or more is normally usually unnecessarily detailed. While it makes a great difference whether a symptom is typical or not, a fine-grained scale adds little. Looking for indicators of other specified group dynamics is inappropriate, as there is no opposite dynamic of groupthink corresponding to, say, Liberalism/Realism.

Leadership practices are investigated both as tradition and during early stages of the case. We look at foreign policy, as for decision-making procedures, which relates to the individuals of the chosen case. This connection seems necessary. Also, a leader may be partial only in certain areas, as was Bush Sr. (Yetiv 430). The middle category for partiality is Slight impartiality, which includes a leader hinting at or indicating preference or not encouraging open debate. It could be argued that a leader that somehow reveals his preference is always partial. But a leader that (perhaps accidentally) reveals his preference may try to counter this by encouraging open deliberations. In such cases, group members may engage in concurrence-seeking with the leaders position anyway, but it seems suitable to reserve partiality for clearer cases. Regarding insulation, Janis only mentions using government experts, but outside experts may serve the same function and are included.

One of Janis least developed antecedents is member homogeneity, which was added on the basis of a single case with only three group members. Considering his other cases with many 16

members, its importance is less clear. Still, Janis mainly discusses professional aspects as background. He mentions that Nixons in-group had a similar cynical view of politics that made them accept criminal behaviour (239). This displays that ideology can be related to the question at hand. Views on foreign policy relates to the group and case specified below. Similar background is a question of relativity, but a foreign policy team would be expected to consist of people from the political, bureaucratic, business, law, and academic sectors. One could argue that they all form overlapping American elites and that all sectors indicate some homogeneity. Still, to specify this, homogeneity here indicates a situation where all members have a professional background in only one or two common sectors, or longstanding affiliation with the same party, and similar views of foreign policy. One person deviating is enough for countering groupthink (Janis 239).

Janis proposes that moral dilemmas, excessive difficulties in decision-making, and recent failures cause low self-esteem. But by no means can we infer low self-esteem in an entire group from, say, a recent policy failure. Also, few would to admit to, or even be aware of, having it. Given the impossibility of investigating self-esteem empirically, it is left out. This is, as mentioned, primarily a practical matter; there is nothing inherently wrong about Janiss self-esteem hypothesis as inducing groupthink.

As for decision-making procedures, Janis only says that a group should examine available options. He thus assumes a stable group setting, which need not be the case. Methodical decision-making should also involve regularly seeking out key players input, so that their views are taken into account.

Moving on to groupthink effects, Janis states that a belief in inherent morality inclines members to ignore the ethical consequences of their decisions. Yet it is not evident that ignoring consequences should be used as an indicator of such a belief. A lack of moral considerations or assumptions is, instead, the neutral category here. A critical stance towards the groups morality indicates a group dynamic clearly contrasting groupthink, with outspoken or clearly assumed morality indicating inherent morality beliefs.

Rationalization and invulnerability illusion are combined. Strong views of the power of the group or the leader are quite subjective, but are acceptable indicators if in the extreme vain of the sense of Nixons group that he could overcome the Watergate scandal by infinite power 17

and wisdom (Janis 221). As for dissent, included here are facial expressions, as Janis mentions, but also openly ignoring dissent, as in showing that dissent is undesired by moving on after someone voices dissent without acknowledging it. When it comes to self-censorship, different variants are difficult to disentangle, but self-censorship apparently flowing from fear or overt pressures, or any political calculus, is unrelated to groupthink.

This methodology might actually set the bar too high. A few instances of self-censorship, for example, could have grave implications and be in the vain of what Janis was suggesting. Still, the idea is to push research in a more rigorous direction. The factors in the first (left) of the columns correspond to the groupthink hypothesis in most cases. The first two columns correspond for decision-making procedures because only methodical procedures counter groupthink according to Janis. Reaction to dissent and self-censorship are special cases. They are split into two, with the category farthest to the left not indicating groupthink, so that there is a scale. They cover types of pressure/self-censorship unrelated to groupthink. For clarity, the hypothesized groupthink categories are marked with an asterisk. The other categories have been developed as a response to the groupthink hypotheses, sometimes inspired by Janis cases of groupthink avoided. Not all of the left and right categories are strict opposites. This would sometimes make little sense. For example, while excessive belief in group or leader power is a sign of groupthink, a contrasting category of no belief in group power seems unlikely to ever be the case. A critical stance towards group power is more relevant.

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Antecedents Group homogeneity *Homogeneity: extensive (ten years) experience from the same party or from two common sectors (bureaucratic, business, etc) and similar views of the international system, the use of force, and international cooperation (like hardcore realists: system anarchic, force used when necessary and unilaterally, co-operation uninteresting) Group cohesiveness (1) *Group dominated by amiability and a friendly atmosphere, jokes, nicknames, informality Group cohesiveness (2) *Group loyalty is norm, presidents decisions followed Group dominated by a neutral/professional atmosphere Group loyalty is common but not norm Group dominated by a conflictual atmosphere, non-amiability, fighting Group disloyalty is norm, presidents decisions undermined Decision-making procedures *No or rare methodical procedures (pros and cons of alternatives considered, key officials consulted) Leadership practices *Partiality: pushes for preference or indicates preference and does not encourage open enquiry Slight partiality: hints at or indicates preference or does not encourage open enquiry Group interaction with experts * Insulation: no outside expertise consulted Seeks limited outside expertise Consults with outside expertise extensively/regularly Stress level *Members experience high stress: worry strongly about threats or decisional dilemmas Members experience some stress Members experience little or no stress Impartiality: does not indicate preference and encourages open enquiry *Infrequent methodical procedures Common use of methodical procedures Moderate heterogeneity: one or a few individuals deviate Heterogeneity: half of the group deviates and diverse views represented (like realists mixed with liberals)

