Democratic Compliance with

Decisions of the International

Court of Justice
By Catherine Bratic*
* Catherine Bratic is a hrst-vear law student at Columbia Law School. She
graduated in Mav 2010 from Rice Universitv, where she mafored in political
science and French studies. She plans to practice law in multiple international
furisdictions, focusing on the European and American relationship and its
implications for both governmental and private sector actors.
Volume IV Autumn 2010
Issue 1
!"#$%&'(
Although traditional compliance theorv predicts
higher rates of compliance with international law in
democracies, studies of compliance with decisions of
the International Court of Justice does not uphold such
a correlation. However, the two areas of studv can be
reconciled bv considering how a democratic leaders
political posturing in the lead-up to the ICJs ruling
can polari:e or tame a domestic electorate, greatlv
inuencing a countrvs abilitv to offer concessions
required to complv with the hnal decision. While leaders
who engage with and encourage a divisive political
atmosphere appear unable to backtrack from this
politici:ation without risking an electoral backlash, it
is also observed that leaders who seem willing to offer
concessions toward dispute resolution can prime their
electorates to accept a third-partv resolution of a dispute.
2
WULR Jol JI, Issue I Autumn 2010
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................2
I: HISTORY OF THE ICJ AND COMPLIANCE WITH ITS JUDGMENTS...................4
II: CONTRIBUTIONS OF TRADITIONAL COMPLIANCE RESEARCH............6
III: COMPLIANCE SPECIFIC TO THE ICJ................................................11
IV: ARGUMENT..................................................................................13
V: HYPOTHESES.................................................................................14
VI: DESIGN.......................................................................................15
VII: DATA.........................................................................................16
VIII: ABBREVIATED CASE STUDIES...................................................20
CONCLUSION.........................................................................31
INTRODUCTION
Trends oI compliance with the rulings oI the International
Court oI Justice, the United Nations court with jurisdiction to resolve
disputes among member states, pose a perplexing subject oI study.
Although compliance patterns Ior this world court conIorm in many
ways to traditional theories about state compliance with international
law, compliance with the International Court oI Justice (ICJ) has
also bucked trends on some issues, conIounding researchers and
escaping a complete explanation. The gaps in comprehension that
exist so Iar indicate that the current understanding oI why states
choose to comply with or deIy ICJ judgments is limited.
One area that is particularly puzzling in current research is
the role oI democracy in infuencing compliance levels. Although
traditional compliance research has consistently shown that
democratic states are more likely to comply with international law,
ICJ compliance histories have not refected this correlation. This
3
7&'()%
paper puts Iorward a theory that could explain why democracies
do not necessarily exhibit higher compliance levels than non-
democracies. In short, the unique domestic pressures which
democratic leaders are subject to under electoral patterns change
the considerations that leaders make when deciding whether or not
to comply with an ICJ judgment. A leader`s political posturing in
either a hostile or Iavorable direction prior to the decision oI a case
may irrevocably commit a leader to action beIore the fnal judgment
is even issued.
Traditional theories oI compliance with international law
do not necessarily extend themselves to ICJ compliance issues.
Other studies have Iound democracies to be more likely to comply
with international law than autocracies are. In the case oI the ICJ,
democratic predictors do not apply; a democratic regime does not
predict higher levels oI compliance with ICJ rulings. However,
other fndings oI traditional compliance theory can still be useIul as
explanatory Iactors here. Due to the Iact that the relationship between
these two felds is complex, it is important to frst understand the
unique questions posed over ICJ compliance. Once laid out, this
paper will consider the ways in which traditional compliance theory
can contribute to the debate, and in what ways its fndings must
be disregarded in o'rder to examine other criteria that impact ICJ
compliance levels. It is Iound, in Iact, that basic theory oI compliance
law continues to be able to oIIer much insight to behavior in response
to ICJ judgments. Although initial democratic determinants do not
hold true in this case, the behavior oI democratic leaders that weigh
domestic electoral concerns when acting internationally oIIers an
explanation oI why the behavior oI democratic states is not so easily
predictable.
