Ben-Haim vs. Neeaman Exhibit-A-S

Shoshana Harper October 7, 2005
EXHIBIT
''A''
Anybody but Dad
Date: Friday, October 07 @ 14:01:10 EDT
Topic: Help!
Please contact your representatives to help a 12 year old Israeli boy and his dad
To: The Honorable Julia Carson
From: Shoshana Harper
Date: October 7, 2005
I am writing to ask that you intervene as soon as possible in this matter concerning a United
States citizen living in Israel. Evan Watkins is an adult voting resident of New York State and
resides with his 12 year old son, Aviram Watkins, in Givat Shmuel, Israel. Aviram Watkins
has been subjected to both physical and emotional abuse from his mother, Leah Dahan
Watkins, including death threats, physical assaults and unspecied threats if her actions are
reported. In Israel, unlike the U.S., no relief has been afforded the minor child despite
repeated reports by both the child and the father to the courts, police, social welfare and child
protection agencies concerning the abuse.
The purpose of this urgent letter is to prevent the child, Aviram Watkins, from being placed
in a closed institution rather than being allowed to stay with his father as per his stated
preference and that of independent social workers and psychologists who have interviewed
Aviram Watkins. Aviram is a bright child with no emotional disabilities.
The immediate need is for protection of Aviram Watkins basic civil rights including the
right to stay with the non-abusive parent, in this case the father. We request gender neutral
application of Israeli law regarding physical and emotional abuse and assault. I further
request the State Department/U.S. Embassy accept ofcial, albeit not original, documents
required for Aviram Watkins citizenship application birth certicate and parents
marriage certicate.
Below is the summary of the most immediate incident. Also attached are a report by one
social worker who accompanied Aviram to the police and a formal evaluation by two other
social workers.
Two weeks ago Leah Dahan Watkins, the mother, threw Aviram to the oor, tore three
phones from his hands injuring his hands and broke one telephone when he tried to call for
help. Ms. Watkins then closed and locked the windows as Aviram screamed for help and
locked him in the house so he could not leave. Aviram was afraid to let his mother out of his
Jewish Indy - Anybody but Dad http://www.jewishindy.com/modules.php?name=News&le=pr...
4 !"#$ 1 9/27/11 4:40 PM
''A''
sight due to fears of being stabbed by her. He therefore did not sleep. This fear is based on
Leah Dahan Watkins repeated threats that she will kill her son Aviram Watkins. In the
morning following the incident, the mother told Aviram not to tell anyone what had
happened or she would do something evil to him.
Complaints were led that and subsequent days with the court, social welfare, child
protection and the police. Israeli law requires that the child be interviewed immediately.
However, no such interviews have taken place. The agencies refuse to respond to mail, fax,
e-mail or phone calls by the father, Evan Watkins, or the minor child, Aviram Watkins.
At this point, the police have accused Evan Watkins with violation of visitation orders since
the child refuses to go to his mothers home.
Two requests for an order of protection from the mother were denied by the family court.
The reasons stated for the denial were: 1)was that the father, Evan Watkins, had previously
appealed the custody decision of this court; 2) the parents have been litigating since 1996;
and 3) unbelievably, the courts claim the incident does not meet the requirements of the law
for an order of protection.
Instead of interviewing the child according to Israeli law, the social welfare and child
protection agencies have convened a Decision Committee. The purpose of which is to
place Aviram outside his home. In other words, they plan on placing him in a closed locked
institution or a foster family rather than place him with his father. The third option is to place
him with the mother and limit the fathers access to one hour per week under social worker
supervision. The social worker and judge have stated that they do not believe Aviram and
that he is being inuenced by his father when he reports incidents of abuse.
The social worker, Hanna Greenfeld (Givat Shmuel, Israel) stated to Aviram Watkins upon
his last complaint to her that she does not believe him. Rather, Ms. Greenfeld believes the
mother who contacted the social worker on her own in advance of any complaint by the
child. The social worker further stated she believes the mother and that Aviram needs
psychiatric medication and treatment.
The social worker, Hanna Greenfeld, has never placed any child in the custody of their
father. She stated to the father, Evan Watkins, years ago that mothers need their children
and thats the way it will be in your case also. She systematically applies this doctrine in
every and all incidents. The police have not investigated because of the intervention by this
child welfare social worker in violation of a legal mandate.
Since that incident Avirams mother and sister have threatened him with once again
doing something evil to him if he does not return to the mothers home. They
attempted to enter the apartment of Evan Watkins while he was at work and remove Aviram.
Aviram has complained to all of his teachers including the guidance counselor. The only
4 !"#$ 2 9/27/11 4:40 PM
response to him is that your mother loves you. This has been the only and consistent
response on every complaint made by Aviram himself over the past ve years.
The father, Evan Watkins, has been found by leading Israeli psychologists to be healthy and
normal and completely capable of raising a child. Reports to that effect have not been
permitted to be admitted into evidence by the judge, Tova Sivan, nor have reports showing
Avirams preference for living with his father.
When the child was taken to independent social workers from Jewish Family Services
(Israel) they found severe mistreatment at the hands of the mother and suspicion of sexual
abuse in addition to the rest. In addition, the ndings showed a continuous relationship of
trust between the child, Aviram Watkins, and his father, Evan Watkins.
There no court action is pending.
The judge, Tova Sivan, has stated off the record, and against Israeli law, that no man will
ever get custody joint or full in her courtroom. In Israel there is no procedure to
change judges. In this and many other proceedings, all currently concluded, the minimal
standards of Western justice have not been met.
The child has run away from his mothers home following the above incident one of the
last in a continuing series of similar incidents over the course of years. Aviram Watkins
refuses to return to her home out of fear. He has stayed with his father.
Aviram Watkins has not been able to get ofcial U.S. citizenship papers because of the
requirement for original birth certicate and marriage certicate which his mother took upon
his birth.
I thank you in advance for your help in protecting the child, Aviram Watkins.
Evan Watkins can be reached in Israel as follows:
PHONE: +972-54-758-4193 E-MAIL: ew670@yahoo.com
I can be contacted at:
Shoshana Harper 317-414-1480
ShoshanaHarper@comcast.net
Please write your Representatives in Congress:
http://www.congress.org/congressorg/dbq/ofcials/?lvl=L
http://www.senate.gov
http://www.horut-shava.org.il/HoSh/about/english.htm
http://www.mishmoret.org.il/modules.php?name=News&new_topic=19 (Hebrew site)
4 !"#$ 3 9/27/11 4:40 PM
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Complaint To Hague Convention Permanent Bureau
September 26, 2011
EXHIBIT
''B''
September 26, 2011
Mr. William Duncan
The Deputy Secretary General
Hague Conference on Private International Law
6 Scheveningseweg
2517 KT Hague
Holland By mail & Fax 00-31-7-360-4867/ wd@hcch.nl

Re: Review of Israels Systematic and Ideological
Failure to Enforce the Hague Convention
Risks Associated with Mediating Hague Convention in Israel

Dear Mr. Duncan,
I'm writing from the United States, and I am a left-behind father of a child
abducted by her mother to Israel. I am writing to alert the Hague Conference of a pattern
of decisions and judicial conduct in Israel, indicating the Israeli Judiciarys refusal to
comply with and enforce the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction, when the taking parent is a female.
The judgments and judicial conduct which favor female taking-parents are
inspired by the fact that Israel is the last country in the Western World that maintains a
statutory discrimination against men in family courts, and in particular the statutory
presumption that favors automatic custody awards with mothers, even if they commit the
crime of abduction. Judges in Israel simply cant hide their sympathy to female
abductors. The three abduction cases described hereinafter should be disseminated to all
experts in the area, both as a warning that Israeli Judgments are contaminated by
statutory discrimination, and as a tool in the preparation of new model international
guidelines.
It appears that the courts in Israel deliberately frustrate the purpose of the Hague
Convention by falsifying facts, inventing interpretations of the Convention that defy
common sense, and imposing tremendous financial burdens for the enforcement of the
Convention. These are fundamental deviations from the clear language and spirit of the
Convention.
1
''B''
I am asking that my letter be brought to the attention of future sessions of the
Malta Process and disseminated to the readership of the Permanent Bureaus publications.
It is vital to tackle the obstacles which Israel is creating in refusing to enforce the
Convention against the background of the statutory Tender Years Presumption, which is
ideologically shared by almost all judges of the Family Court and of the Rabbinical Court
in Israel. It has yielded a batch of decisions that has made Israel a safe haven for female
abductors.
Risks Associated with Mediating Hague Convention in Israel
At this juncture, based on the Special Commission on the practical operation of
the 1980 and 1996 Hague Conventions (1-10 June 2011) Reports endorsement of
drafting a Guide to Good Practice on Mediation under the 1980 Convention, I am
writing to alert the Permanent Bureau of special precautions that should be highlighted in
the Mediation Guide to be published.
In my case, Ben Haim v. Ben Haim, I am a U.S. resident. The mother abducted
the daughter from New Jersey, the state of habitual residence, to Israel. The case reached
Israels highest court, the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ) in Jerusalem. By opinion of
Judge Edna Arbel, she overturned two lower courts judgments directing the return of the
child. Judge Arbels reasoning was that since the left-behind petitioner agreed to
participate in negotiations to amicably resolve the Hague Convention dispute, even
though the negotiations were thwarted by the abductor-mother, who refused to sign the
agreement's draft, my initial willingness to negotiate constitutes an act of acquiescence
to the abduction. The judge was joined by another judge, Judge Meltzer, and upon
motion to reargue, Judge Rivlin reaffirmed Judge Arbels Judgment, denying the return,
again based on some theory of consent to the abduction via incomplete negotiations.
Judge Arbels Judgment was heavily criticized by the New Jerseys Superior
Court's judge, Bonnie Midzol. Yet, the Israeli decision, especially since it originates from
the highest court in that country, can serve as a major obstacle to any idea to introduce
mediation under auspices of the Permanent Bureau. It is enough that one parent agrees to
mediate abduction, and the other parent uses Judge Arbels Judgment as legal basis of
acquiescence, to destroy entirely the concept of mediating international abductions.
I therefore ask you to publish Judge Arbels Judgment in the widest amount of
circulation possible, including The Judges' Newsletter on International Child Protection,
2
so that as many experts as possible can comment on the dangers Judge Arbel created to
the safe return of children to their home state, if the left-behind parent agrees to
mediation, and to the entire concept of international mediations. In fact, it is crucial
that all practitioners worldwide be warned never to consent to any mediation or
negotiations in Israel, since this may destroy their chances in court.
It is important to note that mediation or negotiations in the context of Hague
Convention disputes cannot occur in coercive circumstances. In the case of Israel,
coercive circumstances are engrained into the Judicial system, and they negate any
possibility of effective mediation, as follows: (a) Family Court judges refuse video-
conferencing, and thus coerce the left-behind parent to endure the costs of travel; (b) the
left-behind parent is threatened by the judge that unless he appears in the court and is
cross-examined, his petition will be dismissed; (c) once in Israel, the Rabbinical Court
steps in and traps the father with ex-parte orders of arrest, and ex-parte orders of ne exeat,
to secure appearance in prospective divorce proceedings, thereby abducting the father
together with the child in Israel; and (d) the Family Court adds interim child support
during the pendency of the Hague Convention proceedings, thereby forcing the left-
behind parent to support the abductor and help her establish roots in the destination
country.
These techniques are influenced by a radical feminist approach that is prevalent in
Israel, pursuant to which custody morally belongs with the mothers, whether they
committed abduction or not. These techniques negate a possibility of free will
mediation, and they should be discussed in future panels. Therefore, future sessions on
Principles for the Establishment of Mediation Structures in the context of the Malta
Process (Prel. Doc. No 6) should learn from the negative experience that Israeli judges
are demonstrating.
Israels departure from common rules of interpretation
The Malta Process emphasized the need for the courts in the different countries to
apply common rules of jurisdiction (competence), and to be prepared to recognize foreign
decisions on the basis of those common rules. This was a Conclusion both at the First
and Second Malta Conference, and it really is a key concept for improving judicial co-
operation" (Duncan Speech, The Judges Newsletter, XVI, Spring 2010). In this context,
recent trends in Israeli abduction decisions should be reviewed and condemned in the
next Malta Process meetings.
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In particular, the case of Nachom v. Nachom serves as an example. In order to
accommodate the Tender Years Presumption, which statutorily awards children's custody
with the mothers, judges in Israel find every imaginable excuse to deny Hague
Convention's applications, by interpreting the Convention in ways designed to frustrate
the Convention, and make it difficult, if not impossible, to litigate. While most courts use
a simple test of physical presence in the left-behind jurisdiction to determine the abducted
childs pre-abduction habitual residence, Israel has moved away from the test of
physical location of the child, and instead it now applies the intended habitual residence
of the mother.
In Nachom case, a child was abducted from California to Israel when he was two
months old. The child was born in California and is a U.S. citizen. The judge (Sarit
Golan, Ashdod Family Court) found that the child lacked any habitual residence, and by
way of circular legal acrobatics equated the childs habitual residence with that of the
mother. Since the mother lived 11 months in California prior to the abduction, the judge
conducted a full blown evidentiary hearing on the question of whether the mother
intended to continue to reside there. Based on the abducting mothers self serving
intention to return within two years, Judge Sarit Golan found that neither she nor the
child had habitual residence in the United States. Moreover, Judge Sarit Golan refused
the fathers (a U.S. citizen and resident for 20 years) request to be cross-examined by
video-conference and demanded that he fly from California to Israel, so that he can be
cross-examined. Upon his arrival, a legal trap was set up for him, as the Rabbinical
Court issued an ex-parte ne exeat conditioned on a $500,000 bond, allegedly to secure his
appearance for future divorce/dissolution of marriage hearings.
Mr. Nachom is still trapped in Israel because of inability to post the outrageous
$500,000 bond. The Appellate Courts proceedings affirmed Golans Judgment, after
demanding an exorbitant bond to secure the womans court fees on appeal.
The same thing happened in the Ben Haim v. Ben Haim case. Ben Haims
application for a video-conference in lieu of physical presence was denied. Upon arrival
in Israel, the Rabbinical Court issued ex-parte orders of arrest and ne exeat injunction for
90 days. Ben Haim managed to leave Israel since the ne exeat injunction was not
renewed. In retaliation, the Rabbinical Court issued a ne exeat on Ben Haims father.
The same thing happened in the Cohen v. Cohen case. A mother abducted two
children from Marbella, Spain to Israel. The left-behind father filed a Hague Convention
4
petition with the Be'er-Sheva Family Court in February 2011. The Court, Judge Geula
Levin, denied the fathers request to testify via video-conference. On appeal, the order
denying the video-conference was affirmed, and the left-behind father was ordered to pay
a fine in the amount of $2,100. Judge Levin ordered the left-behind father to pay interim
child support in the amount of $570 per month, pending disposition of the Hague
Convention proceedings. Trial was scheduled for May 2011. Upon Mr. Cohens arrival
in Israel to testify, he was arrested for 24 hours by order of the Rabbinical Court, and
three guards escorted him to court from detention. In addition, a ne exeat order was
already signed ex-parte, also by the Rabbinical Court. Eventually, on September 2011,
Judge Levin denied the Hague Convention Petition based on latches of 9 months (from
abduction to the filing of a complaint), and did not accept the left-behind fathers
explanation that Legal Aid in Israel was on an extended strike, that private attorneys
charged $35,000 which he could not afford, and that he had hopes that the woman would
still change her mind. The judge found that failure to sue immediately, like
extinguishing a fire, constitutes acquiescence (The Convention itself allows one year to
sue).
In the Nachom case, the court denied the Hague Petition based on interpreting
habitual residence on an amorphous test parental intended residence, and not physical
presence before the abduction. A similar attempt was made in the Cohen case, and
although intent (in the context of habitual residence) was fully and needlessly litigated,
this defense was dismissed. The Israeli Central Authority has responded to your 2006
Questionnaire which has already warned about this practice: In the past Israeli courts
have normally viewed habitual residence as a factual physical situation based on the
location of the childregardless of the parents future plans or intentions. However,
in recent cases there has on occasion been a shift to the 'parental intentions' test.
The Israeli Central Authority should issue public statement cautioning judges that
Parental intentions test is not in line with good practice, and it creates deviations from a
unified worldwide approach. Moreover, it is simply a feministic tool to aid women in
defending abduction cases by claiming that their residence overseas was merely
transitory or somehow does not count. Still, this new test is always useful to women
abductors and not even one man benefitted from it, to our knowledge.
The three cases, from different parts of the country (Ben Haim in Nazareth in the
north, Nachom in Ashdod, South of Tel-Aviv, and Cohen in Be'er-Sheva, the southern
district), show common trends in Israel that are heavily influenced by judicial
5
discrimination in favor of women, and Israels strong reluctance to award custody to men,
or to award joint custody.
Special Risks Associated with Enforcing Hague Convention in Israel
Including Financial Burdens
Fathers whose children are abducted to Israel have learned that if the court
demands their appearance in person in Israel, they will not be able to leave the country,
since the Rabbinical Court will trap them with a ne exeat injunction, together with an ex-
parte order of arrest based on failure to pay child support for the abducted child or to
secure appearance in the divorce proceeding itself. As a result, left-behind fathers may
simply abandon the Hague Convention petition, since traveling to Israel poses a risk to
their safety, liberty and property.
Still even when a court is inclined to order the return of a child to a left-behind
father, the courts in Israel impose financial burdens that are unparalleled elsewhere. In
the case of Ben Haim v. Ben Haim, the lower court's judge, at the Nazareth Family
Court, while he found that the abducted minor must return to New Jersey, same judge
took the liberty to impose financial conditions, including (a) payment of the abductors
airfare to U.S.; (b) prepayment of rental accommodation for six months; as well as (c)
prepayment of child support to the abductor for six months after the return. Such
prepayments amount to close to $20,000, which a father must lay out in order to take the
child back home.
These financial conditions make it impossible for middle class fathers to afford the
return of their children to the Origin State. It also unfairly places the burden of rectifying
the results of the crime of abduction, on the victim of abduction. Again, these
techniques of discouraging fathers from prosecuting their rights under the Hague
Convention are products of radical pro-feminist ideation that is supported by Israels
Tender Year Presumption. The international community should be alerted promptly of
Israeli Judiciary, and in particular Judge Edna Arbels scorn of the Hague Convention,
when the victim is a father.
See also, S.v.S. 58309/05 (Tel-Aviv Family Court), in which the left-behind father
in France was able to win a return order, but was required to prepay !10,000 for the
abductors living expenses and prepay rental expenses in France for the duration of the
trial in France. A few years earlier, in D.Y. v. D.T. 621/04 (Appellate Court), again, an
6
American left-behind father was ordered to prepay $6,000 plus rent an apartment for the
wife.
The financial conditions imposed by Israeli courts as conditions to implementing
safe return of children actually frustrate the purpose of the Convention. The Central
Authority must educate the Judiciary in Israel that these practices are not in line with the
Convention, and appear, on its face, spiteful. Needless to say, the Israeli Central
Authority does not translate to Hebrew its own Questionnaire or the Good Practice
Manuals. As a result, each subsequent court raises the bar in creating more and more
obstacles.
Notes regarding Neulinger & Shuruk v. Switzerland
The Working Committee on the Malta Process expressed concern about the
ECHRs Judgment in Neulinger & Shuruk v. Switzerland. The Grand Chamber refused
to order the return of Shuruks child from Switzerland to Israel. The Chamber cited the
mothers rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights for family
life, which may be abridged if Neulinger was compelled to return to Israel. This case
created a rift between Council of Europe member states, where taking parents are entitled
to the extra protection under Article 8, and the rest of the world, where Article 8 doesnt
apply.
We wish to take this opportunity to explain how the Neulinger & Shuruk came
about, and the explanation does not portray Israels Judiciary in a positive light. At the
time, the permanent Bureau was ready to state that ECHR was unfairly exercising
jurisdiction with extraterritorial reach, and impact beyond the states that comprise of the
Council of Europe. However, from the courts final Judgment we understand that the
abductor was able to present a myriad of decisions from Family Court, including orders
of protections, orders of removal of Mr. Shuruk from the marital home, orders of
supervised visitations in a contact center, and a pile of negative social workers reports
against the left-behind Israeli father. To the European judges, the collection of documents
from the Israeli Family Court appeared to reflect negatively on the father, as potentially
dangerous. However, the European judges did not know that in Israel, almost all divorce
cases look exactly the same. It is common that every divorce case starts with bogus and
fictitious domestic violence charges, which requires no evidence whatsoever. These
trigger an immediate removal from home by police orders. At Family Court, women
receive automatic interim custody (because of the Tender Year Presumption), and the men
7
are sent to interviews by state-appointed social workers. The social workers are trained
to treat every man, however mild, educated or dignified, as a potential aggressor and
abuser. It results in negative social worker reports and usually automatic reference to a
supervised contact center. This is the face of almost every divorce case in Israel, and
Shuruk was no different from the rest. This is again one of the legacies of Judge Edna
Arbel, who used to be the State Attorney General, and at the time drafted Attorney
General Guideline 2.5 which immunes all women from prosecution for false police
reports. It is therefore essential for the international community to put Neulinger &
Shuruk in perspective. The only risk that Neulinger & Shuruk poses is for future Israeli
fathers, because the corrupt pro-mothers system of Israel will enable every female
abductor to arm herself with similar paperwork (orders of supervised visitations etc.), and
defend the abduction proceedings in the same manner Nuelinger did.
In conclusion, Judge Arbels recent decision in the Ben Haim case should be
disseminated to international practitioners, since it poses an obstacle to development of
mediation in abduction contexts. Moreover, attention should be paid to the coercive
circumstances in Israel, which set traps and physically imprisonments of the left-behind
fathers when they come to testify. The same applies to the subjective intended residence
test, and to the practice of awarding interim child support to abductors, the orders of ne
exeat against the left-behind fathers, and the financial conditions to return (prepayment of
airfare, accommodation and child support). A new questionnaire should be requested
from the Israeli Central Authority, as the current one appears to falsely describe the
deviations of Israeli courts from common international practices. As to the current witch-
hunt against men in divorce processes in Israel, I respectfully refer you to the English
web pages at www.ccfisrael.org, and to CCFs report to the UNs Committee on
Economic, Social & Cultural Rights (enclosed).
Sincerely,
_______________
Enclosure: Sharon Ben-Haim
25-24 High St.
Fair Lawn, NJ 07410
U.S.A.
Sharonsbh@gmail.com
www.BringOfirHome.com
1-917-775-5386
8

WWW.BRINGOFIRHOME.ORG
WWW.BringOrHome.org
Cc: Ms. Leslie Kaufman
Senior Deputy to the State Attorney
International Department of State
Attorney's Office, Ministry of Justice
P O Box 1087
Jerusalem 91010, Israel
Tel: +972-2-541-9615
lesliek@justice.gov.il
Cc: Ms. Ann B. McGahuey
Ofce of Children's Issues
U.S. Department of State
Tel: 202-736-9098
Fax: 202-736-9132
McGahueyAB@state.gov
Cc: Eric Mark, Esq.
744 Broad St. 16th Floor
Newark, NJ 07102 and
P.O. Box 9151
Paramus, NJ 07653-9151
1-201-394-4676
EricMarkEsq@gmail.com
9
Comparison Prevalence of Visitation Centers Israel v. US
EXHIBIT
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Comparison Prevalence of Visitation Centers
!"#"$ %&'()*$+,-../ 0(1,(2,3)(4)#5+ 0(1,6#5&7&$+,!$)'$8 % Families in Supervised VISITS Population
!"#$%& '()*+, ,+ +'-- 19.9 % 7,500,000
.&$/$0$111111111111111 +()'-* 2 3+( 1.6 % 4,779,000
.&$"4$1111111111111111 3)3+2 '( '(+ 3.1 % 710,000
.#5678$
3
111111111111111
+3)'2( * +(- 0.9 % 6,392,000
.#4$8"$"111111111111111 ',)+,+ ( ( 0.0 % 2,915,000
9$&5:7#85$111111111111111 n/a 85 1885 37,253,000
97&7#$;7111111111111111 +')'<= * -** 2.8 % 5,029,000
9788%>?5>@?1111111111111 '()*3= +3 3<< 3.7 % 3,574,000
A%&$B$#%111111111111111 3)2'= - +(- 6.0 % 898,000
A5"?#5>?C7:C97&@0/5$11111111 ')3+2 2 0.0 % 602,000
D&7#5;$1111111111111111 =<)<'- 23 '+<* 1.6 % 18,801,000
E%7#F5$111111111111111 n/a 343 9,687,000
G$B$551111111111111111 n/a 0 0 1,360,000
!;$H711111111111111111 =)=(( '( '<- 2.5 % 1,567,000
!&&5875"1111111111111111 3+)=2, '3 -,* 1.7 % 12,830,000
!8;5$8$1111111111111111 n/a 33 730 6,483,000
!7B$11111111111111111 =)+<* , 3* 0.5 % 3,046,000
I$8"$"1111111111111111 '()3(3 '- '3= 1.3 % 2,853,000
I%8?@>4J111111111111111 '<)<3' - '(* 0.5 % 4,339,000
K7@5"5$8$111111111111111 n/a 5 122 4,533,372
L$58%11111111111111111 -)3+3 '' +=- 5.2 % 1,328,000
L$#J&$8;111111111111111 '-)++' +< -22 3.6 % 5,773,000
L$""$>H@"%??"11111111111 '+)=+- '' =+ 0.6 % 6,547,000
L5>H5F$8111111111111111 3+)2-, '+ +,3 0.8 % 9,883,000
L588%"7?$11111111111111 n/a 19 690 5,303,925
L5""5""5MM511111111111111 '+)+'( * 2( 0.3 % 2,967,000
L5""7@#5111111111111111 +3)+<< = 3*' 1.6 % 5,989,000
L78?$8$111111111111111 3)<(2 '< 2(2 10.3 % 990,000
N%/#$"4$111111111111111 -)3=< + 23= 8.1 % 1,826,000
N%O$;$1111111111111111 '=),*+ 2 +'< 1.2 % 2,700,000
N%BCG$0M"H5#%11111111111 2)*,* 2 -( 1.0 % 1,316,000
N%BCP%#"%J1111111111111 +3)<=* 3- '(*3 4.5 % 8,791,000
N%BCL%Q5>7
2
111111111111
=)<,< '2 -,< 7.1 % 2,059,000
N%BCR7#4
3
11111111111111
2,)(=( 3' '+<+ 2.8 % 19,378,000.00
N7#?HC9$#7&58$111111111111 3,)=(* '' ',< 0.5 % 9,535,000
N7#?HCA$47?$111111111111 ')-<, + 2 0.3 % 673,000
SH5711111111111111111 3,)*,' 2( '3*= 3.8 % 11,536,000
S4&$H70$11111111111111 ',)*-* * '=, 1.0 % 3,751,000
S#%F781111111111111111 '3)+== '( ++3 1.7 % 3,831,000
T%88"J&O$85$111111111111 +*)*+* '= 2(= 1.4 % 12,702,000
UH7;%C!"&$8;111111111111 3)32- - 3++ 9.6 % 1,052,000
V7@?HC9$#7&58$11111111111 '+)+++ - '*< 1.5 %
V7@?HCA$47?$111111111111 +),+= + - 0.2 % 815,000
W%88%""%%C11111111111111 +-)*23 < *' 0.3 % 6,346,000
W%Q$"11111111111111111 =,)<(< 3+ *32 1.1 % 25,145,000
X?$H11111111111111111 '()=3< + =3 0.7 % 2,763,000
Y%#078?111111111111111 +)'(+ = '** 8.9 % 626,000
Y5#F585$1111111111111111 +*)-+= '3 '2= 0.5 % 8,001,000
Z$"H58F?781111111111111 +,)+-' +3 ,,3 2.5 % 6,724,000
Z%"?CY5#F585$111111111111 <)+3= '( 3', 3.4 % 1,853,000
Z5">78"5811111111111111 '=)+=( ++ 2,' 2.7 % 5,686,000
ZJ7058F111111111111111 +)*33 = '++ 4.3 % 564,000
T@%#?7CU5>71111111111111 '2)<+( 0.0 %
TOTAL US 308,000,000
Divorce Numbers Collected from "National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol 58, No. 25, August 27, 2010
Supervised Visitations Data from Report to Congress "Safe Havens: Supervised Visitations", US Dept of Justice
Population from US 2010 Census "Resident Population Data"
n/a=not available, for example CA does not keep track of number of divorces
"0"= no Supervised Visitations in that State
''C''
Simona Shteinmetz: ''This is How and When
A Parent's Entitlement to see His Children is Determined''
EXHIBIT
''D''
www.haaretz.co.il

This is How and When a Parent's Entitlement to see His
Children is Determined
Between Court and Social Services

Dana Viler-Polack 07.25.2010 02:12am updated: 1:44pm

"When a couple decides to get divorced, the ideal situation is forming seeing
arrangements of the children by the partners themselves, who form a contract and
transfer it the a judicial authority for validation", explains Simona Shtainmatz, the
head legal aiding clerk in the Ministry of Welfare, "Of course there are many cases in
which the parents are fighting and then there is a need to turn to a judicial proceeding
during which a custody will be determined".
In cases in which the conflict is intense and the parents do not reach an understanding,
the judicial authority will turn to evaluation and diagnosis by a legal aiding clerk. This
evaluation, recommending the child's needs, will be conducted by conversing with the
parents, presenting situations and examining their reactions and also conducting a
social investigation in the children's educational systems and health services. "We
examine who is the dominant parent, who maintains contact with these systems, the
nature of contact, who is cooperative and also talk with the children and in an indirect
interview and questions like who do you call when you have a bad dream try to
understand the children's needs", clarifies Shtainmatz.
If the parents will reach an agreement even during the proceeding, it will be accepted.
If we're dealing with a divorce dispute the parent will be referred to a contact center,
which is aimed at renewing the contact between the child and parent or at maintaining
and improving the contact with the parent with whom the child doesn't live
continuously. All that, by a treatment proceeding that eventually builds a normative
contact outside the contact center. In the contact center, the parent and child meet in
the presence and under the supervision of a center manager who is a social worker or
of a professional employee who is currently present there. Meetings in the center are
always supervised, and the level of supervision varies from family to family,
according to the family's needs.
"There is a level in which a person will sit with the parent and child through the entire
meeting, and there is a level in which he will sometimes leave and return", explains
Shtainmatz, "The escort can also get out and watch through a one-sided window and
examine the atmosphere as he returns to the room. So it continues to a level of
removing the supervision, then the parent comes, takes the child, returns there and
delivers the child to the custodian parent". Visitation in the contact center stops by
conversing with the parents and also by an evaluation committee which tests the
proceeding and determines that the treatment may end. This is a committee external to
the center and is also a kind of supervisor committee overseeing the entire proceeding.

''D''
Comparison Chart: Child Support Awards Israel v. USA
EXHIBIT
''E''
(!"#'$%"& '(&)) *"!%+ ,)&-' '+%."* ,&#&/) ,0"12 ,+&&.!
Compar|son Ch||d Support Awards Israe| v. USA
+*+! 3. %*$! ,1#4! !."+! ,1#4! 3"('" %21) 5 '+%."* ,&#&/)
*"!%+* ,&#&/)
5
?'+%."* !)4 "2
uS=100
Lxamp|es
Man's
Income
Woman's
Income
No. of
Ch||dren Ch||d Supp |n ISk Ch||d Supp |n US Mu|t|p|e Iactor |n ISk
1 Chlld 7,000 3,300 1 1,300 690 2.17 LsLm
2 Chlldren 7,000 3,300 2 3,000 1,074 2.79 LsLm
3 Chlldren 7,000 3,300 3 4,300 1,347 3.34 LsLm
"1ova S" 6,000 8,300 1 1,700 473 3.39 AcLual
Mr. "C" +1 4,000 3,300 1 2,130 417 3.16 AcLual
Mr. "C" +2 4,000 3,300 2 3,630 648 3.63 LsLm
Mr. "C"+3 4,000 3,300 3 3,130 813 6.33 LsLm
Mr. n8C +2 10,000 3,000 2 3,000 1,227 4.07 AcLual
Mr. nC8+3 10,000 3,000 3 6,300 1,332 4.19 LsLm
('" '4' 5 1,300 2"- '+%."* *&."6 lsrael Calc [ 1,300 er chlld
hLLp://www.dss.vlrglnla.gov/famlly/dcse_calc.cgl *. !'*7! "2 '- !"#"'$%"&* *&."6 vlrglnla Calc per offlclal charL
440$ = ('"' 5 1,300 '+%."* 3&)"#") Mlnlmum ln lsrael $440 per chlld
23$ = .(&6' ('"' 5 83 *"!%+* 3&)"#") Mlnlmum ln uS $23
''E''
Schnitt Report on Parental Fitness Test to Fathers, September 26, 2011
EXHIBIT
''F''

State of Israel
Ministry of Justice

Report of the Committee for Exami ni ng the Legal Aspects of
Parental Responsibility duri ng Divorce
Complimentary Repor t of the 2008 I ntermediate Report

Submitted to the Minister of Justice, Professor Yaakov Neeman
Elul 5771 (September 2011)

[Brief Recommendations Regarding
Appointing a Parental Competence Specialist]

Preface

On April 2008 the Committee submitted to the Minister of Justice a report
summarizing the first part of its discussions: "The Committee for Examining the
Legal Aspects of Parental Responsibility during Divorce, Stage 1 Intermediate
Report" (hereinafter: "the Intermediate Report"). In the Intermediate Report the
Committee recommended to amend the chapter regarding "parents and their minor
children" in the Legal Competence and Guardianship Act 1962 (hereinafter: "the Act
Proposal", appendix 2 of this report). The amendment is intended to settle a new
normative agreement of parents-children relationship, including during divorce, based
on the perception of Parental Responsibility in the UN Convention for Children's
Rights 1989.

In the second stage of the Committee's discussions, which lasted a lot longer than
expected, the Committee's members disagreed regarding a suggestion to update the
rules according to which the court should decide in disputes between parents
regarding the manner in which they'll realize their Parental Responsibility, and settle
an agreement in the absence of parental consent regarding Parental Responsibility's
realization in the child's best interest.

2.5 Using Specialists in Fami ly Courts

Based on the information learned by the Committee from the surveys conducted by its
members in the second stage of its work: Dr. Aliza Ring, Ms. Anat Inbar, Prof. Shahar
Golan, Dr. Roy Eldor and the psychology and psychiatry specialists who gave the
Committee their opinion verbally and in writing. The Committee wishes to thank Dr.
Mordehai Shery, Ms. Hadara Bar, Dr. Gavriel Vail, Dr. Avigail Golomb, Prof. Sol
Driman, Dr. David Yagil and Dr. Marganit Karmon for their contribution and
assistance to its work, the research material and the comparative information
presented before the Committee revealed some issues which the Committee believes
need organizing.
The first issue the Committee dealt with is how to correctly use the input of specialists
and professionals assisting courts, in order to give the child's best interest the
appropriate place in the judicial process. For this end, courts tend to maximally use
the tools at their service, and give substantial weight to the specialists and
''F''
professionals' opinions. Usually this approach is fitting and proper, however the
Committee has been exposed to a lot of information indicating that in many cases, the
exposure to specialists and professionals is not beneficial and may even harm the
child.

Dr. Avigail Golomb's Survey (brief)

One should remember that we do not examine the parent's personality in vacuum but
in light of the question whether he/she fits a certain child. In other words: I very much
object the term "Parental Competence" outside the context of putting a child out for
adoption, where Parental Non-Competence is really an issue. In almost all other cases
we deal with Parental Fitness of a parent to a child, in certain time and conditions.

In all the literature I have not found a good diagnosis of Parental Competence and
certainly not of Parental Fitness, although in many places such questionnaires and
diagnoses were attempted. All the appropriate literature emphasizes that only broad
examination, using multiple tools, yields a possibility of probable prediction.
Therefore, the tests are one of possible tools, but have no meaning by themselves, just
as one cannot determine recommendations based on a clinical examination of the
parent alone, without knowing the child.

Dr. Marganit Karmon's Survey (brief)

The issue of Parental Competence is sometimes used as a technique for abusing the
system. Sometimes the stronger party uses it as a goading tool against the partner. It is
indeed a good tool, but also a pricy one, which sometimes lacks reliability or validity.
In order to illustrate this issue, in almost every visit to the aiding unit, except
extremely exceptional cases, a narrow examination of about 4 hours (by a psychiatrist
in the aiding unit) will allow for the same conclusions reached at the end of the day
after the long process of Parental Competence evaluation. Very rare are the cases in
which there is an actual problem of Parental Competence. For example, cases in
which one of the parents is mentally ill.

For these reasons and since the Parental Competence is being abused as a tool by
stronger parties against the weaker parties, it is unequivocally recommended that
access to specialists will be through the aiding units. It is vital and essential that the
court will not decide on its own to appoint specialists.

A dispute regarding the content of the parental plan should never be referred to a
specialist. The specialist does not have better tools than the psychiatrist in the aiding
unit for settling Parental Responsibility's arrangements. It may be that the social
worker's tools are more suitable for this issue. Parental Competence examination may
be appropriate when the aiding unit's inspection shows that the partners, one of them
or both, are so disturbed that he/she needs a professional reference. In these cases,
Parental Competence examination may forward the process.

Another important issue is evaluating children by specialists. Many times, the
children are being used as a goading tool, and inspections of children are a classic
example of abusing children. When dealing with evaluating children, one needs to
consult with a psychiatric specialist. Here too, the aiding unit should sort the cases
referred to the specialist. It is less threatening for teenagers to meet with the aiding
unit than with a psychiatrist and it doesn't add costs to the parties themselves.

Dr. David Yagil's Survey (brief)

When dealing with a normative family a family in which both parents functioned as
normative parents, and the cause for divorce is not related to their Parental
Functioning, but to other issues I cannot find any benefit in any psychological tests
for the parents in order to examine what is known as "Parental Competence" (whether
these are projectional psycho-diagnostic tests or objective ones). In normative cases, it
is important to assume that until the dispute irrupted, no party had any claims against
the other party regarding the issue of Parental Functioning.

The specialists who appeared before the Committee emphasized that referring the
cases to the appropriate professional authority social worker, aiding unit or
specialist should be done cautiously, and that one should avoid referring to a
complex and "intrusive" process, which is usually also expensive and prolonged,
before considering the possibility of using a less complex and "intrusive" authority.
So, for example, sometimes specialists are appointed in cases in which there is no real
issue of Parental Competence of either parent. In situations in which the dispute
focuses only on distribution of the time the child will spend with each parent, the
specialist does not have better tools to resolve the dispute than a social worker. In
many cases a few hours' meeting in the aiding unit will lead to the same conclusion as
after long examination and psychological tests by a specialist for the court. The
Committee heard that there are cases in which the debaters use the specialist's opinion
as a goading tool of one parent against the other, or as means to prolong the judicial
procedure, in cases in which a party recognizes that the procedure is not progressing
according to his/her wishes. In such cases, the children are the main sufferers from the
exposure to a prolonged and "intrusive" inspection process. In light of all the above
mentioned, the Committee believes it is highly important to identify in advance the
cases in which appointing specialists will be effective and efficient and the cases in
which a social worker of the aiding unit will be of better use.

The Committee has heard about many advantages of the aiding unit. These
advantages derive first of all from its ability to promote focused dialogue between the
parents, under cover of the court, in order to solve the dispute consensually. The
aiding unit includes, in addition to the social workers, mental health specialists that
can assist in cases requiring such assistance. The aiding unit's work is being done
relatively quickly and without direct cost to the parties themselves. The referral to the
aiding unit is also less labeling for young children or adolescents than independent
referral to a mental health specialist. The Committee formed an impression that the
aiding unit can be used to examine the need to refer to a specialist, as determined in
its explicit roles in article 5(a) of the Family Court Act and article 2(a) of the
Religious Court Act. Referring the parties to the aiding unit, in order to examine
whether the case requires appointing a specialist, will reduce the number of cases in
which a specialist's opinion might harm more that benefit. In addition, identifying the
cases in which appointing a specialist does not benefit professionally and the same
inputs can be received using a social worker's report.

The information revealed before the Committee shows that the cases in which the use
of a specialist is effective are cases in which one of the parents or the children suffers
from a mental illness which harms, or might harm, the possibility of realizing the
Parental Responsibility, or cases in which the dispute level is extremely high and does
not allow any dialogue between the parents regarding realizing their Parental
Responsibility. In all other cases the Committee believes that the need for appointing
a specialist should be truly examined, whether the expected benefit from the
appointment outweighs the harm of exposure to the specialist's examination
procedure.

The information presented before the Committee shows that an opinion on behalf of
only one parent does not benefit the court, and being partial it even twists the family's
situation report. In order to form an appropriate opinion one needs the parent's
cooperation and therefore appointing a specialist should be done fore and foremost
only by the court, but only in cases in which there is an actual justification for its
appointment. In light of the damages which may be inflicted upon the children as a
result of the exposure to the prolonged and intrusive procedure of specialist's
examination, the Committee recommends that an opinion on behalf of a parent will
not be submitted without pre-approval of the court. In addition, in cases in which the
court believes it has all the information needed to make a decision, it should have the
legal authority to prevent the proceeding's prolonging by appointing a specialist on
behalf of a parent. Therefore the Committee recommends that before making a
decision to appoint a specialist, the court will be required to a writing
recommendation of the aiding unit or a social worker's report regarding the need to
appoint a specialist.

An additional issue brought before the Committee is the lack of uniformity in the
work of different specialists. The Committee heard that some specialists insist on
conducting interviews with the whole family, nucleus and extended, and on receiving
information from relevant factors in the education, welfare and health systems. But
some specialists do not insist on hearing all the factors influencing the child's life. The
Committee attributes great importance to promoting the uniformity of specialists'
work and to creating transparency in their work, in order to allow the courts to
critically examine the specialists' opinions submitted. Therefore the Committee
recommends that the opinions will explicitly specify both the unique examination and
diagnosis tools used and the sources upon which they rely, including the nucleus and
extended family and relevant factors in the education, welfare and health systems.

The Committee has also heard different opinions regarding the types of tests used by
psychologists in evaluating Parental Ability. It was also exposed to the heated dispute
in the psychological profession regarding the reliability and compatibility of the tests
in diagnosing Parental Ability. The specialists' testimonies and the research material
published in scientific journals in the field presented to the Committee, show that
sometimes the specialists tend to deduce conclusions regarding Parental Ability based
primarily on psycho-diagnostic tests, which are not a suitable tool for this end. In light
of the above mentioned the Committee believes that the professional factors should
lay down standards for using psychological tests for predicting and assessing Parental
Ability in a careful and reliable manner.