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Outcomes View of group power *Illusion of invulnerability and faultlessness: ignore or collectively rationalize adverse information, excessive optimism about group/leader despite warnings Attitude towards group morality *Assumed or outspoken belief in inherent morality Discussion of adverse information, neutral view of group and leader Neither assumed nor examined morality View of enemy *Stereotyped view as evil, weak and/or stupid Balanced view Critically examines and worries about the nature, strength, and/or intelligence Individual handling of adverse information *Mindguarding: actively prevented from reaching group Neither prevented nor presented Actively presented to group Critical stance: doubt or examination of moral issues Discussion of adverse information and adjustment of assumptions, critical stance towards group/leader

Handling of personal doubt and disagreement (towards group)

Normally selfcensored for fear of consequences or because of political calculations

*Normally selfcensored to avoid disrupting group consensus

Infrequently selfcensored

Normally voiced

Reaction to dissent (objections or challenged assumptions)

Overt pressure: direct challenging, threats, derogatory epithets, dissenter openly banned from process

*Subtle pressure: unthreatening epithets, sceptic or uncomfortable facial expressions, dissent ignored, dissenter excluded from process

Neither pressure nor encouragement

Encouragement of raising alternative views

Perceived agreement

*Illusion of unanimity on central assumptions, silence taken as agreement

Some level of disagreement on assumptions known, silence not taken as agreement

Full level of disagreement known, silent members questioned

Groupthink methodology operationalized. Partly developed from Janis 60, 114-115, 150-153, 166-171, 174-175, and 211-239.

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Examining the New Approach

A Most Likely Case
The methodological literature does not advise on how to choose case to illustrate a reworking of a theory, but this will be a study of a most likely case of groupthink. Case studies are often relegated to the methodological trash heap because they cannot yield generalizable results. The original purpose of a most likely case study is to make generalization possible by trying to falsify the theory. If the theory is expected to be valid but is disconfirmed, we can expect it to be invalid also in less favourable cases (Flyvbjerg 220-230). The purpose here, however, is to use the case to discuss theoretical and methodological points, not to determine if groupthink was empirically at work or to test the theory. Since groupthink contains many variables and requires extensive amounts of information, because a single case opens for rigorous application, and because seeking disconfirmation is in the vain of previous discussions, a most likely case is suitable. It should give us something to work with in terms of groupthink dynamics, with the methodology opening for discussing nuances.

Our case is the decision-making process before the Iraq war in 2003. As highly significant American foreign policy, it corresponds to the situations from which groupthink was developed. The presidents limited foreign policy experience probably made his associates closely involved, and the post-9/11 environment suggests high stress levels. The war also turned out vastly more difficult than envisioned. The puzzling certainty about a short and simple war, the existence of weapons of mass destruction WMD and ties between Iraq and al-Qaida, make groupthink likely.

No one stable group handled the war deliberations, a reminder that group dynamics should not be overstated. Still, the following individuals were central and constitute our analytical group: President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith. The process is seen as starting with 9/11, because Iraq now re-appeared on the agenda, and ending in January 2003, because Bush then revealed his decision.

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Source Material
In line with the objective to make groupthink research more rigorous, a serious reading of the empirics will be made even if the section mainly aims at developing previous discussions. Some primary documents on the Iraq process are available through WikiLeaks and Rumsfelds memoirs, but deal with a later period or provide little material on group dynamics. The study hence relies on secondary material. This may be shaky ground, but the material used here is of high quality and more extensive than for most of the best groupthink studies, like Janis Bay of Pigs reading and t Harts analysis of the Iran-Contra scandal.

The backbone is made up by eleven books providing a mixture of memoirs, journalistic, academic, and military accounts. They are to varying degrees critical. Journalist George Packer favoured war, but he is critical of its handling. Journalist Bob Woodwards books, based on interviews, notes, memos, etc, from White House deliberations and elsewhere, provide a fantastic opportunity to be a fly on the wall. Woodward is more detached, perhaps even uncritical, at least in his early books. One controversy surrounds Tenets assertion that Iraqi WMD were a slam dunk. Woodwards account of this episode based on Bushs description is probably exaggerated (Tenet 359). Generally though, these books appear to have stood the test of time well. Some background information on Bushs team comes from Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, two academics. They also argue convincingly that, contrary to popular belief, Bush himself drove much of his administrations policies.

There is an obvious risk of bias when using memoirs, but the value of key players first-hand accounts trumps such concerns. Still, information is regularly crosschecked here and some contradictions reported. Tenets memoir provides in-depth discussions on the complex issue of intelligence. Secretary of Treasury Paul ONeills semi-memoir, by Ron Suskind, is a startling account of the administrations routines. The recently published memoirs of Bush and Rumsfeld have previously not been used in academic research. Rumsfeld has been criticized for trying to shift the blame for the Iraq debacle to others than himself (Woodward 2011). Certainly, he had had more influence and responsibility than he would like to admit. In Rumsfelds defence, his book contains references to articles, memos, etc that lend some support to his claims. Bushs volume is less detailed, but provides a basic account of the perspective of the most important individual.

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The Iraq Process and Antecedents

This part is meant to shed empirical light on previous discussions. We will examine the new approach empirically, identify potential problems and try to counter them. The discussions typically start with empirics, and proceed with theoretical and methodological remarks.

Group Homogeneity
Bush, the former businessman and governor, wanted less idealism than during Clinton. He surrounded himself with an experienced cadre of realists, ideologues and hegemonists, most of whom had worked on his election campaign, with the goal to free America from international institutions and agreements. Rumsfeld and Cheney were assertive nationalists, positive of the use of military force but scornful of nation-building. The two had a Hobbesian view of world politics and extensive governmental and business experience (Packer 42, Daalder and Lindsay 38-44). Wolfowitz was an academic with governmental experience, and Feith a lawyer who had worked for Reagan. They were both neo-conservatives democratic imperialists and wanted to see Saddam toppled. Rice had a Ph.D. in political science, like Wolfowitz, and had worked for Bush Sr. They all had a billiard-ball view of international politics, focused on nation-states (Daalder and Lindsay 45-48, Packer 25-32).

