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Pakistan Horizon, (Karachi), Vol. 64, No.2, April 2011

Russia: Indispensable for Central Asia Roy Sultan Khan Bhatty and Nazima Shaheen
Introduction Owing to geographical imperatives, Russias interests in Central Asia are not similar to those of the West. Its long, open borders with Asia and Europe force it to keep a balanced policy towards its southern neighbours and the Western world. Threat of instability in Central Asian republics, expansion of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) to Eastern Europe and former Soviet republics, presence of NATO and the US in Afghanistan, rapid economic growth of China with increasing influence in Central Asia and Pakistan are important factors for Russia to consider. Similarly, developments in the US-India and Sino-India relations and energy supply plans from Central Asia and Iran to South Asia and China are some major developments which compel Russia to maintain its influence in its southern neighbourhood, especially in Central Asia. Russia is not considered by the West as a friend whose interests are entirely shared by the West. It has remained less developed and less competitive as compared to the West and has been unable to maintain its superiority over the main European powers. Politically, socially and economically, Russia is not an equal partner of the West. However, it is pertinent to mention here that Russia is the second largest exporter of oil, after Saudi Arabia, and supplies a quarter of Europes gas needs. It possesses some of the worlds largest metal reserves. Russia was the worlds fifth largest producer of nickel in 2008. It was the worlds fifth largest iron ore miner and its reserves had no match in the world in iron deposits. In the same year, Russia was also ranked as the worlds fourth largest steel producer. Moreover, only South Africa has more gold reserves than Russia in the world.1 Russia has the potential to regain its great power status and it is this potential which induces the West to keep Russia at arms length to avoid its overwhelming influence. To compensate for its weak status in Europe, there is a psychological urge in Russia to involve itself in the underdeveloped South so that it may maintain its supremacy in Asia. Fyodor M. Dostoyevskis (1821-1881)
Roy Sultan Khan Bhatty is Election Officer in the Provincial Election Commission, Punjab. Nazima Shaheen is a research specialist.
1

Dawn (Karachi), 27 June 2008.

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words, In Europe we are Asiatic, whereas in Asia we too are European, reflect how Russia views Central Asia. Russian interests in Central Asia broadly revolve around five points: stability in Central Asian states, unhindered rights of transit across Central Asia so that it can maintain its links with China, India and Iran, maintenance of a common economic space with Central Asia, the regions geostrategic potential and international recognition of Russias role in the region.2 Russia has declared the Central Asian states and other former Soviet republics as Near Abroad. The fact that these countries share open borders with Russia is a major determinant of its policy to keep them in its sphere of influence. Any change in the political and economic structure of the Central Asian states will have consequences for Russias stability. This explains Russias tendency towards maintaining a status quo in the region. Paul Kennedy has shown in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, that empires lost their power when their economies collapsed, when they overstretched. The Soviet Union lost control over its union territory and Eastern Europe because it was unable to bear the economic costs of keeping the republics in the Union. It is clear that Russia is well on its way to revive its major power status. Its geographical features and rich natural resources have made it less dependent on the worlds economy and, consequently, shielded it from the adverse effects of global financial meltdowns. The essence of this paper is that Russia, possessing unique advantages in Central Asia, will maintain its strong influence in Central Asia. However, its volume of involvement will depend on its future economic strength. Geography and military clout: Factors in Russias power Geography, military organization, economy, national morale and alliance systems are some factors which play vital roles in the success of a nation. It was the geography of the North which forced ancient tribes to migrate and occupy the South thousands of years ago. Similarly, geography is a major determinant of Russias policy towards Central Asia which, in turn, plays a major role in Russias national stability and cohesion. It is impossible to man Russias long borders with the Central Asian states. For Russia, the best way to
2

Roy Allison, Strategic reassertion in Russias Central Asia policy, International Affairs, vol. 80, no. 2, March 2004, p. 283-284.