The specialists who have testified before the Committee pointed out that they lack a
training program regarding conducting psychological opinions for courts, and as a
direct result we see gaps between different specialists in the way they conduct their
opinion. In contrast, legal social workers must go through a training program and
continuing education program in order to be appointed by the Minister of Welfare for
their duty. The Committee attributes great importance to creating a training program
by the professional factors which will lay down standards and create greater
uniformity in the specialists' work in courts.

Finally, the Committee has heard much of the heavy load that social workers deal
with, and as a result of it, in many cases, the court orders to conduct a survey in very
early stages of the procedure, in order not to delay the discussion later on having to
wait for the survey. Therefore the Committee recommends that the court will order to
conduct a survey only after having a discussion with the parties in which it found that
the survey is indeed necessary for consolidating the parental agreement or after the
aiding unit has recommended it. All that, in order to relieve the heavy load laid upon
the social workers, by conducting surveys only in cases in which the need for it is
real. In order to overcome the concern from delaying court's discussions due to
waiting for surveys, after the court has decided it is required, the Committee
recommends that the order in which the surveys be conducted will be determined
according to the date of opening the procedure in court and not according to the date
of court's decision to conduct the survey. Therefore the court will not have concerns
that the survey will be delayed due to the later date in which the court has instructed
its preparation.

After many deliberations of the Committee regarding these issues, the Committee has
first consolidated suggestions for regulating by law the tools the Family Courts and
the Religious Courts have for determining the child's best interest and the Parental
Responsibility Agreement according to article 9 of the law's proposal (hereinafter p.
33), which will be presented in the next clause. Second, guidelines for appointing a
specialist in court as detailed in article 2.7.

The testimonies before the Committee show that specialists are sometimes appointed
in cases in which the parents are normative and there is no issue of Parental Ability.
In these cases, the specialist's tools are not better than those of the judge and the social
worker in order to make a decision and settle a Parental Ability Agreement. On the
other hand, the referral to a specialist may inflict harm to the debaters and their
children. Such harm may derive from the exposure to multiple examinations which
may be unpleasant for the parents and children, from the high financial cost of the
opinion, and also from the prolonging of the legal proceedings. In addition, the
Committee was shown that sometime specialist's opinions are used as a goading tool
by one parent against the other.

For these reasons the Committee wishes to emphasize the circumstances in which
appointing a specialists may be effective and efficient: when one of the parents or the
children suffers from a mental illness which truly threatens or may threaten the
realization of Parental Responsibility or when the dispute's intensity is so high it does
not allow a dialogue between the parents regarding realizing their Parental
Responsibility. In other cases the Committee recommends to carefully examine the
need to appoint a specialist, due to the doubt that the benefit from his/her opinion to
the establishment of parental arrangement might be over-shadowed by the potential
harm to children and parents inflicted by the actual examination process of the
specialist.

Psycho-diagnostic tests should be carefully and rationally used while forming an
opinion.

The specialists' testimonies heard before the Committee and the research material
published in scientific journals presented to the Committee, show that there is a
dispute regarding the reliability and validity of some of the psychological tests
frequently used to evaluate Parental Ability and Fitness. Likewise, sometimes there is
a tendency among specialists to base their opinions on psycho-diagnostic tests, which
are not a suitable and valid tool for this end. Therefore the Committee recommends
that relying on psycho-diagnostic tests will be done only under careful consideration
while specifying the limitations of the tool being used. In particular, a practice
according to which the specialist uses the tests as the only or the main tool is not
desirable.

Ministry of Health Data on suicides in Israel

EXHIBIT
''G''

Suicides in Israel

Suicides 1981-2007
Attempted Suicides 1999-2008

Jerusalem
Eyar 5770
April 2010
''G''
Chapter A: Suicides

1. The Phenomenon Scope

x On 2007, the number of suicides dropped to 306 in comparison to about 400
since the late 90's and about 200-300 in the 80's. The number of suicides
dropped among both genders, for men from 297 on 2005 to 250 on 2007, and
for women from 115 to 56, respectively.
x About three quarters of the suicides are of men.
x In the past two years, there has been a downward trend in the suicide rate in
comparison to a stable rate in the last decade, and an upward trend in the 80's
and early 90's.
x Standardized suicide rate by age has dropped on 2007 from 5.8 per 100,000
people, 9.9 for men and 2.1 for women, in comparison to 8.1, 12.2 and 4.2 on
2005.

Number of Suici des, 1981-2007

Suici de Rate, 1981-2007
Over Age 15
Standardized rate by age per 100,000 people

11
Total

Men

Women
T
o
t
a
l

N
u
m
b
e
r

Total

Men

Women
R
a
t
e

5. Marital Status

5. Marital Status

x The suicide rate of the married at the age of 25-64 is lower than that of the not
married, for both men and women.
x The suicide rate of the divorced is higher than that of the married and the
singles at the age of 25-44, on the years 2005-2007 the rate for men was 6.2
and 1.7 times higher, respectively, and for women 6.2 and 1.2 times higher,
respectively.
x The suicide rate of the singles is higher than that of the married at the age of
25-44, on the years 2005-2007 the rate for men was 3.7 times higher and for
women 5.2 times higher.
x At the age of 45-64, the suicide rate of the divorced is higher than that of the
married, 3.8 times higher for men and 2.7 times higher for women on the years
of 2005-2007. The suicide rate of single men is 5.1 higher than that of married
men.

Rates Ratio, Men
Rate per 100,000 people

38
Divorced/Singles Divorced/Married Singles/Married
Chapter A: suicides

Suici des accordi ng to Marital Status and Gender
Age 25-64
T ri-yearly average

Men Women
Singles Married Divorced Singles Married Divorced
Age 25-44
1997 21.6 5.4 54.4 (5.6) 1.5 (9.3)
1998 21.6 6.5 49.1 (5.3) 1.5 (6.8)
1999 24.0 6.2 43.0 5.5 1.3 (7.5)
2000 25.6 6.6 42.9 (4.7) 1.4 (6.5)
2001 24.6 6.4 44.9 5.0 1.6 9.5
2002 22.1 6.5 45.2 (4.1) 1.4 (8.2)
2003 21.4 6.5 39.7 5.8 1.3 9.7
2004 19.6 6.2 37.4 6.3 1.2 (8.2)
2005 18.3 5.8 28.4 7.3 1.3 (7.6)
2006 18.1 4.9 30.4 5.6 1.1 (6.6)
Age 45-64
1997 34.5 8.6 33.9 .. 1.9 (8.3)
1998 40.5 9.2 50.6 .. 2.0 (9.8)
1999 32.2 9.4 45.1 (9.7) 2.3 10.5
2000 39.0 10.3 41.5 (11.4) 2.5 10.1
2001 51.3 9.6 31.3 (9.7) 2.6 (8.4)
2002 59.0 10.6 36.0 (7.2) 2.4 10.0
2003 45.3 10.6 44.8 (7.8) 2.3 10.5
2004 35.9 11.0 42.7 (13.2) 3.1 10.7
2005 27.4 9.9 36.2 (12.6) 3.3 9.4
2006 39.7 7.8 29.4 (9.5) 2.9 7.9
() based on less than 20 cases
.. less than 5 cases

39
5. Marital Status

Suici des accordi ng to Marital Status
T ri-yearly average

Men, Age 25-44

Men, Age 45-64

40
Divorced Married Singles
Ministry of welfare and social Services, Report of Supervisor for
Implementing Freedom Of Information 2009
EXHIBIT
''H''
Ministry of Welfare and Social Services

2
nd
Kaplan St., Jerusalem. Our website: http://www.molsa.gov.il Available Government: www.gov.il

''H''

Ab 17
th
5770
07/28/2010!
2010-0002-1078

Data for 2004-2009:

Legal Welfare Clerks

Year Overall
Surveys
Out of which
Divorce
Cases
Protective
Warrants
Guardianship
2004 17,490 11,097 1,756 4,246
2005 18,176 10,437 1,693 5,240
2006 18,862 11,115 1,781 5,537
2007 18,416 9,898 1,730 6,310
2008 18,608 9,958 1,419 6,900
2009 19,011 10,826 1,466 6,333

Centers for Preventing and Dealing with Domestic Violence

Year Number of
Centers
Families
Dealt with
Individuals Number of
Groups
Active
Budget
2004 57 6,947 8,556 266 10,876M
2005 67 7,100 8,425 288 10,767M
2006 66 7,934 9,305 297 10,141M
2007 66 8,600 10,041 377 9,788,965
2008 71 8,608 9,849 455 11,908
2009 73 8,545 10,006 348 14,975

Parents Children Contact Centers

Year Number of
Centers
How Many
Families
How Many
Children
budget
2004 67 1,774 3,068 1,835 0.5
2005 66 1,818 2,518 2,311M
2006 65 2,000 3,333 2,494 1.5M
2007 64 2,140 3,500 4,150
2008 64 2,130 3,506 4,335M
2009 62 2,155 3,540 4,335

The State of Israel

Ministry of Welfare & Social Services
Chief Executive Office

Attorney General Guideline 2.5 Drafted
by Edna Arbel on non-prosecution 2.5
EXHIBIT
''I''
Attorney General's Guidelines Guideline no. 2.5 prosecution policy in
putting on t rial a witness and/or
complainant who changes his/her police
testimony during t rial
October 14
th
1993; August 1
st
2002;
Tevet 27 5763, January 1
st
2003
Last update: Eyar 18 5766, May 16
th
2006

2.5 Prosecution Policy in Putting on Trial a Witness and/or Complainant who
Changes His/ Her Police Testimony During T rial

1. From time to time it occurs that a witness giving testimony before the police
changes it during trial or gives a contradicting testimony before court. In this
matter article 240(a) of the Penal Law 1977 determines that:

"Cne who makes sLaLemenLs or glves LesLlmonles ln a speclflc
lssue before dlfferenL auLhorlLles and hls/her sLaLemenLs or
LesLlmonles conLradlcL each oLher regardlng a fundamenLal
facLual lssue, and does so wlLh lnLenL Lo decelve, wlll be
senLenced Lo flve years' lmprlsonmenL."

2. Considering the above mentioned, the witness must be warned about the
severity of his/her actions, both before and during the discussion, whether
he/she is a hostile witness or not. If despite the warning the witness adheres to
his/her version, without providing a convincing explanation, one should
consider filing a charge sheet against him/her, according to the determination
of the abovementioned guideline. It is all the more true when the person
changing the version is the complainant in the case, a state's evidence or a
public servant.

3. In cases in which there is substantive external evidence that the original
testimony was false to begin with, out of intention to incriminate the accused,
there is, as a general rule, a public interest to pursue justice and sometimes
even put on trial for the offense of delivering false information according to
article 243 of the Penal Law.

4. In cases in which it is apparent that giving contradicting versions was
malicious, one can even use article 81 of the Penal Law 1977, permitting the
court to award compensation against the complainant who submitted his/her
complaint negligently or out of spite or without grounds.

5. In making a decision regarding commencing proceedings against a witness
giving contradicting testimonies, one should consider the following criteria:

a. The effect the contradicting testimony had on the criminal procedure in
which it was given as much as the contradicting testimony influenced the
outcome of the legal procedure, so increases the public interest to pursue
justice.

b. The essence of the criminal procedure in which the contradicting
testimonies were given in terms of the offenses' severity and the intensity
of public interest as much as the criminal procedure in which the
contradicting testimonies were given deals with severe offenses, so
increases the public interest to pursue justice.
''I''
October 14
th
1993; August 1
st
2002;
st
2003
th
2006

c. The quality of justifications given by the witness for his/her contradicting
testimonies a case in which a witness changes his/her version due to fear
or concern of damage or harassment because of his/her original testimony,
is different from a case in which the version change derives from wanting
to assist a friend, as in a case in which an accomplice who incriminated
his/her friend changes the testimony in order to "save the friend's neck". In
this context, we emphasize the uniqueness of violent and sexual offenses,
and even more so when these are done between partners or within one's
family (further see articles 9-10 of this guideline).

d. Court's reference to the witness who gave the contradicting testimonies
and to the testimony itself in cases in which the court explicitly refers to
the need to investigate the witness regarding contradicting testimonies,
there is, as a general rule, a public interest to pursue justice. However, this
criteria should be restricted in cases in which the court lacks information
regarding the witness' motives to change his/her original version (such as
in cases there is concern to appear in court in front of the accused), where
the court's recommendation does not justify by itself pursuing justice with
the witness.

e. Witness' relevant criminal record criminal record in offenses related to
obstruction of judicial proceedings will justify, as a general rule, pursuing
justice with the witness.

6. Let us emphasize that the abovementioned list of criteria is not exhaustive, and
that such cases might be characterized by unique circumstances which
necessitates additional considerations to those mentioned above. Certainly, in
such cases one should consider taking into account those additional
considerations relevant to making a decision regarding commencing
proceedings against a witness giving contradicting testimonies. In any event,
deciding to commence investigation under such circumstances will be made
only by a district attorney, or someone authorized to do so by him/her.

7. As a general rule, it is appropriate that charge sheets for the offense of giving
contradicting testimonies will be filed only when most abovementioned
criteria applies and that the prosecution's policy regarding such offenses will
be a careful and restrained one.

8. As a general rule, commencing an investigation against a witness suspected in
the offense of giving contradicting testimonies may influence the findings
determined by the judge in the criminal procedure in which the witness has
testified. Likewise, in making the decision to commence investigation one
needs to examine the court's determinations in the judicial ruling, as much as
they refer to the witness' testimony. Therefore, as a general rule, commencing
an investigation and making a decision to put on trial will be done only after
the relevant court's procedure ends, unless there are special circumstances
justifying an immediate commencement of investigation.
October 14
th
1993; August 1
st
2002;
st
2003
th
2006

A Witness who was a Victim of a Sexual or Violent Offense

9. While making a decision regarding commencing proceedings against a witness
who was a victim of a sexual or violent offense one must take into account the
witness' state of mind during trial (especially when the victim is a minor who
is supposed to testify against a family member) and to examine whether the
original testimony is a truthful one and the contradiction derives from fear of
the accused, from wishing to reconcile, from guilt towards the accused, from
lack of emotional strength required to give an incriminating testimony against
him/her in court, etc. in such cases one must take a cautious approach and
refrain, as a general rule, from putting the victim on trial for giving a
contradicting testimony.

10. Therefore, only in extremely rare cases there is room to commence criminal
proceedings against the witness in such a case, and certainly there is no room
to arrest him/her for investigational purposes. However, obviously, there is
still room for investigating whether the victim was convinced to change
his/her police testimony, and if so who is responsible for it.
Report of the Coalition For the children and Family to the United
Nations Committee on Economic, social and Cultural Rights
Complaint: ,1,2,3,4,5
EXHIBIT
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News & Media [Unofficial Excerpts relevant to Israels mens rights]
COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
CONSIDERS REPORT OF ISRAEL
17 November 2011
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has considered the third
periodic report of Israel on that countrys implementation of the provisions of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
Introducing the report, Arthur Lenk, Director, Department of International Law,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that, literally, in the midst of all of the change
surrounding the Arab Spring, the Israeli-Palestinian issue remained a constant,
and was certainly relevant to Israels implementation of the Covenant. Threats
continued on a daily basis for Israelis. Despite the devastating attacks expressly
directed towards Israeli citizens, Israel imposed significant restraints on its own
actions to conform with principles of international human rights law. There were
four new pieces of legislation relating to Covenant issues: on promotion of food
and nutrition security, a Students Rights Law, the amended Equal Employment
Opportunities Law, and a law on womens rights in the work place. In June 2011
Israels Supreme Court affirmed that access to water was a basic human right. The
Government was acutely cognizant of the challenges faced by Israels minority
communities, and hoped to significantly reduce economic and social gaps between
the Bedouin population in the Negev and Israeli society as a whole. A standing,
inter-ministerial human rights monitoring committee had been established to
coordinate action, promote and make recommendations on human rights issues.
Presentation of the Report

ARTHUR LENK, Director, Department of International Law, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, said that for the 64 years of its independence, Israel had continually
aspired to live in peace with its neighbors.
''J''
Questions from the Experts
There was a high suicide rate among divorced men in Israel, amounting to half of
all suicides. It was reportedly because family rights for divorced couples were
very biased towards mothers and restricted access of men to children and the
family home to a degree rarely seen in any other State. The situation for divorced
fathers was apparently hellish. Was it true that divorced fathers were not allowed
to leave Israel until they had paid approximately 20 years of alimony? Was it true
that 30,000 children could not leave Israel because of draconian court rulings?
There was little possibility for such men to get redress, and appeal was extremely
expensive. What steps was the State party taking to change that practice? Was the
Israeli approach to family matters divorce, custody - secular or sectarian?
Response from the Delegation (Israel)
The issue of divorce was emotional and complex, and was decided by courts such
as the Family Matters Court that ruled on custody and property rights. Over
12,000 couples divorced annually in Israel, and most reached custody agreements
without judicial intervention. Over the past decade, court decisions on contact
between parents and children following divorce had changed; last year 738 rulings
on mutual custody were passed down, and children were encouraged to spend
more time with their non-custodial parent. Children under the age of six would
live with their mother unless it was in the best interest of the child not to.
Regarding visitation rights, if a woman had information there might be a problem
receiving child maintenance for her children, she could ask a court to grant a delay
on the father of her children leaving the country. Once the problem was solved the
delay would be lifted. Mens organizations took part in important committee
debates about the role of post-divorce fathers, including legal aspects of fathers
responsibilities. Regarding the claim that 2,000 divorced fathers committed
suicide annually, the Ministry of Healths statistics were that there were 400
suicides last year, and 150 of those were divorced men.
Concluding Remarks
ARTHUR LENK, Director, Department of International Law, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, thanked the Committee for the very informative exchange, and said while
there were disagreements Israel was no different from the vast majority of
countries the Committee faced. Israel very much respected the Committees point
of views, and would take the views and opinions home, and factor them into all
three branches of Government.
REPORT OF ISRAELI NGOs FOR FATHERS RIGHTS THE
COALITION FOR THE CHILDREN AND FAMILY

1
REPORT OF THE
ISRAELI NGOs FOR FATHERS` RIGHTS
BY THE COALITION FOR THE CHILDREN AND FAMILY
WWW.CCFISRAEL.ORG

To the 47
th
Session of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
(To Be Held On November 14-December 2, 2011)
Regarding Implementation of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - ICESCR in Israel
Pursuant to Israel`s Third periodic Report

Contents
Page
Introduction ......................................................................... 1
Article 2: General principles: State responsibility, non-discrimination and
international cooperation ..................................................... 8
Article 3: Prohibition oI discrimination between men and women 11
Article 6: The right to work .......................................................... 15
Article 10: Familial rights ................................................... 15
Article 11: The right to an adequate standard oI living ...... 21
Article 12: The right to the highest attainable standard oI health 22

Introduction
1.! The NGOs dedicated to Iighting discrimination against divorced
and separated men in Israel, and Iathers who are disengaged or
alienated Irom the children during divorce and/or separation hereby
Iile objections to the Third Periodic Report oI the Government oI
the State oI Israel, submitted to the United Nations Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in accordance with the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
(the 'Covenant or 'ICESCR).
''1''
ccfIsrael.org

2.! Contrary to the purported representation by the Government, no
Iathers` rights organizations were invited to submit any comments
especially when systematic persecution oI men is ongoing and
getting worse. Only NGOs representing women are allowed to
participate in regular Government and Parliament sessions, as well
as Committees to elect judges, Committees to examine reIorms oI
the laws, and training sessions oI personnel. As a result, bias
against men in the Judiciary, Administrative and enIorcement arms
oI the Government has created the most distorted, cruel and
unconscionable Iamily law system in the Western World. The
Ministry oI Justice collects comments Irom women`s rights
movements and 'gives them substantial consideration. Men are
ignored, ridiculed, impoverished, jailed and disengaged Irom their
children on a daily basis.
3.! Changes in the area oI implementation oI Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights applicable to men in dissolution oI Iamily relations
are only changes Ior the worse, and the extent oI the violations oI
such rights is widening, and becoming a serious liIe threatening
issue Ior this generation oI Iathers, and Ior the next generation oI
Iatherless children.
4.! The Government oI Israel is quick to denounce Hamas Ior
holding soldier Gilad Shalit hostage Ior 5 years, however within
Israel itselI, by Israeli authorities and vis a vis Israeli citizens,
thousands oI children are being kidnapped, taken hostage by welIare
authorities Irom immigrant parents or less economically advantaged
parents, and in any given year tens oI thousands oI children are
systematically alienated Irom their Iathers, without cause. It is done
with the blessing oI judges, welIare/social workers and the police.
What Israel Iinds oIIensive when perpetrated by others, Israel has no
problem inIlicting the same kind oI human suIIering within its own
borders upon its own citizens and its own children.
5.! Every child who is alienated or disengaged Irom his Iather is a
source oI grieI Ior the entire extended Iamily on the side oI the
Iather, including grandIathers, grandmothers, aunts, uncles, nieces.
6.! Legislation is still blatantly discriminatory against men. The
parliament and judges reIuse to eliminate discriminatory preIerences
and presumptions which Iavour women. That is coupled with
automatic and instant decisions in Iavour oI women, compared with
CCFIsrael.org
3

deliberate procrastination in disposing oI motions Iiled by men,
general attitude oI ridiculization and marginalization oI all men,
labeling all men as potential aggressors and dangerous to spouses
and children. It is prevalent in custody, visitations, child support,
enIorcement, orders oI removal and police proceedings. It turns the
lives oI men into hell on earth, driving most oI them into poverty (at
a rate oI 10,000 men each year), inability to carry jobs,
imprisonments, and a large number oI suicides (estimated 200
suicides a year). According to Ministry oI Health, the suicide rate
among divorced Iathers is 8 times greater than everyone else.
7.! The Government`s statement that 'The Iundamental rights
protected by the Covenant are eIIectively protected through
legislation, judicial decisions and otherwise is simply an insult to
intelligence oI the international community. Sadly, the
Government`s attempt to present Israel as a civilized country that
promises equal protection and due process to all, is no more than a
hypocritical Iarce.
8.! Divorced Iathers, or any male in some other matrimonial
proceeding are automatically treated as 'second class citizens who
lose the protections oI their human rights at once.
9.! The 'status oI a 'man in divorce proceedings Israel is subject
to institutionalized torture and denial oI civil rights. The state
reIused to recognize any rights to Iatherhood, Iamily liIe and contact
with child/ren, an it Ireely violates such rights. The State oIIicially
interprets the right to Iamily liIe as dependant on the concept oI
'mother`s consent, a concept which the international community
and ECHR discarded long ago.
10.!The government also maintains discriminatory and unequal
statutory presumptions: the Tender Years Presumption gives
automatic custody oI children to mothers. All men are sent to social
workers who act as personal criminal Probation OIIicers and cancel
visitations at whim. The rate oI supervised visitations in Israel is the
highest anywhere (20-25), compared with 1-3 in the U.S. The
rate oI children`s removal and outplacements is also the highest in
the world. The rate oI Ialse arrests and Ialse convictions is also
extremely high, and the Ialse arrests are one more institutionalized
tool to disengage Iathers Irom children. .
ccfIsrael.org

11.!The Government also reIuses to take into account the women`s
income in considering amount oI child support. Child support
awards are Iormulas based on disposable income, as is the case oin
any other normal country. Instead, it is based on multiplying the
number oI children by a certain minimum (about $400 per child),
and then adding extras (30 oI the woman`s monthly rent, medical,
dental, extracurricular, babysitting, and anything else the Judge Ieels
like 'awarding to the woman). As a result, many men are slapped
with child support awards that exceed their income. This makes
divorce a very attractive option Ior any woman. It also means that
the woman immediately qualiIies as a Single Parent Household, and
a variety oI Government beneIits and subsidies, Iurther ensuring that
can materially proIit Irom the divorce.
12.! ThereIore, the rate oI non-disposable income vs. award oI child
support is unconscionable and is the highest rate in the world. The
Government compels child support deIendants to be bound by
religious laws, even iI they are not Iormally aIIiliated with any
religion or wish to denounce it.
13.!The Government enIorces discriminatory domestic violence
guidelines. Women are exempt Irom Ialse report prosecution, thus
encouraging Iree and careless Ialse reports, which result in
automatic police orders oI removal oI husbands Irom homes. Most
disturbingly, children are routinely disengaged Irom their Iathers,
and all Iathers are subjected to compelled interventionist methods oI
social workers, and costly 'parental Iitness evaluators, thereby
increasing the impoverishment oI Iathers. It aIIects about 10,000
Iathers every year.
14.!At Family Courts, the Government Iails to adequately publish all
the applicable Family laws in a way accessible by citizens. Only
lawyers have subscription-access to the laws and the reported
precedents. The Government Iails to make the Family Courts
accessible and user-Iriendly to pro se litigants. There are no
published Iormulas Ior child support. This simply encourages
excessive litigation in almost every case. The Court Iees charged by
the Government are excessive. In order Ior a Iather to see a child he
must Iile an application costing about $200 to open a case. Thus the
Government collects Irom Iathers at least $2,000,000 each year Ior
visitation petition Iees, and the same amount is collected Irom
CCFIsrael.org
5

mothers when they seek custody Ior a total oI at least $4,000,000 in
custody/visitation Court Iees (excluding interim motion Iees). In
return, all that the Court does is grant the woman`s petition Ior
interim custody immediately, and reIer the parties to a social
worker, who becomes the real Judge oI the case.
15.!The Government has built in mechanisms to deter men Irom
making applications Ior child support reductions or visitation
enlargements, as they are routinely denied without hearing, along
with costs between $600 and $1,200 imposed against the Iather-
applicant.
16.!Family Courts also avoid the requirement oI conducting Iair
trials, by simply holding endless numbers oI 'conIerences, behind
closed doors, which are dominated by the Judge, and during which
the husbands` attorneys are constantly silenced. Decisions on
applications beneIiting husbands, such as equitable distribution oI
marital assets or child access, are deliberately delayed Ior several
months. Applications beneIitting women are decided within days or
on the spot, based on 'aIIidavits containing ridiculous allegations
that are not tested by cross examination.
17.!II the Court must conduct a trial, then judges limit the trial to 30
minutes per side to avoid elicitation oI Iacts adverse to the woman`s
positions, (based on the practice oI J. Tova Sivan in Tel Aviv
District. Same Judge, however, can issue Judgments without trials,
at whim, out oI the blue).
18.! In addition, appeals Irom Family Court are non-aIIordable,
since a $3,000 bond is necessary to secure the appeal. The State
also Iails to provide judicial remedies, as Family Court judges
routinely deny justice by reIusing applications to summon witnesses
or Iinancial records, denying applications to cross examine social
workers` hearsay reports, or issuing a 'Judgment at whim, without
trials at all. Family Court proceedings lack Iair justice and equal
protection.
19.!The per-capita rate oI supervised visitation in 'Contact Centers
is the highest in the world (2,200 Iamilies per year, out oI 6,000
divorces-with-children (but the number is higher as there are 1,000-
1,500 in waiting list). Periods oI State-enIorced disengagement and
Alienation can last 2 years, 5 years and in an extreme case, 12 years.
PAS is so prevalent in Israel, it is subject oI controversy in almost
ccfIsrael.org

every dissolution oI marriage case, and it is the State authorities that
Iail to protect against it.
20.!There is no real judicial evidentiary determination oI Iather-child
contact decisions, orders or judgments, and Family Court judges
simply delegate the authority to determine Iather`s levels oI contact
with children to WelIare Agents (Social Workers) who serve as
court aides. Women still enjoy a presumption that they are the
parent best suitable Ior custody under Capacity and Guardianship
Law, Section 25. Thus, women routinely get primary physical
custody rights on application alone, while conversely, men are sent
to social workers Ior 'investigation, character assessment and
reports. The Social workers routinely threaten the Iathers, collect
rumours and libels against them; entice women to Iile Ialse domestic
violence complaints to expel men Irom their own homes, or delay
proceedings pending reIerrals to private and costly 'Dangerous
Propensity Tests or 'Parental Fitness Tests. These tests oI the
ability to 'serve as a Iather Ieed a booming industry oI
psychologist and mental evaluators at $5,000 per test.
21.!More speciIically, those Iathers who must take Parental Fitness
Tests, are essentially being degraded, punished, and subjected
without consent to non-scientiIic experimentation, since such 'tests
are non scientiIic, and all treatise on the area agree that this may be
a tool Ior prediction, but it is highly subjective, non-scientiIic and
non-clinical. Moreover, it is plain degrading Ior a the Iather who,
devotedly raised his children during the marriage, and was certainly
Iit be a parent, and now all oI a sudden comes the state oI Israel and
doubts his ability to parent, and the only diIIerence in that the wiIe
open dissolution oI marriage case in court.
22.!As a general rule, appointed social workers routinely send the
men to see their children in supervised visitations centers, and this is
admitted in the press by the oIIicial in charge, Simona Shteinmetz),
where the Iathers are treated like criminals, branded as 'dangerous,
and the children only get an hour or two per week with the Iathers,
Ior several years. The supervised visitations take place at social
workers` convenience, and the children only get one or two hours a
week, during the Iathers` work hours. Thus, when the state, via its
appointed social workers conditions visitations with children on
supervised visitations (simply because oI the mother`s reIusal to
CCFIsrael.org
7

consent), Iathers accumulate absences Irom work and risk losing
their jobs and livelihoods, because in order to see their children,
they have to jeopardize their job.
23.!While the woman enjoys the beneIits oI preIerential treatment on
account oI her sex, and receives custody without a Iair trial, or any
trial whatsoever, the man is compelled to submit to the authority oI
a biased and ill-trained social worker, so that she would write a
Social Worker Report about whether she allows the Iather the grace
oI maybe seeing the child. Fathers normally wait Ior such Social
Worker Report 6 months up to 9 months and sometimes longer.
AIter that, Courts routinely ask several more 'supplementary
reports were necessary, so together there were 3 Social Worker,
each taking several months to 'prepare.
24.!The social worker simply collects any piece oI libel and
deIamation she could get Irom the woman, and encourages the
woman to manuIacture more lies. It appears that character
assassination oI men is the usual practice oI such Social workers.
25.!The Social worker is cloaked with absolute immunity, just like a
judge. 99 oI them are women. In Iact, once she is appointed, the
SW becomes the real judge oI the case. This practice violates the
guarantees under article 10 oI ICESCR, and its equivalent in other
international Conventions, since the right to Iamily liIe becomes
conditioned on satisIying the whims oI a hostile and biased social
worker in every case and as to each child. Again, this practice
Ieeds an industry oI lazy social workers who have nothing better to
do than to torture normative men, and Ieel they are part oI the
blessed work oI 'woman empowerment via destruction oI men`s
selI respect, privacy and their natural rights to be a part oI their
children`s lives.
26.!Most men Iind themselves in supervised visitation setting having
to see their children in prison-like setting one or two hours a week,
simply because it is the Ministry oI WelIare`s unwritten policy to
make wholesale reIerences oI men to supervised visitations
whenever a woman voices disagreement with regular visitations.
27.!The duration oI visits at the supervised centers can range Irom 1-
2 years and even more. Failure oI a woman to bring children to the
centres, carries no remedy. In Iact, Family Court judges in Israel
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(except one in Tiberias) express no care about the Iact that so many
Israeli children are growing up without Iathers.
28.!Regarding domestic violence policies, we note that the law
discriminates between men and woman. Attorney General
Guidelines 2.5 immune women (but not men) Irom prosecution Ior
Ialse DV arrest. The woman was encouraged by the authorities and
the social workers to Iile as many DV complaints as she could, in
order to perpetuate the child alienation and disengagement periods.
Thus, the discriminatory Guideline is actually a tool used to cut oII
children Irom Iathers.
29.!We might add that this Guideline was draIted by one oI the
current High Court oI Justice judges, Edna Arbel, when she was
Attorney General oI the State. ThereIore, it is unlikely that it would
be changed by her peers.
30.! Regarding DV complaints, we might add that because the state
oI Israel allows convictions merely on the 'say-so oI the purported
victim, no evidence is required other than the rehearsed words oI the
woman. Even iI prior to the divorce, there were never any DV
complaints, or complaints that the man posed a danger to the well
being oI the child or woman, still, as soon as a woman launches a
DV complaint, the husband is ordered to vacate his home
immediately. He is cut oII Irom his clothing, records, personal
belongings, and his children.
Article 2
General principles: State responsibility, non-discrimination
and international cooperation
Divested State responsibility
31.! Contrary to the Government`s claim in 10, that 'economic,
social and cultural rights continue to be widely recognized in Israel,
whether directly by law, regulations or case law, or indirectly by
administrative programs, the truth is that this plies only to women,
but not to men.
32.! Contrary to the Government`s claim in 12 that 'the Courts in
Israel oIten reIer to the provisions oI the ICESCR when discussing
issues concerning the various rights enshrined in the Covenant, the
truth is that there is not even one single case that applies to a man in
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dissolution oI Iamilial relations, which any Court in Israel was
willing to support the Iather`s rights under international conventions
to access with his children.
33.!Contrary to the government`s position that the High Court oI
Justice 'addressed the Covenant, the truth is that this High Court oI
Justice is inaccessible to the miseries oI Iathers in divorce. It is
impossible to aIIord the Iees and bonds that are required, and this
High Court oI Justice is generally extremely slow, incompetent, and
generally very biased against men and in Iavour oI women. In Iact,
the President oI this Court received a show thrown in her Iace
during live Court session, Irom a Iather in divorce, who had no other
way to protest the Family Courts` usual anti-male atrocities.
34.!We brieIly note that the Government routinely violates article 2
in several areas, as Iollows:
35.!Legislation: "Tender Years Presumption Iavors women in
custody disputes. It aIIords women automatic interim custody
without any evidentiary hearing. It also creates
disengagement/alienation oI Iathers Irom children during long and
intolerable periods.
36.!Legislation: Child support awards are unconscionable, not based
on disposable income, and do not take into account the women`s
income.
37.!Practices: While Iathers must await a social worker`s report,
mothers get instant custody, and indirectly receive the power to
block the Iathers` access to see their own children.
38.!Legislation: There is no legislation or provisions in the Social
Workers Manual addressing joint custody, thus Iathers are denied
the right to equal opportunity to be a signiIicant Iactor in their
children`s lives post-dissolution oI marriage.
39.! Attorney General/Police Guidelines: Guideline 2.5 exempts
mothers Irom the consequences oI Ialse domestic violence
complaints. The Police do not normally accept complaints oI
abused men.
40.!Civil Procedure: Family Courts deliberately procrastinate
deciding on applications beneIiting husbands.
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41.!Civil Procedure: Lack oI Appellate remedies Irom Family
Courts due to unaIIordable appeal bond, which eIIectively block
most middle-class men Irom appealing.

For women Only: Economic, social and cultural
rights as constitutional rights

42.!Again, the Government statement in 15 that 'economic, social
and cultural rights are widely protected in legislation, and continue
to be recognized as having a constitutional status in Israeli
jurisprudence, led by the world renowned Israeli Supreme Court Ior
its proIessionalism and relentless eIIorts to enshrine human rights,
is Iar Irom the truth. Only women enjoy the beneIits oI ICESCR
and its parallels in other treaties. As Iar as claiming that the Israeli
Supreme Court is 'world renowned such selI laudatory words Irom
the Government are ill deserved. In Iact, the Supreme Court in
Israel suIIers Irom lack oI trust Irom almost all sectors oI society, as
it is a collection oI condescending judges, who are detached Irom
the normal diIIiculties oI living in Israel.
43.!16. To the extent the Government claims in 16-24 that 'in
2007, the Government adopted a Socio-Economic Agenda geared
towards reducing socio-economic gaps, we note that the
Government acts by way oI inventing useless patch work agendas
and initiatives, which are meaningless, and do no more than
cosmetic work Ior the selI aggrandization oI the politicians. In the
meantime, Iamilies that used to be solvent and middle income are
ramrodded by the system to Iace bankruptcy oI the man, dependence
on government hand-outs by the women, while lawyers eat up what
used the marital pot.
44.!A Government serious about carrying out the protections oI
ICESCR must eliminate all Iorms oI discrimination Irom the
legislation, so that every spouse has an equal opportunity at Family
Courts. Otherwise, all ad hoc initiatives and agendas only aggravate
a situation which is inherently discriminatory (and in that sense,
there is no other 'western society that still carries Iacially
discriminatory statutes in its books).
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11

For women Only: Non-discrimination
45.!The Government`s 'reiteration in 25 that 'the principle oI
equality is a Iundamental principle in the Israeli legal system as
portrayed both in legislation and adjudication, is again throwing
sand in the eyes oI the world. Equality is only applicable to women.
It is not applicable to men. In reality, men in dissolution oI Iamilial
relations are treated as second class citizens. They are being
discriminated against everyday by judges, social workers and police,
and they have no remedy at law, because Family Courts are
inherently hostile to men, populated by radical Ieminist judges
(Rivka Mekayes, Chana Rotschild, Hana Kitsis, ShiIra Glik, Tamar
Snunit Forer, Tova Sivan), who proIess hatred to men, and practice
hate-justice Irom the bench every day.

Article 3
Prohibition of discrimination between men and women
46.!Family Courts deliberately procrastinate issuing decisions on any
application Ior relieI submitted by the Iather, sometimes 6-12
months, while the mother`s applications are granted ex parte or
within days.
47.!Courts reIuse to conduct hearings or trials. Instead, they
schedule multiple 'conIerences. The Iather`s attorneys are
silenced, the verbal exchanges are not memorialized in a true
transcript, and the judges merely dictate to the record what they
want.
48.!Courts reIuse to summon witnesses on behalI oI the husbands or
allow cross examine social workers.
49.!Judicial determinations oI guardianship, child access, custody
and visitations without evidence, or based on evidence Iabricated by
a biased social worker. The Iact is that the entire domain oI custody
and visitations is judicially handled without probative evidence or
any shred oI Iair trial whatsoever. Every divorcing Iather is sent to
welIare authorities Ior a social worker Report. The Report is a
collection oI libel and deIamatory, non-credible evidence, together
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with some intuitions and 'sensations oI the social worker. Based
on that alone, Courts 'so order the social worker report, even iI it
'sentences Iathers to be automatically separated and alienated Irom
children. This Ieeds a booming industry oI contact-center operators,
social workers and psychologists, at the expense oI the children.
50.!Family Courts erect every obstacle possible to Joint Custody. It
is an undeIined concept and almost impossible to achieve, because
oI the practice oI automatic interim custody to the wiIe, without any
actual evidentiary hearing.
51.!The Government Iails to address the concept oI shared parenting
or joint custody. While the Government triumphs the wording in the
Guardian and Capacity Law that requires parents to mutually agree,
in Iact this is a mockery, since in divorce, parents cannot agree, and
when women get instant custody, and Iathers do not get parallel
visitations, the women gets veto rights on such visitation. When the
women are motivated by revenge, or instigated by the social
workers, the children are rendered Iatherless again.

Wasteful Childcare services expenditures
52.!On this issue, (124), we brieIly note that others NGOs Iighting
practices oI the Ministry oI welIare`s removal oI children Irom
homes, complain that children are arbitrarily removed Irom homes
oI less advantaged parents (immigrants, or poor parents) and placed
in Ioster homes or residences, and juvenile institutions that cost
thousands oI dollars per month, instead oI spending the same
amount oI cash on rehabilitation within the extended Iamily (a
grandmother or grandIather, an aunt or an uncle). There are no
mechanisms to embrace the Stockholm declaration on minimizing
outplacements oI children. Pure Iinancial greed motivates social
workers to kidnap children Irom poor Iamilies, and pay private
operators and Ioster Iamilies huge amounts oI cash, that iI spent
within the Iamily, would have solved the problems, without scarring
the children Ior the rest oI their lives. The NGO 'The Movement
Ior the Iuture oI Our Children is dedicating to Iighting both Iathers`
rights, and the rights oI mothers whose children are taken away to
Ieed a booming industry oI child institutions and Ioster homes. See:
http://yeladeinu.wordpress.com.
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53.!Once a social worker Ieels a child should be removed Irom home,
orders are issued ex parte by the Juvenile Court to remove the child
with the escort oI the police. The parent is ordered to avoid any
contact with the child, and a child who escapes the horrors oI such
institutions is charged with a criminal indictment, thereIore
permanently scarring the child`s Iuture employability. Plenty oI
Videos oI brutal kidnapping oI children by social workers are
available on Youtube. Similarly recorded video testimony oI
graduate oI these institutions detail prison like discipline,
handcuIIing, Iorced medication, physical abuse and rape by staII
and other children.
54.!On March 15, 2011, Ior example, it was reported that social
workers in North Israel petitioned the Court to remove a 14 year old
girl Irom her parents, based on a rumor that she was dating a
Muslim, and thereIore, it was alleged that the Muslim boyIriend
may abduct her to an Arab village. Judge Yuval Shedmi granted the
Petition and ordered the girl to be placed in an emergency shelter Ior
three months. Upon the parent`s appeal to the Nazareth District
Court, the order was vacated, since there was no prooI that the girl
had a boyIriend at all.
55.!On April 29, 2011, it was reported that a pregnant woman who
was a recovered drug addict, whose daughter was removed Irom her
during the addiction period, went to visit her 4 year old and 7 year
old children at the Ioster parents` home, despite an order not to
make any contact with her children. The Ioster parents complained
to the police and the woman was arrested Ior violating an order not
to approach her children. At the police station, a panic attack caused
the abortion oI the Ietus.
56.!Recently, a holocaust survivor grandmother whose
grandschildren were removed made an application to meet with the
grandchildren beIore she dies. The Ministry oI WelIare reIused the
extraordinary request.
57.!Statistical details reveal that in 2006 4,000 children were
removed Irom their homes by judicial orders. Many more were
removed by non-judicial methods` such as coerced consent.
Between 2002 and 2006 the number oI outplacements in the City oI
Yokneam tripled. In Eilat, and Ashdod, Bet Shean number
doubled. In Lod in 2006 there were 4 times more outplacements oI
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children. In Elad, six times more. In Nahariya, 7 times more
outplacements. In Nazareth, an astonishing 10 times more. The City
with the highest number oI outplacements per 10,000 inhabitants is
Tel Aviv 9ranked 8 on socio-economic indicators) with 53.55 cases.
Next door in Givatayim, also ranked 8 on the socio-economic scale,
the rate was 3.81 per 10,000 inhabitants, i.e. 14 times lower rates oI
outplacements.
58.!We note that State or city salaries social workers receive bonuses
Irom institutions Ior successIul placements oI children in residential
care Iacilities.