The team did not exclusively consist of right-wing hardliners, though. Notably, Powell was a former general, National Security Advisor, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was a pragmatic internationalist who thought that the military should only be used as a last resort to accomplish clear objectives, with public and international support essential (Daalder and Lindsay 55, 131, Woodward 2004:78, 39-40, Mitchell 179). Armitage, his deputy and best friend, who had served in Vietnam and worked for Republican administrations, shared his views (Woodward 2006:7, Mitchell 179). A surprising appointee was George Tenet as Director of Central Intelligence, a non-partisan intelligence professional kept from the Clinton years (Daalder and Lindsay 53-54, Woodward 2002:1-2). While it was perhaps not Tenets role to give political advice, he was part of the National Security Council (NSC) and spent considerable time with Bush. With Powell and Armitage, there was a built-in ideological counterweight to the others.

While Janis suggests that group members of different backgrounds should not engage in groupthink, it is not evident that the factor is necessary if a broad range counts as homogeneity. Researchers tend merely to look for similarities (like Hensley and Griffin 510),

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which is clearly inadequate. Similarly, while all of Bushs team had political or bureaucratic experience, this homogeneity conceals their diverse professional and social backgrounds. Bush was born into the elite; Powell had worked his way up from the rank and file; the group included one woman and two Afro-Americans, etc. These could be reasons for a different operationalization. Still, it would seem that we have captured a similarity in background that outweighs the differences, at least as related to foreign policy. They had all, except for Tenet, been moulded in the same Republican elite circle.

Our operationalization of ideology would indicate moderate heterogeneity. This may, conversely, be perceived as overlooking a similar basic foreign policy outlook. No member would be expected to think war with Iraq unthinkable, but it should have stirred debate. It seems suitable to be specific. Janis possibly overestimated the homogeneity factor because it was present in the Watergate group of only three people. Conceivably, less homogenous groups can engage in groupthink, especially with few deviating members. They may follow those perceived as more powerful or in line with the leader. And, while Janis sometimes discusses this is in more general terms, the homogeneity of Nixons group relates to their acceptance of politically motivated criminal behaviour. Homogeneity may thus be understood more narrowly than usual. Our operationalization highlights important differences that should have prevented groupthink, and it is only through being specific that the relevance of ideology can be thoroughly assessed. Similarly, it is crucial not to abstain from including non-partisans like Tenet, and other relevant individuals, in the observed groups. To address the necessity and proper specification of homogeneity, we need to see if groups with deviating members can engage in groupthink.

Cohesiveness
Our first aspect of cohesiveness focuses on group atmosphere. Some members had strong personal ties. Rice had educated Bush on foreign policy, was always by his side, and often the last person he spoke to on important issues (Rumsfeld 329, Bush 82-83). Powell and Armitage were best friends, and Rumsfeld and Cheney were close professionally and personally (Rumsfeld 320, Suskind 2). The group used nick-names, like Condi for Rice (Suskind 72), and Don for Rumsfeld (Woodward 2004:63). Yet some relationships were strained. Appointments were deliberately made to limit Powells influence, and Wolfowitz called Powell the reason for accepting his post (Daalder and Lindsay 46-56). There was a distance between the Secretary of State and the President (Woodward 2002:13-14), and

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Powell and Cheney had serious differences (Woodward 2004:415). Rumsfeld had troubles with Rice and sometimes refused to return her calls (Woodward 2006:109). Policy-wise, Armitage and Powell repeatedly battled the neo-cons, Rumsfeld, and Cheney (Woodward 2004:15, Woodward 2006:241). Rumsfeld, however, notes that the popular conflictual conception of the group is exaggerated (329-330). The general impression one gets is neither one of conflict nor amiability. For example, informal chatting turned into stiff formality when Bush arrived (Suskind 159-160).

Our focus on group atmosphere is meant to be relevant in that we actually focus on the decision-making context, but personal relationships outside the group setting can of course also be important. Sometimes, informal settings may outweigh formal ones. In particular, Rices relationship with Bush stands out. Yet, related to groupthink, deliberations seem central. Close ties between some should not hinder others from being critical.

As for loyalty, Bush wanted quick solutions, never looked back, and ridiculed doubt (Woodward 2002:256). Because of his limited knowledge of international politics and preference for not delving deep into issues, he surrounded himself with a few key people and insisted upon loyalty (Mitchell 175). Powell frequently solved crises but was not allowed to take public credit. He and Armitage joked that he was put in the icebox, isolated and used only when needed (Woodward 2002:256, 13). But Powell obliged. Rice probably followed any indication of Bushs preference and was relentless in defending him (Packer 112). Armitage supports this: Condi, in my view, anytime someone wasnt ready to do immediately exactly what the president wants, it was almost disloyal (Woodward 2006:100). Similarly, Cheney, while often thought to be controlling Bush, was unshakably loyal (Suskind 48, Bush 87).

Splitting cohesiveness into two aspects reveals that they need not go hand in hand. Amiability was possibly not present in the Iraq case and may explain why general support for cohesiveness is weak. Defining cohesiveness as loyalty is perhaps most important for the attempt as such at re-defining an elusive factor, since we would often expect loyalty in such groups, but loyalty may be rewarding for further treatment. As further emphasized below, this case exemplifies how loyalty can be fostered to the leader rather than to creating good policy. The effect of this on a groups inclination to engage in uncritical conformity may be significant, especially when coupled with leadership styles like those of Bush. Specification 25

of cohesiveness, like here, should be able to produce clearer results. Even if either aspect of loyalty and amiability is enough to conduce groupthink, the only way to find out is through splitting. A radically different strategy would be to assume cohesiveness rather than experimenting with operationalizations, as foreign policy teams are by their nature attractive. This would bypass the problem of why support for cohesiveness has been lacking. It is a somewhat unsatisfactory solution, though. Since the cohesiveness favoured by Janis aspect might be mistaken, further research is warranted.