Two hypotheses about disparate behavior oI democratic
leaders will be examined. First, there are those democratic leaders
who seek to engage with an electorate whose heated emotions have
led them to solidly espouse a radicalized view oI the debate. In a
second category are those democratic leaders who try to distance
themselves Irom any such domestic groups by presenting and
Iostering a Iavorable view oI the Court that lends itselI to the
4
WULR Jol JI, Issue I Autumn 2010
oIIering oI Iuture concessions that compliance might require. In this
paper, it is hypothesized and Iound to be the case that leaders
who fnd themselves in the Iormer situation are more likely to deIy
the Court`s judgments, while leaders in the latter cases comply more
oIten, more Iully, and more eagerly.
Also encountered throughout this paper`s research was an
unanticipated third set oI cases, which are marked by the absence
oI a polarized electorate, and one in which a leader`s lack oI public
political rhetoric imply a tacit acceptance oI the Court`s activity.
Taken together, these three fndings allow reintegration oI ICJ
compliance theory with traditional knowledge oI state compliance,
and have the potential to inIorm measures intended to increase
compliance with international law.
PART I: HISTORY OF THE ICJ AND COMPLIANCE WITH ITS JUDGMENTS
The International Court oI Justice at The Hague has
developed an exceptional track record since its inception in 1945.
The Court, which is charged with settling legal disputes between
states and oIIering advisory opinions on legal matters, has boasted
high levels oI compliance with its judgments, despite the contentious
nature oI its subject matter. All United Nations member states are
automatically under the jurisdiction oI the Court due to stipulations
in the treaties they must sign to join the United Nations. Once party,
states may call upon the Court to resolve disputes with other states
through a number oI paths.
There are three procedural paths by which an issue or case
may be brought to the ICJ. Under the frst procedural path, two states
willingly present themselves beIore the Court, seeking resolution
oI a confict. This frst approach is typically considered to be most
highly associated with compliance, as states voluntarily accept the
Court`s jurisdiction. The second procedure through which cases
can be put beIore the ICJ is clausal stipulation oI compulsory ICJ
jurisdiction in international treaties. Although the inclusion oI such
clauses is becoming less common as it is replaced by civil arbitration
clauses that Iavor private civilian Iorums rather than governmental
5
Bratic
ones, such cases still provide regular material Ior the ICJ. Lastly,
the ICJ can be called upon by states to provide advisory opinions
on legal issues. Although compliance with these opinions is not
compulsory, their acceptance refects the states` view oI the wisdom
and impartiality oI the Court.
As is inevitable in all contentious issues, states may
Irequently fnd themselves subject to ICJ decisions with which they
disagree or which are in some way viewed as unIavorable to the
state. Historically, states receiving such judgments Irom the ICJ
have still exhibited relatively high compliance levels, suggesting the
existence oI a more complex calculation on the part oI the state than
simply immediate selI-interest.
EnIorcement oI ICJ judgments is notably diIfcult. The
United States withdrew Irom the ICJ`s compulsory jurisdiction
in 1987. Rejection oI the Court`s authority by such a major
world power has weakened the Court`s reputation and infuence.
1

Furthermore, the Court lacks robust, independent monitoring and
enIorcement mechanisms to reinIorce its judgments, relying instead
on the arguably weak and political United Nations Security Council
Ior such ends. In cases oI binding judgments, Iailure to comply can
result in reprimands and sanctions doled out by the UN Security
Council. However, the Council is a non-neutral body, and one
member`s veto can prevent enIorcement actions Irom proceeding.
The reality is that most states have no reason to Iear that they will be
subject to sanctions iI they Iail to comply immediately and Iully with
an ICJ decision; the Council has not made it a practice to monitor
compliance in the post-adjudication phase, much less to go about
determining culpability and penalties.
Given this background, it is surprising that the Court has
enjoyed very high compliance levels in response to its judgments
and even its non-binding advisory opinions. Most estimates place
compliance levels with binding rulings above eighty percent.
2
Such
a fgure should be unexpected, given that states Iace no negative
(namely, punitive) incentives to abide by decisions.
1 Colter Paulson, Compliance with Final Judgments of the International Court of Justice Since
1987, 98 Am. J. Int`l L. 434-461 (2004).
2 Contanze Shulte, Compliance with Decisions of the International Court of Justice (2004).
6
WULR Jol JI, Issue I Autumn 2010
ICJ compliance poses two particular and complementary
dilemmas. The frst is the question oI why states ever comply
with ICJ judgments, considering the almost complete absence oI
enIorcement mechanisms. The second question posed, which acts as
the impetus Ior this paper`s research, is that oI why states ever deIy
ICJ judgments, given that they have agreed in advance to be subject
to the Court`s jurisdiction. Why would a state willingly reIer a case
to the ICJ, only to deIy the decision once it is reached? Though it is
around this second question that this paper is centered, it cannot be
considered in absence oI its stated counterpart.