The Gender Implications of Legislation Law (Legislative
Amendments)
59.!The Government selI applauds the Gender Implications oI
Legislation Law which imposes a duty to systematically examine
the gender implications oI any primary and secondary legislation
beIore it is enacted by the Knesset (129). In practice, when the
entire system is based on discriminatory laws, policies and attitudes
oI Ieministic brain washing, the 'Gender Implications oI Legislation
Law is meaningless. The Government must meticulously eradicate
any Iorm oI discriminatory statute, or statutes with obvious
discriminatory impact, in order to, once and Ior all, equate the
starting point oI both parents in divorce, without preIerential
treatments and outdated presumptions.
60.!II the Government abolishes all presumptions and preIerences,
and provides a clean slate and equal opportunity at Court Ior both
sexes, there would be no need Ior patchwork legislation such as
gender Implications, or others like it. Similarly, there would be no
need Ior the 'authority Ior the Advancement oI the Status oI Women
Law 5758-1998, once the utopia oI Iull equality in Iamily rights is
implemented in the State oI Israel.

The Collection and processing of statistics
61.!Contrary to the statements in 134, the Government deliberately
Iails to publish statistics that would reveals its inadequacies and the
practices oI discrimination: (1) the average length and duration oI
Family Court proceedings, (2) the average costs to the Iather to
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15

maintain proceedings to be allowed the grace oI visitations with
children, (3) the costs to the national market in involving social
workers in every child custody and visitations dispute, (3) the level
oI satisIaction Irom Iamily Courts and Irom the services oI social
workers, (4) the level oI satisIaction Irom the operations oI the
supervised contact centers, (5) the percentage pI Iathers receving
joint custody, Iull visitations and supervised visitations compared
with other nations in the world, (6) the percentages oI Iathers
ordered to attend supervised visitations, and the level oI client
satisIaction, (7) reasons Ior supervised visitations, (8) the durations
oI child-Iather separation periods in dissolution oI Iamilial relations,
(9) the number oI Ialse domestic violence, detentions and arrests,
and the costs to the national market, (10) the number oI divorced
men committing suicide and the reasons Ior suicide (estimated at
200 per year), (11) the number oI suicides among divorced men as
opposed to the number oI murders oI women in divorce.
Article 6
The right to work
62.!The violation occurs in several respects. First, the incessant
number oI Court 'conIerences, social worker meetings or coerced
therapy sessions, the tests, meeting with attorneys, and having to see
children at supervised visitation centers during work hours, all
jeopardize Iathers` ability to maintain a job.
63.!Second, when Family Court judges impose outrageous and
unconscionable child support payments (sometimes exceeding the
salary itselI), the entire salary is garnished, and Iinding a job is
impossible, because employers cannot handle the constant stream oI
salary garnishments, and incessant Court orders against them to
transIer the salary to the mother, or be dragged into a costly
litigation.
64.!In Iact, the Courts maliciously ignore actual evidence oI actual
salary, and instead they rely on arbitrary 'imputed income, without
even hearing evidence what or why the Iather is alleged to be able to
work more hours than he actually does.
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Article 10
Familial rights
65.!In general, the right to Family liIe oI men in divorce or
dissolution oI Iamilial relations is violated in almost any imaginable
respect:
66.! The Government reIuses to interpret the adult`s right to Iamily
liIe as including his right to relationship and access with his children
during and aIter the dissolution oI the marriage.
67.!The Government compels Iathers to prove that they are Iit to be
parents during and aIter dissolution oI the marriage, rather than take
it Ior granted that the same parent who raised the child during the
marriage has a right to non-interventionist relationship with his
children during and aIter divorce.
68.! The right oI Iathers` to Iamily liIe in Israel is not judicially
handled. Rather, the Judiciary divests its powers and authorities to a
social worker, who is not bound by evidence, and is immune Irom
any scrutiny.
69.! The Iather`s right to Iamily liIe is abridged in reality and in
practice, when every Iather in dissolution oI marriage proceedings is
Iorced to become a welIare client, and be subject to threats,
intimidations and invasion oI privacy, iI and when he wishes to
exercise this right.
70.!The right to Iamily liIe is also abridged, because oI the Courts
and social workers requirement that the mother consent to the
Iather`s contact with the children.
71.!The interpretation oI 'best interests oI the child in Israel does
not include the Iathers` right to Iamily liIe. In Iact, Iathers in Israel
do not have any right to Iamily liIe whatsoever. Courts and social
workers consider contact between Iathers and children as a matter oI
judicial grace, Ior which the Iather must be eternally grateIul
(normally aIter he was impoverished to the bone).
72.!There is absolutely no reason why the Iather has to suddenly
prove that the child`s interest require that his Iather 'visit him.
73.!It is also ridiculous that Iathers are prevented Irom seeing their
own children, while other men in the liIe oI the divorced woman
enjoy Iull access to the children without any investigation by social
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17

workers. Similarly, the same divorced man who is prevented Irom
seeing his own children may meet another divorced woman and
raise her children, without anybody investigating him. So much Ior
the wisdom oI Israel`s Ministry oI Justice and Ministry oI WelIare.
For Women Only: The fundamental right to family life
74.!Discrimination against men exists in the area oI division oI
marital property. Contrary to the Government`s statement in 366,
property divisions between spouses in dissolution are never even-
handedly determined.
75.!To begin with, a man cannot protect his assets by way oI a
prenuptial agreement, because judges are quick to vacate or annul
prenuptial agreements on Irivolous allegations oI Iraud or
concealment.
76.!Second, Courts are quick to award women a monetary
distribution based on unproven Iuture values oI investments,
pensions and proIessional licenses, thus drastically reducing the
current distributive share oI the husband, based on a Iictitious
Iinding oI 'Iuture values oI the 'husband`s 'capital.
77.!Third, because distribution oI marital assets is usually delayed by
3 to 4 years, meanwhile outrageous interim maintenance awards,
and costly attorney Iees, start eating up anything that will be leIt Ior
the husband to receive 3-4 years aIter the case starts, thus leaving
the husband with nothing, and artiIicially shiIting the marital assets
to the woman.
Definition of spouses includes casual sex partners
78.!As to the deIinition oI 'Spouses in 368, while the Government
applauds certain insigniIicant decisions as being noteworthy, the
Iact is that Family Court judges do anything to accommodate the
needs oI women. For example, judges have also extended the
deIinition oI a 'spouse even to partners oI casual sex, who get
accidentally pregnant, or trick their casual partner into unprotected
sex, resulting in birth oI a child (sperm theIt). To accommodate the
needs oI the casual sex partner to obtain jurisdiction in the Family
Court, the judges readily include such Iemale sperm thieves as
'spouses or 'common law spouses,('due to a 'special
relationship), and then the onslaught on the liIe oI the male victim
oI sperm theIt begins: character assassination, ridiculization,
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labelling as violent, denial oI visitations and the general annihilation
oI the man`s selI respect, and privacy.
A joke: Strengthening and protecting the family
79.!The Government`s statement in 369 that it works to 'strengthen
and protect the Iamily is a joke. Because the single Family Law
encourages women in divorce to apply Ior Government beneIits as a
single mother, the Government actually gives incentives to the
break-up oI Iamilies rather than to the protection oI the Iamily.
80.!Once the Iamily unit is broken, instead oI protecting what is leIt
oI the Iamily`s parent-child relationships, the Government
encourages the disengagement oI children Irom their Iathers, and the
compulsory resort to supervised visitations.
No Protection of children, art. 10(3)
81.!It cannot be said that the children are protected in Israel. On the
contrary, the judges and social workers disengage Iathers Irom
children on a regular basis, and thus creating a generation oI
children with unnecessary gulit Ieelings, unnecessary abandonment
phobias, and parental loyalty conIlicts. Those children are not
protected Irom the alienating spouse (woman). On the contrary, the
alienation is encouraged.
82.!In Iact, the ICESCR rights are violated in every divorce case, due
to systematic practices and policies oI Courts and social workers to
disengage Iathers Irom children, in every case where the woman
opposes the visitations.
83.!The level oI Parental alienation Syndrome ('PAS) and PAS-
related litigation in Israel is the highest in the world.
84.!Although it may be conIused with Visitations ReIusal, it is a
parallel phenomenon.
85.!The Government reIuses to recognize that children need equal
and qualitative access to both their parents without intervention oI
authorities, and without compelling Iathers to spend tens oI
thousands oI dollars to win the judicial 'grace oI awarding some
minimal visitations.
86.!In Iact, Court cases repeatedly utilize warped interpretation oI the
concept oI 'Best Interests oI the Child.
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19

87.!Courts have no problem declaring that the child`s best interests
are not served by seeing his Iather. That could happen on many
grounds: allegation by a social worker that the Iather reIuses to
cooperate with social workers, mother` withholding oI consent, or
simply calling the Iather 'litigious or stubborn Ior reIusing to
accept minimal vitiations, and Iighting Ior more access.
88.!The Government Iails to deIine what the 'best interest oI the
child is. Ironically, social workers who procrastinate in preparing
Visitations Reports, and thus create lengthy separation and
alienation periods, actually invoke the best interests oI the child to
'justiIy the denial oI parental contact because oI the same
separation period that they themselves created.
89.!Similarly, when Iathers are ordered to attend supervised
visitation centers (and hour or two per week), the social workers
still invoke the 'best interest oI the child to justiIy even more
separation periods Irom the child.
90.!ICESCR Article 10(3) is thereIore violated because the state Iails
to protect children Irom Parental Alienation Syndrome and
Visitations ReIusals. At Family Courts, judges do not make
visitations schedules simultaneously with the award oI interim
custody. When Iathers are ordered to take a Parental Fitness Test,
one oI the tests seeks to elicit and encourage the child to 'snitch on
his parents, thereby placing the child in an identity crisis and
parental loyalty conIlict.

Compulsory and Needlessly Interventionist
Provision of welfare services

91.!The Coalition Ior the Children and Family notes that the
Government`s allegations in 376 reveal that too many children are
becoming clients oI welIare services, and the Iact is that too many
Iathers are involuntarily subjected to the arbitrary powers oI social
workers. Instead oI working to reduce the client base oI the welIare
services, the Ministry oI WelIare together with the Court
administration OIIice simply increase the 'client-base year aIter
year.
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92.!The deIinition oI children at risk is too overbroad. Even children
in poor households can easily be declared ar risk, and removed Irom
the homes. There is no eIIort to implement kinship Ioster care.
There is similarly no eIIort to utilize polygraph tests to root out Ialse
at risk reports. It is odd that more and more money is invested
into the welIare system, yet the number oI at risk only grows every
year. This reveals an obvious paradox, and admission that the
Government Iails in the way it delivers welIare services.
93.! ICESCR is violated also by reason oI compulsion oI Iathers to
submit to the powers oI social workers, who take control oI their
lives, and are oIIicially trained to collect libel and deIamation,
intrude on the Iather`s privacy, beyond what is necessary Ior a
determination oI rights to access with children, and destroy
reputation by way oI character assassination, sometimes using 'cut
and paste deIamatory scripts.
94.!WelIare services Iail to distinguish between reIerrals Irom
Family Court that merely require a basic proIile investigation, and
those that require intervention. The National Training School Ior
WelIare Employees emphasizes intervention in every case. This
produces a massive amount oI anger and Irustration Irom Iathers
who are IorceIully subjected to unnecessary 'interventionist
methods.

Doctored figures of Child abuse
95.!The Government`s numbers and Iigures regarding child abuse
instances (377) are completely Ialse and doctored.
96.!It is well known in Israel that the mere 'say so by a woman, that
the child was abused would create a substantial period oI suspension
oI visitations with the children. ThereIore, it is in vogue to Iabricate
allegations oI child abuse and even sexual molestation by Iathers
against their own children, simply to gain the added advantage oI
automatic suspension oI any contact between the Iather and the
children, as a tool to extract a better Iinancial settlement.
97.!Such allegations are not checked or investigated, even though
they can be easily solved with a simple polygraph test at the police
station. However, the Iabricated allegations go into criminal records
(rap sheets), and the mere transcription oI an allegation by one
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21

social worker in a report causes all others to merely parrot the
'story` to the point oI selI conviction that the allegation is indeed
true.
98.!The abuse to the children is thereIore produced by the Family
Courts themselves: Iailure to immediately direct a polygraph test
causes the children to struggle with planted Ialse memory
syndromes. It causes a deteriorating separation anxiety Irom the
person who used to be their Iather, and the children are needlessly
treated as victims oI child abuse that never happened. In addition,
those children have to deal with blatant attempts to plant Ialse
memories in their young minds.
99.!Indeed the children are oIten encouraged by social workers to
'snitch against their Iathers, (per social worker`s Manual 3.28), and
are thereIore placed in an untenable loyalty conIlict as pawns in
games oI adults.
Inequality of treatment (Primitive treatment of Same sex)
100.! The Government claims in 410 that 'signiIicant
developments which occurred... concerning the deIinition oI
'Iamily in reIerence to same-sex couples. In reality, a
homophobic Family Judge in Jerusalem, Phillip Marcus has recently
prevented a same sex couple Irom bringing an artiIicially
inseminated child Irom India, on the ground that as homosexuals
they are unIit to parent. The couple and child were stuck in India
Ior several months until the homophobic ruling was overturned by a
higher Court.
101.! In addition, social workers in the Tel Aviv area have
prevented a Iather Irom seeing a child and have issued restrictions
on the schedules oI visitations, because the Iather`s brother is
homosexual, and according to Israel`s social workers, 'there is
always a risk that a homosexual may take a child to a dark room,
and do things to the child. Ridiculously, the Judge assigned to the
case, Tova Sivan, whose son is homosexual as well, Iound nothing
wrong with the social workers` deplorable and primitive conduct.
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Article 11
The right to an adequate standard of living
102.! The rights under Article 11 are violated mostly in the area oI
awarding unconscionable interim and permanent child support
awards that are not based on actual income, disposable income and
co-contribution Iormulas based on both parents` income.
103.! The government authorities support the theory that
extracting unconscionable child supports Irom a Iather, even when
clearly he cannot aIIord it, is in the 'best interests oI the child, even
though it results in denials oI almost every aspect oI humane liIe
(imprisonment, lack oI bank account or credit card, inability to
work, ne exeat injunctions, and going into hiding).
104.! In reality, the payments are not made anyway because they
are unaIIordable, and the children lose their Iathers. There is no
clear Iormula Ior determining child support.
105.! Women`s incomes are not considered at all. Actual income
oI the Iather is ignored by the artiIicial concept oI 'imputed
income, and the statutory minimum child support per one child is
outrageously $430 monthly, in a Country where many people don`t
earn more than $1,500. By contrast, in New York, the minimum is
$25.
106.! In light oI the Ioregoing, the government`s statements in
419, that 'The courts in Israel continue to play a central role in the
protection oI the right to an adequate standard oI living is simply
untrue. No Court in Israel has ever applied the Basic Law. Human
Dignitv and Libertv to protect the rights oI Iathers in divorce or
dissolution oI Iamilial relations. The State claims that it is
'obligated to maintain a saIety net` designed to ensure, that the
condition oI the underprivileged would not deteriorate to one oI
existential deprivation in the sense oI a shortage in Iood, places oI
residency, sanitation, health-care services and such. However this
is exactly what happens to the 10,000 Iathers every year who are
Iorced to litigate in Family Courts oI Israel and in the post Judgment
executions OIIice aIterwards.
CCFIsrael.org
23

Article 12
The right to the highest attainable standard of health

107.! The Government violates article 12 on a constant and
systematic basis due to relentless persecution oI Iathers, who are
stripped oI everything they own, cherish and love, including
children, possessions and assets, all being transIerred to their Iormer
wiIe, yet they are hounded by Child Support executions and levies
oIIice Ior the rest oI their lives. All oI these Iathers live stressIul
lives coupled with mental anguish resulting Irom disengagement
Irom their children.

108.! This also brings 200 divorced Iathers every year to commit
suicide, compared with only 5 divorced women. The rate oI suicide
among divorced men is the highest in the country. When Iathers
commit suicide, children lose Iathers, and grow up in an unhealthy
environment, when they are likely to develop separation anxiety and
lack oI trust in society.

109.! In conclusion, the laws aIIecting human rights in general,
and ICESCR in particular are either plain discriminatory, or
implemented in a discriminatory manner. Fathers are separated and
alienated Irom children, and children routinely lose one parent
during the divorce. The State oI Israel is responsible Ior a whole
generation oI de-Iacto orphans with living parents, sometimes two
blocks away.
Complaint of Amir Toby v. State of Israel
2
1

COMPLAINT OF AMIR TOBY V. STATE OF ISRAEL

May 27, 2011
Human Rights Council and Treaties Division
Complaint Procedure
OHCHR-UNOG
1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland
Fax: (41 22) 917 90 11, E-mail: CP@ohchr.org

Re: HR Council 1503 Complaint v. Israel

This is a complaint invoking the 1503 Procedure pursuant to ECOSOC resolution
1503 (XLVIII) of 27 May 1970 as revised by resolution 2000/3 of 19 June 2000
against the State of Israel submitted by a citizen of Israel.
Date: May 27, 2011
I. Information on the complainant:
Name: Toby First Name: Amir
Nationality: Israel DOB, Place of Birth: April 15, 1966
Israel
Address: 17 Manne Street, apt 11, Tel Aviv
Email: amirtoby@gmail.com
Submitting the communication:
on the author's own behalf: YES
on behalf of another person: NO
If you are acting with the knowledge and consent of that person, please provide
that person's authorization for you to bring this complaint Or
If you are not so authorized, please explain the nature of your relationship with
that person: ...............................................................................................................
and detail why you consider it appropriate to bring this complaint on his or her
behalf:

II. State concerned/Articles violated:
Israel, Ministers responsible: Yaakov Neeman, Minister of Justice and
Moshe Kahlon, Minister of Welfare.

Articles of the Covenant or Convention alleged to have been violated:
ICESCR: Articles 2(2), 3, 6, 10(1), 10(3), 11, and 12.
ICCPR: Articles 2(3), 3, 7, 9, 10, 14, 17, 18, 19, 23, 24 and 26.

''2''
2

III. Exhaustion of domestic remedies/Application to other international procedures

Steps taken by or on behalf of the alleged victims to obtain redress within the State concerned for the
alleged violation - detail which procedures have been pursued, including recourse to the courts and other
public authorities, which claims you have made, at which times, and with which outcomes:

My application to join a Petition to the High Court of Justice (HCJ) in
Jerusalem, Adam Zer v. Ministry of Welfare, docket No. Bagatz 2111/11 was
denied on April 4, 2011 by the Hon. Judge Yzhak Amit. The HCJ is the highest
Court in the State empowered to grant administrative relief and declare laws as
unconstitutional. By denying me the right to join this Petition, my claims for
violations of human rights by the State of Israel cannot be submitted to any other
Court or tribunal. Moreover, on May 16, 2011, Judge Amit issued a warning that
because more applicants are moving the Court to join this petition, he is
considering dismissing it in its entirety.

The Declaratory Relief Petition, filed on March 15, 2011 sought to compel the
Ministry of Welfare to implement equal treatment of men and women during
divorce, abolish all preferential treatment in favor of women, and cease
immediately from the cruel and inhuman practices of state-sponsored child
disengagement from fathers during divorce and separation.

In particular, the Petition sought to abolish Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law,
Section 25, to the extent it is interpreted to require the mothers consent as a
condition to the fathers visitations. The Petition further sought to declare the
automatic referral of fathers to supervised visitation centers as unconstitutional.

The policy of conditioning child visitations on the consent of the mother was flatly
rejected by ECHR many years ago in Elsholz v. Germany, 2 FLT [2000], Sahin
v. Germany, Sommerfeld v. Germany, and Hoffmann v. Germany. All of
these ECHR cases dealt with mothers consent to fathers visitations, and the
resulting alienation of children from fathers.

The Petition alleges that Israel is signatory to international covenants such as
ICCPR, ICESCR and CRC, but it systematically refuses to interpret the right to
family life as including the automatic right of fathers to access the children
without state intervention or interference. Instead, the state and its courts require
the father to demonstrate why the childs best interest warrants that there be some
access to the child by the father. To that end, the Court compels fathers to submit
to the authority of social workers (CSW) for writing a report, and then
supervising visitations, while women get automatic interim custody without a fair,
evidentiary and adversarial hearing.
3

In Many cases, fathers are required to prove there are fit by taking Parental
Fitness Tests and Dangerous propensity tests, which cost thousands of dollars.

There were 29 additional applications of fathers in similar situations to join the
Adam Zer Petition, but the Honorable Judge Yizhak Amit dismissed all such
applications on the ground that the HCJ does not need amicus curiae. When
additional applications were being filed, Judge Amit issued a sua sponte
warning that if more such applications would come in, he will contemplate
dismissing the petition in its entirety.

Thus, I have reached the highest level of the Judiciary in Israel, and was denied
the opportunity to be heard. Needless to say that the pre-dismissal warning issued
to the two Petitioners (Adam Zer, a minor age 5 and a half, and his father, Daniel
Zer, both have not seen each other in two years despite living 5 street blocks from
each other), indicates that the Judiciary in Israel intends to perpetuate the
discriminatory practices, which I am complaining about.

If you have not exhausted these remedies on the basis that their application would be unduly prolonged,
that they would not be effective, that they are not available to you, or for any other reason, please explain
your reasons in detail: N/A
Have you submitted the same matter for examination under another procedure of international investigation
or settlement (e.g. the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the European Court of Human
Rights, or the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights)? NO.
If so, detail which procedure(s) have been, or are being, pursued, which claims you have made, at which
times, and with which outcomes: N/A

IV. Facts of the complaint

Personal aspects of the complaint:

I am a second class citizen of Israel, because I am a father in divorce proceedings.
That means that I am entitled to no rights whatsoever and that I am subjected to
deprivation of life, liberty and properly without due process and without equal
protection of the laws.

I am now 45 years old with 16 years of education. I have three children, ages 11,
15, 17 today. I separated from my former wife in 2008. I am in litigation in
Family Court two (2) years. The Court awarded limited visitations, and I still do
not have full, natural and meaningful relationship with the Child. I have spent
already $30,000 in divorce lawyers (100,000 NIS).

4

Family Court

The Court which deprives me of my rights is the Family Court in Haifa. The
name of the Judge is Ella Meraz.

The wife received immediate and automatic custody. There was no hearing or
trial on temporary custody and there was no hearing or custody on visitations. No
witnesses appeared. No cross examination was allowed. The Judges uses
conferences as a technique to avoid actual adversarial trials. It is a judicial
vehicle for the Judge to dictate what new draconian measures against the man, he
wishes to impose.

In the course of two years there were already 10 conferences, yet no actual trials.
Last January (2011), the Judge illegally pressured me to consent to custody with
the mother, under threats of imposing huge penalties against me. The Judge also
stated that because my entire salary is garnished in favor of child support, and I
have no disposable income, I am unfit financially to be even considered for
custody. However, the garnishment of my salary is a product of the Judges
manipulation, since she never had a real trial or took evidence regarding
temporary custody, and the same applies to the unconscionable interim, child
support, (which incredibly exceeds 100% of my salary).

Interim child support was also decided without a hearing or trial. It was decided
solely on the basis of fabricated affidavits, and by calculating the number of
children, multiplying it by the minimum, ($465 = 2,000 NIS) and adding extras
(home expenses), regardless of actual ability to pay.

The Judge also held visitations with the children as ransom by refusing to make
any visitations rulings concurrently with the award of temporary custody. Only a
year (12 months!) later, the Judge grudgingly granted some visitations.

Because I was removed from the home without warning, the wife lives in the
marital home, and I cannot afford to rent a place, because the Judge refuses to
order selling the marital home (which is owned in fee simple).

Child Support

The Judge sadistically ordered me to pay $2,400 a month (8,000 NIS) in child
support for three children, when my salary is $2,200 (7,500 NIS gross!).

Thus I do not have any disposable income. In fact, I must pay more than I make,
and my salary is being garnished by Child Support enforcement Unit. The Court
5

refuses to consider the womans income for purposes of child support, or the
mans disposable income, because child support is awarded not as a matter of civil
law, but as a matter of Jewish religious law, and the Court believes that Jewish
religion directs a minimum payment of $600 (2,000 NIS) per child, plus extras
regardless of my actual income. By contrast, in the United States, (NYS), the
minimum child support is $25 per month, not $600, and the child support per child
formula is reduced when there are more than one child (17% for one child, 25%
for two and 29% for three.

Thus, the Family Court is condemning me to a life in servitude, and I am denied
the right to adequate or minimum standard of living, since all the money I make
goes to child support, and I still owe more money every month.

Although the Guardian and Capacity Law technically states that I am co-guardian
of my children, I am not allowed to exercise one decision on connection with this
co-guardianship of the children. Co-Guardianship in Israel means sole ATM.

The Court accepts any fabricated Report which the wife produces without
allowing me cross examination. For example, the wife brought a report from a
psychologist, impersonating himself to be a psychiatrist for the allegation that the
children have special needs. As a result, I was assessed additional child support
beyond the standard.

Appeal impossible

I am now in financial ruin and I am a victim of discriminatory practices. I am
denied the right to fair trial, because it does not exist. The doors to the Appellate
Court are also closed, because of insurmountable appeal bond fees $3,000 =
(10,000 NIS, plus attorney fees and Court fees.

While the woman enjoyed the benefits of preferential treatment on account of her
sex, and received custody without a fair trial, or any trial whatsoever,

DV

In addition, there were 5 false DV (Domestic violence) complaints, followed by
several orders for exclusive occupancy of the marital home (home removal)
pending a hearing. Such hearings are constantly being adjourned.

Since the Attorney Generals Guideline 2.5 immunes women (but not men) from
prosecution for false DV arrest, the women was encouraged by the authorities to
6

file as many as she could, in order to perpetuate the child alienation and
disengagement periods, and my expulsion from the marital home.

Thus the facially discriminatory Guideline is actually a tool used to cut off
children from fathers, and give the women control over 100% of the marital
property, via a constant stream of orders of removal.

I might add that this Guideline was drafted by one of the current High Court of
Justice Judges, Edna Arbel, when she was Attorney General of the State. Thus, it
is unlikely that the HCJ will ever overturn a guideline drafted by one of its peers.

Regarding DV complaints, I might add that the state of Israel allows convictions
on the mere say-so of the purported victim. No evidence is required other than
the planted words of the wife. Prior to the divorce, there were never any DV
complaints, or complaints that I pose a danger to the well being of the child.

Legal And Factual Background

Personally, I am a divorced father, or in some other matrimonial proceeding. As
such I am treated by my own country as a second class citizen without rights,
and I am being subjected to discrimination and infringement of the above stated
covenants. The status of a man in divorce proceedings Israel is subject to
institutionalized torture and denial of civil rights. The state refused to recognize
my rights to fatherhood, family life and contact with child/ren. The State
officially interprets the right to family life as dependant on the concept of
mothers consent, a concept which the ECHR discarded long ago.

The state also maintains discriminatory and unequal statutory presumptions: the
Tender Years Presumption gives automatic custody of children to mothers. All
men are sent to social workers who act as personal criminal Probation Officers
and cancel visitations at whim. The rate of supervised visitations in Israel is the
highest anywhere (20%), see charts. The rate of childrens removal and
outplacements is the highest in the world. The rate of false arrests and false
convictions is also one of the highest, and the false arrests are one more
institutionalized tool to disengage fathers from children. .

The state also refuses to take into account the womens income in considering
amount of child support. Therefore, the rate of non-disposable income vs. award
of child support is unconscionable and must be, again, the highest in the world.
The State compels child support defendants to be bound by religious laws, even if
they are not formally affiliated with any religion or wish to denounce it.

7

The State enforces discriminatory domestic violence guidelines. Women are
exempt from false report prosecution, thus encouraging free and careless false
reports, resulting in automatic orders of removal of husbands from home. Most
disturbingly, children are routinely disengaged from their fathers, and all fathers
are subjected to compelled interventionist methods of social workers, and costly
parental fitness evaluators, thereby increasing the impoverishment of fathers
like me.

At Family Courts, the state fails to adequately publish all the applicable Family
laws in a way accessible by citizens. Only lawyers have subscription access to the
laws. The State fails to make the Family Courts accessible and user-friendly to
pro se litigants. The state has built in mechanisms to deter men from making
applications for child support reductions or visitation enlargements, as they are
usually denied with costs between $600-$1,200.

Family Courts also avoid the requirement of conducting fair trials, by simply
holding endless numbers of conferences, which are dominated by the Judge, and
the husbands attorneys are constantly silenced. Decisions on applications
benefiting husbands, such as equitable distribution or child access, are delayed for
several months deliberately. Applications benefitting women are decided within
days.

In addition, appeals from Family Court are non-affordable, since a $3,000 bond is
necessary to secure the appeal. The State also fails to provide judicial remedies,
as Family Court Judges routinely deny justice by refusing applications to summon
witnesses or financial records, denying applications to cross examine social
workers hearsay reports, or issuing a Judgment at whim, (as described in the
Adam Zer Petition, under oath), without trials at all. Family Court proceedings
lack fair justice and equal protection.

The per-capita rate of supervised visitation in Contact Centers is the highest in
the world (2,200 families per year, out of 6,000 divorces-with-children (but the
number is higher as there are 1,000-1,500 in waiting list). Periods of State-
enforced disengagement and Alienation can last 2 years, 5 years and in an extreme
case, 12 years. PAS is so prevalent in Israel, it is subject of controversy in almost
every dissolution of marriage case, and it is the State authorities that fail to protect
against it.

I note that there is no real judicial review of father-child contact, and Family Court
Judges simply delegate the authority to determine fathers levels of contact with
children to Welfare Agents (Social Workers) who serve as court aides. Women
still enjoy a presumption that they are the parent best suitable for custody under
8

Capacity and Guardianship Law, Section 25. Thus, women routinely get
primary physical custody rights on application alone, while conversely, men are
sent to social workers for investigation, character assessment and reports. The
Social workers routinely threaten the fathers, collect rumors and libels against
them, entice women to file false domestic violence complaints to expel men from
their own homes, or delay proceedings pending referrals to private and costly
Dangerous Propensity Tests or Parental Fitness Tests.

As a general rule, appointed social workers routinely send the men to see their
children in supervised visitations centers, and this is admitted in the press by the
official in charge, Simona Shteinmetz), where the fathers are treated like
criminals, branded as dangerous, and the children only get an hour or two per
week with the fathers, for several years. The supervised visitations take place at
SWs convenience, and the children only get one or two hours a week, during the
fathers work hours. Thus, when the state, via its appointed social workers
conditions visitations with children on supervised visitations (simply because of
the mothers refusal to consent), fathers accumulate absences from work and risk
losing their jobs and livelihoods, because in order to see their children, they have
to jeopardize their job.

Allegations of violation per each Article of the Covenants,

ICESCR Article 2(2) Non-discrimination and the right to a remedy. The
Covenant states: The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights
enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

The violation occurs in several areas:
1. Legislation: "Tender Years Presumption favors women in custody
disputes. It affords women automatic interim custody without any
evidentiary hearing. It also creates disengagement/alienation of fathers
from children during long and intolerable periods.
2. Legislation: Child support awards are unconscionable and do not take into
account the womens income.
3. Practices: While fathers must await a social workers report, mothers get
instant custody, and indirectly receive the power to block the fathers
access to see their own children.
4. Legislation: There is no legislation or provisions in the Social Workers
Manual addressing joint custody, thus fathers are denied the right to equal
opportunity to be a significant factor in their childrens lives post-
dissolution of marriage.
9

5. Attorney General/Police Guidelines: Guideline 2.5 exempts mothers from
the consequences of false domestic violence complaints. The Police does
not normally accept complaints of abused men.
6. Civil Procedure: Family Courts deliberately procrastinate deciding on
applications benefiting husbands.
7. Civil Procedure: Lack of Appellate remedies from Family Courts due to
unaffordable appeal bond, which effectively block most middle-class men
from appealing.

ICESCR Article 3 Equal Rights of Men and women The Covenant states: The
States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the
enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the present Covenant.

The violation occurs in the same manner described in ICESCR Article 2.

ICESCR Article 6 The right to work. The Covenant states: The States Parties to the
present Covenant recognize the right to work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to
gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts, and will take appropriate steps to safeguard this
right.

The violation occurs in several respects. First, the incessant number of Court
conferences, social worker meetings or coerced therapy sessions, the tests,
meeting with attorneys, and having to see children at supervised visitation centers
during work hours, all jeopardize fathers ability to maintain a job. Second, when
Family Court Judges impose outrageous and unconscionable child support
payments (sometimes exceeding the salary itself), the entire salary is garnished,
and finding a job is impossible, because employers cannot handle the constant
stream of salary garnishments, and incessant Court orders against them to transfer
the salary to the mother, or be dragged into a costly litigation.

In fact, the Courts maliciously ignore actual evidence of actual salary, and instead
they rely on arbitrary imputed income, without even hearing evidence what or
why the father is alleged to be able to work more hours than he actually does.

ICESCR Article 10(1) The right to family life. The Covenant states : The widest
possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental
group unit of society, particularly for its establishment and while it is responsible for the care and education
of dependent children. Marriage must be entered into with the free consent of the intending spouses.

The violation occurs in several respects:
1. The state refuses to interpret the adults right to family life as including his
right to relationship and access with his children during and after the
dissolution of the marriage.
2. The state compels fathers to prove that they are fit to be parents during and
10

after dissolution of the marriage, rather than take it for granted that the
same parent who raised the child during the marriage has a right to non-
interventionist relationship with his children during and after divorce.
3. The right of fathers to family life in Israel is not judicially handled.
Rather, the Judiciary divests its powers and authorities to a social worker,
who is not bound by evidence, and is immune from any scrutiny.
4. The fathers right to family life is abridged in reality and in practice, when
every father in dissolution of marriage proceedings is forced to become a
welfare client, and be subject to threats, intimidations and invasion of
privacy, if and when he wishes to exercise this right.
5. The right to family life is also abridged, because of the Courts and social
workers requirement that the mother consent to the fathers contact with
the children.
6. The interpretation of best interests of the child does not include the
fathers right to family life. There is absolutely no reason why the father
has to suddenly prove that the childs interest require that his father visit
him.

ICESCR Article 10(3) Protection of Children. The Covenant states Special measures
of protection and assistance should be taken on behalf of all children and young persons without any
discrimination for reasons of parentage or other conditions.

The violation occurs because the state fails to protect children from Parental
Alienation Syndrome and Visitations Refusals. At Family Courts, Judges do not
make visitations schedules simultaneously with the award of interim custody.
When fathers are ordered to take a Parental Fitness Test, one of the tests seeks to
elicit and encourage the child to snitch on his parents, thereby placing the child
in an identity crisis and parental loyalty conflict.

ICESCR Article 11 Adequate Standard of Living. The Covenant states The right to an
adequate standard of living The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to
an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing,
and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to
ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-
operation based on free consent.

The violation occurs mostly in the area of awarding unconscionable interim and
permanent child support awards. The State authorities support the theory that
extracting unconscionable child supports from a father, even when clearly he
cannot afford it, is in the best interests of the child, even though it results in
denials of almost every aspect of humane life (imprisonment, lack of bank account
or credit card, inability to work, n exeat injunctions, and going into hiding). The
payments are not made anyway because they are unaffordable, and the children
11

lose their fathers. There is no clear formula for determining child support.
Womens incomes are not considered at all. Actual income of the father is
ignored by the artificial concept of imputed income, and the statutory minimum
child support per one child is outrageously $430 monthly, in a Country where
many people dont earn more than $1,500. By contrast, in New York, the
minimum is $25.

ICESCR Article 12 The right to health. The Covenant states : The States Parties to the
present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health.

The violation occurs due to relentless persecution of fathers, who are stripped of
everything they own, cherish and love, including children, possessions and assets,
all being transferred to their former wife, yet they are hounded by Child Support
executions and levies office for the rest of their lives. All of them live stressful
lives coupled with mental anguish resulting from disengagement from their
children. This also brings 200 divorced fathers every year to commit suicide,
compared with only 5 divorced women. The rate of suicide among divorced men
is the highest in the country. When fathers commit suicide, children lose fathers,
and grow up in an unhealthy environment, when they are likely to develop
separation anxiety and lack of trust in society.

ICCPR Article 2(3) Effective Remedy against persons in Official Capacity.
The Covenant states Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person
whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding
that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; (b) To ensure that any
person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial,
administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal
system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.

The violation occurs due to a statutory immunity afforded to social workers, who
become the actual Judges of each case. The Ministry of Welfare refuses to
establish an ombudsman, or an ethical grievance committee. The CSW are free
to torment fathers, collect libel, coerce psycho therapy sessions, ignore the social
workers Manual, and encourage filing of false police complaints, as well as
visitations refusals and mental alienation of the children against the fathers. Yet,
there is no effective remedy against them due to immunity, which is equal to that
of a Judge. Thus, the Judiciary divests its jurisdiction to determine custody and
visitations disputes in favor of social workers, cloaking them with immunity from
any negligent or malicious acts, thus preventing any effective remedy against the
CSWs.
ICCPR Article 3 Equal Rights of Men and Woman - The Covenant states : The
enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present Covenant.
12

The violation occurs in the same manner described under ICESCR Article 2(2).
ICCPR Article 7 - torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. The Covenant states: No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to
medical or scientific experimentation.

The violation occurs, in general, when the State forces fathers to submit to the
authority of a social worker, as a condition to seeing their children, yet they know
in advance that they will be subject to years of character assassination.

More specifically, those fathers who must take Parental Fitness Tests, are
essentially being degraded, punished, and subjected without consent to non-
scientific experimentation, since such tests are non scientific, and all treatise on
the area agree that this may be a tool for prediction, but it is highly subjective,
non-scientific and non-clinical. Moreover, it is plain degrading for a the father
who, devotedly raised his children during the marriage, and was certainly fit be a
parent, and now all of a sudden comes the state of Israel and doubts his ability to
parent, and the only difference in that the wife open dissolution of marriage case
in court.
ICCPR Article 9 Liberty Security and No Arbitrary Arrest. The Covenant
states: 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with
such procedure as are established by law. 2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the
time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges
against him. 3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought
promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and
shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general
rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to
guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should
occasion arise, for execution of the judgement. 4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty
by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that
that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his
release if the detention is not lawful. 5. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful
arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.

1. Lack of appointed counsel to those facing jail on account of non-payment
of outrageous and unconscionable child support arrears.
2. Ex parte detention orders and orders of removal from the marital home on
the basis of the complaining womans allegation alone without a shred of
corroboration or supporting evidence.
3. Arbitrary detention of fathers disengages children. The State fails to
implement procedures to screen false domestic violence complaints
launched by women. Women are immune from prosecution for false DV.
On the basis of accusation alone, with no evidence, police issues orders of
13

removals of fathers from marital homes for 30 days, as well as summons
for interrogation and detention. This again results in separation from, and
alienation of children for an automatic 30 days period, and the automatic
supervised visitations for the next several years. The State must abolish
State Attorney General Guideline 2.5 (non prosecution for DV), and
introduce on- the- spot polygraphs at initial DV complaints in police
precincts. False and malicious complaints must be prosecuted to the full
extent of the law.

ICCPR Article 10 Dignity In Deprivation of Liberty - The Covenant states 1. All
persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of
the human person.

The violation occurs due to excessive training of police officers, social workers
and Judges to treat all males as potential aggressors, and all females as potential
victims of violence, regardless of the fact that on the eve of the divorce no prior
DV occurrences existed. As a result, fathers are treated as guilty of DV offenses,
before their guilt has been proven, by almost every official they come in contact
with. Moreover, the criminal records are not expunged, even in the rare cases of
dismissal or withdrawal of the DV complaint. The persons dignity is therefore
forever tarnished by a criminal, unexpunged rap sheet.
ICCPR Article 14 (1) Equality in Courts. The Covenant states 1. All persons shall be
equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his
rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The press and the public may be
excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or national security in a
democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent
strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the
interests of justice; but any judgement rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at law shall be made public
except where the interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial
disputes or the guardianship of children.
The violation occurs in the same respect as ICCPR Article 23.
ICCPR Article 17 Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home,
Honor and Reputation. The Covenant states: 1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his
honour and reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks.
The violation occurs mostly due to compulsion of fathers to submit to the powers
of social workers, who take control of their lives, and are officially trained to
collect libel and defamation, intrude on the fathers privacy, beyond what is
necessary for a determination of rights to access with children, and destroy
reputation by way of character assassination, sometimes using cut and paste
defamatory scripts.
14

ICCPR Article 18 Freedom of Religion - The Covenant states: 1. Everyone shall have
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to
adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 2. No one
shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his
choice.

The violation occurs in the area of child support. While the State has a civil child
support statute on the books regarding equal contribution of both parents to child
support, the Civil Court Judges ignore the law and compel citizens to be bound by
religious law. Under religious Jewish law, the wifes income is not taken into
account, and the husbands income is also, not taken into account. Instead it is a
strict formula of multiplying a hefty minimum by the number of children, and
then adding extras. As a result, outrageous child support awards are ordered,
supposedly pursuant to religious law, and it deprives citizens of the right to be free
from religion.

ICCPR Article 19 Right to Opinion - The Covenant states: 1. Everyone shall have
the right to hold opinions without interference.
The violation occurs in three respects:

1. The State authorities are tormenting and persecuting father activists.
Fathers who publish on the internet guides for other fathers, or who share
their horror stories on fathers rights web sites, find themselves at Court
being threatened that they will lose rights of access, if they continue
educating the public on the internet, or lobbying for the change of the
draconian family laws.
2. Owners of womens shelters send the police to search homes of fathers
rights activists under false claims that the activists harbor illegal guns (case
of Moshe Aberjil v. Ruth Reznik).
3. Recently, a Judge in Tel Aviv District Family Court Judge, Mira Dahan,
issued a $10,000 (35,000 NIS) penalty against a father who wrote in a blog
that he is crying every night because his daughter cannot sleep at his
residence. Thus the Judiciary is now forbidding freedom of private non-
activist speech on facebook and local internet forums.

ICCPR Article 23 Equality of Spouses in Dissolution - The Covenant states
1. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society
and the State 4. States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality
of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. In the case of
dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary protection of any children.