Decision-Making Procedures
The impression one gets of decision-making procedures is not flattering. During the first NSC meeting, Bush startled Powell by announcing that they would abandon the Israeli-Palestinian peace process (Suskind 70-72). When Powell stated that the administration would continue where Clinton left off on North Korea, the White House announced a sudden decision to break with those initiatives. Powell was out of the loop (Suskind 114-115). When the leading environmental official met with Bush on global warming, he surprised her and Powell by having already decided to abandon Kyoto and reverse the campaign promise to regulate carbon dioxide (Suskind 121, Mitchell 187). ONeill found the decision-making process broken (Suskind 97), and Powell was often excluded from it (Woodward 2002:13-14). It was Rices role to be the honest broker, but she over-emphasized harmony and papered over differences rather than presenting alternatives to the president (Rumsfeld 324-329). Cheney pulled the strings out of view, forming policy himself and often keeping his opinions secret to everyone but Bush (Suskind 120, Bush 87, Packer 43-44). Hence, the process was opaque and non-systematic.

Some issues contrast this view. Iraq was debated openly as the administration took office, and Bush went with Powells smart sanctions (Mitchell 190-191). There had also been debates on North Korea (Suskind 114-115). Sources might focus on the bad examples, and there may have been neither a norm nor an absence of methodical decision-making. The process was flawed, though, with members used to conform to already-made decisions. This makes it possible as an antecedent, though the problem remains that there is a weak link between this antecedent and the outcomes as they are so separated in time. Also, conforming to decisions is not quite the same as conforming to a perceived group norm, as in groupthink, but it is possible that the former can contribute to the latter by creating a sense that a decision has, as often in this case, already been made.

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This case supports the inclusion of looking at whether groups regularly incorporate the views from relevant actors. Powell was not always part of the process, which in all likelihood affected the decisions since he could not argue for his views. His predicament also highlights that exclusion, part of the operationalization of pressure, does not always entail groupthink even in less overt forms. While a perfect line is impossible to draw, a slight reformulation is appropriate. At one point, Janis mentions that exclusion may happen after domestication attempts (257). This, together with repeated or permanent exclusion, seems a suitable specification of exclusion as pressure. This should further counter the custom of letting any exclusion variants indicate groupthink (like t Hart 256). It gives the group a chance to preserve its unity, and random exclusions owing to, say, time restraints are excluded.

Leadership Practices
Before September 11, the administration was focused on domestic issues such as the gigantic tax cut (Woodward 2004:79). As the process was weak, Bush could not always facilitate discussion. But he encouraged open deliberations on Iraq without revealing his own preference, and little indicates partiality on issues such as terrorism (Mitchell 188-189) or North Korea (Suskind 114-115). Information is scarce from this period, but Rumsfeld similarly notes that Bush normally kept his opinions to himself (319).

9/11 brought a significant change. Bush immediately declared war, deciding on an unprecedented military response to terrorism without consulting Cheney, Powell, or Rumsfeld (Woodward 2002:15-31). Bush now emphasizes that simultaneous military and diplomatic tracks were used to confront Iraq (229-230), but little indicates that this was the initial plan or that he encouraged an open enquiry. Shortly after 9/11, he asked his terrorist experts to look for any indications that Saddam was involved (Clarke 32), and told his war council that he believed he was (Packer 41). In November, he asked Rumsfeld to update the Iraq war contingency plan, which was soon brought to the NSC (Woodward 2004:1, 52-53). Rumsfeld did not get the impression that the President had made up his mind (425) yet, but there appears to have been a tendency. In January 2002, he called Iraq, Iran, and North Korea and their terrorist allies an axis of evil. Bush liked the line, and Korea and Iran were mentioned partly to conceal the Iraq focus. (Woodward 2004 87-92). Shortly after, he stopped by when Rice was discussing Iraq with three senators and said: F___ Saddam. were [sic]

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taking him out (Time). He focused on Saddam early and seems to have kept discussions on military engagement.

Separating leadership tradition from the specific case underlines our theoretical point that they may contrast; a tradition of impartial leadership can be followed by partiality, and the tradition seems less important. Janis discusses both aspects, and some researchers argue that a tradition of partiality is central. As a direct cause of groupthink, each case would seem to be central, and Bushs partiality seems clear. If future research shows that case-bound impartiality can co-vary with groupthink, tradition might be left in the model. Otherwise, the theory, traditionally difficult to test, would benefit from a narrower focus. Splitting leadership practices can shed light on whether tradition should be removed.

Bush may have been unaware himself of the extent to which he was partial, as he never stated explicitly that he preferred war. However, it is also important to recognize that one can easily produce an impression of partiality that was less apparent to the involved actors. Even if he may be white-washing, Rumsfelds stating that he was unsure of Bushs preference is a reminder that the accumulated picture of a list of examples from varying situations over a period of time need not correspond to the groups perception. This is why it is important to look for disconfirmatory evidence as well, like here, where little indicates that Bush acted impartially. This should make results more robust.

Group Interaction with Experts

Bush always kept his information circle narrow and used a small set of senior advisers (Clarke 243). This became even more pronounced after 9/11. ONeill found Bush caught in an echo chamber of his own making (Suskind 293). Bush called himself a guy in a bubble at Camp David after 9/11, conceding that he had no outside advice on the war on terror (Washington Post). Those meetings now seem crucial. While some objected to Rumsfelds and Wolfowitzs suggestion to attack Iraq, nobody challenged the idea of incorporating Iraq into the war on terror (Woodward 2002:83-91, Suskind 187-188). Few were involved when war planning started, and the emphasis on secrecy and military plans left little room for debate (Woodward 2004:3, 65). As Bush probably decided early to confront Saddam, the insulation during this time is significant. Theoretically, one might question the importance of this antecedent given that foreign policy is often handled by small groups, but it might be a necessary but insufficient cause of groupthink. While the problem that insulation need not be

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a factor later on remains, this case exemplifies that initial insulation can be critical. Iraq had likely been set as the next target when the full government apparatus become involved.

That a group can be insulated throughout a process highlights its potential as a symptom. While there may be many reasons for isolation, like habit or need for secrecy, it might flow from a groupthink-like drive to protect the group from challenging perspectives. Janis shows that prolonged insulation can be the case, but only regards it an antecedent and misses contemplating its possible role as a symptom. As there is virtually no way to tell the difference between various types of insulation, however, and since cause and effect should ideally be kept strictly apart, it is perhaps best left as an antecedent. But insulation can certainly reflect different dynamics, which shows that the causal view of groupthink may be slightly flawed even if empirics seem to support Janis model.