PART II: CONTRIBUTIONS OF TRADITIONAL COMPLIANCE RESEARCH
Traditional compliance theory has Iocused on a limited
number oI reasons why states might be motivated to comply with
international law. These explanations can be applied to both oI the
previous questions: why states comply with judgments and why
they deIy them. When the conditions oI compliance theory motives
are met, states are presumed to have motives to comply, and when
the conditions are not met, states are presumed to have motivation
to deIect. Traditional compliance theory is useIul to frst consider
here because it has proposed and presented consistent fndings that
oIIer solid explanations oI when states comply with international
law. Many oI these explanations also apply to the ICJ. However, in
the realm oI correlations between democratic Iorms oI governance
and compliance, there is a sharp divergence. The examination oI
traditional compliance theory and the extent to which it can be
applied to the ICJ oIIer suggestions Ior how the democratic paradox
oI compliance can be understood.
Markus Burgstaller, a scholar oI international law and a legal
adviser to Austria, advances three reasons that might drive states to
obey international law. Perhaps the most basic reason is out oI Iear
oI punishment.
3
II defant behavior is subject to sanctions whose
costs would exceed the immediate benefts oI deIecting Irom an
agreement or fouting an international ruling, the state may still be
3Markus Burgstaller, Amenities and Pitfalls of a Reputational Theorv of Compliance with
International Law, 76 Nordic J. Int`l L. 39-71 (2007).
7
7&'()%
refecting its own selI-interest when it complies. However, this is not
a likely motivation in the case oI the ICJ, as shown by the Iact that
mechanisms Ior enIorcing its judgments are virtually nonexistent.
Burgstaller`s second rationale Ior obedience is that a state
may hold the belieI that compliance is in its best interest. Though
this evaluation has many Iacets, it is essentially based around the
realist perspective that states are rarely induced to behave in ways
that do not correlate with their own best interests and those oI
the most powerIul states. ProIessor George Downs oI New York
University; ProIessor David Rocke oI the University oI CaliIornia
Davis; and Peter Barsoom, a PhD student at Princeton University,
take an extreme view oI this theory, suggesting that states only enter
into shallow agreements with which they already have motivation to
comply.
4
While this theory might explain why a state with a strong
case would proceed to the ICJ, it is certainly not a compelling
explanation oI compliance with all cases that are Iound beIore the
ICJ. AIter all, by nature, every case must have a winner and a loser,
so not all states can consistently receive Iavorable judgments. The
very Iact that there are 'losers in ICJ rulings proves Downs, Rocke,
and Barsoom`s assertions do not provide a complete explanation oI
the behavior observed.
Another variation, deeply rooted in the theory that states
always act in their own rational interest, revolves around game theory.
Although states may have material incentives to deIect Irom their
obligations under international law, they may view that it is in the
overall best interest oI themselves and the international community
as a whole iI everyone abides by their commitments, even when the
immediate eIIects oI this compliance are negative. Because the UN
is the basis Ior the ICJ, states have a reasonable expectation that they
will oIten interact with the international community aIter the case
has concluded. This demonstrates what James Fearon, a political
science proIessor at StanIord, would call a 'large shadow oI the
Iuture.
5
The more likely a state`s Iuture interaction in a community
4 George W. Downs, David M. Rocke & Peter N Barsoom, Is the Good News About Compliance
Good News About Cooperation? 50 Int`l Org. 379-406 (1996).
5 James D. Fearon, Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation, 52 Int`l Org. 269-
305 (1998).
8
WULR Jol JI, Issue I Autumn 2010
is, the greater the incentive that the state has to maintain a good
standing in that organization. Since the enIorcement mechanisms
oI international law are horizontal rather than vertical that is
to say that punishments are doled out by other states more oIten
than by supranational organizations reputational concerns are oI
increased salience. Andrew Guzman, a proIessor at the University oI
CaliIornia Berkeley School oI Law Iully develops a theory oI how
reputational concerns impact the decision to abide by international
commitments, concluding: 'II a country violates international law,
other states may reIuse to enter into Iuture agreements, demand
greater concessions when entering into such agreements, or lose
Iaith in the strength oI existing agreements.