The violation occurs in various areas, and we do take into account Israels
reservation to Article 23 that matters of personal status are governed in Israel
15

by religious law of the parties concerned. However, the state does not provide an
option for a party to opt out, when his affiliation with religious law does not exist.
Further, matter of child support awards are not matters of personal status. They
are monetary/pecuniary matters, and therefore the reservation filed by Israel does
not cover the unconscionable male-discrimination existing in that area, under the
guise that child support should also supposed to be determined pursuant to
religious law, in a civil court (despite the existence of a civil child support law,
that applies to nobody).

1. Family Courts deliberately procrastinate any application for relief
submitted by the father, sometimes 6-12 months, while the mothers
applications are granted ex parte or within days.
2. Courts refuse to conduct hearings or trials. Instead, they schedule
conferences. The fathers attorneys are silenced, the verbal exchanges
are not memorialized in a true transcript, and the Judges merely dictate to
the record what they want.
3. Courts refuse to summon witnesses on behalf of the husbands or cross
examine social workers.
4. Judicial determinations of guardianship, child access, custody and
visitations without evidence, or based on evidence fabricated by a biased
CSW. The fact is that the entire domain of custody and visitations is
judicially handled without probative evidence or any shred of fair trial
whatsoever. Every divorcing father is sent to welfare authorities for a CSW
Report. The Report is a collection of libel and defamatory, non-credible
evidence, together with some intuitions and sensations of the social
worker. Based on that alone, Courts so order the CSW report, even if it
sentences fathers to be automatically separated and alienated from
children. This feeds a booming industry of contact centers, social workers
and psychologists, at the expense of the children.
5. Family Courts erect every obstacle possible to Joint Custody. It is an
undefined concept and almost impossible to achieve, because of the
practice of automatic interim custody to the wife, without any actual
evidentiary hearing.
6. The State fails to address the concept of shared parenting or joint custody.
While the State triumphs the wording in the Guardian and Capacity Law
that requires parents to mutually agree, in fact this is a mockery, since in
divorce, parents cannot agree, and when women get instant custody, and
fathers do not get parallel visitations, the women gets veto rights on such
visitation. When the women are motivated by revenge, or instigated by the
Social Workers the children are rendered fatherless again.

16

ICCPR Article 24 (1) Protection of Child. The Covenant states: Every child shall have,
without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or
birth, the right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his
family, society and the State.

The violation occurs due to systematic practices and policies of Courts and social
workers to disengage fathers from children, in every case where the woman
opposes the visitations. The level of Parental alienation Syndrome (PAS) is the
highest in the world. Although it may be confused with Visitations Refusal, it is a
parallel phenomenon. The State refuses to recognize that children need equal and
qualitative access to both their parents without intervention of authorities, and
without compelling fathers to spend tens of thousands of dollars to win the judicial
grace of awarding some minimal visitations.

In fact, Court cases repeatedly utilize warped interpretation of the concept of
Best Interests of the Child. Courts have no problem declaring that the childs
best interests are not served by seeing his father. That could happen on many
grounds: refusal to cooperate with social workers, mother withholding of
consent, or simply calling the father litigious or stubborn for refusing to accept
minimal vitiations, and fighting for more access.

The State fails to define what the best interest of the child is. Ironically, social
workers who procrastinate in preparing Visitations Reports and thus create lengthy
separation and alienation periods, actually invoke the best interests of the child to
justify the denial of parental contact. Similarly, when fathers are ordered to
attend supervised visitation (and hour or two per week), they still invoke the best
interest of the child to justify even more separation periods from the child.

ICCPR Article 26 Equal Protection and No Discrimination - The Covenant
states: All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

The violation occurs in many respects, as describe elsewhere above.

In conclusion, the laws affecting Human rights and CRC implementation
in Israel are either plain discriminatory, or implemented in a discriminatory
manner. Fathers are separated and alienated from children, and children routinely
lose one parent during the divorce. The State of Israel is responsible for a whole
generation of de-facto orphans with living parents, sometimes two blocks away.
17

Wherefore, I ask that the Human Rights Council find this Complaint admissible,
and work with the State of Israel towards compliance with the States international
undertakings.

V. Checklist of supporting documentation (copies, not originals, to be
enclosed with your complaint):

Due to lack of material in English, and the lack of any official translation of Israeli
statutes into English, I am attaching several available records, refer to the English
pages in the web site of the Coalition for the Children and Family (Israel) at
www.ccfisrael.org, and note that a documentary movie documenting five years of
fights of fathers in similar situation, which due to copyrights will be released soon,
and can visually support this Complaint and its admissibility.

Complaint of Igal Uriel v. State of Israel
3
1

COMPLAINT OF IGAL URIEL v. STATE OF ISRAEL

May 27, 2011
Complaint Procedure
OHCHR-UNOG


Date: May 27, 2011
Name: Uriel First Name: Igal
Nationality: Israel
DOB, Place of Birth: October 12 1968
Tel Aviv, Israel
Address: 103 Hahagana Street, Tel Aviv, Israel
Email: IGALU@TEFEN.co.il
that person: ...............................................................................................................
behalf:



''3''
2







3







I am a second class citizen of Israel, because I am a divorced father. That means
that I am entitled to no rights whatsoever and that I am subjected to deprivation of
life, liberty and properly without due process and without equal protection of the
laws.

I am now 42 years old with 12 years of education. I have two children, ages 9 and
11 today. I separated from my former wife in 2003. I am in litigation in Family
Court eight (8) years. The Court awarded limited visitations, and I still do not
have full, natural and meaningful relationship with the Child. I have spent already
$30,000 in divorce lawyers (100,000 NIS).

4

Family Court

The Court which deprives me of my rights is the Family Court in Ramat Gan. The
name of the Judge is Yzhak Shenhav.

I am already 8 years in litigation in Family court. There were more than 100
conferences, not hearings in several courts and tribunals (appeals). I note that
because I refused to attend a supervised visitations center, 4 months of
suspension of visitations followed, as a penalty. Also, I refused to take Parental
Fitness Test, on the ground that it is not scientific; it is meaningless prediction
tool, unconstitutional, costly and a dilatory tactic. The Judge took this under
advisement as an inference against my fitness.

The wife received immediate and automatic custody within 10 minutes of the first
conference. The conference was scheduled within 3 days from the service of
the Complaint. I had no time to hire a lawyer. The Court refused to adjourn to
allow me time to be legally represented. I was pro se, and the Court refused to
hear anything I had to say.

There was no hearing or trial on temporary custody and there was no hearing or
custody on visitations. No witnesses appeared. No cross examination was
allowed. The Judges uses conferences as a technique to avoid actual adversarial
trials. It is a judicial vehicle for the Judge to dictate what new draconian measures
against the man, he wishes to impose.

Social Workers (CSW)

race, and received custody without a fair trial, or any trial whatsoever, I was
compelled to submit to the authority of a Social worker, whose names are Ofra
Messika, Shosh Cohen and Ms. Luda, so that they would write a Social Report
about whether they allow me the grace of maybe seeing the child.

The court ordered the CSW Report only after one full year from the filing of my
application for custody. The CSW procrastinated deliberate one year and 4
months until they finally submitted a fuirst Report. That was two years and 4
months after my counterclaim for custody was filed.

After that, 3 more reports were necessary, plus another report from Committee
of Social workers in a panel opf three, so together 5 reports were prepared. This
procedural tool of ordering one social report after another is merely a judicial
vehicle to fatigue the father and cause him to simply give up his claim for custody.
5

The CSW understand the message, and in return they deliberately procrastinate the
Reports

The social workers simply collected any piece of libel and defamation they could
get, and encouraged the wife to manufacture more lies. It appears that character
assassination of men is the usual practice of such Social workers. I may add that
the Social worker is cloaked with absolute immunity, just like a Judge. In fact,
once she is appointed, the CSW becomes the real Judge of the case.

The first CSW refused to perform a house visit at my place, contrary to CSW
manual (which has a binding effect). She refused to report to me about the
physical conditions at the mothers residence. Also, she refused to verify
information from available witnesses in my favor, or to accept evidence that I tried
to submit about abuse by the mother. CSW also refused to address any
occurrences of denial or cancellation of visitations. Also, CSW refused to listen to
the children, who were being raised by the mothers new lover. Ironically, while
the Judge believes that I as the natural and biological father, must submit to the
charade investigation of the CSW to see my children, he did not think that new
lover of my ex wife, an alcoholic, needs a license to raise children, while he is
raising my own children without investigation. All reports were mere fabrications
and delusions of a blinded CSW indoctrinated by the system to torment fathers,
depress them, and pose any obstacle to visitations or parental custody. In fact, one
of the CSW was a personal friend of the mother, and even this fact did not
disqualify her from serving as a court-appointed CSW.

I might add that one of the CSW tried to compel me to see the children only in a
supervised center, and because I refused, a 4 months period of disengagement
from the children ensued.

Then, the CSW tried to compel psychological treatments, and also forced
prescription of Ritalin for the children. This was coupled with constant advice
from the CSW to file domestic abuse claims against me for seven years.

Child Support

While my salary was $2,000 a month (7,000 NIS), the Court ordered me to pay
$1,825 (6,200 NIS) in monthly child support, plus $800 in monthly spousal
support (2,700 NIS). This means I was ordered to pay monthly $2,625 (8,900
NIS), per month, which is $625 above my salary. The Judge simply invalidated a
pre-nuptial agreement, which was legalized and so ordered by a family Court
Judge, and imposed this outrageous and unconscionable child support and spousal
support. The consequences are self evident.
6

Needless to say that although Family Court is a civil Court, child support
determinations are based on religious law, whether I am observant, or not.

DV

In addition, there were over 100 false DV (Domestic violence complaints),
followed by 5 criminal indictments. I was acquitted from all five indictments.
However, each indictment caused several months of disengagement from the
children, tremendous costs, colossal waste of time, denial of opportunity to work,
and, of course, loss of liberty.

Since the Attorney Generals Guideline 2.5 immunes women (but not men) from
prosecution for false DV arrest, the women was encouraged by the authorities and
the social workers to file as many as she could, in order to perpetuate the child
alienation and disengagement periods. Thus the facially discriminatory Guideline
is actually a tool used to cut off children from fathers. I might add that this
Guideline was drafted by one of the current High Court of Justice Judges, Edna
Arbela, when she was Attorney General of the State.

Regarding DV complaints, I might add that because the state of Israel allows
convictions on the say-so of the purported victim, no evidence is required other
than the planted words of the wife. Prior to the divorce, there were never any
DV complaints, or complaints that I pose a danger to the well being of the child.



7



like me.


days.


8

against it.





9

from appealing.



right.



10


the children.
him.




11

minimum is $25.




12

CSWs.


in court.

13

extent of the law.
the human person.

attacks.
14

defamatory scripts.
choice.

from religion.



15



16







17


undertakings.

Author's signature:



Complaint of Nisan Ben Guy v. State of Israel
4
1

COMPLAINT OF NISAN BEN GUY V. STATE OF ISRAEL

May 27, 2011
Complaint Procedure
OHCHR-UNOG


Date: May 27, 2011
Name: Ben Guy First Name: Nisan
Nationality: Israel DOB, Place of Birth: March 19, 1961
(USSR) Uzbekistan
Address: 22 Hamesila Street, Apt 3, Pardes Hana, Israel

Email: NISANBG@GMAIL.COM
that person: ...............................................................................................................
behalf:


''4''
2







3







life, liberty, properly and right to family life, without due process and without
equal protection of the laws.

I am now 50 years old with 15 years of education. I have two children, ages 3
years and 1.5 today. I separated from my wife in 2009. I am in litigation in
Family Court for a year and a half (1.5). The Court awarded limited visitations,
and I still do not have full, natural and meaningful relationship with my children.
I have spent already $16,000 on divorce lawyers (55,000 NIS).

4

Family Court

The Court which deprives me of my rights is the Family Court in Rishon LeZion.
The name of the Judge is Hani Shira. So far there were 3 conferences in a year
and a half, and no actual fair trial hearings, and the end is far away.

The wife received immediate and automatic custody. There was no hearing or
trial on temporary custody and there was no hearing on the issues of custody or
visitations. No witnesses appeared. No cross examination was allowed. The
Judges uses conferences as a technique to avoid actual adversarial trials. It is a
judicial vehicle for the Judge to dictate what new draconian measures against the
man, she wishes to impose. I am allowed to see the children twice a week and
every other Saturday, but no sleepovers.

Social workers (CSW)

sex, and received custody without a fair trial, or any trial whatsoever, I was
compelled to submit to the authority of a Social worker, whose name is Michal
Halfon, so that she would write a Social Report about whether she allows me the
grace of maybe seeing the children. The Court simply procrastinates every
application for relief filed by a man, but when an application is filed by the
woman, the Court gives it immediate attention.

I waited for this Social worker Report 4 months. The social worker simply
collected any piece of libel and defamation she could get, and encouraged the wife
to manufacture more lies. It appears that character assassination of men is the
usual practice of such Social workers. I may add that the Social worker is cloaked
with absolute immunity, just like a Judge. In fact, once she is appointed, the SW
becomes the real Judge of the case.

The CSW wrote her report without even meeting with me or conducting
interaction with children as required by social Workers Manual, which has a
binding effect. She simply refuses to listen to me at all, and writes everything that
is fabricated by the former wife. Reading the Report gives the impression of cut
and paste work, simply copying the trash she disseminated on previous clients.
This is evident, because the name of the former wife was mistaken three times.
My application to appoint a new CSW resulted in a $250=870 NIS penalty against
me by the Judge.
Needless to say that the CSW gave malicious advise to the woman how to
improve her odds of getting better impression in the Report using lies and
fabrications.
5

Further, I had to pay $3,500 for a useless psychologists Parental fitness Exam.
Once again this appeared to be a "cut and paste" job designed to stencil the usual
compliments to the woman, at the expense of the fathers right to equal access.

Both these "professionals", whose job should be based on a "Child's best interest",
did not fulfill this principle at all, but rather a "Woman's best interest"!!!

Child support

The Court ordered me to pay 50% of my salary as child support for 2 children.
My salary is close to $3,000 (10,000 NIS), and the child support order is for
$1,500 - 5,000 NIS. It does not take into consideration the womans income, it is
unfairly and unduly oppressive, and perhaps 3 times higher than what is awarded
in more developed countries, where both parents incomes are taken into account.
Moreover, it is allegedly based on religious law, and not on civil law. (Religious
law, as interpreted by the Civil Family Courts requires a minimum child support
multiplied by the number of children regardless of the fathers income or
disposable income).




6


like me.


days.


against it.

7





8

from appealing.



right.




9

the children.
him.




10

minimum is $25.




CSWs.
11



in court.

12

extent of the law.

the human person.

attacks.

13

defamatory scripts.
choice.

from religion.



14



15







16


undertakings.



Complaint of Yaakov Koren v. State of Israel
5
1

COMPLAINT OF YAAKOV KOREN V. STATE OF ISRAEL

May 27, 2011
Complaint Procedure
OHCHR-UNOG


Date: May 27, 2011
Name: Koren First Name: Yaakov
Nationality: Israel DOB, Place of Birth:
Israel
Address: 44A Hagdud HaIvri Street, Kiryat Haim
Email: korko@smile.net.il
that person: ...............................................................................................................
behalf:



''5''
2







3







life, liberty and properly without due process and without equal protection of the
laws.

I am now 51.5 years old with 13 years of education. I have three children, ages
12, 19 and 23 today. I separated from my former wife in 2004. I am still in
litigation in Family Court eight (8) years. The Court initially awarded limited
visitations, and even when the young child announced he prefers to live with me,
the father, the social workers and Court did everything in their power to stop it.
Eventually, the childs voice was heard and I got full custody, but after such a
tormented and biased litigation, I am now impoverished with no assets and cannot
provide for the child what I could, if the court was fair, honest, unbiased and
efficient.
4

The Family Court

All my money and property was liened immediately at the start of the case. I had
to borrow $5,000 from my parents to finance the litigation. I then went pro se,
and as prop se, I was ridiculed by the two Judges in the case, and lost each time.

The Court which deprives me of my rights is the Family Court in Haifa. The
name of the first Judge is Golbinski. His replacement is Benzion Berger.

The wife received immediate and automatic custody at the first initial
conference. There was no trial, hearing or witnesses. What the Judge calls
conference is merely an opportunity to dictate to the record what new strikes he
intends to unleash against me and for the benefit of the woman.

Social workers (CSW)

race, and received custody without a fair trial, or any trial whatsoever, I was
compelled to submit to the authority of a Social worker, whose name is Haya
Giron, and then Batya Zaki, so that she would write a Social Report about
whether they allows me the grace of maybe seeing the child. All in all there were
7 social worker reports, plus one secret report, which the Judge saw and referred
to it, but I never got it and never saw it. I had to contact the Minister of Welfare
himself, and only after one year I received confirmation that indeed a secret report
was filed, yet I still did not get it.

I note that when the woman demanded a Report, the SW submitted it with 30
days. When I asked for a report, it took 6 months.

The social worker simply collected any piece of libel and defamation she could
get, and encouraged the wife to manufacture more lies. It appears that character
assassination of men is the usual practice of such Social workers. I may add that
the Social worker is cloaked with absolute immunity, just like a Judge. In fact,
once she is appointed, the SW becomes the real Judge of the case.

In fact, when the child, who is now 13, was 6 years old, he told the SW in no
uncertain terms that he wants to live with me. The SW omitted this vital
information from her report.

5

Child Support

The Judge sadistically ordered me to pay $1,150 a month (3,900 NIS) in child
support for three children, when my salary was $1,450 (5,000 NIS). That left me
$300 to support myself. The Judge ruled based on religious law and ignored the
womans income. Since this child support is unconscionable, I could not pay it,
and lost my job, so I am now unemployed, and hounded by levies and CS
executions. In reality, the children lived with me half the time, and for that I got a
credit of $90 per child; otherwise I would have had to pay $270 more.

Thus I do not have any disposable income. In fact I must pay more than I make,
and my salary is being garnished by Child Support enforcement Unit. The Court
refuses to consider the womans income for purposes of child support, or the
mans disposable income, because child support is awarded not as a matter of civil
law, but as a matter of Jewish religious law, and the Court believes that Jewish
religion directs a minimum payment of $600 (2,000 NIS) per child at todays
rates, plus extras regardless of my actual income. By contrast, in the United
States, (NYS), the minimum child support is $25 per month, not $600, and the
child support per child formula is reduced when there are more than one child
(17% for one child, 25% for two and 29% for three. Thus, the Family Court is
condemning me to a life in servitude, and I am denied the right to adequate or
minimum standard of living, since all the money I make goes to child support, and
I still owe more money every month.

Equitable Distribution

Regarding equitable distribution of property, the Judge simply robbed me of all
my savings and transferred everything to the woman without fair hearing or trial.
The Court conducts conferences instead of trials. I could not appeal it, because
the barriers to appeal from Family Court are insurmountable. I was directed to
pay a hefty bond, (thousands of dollars), which I could not afford.


6



like me.


days.

7


against it.





8

from appealing.



right.


9



the children.
him.



10


minimum is $25.



11

CSWs.


in court.
12


extent of the law.
the human person.

13

attacks.
defamatory scripts.
choice.

from religion.


14




15





16


undertakings.

Authors Signature: ___



Investigative report re Judge Mekayes, graduate of the Israel
Womens Network A Monolog of a Despondent Father

EXHIBIT
''K''
www.news1.co.il
December 20
th
2007

The Vengeful Judge A Monologue of a Despondent Father
By Fi rst Department Team

They are a part of Makayes' casualty group,
and they are not letting go * Thei r story, as they
tell it, presents a harsh reality * " Makayes " or
not, these are fathers who haven't seen thei r
children * This, in itself, is a sad story

" I didn't get to be a real father "

" Without the kids, I'm losing my mind "

* * *

" I didn't get to be a real father "
Pini Zuaretz, 43 years old, works in Pelephone Company. Zuaretz's story, like many
others, reveals years of bitter experience. "Makayes had ruined my life. It's hard to
describe it in any other way. That's the essence of the entire story. My story is just
one example of many dozens of men who were hurt forever", he claims.
"I had a signed divorce agreement on February 22
nd
2002", he says with excitement.
"All that was needed was to approve it in court...". "If the agreement was signed", he
asks, "then why did it take 5 years to take care of the case?". According to him,
"Judge Makayes took the agreement and dragged it for five years of run-arounds, five
long years of uncertainty".
Zuaretz, who has already concluded his court proceedings, insists on continuing to
struggle with the system. "I've finished the deliberations in front of Judge Makayes,
but I go out to this struggle because I can't sleep at night. I cannot accept this
injustice". I did not know of the group gathered against Makayes, he says. "I don't
know if it's any consolation, but I know I'm not the only one, I am not alone. I found
out that it wasn't just me suffering because of her".
Zuaretz can't come down. "You know, during all that time I could have gone back to
live with my wife; she just prevented us from being together. Today, my daughters
don't know me anymore. I didn't get to raise the girls. I didn't get to be a father". In
one instance, says Zuaretz, "there was a complaint against me, while I was in surgery
for my cancer. The complaint was on the exact same time. The judge, instead of
checking the complaint, backs the woman up, giving her immediate restraining
orders, and in fact always accepted her requests. I never got to receive anything in
Makayes' court. I never received anything. I gave up the house, the money, the kids,
everything. My life was ruined".
Zuaretz's monologue doesn't end. It's difficult to stop the emotions from bursting out,
and the tears already trickle. "I don't know what the law is anymore, I don't know
what is justice. I sat in court miserable. I went in to see her, and I knew I'll leave with
nothing. I was a sick person, she removed me out of the house for good. I would
come back from surgeries and have nowhere to be".
"If I could turn to the minister of justice", he sums it up, I would have asked him to
investigate the whole store immediately. "She stands behind the scales of justice, but
A photo f rom the secret gathering of
the Makayes' casualties
''K''
Makayes does not represent even a shred of justice. As I've said, I am done with my
story, I pay alimony, I don't have relationship with the girls, and I can't sleep at night
with this feeling that everything was taken from me. That is why I'm here, in the
struggle".

" Without the kids, I'm losing my
mind "
Yossi Tzaig, one of the complainants in
the matter of Judge Makayes, tells for
the first time of his difficult experience
in the "contact center", where he was
required by the judge to meet his
children only once a week, for only one
short hour. "I will never forget it. It's
just a way to sit on your back and not let go. You go inside, there are a Iew rooms.
You sit down and immediately someone sits near you and listens to your
conversations with the kids. It bothers the kids, hurts their spirit. It's not normal.
Makayes asks me to go through psychological tests so I have. No problem. And
now the judge reIuses to hand the results to my lawyers. but even beIore that there
was no problem with the kids. A contact center is for fathers who bit their kids or
abuse them. Here, the judge is just as evil as can be, unbelievable. What's this center
has to do with me?"
"I have no problem with my ex-wife having custody. I'm a great father, I had no
problem with my ex-wife leaving home. But why cut the kids from their dad? If it
weren't for my enormous effort to stay with them, they would have cut me off my
kids a long time ago. The kids are crazy about me, they long for a father. My son is
already losing his sanity. He calls me and starts talking, and you feel that he's already
losing his mind 'cause he so wants to see dad. Dozens of times he wants to play
soccer with me, and he can't".
"I'm willing to humiliate myself for my kids. Otherwise my kids will feel that I didn't
do everything for them. Their mental health depends on knowing that I will do
anything for them. Judge Makayes humiliates the men and I am willing to take it, if
my kids' future depends on it. But many of the fathers that were sent there, simply
don't go, and give everything up. They're uncomfortable. Justifiably or not, I don't
know".

_______________________

NFC editorial staff emphasizes that these claims are currently only supposed and
needs to be thoroughly legally examined. We only publish things as were said to us,
and we do not take a stance regarding the truthfulness of the matter or its severity.

"Judge Makayes humiliates the
men and I am willing to take it, if
my kids' future depends on it. But
many of the fathers that were sent
there, simply don't go, and give
everything up"
Womens Network The Matter of the Vengeful Judge

EXHIBIT
''L''
www.news1.co.il
December 21
st
2007

Exclusive: The Matter of ' The Vengeful Judge'
Yossi Abadi, lawyer and journalist

Precedent: Dozens of men gathered against Judge
Rivka Makayes * They claim: " She discri minates
against men " * Intended: huge lawsuit against the
state of Israel for vicarious liabi lity

The Accusation: Tendentious Behavior and Concealment

The Details Erased from the Resume

Makayes' " Guard "

The Claim: Assists Women during Discussion

The Claim: " Law Orders Far from Her "

" Contact Center " ? Where's the Contact?

Comments: The Complaints were not Found to be True

* * *

The family court was never a pleasant place for spouses. For many, it is the end of the
road for a long-term relationship, a battle field for distributing alimony, and quite
often the last chance to see the child. Family court in Kfar-Saba is a different story:
They call themselves "Makayes' casualties", they've coincidentally met only recently,
and today they start a precedential organization journey against a judge in Israel. the
declared purpose: "to wake the system up to act".
The things to be presented hereinafter are not news to the officials in the Ministry of
Justice. They are also not news to the commissionership for public complaints against
judges, nor for the court's administration and the regional court judges. President
Judge Dorit Beinisch has also received a severe complaint in the matter more than
once. Her name is Rivka Makayes, judge in the Family court in Kfar-Saba. She was
appointed as a judge on 2001, and since then had accumulated a bundle of
unprecedented complaints regarding her conduct.
While gathering materials, NFC editorial staff has accumulated hundreds of pages of
protocol documents, dozens of hours of discussions' records, official complaints to the
Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice, many requests of judge's dismissal,
petitions to regional courts and dozens of testimonies of those hurt by the rulings.
Based on the evidence, it seems that Makayes' attitude towards men facing her is
supposedly problematic. Due to the nature of discussions in family courts, most of the
materials we have are confidential. The hereinafter presented is therefore only within
what's allowed.
The testimonies we hereby present are only a small portion of the hundreds of data
accumulated; but what is presented here will be based on the testimonies of those who
were hurt. The harsh claims remain prima facie at this point, and we do not take a
Judge Rivka Makayes.
Precedential lawsuit
''L''
stance regarding the truthfulness of these claims or their severity, but only to publish
them as they were said to us.

Met by Coincidence
The group of "Makayes' casualties" already includes a few dozens of members. Yossi
Tzaig, a 46 years old electronics engineer, formerly an intelligence officer, claims that
"this is a judge that violates all possible law orders". Tzaig is not alone. The hereby
presented testimonies will supposedly paint a sad judicial picture.
O., a father of two little girls, sums up the main criticism: "Judge Rivka Makayes", he
says, "extremely discriminates against men, clearly violates law orders, deprives the
right to argue, sins in judge's counsel to the woman's representative during trial, in
inaccuracies in her resume, in inprobable use in maintaining men's movements during
discussion. She had supposedly demonstrated problematic protocols, tendentious
protective warrants, separating fathers from their children in a manner unprecedented
in Israel, and had also made an exaggerated and irresponsible use of the 'contact
center' infrastructure as a condition to a meeting between a father and his children."
NFC editorial staff has recently received exclusive information, according to which a
precedential lawsuit is being consolidated these days, within which a number of
attorneys, representing the "Makayes' casualties", claim that the courts' administration
and also the state of Israel are responsible for the parties' damages, by force of
vicarious liability and negligence for damages caused by Judge Rivka Makayes. We
emphsize that the law in Israel does not allow to personally sue a judge for his/her
administrative conduct during trial.

The Accusation: Tendentious Behavior and Concealment
Sunday, December 16
th
2007,
8pm. NFC team joins a special
gathering initiated by "Makayes'
casualties group" in an apartment
in the center of Israel. None of the
participants knew the others who
were about to become their
partners in their personal struggle.
They met through the internet, and as one of the participants defined it: "everything
was by coincidence".
Dr. Eric Cohen-Adad, a French senior plastic surgeon, immigrated to Israel about ten
years ago, and claims he was severly hurt by Makayes. He told NFC how testimonies
accomulated in webites, forums and talkbacks for articles. "Everyone thought that
they have a personal issue with Makayes. No one knew that this is the judge's tactic.
They thought they had bad lawyers, that it's the entire judicial system. Why, we're
dealing with closed discussions, and we don't know the people that come there not
by name nor by details. But thanks to the internet we've learned that we're not the only
casualties. I've heard horrifying testimonies regarding unacceptable actions of
Makayes, regarding the exact same method, from dozens of men", he tells us.
Half an hour into the gathering, and the house is already full. About twenty men, and
some women representing their sons, found themselves a "support group", while
being their own supporters. One after the other, they present us wit h prima facie
evidence, which in thei r view requi res an immediate examination of the system.
"We wish to reveal our personal story in the media, so we can gather more cases",

" Everyone thought that they have a
personal issue with Makayes. No one
knew that this is the j udge's tactic.
They thought they had bad lawyers,
that it's the enti re j udicial system"
they say. "Why, we've met by coinsidence, and each of us knows of many more men
in the same situation we're in", they claim.

The Details E rased f rom the Resume
The forum members demand Judge
Makayes to reveal the details that they
claim were erased from her resume prior
to her appointment to be a judge. In their
opinion, the information supposedly
erased regarding her work in the Israel
Women's Network and other women's
organizations, attest the discriminatory attitude they claim to have fased in court.
Documents obtained by NFC editorial team show that when Judge Makayes applied
for a position in the family court, she withheld information regarding her full
professional history. In her resume, as it is posted in the official website of the court,
19 years of her professional history are in fact missing. The court's website states that:
"In March 1982 she was authorized as a lawyer, and since then worked in an
academic and public framework related to her field of expertise in fami ly law".
What has she really done since then up until 2001, when she was appointed to be a
judge? the fathers wonder since nothing is written about it.
We obtained the original form, hand written by the j udge, the form she filed to the
court while applying for the position (March 10
th
2000). Nothing was written there
regarding the missing 19 years. In fact, the court's website quoted word for word her
resume as she herself wrote it in her application form.
In a letter he has recently sent to the minister of justice, Niv Amit, one of the
struggle's leaders, wrote: "For some reason, the judge hides her various activities
(prior to her appointment), including her work in the Israel Women's Network, her
wor k in an abused women's shelter in Jerusalem, her involvement in NA'AMAT,
in N.O. association, etc.".
These data, the struggle's leaders explain, don't mean she should be excluded from
being a judge. However they claim: "These things clearly prove her history as
women's activist. For over a decade she had represented abused women. She
worked in an abused women's shelter in Jerusalem since 1994. Don't you think it
should be mentioned in her resume? Don't you think that the court should have known
about it while hiring her for the position? And why do all the judges specify their
resume in detail and she doesn't?", they ask. And the result, in their opinion, is that
"Makayes systematically discriminates against men", and that they say is just
another reason for it. "She comes from a background in which men are the enemy",
tell us Dr. Cohen-Adad. "For most of her professional life, men were the defendants.
The enemy of the abused woman... it's unacceptable that a clearly not objective
person will sit as a judge and discuss the fate of children, and men, without revealing
his past. Even of it does not disqualify her from being a judge, it's hard to understand
the mere concealment."

Makayes' " Guard "
A letter sent to the court's legal adviser and to the minister of justice, Prof. Daniel
Friedmann (September 1
st
2007), claimed that Judge Makayes uses the court's security
guards in an exceptional and unlikely manner. "We claim", says the letter, "that the
use of security guards is intended to humiliate the deliberating men".

" Makayes systematically
discriminates against men. She
comes f rom a background in
which men are the enemy "
The NFC editorial team gathered
many testimonies, according to which
Judge Makayes often attaches many
men, who have no history of violence
or outbursts in courts with a private
guard. "They don't let us move or talk
without raise our hand. Needless to
say that the woman has never received
such a guard". One of the
complainants is Uri Ein-Tzur. "I've
never even raised my voice", he claims. "But Makayes doesn't need anyone's approval
in order to activate the court's guard".
Yossi Tzaid claims: "I usually sit in the back. My lawyers sit in the front, and
Makayes sends to each discussion a special guard that will stand behind me. She
wants to intimidate us, but we're strong. We will not brake". Ein-Tzur and Tzaid are
not the only ones. An unprecedented damages claim was filed these days, in the
amount of 7,000,000 NIS, regarding a physical harm one of the court guards inflicted
upon Dr. Eric Cohen-Adad. Dr. Cohen-Adad explains: "I was crippled because a
guard hit me while removing me out of the courtroom for no reason. I've been to
hospitals for a long time. But regardless of my case, many men I know, who have no
history of violence or outbursts, are attached to guards that don't allow them to speak
up. They literally bend forward over us... It's an outrage, and should be immediately
examined. Compared to other judges, here is an unlikely trend of using security
guards against men during discussions. No other judge in Israel competes with
Makayes in this matter. Not even one".

The Claim: Assists Women during Discussion
One of the more severe testimonies
regarding Judge Makayes's conduct
is the claim that she supposedly
recommends legal actions to the
woman's representative during
discussions. "I've reached an
agreement with my wife", says A.,
one of the complainants, who
wishes not to reveal his full name.
"Everything was ready to be
signed. Alimony was in the amount of 4,000 NIS. We came with a lawyer. The
younger child stayed with the wife, the older one with me. When we came to court,
Makayes had to sign the agreement. All of a sudden, she asks my ex-wife: 'Say, are
you happy with the agreement?'. My wife answered yes. Makayes immediately
responded and asked my wife: 'Don't you think you should add 1,000 NIS for the
older child that stays with the father and will come to visit you from time to time?'".
The wife, so says the complainant, replied that she thinks the agreement is "OK".
According to him, "after a few minutes my wife was convinced by the judge and
insisted on changing the agreement. Because of that we were dragged ourselves
through long years of deliberations. She blatantly intervened and counseled the wife
how to act".
A.'s case is not the only one. We have many testimonies claiming a supposedly
wrong counseling during trial. In one instance, also documented in protocols we've

" I usually sit in the back. My
lawyers sit in the front, and
Makayes sends to each
discussion a special guard that
will stand behind me. She wants
to intimidate us, but we're
st rong. We will not brake "

" Judge Makayes puts words in
experts' mouths. While the expert
suggested that he will see his
children twice a week in a 'contact
center', Judge Makayes intervened
and 'suggested' otherwise, while
leading the expert to the answer "
obtained, Judge Makayes recommended a woman to file a criminal complaint against
her husband, while instructing her to read the Privacy Protetive Act, which might
assist her in her complaint. The woman, for the record, did not mention such a
complaint before that.
Page 410, row 12 of the protocol quotes Judge Makayes who says: "Madam will act
in the matter and file the appropriate complaint". ThereaIter she says: "Sorry. I ask
Madam to consider the issue of blatant violation of the Privacy Protetive Act".
A. further claims that "Judge Makayes puts words in experts' mouths". He says that
while an expert suggested that he will see his children twice a week in a "contact
center", Judge Makayes intervened and "suggested" otherwise, while leading the
expert to the answer. In the protocol of the discussion, page 363, the following is
quoted:

Honorary Judge: "Twice a week in a contact center?"
The Expert: "Twice a week, that's the maximum, yes."
Honorary Judge: "Once a week?"
The Expert: "Once a week, yes, once a week."

P. tells us how in one instance he came to a discussion unprepared, and was surprised
to hear what Makayes had to say. "My wife told me on Thursday night that we have
an evidence discussion on Sunday morning. The lawyer's office was already closed,
and I've arrived on Sunday not prepared. During discussion I've told Judge Makayes
right away that I did not know about the discussion. Makayes turned to my wife and
asked her: 'Did you call him two weeks ago and told him of the discussion?' My
wife answered yes, of course, and so the discussion continued without me. I left. I had
nothing to do there. I was not ready to continue with such an abuse".
It is worth mentioning that the complainant did not receive any official summons to
court. Judge Makayes even had proof, supposedly, that the complainant was not
properly summoned. The court knew that the complainant's address is not the address
written for summoning, and indeed, the NFC editorial team has the official court
record indicating that the summons did not reach its destination. In spite of all this,
Judge Makayes, according to the data we've gathered, was satisfied with the wife's
oral testimony, "and created a dangerous precedent", so say legal authorities,
according to which "one can rely on a litigant's testimony regarding delivery of
summons letter for court".
B., another complainant hurt by the judge's conduct, claims that in one instance he
was late to file documents, and Judge Makayes turned to his ex-wife and told her:
"Don't you think you should ask for monetary compensation for this delay?".
According to him, Makayes guided his ex-wife how to act.

The Claim: " Law Orders Far f rom Her "
Judge Makayes, claim the members
of the new forum, didn't allow a 19
years old, legally adolt, to testify in a
trial regarding his sister's future,
while violating his right. "I haven't
seen her for two years", he says with
tears in his eyes. "I've sent letters,
asked to talk with the judge, she
rejected everything and didn't allow

" In one of the discussions she
started yelling at me, pulled me out
of court, and all that doesn't even
appear in the protocol. It's erased.
And it's not the only incident "
me to testify even though it's a basic right". And indeed, in the protocol from
September 1
st
2005, page 62, row 24, the judge is quoted saying that: "The kids don't
testify".
In other instances, we were presented with claims that Judge Makayes accepted the
woman's version, without documents supporting it, even though the law obligates it.
In other instances, it was claimed that Makayes refused to approve an expert's
testimony, without any reason. One document even shows that Makayes prefered an
application hand-written by the wife, while a similar application of her ex-husband
was rejected immediately and "required to be delivered only if typed".
Yossi Tzaig also says: "My lawyer wanted to see my file, and Makayes didn't allow it.
They claimed it's in her oIIice. but so it went on Ior weeks. We came once, twice,
we came a third time, they didn't want to let us see the documents, in contrast to the
law. Only when Ms. Lea Rakover intervened we were able to receive the documents".
In another case, one of the complainants told us that "Judge Rivka Makayes doesn't
quote the protocol accurately". He said that "in one of the discussions she started
yelling at me, pulled me out of court, and all that doesn't even appear in the protocol.
It's erased. And it's not the only incident". Let us emphasize that the NFC editorial
team heard of similar claims, but we do not have the ability to confirm them. The
proper authorities should thoroughly examine whether or not it is true.
Claims of delaying discussions for months and years were the most frequent claims. A
senior legal authority revealed to us that the Supreme Court's president examined the
cause for delay herself, and that other judicial authorities instructed the judge, on
several cases, to respond immediately to many unanswered requests, in which they
have identified a severe delay of justice.
Dr. Eric Cohen is an extreme example of that claim. He filed no less than 41 requests,
which according to him, "Judge Makayes didn't reject, didn't accept, and in fact didn't
give any decision regarding them". A legal specialist who reviewed the case claimed:
"There's no need to go into detail in regards to the basic right of a litigant to turn to
court with various requests. Not in vein did the legislator determine in chapter 20 of
the Civil Law Order Regulations a machanism of 'written request'; such a machanism
not only gives the litigant the right of access to court through a written request but
also outlines and allots the times in which the other party should reply to the request
and how to discuss it".

" Contact Center " ? Where's the Contact?
The angry fathers complain about
unreasonably high alimony,
about blatant discrimination in
seeing arrangements, and "about
the intolerable ease with which
Makayes sends parents to
psychiatrists and psychologists".
Makayes' casualties are not
calming down. Most of them are
emotionally exhausted, they lost
their money. They've been through years of discussions and didn't see their children
for many months. One father tells NFC that due to a false accusation, Makayes
removed him from the entire city of Jerusalem. "My restraining order doesn't refer to
300 meters or the kindergarden. I was never violent, but they say I can't enter

" My rest raining order doesn't refer
to 300 meters or the kindergarden. I
was never violent, but they say I can't
enter Jerusalem as a whole. Makayes
said so. A Jew that can't go into
Jerusalem, the enti re city?! What am
I, a killer? What have I done? "
Jerusalem as a whole. Makayes said so. A Jew that can't go into Jerusalem, the entire
city?! What am I, a killer? What have I done?".
In another case, Dr. Cohen-Adad says that although his wife "abducted" his daughter
to Jerusalem, he not only can't see her but he was also banned from talking with her
over the phone. The fathers claim that Makayes is causing a de facto separation of the
children from many of them, without any objective justification. With that, The
fathers claim that Judge Makayes conditions many seeing arrangement with the kids
only in a meeting under the cover of a "contact center".
The Jerusalem municipality, in charge of the center, gave no data about it.
Representatives of Makayes' casualties claim that this is a center designated to
supervise an estranged parental contact with the children. "This is a center designated
for parents who were previously violent towards their children, parents who had
abused them, ones who need to be supervised". In any event, they explain, "other
judges don't tend to send there the parents and their children with such an ease".
Yossi Tzaig sees his children in the "contact center" for only one hour a week, for
over a year and a half. In a tearful monologue Tzaig says that "it bothers the kids.
The fact that the meetings are only in the center hurts their spirit. They present the dad
poorly, it's an unproportional use. It's impossible that Makayes has so many fathers in
contact centers, for very long periods of time, I never yelled. Never raised my voice,
or hit someone".
"It never happened that I returned the kids to their mother and there was yelling", he
adds excitedly. "It's just pure evilness of the judge. For a year and a half, their
grandfather hasn't seen the kids. The family is separated. I realize it sounds
unbelievable, we searched for a reason. The alimony is paid exactly on time. I arrive
at the contact center, I bring them clothes, but one hour a week for three kids is
nothing. What have I done so wrong? I just want to see the kids. Hug them. Why must
I be supervised for a year and a half while I talk with them and spend time with
them?, and all that for just one hour", he complains.

Comments: The Complaints were not Found to be True
x Court's spokesmanship: "Complaints filed were examined, including by the
commissionership for public complaints against judges, and were not found to be
true. In a number of cases of order violations which occurred in Judge Makayes'
court room, the court guard acted in order to prevent order violations and allow
the legal proceedings to continue". However, the court's spokesmanship refused
to define Judge Makayes as a "valued judge" and preferred not to address the
issue.
! In response, says Mr. Yossi Tzaig, one of the struggle's leaders: "We have
recordings showing we were attached to guards without any provocation. We can
hear everything. Beyond that, we've suggested to the court to install cameras
within the courtroom in order to prove that we didn't do anything, and so clarify
our position. The court firmly refused".
x The Ministry of Justice's comment preferred not to refer to the presented claims,
and mentioned only the following: "Due to the confidentiality duty anchored in
Article 13(a) of the Commissioner for Public Complaints Against Judges Act
2002 and Article 14(a)(12) of the Freedom of Information Act 1998 (excluding
the commissionership in regards to the Freedom of Information Act), no details
of this issue will be given".
x Many legal authorities refused to address the matter. Some fear for their position,
some for their role as representatives before the judge, but all of them have a
common denominator: profound criticism of Judge Rivka Makayes' conduct. The
Ministry of Justice said off the record that "this is a known and familiar case".
x The struggle's leaders emphasize that "there are many more men that don't even
know that they're a part of many casualties". They wish to clarify that they can be
approched by e-mail: mekaycase@gmail.com; and also by phone: 052/9966004.