Stress Level
Janis suggests that stress is the underlying basis for groupthink. The Bush administration clearly faced external threats, which made the risk of inaction apparent. Bush felt, had an intuition, that 9/11 was not an isolated incident (Woodward 2004:85). Cheney became the self-appointed special examiner of worst-case scenarios, fixated with the risk of terrorists acquiring WMD. With a fever about Iraq and al-Qaida (Woodward 2004:237, 4), he was sometimes nervous to be around the president, moving to an undisclosed location to guarantee continuity of government if Bush were killed (Woodward 2002:270). Tenet became obsessed with fighting terrorism: Al-Qaida occupied my nightmares []. I was wracking my brain for [how] to [] prevent an attack (301).

The perception of danger might sound exaggerated, but there were, for example, repeated warnings of a second attack (Woodward 2002:270). Still, while Rumsfeld notes in his photo section that we were never really off the clock, it is not apparent that everyone felt severe stress or had sleepless nights. The question is whether this is because information is lacking or because they did not. Stress is difficult to investigate since it is difficult to find signs of nonstress. Better operational definitions are needed. One may question the need for this antecedent because we would normally expect stress for foreign policy teams. This is not evident, though. The period before 9/11 was something of a honeymoon for the administration. The methodological risk, of course, is that one can find signs of stress even during such periods.

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This period points to the danger of letting recent failures indicate low self-esteem, as Janis suggests. It would be tempting to argue that 9/11, a failure of great magnitude considering that the administration had been warned of al-Qaida, caused low self-esteem and groupthink. This is possible. Yet, after the success in Afghanistan, the confidence of the group was likely boosted. Other indicators of self-esteem are clearly needed. And while Janis explanation of groupthink is plausible, it seems conceivable that concurrence-seeking might flow from a non-deliberate drive to follow the direction set by a powerful leader without self-esteem playing a part. How to determine this, though, remains unclear. Self-esteem is perhaps best left to psychologists.

The Iraq Process and Outcomes

View of Group Power
There are few outspoken examples of how the group perceived itself, and one should be conservative when examining such. Otherwise, one risks interpreting, say, mere respect as groupthink. Notably, when Powell revealed that he had discussed issues about the war plan with General Franks, Bush was confident that Powells concerns had been heeded (Bush 251). He did not pursue the issue further. This is remarkable considering the numerous warnings. Rumsfeld pushed his military commanders to cut force levels dramatically. Numbers were whittled down from an original 450,000 to 160,000 (Gordon and Trainor 52-53, Woodward 2006:472). The war was expected to be a quick affair, and 90 days after the fall of Baghdad, only 50,000 troops would remain (Washington Post). But of the five thousand Iraqi exiles that were planned to join the fighting, only seventy (!) completed the training (Woodward 2004:322). General Shinseki suggested that several hundred thousand troops were needed to stabilize Iraq, but was dismissed as wildly off the mark (Packer 114). Rumsfeld states that Shinseki never objected in private (452), but this is not accurate (Woodward 2004:207). They refused to listen, and warnings appear to have had little effect.

They rationalized adverse WMD information. When Franks revealed that the military could not tell the location of a single weapon after years of searching, this was merely deemed a call for better targeting information (Woodward 2004:173). When the CIA made an unconvincing case on WMD, the group blamed the presentation, focusing on sharpening the arguments (Tenet 362). It was suggested that Hans Blix of the UN was downplaying weapons findings or even lying to prevent war (Woodward 2004:293-294), and they reasoned that Saddam must

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have weapons since there was no other rationale for risking war (Bush 252-253). They saw the failure to find them as proof that they were being hidden: This business about, you know, more time [] how much time do we need to see clearly that hes not disarming? (ABC). All these examples are meant to illustrate the high demands necessary for confirming this symptom. One cannot merely look for any kind of protests, like from political enemies or pacifist groups, which perhaps never reach the group. As demonstrated, one should look for repeated warnings from credible sources that reach the group and challenge their assumptions. If this sparks no reconsideration, a groupthink interpretation seems valid.

Combining the symptoms of illusion of invulnerability and collective rationalization appears rewarding. A downside is that the latter could be seen as originally referring strictly to group deliberations, while with them combined, this need not be so. This is in some ways a shame, because pushing symptoms such as stereotyping towards deliberations increases their strength as groupthink factors. Yet this downside should be accepted, especially considering that one normally does not have access to transcripts and cannot tell whether a warning was only ignored. While the demands for affirming groupthink should be high, combining these symptoms actually means lowering the bar somewhat because we do not demand ignoring and rationalization warnings as different symptoms. But the bar was previously set too high because of theoretical confusion.

Attitude towards Group Morality

The question of morality highlights some methodological issues. The group tried to limit immediate civilian casualties and suffering during the military invasion (Gordon and Trainor 89, Woodward 2004:276). In that sense, they did not completely ignore the moral consequences of their decisions, as Janis formulates the belief in inherent morality symptom, and such indirect concerns are not perfectly covered by our analytic table. But while we should not wave away such concerns, they do not entail a meaningful examination of moral issues. It seems, rather, that the orders to minimize casualties during the invasion strengthened a preconceived sense of inherent morality. For example, when Vladimir Putin expressed his compassion to Bush because the war would take its toll on him, Bush was surprised since they had a war plan that would spare civilian lives (Woodward 2004:404-405).

The war was more than a necessity for Bush, who believed that fighting terrorism was why he had become president. Some sensed that he believed that he was on a divine mission (Daalder

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and Lindsay 85-87). Indeed, he said that [f]reedom is Gods gift to everybody in the world [.W]e have a duty to free people (Woodward 2004:88-89). War protests perplexed him (Bush 248). He saw war as a duty of the morally righteous US, and the group assumed that the Iraqis would embrace the Americans as liberators and move towards their universal values of freedom and democracy (USA Today, Woodward 2004:152). Little indicates a critical stance towards their morality. Possibly, a sometimes outspoken belief in inherent morality worked to bolster belief in the war.