6

Reputational concerns are not a suIfcient motivating Iactor
in all decisions, however, as evidenced by occasional deIections.
Burgstaller fnds that these incentives only act at the margins oI the
decision to deIect or not. When stakes are higher and states have
signifcant inducements to deIect based on their own rational and
material selI-interest, reputational concerns are simply not enough.
But reputational concerns are always a Iactor to some degree. In a
study oI the US`s historical decision-making processes, ProIessor
Michael ScharI oI Case Western Reserve University School oI Law fnds
a distinct reliance on international law as real legal doctrine, in a
partial rejection oI realism. The United States has been historically
defant toward the ICJ, so its motivations are particularly relevant.
ScharI recounts how even in cases that terminated in noncompliance,
reciprocity and reputational costs oI non-compliance were given
great consideration.
7
The case may be then, as Guzman believes,
that although reputational concerns are constantly in play, the
stakes oI certain disputes may be too high to be aIIected by these
considerations.
8
These high-stakes issues are the ones which most interest
the study oI compliance with ICJ judgments. Low-stake and low-
salience issues have no compelling reason to incite deIection. (As
6 Andrew Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theorv of International Law, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1823-
1887 (2002).
7 Michael SharI, International Law in Crisis. A Qualitative Empirical Contribution to the
Compliance Debate, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 45-97 (2009).
8 Guzman, 14,&' note 6.
9
7&'()%
illustrated by this very research, there are cases where the low
domestic investment in the dispute made no compelling demands
upon leaders to engage in any way other than the tacit expression oI
complicity.) Researchers oI the Court fnd themselves examining,
over and over, the cases in which the issue was just too important
Ior a country to give in and comply with an unIavorable ICJ ruling.
Lastly, Burgstaller says states may Iully ignore a calculation
oI whether deIection would serve their interests because the norm
oI conIorming to international law has become internalized within
the state. When Iear oI sanctions or a damaged reputation are not
enough to motivate compliance, states may nonetheless choose to
comply with a ruling because the norms oI international law have
been accepted and incorporated into the national psyche.
International cooperation scholar Judith Kelley`s analysis oI
states` responses to the US demand Ior a nonsurrender agreement
attached to the International Criminal Court provides prooI that the
jurisdiction oI international courts has been embraced as a norm
in the international community.
9
In devising the implementation
oI this agreement, the US approached other countries, pressuring
them to sign an agreement to reIrain Irom surrendering American
citizens to international courts without US consent. The debates
within each country approached by the US over whether or not
to sign are interesting because they were based almost entirely
on principles; the nonsurrender agreement was unlikely to be
enIorceable, so states would not hurt the Court`s power by signing
on. However, the vast majority oI states reIused, valuing the norm
oI international justice above their immediate selI-interests oI
avoiding punishment Irom the US. Kelley shows that states valued
adherence to commitments to the international court Ior their own
sake, absent oI any tangible benefts. This value, given to adherence
itselI, conIorms perIectly with the traditional defnition oI a norm.

10 11
While this is unquestionably a valid proposition that is likely
9 Judith Kelley, Who Keeps International Commitments and Whv? The International Criminal
Court and Bilateral Nonsurrender Agreements, 101 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 573589 (2007).
10 Robert Axelrod, Robert Axelrod, An Evolutionarv Approach to Norms, 80 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 10951111
(1986).
11 Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikking, Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikking, International Norm Dvnamics and Political Change,
52 Int`l Org. 887-917 (1998).
10
WULR Jol JI, Issue I Autumn 2010
a Iactor in many ICJ compliance cases particularly the ones oI
states who routinely and unhesitatingly comply with ICJ judgments
it Iails to explain the cases oI deIection, where clearly norms are
not internalized enough to ensure compliance. The cases oI defance
that are examined are ones in which norms iI they even exist in
the states were clearly overruled by other considerations.
More generally, the Iundamental norm that governs states`
actions in international law is pacta sunt severanda, meaning that
commitments must be Iulflled. International legal scholars Antonia
Chayes and Abram Chayes fnd that states value policy continuity
above all as the most eIfcient strategy.
12
Any treaty that has been
negotiated between states inherently represents each state`s national
interests, as they are Iormed Iurther in the negotiating process.