NF C editorial staff emphasi zes once again that the abovementioned claims are
only a small part of hundreds of data accumulated; the testimonies presented
here are based on the testimonies of those who were hurt. The harsh claims
remain prima facie at this point, and we do not take a stance regarding thei r
t ruthfulness or severity, but only publish them as they were said to us. However,
these severe prima facie claims need to be examined. It is therefore appropriate that
authorized legal authorities will immediately commence an extensive examination of
the "Makayes' casualties" group's claims.

MEKAYES Manual for Fictitious VAWA Complaints

EXHIBIT
''M''
''M''
Final Judgment Of Edna Arbel in the Matter of
Ben Haims Abduction Case
EXHIBIT
''N''

Page 1 of 21

Supreme Court of the State of Israel
F.P.A. 741/11
Facing honorary judge E. Arbel
honorary judge H. Melcer
honorary judge U. Vogelman
Plaintiff Anonymous
Vs.
Respondent Anonymous
Sitting regarding permission to appeal the ruling of Regional
court in Nazareth from January 20
th
2011 in Case Appeal No.
44293-12-10 given by honorary judges A. Avraham, Y.
Avraham and D. Sarfati
Sitting Date: Adar B 1
st
5771 (March 7
th
2011)
For the plaintiff: Advocate, T. Itkin
For the plaintiff: Advocate, G. Torres
Court ruling
Judge E. Arbel:
Permission to appeal the ruling of Regional court in Nazareth (honorary judges A. Avraham,
Y. Avraham, D. Sarfati), which partially accepted the plaintiff's appeal on the ruling of Family
court in Nazareth (honorary judge S. Jayyoussi), and ordered the return of the plaintiff's and
respondent's mutual daughter to New Jersey, United States, by force of Hague Convention
Act (returning of abductees children) 1991 (hereinafter: the Convention Act).
Factual background
1. The plaintiff and the respondent, both born in Israel, grew up and met each other in
their home town in Israel. As of 2006, the two lived as a couple in the state of New Jersey,
United States, by force of tourists' visa. On 2007 the plaintiff began studying, while the
respondent continued working in odd jobs. By force of the plaintiff's schooling, they both
received a staying visa for student and partner. On 2008 the plaintiff and the respondent got
married in Israel, and immediately after the wedding returned to United States. On
September 2009 their daughter was born in United States (hereinafter: the daughter).
About two months later the plaintiff came to Israel with the toddler, and later on the
respondent joined both of them. During that visit in Israel, which lasted about two months,
the couple had opened a children's clothing shop in their home town. As the shop opening
''N''

Page 2 of 21

arrangements ended, the three of them returned to United States. On March 2010 they had
arrived again at Israel for Passover holiday (hereinafter: the last visit). The respondent
returned to United States on April 19
th
2010, and the plaintiff and their daughter were to
join him on June 20
th
2010. However, the plaintiff and the daughter remained in Israel, in
which they reside to this day.
2. To complete the picture one should note that, as pointed out in the ruling of the
Family court, at some point during the relationship the respondent began embracing a
religious lifestyle, while the plaintiff did not change her way of life. It created some
controversy between the partners, and during the plaintiff's pregnancy the respondent even
considered divorcing her. During their last visit in Israel the dispute between the partners
reached a peak, when each of them stayed separately in their families' houses. On April 7
th

2010, the plaintiff has filed a divorce claim in the Rabbinate court, to which she had attached
the issue of custody over the mutual daughter. On April 11
th
2010, the plaintiff and the
respondent met, and with the mitigation of an accountant reached an agreement regarding
the end of their marriage, titled "financial agreement" (hereinafter: the agreement or the
financial agreement). In the agreement were paragraphs establishing the property
allocation between the two partners, as well as paragraphs establishing the issues of
custody over the mutual daughter, alimony and seeing arrangements. Eventually the
agreement was not signed, since the plaintiff refused to sign it as the respondent rejected a
demand made by her regarding possessional rights of the two. The respondent returned to
United States as planned, after the plaintiff agreed to remove the warrant detaining his
departure from Israel, issued against him at her request. Shortly prior to the day in which
the plaintiff and the daughter were to return as planned to United States, the respondent
sent the plaintiff, through his lawyer, a warning in which he pointed out that he expects
their return as planned. On July 2010, as the plaintiff and the daughter did not return to
United States, the respondent filed a claim to return the daughter in a court in New Jersey.
Later on he has filed a similar claim to Family court in Nazareth, in which he had requested
to order the return of the daughter to United States according to the appendix to the
Convention Act (the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,
31, 43 (opened for signing on 1980); hereinafter: the convention).
Family court's ruling
3. The Family court in Nazareth determined that the retention of the daughter in Israel
is indeed abduction as defined by the convention, and since the defenses do not apply, the
daughter should be returned to United States. First was determined that there was an
abduction, as defined in article 3 of the convention, while the main issue was whether at the
time of the abduction the "habitual residence" of the daughter was United states. The court
tested this issue according to two different schools, the "factual school" and the "intentional
school". The court's decision was based primarily on the "factual school", according to which
it determined that the geographic-physical place of residence of the daughter prior to the
abduction was United States. Furthermore, the court discussed the "intentional school",
testing the parties' intents regarding the current and future place of residence. It was
determined that renting an apartment in United States and entertaining acquaintances in it,
alongside establishing a business in United States, attest an intention to settle in this state.
On the other hand, it was determined that the one-sided decision made by the plaintiff to
quit her school in United States, opening a shop in Israel, maintain social rights, real estate
and bank accounts in Israel do not attest an immediate intention to return to Israel, but a
future intention to do so at best.

Page 3 of 21

After determining that abduction, as defined by article 3 of the convention, indeed
occurred, the court discussed the defense claims made by the plaintiff. It was determined
that the defense regarding the "abducted" parent's consent to the abduction act, as set by
article 13(a) of the convention (hereinafter: the consent defense), does not apply in the
circumstances of the case. First, it was found that the concern expressed by the plaintiff in
her plea to Rabbinate court, that the respondent will abduct the daughter, indicates his
refusal to stay in Israel. second, it was determined that the agreement does not suggest
consent since it did not develop into a binding contract, and also since the agreement was
written while the respondent was under a lot of pressure because of the detention warrant
against his departure from Israel. the court also rejected the claim regarding the applicability
of the defense of acquiescing with the abduction act, as defined in article 13(a) of the
convention (hereinafter: the acquiescing defense), since the respondent sent a warning to
the plaintiff shortly prior to the planned return date in which he had expected both of them
to return to United States, and also since he had turned to the authorities in United States
regarding the daughter's abduction about a month after the plaintiff and the daughter were
due to return to United States. Thirdly it was determined that the defense regarding grave
risk of exposing the minor to harm, according to article 13(b) of the convention (hereinafter:
the grave risk of harm defense), does not apply in the circumstances of the case. The court
rejected the plaintiff's claim, according to which an illegal stay of the parents in United
States may harm the daughter, and clarified that the question of the legal status of the
parties isn't related directly to the applicability of this defense, since it is enough that the
daughter's entry to United States is possible, being an American citizen. Therefore the court
ordered the return of the daughter to United States, subject to depositing a sum of 6,000$
to ensure the daughter's alimony, and subject to providing the plaintiff and the daughter
accommodations in the apartment in which they had lived in United States, or an alternative
apartment, for a period of 6 months.
Regional court's ruling
4. The Regional court in Nazareth rejected the plaintiff's appeal by majority of
opinions, subject to corrections of the terms for returning the daughter. The majority
opinion (honorary judges Y. Avraham and D. Sarfati) determined that one should not
interfere with the factual findings determined by the Family court, regarding both the issue
of the abduction act and the lack of applicability of the defenses. It was noted that the
purpose of the convention, to prevent self justice made by the abductor parent, obliged the
one claiming the defenses' applicability to present substantial evidence for its existence.
Since the plaintiff did not carry this burden, it was determined that the daughter should be
returned to United States, subject to depositing 10,000$ by the respondent, to ensure the
daughter's alimony, and subject to providing confirmation of commencing a legal proceeding
for custody in New Jersey court by the respondent. The minority opinion (V. President A.
Avraham) was that the appeal should be accepted, since the acquiescing defense applies.
According to this opinion, the starting point of the discussion was that the habitual residence
of the daughter was New Jersey, and therefore the plaintiff's act should be defined as
"wrongful retention". However, under the circumstances of the case, evidence show that
the acquiescing defense applies: first, the agreement which did not develop into a binding
contract was given an evidential weight in proving the respondent's acquiescing with the
retention. Second, the removal of the warrant detaining the respondent's departure from
Israel, under the plaintiff's consent, shortly after writing the agreement, was understood as
an expression of understandings made in the agreement and as an attempt to fulfill one of
its terms. Thirdly, the respondent's return to United States was presented as indicating that

Page 4 of 21

the respondent has waived the immediate realization of his custodial right, as well as the
immediate return of the daughter to United States.
Now we were asked to grant permission to appeal this ruling.
The plaintiff's claims
5. The plaintiff claims in the appeal request that under the circumstances of the case
the terms set in article 3 of the convention do not apply, and therefore one must not
determine that the retention of the daughter in Israel is wrongful. It was claimed that the
parties stayed in United States temporarily, and therefore the Regional court was mistaken
in his determination that the habitual residence of the daughter is United States. It was also
claimed that the respondent did not prove that his custodial rights were breached, and that
during the discussion in the Family court no ongoing legal proceeding was held in an
authorized court in United States.
Alternatively, the plaintiff claims that the defenses against return apply. First, it was
claimed that consent and acquiescing defenses according to article 13(a) of the convention
apply. According to her claims, the respondent filed the current prosecution after consenting
to the unique jurisdiction of the Rabbinate court regarding the divorce and associated issues.
In light of his consent the warrant detaining his departure from Israel was cancelled, and he
returned by himself to United States. In addition, in the agreement the respondent gave his
consent to his daughter's stay in Israel, to paying alimony in NIS (New Israeli Shekel) and also
to agreed-upon seeing arrangements during his visits in Israel. according to the plaintiff's
claim, the respondent was willing to accept the agreement as is while it was she who
refused to sign it, due to a financial dispute between the parties. Second, it was claimed that
the defense of grave risk of harm according to article 13(b) of the convention applies, and
that the best interest of the minor requires her stay in Israel. according to this claim, under
the circumstances in which the daughter has no medical insurance in United States and her
parents do not have a proper stay visa, the minor is exposed to actual harm if she were to
return to United States. The plaintiff wishes to deduct from that that even if she had
performed an act of wrongful retention, one should not order under the circumstances of
the case the immediate return of the daughter to Unites States. For all the above mentioned
reasons the plaintiff wishes to receive permission to appeal the ruling of the Regional court
and to override the Regional court's ruling ordering the daughter's return to United States.
The respondent's claims
6. The respondent claims, on the other hand, that the permission to appeal should be
denied since the current case does not involve a fundamental legal issue which exceeds the
interests of the parties. Specifically he claims that in the current case the terms set in article
3 of the convention apply. It was claimed that custodial rights of the respondent were
exercised according to the law of the state of New Jersey, determining that both parents
have joint custody over the daughter, and that according to Regional court's ruling a
custodial claim to the court in New Jersey was filed, so that the respondent has actually
exercised his custodial rights as required by the convention. The respondent further claims
that there is no justification to intervene with the factual determination of the Family court
that the habitual residence of the daughter is United States. He had attached to his written
response several evidence, which were discussed in Regional court, which to his claim show
that the parties' stay in United States wasn't temporary or limited to the plaintiff's schooling

Page 5 of 21

period. Among other things he had presented confirmation of bank accounts and a
certificate indicating prolonging the rent lease of the couple's apartment in United States.
The respondent thinks that the defenses against return, which the plaintiff claims,
do not apply to the current case. It was claimed that the agreement does not indicate
consent or acquiescing since it wasn't signed, and also since it was the plaintiff who had
written in the draft attached to the agreement, by hand, "returning to Israel". As far as he's
concerned, this comment indicates lack of decision regarding place of residence. The
respondent adds that the harm defense also does not apply to the circumstances of the
case. To his opinion, there is no concern that the parties will be deported from United States
upon return, since he had received a worker's stay visa for a period of two years, while the
plaintiff has a tourist stay visa for a similar period. He emphasizes that he had met every
term set by Regional court to ensure the daughter welfare upon returning to United States.
The rent lease of the apartment was prolonged accordingly, and the required sum of money
to ensure the minor's alimony was deposited. Therefore he claims that the permission to
appeal should be denied and asks to order the daughter's return to United States
immediately.
7. After examining the parties' claims and discussing it, we have decided to grant
permission to appeal and discuss the request as if an appeal was filed according to the
granted permission.
Discussion and decision
8. In the current case, two key questions emerge. The first is whether the plaintiff
performed an act of wrongful retention, as defined in article 3 of the convention, by not
returning the daughter to United States on the planned date. If the answer is affirmative, the
second question rises may we conclude from the circumstances of the case that one of the
defenses against immediate return as set by the convention applies, so we should not order
the immediate return of the daughter to United States as required by the convention. I will
discuss these questions in order.
Normative framework
9. In the last few decades, as the world became a global village, in which moving from
one state to another is done easily, and people move between states often, emerged an
actual need for international cooperation in dealing with the phenomenon of children's
abduction by one of their parents, while breaching the custodial rights of the other parent.
In most cases that the convention applies to, we deal with parents from different states of
origin, that their separation inflicted conflict regarding place of residence, when each parent
wishes to raise the mutual child in his home land. Sometimes, one of the parents decides to
take a one-sided action of removing the child to another state, without consent of the other
parent and while breaching his custodial rights. Such an act of self justice requires a quick
and efficient aid, which can be given only by way of cooperation between states. On this
background the convention was signed. Judge M. Cheshin points this out as he writes:
"Hague convention and the convention act were intended to set
an inter-state arrangement for a phenomenon, which was seen in
the past but in our days became more and more common. The
of people from one state in other states became more common,

Page 6 of 21

and these visits create by nature encounters between young men
d
The couple, living together in love, must decide: where will they
reside in his state or hers? The decision is made, and one of the
partners follows the other. Days go by, and the couple discovers
they can no longer live with each other. The partner who has left
his state wishes naturally to return to his state, where he was
born and raised. And he wishes again naturally to not part with
his child. When agreement and understanding between the
partner lacks, comes the abduction. However, the other partner is
also not willing to give up his child, and so the issue comes before
court. And the question is: under whose custody will the child be,
and in which state will he reside. Hague convention was not
destined to apply only for such cases, obviously, but we know that
these cases are especially common" (C.A. 4391/96 Paul Row vs.
Dafna Row, I.r. 50(5) 338, 343 (1997); hereinafter: matter of
Row).
In the basis of the convention lays several inter-linked purposes. First, achieving
inter-state cooperation in dealing with children's abduction, while breaching the custodial
rights determined in the state of origin. Second, honoring the rule of law not only within the
state but also in the relationship between states of the world. Third, deterring against self
justice by one of the parents, and finally preventing harm to the best interest of the child
being torn from his natural environment due to the abduction act (see: F.P.A. 1855/08
Anonymous vs. Anonymous (unpublished, 4.8.08); hereinafter: matter of anonymous). In
order to accomplish these purposes, the convention sets an aid defined as "first aid" to the
abduction act, which requires the contracting states to order the return of the child to the
state from which he was abducted urgently and as soon as possible (see: C.A. 7206/93
Gabay vs. Gabay I.r. 51(2) 241 (1997); hereinafter: matter of Gabay), while leaving very
limited room for discretion of the court discussing the return request.
Preliminary terms for the convention's applicability
10. An order to return a child to the state from which he was abducted and to which he
was not returned may be given under the preliminary terms of the convention's
applicability, set in article 3 of the convention, which turn an act to an "abduction". One
should distinguish between two types of cases under this article. The first type is an act of
"active abduction", meaning removal from the habitual residence of the minor to a
contracting state. The second type is an act of "abduction by omission", meaning retention
of the minor to a contracting state and not the state of habitual residence of the minor (See:
F.P.A. 9802/09 Anonymous vs. Anonymous (unpublished, 12.17.09); hereinafter: matter of
anonymous(1)).
11. Article 4 of the convention sets an age limit of the minor according to which the
convention's instructions apply, and sets it on the age of 16 years. Article 3 of the
convention sets three preliminary terms for defining the removal or retention of a minor as
"wrongful", and therefore the convention applies: it is required that the act has breached
the custodial rights of the "abducted" parent; that these rights were actually exercised; and
that the state from which the minor was abducted or the state to which he was not returned
was indeed the habitual residence of the minor. The term "habitual residence" isn't defined

Page 7 of 21

in the convention, probably since its drafters intended to allow flexibility and ability to
discuss the circumstances of each case, considering a variety of possible cases. The
interpreting tendency in to give the term "habitual residence" a literal and limited
interpretation, since an overly extensive interpretation might harm the fulfillment of the
convention's purposes and even nullify it (see: ibid, art. 9; matter of Gabay, p. 254-255).
12. Regarding the question of "habitual residence" of the minor, two schools developed
in the ruling, namely "factual school" and "intentional school". The factual school is based on
testing the geographic-physical residence prior to the minor's removal. This is a factual
examination and not a legal one. This school addresses the past. In its framework, one
mustn't test intentions or future plans of the parents, together or separately, regarding
residence. The only question asked is where did the minor reside regularly prior to the act of
removal, from his point of view, or from the parent's point of view if he did not yet reached
the age of testifying regarding his residence:
"the residence is not a tec It expresses ongoing life
reality. It reflects the place in which the child had regularly resided
prior to the abduction. The point of view is that of the child and
where he had resided. The examination focuses on the daily lives
of the past and not on the plans for the future. When the parents
live together, the habitual residence of the child is usually the
parent's residence" ((retired) president A. Barak, ibid, p. 254).
In parallel to the factual school, gradually developed an additional school, named
the "intentional school". In this school, one does not test only the physical residence of the
minor prior to his abduction, but also the parent's intentions regarding the duration and
circumstances of staying in the state. So, for example, the fact that the parents immigrated
to a state permanently or moved there for a limited period has a different relevance in
determining the "habitual residence" according to this school. The parent's intention is
inferred from the circumstances of the case and the interpretation of their stay in the state
(see: matter of anonymous(1) and the references there).
13. Of all the above mentioned, it seems that the intentional school focuses on "matters
of the heart" and arguable circumstances, whereas the factual school presents an easy and
simple test, objective by nature, which makes it difficult at times to consider a more complex
reality. The issue of comparing the two schools and giving different weight to each of them
remains to be discussed (see: C.A. 7994/98 Dagan vs. Dagan, I.r. 53(3) 254 (1999)
(hereinafter: matter of Dagan); C.A.D. 10136/09 Anonymous vs. Anonymous (unpublished,
12.21.09)), although it is customary to test mainly the factual school, since testing the
parent's intentions might erode the convention's purposes. In my opinion, the two schools
should be combined, in a manner that will leave the focus in the question of factual physical
residence, but will also give some weight to the parties' intentions and reality of life.
Anyway, we are not asked to settle this issue in the current case. And indeed, in the current
case too, the previous courts tested both schools in discussing the question of "habitual
residence" of the daughter. The conclusion was that the habitual residence of the daughter
prior to her retention was United States.
Defenses against return
14. The underlying perception of the convention is that the act of abduction harms the
best interest and welfare of the child, since he is torn from its natural environment and

Page 8 of 21

custodial parent and brought to a foreign environment, forced upon him by the other
parent. Even though the term "best interest of the child" isn't mentioned in the convention,
this principle underlies it, since one cannot discuss matters of children without considering
their best interest (see: matter of Gabay, p. 251; for a discussion of the relation between the
convention and children's rights see: Rona Shoz "rights of abducted children: does Hague
Convention Act (returning of abductees children) 1991, coincides with the doctrine of
children's rights?" legal studies 20, 421 (2004)). It is the question of the best interest of the
child that will determine the fundamental dispute regarding child's custody. The discussion
regarding procedures according to the convention act should be held in a forum that will
discuss this question. Considering the purposes of the convention, and especially the
importance of honoring the rule of law on an international level, the default rule is that the
best interest of the child will be discussed in his habitual residence and not in the state to
which he was abducted.
15. However, sometimes returning the child to his habitual residence might harm him,
so it is not in his best interest. For such cases there are the defenses against return,
anchored in articles 12, 13 and 20 of the convention. According to article 12 of the
convention, the return is not required if the child stayed in the state to which he was
abducted for more than one year, and it is proven that he has integrated well in his new
environment. Article 13 sets three defenses against return: the consent and acquiescing
defenses, the grave risk of harm defense and the consideration of the minor's will defense, if
he has reached a proper age and degree of maturity. An additional defense is specified in
article 20, according to which one may refuse to return a child if the return does not settle
with fundamental principles of the state discussing the return request in regards to
protecting human rights and fundamental liberties. Underlying the defenses against
immediate return is the duty of protecting the child and the need to prevent grave harms
which may be inflicted upon him as a result of his return.
These defenses conflict to some degree with other main purposes of the convention,
specifically the purposes of preventing self justice made by the abductor parent and
honoring the rule of law according to universal standards. In the balance between these two
purposes, it was determined that the defenses should be used under careful consideration,
lest the exception will become the rule in a manner that will undermine the purposes of the
convention and nullify the obligations of the contracting states. Therefore it was determined
that the burden of proof carried by the one claiming the defenses apply is a heavy burden,
not to be treated lightly (see: F.P.A. 672/06 Abu Arar vs. Raguzo (unpublished, 10.15.06);
Elisa Perez-Vera, Explanatory Report on the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention, Hague
Conference on Private International Law, Acts and Documents of the Fourteenth Session
426, 460 (1980) 3; hereinafter: Perez-Vera report). Note well, carrying the burden of proof
does not terminate the possibility of returning the minor to the state from which he was
removed or to which he wasn't returned. Proving that the defenses apply merely provides
the court discretion whether under the circumstances of the case the minor should remain
in the state to which he was abducted or to return to the state of residence, considering the
convention's purposes. Obviously, in such a case, the court will place at the top of its
considerations the best interest of the little child, standing in the middle between his two
parents.
16. The defenses to be tested in the current case are set in article 13 of the convention,
and so is written in it:

Page 9 of 21

"Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the
judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not
bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or
other body which opposes its return establishes that
a. The person, institution or other body having the care of the
child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time
of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently
acquiesced in the removal or retention; or
b. There is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the
child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the
child in an intolerable situation.
The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order
the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being
returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which
it is appropriate to take account of its views" (The emphases were
made by me, E.A.).
I will discuss the essence and scope of the related defenses according to order.
The consent and acquiescing defenses
17. As aforementioned, article 13(a) of the convention sets the defenses against
immediate return: the consent defense and the acquiescing defense. These two defenses
have two main purposes. The first purpose is providing a proper response to a situation in
which the "abducted" parent consented or acquiesced with the abduction act, in a manner
which makes the need to immediately return affairs the way they were before redundant
(see: C.A. 473/93 Libowich vs. Libowich I.r. 47(3) 63 (1993); hereinafter: matter of
Libowich). The second purpose is preventing cynical use of the immediate return aid given in
the convention, in a manner that will turn the convention to a bargaining tool in the hands
of the abducted parent:
"On the other hand, the guardian's conduct can also alter the
characterization of the abductor's action, in cases where he has
agreed to, or thereafter acquiesced in, the removal which he now
seeks to challenge. This fact allowed the deletion of any reference
to the exercise of custody rights 'in good faith', and at the same
time prevented the Convention from being used as a vehicle for
possible 'bargaining' between the parties" (Perez-Vera report, p.
461).
18. The issue of consent or acquiescing is that of custodial rights; That is, the parent's
consent to or acquiescing with the factual status created in regards to custodial rights of the
minor (see: matter of Gabay, p. 257). Unlike determining the habitual residence under
article 3 of the convention, where it is customary to give some weight to the parents'
intentions and future plans, in these defenses one must consider the parent's intentions
regarding the minor's residence, their expectations and future plans (see: Shmuel Moran,
Alon Amiran and Hadara Bar, Immigration and Children's Abduction, Legal and
Psychological Aspects 88-89 (2003)). If these suggest consent to or acquiescing with the act
of removal or retention, one should not order the return of the minor to the habitual

Page 10 of 21

residence immediately. The immediate return is no longer mandatory, and becomes
subjected to discussing court's discretion.
19. The consent defense and the acquiescing defense are similar in their essence and
characteristics, even though the ruling mainly addresses the acquiescing defense (see for
example: matter of Dagan; matter of Libowich). The main difference between the two
defenses lays in the time factor while consent is granted before the act of removal or
retention, acquiescing is created in retrospect, after such an act (matter of Gabay, p. 257;
matter of Libowich, p. 72). Therefore, when we wish to determine which of the two
defenses applies to the circumstances of the case at hand, we should first determine
whether we're dealing with consent given prior to the abduction act, or with acquiescing
after the abduction act. On the subsequent stage we should examine the main question
regarding the applicability of these defenses, which is whether the parent whose rights were
suffered acted as would a parent whose goal is to immediately return affairs the way they
were, or has he acted in a manner that indicates his consent in effect to it or acquiescing
with it:
"the existence of consent is examined in light of the question: did
the "abducted" parent's behavior coincides with his intent to
guard his rights regarding returning the status-quo, that is,
immediately returning the child to his habitual residence from
which he was removed, or whether the circumstances and his
behavior suggest consent to the change in status-quo, to moving
the child to the new location?" ((then) vice president judge Alon,
ibid, p. 72).
20. Logic dictates that cases in which the question of defenses rises will be discussed
individually, each case and its unique circumstances. Therefore, narrow standards regarding
the issue of consent or acquiescing should not be determined. However, the boundaries of
these defenses should be defined, and as mentioned above, the convention's purposes
require giving it a narrow interpretation and use them with care and restrain. Three main
characteristics assist in examining the applicability of the defenses and in understanding
their boundaries: nature and quality of the consent or acquiescing; contract law
applicability; and the weight to be given to the reasons of consent or acquiescing and to the
period of time passed (matter of Gabay, p. 255-259; matter of Libowich, p. 71-75). All these
will assist us in answering the question of whether the requesting parent has waived the aid
of immediately returning the minor by consenting to the act from the outset or by
acquiescing with it post factum. All this will be specified subsequently.
21. First, we should outline the nature and quality of the consent or acquiescing. It was
determined that it should not necessarily be interpreted or done in a manner of active
action. One can also learn of consent to the abduction act or of acquiescing with it from
behavior by omission or implied behavior. However, not every step made by one of the
parties indicates consent or renunciation. It is a fundamental examination of the abducted
parent in general we should conclude from the overall circumstances and observing the
general picture that the parent has waived the immediate fulfillment of the custodial or
visitation rights that he had by force of the habitual residence state prior to the act of
removal or retention (see: matter of Dagan, p. 273). Such an examination is objective by
nature. The abducted parent's subjective state of mind will be examined only as long as it
realizes in his objective external behavior (see: matter of Libowich, p. 74). The existence of

Page 11 of 21

consent or acquiescing is also learned, among other things, from the awareness of the
"abducted" parent to the fact that his rights are being hurt. He needs not be aware of the
specific rights granted to the parent by force of the convention. A general understanding
that his parental rights are being hurt or may be hurt due to the other parent's actions is
sufficient to learn of awareness. So, for example, if the parent knows that a wrongful act was
done, and did not attempt to receive legal advice in the matter, it may indicate consent to
the abduction act (see: matter of Dagan, p. 274).
22. Consent or acquiescing are contractual by nature, as it is a one-sided action done by
one parent, develops within the other parent and creates a relying interest regarding the
change of status quo. Therefore it was determined that contract laws apply to the consent
and acquiescing defenses, including all implications (matter of Libowich, p. 73 and the
references there; matter of Gabay, p. 258). So, for example, consent or acquiescing that was
done by mistake, deception, coercion or exploitation should be treated as a contract done
under similar circumstances and can be cancelled. Likewise, if the abductor parent was
aware of the fact that the abducted parent does not waiver the change of status-quo,
therefore a claim on his behalf that the defenses apply will contradict the bona fide
principle. In addition, one should consider the foundation on which the parent who made
the abduction act had to rely. If he had made some actions to change his condition following
the consent or acquiescing of the other parent, it should be brought into account within the
considerations examined under this defense, although it is befitting that the relying interest
as above mentioned will be considered cautiously, lest the abductor parent enjoys the fruits
of his own wrong doing (matter of Libowich, p. 71).
23. In addition, the weight to be attributed to the different circumstances in which the
consent or acquiescing was given should be considered, and especially the weight to be
attributed to the reasons for the consent and to the period of time that passed since the act
of removal until the filing of the prosecution according to the convention. So was
determined that the reasons for which the parent has consented to the abduction act or
acquiesced with it will not be taken into account while examining the quality of consent or
acquiescing, since it is possible that he did not want to move the minor from state to state,
or he was interested in having the custodial issue discussed in the state to which the minor
was abducted, being the parent's state of origin. Whatever his reasons are, if the behavior of
the parent indicates consent to or acquiescing with the abduction act, one should conclude
that he has waived the immediate aid granted by the convention, and is willing to solve the
dispute in alternative ways (matter of Libowich, p. 70).
The time factor should also be considered while examining the question of whether
the parent's behavior during the time passed coincides with his later demand to return the
minor. Regarding the consent defense, it was ruled that one should examine the period of
time that has passed since the day of abduction until the day the prosecution according to
the convention was filed, and whether one can infer from it, alongside other circumstances,
acquiescing of the parent with the condition created. In this context it was determined that
the time in which the acquiescing consolidated is not defined, and should be learned
individually in each case, according to its unique circumstances (ibid, p. 72-74). While
examining the consent defense, the time factor is less significant. A short or long period of
time might pass since the day of abduction until the day the prosecution was filed, but in
most cases it will have no relevance since the consent, by nature, was given in advance, prior
to the abduction act. Therefore, under the consent defense the main question is that of
weight, that is, what were the circumstances indicating consent, and to what degree of

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details it indicates consent of the "abducted" parent to waiving the "first aid" granted by the
convention, all that subjected to the above mentioned defenses' boundaries.
24. In several cases, a parent who has consented to or acquiesced with the abduction
act may wish to go back on his consent. The rule is that one cannot go back on his consent or
acquiescing and cancel it retroactively. Since the time consent or acquiescing has developed,
the parent whose custodial rights were harmed will be seen as if he has waived the
immediate aid granted by the convention (ibid, p. 73; matter of Dagan, p. 275). Even
changed circumstances do not justify going back on consent or acquiescing. As above
mentioned, the main question to be asked by the court is whether the parent's behavior
indicates clearly that he has waived the "first aid". If the answer is affirmative, the return of
the child to the habitual residence state is not an immediate requirement the court must
instruct. The time for an immediate aid has long gone, and the court discussing the matter
has discretion to instruct that the matter will be discussed in the current state or in the
habitual residence state, while considering the best interest of the child.
The grave risk of harm defense
25. Article 13(b) of the convention determines that where there is a grave risk that the
in an intolerable situation, the court does not have to instruct his return. The rule is that the
best interest of the child considered in this defense is narrower than the one considered in
regular custodial proceedings, since over-extension of the defense might nullify the
convention's purposes (see: matter of anonymous, art. 29-33). Therefore the court used two
tools intended to reduce the defense's applicability. First it was determined that the burden
laid upon the one claiming the defense applies is beyond reasonable doubt, which is of
course a very heavy burden of proof. Second, the defense's applicability was reduced in an
interpretational way, as the principle determining the defense is that set at the end of article
13(b), according to which the child will not be returned only if there is a grave risk that his
return will place him in an intolerable situation.
"the principle determining article 13(b) of the convention is the
one at its end, which regards placing the child in an intolerable
situation were he to return d
refers to d one
may not instruct to return a child if his return will place him "in an
intolerable situation": whether that intolerable situation is due to
a grave risk of exposing the child to physical or psychological
harm, or his return will place him in an intolerable situation
"otherwise"" (matter of Row, p. 347).
In addition, it was determined that the defense in question refers to harm inflicted
upon the minor due to returning to the state from which he was removed, and not as a
result of returning to the parent from which he was abducted or from disconnecting him
from the abductor parent (see: C.D.R. 1648/92 Turne vs. Meshulam I.r. 46(3) 38, 46 (1992)).
Accordingly, in many cases the claim of lack of parental capability of the parent requesting
the aid by force of the convention was rejected, as was a claim that the abductor parent is
facing deportation or substantial financial difficulty as a result of returning with the child to
the state he had left (see for example: C.A. 5532/93 Gunzburg vs. Grinvald. I.r. 49(3) 282
(1995)). The court relies in this context only on experts' determinations, from which one can

Page 13 of 21

clearly realize that the risk of physical or psychological harm is substantial. So, the harm
defense is extremely narrow, only for cases in which returning the minor would expose him
to physical or psychological harm, or otherwise place him in an intolerable situation.
Deduction from the general to the specific
26. In the current case, the plaintiff and the respondent were both born in Israel and
went to find their luck in United States, in which they had resided since the beginning of
their relationship. The plaintiff began studying, while the respondent worked in odd jobs,
and at some point established a business company in partnership with the plaintiff. In
United States their first daughter was born. Throughout all this time they maintained their
connections in Israel, came to visit in Israel often and preserved their social rights and even
opened a shop in their home town. Consensually, the plaintiff and the respondent came
with their daughter to Israel for Passover holiday. In this vacation they have decided to
separate. The respondent returned to United States as planned while the plaintiff did not do
so, having decided to stay in Israel with the daughter. As the daughter was not returned to
United States at the planned date, the respondent filed a claim for her return according to
Hague convention.
27. Therefore, we deal with a case of retention, and the question at hand is whether the
terms of the convention's applicability exist. The minor the respondent wishes to return to
United States is extremely young. At the time in which she were allegedly to return to
United States she was only nine months old, and therefore her age meets the age limit set in
article 4 of the convention, determining the age limit for claiming the return of a minor
according to the convention at the age of 16 years. In addition, the Regional court decided
that the law in the state of New Jersey, in which the plaintiff and the respondent has
resided, is that the custodial rights are joint rights. Therefore the first term set in article 3 of
the convention exists, since the retention has breached the custodial rights of the
respondent over his daughter. Later on, the Regional court ordered the respondent to issue
a custody proceeding in the state of New Jersey before returning the daughter to United
States, and the respondent attached to his written response confirmation of issuing such
procedure. With that, the respondent has actually exercised his custodial rights, and the
second term set in article 3 of the convention, according to which the parent requesting the
return of the minor according to the convention must exercise the custodial rights granted
to him, exists. Finally, the Family court determined that the habitual residence of the
daughter was United States, so the third term set in article 3 of the convention for proving
an act of abduction exists. In examining the issue of habitual residence by factual school and
intentional school, the Regional court reached the same conclusion regarding the habitual
residence prior to the act of retention. The Regional court's judges also accepted this factual
determination. I do not find a reason to intervene with this factual determination of the
discussing court (see: F.P.A. 911/07 Anonymous vs. Anonymous (unpublished 10.30.2007)).
After two courts examined the circumstances of the case and reached the same conclusion,
and after examining the parties' claims, I do not find justification for additional factual
examination of the term regarding the habitual residence or for deviating from the rule of
non-intervention in this context.
In conclusion of this issue regarding the preliminary terms of the convention's
applicability, as determined by Regional court, the plaintiff has performed an act of wrongful
retention. At this point we should therefore examine whether one of the defenses against
immediate return applies.

Page 14 of 21

28. In order to determine whether under the circumstances of the case, the consent
defense or the acquiescing defense applies, one must first examine the time factor, that is,
do the circumstances indicate that the respondent consented in advance to the retention or
acquiesced with it after the effect. The Family court's premise, also adopted by Regional
court, was that the date of the daughter's retention is June 20
th
2010, the day in which the
plaintiff and the daughter were to return to United States according to the plane tickets
purchased before the parties' arrival at Israel (hereinafter: the date of retention). The
respondent issued proceedings according to Hauge convention in order to return the
daughter to United States, immediately and shortly after the date of retention. At this stage
I will clarify that I realize that the minority opinion in the Regional court focused on the
applicability of the acquiescing defense. However, in light of the distinction I described
between these two defenses, it seems that under the circumstances of the case the
respondent's immediate action does not allow us to view his behavior as acquiescing with
the daughter's retention. Therefore, the defense fitting the current matter is the consent
defense, according to which one should examine whether the overall circumstances indicate
that the respondent consented in effect to the retention and the change of status-quo, and
with that actually waived the "first aid" granted by the convention. As I'll explain hereinafter,
I believe that this question should be answered affirmatively, since the circumstances of the
case suggest that the respondent consented prior to the date of the daughter's retention to
leaving the custody over her at the plaintiff's hands.
29. The Regional court determined that the plaintiff and the respondent consensually
arrived at Israel for Passover holiday. During this vacation, in which each of them stayed at
their families' houses, they have decided to separate. The plaintiff turned to Rabbinate court
and issued a divorce procedure, to which she attached the issue of custody over the
daughter. On her request, the Rabbinate court issued a warrant detaining the respondent
and the daughter against departure from Israel. The respondent turned to Rabbinate court
with an urgent request to cancel this warrant. In his request, the respondent described
before the Rabbinate court the course of events between the couple, and even declared
that he is willing to divorce the plaintiff immediately and reach an alimony agreement with
her as required. That, I emphasize, is not enough to teach of his consent to leave the custody
over the daughter with the plaintiff.
Later on, the parties decided to converse and reach a separation agreement that will
be acceptable by both of them. With the mitigation of an accountant, which is a mutual
friend, an agreement was drafted, titled "financial agreement". The paragraphs of the
agreement indicate that the parties consented to the plaintiff's and the daughter's stay in
Israel, while the respondent returns to United States to his business. So was determined on
paragraph 1 of the agreement that the plaintiff will remove the detaining warrant issued
against the respondent at her request; paragraph 2 states that the monthly alimony for the
daughter will be paid in NIS; in paragraph 3 the respondent promised to transfer on his
name certain contracts that the plaintiff was signed on as a partner in the company in
United States; in paragraph 4 the respondent consented to moving the plaintiff's and the
daughter's equipment to Israel; and in paragraph 7 the parties determined consensual
seeing arrangements were the respondent to return and reside in Israel. the overall points of
agreement in this agreement teaches clearly that the parties consented that each of the
parties will go their own way the respondent will return to United States and the plaintiff
and the daughter will remain in Israel.

Page 15 of 21

However, at the end of the day, due to financial dispute, apparently from the
plaintiff's side, the financial agreement was not signed. Nonetheless, the plaintiff performed
actions indicating she began honoring her obligations according to the agreement. We learn
of that by her consent to cancel the detaining warrant issued against the respondent at her
request, after which the respondent has returned by himself to United States.
30. In other contexts it was said that "there is nothing holy about signature" (A.D. 40/80
Kenig vs. Cohen I.r. 36(3) 701, 724 (1982)), so if foundations of decision and specification
exist in an agreement, it is valid even without the parties' signatures (see for example: C.A.
692/86 Botkowsky vs. Gat I.r. 44(1) 57 (1989)). Of course, this rule does not apply to the
circumstances of the current case, since the parties agree that the financial agreement did
not develop into a binding contract. However, I believe that the minority judge in the
Regional court was right to determine that the agreement has a "semi-evidential" meaning
in examining the respondent's consent to leaving the custody over the daughter in the hands
of the plaintiff. The agreement was not signed eventually since the plaintiff refused to sign
it, while the respondent was willing to accept it as is, including the paragraphs indication his
consent to the daughter's stay in Israel, under the plaintiff's custody. Under these
circumstances I believe that the agreement should be viewed as main evidence, assisting in
completing the overall picture, which indicates that the respondent waived the urgent
fulfillment of the custodial rights granted to him by force of the state of New Jersey's law.
I fully realize that the respondent attached to his written response an additional
agreement draft, written to his claim by the plaintiff by hand, on which she wrote "returning
to Israel" (hereinafter: the draft). To his claim, it attests that the parties did not agree on the
issue of the daughter's residence, and therefore there wasn't any early consent regarding
custody. The Family court who examined this draft treated it as a draft for the financial
agreement, while the Regional court did not discuss its relevance. After reviewing the draft it
becomes evident that its content does not coincide with the financial agreement's content,
since it deals with a situation of reconciliation between the plaintiff and the respondent and
not of separation and divorce. It wasn't clarified and in any case wasn't proved when was
this draft written and by whom. In the absence of such information, the draft cannot teach
us what the respondent wishes to teach, and in any case it seems that no one disputes the
fact that the final draft of the financial agreement is the one edited by the accountant and
deals with separation and with the plaintiff's and the daughter's stay in Israel.
31. In conclusion of this issue consent is being learned from the overall circumstances
and it need not be literal. Indeed, in the current case the respondent's conduct teaches that
he had consented to the non-return of the plaintiff and the daughter to United States. He
was involved in drafting the financial agreement, in which he had consented among other
things to the issue of custody and seeing arrangements. Later on he has even made an active
action by turning with the plaintiff to the Rabbinate court, requesting to remove the warrant
detaining his departure from Israel, and returned to United States to his affairs, while the
plaintiff and the daughter remained in Israel. I will clarify that it is indeed possible that the
respondent hoped that the plaintiff and the daughter will return to United States at the date
of retention, and may have even believed they would do so, especially given the fact that
the marriage did not yet end officially. However, the respondent's objective behavior
indicates his consent to leaving the custody over the daughter in the plaintiff's hands, and to
the staying of the two of them in Israel. the subjective state of mind, feelings and
expectations of the respondent are not suffice to conclude that he did not give his consent
to the plaintiff's and the daughter's stay in Israel, in light of his explicit manifested actions.