Note that we cannot merely look for indications that a group deems its policies morally justified, and then infer inherent morality beliefs. Even policies deemed morally right can be preceded by moral discussions and doubt. The methodology should shift focus from mere belief in the morality of a policy (like Yetiv 429), which is unrelated to groupthink, towards a belief in inherent morality of the group. Here, morality is self-evident, or members unwittingly avoid moral aspects from fear of disrupting the group harmony. One should be careful, though, about attributing inherent morality beliefs to groups where explicit moral discussions are rare in the group setting, as in this case. Time pressure might induce this. Public or later statements emphasizing moral righteousness might be meant to generate political support or to white-wash. Note also that this symptom assumes that the group is planning an immoral or at least morally doubtful policy. This works well with war, but there are cases where morality is of little relevance and hence cannot indicate groupthink.

View of Enemy
The idea of invading Iraq was based on stereotypes of Saddam as evil and a madman (Woodward 2004:27). Two evils, al-Qaida and Saddam, were seen as logical partners, despite the violent Islamism of the former and the Baahthist tyranny of the latter (Powell). The fear was that Saddam would provide terrorists with WMD to strike against the US (Gordon and Trainor 85), despite their weak ideological and real connection, and the obvious risk of US retaliation. The irrationality of and threat posed by Saddam were questioned before the war by prominent realists. They argued that Saddams attack on Iran was classic balance-of-power politics, and that the US had indicated that they would not respond to an attack on Kuwait. Also, he had only used WMD on weak enemies (Mearsheimer and Walt). Bushs team ignored such nuances.

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The picture is less clear regarding enemy strength. They believed in Iraqi WMD, and American troops were to use chemical protective gear (Gordon and Trainor 135). It seems, though, that the enemy was primarily viewed as weak. The ancient tactic for inferior warring sides, guerrilla warfare the enemys plan all along was for some reason never considered (Packer 298-299). Powell sensed that Rumsfeld and the Pentagon believed that Iraq was a crystal goblet[:] tap it and it would crack (Woodward 2004:414). Military insiders worried that the balloon everybody in Washington was talking about [might] be a bowling ball (Gordon and Trainor 84).

A few remarks are called for. First, as indicated, all listed stereotype aspects need not be manifest for confirming this symptom. Some may be irrelevant. Second, the listed aspects need not be the only relevant stereotypes. The assumed irrationality of Saddam underlines that the list should be seen as suggestive rather than conclusive. Assumed irrationality would seem perfectly in line with this symptom. Third, the irrationality example highlights that what is easily interpreted as stereotyping may in extreme cases be justified. Given the alleged assassination plans of Bush Sr., for example, some of the strong views of Saddam may be deemed balanced. There is no perfect dividing line. This also points to the difficulty when groups display stereotyped aspects mixed with balances ones. If an unchallenging stance dominates, interpretation should tilt towards stereotyping. If there are, however, some stereotyped aspects but a critical examination of others, confirmation bias is best prevented by assigning theoretical significance to the latter.

Powell challenged stereotypes by arguing that the UN could deal with Saddam, but problems were emphasized and the failure to find weapons rationalized away. This could be seen as supporting the view that stereotyping belongs to groupthink as a way of alleviating doubt. Yet it remains difficult to say this with certainty. Prior views of Saddam might have caused the rationalization. Stereotypes might cause, result from, or be unrelated to groupthink. But unchallenged stereotyping seems relevant since this is uncritically accepting assumptions. Beliefs should not preclude the possibility of examining them when discussing consequential policy plans. It is more difficult to analytically handle less pronounced stereotypes. Members may accept policy plans without noting their underlying assumptions. The most reliable result is thus clearly when deliberations contain outspoken stereotyping, as this opens for the possibility of challenging them. It seems unreasonable to demand this though, since it is in the

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nature of stereotypes that they may be unspoken assumptions. Yet they should be prominent. Such variations directly affect the strength of groupthink interpretations.

Individual Handling of Adverse Information

Bush reports that he consulted a variety of sources on Iraq, including Nobel Peace Prize laureate Elie Wiesel (247). One wonders if anybody filtered those sources. As a White House visitor later put it, Bush knew only what Cheney let into his office (Packer 146). It is notable, for example, that Wiesel favoured war, hardly a typical Peace Prize laureate view. Bush also met with Iraqi exiles who had long argued for overthrowing Saddam (Packer 6673). They told him that American troops would be greeted with flowers and sweets (Woodward 2004:259). Sceptics of whom there was no shortage were absent. But while mindguarding is possible, such indirect inference is best avoided to keep the confirmation bar high. Mindguards should serve a negative function. Presenting information in support of ones position should be common; preventing information that does not is quite different.

Rice exemplifies that some changes are suitable here. We should include how members treat critics, which Rice, rather than being the honest broker, opposed. When Richard Haass from the State Department revealed misgivings about war, Rice told him that the decision had already been made: [D]ont waste your breath (Pfiffner 2005). Brent Scowcroft, Bush Sr.s National Security Adviser and friend, wrote an article listing various reasons against war. Rice called him up and had sharp words, making him retreat from public discussion (Woodward 2004:159-160). Rice did not directly prevent adverse information from reaching the group, but functioned in the spirit of a mindguard. She was not passive, but signalled that criticism was unwelcome and thus prevented further opposition. Hence, it is suitable to include handling of critics here. Direct discouragement not merely answering criticism indicates groupthink. For logical coherence, and highlighted by Powells thanking Scowcroft for the article (Woodward 2004:159), encouragement is the contrasting hypothesis, with passivity the alternative. (This is similar to reaction to dissent, albeit not from group members. Consequently, there is no reason to expect subtle domestication attempts to preserve group unity.) While one should not overstretch the theory, not including this aspect would seem incoherent. Figuratively, Rice was guarding the house from unwelcomed visitors, critics, and thus thwarted challenging views much like traditional mindguards.