Demonstrating continuity with these interests is useIul both
domestically in order to present an unwavering policy record
as well as internationally, as states Ieel obligated to maintain
good standing in international organizations by upholding their
agreements.
Assuming that these three infuences are constant within a
system, there is still an observable diIIerence in compliance rates
between democratic and non-democratic countries. Clearly there is
something unique about a democratic state. These regimes are much
more likely to cooperate with international law, and this correlation
between cooperation and democratic governance has been Iound
time and time again.
13
,
14
,
15
Scholars have identifed a handIul oI
explanations Ior this correlation, namely the importance oI rule oI
law, accountability, and domestic pressures within democracies.
International legal scholar Brett Ashley Leeds has Iound that
democracies are able to make more credible commitments in
negotiation processes because they are held accountable by domestic
interests that oppose any attempt to renege on past commitments.
16

12 Abram Chayes & Antonia Chayes, Abram Chayes & Antonia Chayes, 8.*+$#,-)'.%", 47 Int. Org. 175-205 (1993).
13 James D. Morrow, James D. Morrow, When Do States Follow the Laws of War?, 101 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 559589
(2007).
14 Todd L. Allee & Paul K Huth, Todd L. Allee & Paul K Huth, Legitimi:ing Dispute Settlement. International Legal Rulings
as Domestic Political Cover, 100 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 219-234 (2006).
15 Brett Ashley Leeds, Brett Ashley Leeds, Alliance Reliabilitv in Times of War. Explaining State Decisions to
Jiolate Treaties, 57 Int`l Org. 801-827 (2003).
16 Id.
11
Bratic
Similarly, American political scholar James D. Morrow has
Iound that domestic interests can also exert considerable political
pressure on leaders to comply with international norms. Because
oI their political structure, democracies tend to have a greater
respect Ior the rule oI law,
17
and this domestically-established norm
makes it politically costly Ior a leader to openly deIy international
agreements.
18
International legal scholars Todd Allee and Paul Huth
Iound this eIIect to oIten be overwhelming Ior a democratic leader,
and suggested that there are cases in which a democratic leader
would like to oIIer concessions but is constrained by the public`s
investment in the issue. In order to shelter oneselI Irom domestic
political backlash, a democratic leader may instead choose to oIIer
the case up to an international court.
19
Through their research, Leeds,
Morrow, Allee and Huth oIIer a very clear picture oI the diIIerent
situations that democratic leaders Iace in the decision to comply.
Yet like a Iew oI the other fndings oI general compliance theory,
this democratic conclusion cannot be easily extended to compliance
with ICJ rulings.
PART III: COMPLIANCE SPECIFIC TO THE ICJ
AIter being neglected by academics Ior many years,
the study oI compliance with international court judgments has
recently begun to receive increased attention. Previous studies
have been able to identiIy certain conditions that make compliance
more likely. However, these studies have Iocused primarily on the
conditions oI the judgment rather than the conditions oI the state.
For example, one study by Colter Paulson, who has studied the ICJ
extensively, showed that land boundaries (as opposed to maritime
boundaries), questions oI political strategy, and a history oI armed
confict predict lower levels oI compliance.
20
Other research shows
that joint reIerrals oI cases by both parties are more likely to be
17 Kelley, Kelley, supra note 9.
18 Morrow, Morrow, supra note 13.
19 Allee & Huth, Allee & Huth, supra note 14.
20 Paulson, Paulson, supra note 1.
12
WULR Jol JI, Issue I Autumn 2010
complied with than iI one state drags another beIore the Court.
21 22

While the procedural path that a case takes to the ICJ docket has little
eIIect on compliance levels,
23 24
selI-removal Irom the process once it
has begun an outright reIusal to participate in the proceedings
is another early predictor oI defance.
25
While research specifc to the ICJ has delved more specifcally
into the intricacies oI compliance particular to the Court, it has not
oIIered a lot oI solid conclusions. Certainly none oI the fndings
that have emerged Irom this feld are universally applicable. More
importantly, none oI these fndings have even attempted to answer
the question oI why the established theory oI higher levels oI
democratic compliance cannot be extended to the ICJ.
Constanze Schulte, a scholar oI the ICJ, has Iound that
democratic states are no more likely to be receptive to unIavorable
ICJ judgments.