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address any trans-border threat is to maintain its firm control in Central Asia. The Ottoman Empire (1299-1923), due to its superior military organization, dominated Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean region from 1453 to 1683. The United Provinces were the richest ports of Europe and Russia was the poorest one.3 But, unlike Russia in later years, the United Provinces were unable to achieve the status of a superpower. Historically, military power has played an important role in maintaining influence outside the territorial borders of a state. Political or geographical factors can motivate an economic power to show a lower profile in the military sphere.4 For example, Japan has not made its military as strong as that of the US, Russia, China or other major powers. But it continues to be the worlds second largest economy after the US. On the other hand, an economically weak state can organize itself as a military giant like Russia which has strong armed forces and the largest number of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Despite its weak economy, Russia has been able to maintain its major power status in the international political system. It has faced the collapse of its military power four times in the past two centuries: (i) at the end of the Crimean War in 1856 (ii) during the war with Japan in 1905 (iii) at the end of the First World War in 1918 and (iv) after the dismemberment of the Soviet Union in 1991. Despite these setbacks, Russia was able to revive its power within a decade or two.5 Historically, geography and military power have played a vital role in making Russia a great power. These two factors explain Russias attempts at maintaining its influence in Central Asia. Russias economy and military power From 1991 to 1995, the size of Russias economy reduced substantially. It was approximately half the size of the former Soviet Unions economy at
3

The United Provinces (present Kingdom of Netherlands), sometimes referred to as the Dutch Republic or the Netherlands, lasted from 1579-1795. It was a federation of seven states: Holland, Zeeland, Gelderland, Utrecht, Friesland, Overijssel and Groningen. Of these, Holland was the largest and most important. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London: Fontana Press, 1989), pp. xxvii, 190, 254. Jack Snyder, Russia: Responses to Relative Decline, in T.V. Paul and John A. Hall, eds., International Order and Future of World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.147.

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the end of 1995. Russias real military spending decreased dramatically from 146 billon dollars to 73 billon dollars during this period.6 During this period, Russia took less interest in Central Asian affairs. From 1994 onwards, Russias economy began to recover and it started to increase its involvement in Central Asia. After the 19971998 financial crisis, which severely affected Russias economy, Russian President Vladimir Putin introduced market reforms for unhindered economic growth. Russia tried to build its economy by reforming and developing its economic structure and generating revenues from oil and gas exports to Europe. After five years of economic development, based primarily on energy exports, Russias economy steadied in 2003-2004 and it was able to reverse the economic decline that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. According to Shleifer and Treisman, the Russian populations real income grew by an average of 10 per cent per year during the period 1999-2004 when Putin was president. From October 2002 to October 2003, the growth in real income was a massive 17 per cent.7 In 2006, Russias average per capita GDP increased from 600 dollars to 4,500 dollars.8 The number of poor fell from 42 million to 26 million.9 At the end of 2007, average income growth was 12 per cent. Better economic prospects enabled Russia to pay off its foreign debt which, at one time, neared 200 billion dollars. In 2008, Russia was the worlds eighth largest economy based on purchasing power parity and was the third major holder of foreign reserves in the Asia-Pacific region after China and Japan. The volume of Russias exports rose by 9.8 per cent in the first nine months of 2007. The total volume of its exports was 242.8 billion dollars as compared to imports of 136.8 billion dollars in the same period.10 In 2008, Russias exports rose by 33 per cent totalling 468.1 billion dollars while imports increased by 33.6 per cent to 266.9 billion dollars.11 Russias economic revival is linked with high oil prices, which is partially correct. In the growth of Russias economy, defence
6

Nicole J. Jackson, Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS: Theories, Debates and Actions (London: Routledge, 2003), p.8. 7 Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, A Normal Country, Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, no. 2, Mar/Apr 2004, p.36. 8 Fareed Zakaria, What the World Really Wants, Newsweek, 29 May 2006, p.5. 9 Ibid., p.5. 10 UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific , Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2008 (New York: United Nations, 2008), www.unescap.org 11 www-prime-tass.com