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The intelligence-handling was noteworthy. Cheney and Wolfowitz let exiles that favoured war and had a stake in post-Saddam Iraq provide information. Unsurprisingly, much of it proved inaccurate (Daalder and Lindsay 155-156, Woodward 2006:152-153, 176, Woodward 2004:289). Feiths team analyzed raw intelligence on their own, reporting cherry-picked evidence to the White House (Tenet 347-357, Pfiffner 2007). This forced adverse intelligence aside. They relentlessly asked the intelligence community to check, recheck, and re-recheck (Tenet 342) for supportive evidence. In time, the effect was probably significant (Pillar). Methodologically, however, it is impossible to distinguish mindguarding from behaviour by people like Wolfowitz, who may have been deliberately pushing for their pet project, war. This is highly problematic for the theory, as mindguarding and self-censorship have been called its most typical characteristics (Aldag and Fuller 540). In this case, mindguarding was possibly a general tendency, and a prior pro-war stance does not rule out the possibility of concurrence-seeking. It may strengthen such dynamics. Still, we cannot know. In groups without such predispositions, a groupthink interpretation would be more convincing but still uncertain. To assess the value of groupthink in specific cases, one can compare the explanatory power of rivalling theoretical perspectives. But the general problem remains.

Handling of Personal Doubt and Disagreement

While Powell remained loyal to the war decision, he was always doubtful (Woodward 2002:331-332, Woodward 2004:25, 148). In August 2002, he requested a private meeting with Bush. He presented risks about invading and suggested going to the UN (Woodward 2004:148-151). The meeting displays that Powell voiced some concerns, but highlights that he stayed silent on significant issues while in the group setting. He had problems with the war plans, but rather than airing them openly, he circumvented regular channels and discussed, among other things, troop levels with Franks (Woodward 2004:80). He planned to raise the issue in the NSC, but never did so (Rumsfeld 437-438). Also unconvinced of the WMD allegations, he discussed the possibility of not finding any weapons with a State Department colleague but not with the group (Gordon and Trainor 132).

Tenet watched the administration make WMD claims unsupported by intelligence. Sometimes he slammed the brakes, and sometimes not (Woodward 2006:135, Tenet 317). He believed that Saddam had WMD but never voiced his occasional doubts, instead being assuring (Tenet 330, 362). He had serious problems about war and ample opportunity to speak up. But Tenet never said it, apparently unsure why himself (Woodward 2006:90). Armitage was appalled

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at [the] hyperbole on al-Qaida ties and sceptical of WMD intelligence (Woodward 2004:286-295), but appears not to have revealed this.

There may have been a tendency, but distinguishing between compliance and non-deliberate conformity is exceptionally difficult. This requires data on individual motivation, which is hard to obtain and problematic to assess. Still, problems of empirical measurability do not justify conceptual stretching. At least this brief study indicates that the type of self-censorship Janis was referring to might exist, since we found no overt pressure. This would support the view advocated above that the theory would lose from conceptual stretching. A groupthink interpretation seems plausible, as Powell traditionally stepped up against the others, but it is not evident. He might, for example, have deemed it hopeless to challenge the assumptions guiding the war plan that all the others shared. The crucial, and difficult, question hence becomes not only whether self-censorship is a tendency, but what triggers it.

Reaction to Dissent
There was not much dissent to talk of. The clearest example is Powells meeting with Bush, which Rice attended, where he analyzed possible consequences of war, including regional instability (Woodward 2002:331-334). The conversation turned tense several times, but Bush let Powell proceed. Rice later told Powell that the presentation was great, and Chief of Staff Andy Card requested to receive it. Powell however, wondered whether Bush had fully grasped his message. Rice thought that Powell simply made the case for building a coalition, which was only partly his point (Woodward 2004:149-152). Conceivably, Powell kept within acceptable boundaries, and Bush and Rice may have missed his full message, but he was not subjected to pressure. On the contrary, as our search for alternative reactions highlight, he was encouraged (not immediately by Bush, but he did go to the UN).

A less clear-cut example of dissent is when Rumsfeld brought a memo listing potential problems for discussion. It mentioned, among other things, that troops might be bogged down for years, hence challenging their assumptions. The discussion was brief, but there are no indications of pressure. Possibly, this was because Rumsfeld was no genuine sceptic. Moreover, the list was referred to as the Parade of Horribles, as if not taken seriously. It noted that no regime change also entailed a number of problems (Rumsfeld 480-481), as if to neutralize the warnings. But still, dissent sparked little interest. So did Tenets telling Bush that the CIA could not support a speech Cheney planned to give on Iraq-al-Qaida connections.

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He was simply told not give it (Woodward 2006:135). As for exclusion, Bush had many oneon-one meetings with Rumsfeld (Woodward 2004:149). This might indicate exclusion of dissenters, but it is best to avoid such indirect reasoning and focus on dissenters. Not only dissenters were shut out.

There may have been no pressure, neither overt nor subtle, but this may have been because the level of dissent was tolerable. In such cases we cannot expect it, but one should be careful about such a conclusion if there is some dissent. The general atmosphere may have discouraged voicing dissent, which highlights the need for exploring how more subtle pressure is exerted and how to measure it. Otherwise, pressure may be missed. Based on the case at hand, it may be noted, for example, that by mostly scheduling meetings on military planning, signals were sent from people like Bush and Rice that war was coming. The logical leap from 9/11 to Iraq had already been made; critical discussions were discouraged. Things in this vain, if connected more directly to dissent, might be fruitful to examine.

Perceived Agreement
Illusion of unanimity is a symptom that invites confirmation, as one can easily find signs that group members mistakenly think they agree on some issue. As operationalized here, the focus on central assumptions is meant to push this in the direction of fundamental issues, but there is obviously an interpretive gap, as this case highlights. Self-censorship, a weak policy process, and the assumption that silence meant consent contributed to some level of mistaken consensus. Despite doubt, Powell remained silent. Neither Rumsfeld nor Rice ever heard him question troop levels (Rumsfeld 438), and Bush possibly failed to grasp the level of his concerns, taking his presentation merely as arguing for UN involvement, and his discussions with Franks to imply that his concerns had been heeded. The group likely remained in the dark about Tenets and Armitages misgivings as well.