26
These fndings are Iurther supported by the work
oI Sarah McLaughlin Mitchell and Paul Hensel, two scholars
oI international cooperation.
27
The lack oI correlations Iound by
Schulte and Mitchell and Hensel occur despite the Iact that studies
oI compliance in general have Iound the type oI government to
greatly infuence responses to legal rulings,
28
and serve an important
reminder oI the way that ICJ judgment compliance records diIIer
Irom compliance records oI treaties and regulations.
UnIortunately, the current analyses oI domestic conditions
Iail to consider why a single state may comply with one ICJ judgment
but not another, although its democratic status remains unchanged.
Because a constant, democratic Iorm oI government is unable to
explain this variation, other shiIting domestic considerations must be
examined, and the type oI governance changes to a control variable.
21 Schulte, Schulte, 14,&'*note 2.
22 SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, 1920-2005: VOLUME I:
THE COURT AND THE UNITED NATIONS (Martinus NijhoII Publishers 2006) (2006).
23 Paulson, supra note 1. Paulson, supra note 1.
24 Aloysius Llamzon, Aloysius Llamzon, Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the International
Court of Justice,18 Eur. J. Int`l. L. 815-853 (2008).
25 Schulte, Schulte, 14,&'*note 2.
26 Schulte, Schulte, 14,&'*note 2.
27 Sarah Mclaughlin Mitchell & Paul R. Hensel, Sarah Mclaughlin Mitchell & Paul R. Hensel, International Institutions and Compliance with
Agreement, 51 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 721737 (2007).
28 Xinyuan Dai, Xinyuan Dai, The Conditional Nature of Democratic Compliance, 50 J. Conf. Resol. 1-24
(2006).
13
7&'()%
Examining only the cases oI democracies, where no predicting
eIIect has been observed, the cases must be separated to fnd what
Iactors do indeed distinguish the democratic leaders who choose to
comply Irom the democratic leaders who do not choose to comply.
States accepting the ICJ`s jurisdiction do not have Iull
inIormation about how their Iuture interests will aIIect their ability
or desire to comply, because their commitment is an agreement to
be bound by any range oI judgments that might occur at unspecifed
times and against unspecifed parties. In this sense, compliance with
the rule oI the ICJ demands a lot Irom states. These states must
agree to Iully comply with any judgment the Court will make in the
Iuture, regardless oI which country hales them beIore the Court or
what judgment the Court will make. Without the Iull knowledge oI
the circumstances they will Iace, states must make a leap oI Iaith in
accepting the ICJ`s jurisdiction.
PART IV: ARGUMENT
In the selected cases oI judgments which were unIavorable
to the party not exhibiting Iull compliance, states clearly received a
judgment that they were not hoping Ior. In cases oI noncompliance,
the threat oI international punishment and reputational concerns
were clearly not enough to induce compliance. Particularly in
democracies, political leaders must think about domestic support
Ior all oI their actions. II leaders lose that domestic support, they
risk losing political power and their oIfces. Under what conditions,
then, will democratic leaders have domestic incentives to comply
with an unIavorable judgment?
According to international legal scholar James Fearon, a
state`s prior posturing can exert one oI the greatest infuences on
behavior.
29
Fearon fnds that backing down Irom prior rhetoric is
surprisingly costly. In addition to the standard price that leaders
must pay Ior concession on the issue itselI, they also Iace additional
costs: physical costs Ior any backtracking that must occur, such as
the demilitarization oI areas and the restoration oI damaged bilateral
29 James D. Fearon, James D. Fearon, Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,
88 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 577592 (1994).
14
WULR Jol JI, Issue I Autumn 2010
relations, and audience costs Ior engaging the national honor only to
abandon it. When leaders raise an issue to national consciousness,
clearly positioning the state in one direction or another, they give
their opponents the chance to bemoan the loss oI international Iace
when they retreat Irom this position.
PART V: HYPOTHESES
This paper expects to fnd that, Ior leaders who have raised
the particular dispute to the level oI the national consciousness,
retreating Irom the strong positions initially put Iorth in order to
oIIer required concessions may be too costly to consider.
The attitude oI a state`s leader can have impressive eIIects
on a country`s psyche as determined by the powerIul electorate.
Leaders particularly democratic ones can risk becoming so
buried in political rhetoric that they are unable to backtrack Irom
a combative stance in order to oIIer the concessions necessary Ior
compliance.