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industry, retail, chemicals, metals and information technology have also played an important part. Russias dependence on energy resources is overstated. Instead, energy should be viewed as an important comparative advantage and an opportunity to diversify its economy.12 As far as financial independence is concerned, it must be kept in mind that the Russian leadership cannot politically afford to invest heavily in the non-oil sector because even a low oil price brings a cash flow that cannot be replaced by other industries. 13 Russias backwardness is often discussed in the Western media. Actually, there are different psychological, ideological and political factors which have contributed to projecting a distorted image of Russia in the world. In the Soviet period, managers of industries showed fake economic figures to highlight their good performance and to get financial benefits. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and with capitalist reforms, managers tried to conceal their original output and indicated a reduction in production to avoid tax imposition. Official records indicated a low growth of Russias economy in the 1990s. Russias unofficial economy grew rapidly in the same period. According to official statistics, GDP fell by 29 per cent during this period but electricity utility decreased only by 19 per cent which showed that Russias economy expanded in the 1990s.14 A moderate rate of economic growth has facilitated Russia to strengthen its military. That is why Putin took military modernization as one of the most important sectors in his second presidential term. In 2004, annual growth rate of military expenditure had reached nearly 20 per cent.15 The budget for the federal space programme in 2006-2015 was about 300 billion rubles (10.50 billion dollars), which was substantially higher than previous budgets.16 A measure of the growth in Russias economy was the apprehensions, as well as hopes, it generated in its immediate neighbourhood. In November 2001, during the summit meeting of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Uzbek President Islam Karimov, while acknowledging that the Central Asian republics and other former Soviet republics integration with the CIS depended
12

Andrei P. Tsygankov, Projecting Confidence, Not Fear: Russias Post Imperial Assertiveness, Orbis, vol. 50, no. 4, Fall 2006, p. 680. 13 Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes, Putins Third Way, 21 January 2009, www.nationalinterest.org 14 Shleifer and Treisman, op. cit., p. 23. 15 Trends in US-Russia Ties, Contemporary International Relations, May 2004, p.19. 16 Daily Times (Lahore), 18 July 2005.

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on Russias economic power, stated that if ruble and Russian economy continued to strengthen on us, we would not be able to escape its influence. 17 Historically, core states in East, South and West Asia have repeatedly exploited parts of Central Asia during their expansions. Even when the Central Asians states used military force to invade and tried to dominate neighbouring states, they only succeeded by using military power, and to some extent political power, but never economic influence. Although contemporary Russia is weak as compared to Stalinist Russia, it is not weak vis--vis the Central Asian states and other regional powers. Militarily weak and economically fragile Central Asian states are no match to Russias military strength and growing economic clout. More than three centuries ago, the German mercantilist writer Von Hornigk wrote that whether a nation be today mighty and rich or not depends not on the abundance or security of its power and riches but principally on whether its neighbors possess more or less of it.18 Russias military and economic preponderance in Central Asia is a classic example of the above-mentioned maxim. Russia-Central Asia economic interdependence Russia imports sizeable quantities of oil and gas from the Central Asian states and then exports them further to European customers on higher prices. Russias transit facility for the supply of oil and gas is also quite beneficial for Central Asian economies. Without this facility, impoverished Central Asian states are unable to export their energy resources to world markets to get hard currency which is necessary for their economic growth. Russia-Central Asia interdependence in the energy sector has contributed to development of strategic interdependence in other fields. Russia has offered the Central Asian states high prices for their energy resources which prevented these states from materializing any oil and gas deals with other countries by bypassing Russia. Russias economic stability is important for Central Asian economies because of their strong trade relations with Russia. For instance, any devaluation of Russian currency makes Russian commodities cheaper which, in turn, adversely affect Central Asian economies, as was witnessed during the 1998 financial crisis.

17

Shireen T. Hunter, Jeffery L. Thomas and Alexander Melikishvili, Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p.342. 18 Paul Kennedy, op. cit., p.xxv.

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Russia is a major trading partner of the Central Asian states. The volume of trade between Russia and the Central Asian states was 16.6 billion dollars in 2007. It rose to 9.6 billion dollars in the first half of 2008, showing an increase of 27 per cent per year.19 In 2008, Russia represented 75 per cent of all foreign investment in Tajikistan.20 During January-September 2009, Russia-Tajikistan bilateral trade increased to more than 600 million dollars. Russia is the biggest trading partner of Tajikistan with a foreign trade volume of 857.9 million dollars in 2010.21 The volume of trade between Kazakhstan and Russia increased by 39.2 per cent in 2010 and Kazakhstans exports to Russia grew by 47 per cent.22 Russia is the second largest trading partner of Uzbekistan. Total trade turnover between Uzbekistan and Russia was 4.5 billion dollars in the period January-September 2010. During the same period, Uzbekistans exports to Russia rose to 3.2 billion dollars while the total volume of its imports from Russia was 1.3 billion dollars.23 In 2007, Turkmenistans exports to Russia aggregated 754.1 million dollars, making up 57.7 per cent of its total exports. Turkmenistan mainly exported gas, 61.5 per cent of its total exports, and oil products which counted for 17.1 per cent of its total exports. In 2010, the share of Russian products in Kyrgyzstans imports was 36.6. 24 In addition to close trade relations between Russia and the Central Asian states, a large number of Central Asians work in Russia. In 2000-2003, of the more than 600,000 citizens of Tajikistan who worked outside the country, four-fifths worked in Russia.25 In 2004, Russia was second in the world, after the US, as a migration
19 20