Page 16 of 21

32. As above mentioned, the act of consent is a contractual action by nature. After the
parties conversed the issue of custody, and after the plaintiff agreed to remove the
detaining warrant against the respondent's departure from Israel, he left Israel and return to
his business in United States. It is certainly reasonable to assume that the chain of events,
and specifically his departure from Israel under the plaintiff's consent, after the financial
agreement was written and partially even fulfilled, caused the plaintiff to rely on the issue of
change in status-quo, mainly separation of the couple and her stay with the daughter in
Israel. while discussing the relevance of the agreement between the parties, Family court
determined that:
"the plaintiff was under stress as he had a detention warrant
against him leaving Israel, which would have disrupted his plans to
h^ Z
whether it was written under the heavy shadow of the detention
warrant, and even if the plaintiff's consent would have been
granted in the draft, indeed it would have been granted under the
pressure laid upon him by the detention warrant" (Family court
ruling, paragraph 28, p. 14; The emphases were made by me,
E.A.).
I cannot accept such assumption, that the respondent consented to the daughter's
stay in Israel only because he was under pressure laid upon him by the detention warrant
against him. While negotiating for a contract, each side is surely under pressures and
influenced by various considerations, and calculates his actions accordingly. The rule is that
the freedom of will should be interpreted widely, and that various pressures, financial, social
or political, should not be viewed as harming the minimal will (see and compare: C.A.
1569/93 Maya vs. Panford I.r. 48(5) 705 (1994); C.A. 1912/93 Shaham vs. Mans I.r. 52(1)
119 (1998)). Therefore, I do not believe that it is right to determine that the respondent was
under heavy pressure due to the detention warrant, and that his consent was granted under
that pressure without being able to use his discretion. Let us not forget that against the
pressure under which the respondent was to continue with his plans, stood the issue of
custody over his daughter, which is in itself a matter of uppermost importance.
33. The respondent's later actions, around the date of retention, may well teach that he
had a change of heart regarding his daughter's stay in Israel, or that he had still hoped to
reconcile with the plaintiff. The respondent sent the plaintiff a warning letter by his lawyer,
close to the date of retention. He even issued proceedings to return the daughter to United
States according to the convention, in the authorized court in Israel, about two months after
that date. Furthermore, he acted to achieve a stay visa for himself in United States;
presented documents indicating he had prolonged the rent lease and paid health insurance
fees for the daughter in United States; and later he met the preliminary terms for returning
the daughter as set by the Regional court. These actions indicate his desire to return the
daughter to United States, and that the custody hearing in her matter will be held in his
state of residence. However, these later actions do not erase the consent he had previously
granted to the daughter's stay in Israel, prior to the act of retention. As above mentioned,
the rule is that one cannot go back on granting consent, since the respondent's consent to
the plaintiff's and the daughter's retention in Israel teaches of his waive of the immediate
aid granted by the convention. Hence, in light of the overall picture arising from the
specified facts, the consent defense applies to the case at hand. Therefore, the question of

Page 17 of 21

returning the daughter to United States is within the court's discretion, and there is no
immediate obligation to return her according to the convention.
34. In light of the determination that the consent defense applies, we need not further
discuss the plaintiff's claim regarding the applicability of the grave risk of harm defense,
since it is sufficient to prove one of the defenses in order to grant the discussing court the
discretion to decide whether to order the daughter's return or not. In short I will comment
that the burden of proving such defense applies, laid upon the one claiming it, is very heavy,
and the interpretation given to it is extremely narrow. It seems that in the absence of an
expert opinion in the matter, and in the absence of extreme circumstances indicating grave
risk of harm, one cannot determine that this defense applies to the current case.
35. In conclusion, the convention applies to the matter at hand, since the preliminary
terms for its applicability exist, and the plaintiff performed an act of wrongful retention in
Israel. however, the consent defense applies to the current case, since the overall
circumstances, mainly the separation agreement and the parties' behavior after writing this
agreement, indicate that the respondent had consented to the mother's and the daughter's
stay in Israel. Therefore the immediate return is not mandatory according to the convention
and it is included in the court's discretion. I will turn now to the considerations relevant for
such a decision.
36. After considering the overall circumstances, I am satisfied not to order the
daughter's return to United States, and believe that the custodial issue should be discussed
in the authorized court in Israel. The plaintiff and the respondent resided in United States for
about four years, since the beginning of their relationship. They do not have an American
citizenship the respondent has a temporary work visa for only two years, and the plaintiff
has tourist's visa, which does not allow her to work for a living. The extended families of
both parties stay in Israel and they do not have a permanent housing in United States. While
they resided in United States, they've established a business in Israel and maintained their
bank accounts and social rights in Israel. The entire nature of the stay in United States, even
if it lasted for several years, is therefore that of temporariness. As they've decided to
separate, the respondent wished to return to his business in United States whereas the
plaintiff wished to stay in Israel, within a family support system, while in the middle stands
the mutual daughter, a very young toddler, whose both parents surely wish her the best. In
my opinion, the best interest of the minor obligates discussing the custodial proceedings in
her matter in Israel and not in United States. For most of her life the daughter, who is not
even two years old, resides with the plaintiff, which is the dominant parental figure in her
life, especially considering the respondent's long stay in United States, even to this day, in
separation from his daughter. Under the circumstances of the couple's separation, the
return of the plaintiff and the daughter to United States for the custodial proceedings might
place the plaintiff in an unbearable situation, which will ultimately be against the minor's
best interest. First, one cannot expect that after separating, the plaintiff and the respondent
will continue residing in the apartment in which they lived as a couple, of which the lease
was prolonged according to the decision made by Regional court in order to ensure the
minor's accommodation. Note well, under the circumstances in which the plaintiff has only
tourist's visa, and may not work for a living in United States, the plaintiff will not be able to
provide for herself and the daughter for housing separately from the respondent, and if she
will do so, she may face the danger of expulsion from United States. Even if the risk of such
an event is not grave, I believe that we should not risk disconnecting the plaintiff from her
toddler daughter, in a manner that contradicts the young daughter's best interest (see:

Page 18 of 21

C.P.A. 4575/00 Anonymous vs. Anonymous I.r. 55(2) 321, 331 (2001)). Alternatively, the
plaintiff might be forced to reside again with the respondent under the same roof, but
considering the ongoing disconnection and alienation between the parties during the legal
proceedings, it is reasonable to assume that joint residence of parents who do not get along
will also be against the minor's best interest. Thus I believe that the above mentioned
considerations, primarily the daughter being extremely young and the plaintiff's legal status
in United States, indicate that the custodial issue should be discussed in Israel, and therefore
I won't instruct her return to Unites States for the purpose of deliberating this issue.
37. In conclusion I have two comments regarding the progression of the procedure at
hand. First, the respondent requested to present us with the exhibits file presented before
the Regional court, and the plaintiff replied she leaves it to the court's discretion. I've
reviewed the file as requested, but did not find the exhibits within it to shed light on
additional aspects discussed in this decision. Its content surely influenced my current
decision, but it did not convince me to accept the respondent's point of view.
A second comment refers to an announcement the respondent filed to court, in
which he had informed that he is forced to leave Israel and return to his business in United
States before the legal proceeding at hand ends. The plaintiff responded to this
announcement by claiming that the respondent's return to United States was done while
violating a detention warrant against his departure from Israel. In his response, the
respondent rejected this claim. Without discussing the claim itself, since it is not necessary
and we don't have enough details to make any determination in the matter, it seems that
the divorce dispute has brought the parties to a bitter and alienated confrontation. I
sincerely hope that as the current proceeding ends, the plaintiff and the respondent will
succeed soon in achieving an understanding and resolve their differences, placing at the top
of their priorities the best interest of the mutual daughter, who's entitled to have both
parents present in her life.
Hence I suggest my colleagues to accept the appeal and determine that the Regional
court's decision regarding the daughter's return to United States according to the
convention is hereby cancelled. I also suggest cancelling the plaintiff's debit of legal
expenditures as determined by Family court. Under the circumstances I do not find it
appropriate to debit the respondent with the expenditures of the current discussion.
At the end of affairs I've read the opinion of my colleague, judge Vogelman, and wish
to shed a light on two issues. First, I believe that there will be cases in which the overlap
between civil contract law and family contract law will not be complete, and there will be a
need to address uniquely the family contract (see for example: C.P.A. 8791/00 Shalem vs.
Twinko, art. 7 (unpublished, 12.13.06); Shahar Lifshitz "Couple Contract Regularization in
Israeli Law Initial Outline" Court Campus 4, 271 (2004)). Second, as for the concern my
colleague has regarding the negative implications of parties' willingness to maintain an
effective negotiation, I believe that this concern is not an actual one, since this case has
unique circumstances. In this case there was a complete agreement which was not signed
eventually only due to the plaintiff's refusal while the respondent was willing to fulfill it.
Beyond that, as I've emphasized, the parties began acting according to the agreement by
consensually cancelling the detention warrant issued against the respondent's departure
from Israel, and the respondent even left Israel and returned to United States, while the
plaintiff and the daughter stayed in Israel. These unique circumstances justify in my view

Page 19 of 21

seeing the respondent's consent within the negotiation between the parties as indication of
the consent defense's applicability.
J u d g e

Judge H. Melcer:
1. I concur with the result my colleague, judge E. Arbel, has concluded in her review
and with the main reasons she elaborated. However, I believe that the reason supporting
the conclusion reached by her in her ruling should be based more on "the acquiescing
defense" set in article 13(a) of the convention, as defined by Hague Convention Act
(returning of abductees children) 1991, than "the consent defense" included in the same
article. I hereby explain my reasons.
2. Due to the circumstances described in my colleague's ruling and also in the minority
opinion of vice president, judge A. Avraham in the Regional court in Nazareth, I believe that
the respondent upon leaving recently for United States, has actually "consented" at least
at the time to the daughter's retention in Israel and to leaving her in her mother's hands in
Israel at that point. This may be inferred from the request made by the respondent to
Rabbinate court in order to cancel the detaining warrant issued against his departure from
Israel by the plaintiff a procedure at the end of which the abovementioned warrant was
cancelled consensually. In this context we remind that the Rabbinate court has unique
jurisdiction in the divorce claim between the parties, being Israeli citizens who got legally
married in Israel. furthermore the respondent was willing within the "financial agreement"
deliberated between the parties (and was not signed eventually due to reservations made in
fact by the plaintiff) to promise to move all the personal equipment of the minor to Israel
and pay her monthly alimony in NIS. At the same time he wished to guarantee himself
seeing arrangements with the child whenever he arrives at Israel.
This information, learned from the evidence included in the case, suffice to view
them, under the unique circumstances of the matter at hand, as kind of "acquiescing" and
waiving the "first aid" granted by force of the convention. see: C.A. 7206/93 Gabay vs.
Gabay I.r. 51(2) 241, 256-259 (1997); C.P.A. 7994/98 Dagan vs. Dagan, I.r. 53(3) 254, 273-
276 (1999).
All this is said without expressing my opinion regarding the continued procedures
between the parties.
Furthermore differently. Even if we were to say that the respondent did not
explicitly express his "acquiescing" with the child's retention in Israel at that point, the
plaintiff could have concluded from the agreements achieved during negotiations with the
respondent towards signing the abovementioned "financial agreement" that he has
effectively "acquiesced" for the time being with the child's move to Israel, or consented to it.
Therefore, by force of estoppels law the respondent is not entitled to the temporary aid
requested by him. An expression of similar view may be found in the reasoning (although
not the conclusion) mentioned in the ruling of the house of Lords in England in the matter of
In re H and Others (Minors) [1997] UKHL 12 (which also refers to Israeli couple) written by
Lord Browne-Wilkinson, who emphasized that it is an exception to the rule. See also: In re AZ
(Minor) [1993] 1 FLR 682.

Page 20 of 21

Such defense is also known in France, where it led to a result similar to the one laid
out by us here. See: ruling of Aubrey vs. Aubrey, as quoted in the book: Beaumont &
McEleavy, The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction (1999), P. 122 (note that
the abovementioned book criticizes the abovementioned ruling and also mentions a
contradicting French ruling Horlander c. Horlander. Cass. 1re civ., 1992 Bull. Civ. L. No 91-
18177; D.S 1993, 570).
3. In light of all the abovementioned the appeal is accepted, as suggested by my
colleague, judge E. Arbel.
J u d g e

Judge U. Vogelman:
1. I concur with the majority of determinations detailed in the opinion of my colleague
Judge Arbel, and the reasons for them. I also concur with her determination that the
"acquiescing defense" set in article 13(a) of the convention, as defined by Hague Convention
Act (returning of abductees children) 1991, does not apply to the current matter. However,
regretfully, I cannot concur with her determination that the consent defense set in the same
article was proven in the current case, which allows not to return the mutual daughter to
U.S.A; that, since the respondent consented to it in an early draft made during negotiation
to prepare a "financial agreement" which did not develop at the end of the day.
2. As my colleague points out, contract law applies to the consent defense, including all
implications of it. A fundamental principle of contract law, which has relevance to the
current matter, is the principle of reciprocity. According to this principle, the advantage of a
contract, that is the benefit received from the other party, and the disadvantage, that is the
thing to be given to the other party, have to be reciprocal (see Daniel Friedman and Nili
Cohen Contracts 149 (volume 1, 1991) (hereinafter: Friedman and Cohen). A situation in
which the legal status of the two parties is divided, so one of them is being held for his
sayings and concessions during negotiation while the other party is exempt and released of
his obligations places the parties in an uneven position, and therefore does not coincide
with the abovementioned principle.
3. The agreement draft in the current matter is a result of a negotiation between the
parties, in which none of the parties fulfilled all his wishes. Examining the various ingredients
of the contract suggests that each side waived and compromised until eventually they've
reached consent to a draft, in which the various obligations are dependant and conditioned
to each other. Assuming that the respondent's consent to the plaintiff's and the daughter's
stay in Israel is a one-sided, unconditional obligation does not coincide, in my opinion,
according to the factual infrastructure before us, with the various ingredients of the contract
nor with its purpose to settle all controversial issues in a manner that will allow the parties
to end their marriage. Therefore, since at the end of the day the draft did not develop into a
binding agreement, the obligations included in it do not stand, as they were conditioned by
each party's execution reciprocally.
4. Indeed, as my colleague points out, "there is nothing holy about signature", and if
foundations of decision and specification exist in an agreement, it is valid even without a
signature. However, as she points out, these foundations, and especially that of decision, did
not exist in the matter at hand and therefore the contract did not develop. In this state of

Page 21 of 21

affairs, I do not believe that one can separate the respondent's consent regarding one of the
ingredients of the agreement's draft from the overall agreement, and view it by itself, even
though the framework in which it was supposed to fit did not emerge. Furthermore, these
things do not deny the possibility of creating a legally binding obligation even one-sided by
nature even during negotiating towards a contract which did not develop at the end of the
day to an agreement. Such are for example situations in which one party has reason to rely
on a contract, following obligations given or presentation shown by the other party during
negotiation (Friedman and Cohen, p. 519-648). However, I do not believe that in the matter
at hand the factual infrastructure laid before the discussing court indicates that the
respondent said or presented anything that might have brought the plaintiff to reasonably
rely on it in a manner that justifies protection by law.
5. Beyond the abovementioned, using the points of agreement within a negotiation
draft of an agreement, which failed at the end of the day, may carry with it negative
implications regarding the willingness of parties to maintain an effective negotiation towards
a contract. Note well: the parties might refrain from presentations, declarations or
proposals, which include concession in favor of the other party, since they'll fear that such
concessions may be held as evidence against them in a future proceeding that the parties
may have (see C.A. 172/89 Sela insurance company Ltd. Vs. Solel Bone Ltd., I.r. 47(1) 311,
333 (1993)). It may create difficulties in achieving an agreement, thwart compromises and
unnecessarily prolong debating.
Since the consent defense does not apply, there is no choice, in my view, but to
reject the appeal.
J u d g e

By majority of opinions it was decided as specified in the ruling of Judge E. Arbel.
Given today, Iyar 13
th
5771 (May 17
th
2011).

J u d g e J u d g e J u d g e
Judgment of Superior Court Justice
Bonnie Mizdol, in the Matter of Ben Haim
EXHIBIT
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
BERGEN COUNTY
CHANCERY DIVISION: FAMILY PART
DOCKET NO.: FD 02-906-11
A.D. #
SHARON BEN HAIM,
Plaintiff,
vs.
OSHRAT BEN HAIM,
Defendant.
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PROCEEDING
Order to Show Cause
Judge Mizdol's Ruling
Place: Bergen County Courthouse
10 Main Street
Hackensack, New Jersey 07601
Date: August 25, 2011
BEFORE:
HONORABLE BONNIE J. MIZDOL, J.S.C.
TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY:
ERIC M. MARK, ESQ. (Eric M. Mark Attorney-at-Law)
APPEARANCES:
ERIC M. MARK, ESQ. (Eric M. Mark Attorney-at-Law)
Attorney for Plaintiff
OSHRAT BEN HAIM
Pro Se
Sara L. Kern, CET**D-338
KING TRANSCRIPTION SERVICES
FRANK H. ULRICH
65 Willowbrook Boulevard
Wayne, New Jersey 07470
Audio Recorded
Recording Opr:
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Proceedings 2
(Commencement of proceedings)
THE COURT: Okay.
Hello?
MS. BEN HEIM: Hello?
THE COURT: Hi. Ms. Ben Haim, can you hear me?
MS. BEN HEIM: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. We're going on the record. And
this is the matter of Sharon Ben Haim and Oshrat Ben Haim.
Counsel, may I have your -- your appearance,
please.
MR. MARK: Eric Mark, Newark, New Jersey, for
Mr. Ben Haim.
THE COURT: Okay. Let the record reflect that
Mr. Ben Haim is present in my courtroom, that I am permitting
Oshrat Ben Haim to participate telephonically from Israel.
This is a matter that was brought to the Court's
attention. I -- the -- the complaint in this matter
specifically was filed via an order to show cause. That
order to show cause was filed on February 4th of 2011, and in
essence it sought the emergent return of the parties' child
to the United States from Israel. At that time -- and the
child's name is Ofir.
At the time, both parties were represented by
counsel, and it was represented to me that there were matters
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Proceedings 3
pending in the courts of Israel. This Court saw fit to defer
decision-making in this matter until such time as I could
secure the determination of the Israeli court. Since the
inception of this matter, there have been several decisions,
and I believe the easiest way for me to do this is to provide
background.
The order to show cause application filed by the
father in this court was done actually on February 2d. The
request was that the defendant mother and the child be
required to return to the United States from Israel. There
is a timeline that this Court must consider in making this
determination, and that timeline is that both of these
parties are Israeli citizens, and they both came to the
United States in or about 2004, and they resided in New
Jersey. They married sometime in 2008. That marriage
ceremony took place in Israel. The parties returned to the
United States. And ultimately on September 10th of 2009,
their child Ofir was born here in Englewood, New Jersey.
Thereafter, in or about November or December of
2009, these parties returned to Israel. They opened a
children's clothing shop sometime in January of 2010. And
after opening that shop in Israel, the parties returned to
the United States in February of 2010. They then went back
to Israel for the Passover holiday in March of 2010. And at
that time, the defendant, who is the wife, filed for divorce
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Proceedings 4
with the rabbinical court in Israel. That filing was done on
April 7th of 2010.
On April 11th of 2010, the parties met and they
began the negotiation of a marital settlement agreement. The
agreement was never signed. Ultimately, the wife disagreed
with a portion of that agreement that addressed monetary
issues.
The plaintiff husband left Israel, and he returned
to the United States on April 19th of 2010.
There is no question, based upon the facts
presented, that prior to going to Israel for the Passover
holiday, these parties had agreed that the wife and the child
would return to the United States on June 20th of 2010, and,
in fact, there were airline tickets confirming that return.
About a month before the return date, the
plaintiff's attorney wrote to the wife warning that if she
did return to the United States with the child, that the
plaintiff father would move under the Hague Convention for
the child's return. And on July 1st of 2010, the father
filed for return of the child with the central registry under
the Hague Convention in the United States.
A few days thereafter, on July 5th of 2010, the
Haifa rabbinical court in Israel granted the defendant wife
temporary custody of the child.
I first want to address the fact that courts in New
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Proceedings 5
Jersey have previously addressed the issue of ecclesiastical
court rulings in other jurisdictions, and I particularly note
Innes v. Carrascosa, which is 391 N.J. Super. 453. And in
that case, the defendant mother had argued that the religious
annulment that she had filed for in Spain first should be
recognized.
In this case, the defendant mother filed for
divorce in the rabbinical court in Haifa, again an
ecclesiastical court. That court granted her temporary
custody. And this Court finds that that ruling is not to be
recognized by the State of New Jersey. As in Innes v.
Carrascosa, the rabbinical court is a religious court whose
is ruling not given any civil effect. New Jersey case law
provides that such rulings should not be recognized, and as a
result, that ruling has no bearing on the decision to be made
by this Court.
In or about November of 2010 until March of 2011,
it is without doubt that the plaintiff husband took part in
litigation before the regional court in Nazareth. This is a
civil court.
The plaintiff husband had filed a complaint with
the family court in Nazareth on August 31st of 2010, seeking,
again, return of the child. And on December 20th, the family
court in Nazareth ruled that the habitual residence of the
child was New Jersey. The family court found that the
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Proceedings 6
parties did not arrive in Israel to stay but that their
intentions were to return to the U.S. Further, the family
court rejected the defendant mother's claim that the father
had consented to the child's retention in Israel. She
attempted to rely on an unsigned draft of the settlement
agreement, and that argument was rejected by the family court
indicating that that agreement had no binding value.
The family court ordered that the child be returned
to the United States on the proviso that father deposit the
sum of $6,000 in Israeli shekels as support for the child
when she returned to the United States and to enable the
defendant mother to live in a rented apartment for six
months.
Mom appealed that ruling to the regional court in
Nazareth, and on January 20th of 2010, that court rendered
its decision. And in its opinion, the court ruled that again
the habitual state of residence of the child was New Jersey,
and as such, the child should be returned to New Jersey.
The mom then took an appeal to a three-judge panel
of the Supreme Court of Israel.
While the appeal to that three-judge panel was
pending, the husband in this matter in February of 2011 filed
the order to show cause in Bergen County. That order to show
cause requested that the defendant be compelled to return to
the United States with the child. The order to show cause
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Proceedings 7
was denied without prejudice and converted to a motion, and
that was to enable proper service to be effectuated on the
defendant wife. At the time of the filing, the husband was
in Israel participating in the proceedings before the
regional court. And on April 29th of 2011, I thereafter held
a case management conference awaiting determination of the
Israeli three-judge panel and permitting there to be daily
Skype communication with the child.
On May 17th of 2011, the three-judge panel of the
Israeli Supreme Court rendered opinions very different than
those done here in New Jersey or the United States. Each of
the judges on that panel rendered separate and independent
opinions. The first opinion was the opinion of Judge Arbel.
The opinion overturned the regional court's decision that the
child be returned to the United States, and although every
member of that three-judge panel found that the habitual
residence of the child was New Jersey, two of the judges
found defenses under Article 13 of the Hague Convention
applicable. The third judge found no such application.
So the first judge on the panel, Judge Arbel,
determined that the father had consented in advance to the
wife having custody of the child in Israel and had thereby
relinquished the immediate aid to be given to him by the
Convention. Judge Arbel determined that the child should not
be returned to the United States and that the custodial issue
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Proceedings 8
should be litigated in Israel. He [] based his findings
on the unsigned agreement that had been negotiated by these
parties. And he assumed that the father consented to the
minor's stay in Israel as a result thereof.
This Court disagrees with application of the
consent defense as the facts in this matter do not sustain
its application. The couple's original plan was that the
father would return by himself to the United States in April
and that the mother and daughter would return in June. This
Court finds that the father's return to the United States by
himself attests only to the fulfillment of the original plan
and does not allow for an assumption of consent to the
retention of the minor daughter.
This Court finds that the entire situation was
laden with duress. That the plaintiff in good faith
willingly began to negotiate with the defendant to reach some
type of an agreement would be the only thing a parent in this
set of circumstances could possibly do under this abduction.
The Court finds that the mere fact of a parent arriving in
the state to which the child was abducted and later returning
by himself to his habitual residence cannot be interpreted as
consent.
The United States is the plaintiff father's
habitual residence, and all courts involved have held that
the child's state of habitual residence is New Jersey as
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Proceedings 9
well. Therefore, the plaintiff father's return to the United
States will not be used against him. Further, reliance upon
an unexecuted agreement does not equate to consent.
The second judge of the three-judge panel was Judge
Melzar. He determined that although Judge Arbel was correct
in that one of the defenses under Article 13 of the Hague
Convention applies, he did not agree that it was the
defendant -- the defense of consent. He determined it was
the defense of acquiescence, and he opined that the father
acquiesced after the date of wrongful detention by inferring
acquiescence from the unsigned agreement. Judge Melzar
reasoned that the father was estopped by the terms of the
unsigned agreement.
Since I found that the unexecuted agreement does
not constitute consent, it clearly does not constitute
acquiescence. The father's lack of consent or acquiescence
is demonstrated by his correspondence directed to the wife
from his counsel, his institution of proceedings in New
Jersey. This Court finds that acquiescence needs to be
expressed clearly and unequivocally, as stated in the
minority opinion of Judge Fogelman.
I need to go back for one moment and talk about the
Hague Convention in general because the Hague Convention was
designed specifically to restore the factual status quo,
which is unilaterally altered when a parent abducts child.
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Proceedings 10
Its purpose is to protect the legal custody rights of the
nonabducting parent, and it empowers a court to determine the
merits of the alleged abduction, but not the merits of the
underlying custody claims or issued []. Those custody
rights are to be determined by the law of the child's
habitual residence.
Any person seeking the return of a child under the
Convention may commence a civil action by filing a petition
in the court where the child is located. The petitioner
bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the
evidence that the removal or the retention was wrongful. It
is the respondent's burden to show by clear and convincing
evidence that one of Article 13's exceptions apply.
In this case, the Israeli courts have acknowledged
that the habitual residence of Ofir is the state of New
Jersey. Notwithstanding the determination, the Israeli
courts have also held that one of the defenses under
Article 13 applies. Application of the Hague to the case
before this Court requires four factors to be considered in
order for relief to be invoked. The first is that the
nations involved must be signatories to the Hague. There is
no question that both Israel and the United States are
signatories to the Hague, so that Prong 1 is met.
Prong 2 is that the child must be a habit- -- a
habitual resident of a contracting state immediately before
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Proceedings 11
any proceeding, breach of custody or access right. There is
no question that this child's habitual state of residence was
New Jersey from the time of birth. As I mentioned before,
the timeline provides that these parties had lived in the
United States since 2004, that while they were married in
Israel, they returned to the United States. The child was
born in the United States. After the birth, the parties
traveled to Israel, returned again to the United States, and
then were going to take a holiday in Israel, at which time
the child was retained. So I find clearly that the child's
habitual residence is New Jersey.
The child must be under the age of 16 years of age.
This is without question. She was born on September 10th of
2009. Therefore, the third prong is likewise satisfied.
The fourth prong is that the child's removal or
retention in a country other than their place of habitual
residence must have been wrongful. I find that the actual
removal of the child to Israel in this case was not wrongful;
both parties accompanied the child to Israel for a Passover
holiday. There was no question that the agreement was that
the wife and the child and the father would be returning to
the United States; the father returning prior, the mother and
the child to return on June 20th. Therefore, this Court
considers the date of wrongful retention to be June 20th of
2010 because the wife retained the child in Israel after that
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Proceedings 12
point in time.
This Court also finds that the plaintiff father was
exercising custody rights. The parties were married and
living in New Jersey prior to this vacation, this holiday
Passover vacation in Israel, and that our law specifically
provides that parents have equal rights to their children
when no specific court order has been effectuated. And
that's 9:2-4 of our statutes.
Finding that jurisdiction lies here in New Jersey
as the habitual state of residence of the child, the Court
must now consider whether there are exceptions which would
permit there to be a different consideration of the facts.
The first exception is that the parent who filed
the petition was not actually exercising their custody rights
at the time of removal or retention. This is clearly not the
case in this file. These parties were a married couple
living together in a familial unit. They went to Israel with
a full intention of returning. This is evidenced by prepaid
plane tickets bought specifically for their return. And both
parties are entitled to the child under the statute just
cited, 9:2-4. That statute specifically provides that this
legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy
of New Jersey to assure minor children a frequent and
continuing contact with both parents after the parents have
separated or dissolved their marriage, and that it is in the
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Proceedings 13
public interest to encourage parents to share the rights and
responsibilities of child-rearing in order to effect that
policy.
Further, our statute 9:2-2 is a statute of
and as interpreted by our United States Supreme Court in the
case of Abbot v. Abbot, 130 S.Ct. 1983, where a state bars
the exit of a child without the consent of either parent or
court order, a right exists, and that is a custody
right pursuant to the Hague Convention. Our statute is clear
that provided this Court has jurisdiction over the custody
and maintenance of minor children and that the children are
natives of this state, which I find Ofir to be, that the
child cannot be removed out of its jurisdiction unless it is
with consent of both parents or unless there is an order of
the court. I find neither of these to exist, so I find no
exception under the first prong of exceptions. I find that
the plaintiff father was, in fact, exercising his custodial
rights at all times.
The parent who filed the petition consented to or
acquiesced in the removal or retention, I need not repeat my
findings. I find that no consent existed. I find no
acquiescence existed based upon an unsigned agreement during
a period laden with duress.
Another exception is that grave risk of harm could
happen upon this child or the child would be placed in some
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Proceedings 14
intolerable situation. The defendant in this proceeding
indicates that if she would -- if she were to return to the
United States, she would have to do so under a visa status,
and that would not allow her to work or support herself in
any way and that she would be relying upon the plaintiff in
order to support the family. This Court does not find that
to be the type of risk that the Hague Convention was designed
to protect. The Convention was designed to protect from
grave risk of harm; for example, war, civil unrest, something
that rises to that magnitude. Mere unemployment status does
not rise to the level of presenting risk to this child,
particularly since the dad is able to well afford the child.
Further, the proceeding must have been commenced
within a year after the date of the wrongful removal. There
is no doubt that this proceeding was commenced within the
one-year mark of the wrongful retention. The date of the
wrongful retention was June 20th of 2010. The husband filed
a complaint with the central authority here in the United
States on or about July 1st of 2010. He filed an order to
show cause in February of 2011. And he vociferously
participated in the defense of the proceeding in the Israeli
courts, all within one year of that period. I find that he
did nothing less than act diligently to try to ensure the
return of this child to the United States that.
As such, I find that none of the four exceptions to
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Proceedings 15
the Hague apply.
Therefore, I cannot afford comity to the decisions
made by the Israeli court. Full faith and credit is to be
accorded to participants of the Hague Convention provided
that the underlying decision was properly made. The rule of
comity is grounded in the policy of avoiding conflicts.
However, it is only afforded if the underlying issue was
decided correctly.
I cannot agree with the final determination of the
Israeli court. I find that the Hague applies. I find, as
did every other judge who has entertained this application,
found that New Jersey is the habitual residence of the child.
And I find that the child must be returned to New Jersey.
The Israeli court failed to follow the provisions established
within the Hague. I find that the decisions were not based
in the facts and that they have exceeded their boundaries.
And as such, I will not accept that decision. I
will not afford it comity. And I am going to order that the
child be returned to the state of New Jersey. I'm going to
order that that be done not later than September 10th.
Ms. Ben Haim, do you understand the decision?
Hello?
(Telephone call is disconnected)
THE COURT: I'm trying to get her back on the line
or you don't have it or we can't do it.
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Proceedings 16
Okay. I want the record to reflect that the Court
could hear the click of the phone as the decision was
finalized.
The Court will enter an order. It will be
necessary for you to serve this on Israeli counsel as well.
Okay? We'll prepare an order for you, counsel.
MR. MARK: Thank you, Judge.
(Conclusion of proceedings)
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Certification 17
CERTIFICATION
I, Sara L. Kern, the assigned transcriber, do hereby
certify the foregoing transcript of proceedings on Audio File
Room 265, Thursday, August 25, 2011, is prepared in full
compliance with the current Transcript Format for Judicial
Proceedings and is a true and accurate, non-compressed
transcript of the proceedings as recorded.
S/ August 29, 2011
Signature of Approved Transcriber Date
Sara L. Kern, CET**D-338
King Transcription Services
65 Willowbrook Boulevard
Wayne, NJ 07470
(973) 237-6080
Israeli Central Authority Opinion Ben-Haim
EXHIBIT
''P''
1

In Supreme Court C.A.D. 4117]11

In the matter of nague Convent|on Act (1991), return|ng of abductees ch||dren
nague Convent|on Act

and In the matter of 1he m|nor C. 8.n., born |n 2009 1he M|nor

S. S. 8.n.
Irom New Iersey, Un|ted States

8y hls represenLaLlves AdvocaLe
Shmuel Moran and assoclaLes
2
nd
Welzmann SL., 1el Avlv 64239
1el.: 972-3-6932013 lax: 972-3-6932012

and by hls represenLaLlves AdvocaLe
Cal 1orres and/or 8an Arnon
Calllee Llyon mall, Pazor Pa'gllllL
1el.: 972-4-6860888 lax: 972-4-6860890
1he et|t|oner

vs.

C. 8.n.

8y her represenLaLlves advocaLe
1al lLkln and/or A. Cloblnsky
3
Lh
Pa'aLzmauL SL., .C.8. no. 23, Palfa
1el.: 972-4-8661919 lax: 972-4-8641066
1he kespondent

Cp|n|on of the Israe|| Centra| Author|ty accord|ng to
nague Convent|on Act (return|ng of abductees ch||dren) 1991

Cn !une 14
Lh
2011 Lhe deparLmenL of lnLernaLlonal affalrs ln Lhe sLaLe aLLorney's
offlce recelved a copy of Lhe honorary courL's declslon daLed !une 13
Lh
2011,
deLermlnlng LhaL: "Lhe aLLorney general ls hereby requesLed Lo sLaLe hls oplnlon
regardlng Lhe quesLlons aL hand", ln regards Lo Lhe peLlLlon for addlLlonal dlscusslon
requesLed by Lhe peLlLloner's represenLaLlve, wlLhln 13 days.
1he deparLmenL of lnLernaLlonal affalrs acLs on behalf of Lhe aLLorney general as Lhe
CenLral AuLhorlLy ln lsrael (herelnafLer: "the Centra| Author|ty") accordlng Lo Pague
ConvenLlon AcL (reLurnlng of abducLees chlldren) 1991 (herelnafLer: "nague
Convent|on Act").
''P''
2

AfLer revlewlng Lhe abovemenLloned declslon and Lhe aLLached documenLs, Lhe
CenLral AuLhorlLy ls hereby honored Lo presenL lLs oplnlon as follows:
1. 1he peLlLloner's (herelnafLer: also "the father") requesL for addlLlonal
dlscusslon ls based on arLlcle 30(b) of Lhe courLs' law [lnLegraLed], 1984,
sLaLlng LhaL:
"(b) |f the Supreme Court d|d not dec|de on the matter as
stated |n sub-art|c|e (a), each of the part|es |s ent|t|ed to
request an add|t|ona| d|scuss|on as prev|ous|y descr|bed,
the Supreme Court's pres|dent or a d|fferent [udge or
[udges, as determ|ned, may accept the request |f the |aw
dec|ded upon |n the Supreme Court contrad|cts a prev|ous
|aw determ|ned by the Supreme Court, or |f the
|mportance, d|ff|cu|tness or nove|ty of the determ|ned
|aw a||ows |n the|r op|n|on room for add|t|ona|
d|scuss|on."
2. Accordlng Lo Lhe CenLral AuLhorlLy's oplnlon and as wlll be speclfled, Lhe
honorary courL's rullng from May 17
Lh
2011 conLradlcLs Lhe prevlous law
deLermlned by Lhe Supreme CourL regardlng lnLernaLlonal abducLlon of
chlldren accordlng Lo Pague ConvenLlon AcL. ln addlLlon, ln Lhe CenLral
AuLhorlLy's oplnlon Lhere ls room for addlLlonal dlscusslon due Lo Lhe
lmporLance, dlfflculLness or novelLy of Lhe law deLermlned ln Lhe rullng.
Iactua| background as descr|bed |n the ru||ng
3. 1he respondenL (herelnafLer: also "the mother") and Lhe peLlLloner, boLh
born ln lsrael, reslded as of 2006 ln new !ersey as a couple (by force of
LourlsLs' vlsa). Cn 2007 Lhe plalnLlff began sLudylng ln unlLed SLaLes, and as a
resulL boLh parLners recelved a sLaylng vlsa for sLudenL and parLner. Cn 2008
Lhey goL marrled ln lsrael, and lmmedlaLely reLurned Lo unlLed SLaLes. Cn
SepLember 2009 Lhelr daughLer was born Lhere (herelnafLer: also "the
daughter").
4. AbouL Lwo monLhs afLer blrLh Lhe couple came Lo lsrael for abouL Lwo
monLhs, opened a chlldren's cloLhlng shop ln Lhelr home Lown and reLurned
Lo unlLed SLaLes. Cn March 2010 Lhe Lhree of Lhem had arrlved agaln aL lsrael
for assover hollday. 1he moLher was due Lo reLurn Lo unlLed SLaLes wlLh Lhe
mlnor on !une 20
Lh
2010, buL dld noL do so. lL appears LhaL Lhe couple had
experlenced a crlsls based on Lhe faLher's newly embraced rellglous llfesLyle,
whlle Lhe moLher dld noL embrace lL. Cn Aprll 7
Lh
2010, whlle ln lsrael, Lhe
parenLs reslded separaLely and Lhe moLher flled a dlvorce clalm ln Lhe
8abblnaLe courL, Lo whlch she had aLLached Lhe cusLodlal lssue.
3. ln a mlLlgaLlon procedure, Lhe Lwo parLles reached a flnanclal agreemenL
deLermlnlng Lhe cusLodlal lssue over Lhe daughLer buL Lhls agreemenL was
noL slgned, slnce Lhe moLher refused Lo slgn lL due Lo dlfferenL demands
3

regardlng possesslon. 1he faLher reLurned by hlmself Lo unlLed SLaLes, afLer
Lhe moLher removed Lhe warranL deLalnlng hls and Lhe daughLer's deparLure
from lsrael. As Lhe moLher and Lhe mlnor dld noL reLurn Lo unlLed SLaLes, Lhe
faLher lmmedlaLely lnlLlaLed procedures accordlng Lo Pague ConvenLlon ln
unlLed SLaLes and ln lsrael.
6. Cn uecember 21
sL
2010 Lhe lamlly courL ln nazareLh ruled ln Lhe faLher's
favor and deLermlned LhaL Lhe mlnor should be reLurned Lo her hablLual
resldence unlLed SLaLes. 1hls rullng was appealed ln 8eglonal courL ln
nazareLh, whlch was re[ecLed of lebruary 20
Lh
2011. LaLer, Lhe moLher
requesLed permlsslon Lo appeal before Lhls honorary courL, whlch on May
17
Lh
2011 overLurned Lhe 8eglonal courL's rullng and deLermlned LhaL Lhe
mlnor should noL be reLurned Lo unlLed SLaLes.
1he procedure accord|ng to nague Convent|on Act
7. 1he courL's role ln a procedure accordlng Lo Pague ConvenLlon AcL was
descrlbed ln C.A. 1372/93 Stagman vs. 8urk l.r. 49(2), 431 (herelnafLer
"Stagman |aw") by honorary [udge Coldbrg, as follows:
"'As the court's ro|e |n a procedure by the act, |n th|s |ssue
of ch||dren's return, |s on|y "f|re ext|ngu|shment" or "f|rst
a|d" to reestab||sh the status-quo' (C.k. 1648]92 1urne vs.
Meshu|am, p. 4S), the court shou|d not address the |ssue
of ch||d's permanent custody, and even not the ch||d's
best |nterest |n the fu|| sense of the term. 1he d|scuss|on's
framework |s not dest|ned to be a w|de one and does not
a||ow |t. In other words, the ch||d's best |nterest |s not to
be dec|ded upon per se, and m|ght ar|se, |n case one of
the defenses of the convent|on app||es, on|y as a dec|s|ve
cons|derat|on |n a conf||ct between [the |nterest to cance|
the act of abduct|on, wh|ch |s tak|ng the |aw |nto one's
own hands by one of the parents, by reestab||sh|ng the
status-quo, and the need to defend the ch||d's best
|nterest], wh|ch [ust|f|es avo|dance from return|ng the
ch||d to |ts res|dence."
8. AfLer provlng Lhe appllcablllLy of Lhe Lerms seL ln arLlcle 3 of Lhe appendlx Lo
Pague ConvenLlon AcL, LhaL ls a wrongful removal or reLenLlon lndeed
occurred, arLlcle 12 of Lhe appendlx Lo Pague ConvenLlon AcL deLermlnes
LhaL:
"Where a ch||d has been wrongfu||y removed or reta|ned
|n terms of Art|c|e 3 and, at the date of the
commencement of the proceed|ngs before the [ud|c|a| or
adm|n|strat|ve author|ty of the Contract|ng State where
the ch||d |s, a per|od of |ess than one year has e|apsed
from the date of the wrongfu| remova| or retent|on, the
4

author|ty concerned sha|| order the return of the ch||d
forthw|th. 1he [ud|c|a| or adm|n|strat|ve author|ty, even
where the proceed|ngs have been commenced after the
exp|rat|on of the per|od of one year referred to |n the
preced|ng paragraph, sha|| a|so order the return of the
ch||d, un|ess |t |s demonstrated that the ch||d |s now
sett|ed |n |ts new env|ronment. Where the [ud|c|a| or
adm|n|strat|ve author|ty |n the requested State has
reason to be||eve that the ch||d has been taken to another
State, |t may stay the proceed|ngs or d|sm|ss the
app||cat|on for the return of the ch||d."
9. noLe LhaL Lhe currenL case falls wlLhln Lhe beglnnlng of arLlcle 12 slnce Lhe
appllcaLlon was flled ln close proxlmlLy Lo Lhe daLe of reLenLlon. 1herefore,
Lhe courL as a rule should lnsLrucL Lhe lmmedlaLe reLurn of Lhe mlnor, whlle
conslderlng Lhe defenses llsLed ln arLlcles 13 and 20 of Lhe appendlx Lo Pague
ConvenLlon AcL. 1he defenses clalmed on Lhe currenL maLLer by Lhe moLher
are consenL and acqulesclng, descrlbed ln arLlcle 13(a) of Lhe appendlx,
deLermlnlng LhaL:
"Notw|thstand|ng the prov|s|ons of the preced|ng Art|c|e,
the [ud|c|a| or adm|n|strat|ve author|ty of the requested
State |s not bound to order the return of the ch||d |f the
person, |nst|tut|on or other body wh|ch opposes |ts return
estab||shes that -
a) 1he person, |nst|tut|on or other body hav|ng the care
of the ch||d was not actua||y exerc|s|ng the custody r|ghts
at the t|me of remova| or retent|on, or had consented to
or subsequent|y acqu|esced |n the remova| or retent|on."
10. Accordlng Lo Lhe rullng, boLh ln lsrael and worldwlde, Lhe defenses should be
lnLerpreLed narrowly. See for example C.A. 7206/93 Gabay vs. Gabay l.r.
31(2) 241 (herelnafLer: "Gabay |aw") ln paragraph 19 of honorary [udge
8arak's rullng:
Sett|ng the boundar|es of th|s defense |s known to
have grave |mportance. Its w|den|ng m|ght nu|||fy the
nague Convent|on of |ts content. 1herefore |t |s
acceptab|e to determ|n|ng that the extent of the defense
shou|d be |nterpreted narrow|y (see the abovement|oned
C.A. SS32]93 [6] and the references there). 1he burden of
prov|ng the defense's app||cab|||ty ||es upon the one
c|a|m|ng |t app||es (see C.A. 6327]94 . Issac vs. k. Issac
and others [7])."
11. Ponorary [udge Arbel, ln paragraph 13 of Lhe currenLly dlscussed rullng,
emphaslzes Lhe balance beLween Lhe defenses and Lhe ConvenLlon's
5