Rumsfeld, exemplifying that silence was taken as agreement, thought incorrectly that there was a broad consensus on the war plan (438, 452). Powell had to request a meeting with Bush to introduce discussions beyond war plans, which highlights the flawed process. That it was private also meant that his concerns did not reach the group. Bush would not push, and never asked Powell, Cheney or Rumsfeld for direct advice on war: I could tell what they thought (Woodward 2004:251-252). This does not imply an imagined agreement, but it prevented an examination of differences. Tenet notes the lack of a serious debate [] about the

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imminence of the Iraqi threat[and a] significant discussion regarding enhanced containment [] versus [] regime change (305). Fundamental discussions on war plans, al-Qaida ties, WMD, and on the need for and ease of war, largely seem non-existent. Possibly assuming a consensus on these points, they moved on to military planning.

While we should avoid looking for any indication of illusory agreement, confirming this symptom cannot require an imaginary consensus in every respect. The new methodology is meant to open for disconfirmation, not to desperately seek it. This, though, entails the bias risk of leaving out known disagreement. Exemplifying this, Bushs group was hardly completely unaware of Powells concerns. People may have ignored him, and now exaggerate a perceived agreement to shift the burden onto others. This is for others to decide, but generally speaking, confirming this symptom does not seem quite right if we know that members are aware of others disagreeing. This should break the spell. But group dynamics may be such that the context of deliberations overshadows doubt that was raised earlier, instilling a sense of consensus that may even be correct (members may change their minds). Thus, any form of doubt raised at any point cannot equal disconfirmation. One should look for the general tendency, with particular focus on deliberations. If members genuinely agree, however, this symptom should not be confirmed. Such a category should be added.

Conclusion
This essay has identified a number of theoretical and methodological problems related to groupthink, tried to remedy them, and examined and improved the new approach through an empirical study. Groupthink research often lacks in rigour because researchers tend to focus on groupthink factors and anecdotal evidence, using unclear definitions. In reaction to this, a table was created with operational definitions to create a search for tendencies and alternative hypotheses. Hopefully, this can make results more reliable and open for studies able to counter the strong criticism against the theory. A number of additional problems, such as the relation between pressure and self-censorship, and how to reach firmer conclusions on the importance of cohesiveness and the role of the leader, have also been explored.

On the basis of the empirical investigation and encountered problems, the approach has been slightly reformulated. For example, handling of adverse information has been broadened somewhat to include handling of critics, while exclusion as pressure has been more narrowly

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defined as repeated/permanent and after domestication attempts. Another suitable improvement regards view of group power. Warnings need not only concern the groups policies as such, but can also, by extension, concern the individuals responsible for it. Bushs strong faith in Rumsfeld despite all the protests would indicate an excessive belief in him. One should thus also include reactions to warnings directly concerning individuals regarding, say, their competence.

Moving on to general concerns, a noteworthy aspect is the matter of defining the group one investigates, which most researchers completely fail to address. Its importance was implicitly demonstrated by Janis. He questioned research that had not found groupthink during Watergate by focusing on Nixons in-group (211). In the Iraq case, it seems necessary to include people like Wolfowitz and Armitage, but they may not have met regularly with the president. They were certainly involved, but how involved is impossible to say. Thus, there are some analytical questions regarding, for example, whether Armitage self-censored. While excluding them would unlikely change the results in that case significantly, this definitional issue emerges as absolutely crucial, directly affecting all groupthink research results.

Another general concern is that only some group members may display symptoms. This is expected for, say, self-censorship. But it becomes problematic when only some, for example, have stereotyped enemy views. There is no perfect line that delineates groupthink in such cases. One can merely advise cautiousness and a look for tendencies, assumptions guiding the deliberations, attempts at challenging stereotypes, and so forth. New research agendas emerge. One way forward is to analyze groupthink in new contexts. This might answer Janiss question whether it is an American phenomenon (186), and if so, why. If investigating groups with members from different parties, the homogeneity factor can be better understood. Examining the immediate response to 9/11 is another possibility. A cursory reading indicates that Bush was partial regarding Afghanistan, but groupthink not evident despite the extremely stressful situation. One could use the Iraq case for comparison. As the antecedents should have been similar, one may discover new antecedents if only one is a case of groupthink. If all antecedents are found but neither case confirms the groupthink hypothesis, there would be another puzzle worth addressing. One may also try to correct the traditional tendency of carelessly confirming groupthink by re-visiting confirmed groupthink cases, including Janis, with the methodology advanced here.

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Some serious problems remain. The most central challenge is how to separate groupthink from unrelated dynamics. This especially concerns mindguarding and self-censorship, earlier viewed as symptoms that best discriminate groupthink from other dynamics. That view must be problematized. Adding a politically motivated mindguarding category is suitable, but will help little. Restricting groupthink analyses to in-depth case studies is no solution. Mindguarding and self-censorship depend on individual motivation for theoretical relevance. Such information is hardly ever available. A person may even be unsure himself. This points to the shaky foundations of the theory: all groupthink studies are surrounded by uncertainty. While the theory makes conceptual sense with modifications, and while traditional methodology can be improved, we can only go so far. Janis later suggested that one demand practically all of the symptoms for confirmation (quoted in Fuller and Aldag 167). This is no conceptual solution either. As originally conceived, groupthink is not merely a description of certain characteristics, but reflects the underlying concurrence-seeking dynamic. Hence, it cannot be acceptable to have a symptom indicate groupthink just because a certain number of other symptoms are manifest.

This leads to a somewhat contradictory conclusion. On the one hand, many theoretical and methodological problems associated with groupthink can, to varying degrees, be remedied. Hopefully, this study can contribute to the development of groupthink methodology and inspire further conceptual improvement. On the other hand, some groupthink dynamics are impossible to distinguish from unrelated dynamics. Hence, no research design will be able to categorically verify or falsify the theory. This is no reason to dismiss it as an academic goatsucker and abandon it, for it has a distinct contribution to make. But groupthink research will remain tentative.

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