www.en.rian.ru John C.K. Daly, Russia Dominates Tajikistan Energy Sector, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 7 November 2008, www.jamestown.org 21 Turkey Becomes Tajikistan's Third Biggest Trade Partner, Turkish Weekly, 16 December 2010, www.turkishweekly.net 22 www.itar-tass.com, 4 February 2011. 23 Trade turnover between Uzbekistan and Russia to exceed US$5bn in 2010, Uzbek Daily, 28 December 2010, www.uzdaily.com 24 Daniel Workman, Top Kyrgyzstan Exports and Imports New Kyrgyzstani Constitution, 3 July 2010, www.suite101.com 25 UN Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2004 (New York: United Nations, 2004), p. 81. In 2003, the average wage for workers was under 10 dollars a month in Tajikistan. In Russia, they could earn 1,000 dollars in one season. Tajikistans Migrant Workers: A Wretched Eldorado, The Economist, 13 December 2003, p.30.

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destination.26 Official figures show that about 300,000 Kyrgyz are involved in legal and illegal labour intensive jobs in Russia. According to some analysts, this figure exceeds 800,000. According to an estimate, Kyrgyz workers send home nearly one billion dollars per year in remittances, most of which are from Russia.27 In an interview, Kazakh Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin rightly said: Russia and Kazakhstan have 300 years of cooperation behind themAsia is not a market for us. Our market is in Russia.28 Interdependence between Russia and the Central Asia states in energy and trade is a major determinant of Russias assertive policy in Central Asia. Internal rivalries among Central Asian states: Opportunities for Russia During the conquest of Central Asia, Russia took advantage of the conflictual relationship between the three kingdoms of Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand. Similarly, contemporary rivalries among the Central Asian states will have an impact on their ties with Russia. Mutual distrust among the Central Asian states will provide Russia with the opportunity to infiltrate in Central Asia and play the role of mediator as well as regulator. Uzbek President Islam Karimovs aggressive policies towards smaller states like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have served the Russian purpose. During the Tajik civil war (1992-1997), Uzbekistan tried to mould Tajikistans internal situation according to its own vested interests. Uzbek designs compelled Russia to involve itself in Tajikistans affairs to check Uzbek supremacy in Tajikistan. In 1999, when the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) started its activities in Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyzstan requested assistance from Uzbekistan as it lacked the capacity to check the activities of the IMU. But Uzbekistan did not respond positively and Kyrgyzstan had to seek Russian support. Moreover, US aid to Uzbekistan, especially after 9/11, compelled Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to look towards Russia for support. Russias policy is to avoid strengthening any one republic given its trade and economic relations with these republics. Absence of military cooperation among the Central Asian states has the potential to generate misunderstandings and, consequently, rivalries. Kazakhstan is the most developed and the largest republic
26 27

Tsygankov, Projecting Confidence, Not Fear, op. cit., p. 680. Farangis Najibullah, Kyrgyzstan Calls on Russia to Stem Tide of Racial Attacks, Eurasianet, 22 April 2008, www.eurasianet.org 28 Russia-Kazakhstan: Capital Obliterates Borders, Russia and the Muslim World, vol. 31, no.1, 2004, p. 30.