purposes as follows:
"1hese defenses conf||ct to some degree w|th other ma|n
purposes of the convent|on, spec|f|ca||y the purposes of
prevent|ng se|f [ust|ce made by the abductor parent and
honor|ng the ru|e of |aw accord|ng to un|versa| standards.
In the ba|ance between these two purposes, |t was
determ|ned that the defenses shou|d be used under
carefu| cons|derat|on, |est the except|on w||| become the
ru|e |n a manner that w||| underm|ne the purposes of the
convent|on and nu|||fy the ob||gat|ons of the contract|ng
states. 1herefore |t was determ|ned that the burden of
proof carr|ed by the one c|a|m|ng the defenses app|y |s a
heavy burden, not to be treated ||ght|y (see: I..A. 672]06
!"#$ !%&%$ '()$ *&+#,- (unpub||shed, 10.1S.06), ./0(&$ 12%2,3
42%&5$ .67/&8&9-%:$ *27-%9$ -8$ 9;2$ <=>?$ @&+#2$ A;0/B$
!"B#C90-8$ A-8'2890-85$ @&+#2$ A-8D2%28C2$ -8$ 1%0'&92$
E892%8&90-8&/$F&G5$!C9($ &8B$H-C#I289($-D$ 9;2$J-#%92289;$
K2((0-8$ LMN5$ LN?$ O<=>?P$ QR$ ;2%208&D92%S$ 12%2,342%&$
%27-%9)."
12. 8emember LhaL even upon provlng Lhe appllcablllLy of a defense, Lhe courL
has no obllgaLlon Lo refraln from reLurnlng Lhe chlld buL raLher has room for
courL's dlscreLlon regardlng Lhe reLurn.
13. 1he defenses agalnsL reLurnlng an abducLed chlld have already been
dlscussed by Supreme CourL, ln Lhe rullng of honorary presldenL Aharon
8arak ln Gabay law, ln whlch paragraph 21 deLermlnes LhaL:
'Consent' or 'Acqu|esc|ng' accord|ng to Art|c|e 13(a)
of nague Convent|on |s a one-s|ded |ega| act|on, wh|ch
requ|res comprehens|on by the other parent. It |s based
on the sub[ect|ve des|re of the parent f|nd|ng |ts externa|
express|on |n h|s behav|or. It |s enhanced when |t's
comprehended by the other parent, as he becomes aware
that the 'abducted' parent re||nqu|shes chang|ng the
status-quo. 1herefore, |f the 'abductor' parent be||eves
that the 'abducted' parent does not re||nqu|sh the change
of the status-quo, he may not c|a|m that th|s parent
consented nor acqu|esced, even |f such consent or
acqu|esc|ng m|ght be |nterpreted by the reasonab|e
person. Such a c|a|m w||| a|so contrad|ct the bona f|de
pr|nc|p|e. Iurthermore, consent or acqu|esc|ng that was
granted by m|stake, decept|on, coerc|on or exp|o|tat|on
may be cance||ed (see art|c|es 14-17 of Contract Law
(genera|), 1973 and art|c|e 61(b) of th|s |aw). Indeed,
'Consent' or 'Acqu|esc|ng' be|ng a one-s|ded |ega| act|on,
the one-s|ded |ega| act|on's |aws as they deve|op |n Israe|
6

w||| app|y, cons|der|ng the un|que purpose under|y|ng
nague Convent|on (compare: A. 8arak M|ss|on Law [10],
p. 396)."
Consent and |ts estab||shment
14. Ponorary [udge Arbel saw flL Lo base esLabllshmenL of Lhe peLlLloner's
consenL on hls conducL regardlng Lhe unslgned conLracL.
13. ln paragraph 29 of honorary [udge Arbel's rullng lL was deLermlned LhaL:
d
teaches c|ear|y that the part|es consented that each of the
part|es w||| go the|r own way the respondent w||| return
to Un|ted States and the p|a|nt|ff and the daughter w|||
/
noLe LhaL, as was deLermlned by Lhe honorary courL, unlLed SLaLes ls Lhe
peLlLloner's hablLual resldence (as well as Lhe moLher's and Lhe mlnor's) and
place of llvellhood. 1he lamlly courL noLed LhaL Lhe peLlLloner was forced Lo
s|gn the agreement ln order Lo cancel Lhe deLenLlon warranL lssued agalnsL
hlm so he can reLurn Lo hls hablLual resldence unlLed SLaLes.
16. ln paragraph 29 honorary [udge Arbel also deLermlned LhaL one can learn of
Lhe faLher's consenL Lo Lhe mlnor's sLay ln lsrael, by hls reLurn Lo unlLed
SLaLes by hlmself:
h|mse|f to Un|ted States". ln Lhls regard, lL ls emphaslzed LhaL Lhe couple's
orlglnal plan, as shown by Lhe facLs, was LhaL Lhe faLher wlll reLurn by hlmself
Lo unlLed SLaLes ln Aprll and LhaL Lhe moLher and daughLer wlll reLurn ln
!une. 1herefore, Lhe CenLral AuLhorlLy Lhlnks LhaL Lhe faLher's reLurn Lo
unlLed SLaLes by hlmself aLLesL only Lhe fulflllmenL of Lhe orlglnal plan, and
does noL Leach anyLhlng regardlng hls consenL Lo reLenLlon. lurLhermore, one
can learn of Lhe faLher's relylng on Lhe orlglnal plan as Lhe agreemenL was noL
slgned. Cbvlously, a dlfferenL lmpresslon of Lhe facLs does noL warranL an
addlLlonal dlscusslon. Powever, under Lhe maLLer's clrcumsLances Lhere ls
concern LhaL Lhe abovemenLloned deLermlnaLlons wlll become basellnes ln
many oLher cases Lo recognlze such acLlons, lncludlng Lhe complalnlng
parenL's reLurn Lo hls hablLual resldence, as consenL accordlng Lo Lhe
ConvenLlon, whlch ln Lhe CenLral AuLhorlLy's oplnlon conLradlcLs Lhe
ConvenLlon's purpose and makes lL lmposslble Lo acL accordlngly.
17. ln Lhls regard, and wlLh all due respecL, especlally from a wlde polnL of vlew,
Lhe CenLral AuLhorlLy supporLs Lhe words of honorary [udge !ayyoussl ln
lamlly courL ln nazareLh, paragraph 28:
d
warrant aga|nst h|m |eav|ng Israe|, wh|ch wou|d have
d|srupted h|s p|ans to return to USA... 1he p|a|nt|ff had to
act fast |n order to cance| that warrant and |n order to
7

m|n|m|ze the harm caused to h|m and return to h|s [ob
and other ob||gat|ons |n USA. Lven |f the p|a|nt|ff had

w||||ngness to negot|ate w|th the respondent and reach
some agreements cannot be v|ewed as consent to or
/
to make such a fundamenta| and cr|t|ca| dec|s|on about
the|r daughter, wh|ch has the potent|a| to transform the|r
||ves a|| together, hast||y and under pressure, and an
|nd|cat|on of consent to |eav|ng the daughter |n Israe|

18. noLe LhaL Lhe currenL case ls qulLe common and mosL cases under Lhe care of
Lhe CenLral AuLhorlLy deal wlLh a parenL who remaln ln or reLurns Lo Lhe sLaLe
from whlch Lhe chlld was abducLed even afLer Lhe abducLlon or Lhe
reLenLlon. 1hls procedure ls supposed Lo be held rapldly and Lherefore Lhe
parenL's arrlval aL Lhe sLaLe Lo whlch Lhe chlld was abducLed ls Lhe excepLlon
and noL Lhe norm.
19. Clvll Law 8egulaLlons 1984, chapLer 22(1): reLurnlng of abducLed chlldren
abroad, deLermlne:
"29S.9. Summon|ng and |nterrogat|on w|tnesses
(amendment: 1996)
-------------------------------------------------
(b) 1he court may demand, for noted spec|a| reasons, that
one of the part|es w||| come forth for |nvest|gat|on or
determ|ne another means for |nvest|gat|on." (1he
emphasls ls noL orlglnal)
20. Cne can see LhaL accordlng Lo Lhe regulaLlons, only ln speclal cases Lhe
harmed parenL wlll be requlred Lo arrlve aL Lhe sLaLe Lo whlch Lhe chlld was
abducLed. 1he CenLral AuLhorlLy sLaLes LhaL Lhe mere facL of a parenL lndeed
arrlvlng aL Lhe sLaLe Lo whlch hls chlld was abducLed, wheLher asked Lo do so
by Lhe courL buL also due Lo dlfferenL reasons, and laLer reLurnlng by hlmself
Lo hls hablLual resldence cannoL be lnLerpreLed as consenL or acqulesclng for
ConvenLlon's purposes.
So, wlLh all due respecL, ls Lhe maLLer aL hand: Un|ted States |s the father's
and the m|nor's hab|tua| res|dence as determ|ned by a|| courts, |nc|ud|ng
the honorary Supreme Court. 1herefore, lL ls Lhe CenLral AuLhorlLy's oplnlon
LhaL one cannoL learn of consenL by mere facL of Lhe peLlLloner's reLurn Lo hls
hablLual resldence, even lf he has done so by hlmself.
21. ln paragraph 32 of honorary [udge Arbel's rullng lL was deLermlned LhaL:
/
change |n status-
8

lL seems LhaL one may lndeed lnfer relylng lf Lhere ls a slgned agreemenL
accordlng Lo whlch Lhe parLles acL or, as honorary [udge Arbel says, when
declslon and speclflcaLlon are proven. under Lhe currenL clrcumsLances, lL
was Lhe respondenL who creaLed relylng, as she evenLually caused Lhe
peLlLloner Lo reLurn Lo unlLed SLaLes wlLhouL hls daughLer. ln honorary [udge
Arbel's oplnlon, Lhe lamlly courL's deLermlnaLlon LhaL Lhe peLlLloner was
under pressure ls speculaLlon and noL facL. Powever, lL seems LhaL Lhe
deLermlnaLlon regardlng Lhe peLlLloner's consenL, whlch as abovemenLloned
was noL speclfled ln any slgned documenL, ls slmllarly an assumpLlon.
WlLhouL a slgned agreemenL, one musL prove declslon and speclflcaLlon,
whlch Lhe honorary courL has based on Lhe peLlLloner's reLurn Lo unlLed
SLaLes. As emphaslzed above, lL ls lnherenLly dlfflculL Lo esLabllsh such
declslon on Lhe basls of such reLurn ln cases accordlng Lo Pague ConvenLlon
AcL, ln whlch Lhe parenL's reLurn Lo or remalnlng ln Lhe hablLual resldence ls
Lhe norm. 1he CenLral AuLhorlLy belleves LhaL Lhe honorary courL's
deLermlnaLlon mlghL acLually harm Lhe sLaLus of Lhose parenLs chooslng Lo
follow Lhelr chlldren Lo Lhe sLaLe Lo whlch Lhey were abducLed.
22. 1he CenLral AuLhorlLy's oplnlon ls LhaL Lhe approprlaLe approach Lo Lhe
consenL defense lnLerpreLaLlon and esLabllshmenL accordlng Lo ConLracL Law
ls Lhe approach descrlbed by honorary [udge vogelman ln paragraphs 2-4 of
hls rullng:
"As my co||eague po|nts out, contract |aw app||es to the
consent defense, |nc|ud|ng a|| |mp||cat|ons of |t. A
fundamenta| pr|nc|p|e of contract |aw, wh|ch has
re|evance to the current matter, |s the pr|nc|p|e of
rec|proc|ty. Accord|ng to th|s pr|nc|p|e, the advantage of a
contract, that |s the benef|t rece|ved from the other party,
and the d|sadvantage, that |s the th|ng to be g|ven to the
other party, must be rec|proca| (see Dan|e| Ir|edman and
N||| Cohen Contracts 149 (vo|ume 1, 1991) (here|nafter:
Ir|edman and Cohen)). A s|tuat|on |n wh|ch the |ega|
status of the two part|es |s d|v|ded, so one of them |s
be|ng he|d for h|s say|ngs and concess|ons dur|ng
negot|at|on wh||e the other party |s exempt and re|eased
of h|s ob||gat|ons p|aces the part|es |n an uneven
pos|t|on, and therefore does not co|nc|de w|th the
abovement|oned pr|nc|p|e.
1he agreement draft |n the current matter |s a resu|t of a
negot|at|on between the part|es, |n wh|ch none of the
part|es fu|f|||ed a|| h|s w|shes. Lxam|n|ng the var|ous
|ngred|ents of the contract suggests that each s|de wa|ved
and comprom|sed unt|| eventua||y they've reached
consent to a draft, |n wh|ch the var|ous ob||gat|ons are
dependant and cond|t|oned to each other. Assum|ng that
the respondent's consent to the p|a|nt|ff's and the
9

daughter's stay |n Israe| |s a one-s|ded, uncond|t|ona|
ob||gat|on does not co|nc|de, |n my op|n|on, accord|ng to
the factua| |nfrastructure before us, w|th the var|ous
|ngred|ents of the contract nor w|th |ts purpose to sett|e
a|| controvers|a| |ssues |n a manner that w||| a||ow the
part|es to end the|r marr|age. 1herefore, s|nce at the end
of the day the draft d|d not deve|op |nto a b|nd|ng
agreement, the ob||gat|ons |nc|uded |n |t do not stand, as
they were cond|t|oned by each party's execut|on
rec|proca||y.
Indeed, as my co||eague po|nts out, "there |s noth|ng ho|y
about s|gnature", and |f foundat|ons of dec|s|on and
spec|f|cat|on ex|st |n an agreement, |t |s va||d even
w|thout a s|gnature. nowever, as she po|nts out, these
foundat|ons, and espec|a||y that of dec|s|on, d|d not ex|st
|n the matter at hand and therefore the contract d|d not
deve|op. In th|s state of affa|rs, I do not be||eve that one
can separate the respondent's consent regard|ng one of
the |ngred|ents of the agreement's draft from the overa||
agreement, and v|ew |t by |tse|f, even though the
framework |n wh|ch |t was supposed to f|t d|d not
emerge. Iurthermore, these th|ngs do not deny the
poss|b|||ty of creat|ng a |ega||y b|nd|ng ob||gat|on even
one-s|ded by nature even dur|ng negot|at|ng towards a
contract wh|ch d|d not deve|op at the end of the day to an
agreement. Such are for examp|e s|tuat|ons |n wh|ch one
party has reason to re|y on a contract, fo||ow|ng
ob||gat|ons g|ven or presentat|on shown by the other
party dur|ng negot|at|on (Ir|edman and Cohen, p. S19-
648). nowever, I do not be||eve that |n the matter at hand
the factua| |nfrastructure |a|d before the d|scuss|ng court
|nd|cates that the respondent sa|d or presented anyth|ng
that m|ght have brought the p|a|nt|ff to reasonab|y re|y
on |t |n a manner that [ust|f|es protect|on by |aw." (1he
emphasls ls noL orlglnal)
23. ln Lhe CenLral AuLhorlLy's oplnlon, Lhe legal analysls of honorary [udge
vogelman regardlng Lhe consenL defense, based on Lhe case's facLs, ls, wlLh
all due respecL, ln llne wlLh Lhe lnsLrucLlons and purposes of Pague
ConvenLlon.
Acqu|esc|ng and |ts estab||shment
24. Ponorary [udge Melcer, ln conLrasL Lhe honorary [udge Arbel's oplnlon buL
based on Lhe same facLs, deLermlnes LhaL Lhe appllcable defense ls noL Lhe
consenL defense buL raLher Lhe acqulesclng defense.
10

23. 1he cusLomary rullng ln Lhe maLLer ls LhaL Lhe acqulesclng defense ls
examlned afLer Lhe daLe of abducLlon or reLenLlon (see Gabay law, p. 237).
Ponorary [udge Melcer lnferred Lhe faLher's acqulesclng from Lhe flnanclal
agreemenL dlscussed buL noL slgned beLween Lhe parLles. 1he CenLral
AuLhorlLy Lhlnks LhaL slnce Lhe daLe of reLenLlon occurred afLer Lhe
negoLlaLlon, one cannoL learn of acqulesclng noL ln regards Lo Lhe daLe ln
whlch lL was examlned and noL ln regards Lo Lhe clrcumsLances.
26. ln paragraph 2 of hls rullng, honorary [udge Melcer deLermlnes LhaL:
force of estoppe|s |aw the respondent |s not ent|t|ed to the temporary a|d
requested by h|m." As emphaslzed above, a parenL's reLurn Lo hls sLaLe does
noL Leach of consenL and cerLalnly noL of acqulesclng. under Lhe case's
clrcumsLances, and wlLh all due respecL, Lhe CenLral AuLhorlLy's oplnlon ls
LhaL Lhe faLher should noL be addressed wlLh esLoppels [usL because he
wlshed Lo reLurn Lo hls hablLual resldence. All Lhe more so when he acLed
lmmedlaLely afLer Lhe acL of reLenLlon ln order Lo reLurn Lhe chlld Lo unlLed
SLaLes. lL ls for a good reason ofLen ruled LhaL negoLlaLlons afLer an acL of
abducLlon or reLenLlon do noL aLLesL acqulesclng wlLh Lhe currenL sLaLus-quo
(ln Lhls regard see Gabay law, p. 238-239, and C.A. 3332/93 Gunzburg vs.
Gr|nva|d, l.r. 49(3) 282).
27. 8egardlng acqulesclng see also l.A. 1026/03 L. A. vs. M. A. 130-48 2003 (1)
8838. ln LhaL case, afLer flllng a requesL accordlng Lo Pague ConvenLlon AcL,
Lhe faLher reLurned Lo araguay, hls hablLual resldence, and negoLlaLed wlLh
Lhe respondenL regardlng Lhe mlnor's allmony. 1he moLher's clalm of Lhe
faLher's acqulesclng was re[ecLed.
"An acqu|esc|ng needs therefore to be expressed c|ear|y
and unequ|voca||y. 1he way |n wh|ch the appea|er's
'acqu|esc|ng' |s |earned, that |s not stat|ng before the
kabb|nate court the fact he w|shes to f||e a c|a|m
accord|ng to nague Convent|on, and s|nce he had
negot|ated the m|nor's a||mony, |s |nsuff|c|ent. It |s not a
c|ear and unequ|voca| acqu|esc|ng. 1he appea|er's act|ons
may have many reasons. And one must not |earn from h|s
conduct that he has acqu|esced w|th the m|nor's
'abduct|on'. Add|ng the extreme|y short t|me s|nce the
appea|er had arr|ved at Israe| and the date he had
commenced a c|a|m accord|ng to nague Convent|on, as
abovement|oned 11 days pr|or to the pre-set date for the
end of the m|nor's vacat|on |n Israe|, may teach us that
the appea|er's acqu|esc|ng does not stem from the
ev|dent|a| body, |s not c|ear and unequ|voca|, and |s not
an acqu|esc|ng" (paragraph 7 of honorary [udge SLoffman's
rullng).
28. 1herefore, ln Lhe CenLral AuLhorlLy's oplnlon, under Lhe clrcumsLances of Lhe
currenL case, applylng Lhe defenses of consenL or acqulesclng conLradlcLs
11

exlsLlng laws and may place dlfflculLles on addresslng such lssues ln fuLure
cases. 1he CenLral AuLhorlLy Lherefore recommends an addlLlonal dlscusslon
regardlng Lhe maLLer.
29. As abovemenLloned ln paragraph 12, even lf such defenses were proved Lo
apply, Lhe courL sLlll has dlscreLlon wheLher Lo lnsLrucL Lhe chlld's reLurn Lo
her resldence ln unlLed SLaLes.
Lxerc|s|ng court's d|scret|on |n case the defenses app|y
30. lL ls Lhe CenLral AuLhorlLy's oplnlon LhaL Lhe rullng aL hand does noL colnclde
wlLh Lhe exlsLlng norm regardlng exerclslng such dlscreLlon, and also creaLed
a new LesL ln Lhe maLLer whlch confllcLs wlLh Pague ConvenLlon's purposes.
31. 1hls honorary Supreme CourL has dlscussed prevlously Lhe manner of
exerclslng dlscreLlon on wheLher Lo reLurn an abducLed chlld Lo hls hablLual
resldence, ln Stagman law. 1he honorary courL sLaLed LhaL Lhe ConvenLlon
does noL lgnore Lhe chlld's besL lnLeresLs and Lhe defenses exlsL ln Lhe
ConvenLlon ln order Lo provlde resoluLlon when Lwo lnLeresLs confllcL Lhe
need Lo proLecL Lhe chlld's besL lnLeresL and Lhe need Lo prevenL self [usLlce
and Laklng Lhe law lnLo one's hands:
"nowever, even |f we've sa|d that the ch||d's |nterest
overpowers when the |nterests conf||ct, the purposes
under|y|ng the Convent|on requ|res that the abductor
parent w|sh|ng to benef|t from h|s act|on, must carry the
burden of prov|ng the defense. 1hat |s, doubt|ng the
defense's app||cab|||ty shou|d support return|ng the
abducted ch||d and not |eav|ng h|m w|th h|s abductor"
(paragraph 9 of Lhe honorary [udge Coldbrg's rullng ln Lhe
maLLer of SLagman).
32. Cne can also learn of exerclslng Lhe courL's dlscreLlon from Lhe leadlng rullng
of Lhe Lngllsh Pouse of Lords ln Lhe maLLer of ln 8e M (lC) and anoLher (lC)
(Chlldren)(lC) [2007] ukPL, ln whlch lL was deLermlned LhaL:
"1he Convent|on |tse|f has def|ned when a ch||d must be
returned and when she need not be. 1hereafter the
we|ght to be g|ven to Convent|on cons|derat|ons and to
the |nterests of the ch||d w||| vary enormous|y. 1he extent
to wh|ch |t w||| be appropr|ate to |nvest|gate those
we|fare cons|derat|ons w||| a|so vary. 8ut the further
away one gets from the speedy return env|saged by the
Convent|on, the |ess we|ghty those genera| Convent|on
cons|derat|ons must be."
1he Pouse of Lords deLermlned LhaL Lhe range of conslderaLlons depends on
Lhe clalmed defense. lor example, when lL ls proven LhaL Lhere ls a grave rlsk
LhaL a chlld's reLurn would expose hlm Lo grave harm, Lhen lL ls lnconcelvable
12

LhaL Lhere shall be dlscreLlon wheLher Lo reLurn Lhe chlld. Powever, as for Lhe
consenL or acqulesclng defense, Lhe Pouse of Lords deLermlned LhaL:
"In consent or acqu|escence cases, on the other hand,
genera| cons|derat|on of com|ty and conf|dence,
part|cu|ar cons|derat|ons re|at|ng to the speed of |ega|
proceed|ngs and approach to re|ocat|on |n the home
country, and |nd|v|dua| cons|derat|ons re|at|ng to the
part|cu|ar ch||d m|ght po|nt at a speedy return so that her
future can be dec|ded |n her home country."
33. ln paragraph 36 of Lhe rullng dlscussed ln Lhls oplnlon lL was deLermlned LhaL:
d
/ h ^ Ponorary
[udge Arbel [usLlfles Lhls deLermlnaLlon wlLh Lhe dlfflculLles Lhe moLher and
Lhe mlnor wlll be faced wlLh ln unlLed SLaLes. Powever, when deallng wlLh
exerclslng dlscreLlon, one musL balance beLween Lhe ConvenLlon's purposes
and Lhe mlnor's besL lnLeresL ln Lhe wlder sense. As speclfled above, ln case
of consenL or acqulesclng defense Lhe balance should lncllne Lowards Lhe
ConvenLlon's purposes. WlLh all due respecL, Lhe CenLral AuLhorlLy sees LhaL
Lhe manner ln whlch Lhe dlscreLlon was exerclsed ln Lhe currenL rullng ls
more relevanL Lo Lhe conslderaLlons of chooslng Lhe approprlaLe forum for
cusLodlal lssues Lhan proceedlngs by force of Pague ConvenLlon, desLlned Lo
provlde flrsL ald and Lo prevenL slLuaLlons ln whlch a parenL can declde on hls
own and by Laklng Lhe law lnLo hls own hands where wlll Lhe cusLodlal
hearlng ln hls maLLer Lakes place, and by dolng so wlll galn an un[usLlfled
advanLage over Lhe parenL from whlch Lhe mlnor was abducLed. As ls well
known, Lhe mlnor's besL lnLeresL ln Lhe wlder sense wlll be examlned ln Lhe
sLaLe from whlch Lhe mlnor was abducLed, LhaL ls Lhe chlld's hablLual
resldence.
34. lurLhermore, noLe LhaL lL was noL uncommonly ruled LhaL Lhe parenL's sLaLus
ln Lhe sLaLe of hablLual resldence, wheLher legal or noL, nelLher adds Lo or
subLracLs from Lhe lssue of defense's examlnaLlon (see ln Lhls maLLer C.A.
Dagan vs. Dagan, l.r. 33(3) 278, p. 269-270).
33. WlLh all due respecL lL seems LhaL Lhe honorary courL's reasons for exerclslng
lLs dlscreLlon do noL necessarlly colnclde wlLh lLs own deLermlnaLlons ln Lhe
rullng's beglnnlng. So for example, lL was deLermlned legally and facLually
LhaL Lhe chlld's hablLual resldence ls unlLed SLaLes, buL paragraph 36 sLaLes
LhaL Lhelr sLay ln unlLed SLaLes was Lemporary and unsLeady. lL was also
deLermlned LhaL one cannoL apply defense 13(b) on Lhe merlLs of Lhe case
buL paragraph 36 sLaLes LhaL Lhe mlnor faces grave rlsk upon her reLurn a
sLaLemenL whlch should be based solely on LhaL defense. 1he CenLral
AuLhorlLy sLaLes, wlLh all due respecL, LhaL lL ls only approprlaLe LhaL maln
clalms whlch were re[ecLed wlll noL be also used as facLors ln exerclslng
[udlclal dlscreLlon as basls for reLenLlon.
13

36. lL wlll be furLher noLed LhaL conslderaLlons regardlng Lhe moLher's ablllLy Lo
supporL herself and Lhe mlnor flnanclally or Lhe moLher's legal sLaLus ln
unlLed SLaLes cannoL, ln Lhe CenLral AuLhorlLy's oplnlon, be used ln favor of
Lhe moLher whlle she chose Lo conducL her affalrs ln unlLed SLaLes
noneLheless.
Concern for the ru||ng's |mp||cat|ons
37. As abovemenLloned, ln Lhe CenLral AuLhorlLy's oplnlon, Lhe rullng may have
dlrecL lmpllcaLlons on famlly laws ln lsrael, and ln parLlcular on cases
conducLed accordlng Lo Pague ConvenLlon AcL, and conLradlcLs prevlous law
regardlng Lhe defenses' examlnaLlon whlch should be lnLerpreLed narrowly
lesL Lhe Pague ConvenLlon be nulllfled. ln Lhe CenLral AuLhorlLy's oplnlon and
wlLh all due respecL, even Lhe manner ln whlch Lhe honorary courL has
exerclsed lLs dlscreLlon does noL colnclde wlLh Lhe exlsLlng norm and wlLh Lhe
ConvenLlon's purposes. lurLhermore, Lhere ls a concern LhaL Lhe parLles,
especlally ln legal confllcLs, wlll heslLaLe Lo have negoLlaLlons lf such sLages
mlghL be used agalnsL Lhem. ln Lhls maLLer also Lhe CenLral AuLhorlLy agrees
wlLh honorary [udge vogelman:
"Us|ng the po|nts of agreement w|th|n a negot|at|on draft
of an agreement, wh|ch fa||ed at the end of the day, may
carry w|th |t negat|ve |mp||cat|ons regard|ng the
w||||ngness of part|es to ma|nta|n an effect|ve negot|at|on
towards a contract. Note we||: the part|es m|ght refra|n
from presentat|ons, dec|arat|ons or proposa|s, wh|ch
|nc|ude concess|on |n favor of the other party, s|nce
they'|| fear that such concess|ons may be he|d as ev|dence
aga|nst them |n a future proceed|ng that the part|es may
have (aragraph 3 of honorary [udge vogelman's rullng)
38. noLe LhaL Pague CommlLLee for lnLernaLlonal Law frequenLly emphaslzes Lhe
lmporLance of mlLlgaLlon and negoLlaLlon proceedlngs ln order Lo obLaln a
resoluLlon ln pleasanL manner, whlch wlll serve Lhe chlld's besL lnLeresL by
avoldlng a prolonged and cumbersome legal procedure. ln addlLlon, arLlcle
7(c) of Pague ConvenLlon AcL requlres LhaL Lhe CenLral AuLhorlLles Lake all
approprlaLe measures "Lo secure Lhe volunLary reLurn of Lhe chlld or Lo brlng
abouL an amlcable resoluLlon of Lhe lssues". lf parLles wlll heslLaLe Lo
negoLlaLe slnce someLhlng Lhey've sald or a noL-slgned drafL durlng
negoLlaLlons mlghL be held agalnsL Lhem Lhey wlll lose ouL, and so wlll Lhe
publlc as a whole. 1o Lhe CenLral AuLhorlLy's besL knowledge, saylng lL ln Lhe
careful manner requlred, Lhe honorary courL's deLermlnaLlon regardlng
lnLerpreLlng negoLlaLlon's procedures ls unprecedenLed even on lnLernaLlonal
level, whlch may harm Lhe reclproclLy of oLher conLracLlng sLaLes Lowards
lsrael ln Pague ConvenLlon's cases.
39. In conc|us|on, based on the abovement|oned, the Centra| Author|ty's
recommends hav|ng an add|t|ona| d|scuss|on regard|ng the matter.
14

lssued Loday,
!uly 6
Lh
2011

_________________________
Lesley kaufman, AdvocaLe
Senlor uepuLy of Lhe ALLorney Ceneral
ueparLmenL of lnLernaLlonal Affalrs ln SLaLe ALLorney's Cfflce
Cn behalf of lsraell CenLral AuLhorlLy accordlng Lo
Pague ConvenLlon AcL (reLurnlng of abducLees chlldren) 1991

Investigative Report ''Discrimination Against
Divorced Fathers In Courts and at Welfare Office''
EXHIBIT
''Q''
www.news1.co.il
September 21
st
2011

Discrimination against Divorced Fathers
in Justice and Welfare
Eli Daniel

Men are discriminated against in determini ng
alimony, in courts a nd the police, by
encouraging filing of false complaints; in
determining fictitious " earning ability " of the
man in order to charge him with alimony
without considering reduction in this ability
following divorce proceedings

Family Courts Sophisticated Machine for Destroyi ng Men

Outrageous Alimony I r relevant to Income

Fictitious Earning Ability Fertile Judicial Fantasy

Separating Children from Thei r Fathers Systematically Violating International Conventions

Balancing Resources Taking Property and Transferring It from Men to Women

Pre-Marital Financial Agreements Nullified

Police Stations A Small Scale Court

Cachlon's Aiding Clerks Arousing Gender Hatred

* * *
Tags: Zehava Galon, Hanna Beit Halachmi, Yoel Hasson, Shelly Yechimovich,
Tzipi Hotovely, Tova Sivan, Rivka Makayes, Moshe Cachlon

The state of Israel has yet to free itself from the ancient stereotype that women
deserve to raise children more than men. The discrimination is based by law of the
Tender Years Presumption, and the result is lack of equality in dividing parental
responsibility between father and mother, and initiated separation of children from
their fathers. Every year, thousands of children are separated from their fathers and
about 3,500 children are sent to contact centers, otherwise known as "contact corrals".
A man arriving at a family court is instinctively perceived as extortionist, violent,
danger to his children and someone who abused his wife during years of relations,
and now must pay of his own money, since the prevailing opinion is that women are
gentler, women earn less than men, women suffer from lack of occupational
opportunities, women are liable to extortion in rabbinical courts and they suffer from
male hegemony. All these are false stereotypes nurtured by a handful of feminists of
the hypocritical kind, which doesn't really want equality but preferences and
privileges. Google the following names and you'll see who we're referring to: Daphna
Hacker, Hanna Beit Halachmi, Tzipi Hotovely, Ruth Halperin Kaddari, Ayelet
BlecherPrigat, Shelly Yechimovich, Zehava Galon, and Yoel Hasson.
Think twice if you should even have
children in Israel [photo: AP]
''Q''
The anti-male gender discrimination unquestionably ruling the Israeli society,
overlooks a variety of fields which the Israeli governing authorities are responsible
for, including: judicial authority and executional authority (police, welfare services
etc.), and headed by the legislative authority, the Knesset.

Fami ly Courts Sophisticated Machine for Dest roying Men
In courts, in 99% of the cases the man is discriminated against in the deliberations
between him and the woman, both procedurally and in essence. On the procedural
level, the wrongful discrimination is mostly apparent in the man's lack of opportunity
to prove perjury in the woman's affidavit by cross-examination. Many family courts
refuse to summon witnesses in favor of the man, refuse to summon evidence from
banks and financial institutions, or the material is "summoned" but gets lost.
Another tactic is limiting the man to only "five questions", even if the opposite side
submitted a detailed affidavit of dozens of pages, and if that's not enough, some
family court judges simply erase the man's affidavit for various reasons. Other judges
determine three or four hours for trial, but when the parties stand they announce that
each party will have half an hour and then the judge takes the remaining three hours
for personal time. Some family court judges are so busy replying to the enormous
amounts of police complaints issued against them in the commissionership for public
complaints against judges, it's hard to believe that they even have time left to discuss
the current cases.
One judge, Tova Sivan, issues rulings without even setting a date for evidence
showing or for trial. So she produces a false impression of efficiency by wholesale
closing of cases. Another judge, Rivka Makayes, has accumulated thousands of
complaints regarding wholesale separations of children from their fathers while
collecting an additional paycheck as a college lecturer. Likewise, requests made by
the woman are discussed immediately, and when the man files a request he
encounters postponing and deliberate foot-dragging, such as: "will be discussed in
pre-trial in six months".
Additionally, when the court faces two factual versions, each by only one witness:
one by a man and the other by a woman, the court determines, out of thin air and
without any fundamental reasoning, that "the woman's version is preferable", as the
judges shelter under the jurisdictional fabrication that the judge is able to see into the
parties' minds and souls, and still, as mentioned above, always accepts the woman's
version.

Out rageous Ali mony I r relevant to Income
Unlike any other country, in which children's alimony is determined according to the
free income as shown in paychecks, and according to both parents' income level, in
Israel the woman's salary is completely ignored, and men are bound according to the
number of children, 1,200-2,000 NIS per child, with the addition of accommodations
and various "needs" which suddenly pop up. The wrongful discrimination is apparent
in ignoring the woman's income and determining fictitious "needs" of children, both
"necessary" and luxuries, requiring enormous amounts of money, and "dividing" the
luxuries is also fictitious. Seemingly the additional alimony charges seem equally
divided, but eventually only the man pays out of his pocket to the woman's pocket,
and the sums of money and its designation in practice are not supervised.
Obviously, when the couple raised their children, they raised them out of the pre-
divorce existing income. Without any justification, when a claim for alimony is
applied, the man is required to go out and get money, which did not exist before, and
all that after the man had spent tens of thousands of NIS on attorneys, was taken out
from his home, searched for a new place to live in, and usually his salary is also
confiscated, sometimes fully.
When an average family has 3 children, according to official statistical data, the
alimony will be 6,500 NIS, no matter how much the man earns, and how much he
needs in order to live. That is blatant discrimination. Some fathers have to pay
alimony in a rate of 80% of their salaries, 100%, 120% and sometimes even double.
There is no correlation between income level and the alimony rate. Assuming the
woman earns 5,000 NIS she's supposed to receive 6,500 NIS, and the man is
supposed to manage with whatever he has left, if any, and in many cases he is left
with zero. The family court judge is not even interested in knowing what are the
woman's salary or assets. The goal is to transfer as much money as possible, as fast as
possible, from the husband to the wife.
There is no binding formula for child's alimony. The alimony is set according to the
judge's mood that day. A certain panel of court may determine that in order to pay for
all the child's essential needs one needs a monthly amount of 1,200 NIS (not
including accommodations), and the same court (different panel) may determine that
in order to pay for all the child's essential needs one needs a monthly amount of three
time more than that, all that while the data of both children and parents are similar
and even identical.
We've compared the rates of alimony determined in Israel, in comparison to
customary alimony in United States. We've found that in Israel the alimony rates are
4 times more than in United States. That is, when claimed that there are enormous
debts of uncollected alimony, in fact only 25% of that are actual alimony and the rest
are "gender fines" for having children.
In Israel prevails the belief that during divorce one must examine "the children's
needs" and determine the alimony accordingly, and it is a fatal mistake. In other
countries one examines the existing income and the available income, regardless of
"the children's needs". In practice in Israel, most of the claimed "children's needs" are
fabricated: classes, treatments, babysitting, day-care, etc. the woman just claims she's
entitled to it, and she receives it, because the court gives it to her. No one stops and
asks the simple question: and if they wouldn't have gotten divorced, how would they
have managed with the claimed "needs"? We know of one judge that told a man:
"For all I care, go and sell a kidney".
It is a situation in which family courts mislead women to think that they are "entitled"
to minor alimony in outrageous rates, that cannot be afforded, and are 4 times higher
than customary and acceptable overseas. These women fight in court in order to
"achieve the maximum". As they receive the ruling, the bitter reality slowly reveals
itself, that there is no chance that the man will be able to afford such payments
without collapsing. The women are disappointed, because the judge promised them
that "they are entitle to it" and so they revenge. The revenge is in the form of
separating the father from the children, refusal to contact and parental alienation.
Let us point out that a typical ruling of alimony in United States will include the
average salary of the woman in the past few years, the average income of the man in
the past few years, and the relevant percentage from which derives the alimony
according to the ratio between woman's salary and man's salary. In israel, on the
other hand, the rulings look like an imaginary list of "needs". Courts waste pages
upon pages of deliberations that look like this: The woman presented receipt for judo
lessons for the child and ballet lessons for the mother. The man objected.
The court finds that the husband should finance the lessons, and so on and so forth.
So family courts waste their time in futile calculations of various needs, which did
not exist at all during marriage, while a simple equal formula would have resolved
the issue. In other countries the formulas appear on the court's website, so the parents
can know in advance what they are entitled to and what they are not entitled to, and
the lawyers cannot mislead the woman to believe they will get her more than that.

Fictitious Earning Ability Ferti le Judicial Fantasy
Moreover, in order to determine the father's portion in financing "the minor's needs",
the fiction called "earning ability" was invented, according to which the court decides
what it believes that the father is capable of earning above what the paychecks show.
The court does not examine whether the man has free time to work another shift, or if
there is even an employer that will pay him the imaginary salary that the court
determines. So the court invents non-existing facts, completely overlooking the
unemployment rate in the market, since the man is in the midst of a deep emotional
crisis while his family falls apart.
A man's low mental state does not allow him to stay focused in his job, and as a
result his productivity reduces, and he is facing dismissal and entering the
unemployment cycle and multiple legal proceedings which completely deplete the
free assets for distribution. Who can work while such a sword is placed next to his
neck, he is separated from his children, undergoing an intensifying mental crisis, his
wife's police complaints lead to his arrest, removal from home, separation from his
children and conducting criminal proceedings against him.
He is required to spend time and financial, mental, emotional resources on the
divorce battle and all its extensions, to pay separate accommodation's expenditure so
he will have a place to live in, alongside the expenditures to maintain a separate
household (involving significant costs) etc. The new trend in women's help clinics
(Wizo, Na'amat, Legal Aid) is to also prosecute the grandparents on the husband's
side for "smuggling assets" in order to maximize the pressure against men to give up
everything they have.
It is unnecessary to mention that in a nucleolus family, in cases of financial
difficulties, the standard of life of the entire family's components drops for both
partners. Not so in cases of divorced families: the rulings lay the consequences of the
financial difficulties upon the man alone. He himself bears the consequences. If he
cannot afford it, he will automatically be sentenced, like a criminal, to an
"imprisonment" penalty of up to 21 days (in vast majority of cases). The executional
authority will not have any deliberations regarding inability to pay. The man will not
even receive a lawyer if he cannot afford one, as customary in criminal courts. In
light of the above mentioned, many divorced Israeli men are forced to move back in
with their parents or live on the streets.
In such inhuman conditions, no sane person has any real earning "potential", the man
is labeled as "problematic", his self image deteriorates into bottomless abyss, and
someone with such low self esteem finds it difficult to live up to even some of his
potential.
Add to it the fact that "alimony" may also include "wife's alimony", including a wife
that has stopped working in order to be provided to by the man, even though she has
earned a nice salary until the dispute erupted and her salary was a main part of the
joint household expenditures, and you will surely conclude that the ruling is totally
irrelevant to reality, and leading to an odd and clearly intolerable situation.

Separating Children f rom Thei r Fathers Systematically Violating International
Conventions
Likewise, the "parenting time" divided between both parents is far from equal as east
is far from west. Separating a child from one of the parents is an everyday act in
family courts. The woman is the only one controlling the level of contact of the father
with his children.
If the woman wishes the father to see his children, she allows it. If she doesn't want
to, she separates them. The aiding clerk will automatically approve every step and
action made by the woman. Social services believe that separating children is a
healthy and welcomed phenomenon. So they learn in social workers' training schools.
All that constitutes a systematic violation of international conventions on which the
state is signed, and obligated to guarantee a full and qualitative contact of both
parents with the child even during divorce.