Hvpothesis 1 (H1). States whose leaders have
used extreme political rhetoric to tie their political
reputations to the outcome of the dispute will be
less likelv to offer compliance to ICJ demands for
concessions.
The degree oI political entrenchment can be measured by the
leader`s remarks, but also through material threats unrelated to the
Court itselI. II a leader has previously threatened military escalation
oI the confict or has otherwise expressed that the state is willing to
take any means necessary to deIend its position, the leader may be
said to be more politically entrenched in the confict. This eIIect is
ever the more increased iI the leader has expressed hesitance in the
ICJ`s discriminating abilities.
Leaders are oI course Iree to backtrack Irom combative or
divisive remarks. However, they may risk their electoral backing
when doing so, in an over-cooperation eIIect examined by political
15
7&'()%
scientist Michael Colaresi.
30
In Iact, dovish leaders who are more
willing to oIIer cooperation can be easily ousted by hawkish leaders
who will not make such concessions, and can take advantage oI a
'rally-round-the-fag eIIect to rouse support Ior both deIection and
political campaigns. Conversely, support Ior the ICJ may also prove
to be an intractable position.
Hvpothesis 2 (H2). States whose leaders publiclv
express favorable views of the ICJ prior to the Courts
fudgment will be more likelv to offer compliance.
Democratic states are known Ior their tendency to have a
greater regard Ior the rule oI law. As previous general compliance
studies have shown, norms make an important contribution to a
country`s domestic views. II a leader has played up respect Ior the
Court, publicly stating that the country in question holds the ICJ
in high esteem and is willing to comply with the ICJ`s inIormed
judgment in order to resolve a dispute, that leader may be both
refecting and enIorcing domestic norms in his or her state. Posturing
oI this sort is just as powerIul as the posturing oI politicization, and
leaders are likely to have an equally diIfcult time retreating Irom
such remarks while preserving their domestic standing.
One is then leIt with a variable that aims at the core oI
what the leader thinks oI the Court: is his or her attitude respectIul
or defant? Fortunately, the task at hand is not to determine the
leader`s true belieIs; rather, since this paper has hypothesized that
leaders posture themselves in such a way as to cater to a specifc
domestic audience, it is only the leader`s public remarks that must
be considered in this regard.
PART VI: DESIGN
There is no oIfcial compendium oI ICJ compliance data.
ThereIore, determining whether or not a state has complied with an
ICJ judgment is a diIfcult process.
31
ThankIully, researchers whose
30 Michael Colaresi, Michael Colaresi, When Doves Crv. International Rivalrv, Unreciprocated Cooperation, and
Leadership Turnover, 48 Am J. Pol. Sci. 555-570 (2004).
31 Schulte, Schulte, 14,&' note 2.
16
WULR Jol JI, Issue I Autumn 2010
work has preceded this paper have already analyzed individual
cases to make this determination. This paper does not seek to
impose any judgment over theirs, so it will combine and utilize both
Paulson and Schulte`s analyses oI historical data Ior determining
compliance. The research put Iorth in this paper will expand upon
these pronouncements by considering the diIIerence between the
cases oI compliance and defance already established.
The majority oI the data needed to make the distinctions
needed to test H1 and H2 can be gained Irom a leader`s public
remarks. Since one can assume that the leader does indeed have
a message to convey, the tone oI that leader should be readily
discernible. Rhetoric that is Iavorable to the Court expressing
confdence in its judiciousness and reiterating the state`s eagerness
to comply with the Court in order to receive a Iair resolution oI a
confict can be interpreted as preparing the electorate to accept
the Court`s legitimacy and oIIer any needed concessions. Through
the examination oI news reports, articles published around the time
oI the judgment, and public statements issued beIore and aIter the
Court`s ruling, this paper will veriIy whether cases oI compliance and
noncompliance diIIer according to the conditions oI its hypotheses.
PART VII: DATA
This paper has drawn Irom the cases and compliance
studies perIormed by Schultz in Compliance with Decisions
of the International Court of Justice, which include a Iull list oI
contentious cases that have come beIore the Court since it began
its work in 1946 and which examined substantive legal issues
and issued binding decisions. This paper determines that the only
applicable international procedures to consider are those cases which
demanded substantive compliance, and so eliminates cases which
asked instead only that parties continue negotiations. Finally, as the
hypotheses being considered relate only to the oIfcial responses
oI democratic states, the cases considered were Iurther reduced to
those in which the 'losing state was a democracy, as judged by data
Irom the Polity IV data set, which measures the type oI governance
17
7&'()%
since 1800 in all world nations.
