Buncefield Command and Control Lessons Learned

www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk

UKs response to the Buncefield Incident The BSTG Report

3 - LASTFIRE Meeting 29/10/2009 - MRP

BSTG - Buncefield Standards Task Group

Formed from representatives from the Control Of Major Accident And Hazards (COMAH) Competent Authority and Industry Objective : to translate the lessons from the MIIB into effective and practical risk management
STEERING GROUP FOCUS GROUP

WORKING GROUP 1 Project Co-ordination

WORKING GROUP 2 Application/Scope

WORKING GROUP 3 Management of Operations

WORKING GROUP 4 Design & Maintenance Plant & Equipment

WORKING GROUP 5 Design & Maintenance Control & Safety Systems

WORKING GROUP 6 Emergency Response Arrangements

BSTG Buncefield Standards Task Group

Ran in parallel to the MIIB investigation Finished with publication in July 2007 of the BSTG final report. Final report consisted of four parts:
Part 1 : Actions required of Operations including timescales Part 2 : Detailed Guidance produced by the BSTG Part 3 : Work in progress Part 4 : Comparisons with MIIB Recommendations on the Design and Operation of Fuel Storage sites

www.tsoshop.co.uk

Incident Commander (White surcoat) consulting industry expert and bronze commanders.

First decision! Extinguish or burn out!

Hertfordshire Constabulary Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service Beds & Herts Ambulance & Paramedic Service Hertfordshire County Council The District and Borough Councils of Hertfordshire Hertfordshires National Health Services Voluntary Agencies Environment Agency

Multi Agency Involvement

Utility & Transport companies

This presentation concentrates on fire aspects but many multi-agency lessons also learned

Main Command and Control Issues:

Access control Control of Personnel Payment for resources Staging Areas Equipment deployment Foam Logistics Continuity Availability Responder rotation Run off control Back up resources Strategic capability Tank fire training

Some from report, some personal opinion

Recommendation Systems and Protocols to enable national deployment and extended working of fire resources need to be implemented and tested between FRSNCC and others. All potential responders should adhere to accepted protocols and not mobilise until properly ordered to do so.

Other brigades mobilised without request Some turned up from overseas to help Industrial responders mobilised without request Good intentions but not easy to manage

Recommendation All local authority FRSs must work to the current edition of the fire Service Manual on incident command. Other fire responders should be aware of the incident command system and be able to integrate their working practices in order to ensure a safe system of work.

i.e.Industrial!

Comment made by On Scene Commander: Those industrial firefighters who had been with brigades knew the system

In the early stages there was little access management and anyone who wanted to turn up could. (HFRS Officer) Recommendation Structured inner cordon procedures must be implemented and maintained at major incidents.

Recommendation A national system needs to be established to maintain an accurate record of all fire responders at the scene that will enable a rapid head count if required.

During the incident finance staff, I think, could have assisted with some of the queries relating to ordering and paying for goods and services this would have released uniformed officers to do what they do best. HFRS Service Accountant

Who is going to pay?

Decision to build temporary road was left late into the night. This decision should have been made earlier in the day. Could the army or local authorities not have done this instead of fire crews shovelling type 1? HFRS crew. Recommendation Local resilience forums should develop a single coordinated centre for the acquisition and distribution of all generic resources for all agencies.

The UK have developed Civil Resilience enhancement under the New Dimensions Programme

Incident Response Unit (IRU) and Support Modules carrying equipment for the Mass Decontamination of the public.

A High Volume Pumping (HVP) module unloaded to ground level.

Buncefield the first deployment of New Dimensions on a National scale

Recommendation A team of HVP national operational and tactical advisors should be trained and equipped to be deployed anywhere in the U.K.. Consideration should also be given to extending this to all National New Dimensions resources.

Deployment of High Volume Pumps

Hose Logistics

Hose Ramps

Recommendation The New Dimension programme needs to consider the provision and supply of large capacity hose ramps.

London Lighting Unit

Recommendation All equipment should be clearly labelled with the fuel type, quantities, restart procedures etc.

Foam supply logistics and continuity A major problem

The large foam monitors required huge amounts of foam and water before they could be used. Not many people appreciated this and they also didnt understand the enormity of the task to supply them and the time it takes to get the right equipment in place. (HFRS Officer)

Specialist foam equipment and training of relief crews on the job was a little fraught. (HFRS Officer)

Foam inventory control and coordination: our opinion here is based on the fact that there were too many points of contact on foam needs and requirements from the fireground, especially during the early stages of the incident.

getting the foam to the fireground was problematic enough but getting foam concentrate from a 25 litre container into a 1,000 litre container would take almost an hour: clearly the small containers were not useful at all. (HFRS officer)

tankers turned up with little or no means to get the foam from it to another vehicle or branch. Much innovation was needed by fireground personnel to enable foam to be collected from these vehicles and delivered into the tankers that delivered the foam to the branches via inline inductors. (HFRS officer)

Foam marshalling was a difficult and strenuous operation.

Recommendation Consideration needs to be given to the standardisation of foam couplings or the provision of adaptors between industry and local authority FRSs.

Water run off control

Bund wall retaining firewater run off

Run off adjacent to site

Should be considered as part of Emergency Planning

Response capability for other incidents?

Recommendation Local and national assessments of the likelihood of further incidents should be undertaken prior to the release of FRS resources under national mutual aid.

Responder rotation/flexibility
Recommendation Future upgrades to command and control systems should provide the flexibility required to be able to mix and match crews and appliances. I know it was very difficult logistically, but during that week we took home three different appliances. (HFRS crew) Recommendation Consideration should be given to providing advance warning of redeployments for an extended period to all crews but particularly retained units.

Response to similar incidents in the future?

Recommendation FRSs should establish mutual aid arrangements with industry fire brigades.

Other Issues: Site knowledge essential Emergency Plans Operator and Responder actions

Vital to coordinate Operator and Responder actions

Minimise inventory/Shut off source

Fight the fire!

Ultimately many of the lessons learned are the same as from other incidents

Caribbean Petroleum Corp San Juan Friday 23rd October 2009

Summary of incident Initial Reports

Location: San Juan, Puerto Rico Blast equivalent to 2.8 magnitude quake Evacuations: capital and 4 towns, 1500 people No fatalities 2 injuries nearby army base 130 fire fighters Flames reported to be 30m (100ft) above depot Aviation authority diverted planes Estimated initial cost to island: $6.4 million

Environmental Concerns Smoke and Water Quality!

Overall personal opinion?

Of course, with the benefit of hindsight, things could have been done differently But! It was a magnificent effort The tremendous logistical strength and incident management expertise of the Local Authority Fire Brigade under the command of their CFO combined with the expertise and specialist equipment from industry meant that an effective fire attack could be mounted and sustained.

Cooperation is the way forward.

It has been done elsewhere! Sweden Japan Amsterdam area Rotterdam Europoort

Its important to learn from each other