Balancing Resources Taking Property and Transfer ring It f rom Men to
Women
The same is true in regards to dividing mutual property. Theoretically the public
belief is that during divorce the mutual property is balanced, usually equally. In fact,
under the subtitle of resources' balance, courts simply transfer most of the
accumulated property to the woman and leave the man with nothing. Extremely
despicable lawyers initiate proceedings against the man's family members, especially
his parents, under a claim of "property smuggling".
The expectation is that family members will instruct the man to give up whatever he
can, as long as they will not reach the family court, in which the undisputed queen,
the woman, triumphs over everyone, including the man's mother. For example, a man
who from time to time drove in his mother's car, which she had received from the
Ministry of Defense, had to give up all his possessions since his wife sued her sister-
in-law claiming she is smuggling joint property.
The woman, who directly contributed very little, if any, of her skills to achieving the
property, gets in a lot of cases a bigger portion of the joint property, in addition to
taking the man's money for 24 pre-paid alimony payments, legal fees of thousands of
NIS, and usually the family court judges deliberately delay the property distribution
in order to accumulate debts in favor of the woman. In rabbinical courts, the woman
may claim specific accommodation, and then the man will not receive any property
distribution since the woman will be able to live in the joint apartment until the
children grows up, thus withholding the property distribution.
The problem intensifies as many men tend to believe that they can ensure themselves
against theft of their property by a financial agreement or a pre-marital agreement.
We've already seen judges who state without a blink of the eye that "right now I
nullify the financial agreement", if it favors the man, obviously.

Pre-Marital Financial Agreements Nulli fied
If someone believes one can insure the couple from property claims during divorce
by having a financial agreement or a pre-marital agreement, than he doesn't know
what he's talking about. All one needs to do is to file a claim to cancel the financial
agreement, claiming that it was signed under pressure and it is unfair. When such a
claim reaches family courts, the judge states she "nullifies" the agreement, since the
man enforced it on the woman, or any other excuse, and with that the financial
agreement disappears.
Sometimes family court judges also raise the claim of "relying", meaning that the
woman relied on the man and he deceived her, or acted against her interests, when he
asked her to sign a financial agreement, assuming that women marry men because
they are weak and cannot have independent discretion, and so they "rely" on men.
From here it is a short distance to rule that in any event the man has betrayed his duty
towards his wife and to nullify all financial agreements. Obviously, each time the
judge used the relying claim, it was done while winking at the woman's lawyer, since
everybody knows that "relying" cannot be proved by evidence, since the woman is
instructed in advance to say "I relied on the man", and the court determines as usual
that it believes the woman, just because she claims so.

Poli ce Stations A Small Scale Court
A woman can complain in the police station about whatever she wants, and does not
need any evidence. It is enough for a woman to say she is threatened or that the man
said something that can be interpreted as a threat. The result is an immediate removal
of the man from home. The immediate restraining warrant given by the police is
actually like a judge's order, and its impact is awful. The man is thrown away from
his home, he has no place to go to, and he will not see his children.
It is well known that in the help clinics of Wizo, Na'amat, Israel's Women Network
and Legal Aid, they teach the women to fabricate false complaints. The Israel's
Women Network published a guidebook written by Rivka Makayes herself in 1992,
including instructions regarding what to say and what are the most effective false
complaints. For example, Makayes guides the women to claim: "My husband pulled
out his penis and demanded I perform oral sex" or "my husband raped me in the
shower" or "my husband hit me with the shower head and I bled". "Nothing will
deter my husband". "In light of reoccurring acts of violence a restraining order is
requested". A woman equipped with such statements while coming to the police
station, knows that she is guaranteed to win the divorce claims.
In police stations, 99% of the times the man is discriminated against, as manifested
by the following actions: immediate removal from home based on fear and without
any evidence, tendentious questioning aimed at labeling the man as an offender (for
example, blatant refusal to perform polygraph tests and/or questioning under
hypnosis), refraining from interrogating witnesses, refraining from receiving the
man's complaints against offenses done by his wife etc, refraining from indicting a
woman who maliciously made up false accusations against a man, automatic arrests
of men, conditioning the man's release in his "consent" to being removed from home
for 15 days, refraining from use of minimal interrogational tools (such as
confrontation, finding relevant witnesses, etc). The courts are backing up such acts of
the police, by wrongfully using the rule of "evidence sufficiency". In fact, not even a
shred of evidence is required in order to convict a man according to the Domestic
Violence Act, except her say-so.
If that's not enough, Attorney General's guideline 2.5 gives women immunity against
filing false complaints. Women know that most chances are that they will not be
punished, even if the false complaints will be proven to be false. Closing cases due to
"lack of evidence" or "lack of public interest" instead of "lack of guilt" guarantees
that nothing can be done against the falsely complaining women.

Cachlon's Aiding Cler ks Arousing Gender Hat red
In no other place in the world do the aiding clerks have such power. Courts do not
decide in regards to issues of custody and seeing arrangements. They cast the task on
aiding clerks, but only after giving the woman temporary custody. So the father is
required to magically prove the aiding clerk that he is worthy of the grace of seeing
his children. The aiding clerk can arbitrarily cancel a visitation, suspend it, or insist
that the father will go to a contact center since the mother is uncooperative.
One of the most despised tricks of the aiding clerks is the excuse that since the father
doesn't see his children, the relationship cannot be resumed but in a contact center,
otherwise the children will be shocked and traumatized. There is nothing crueler than
when an aiding clerk tells a father his children will be traumatized by seeing him.
Another trick is "convenient gradualness". The aiding clerk writes the court that the
children should be exposed to the father by way of "convenient gradualness", that is
of slowly getting the children to be accustomed to their father.
Such a father, who before the divorce was responsible for the children, read them
stories, fed them, sang to them, changed their diapers, is deeply insulted when told
that those children should get accustomed to seeing him by way of "convenient
gradualness". Simona Shtainmatz, the head aiding clerk, is not ashamed to admit that
the policy of the Ministry of Welfare is to send every possible father to contact
centers, probably in order to provide livelihood to the contact centers operators and
the teams of social workers who work there. 25% of divorced fathers in Israel see
their children for an hour or two a week, and Simona Shtainmatz believes these are
proper "seeing arrangements". An additional considerable percentage simply refuses
to go near the contact centers, both due to the inevitable labeling that this is a place
for criminals and violent people and due to the emotional scarring of the children.
The policy of the Ministry of Welfare, and the minister Moshe Cachlon responsible
for it, is extremely hypocritical, since a woman may enter into her home any man see
wants, to have relationship with the children and even raise them, without being
checked by anyone, or required to get the children to be accustomed to him by way
of "convenient gradualness" or required to go through tests of parental competence.
In the same manner, the father forced to be treated by the aiding clerk may meet a
divorced woman and raise her children without being interrogated by anyone
regarding his right to go near her children.
In the welfare authorities, in 99% of the cases the man is discriminated against, as
manifested mostly, but not only, by the following actions: conditioning seeing
arrangements in the man's commitment not to expose the children to the causes of the
family's dismantling and the order of events and actions of either parent (such
restraint not only does not apply for the mother, but her lies to the children are
perceived as legitimate by legal aiding clerks).
The Knesset actually reveals a deliberated and dictated policy of wrongful and
clearly unconstitutional gender discrimination against an Israeli man. In his first
meeting with the aiding clerk, she puts on a false mask of loveliness, hums a few
words of empathy, and sometimes even makes promises. After 3-4 months, when her
review is completed, only then the man realizes how the aiding clerk had tricked him.
We know of many cases in which the parties agreed to a joint custody or to give the
custody to the man, and the one who thwarted the agreements was the aiding clerk,
which was annoyed by the fact that the woman did not insist on raising her children
by herself.
So that`s it, iI you think you should have children, and take the one in three chances
of divorce, you're invited to think twice if you should even have children in Israel.
The price is just not worthwhile. Maybe it's better to buy the children in India.

Parliamentary Commission Report Slonim Nevo
on Social Workers Treatment of Men in Divorce

EXHIBIT
''R''
SUMMARY!OF THE!
SLONIM!NEVO COMMISSION FINDINGS
!
The Slonim Nevo commission is a Commission appointed in 2006 by the Israeli
Ministry of Justice to examine discrimination in access to children in separation or
divorce. Its report was delivered in 2008. The Minister of Justice, Moshe
Kachlon decided to take no action.

The commission has found that social workers appointed as aides of Court to
determine rights of visitations are understaffed, lack appropriate guidance, lack of
transparency and reliability, and cause increased levels of deprivation and
frustration among the fathers.
! The policies and guidelines are not up to date.
! Social welfares act as both investigators and therapists; however, they use
information extracted during therapy to hurt fathers in the investigatory
Visitations Rights Report.
! Duties of confidentiality owed to fathers who are forced to go through
psycho-therapy, as condition to seeing their children, are constantly
breached.
! The Commission further found that the social workers should not write a
Social Welfare report to the Family Court about a family previously treated
by it as a welfare agent or social worker.
! Occasionally welfare officers must conduct a Report on families, who were
treated by them previously, as social workers. In most cases, the social
workers acquaintance of the family caregiver is with the woman, thus
earning the Social workers sympathy in advance. The prior acquaintance
creates bias against the man.
! The Commission recommended that Welfare officers must provide an
objective opinion, and therefore they should not have a previous
acquaintance with the family.
! Social workers do not provide copies of the reports to the adversaries in
Court, thus denying the parents procedural rights to know the contents of
the reports.
! The commission also recommended appointing an independent ombudsman
officer to review all complaints regarding the welfare officers.
! The Commission also found that Visitation Reports do not adhere to
professional principles. Training in preparing Visitations Reports are
lacking.
! The duration of the services is too long, and appointment for more than one
year is not necessary.
! Because of personnel shortage, the waiting list for Visitations Reports is too
long, and during the waiting period, fathers are disconnected from children.
''R''

The Commission further criticized the privatization of state responsibility to
provide a forum, to litigate custody and visitations. The delegation of powers to
social workers raises questions and concerns regarding the definition of welfare
officer role and work.

Social Workers or Welfare officer's role is to perform an investigation, draw a
factual picture of the family, followed by recommendations about custody
arrangements. The welfare officers tend to mix therapeutic components with
investigatory ones. While Courts expect them to provide diagnostic reports, the
social workers instead resort to forced therapy treatments. The social workers
then use the information stated by the patient, and submits it to court.
.
The Commission found that Social Workers should limit themselves to the
obvious welfare job, which is to focus on gathering information, assessment and
formulating recommendations about the parents as caregivers, without therapy or
over-involvement in the parents intimate lives.

Parliamentary Commission Schnit (2008)
On The abolishment of the Tender Years Presumption
EXHIBIT
''S''
1. Int roduction

1.1. Committee's Purposes and Its Appointment' Background

The public committee for examining the legal aspects of parental responsibility during
divorce, headed by Prof. Dan Schnit, was appointed on March 2
nd
2005 by the then
Minister of Justice, Ms. Tzipi Livni.
In its letter of appointment, the Committee was asked to examine the rules set in the
Legal Competence and Guardianship Act 1962 (hereinafter: the Competence Act)
regarding sharing and distributing parental responsibility during and after divorce, and
its application in the existing practice in Family Courts and various Religious Courts.
In particular, the Committee was asked to give recommendations regarding
justification to continuing to apply the "Tender Years Presumption" in Article 25 of
the Competence Act, alongside examining the need to statutorily anchor alternative
arrangements of sharing and distributing parental responsibility during divorce. The
Committee was also asked to offer ways in which to improve the tools available to the
courts and religious courts in order to determine the child's best interest in custody
and parental contact arrangements, and finally, to examine and recommend in regards
to the implementation and enforcement of the arrangements suggested by it (see: the
Committee's letter of appointment, appendix A).
The Committee's establishment was intended to regulate parental responsibility during
divorce according to Hague Convention for Children's Rights 1989 (hereinafter: the
Convention), which was not included in the report of "the committee for examining
basic principles regarding children and law and legislating them", headed by honorary
Judge Saviona Rotlevi, February 2003 (hereinafter: the Rotlevi Committee). Even
though the Rotlevi Committee dealt with various legal aspects of applying children's
rights according to Hague Convention, its recommendations did not address the issue
of regularization of parental responsibility during divorce.

The Committee's members are: Prof. (emeritus) Dan Schnit, School of Social Work,
Tel-Aviv University; Judge Hanna Rothschild, Family Court in Ramat-Gan
(substituted due to sabbatical by Judge Alisa Miller, Family Court in Ramat-Gan from
September 2005 till March 2006); Rabbinical Judge Rabbi Avraham Sherman, Great
Rabbinical Court; Advocate Kadi Iyad Zhalke, Manager of Sharia Muslim Court; Ms.
Ruthy Daniel, "Equal Parenting" NGO, and her substitute Mr. Tal Shahaf (from
March 2006); Dr. Daphna Hacker, Faculty of Law and Women and Gender Studies,
Tel-Aviv University; Dr. Tirtsa Joels, Department of Psychology, Haifa University;
Advocate Galit Sne-Luria, former chairperson of the Mediation Committee of the
Israeli Bar Association in the Haifa and Northern District; Advocate Gali Etzion, legal
adviser of NA'AMAT; social worker Ronit Tzur, Head Legal Assistance Clerk,
Ministry of Welfare; Advocate Shmuel Moran, chairperson of the Legislation
Committee for Children and Youth of the Israeli Bar Association; Prof. Avi Sagi-
Schwartz, Department of Psychology, Haifa University; Dr. Peretz Segal, Ministry of
Justice, Committee's Coordinator; Advocate Yaakov Fridberg and Advocate Yafit
Lev-Eretz, Committee's Secretaries.

1
''S''
2. Wor k Process, and Inputs Underlying the Committee's Recommendations

2.1. Wor k Topics, and Presenting Main Questions for Discussion

In the first stage of its work the Committee has decided as abovementioned to focus
on the issue of parental responsibility. The starting point was examining the changes
required in the Competence Act in regards to regularizing children-parents
relationship due to applying the concept of 'parental responsibility' according to the
Convention, and the deriving consequences in divorce situations, particularly in
regards to the Tender Years Presumption.

Let us emphasize that the Committee was not required at all to deal with the issue of
financial aspects of distributing parental responsibility which is settled in the
framework of children's alimony, since it was not included in the Committee's letter
of appointment. This issue is the focus of discussion in another committee appointed
by the Minister of Justice "the committee for examining the issue of children's
alimony in the state of Israel" headed by Professor Pinhas Shifman.

Hereinafter are detailed the questions of which the Committee discussed, while
focusing on the main discussions and opinions arising, in order to present the process
which led to the current version of the law's proposal to amend the second chapter of
the Competence Act, which will be presented in the third chapter of this report.

The main issues on which the Committee focused are:

x Unique j udicial perception of the state of Israel, in light of the personal
law customary in divorce issues, and its i nfluence on the issue of
dist ributing parental responsibi lity in divorce situations.
x The Convention's influence on continuing to apply the Tender Years
Presumption.
x Establishing an appropriate legal ar rangement that will lead to applying
the concept of parental responsibi lity according to the principle of the
child's best interest.

Discussing these issues was first based on surveys given by the Committee members
and external specialists, and also on inputs from the public and different
organizations, following an advertisement published in daily newspapers (the
advertisement is included in appendix B). In light of the public's appeals, some of the
appealers and the organizations were invited to present their doctrine in length before
the Committee. In the next stage, the Committee members deliberated the underlying
principles which should be the basis for amending the Competence Act. Accordingly,
the work process was divided to the four stages specified in this chapter.

2.2. Summary of the Committee Member's Professional Surveys

In order to examine the customary legal status, according to the laws and the rulings
of various Family Courts and Religious Courts, the Committee held special
deliberations regarding surveys of these issues done by the Committee members.

7

d. Presenting the position of organi zations representing the interests of
fathers in divorce situations The following representatives appeared
before the Committee: Mr. Raz Misgav on behalf of "Struggle
Headquarters for the Divorced Father", Dr. Yoav Mazeh on behalf of
"Parenthood for Children", Mr. Gil Ronen on behalf of "the Male Voice"
organization, Mr. Eyal Lidor and Mr. Yonatan Kapah on behalf of
"Children for Both Parents" organization, Mr. Ronen Paz and Dr. Mark
Radutzki on behalf of "Parent's Forum".

All the representatives believe that there is room to consider the issue of cancelling
the Tender Years Presumption while carefully examining the current changes in the
functioning of fathers within the family, and not only during divorce. To the speakers'
opinion, the Tender Years Presumption gives too much power to women to initiate the
family's dismantling and to distance fathers from their children.
No one disputes that the principle of the child's best interest should be the top priority.
But in reality the surveys done by social workers, as well as decisions made by
Family Courts, defend the women without properly examining the child's best
interest. Both systems lack an appropriate guidance regarding parenthood, and so the
outcome is that children are distanced from their fathers, and the fathers endure the
pain of separation and longing. Furthermore, due to the existing reforming preference
towards mothers, they act in order to prevent joint custody and to avoid cooperation
with the fathers which gives them too much legal power, which is activated at the
end of the day at the expanse of the child.
The Tender Years Presumption contradicts the principle of equality and therefore is
unconstitutional. The speakers maintained that the burden of raising the children
should be evenly and responsibly divided in situations of parents divorcing. The
existing public atmosphere against fathers mainly due to existing alimony laws
makes them feel persecuted. The courts award extremely high children's alimony, in
order to improve women's status, among other reasons. When fathers cannot afford it,
execution office's proceedings are issued against them, including arrest warrants, and
as a result fathers can't adhere to the seeing arrangements. This is abused by some of
the mothers which explain to the children that their fathers no longer wish to see
them.
In the current legal status, many men feel that women have better terms in
dismantling marital relationships. Since the courts do not have tools to examine the
child's best interest, the woman receives automatic custody over the children.
Experience in countries which have set laws favoring joint custody, shows that most
custodial arrangements are done consensually between parents without legal
deliberations. The speakers therefore sided with the immediate cancellation of the

18
Tender Years Presumption, and with founding in its place a duty for joint custody
except for exceptional cases.

e. Presenting the position of women's organi zations in divorce proceedings
The following representatives of organizations representing the interests of
mothers in divorce proceedings appeared before the Committee: advocate
Ziona Kenig Yair on behalf of "Israel Women's Network", advocate Dana
Mirtenbaum and Ms. Gila Brazilay Nudelman on behalf of "Women
Lawyers for Social Justice" organization, advocate Nasrin Aalimi Kabha
on behalf of the Working Group for Equality in Personal Status Issues, Dr.
Ester Hertzog and Dr. Hanna Beit Halahmi on behalf of Coalition of
Women's Organizations, Dr. Orly Binyamin on behalf of "My Sister"
organization and Ms. Orna Meri Ash on behalf of "Isha L'Isha"
organization.

The representatives maintained that Article 25 of the Competence Act, anchoring the
Tender Years Presumption, should stay unchanged. In their opinion, there is no
evidence that other custody models are better for children, and there is no room for
"experimenting" on children in the name of so-called equality. The Presumption does
not prevent fathers from requesting joint custody over their children, since the
Presumption is not conclusive but a mere means to make the legal deliberation
efficient. On the one hand, the Presumption prevents in total majority of cases
unnecessary deliberation regarding custody, and on the other hand, does not prevent
the court from finding appropriate solutions for the minority of fathers interested in
custody.

As long as the religious law dominates the divorce process, in which the woman is at
a disadvantage as is well known, the Presumption should not be changed. Family
issues should be seen as a whole, and the only advantage the woman has in regards to
children's custody should not be cancelled. The existing inequality in divorce laws
causes the woman to be extorted and required to waive her financial rights in order to
receive a divorce certificate. Cancelling the Presumption and discussing each case
separately will turn the issue of children's custody to yet another tool for extortion
against the woman. Even separating the connection between children's alimony and
custody is artificial. It is all the more true in regards to weaker women, since custody
over the children and alimony moderates their financial damage following divorce,
especially in cases in which the women waive their financial rights in order to receive
a divorce certificate.
Cancelling the Presumption will force women to prove that their parental competence
is preferable to that of their partners, which will lead to prolonged deliberations at the
children's expense. Since women are generally weaker, it is not infrequent that they
lack the resources to allow for such proceedings. Their willingness to appeal to courts
is low, to the point of lack of awareness to their overall legal rights. In light of their
natural tendency to waive their financial rights in order to receive custody, and in
light of researches showing that women are more interested in custody than men, and
at the same time they have lower financial abilities, one can infer that they will be
harmed by the need to deliberate over custody, and one way or the other the children's
rights will also suffer.
The overall difficulties mentioned exist prominently among women of the Arab
sector, in which the inequality is more extreme. In fact, these women have no actual
freedom to leave the marital institution due to their social status after divorce. So, for
example, only 17% of them work. In addition, they have no access at all to the civil
legal system, and therefore more easily waive their basic rights in order to ensure
themselves custody over their children.

19
The existing reality in countries in which the Tender Years Presumption is not
customary, is that women constitute for the majority of "single parent" families (about
80%). Among other reasons, since many fathers withdraw after a short time from the
joint custody due to lack of genuine willingness to assume responsibility over raising
the children. Experience in these countries shows that there is no correlation between
courts' rulings and the realization of the joint custody arrangements in practice. The
claim for cancelling the Presumption is in fact a claim for formal equality for men, but
is not accompanied by a desire for essential equality.
The speakers maintained that there is no use in trying to achieve social change though
courts. Therefore the Presumption shouldn't be changed as long as it reflects the
customary social status. In their opinion, legislators should be especially cautious
regarding this issue, since changing the Presumption will greatly harm the status of
women in Israel. Changing the Tender Years Presumption to a presumption in favor
of the "primary caregiver" parent might also especially harm weakened women, since
there is a real concern that they will refrain from work so as not to be recognized as
"primary caregiver". Instead of changing the Presumption one should encourage
mechanisms for enforcing contact and seeing arrangements, since the essence of the
problem of detachment between children and fathers is lack of means to enforce
contact.

f. Presenting the position of grandparents regarding thei r relationships
with thei r grandchildren in cases of divorce Before the Committee
appeared Ms. Nili Sandrov, Dr. Meira Or, Dr. Mati Wexler, Jack and Lea
Lorr, Shlomo and Dvora Serd and Ms. Adina Zeharia.

The appealers are grandparents detached from their grandchildren following the
divorce of their grandchildren's parents or following disputes between them and their
grandchildren's parents. They maintained that the detachment causes great damages
and pain to all those involved and substantially harms the children's best interest and
their right to a relationship with their grandparents. The existing legal status
perpetuates an absurd, since on the one hand the law does not regulate the relationship
between grandparents and their grandchildren, but on the other hand in some cases
they are laid with the duty to pay alimony for their grandchildren.
The current situation allows for incitement against grandparents as part of the dispute
between parents, to a point where the grandchildren are sometimes unaware of the
grandparents' existence. Things reach a point in which the detachment of
grandchildren from grandparents is cynically used during divorce as a part of financial
extortion or other wrongful reasons. All that, while using the fact that the minors have
no ability to protest and there is no factor the child can approach regarding the matter,
since the detachment is done under cover of the law. It is a common phenomenon
which is wider than publicly known, and harms thousands of children. Therefore, in
their opinion, the Committee should recommend amending the legislation so it will
encompass the issue of relationship between grandparents and grandchildren, and so
will exclude the contact with grandchildren from the deliberation issues during
divorce.

2.5. Professional Literature Overvi ew Regarding Parental Responsibility and
Its Components

The research and basis of knowledge in the field of child's developmental psychology
was given a wide push in the last few years, and with it came the realization that both
parents' involvement in raising their child is vital to his/her proper development.

20

3. Applying the Principle of Parental Responsibi lity Suggested Legislation

3.1. Main Suggested Legislational Amendments and Alternatives Discussed by
the Committee

Based on what was heard by the Committee and the professional literature laid before
it, the Committee maintains that regulating the parental responsibility during divorce
should be based on legislation that will anchor the legal relationship between parents
and children according to overall perception of parental responsibility. According to
the Convention, parental responsibility obligates parents to act to realize their child's
rights in his/her best interest, both while they share their lives and while they are
apart. Therefore the Committee recommends amending the second chapter of the
Competence Act, while including the principles of parental responsibility within the
principles of existing Competence Act.
In light of the above mentioned, the Committee maintains that the Ministry of Justice
should consider legislation that will separate the field of child's legal status and rights
from the field of defending the incompetents and guardianship over them, which are
currently tied together under the Competence Act. Based on the Committee's letter of
appointment, it does not see itself as qualified to suggest wording of an independent
law that will regulate the child's status and the overall legal relationship between child
and parents. Instead, the Committee wishes to offer an amendment to the Competence
Act according to the Convention's perception of parental responsibility. Hereinafter
suggested are the principles upon which the legislation proposal is based, the
considerations which guided its wording, and also alternatives discussed by the
Committee but eventually not chosen to be recommended by it. In any case in which
the opinion of the Committee members remained divided, the divided opinions are
presented, including referral to their relevant position in the minority opinion attached
as an appendix to this report.

3.1.1. The Principle of the Chi ld's Best Interest Its Status as a Decisive
Principle in Determining How to Realize Parental Responsibi lity

The principle of the child's best interest is a universal consensus by force of the
Convention (Article 3). Furthermore, the child's fundamental rights according to the
Convention are within the realms of unique collection of human rights for children.
Therefore the Committee saw fit to determine the principle of the child's best interest
as the basic starting point from which derives the parental responsibility. Nowadays
this principle is reflected in the Competence Act, Articles 17 and 24, and in the
rulings of custody disputes during divorce cases.

3.1.1.1. The Committee based its analysis of the meaning of the principle of the
child's best interest on the model which was developed in the Rotlevi Committee,
according to which it includes "the overall rights needs and interests of the child".
Therefore, Article 3 of the hereby suggested act specifies the elements of the child's
best interest, according to the Convention and the Competence Act, in reference to
parental responsibility, as follows:

"Whlle deLermlnlng hls/her chlld's besL lnLeresL Lhe parenL wlll
Lake lnLo accounL Lhe overall maLLers relevanL Lo Lhe speclflc
declslon regardlng Lhe chlld, ln parLlcular hls/her physlcal and
menLal wellbelng, wlshes, feellngs, oplnlons, age, gender,
characLer and developlng ablllLles, Llme dlmenslon ln llfe and Lhe

23
expecLed fuLure lmpacL Lhe acLlon mlghL have, as well as sLablllLy
and conLlnulLy ln conLacLs and relaLlonshlps beLween Lhe chlld
and hls/her famlly and surroundlngs."

As shown above, Article 3 in fact specifies the overall subjective ingredients which
should be considered while deciding how to realize a certain child's objective needs
for his own good. Article 2 of the hereby suggested act specifies all the child's
Objective needs, for which his/her parents are responsible:

"arenLal responslblllLy lncludes, among oLher Lhlngs, ensurlng
Lhe chlld's physlcal and menLal wellbelng, economy, healLh,
proper physlcal, splrlLual, moral and soclal developmenL,
educaLlon and developlng ablllLles and skllls, resldence,
malnLalnlng a personal, dlrecL and conLlnuous conLacL beLween
Lhe chlld and parenLs (herelnafLer - "parenLal conLacL") and
malnLalnlng conLacL beLween Lhe chlld and famlly members
(herelnafLer - "famlly conLacL")."

For example, the Convention determines the right of every child to have contact with
his/her parents (Articles 7, 9 and 18 of the Convention), and also his/her right to have
contact with additional family members (Article 8 of the Convention). This right of
the child imposes an obligation on his/her parent, on whoever is responsible for the
child and on the state to allow for realizing these rights. Obviously one should see the
child's right to contact not only as a legal right but also as a personal obligation of the
parents mentally and psychologically to care for their child and make sure that
his/her personal contact with them and with other family members is realized. Since
we deal with a child's personal right, the parents should allow him/her to realize it
without its manner and extent being affected by existing relationships between them
and other family members.

3.1.1.2. According to the Convention, the principle of the child's best interest is
a decisive principle, giving normative priority to the child's rights. The Rotlevi
Committee suggested that the child's best interest should be the "fi rst and foremost
consideration". This wording follows Article 3 of the Convention, which determines
the general principle of the child's best interest as follows:

!"#$%&'()
1.! "#! $%%! $&'()#*! &)#&+,#(#-! &.(%/,+#, wheLher underLaken by
publlc or prlvaLe soclal welfare lnsLlLuLlons, courLs of law,
admlnlsLraLlve auLhorlLles or leglslaLlve bodles, '.+!0+*'!(#'+,+*'*!
)1!'.+!&.(%/!*.$%%!0+!$!2,(3$,4!&)#*(/+,$'()#.
(+32.$*(*!#)'!),(-(#$%)

The obvious translation of the expression "A primary consideration" is "first and
foremost consideration", that is the preferred consideration and not a decisive one.
This translation seems accurate and reflective of the Convention's intent both literally
and figuratively as suggested by other Articles of the Convention, as will be explained
hereinafter.
Article 18 of the Convention uses the term "basic concern", which was translated to
"top priority", a term which reflects parent's obligation to act according to the
principle of child's best interest of Article 3. As for Article 3 itself, it seems that the

24
Convention does not determine that the principle of the child's best interest has a
decisive weight since it did not use the term "the paramount consideration", as was
used regarding adoption in Article 21 of the Convention:

!"#$%&'(*+
SLaLes arLles LhaL recognlze and/or permlL Lhe sysLem of
adopLlon shall ensure LhaL '.+!0+*'!(#'+,+*'*!)1!'.+!&.(%/!*.$%%!0+!
'.+!2$,$3)5#'!&)#*(/+,$'()# and Lhey shall...
(+32.$*(*!#)'!),(-(#$%)

Most members of the Committee maintain that this wording should be based in law,
since the child's best interest should be seen as a top principle being a basic and
guiding principle of the Convention. This principle is unique to the status of children,
since their needs rights and wishes need protection while their physical and mental
personality develops. Accordingly, the concept of "best" for a person needs to reflect
a variety of morals which their relative importance varies according to subjective
circumstances of each person from time to time. "The best interest of a child"
therefore expresses a moral perception which sees the child as an autonomous person
with a variety of unique rights due to the limitations of his/her age and development,
whose parents should give it a preferential consideration in order to guarantee the
realization of his/her best interest. Since the child's development is a complex process
which its outcomes as he/she matures are difficult to predict, there is a concern that
the parent will prefer his/her own best interest in the short term over his/her child's
best interest in the long term. Therefore it is fitting to determine that the child's best
interest is top principle and not just a main consideration among others.
However, a minority of the Committee members maintained that it is more fitting to
determine that: "while realizing his/her parental responsibility, the parent will act so
the child's best interest will be a main consideration". This approach sees the child's
best interest as a "main" consideration of greater importance than other
considerations. All that, in order to balance between the interests of the child and the
interests of his/her parents. Therefore, when the parent experiences unique
circumstances, the parent's interests may be preferable to the child's interests (see
minority opinion, appendix D, p. 58).
The Committee believes that it is fitting to determine by law the wording of the
Convention also suggested by the Rotlevi Committee that the principle of the
child's best interest will be the "first and foremost consideration" "A primary
consideration" (according to the official wording of the Convention). Even though the
child's best interest should not be an exclusive decisive consideration, it must be
preferred and not just a main principle among various considerations. Furthermore,
defining the child's best interest as "main principle" does not provide guidance
regarding the principle's significance, and may leave it for the test of the reasonable or
devoted parent's discretion. Most members of the Committee see this interpretation as
inferior to the significance attributed to the principle of child's best interest by the
Convention.

3.1.2. Parental Responsibility and the Principle of the Child's Best Interest

The Rotlevi Committee's report included a recommendation for establishing the legal
relationship between children and their parents based on the perception of parental
responsibility instead of the guardianship concept that exists nowadays within the
Competence Act. One must remember, of course, that at the time in which the
Competence Act was legislated 45 years ago, the term of parental responsibility did
not yet exist, the independent status of women was not yet developed as it is today
and the divorce rate was much lower. The approach represented in the Competence

25
Act fitted to the norms common at the time, and the law was not required to
realistically deal with the issue of realizing parental responsibility between the parent
taking care of the child in practice ("custodial parent") and the other parent. Adopting
the model of parental responsibility came to deal with the changes that occurred since
the Competence Act was legislated.
The Committee's legislative suggestion was intended therefore to give unique
authorities alongside obvious duties towards the child. In regards to parental
responsibility, Article 18 of the Convention determines as follows:

!"#$%&'(+,
SLaLes arLles shall use Lhelr besL efforLs Lo ensure recognlLlon of
Lhe prlnclple LhaL 0)'.! 2$,+#'*! .$6+! &)33)#! ,+*2)#*(0(%('(+*
for Lhe upbrlnglng and developmenL of Lhe chlld, arenLs or, as
Lhe case may be, legal guardlans, have Lhe prlmary responslblllLy
for Lhe upbrlnglng and developmenL of Lhe chlld. 7.+! 0+*'!
(#'+,+*'*!)1!'.+!&.(%/!8(%%!0+!'.+(,!0$*(&!&)#&+,#9
(+32.$*(*!#)'!),(-(#$%)

As abovementioned, the Article does not deal with setting the principle's significance,
but determines a guideline to the manner in which the parental responsibility
should be reali zed, guaranteeing the best interest of the child which is
manifested in the official translation according to which the child's best interest will
be their "top priority". Accordingly we suggest setting by law that the meaning of
parental responsibility, together and separately, is: "the duty and the authority to
decide and act on the child's behalf according to the child's best interest". In this
regard, the following paragraph of the Rotlevi Report is suitable:

"1hls change ls noL only Lermlnologlcal, lL encompasses a llne of
ldeas whlch embody a new percepLlon boLh ln Lhe fleld of
parenLs-chlldren relaLlonshlps and ln Lhe fleld of chlldren's rlghLs
wlLhln Lhe famlly cell. 8eferrlng Lo chlldren accordlng Lo Lhe new
model puLs Lhe chlld aL Lhe cenLer of Lhe famlly cell and deflnes
Lhe relaLlonshlp beLween hlm/her and hls/her parenLs as
founded on muLual respecL, cooperaLlon and Lhe prlnclple of Lhe
chlld's besL lnLeresL whlch obllgaLes Lhe parenLs Lo acL on behalf
of promoLlng and reallzlng Lhe chlld's rlghLs, lnLeresLs and
needs"
13
.

The existing instructions of the Competence Act are based, as abovementioned, on the
social perception that prevailed in the world while it was legislated, according to
which parents have rights in regard to their children. As a consequence, Article 14 of
the Act defines the legal relationship between parents and their children as a
relationship of guardianship, as follows:

"1he parenLs are Lhe naLural guardlans of Lhelr mlnor chlldren"

Article 15 respectively defines the guardianship's extent:

13
Secondary Committee's report regarding the child and the family, p. 200.

26
"1helr guardlanshlp lncludes Lhe obllgaLlon and Lhe prlvllege Lo
care for Lhe mlnor's needs".

The Act gives the natural status of parents a legal status of guardians of their children,
from which derives their obligations and privileges towards their children. The term
guardian, which literally means responsible or executor
14
, is linked to the need to
defend people who are in need of others' shelter for their protection. The guardian has
control over the sheltered, and therefore he/she was given the legal obligation and
privilege to control the sheltered' actions. We can therefore see from use of the
existing terms in the Competence Act that parents control their children, since the
children are a kind of natural asset of their parents. According to this approach, the
law in many countries gives in divorce situations the guardianship to the parent who
has custody over the child. In Israel the custody itself does not change the status of the
non-custodian parent, and he continues to be the child's guardian, unless the parents
decide otherwise according to Article 24 and the court approves it:

/
Lhem whlch one of Lhem wlll be Lhe mlnor's guardlan, fully or

Therefore, the suggested term of parental responsibility does not change the extent of
obligations parents have for their children incorporated in the term "guardianship"
according to the Competence Act, but it cancels the parent's right to waive his/her
guardianship towards his/her child. The parental responsibility, by definition, applies
for every parent as long as his/her children are minors and he/she cannot evade this
responsibility of him/her.
Nowadays, many parents mistakenly perceive the guardianship as automatically given
to the custodian parent. Obviously, such perceptions which do not center the child but
his/her parents, have no place in a judicial system which gives children the rights of
an independent person, that is a child centered approach, as expressed in the
Convention. So defines it the Rotlevi Committee too:

"1he approach ls LhaL Lhe baslc rlghL glven Lo every chlld as a
developlng belng ls LhaL Lhere wlll be a responslble and lovlng
adulL who wlll be ln charge of reallzlng, promoLlng and fulfllllng
hls/her besL lnLeresL. 1hls responslblllLy should be enLrusLed wlLh
boLh parenLs of each chlld, and Lhey precede any oLher
auLhorlLy"
13
.

The same approach is set today in Article 18 of the Competence Act:

"ln any maLLer relaLed Lo Lhelr guardlanshlp boLh parenLs musL
acL consensually"

14
As says the Mishna: "orphans. whose Iather appointed a guardian Ior them" (Gitin 5,4).
15
Secondary Committee's report, "The child and the family", p. 29.

27
In conclusion, the majority of Committee members maintain that the legal situation as
reflected in the Competence Act, according to which a parent's guardianship does not
revoke due to divorce, should continue. However, parents must not be allowed to
agree to exempt a parent of his/her parental responsibility. The abovementioned
stands, in the majority opinion of the Committee members, even in circumstances of
violence between the spouses. There is no reason to cancel the parental responsibility
of the violent parent, since it is in the child's best interest to guarantee his/her right to
have direct contact with both parents. Furthermore, one should not see it as obligation
to maintain contact between the spouse who was a victim to violence and the violent
spouse, since in these cases one may use a third party or a contact center as a
coordinator between the spouses. The Convention and also countries which has
validated it by their laws did not see fit to limit the parental responsibility in cases of
spousal violence in itself, unless contact with such parent contradicts the best interest
of the child himself/herself. In light of all the above, we suggest to determine by law
that the parental responsibility is together and separately without limitation.

3.1.3. The Child's Right to Contact with His/ Her Parents and Family Members

In the framework of the parental responsibility the Committee has included, as
abovementioned, the parent's obligation to care for realizing their child's right to both
parental contact "every child's right to have a meaningful, personal, direct and
continuous contact with both parents", and family contact "every child's right to
have a family contact with his/her siblings and grandparents". All that under the
principle of the child's best interest, meaning revoking such contacts when there is a
probable concern that their realization will harm his/her best interest. The
Committee's stance follows the Rotlevi Committee's recommendations and relies on
the Convention's instructions as specified above.
In the Committee's opinion, the contact the child has with each of his/her parents is a
significant and essential component of his/her intact development. Empirical research
in developmental psychology, which was presented in detail before the Committee,
shows that the development of children who has contact with both parents is
significantly more intact than that of children who has contact with only one parent,
including situations in which the parents are severely disputed. The contact's
importance lies in the child's direct and close exposure to both parent figures, which
improves his/her personality's development. In addition, reducing the contact's
frequency might harm his/her relationship with each of his/her parents, and such harm
has immediate and long-term damaging consequences on the child.
Likewise, when the child enjoys contact with both parents, he/she will tend to suffer
fewer difficulties when one parent will have to take on himself/herself the other
parent's responsibility, in case the latter isn't able to maintain his parental
responsibility for some reason. In this regard the following verse applies: "The two
are better than the one. since if they fall one will help his friend, but the one falling
will not have anyone's help" since if one parent falls, the other parent will rise up to
help the child. The same is true in regards to other family members, like grandparents
and siblings, which contributes to the child's development and is a source of support
when the parents cannot realize their responsibility. This right complements the
child's right for alimony from siblings and grandparents according to Article 4 of the
Family Law's Correction Act (Alimony) 1959.
The child's right to have contact with his/her parents is, as abovementioned, his/her
self right to have a personal, direct and continuous contact with both parents, due to
this contact's significance in the child's development. Therefore, it is within the
parental responsibility to allow the child to have an actual contact with the other
parent, and only in cases in which the child's contact with the other parent harms the
child's best interest, one may determine that the contact will principally be with only

28
one parent. Since today maintaining contact between the child and the non-custodian
parent is perceived as the parent's right, and not the child's, the Committee believes
that there is a need to explicitly settle the child's right to have direct contact with both
his/her parents after divorce. The parents' separation should not force one parent to
separate from his/her child only due to lack of legal definition of the non-custodial
parent's obligations.
Likewise, the Committee maintains that the law should explicitly include the child's
right to have family contact with his/her siblings and grandparents, and determine that
such contact will be realized in the framework of parental responsibility. Nowadays
the custodial parent has the power to withhold the realization of such contacts. Since
the child's rights are not set by law, reality shows that this is indeed the situation in
many cases. According to the Convention's intention, in particular Article 8(a), which
sees it as a component of the child's personal identity, it is therefore fitting to
determine the right by law, so that even in case of parent's separation it is their
parental responsibility to ensure the realization of the child's family contacts with
his/her siblings and grandparents.
The Committee was indeed asked whether giving such a right will expand the room
for conflicts and add a field of legal deliberations also with the grandparents and
siblings, which may demand during the dispute between the parents to ensure the
child's right to have contact with them. In spite of this concern, the Committee
believes that the child's right to have family contact should be included, since it is
essential for intact development. However, due to the abovementioned concern it is
suggested to limit the child's right to have family contact to contacts with his/her
siblings and grandparents only. In addition, it is suggested that this right will not be
defined as a right to have meaningful relationship like the child's right to have
relationship with his/her parents in order to prevent deliberations about the contact's
extent and the various psychological interpretations regarding the nature of this right.

29

The majority of the Committee members mai ntains, as abovementioned, that the
" Tender Years Presumption " cont radicts both proven psychological perceptions
regarding the child's best interest and the legal perception of parental
responsibility together and separately as determined in the Convention.
Adherence to the existing Presumption will lead to a situation in which the essence
and gist of the child's best interest will be absent from the law, especially in divorce
situations in which the parents' ability to detach themselves from their personal
matters and properly consider their child's best interest as first and foremost
consideration, is weakened.

36

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Shoshana Harper October 7, 2005

Ministry of Welfare and Social Services

The State of Israel

Introducing the report, Arthur Lenk, Director, Department of International Law,

Presentation of the Report

of people from one state in other states became more common,

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