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in Central Asia. It has leanings towards Russia as well as the West. Uzbekistan projects itself as a big brother to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and has been quite aggressive in its policies. Uzbekistans aggressive tendencies will create fear in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and suspicions in Kazakhstan. Moreover, these states are facing a number a number of problems which are trans-border in nature. They include terrorism, drug trafficking and water management issues. The Central Asian states blame each other for these problems. The Central Asian states security agreements with external powers other than Russia create a security dilemma. On the other hand, using the Russian security umbrella and deployment of Russian troops in Central Asia will always be cost effective compared to security arrangements with other external powers. Their internal rivalries and a security arrangement of any one of them with an external power like the US will induce the other states to seek Russias support. In short, internal rivalries among the Central Asian states and their economic interdependence with Russia will be a deciding factor in Russias policy towards Central Asia. Limited space for Russia in the West In the fourth decade of the 19th century, the export of Russian fabrics to the North American market was reduced and, in the sixth decade, British and German fabrics dominated the American market. Also, Russia had to bear losses in its metals exports due to tough competition with Britain and Sweden. To compensate for these losses, Russia required new markets for its exports. Russian decision-makers focused on Central Asia as an alternative market for Russian products and planned to colonize it.29 Historically, Russias expansion towards the west had faced tough resistance. Russia could not dominate Sweden and Poland because they matched Russian prowess in military technology, like gunpowder. In the contemporary era also, Russias influence has waned in Eastern Europe, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union and expansion of EU and NATO in this region. Another manifestation of Russias declining clout in Eastern Europe is the US plans to install a missile defence shield in Poland. NATO, encircling Russia, has been reluctant to acknowledge Russias interests in the region.30
29

Devandra Koshak, Soviet Wasti Asia: Mazi ur Haal [Soviet Central Asia: Past and Present] (Moscow: Progressive Publishers, 1976), p.41.

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In Central Asia, Czarist Russia expanded its empire in the environment in which Russo-British rivalry was at its peak. Therefore, Russia adopted a pragmatic policy. With the lessening of the intensity of Russo-British rivalry, Czarist Russia became more vigorous in pursuing its interests in Central Asia. Today, Russia is working on the same lines. In an atmosphere of geopolitical confrontation with the US and the US presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia, Russia has not become directly involved in Central Asian politics. It avoided taking any action in Kyrgyzstan when the pro-Russian government of Askar Akayev was toppled in 2005. During the uprising against the government of Kurmanbek Bakiyev in 2010, Russia remained neutral vis--vis Kyrgyzstans internal affairs. Contemporary Russian policy can be understood in terms of peredyshka. It refers to a temporary accommodation of an enemy in order to get a breathing space. Also, Russias relative geographic isolation and self-sufficiency makes its policy of appeasement less dangerous than it might be for other powers.31 Russias low or defensive postures should not be taken as its minimized role in Central Asia. The Soviet Union under Leonid Brezhnev (1964-1982) was more powerful as compared to Stalins rule (1922-1953). But as Russian power increased, it also had to deal with new internal developments and foreign obligations that made things more difficult. 32 Todays Russia appears to have learnt lessons from past mistakes. It is quite reluctant to take any burden of foreign involvement. For instance, in 2001, Russia did not try to renew the lease of a former Soviet Union base whose lease was going to expire in 2004. It was not that Russia did not have the financial capacity, especially in the context that Vietnam owed 17 billon dollars to Russia in debt, but because it wanted to concentrate on its internal economic and political stability.

30

The West knows that an unstable Russia can be a danger. Marginalization of Russia will be counterproductive as it will make it more aggressive. Therefore, the West is also trying to engage Russia through different partnership mechanisms, like EU-Russia summit meetings, the Russia-NATO Council, and NATO PfP programme membership, without fully accepting Russia as a member of its community. Russia, itself, is not much eager to join such groupings because of the apprehension that they will erode its capacity to act independently. 31 Jack Synder, op. cit., p. 149. 32 Paul Kennedy, op. cit., p. 531.

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Another example is that of the closure of a Soviet-era listening post in Cuba in January 2002. 33 It sought to pay attention to regional affairs and investment in Central Asian economies. The same line of argument explains Russian control of air bases and space stations in Central Asia. It is investing in hydroelectric projects in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan whose main resource is water. Russian energy giant Gazprom has invested billion of dollars in Central Asian oil and gas fields. Thus, Russia has diverted its resources from distant areas to its Near Abroad for more influence which has helped Russia to maintain its supremacy in the region. It is likely that after the withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan and Central Asia, Russia will push forward with increasing its presence in the region. Conclusion Russia, as a major neighbouring power, will have a special role to play in Central Asias economic and political development as well as in the internal and external security of the Central Asian states. Russias geographical proximity, its military and economic clout, Russia-Central Asia economic interdependence and mutual rivalries among the Central Asian states make Russia indispensable for Central Asia. If the policy statements from the Russian leadership and the primacy of economic interactions, especially at the regional level, are anything to go by, the extent of Russias involvement in Central Asia will depend on the health of its economy in the future.

33

Richard Sakwa, Putin: Russias Choice (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 218.