32
The fnal set oI Iourteen cases is
shown in Table 1.
Case Date States involved
Rights oI Nationals oI the USA
in Morocco
1952 France (Morocco), USA
Ambatielos 1953 Greece, UK
Minquiers and Ecrehos 1953 France, UK
Sovereignty over Certain
Frontier Land
1959 Belgium, Netherlands
North Sea Continental ShelI 1969 Germany, Denmark, Netherlands
Fisheries Jurisdiction 1974 UK, Iceland, FRG
Delimitation oI the Maritime
Boundary in the GulI oI Maine
Area
1984 Canada, USA
Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against
Nicaragua
1991 Nicaragua, US
Land, Island, and Maritime
Frontier Dispute
1992 El Salvador, Honduras
MaritimeDelimitation
Greenland and Jan Mayen
1993 Denmark, Norway
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project 1997 Hungary, Slovakia
Kasikili/Sedudu Island 1999 Botswana, Namibia
LaGrand 2001 Germany, US
Arrest Warrant oI 11 April
2000
2002 Belgium, DRC
Table 1: Cases considered
In the majority oI the cases, the ICJ issued a ruling which
indicated a clear 'loser in the dispute, in which one state was required
to make concessions that were either unilateral or signifcantly
greater than those demanded oI the other state.
33
In a select Iew cases
(Rights oI Nationals oI the USA in Morocco, Delimitation oI the
Maritime Boundary in the GulI oI Maine Area, Denmark, weak),
32 Monty G. Marshall, Polity IV Project: Monty G. Marshall, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions,
18002002, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, COLLEGE PARK (2002), http://www.nd.edu/~mcoppedg/
crd/PolityIVUsersManualv2002.pdI.
33 The determination oI the 'losing state was made aIter reading the judgments issued directly The determination oI the 'losing state was made aIter reading the judgments issued directly
by the ICJ, which can be accessed at www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p13&p22. 22 April
2010.
18
WULR Jol JI, Issue I Autumn 2010
the judgment weighed heavily enough on both parties that Iull
and complete compliance could only be accomplished through the
cooperation oI the parties. In these cases, both sides are considered
to be 'losers in the dispute, noting iI one side was slightly more
disadvantaged by the ruling.
Actual compliance with the judgment was taken Irom
Schulte`s case descriptions. Past studies oI compliance show that a
country`s response is best viewed not as a dichotomous measure oI
total compliance or outright defance, but as a spectrum oI cooperative
behavior. However, such a measure is oI course not conducive to a
research endeavor such as the one at hand. As Paulson did in his
studies oI compliance, this paper includes a third option oI 'medium
compliance between 'high compliance and 'low compliance in
order to balance these two extremes. The highest valuation was
assigned to countries who immediately moved to comply Iully with
the judgment, and whose compliance was eventually Iully achieved.
The 'medium compliance level was assigned to countries that
publicly stated their acceptance oI the Court`s judgment, but whose
compliance was not Iully achieved in a timely manner, due to either
to problems oI implementation or internal hesitance on the state`s
part. Finally, the lowest compliance rating was assigned to countries
that explicitly rejected the validity oI the decision and/or made no
eIIorts to comply with its terms. The compliance assessments Ior
each oI the 'losing states are shown in Table 2.
Case Loser Compliance
level
Rights oI Nationals oI the USA in Morocco France (USA) High
Ambatielos UK High
Minquiers and Ecrehos France High
Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land Netherlands High
North Sea Continental ShelI Denmark,
Netherlands
High
Fisheries Jurisdiction Iceland Low
Delimitation oI the Maritime Boundary in the
GulI oI Maine Area
US, Canada High
19
7&'()%
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua
US Low
Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier Dispute El Salvador Medium
Maritime Delimitation Greenland and Jan
Mayen
Denmark
(Norway)
High
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Hungary Medium
Kasikili/Sedudu Island Namibia High
LaGrand US Medium
Arrest Warrant oI 11 April 2000 Belgium High
Table 2: Compliance by losing states
Finally, the leader`s responses through publicly issued
statements and other expressions oI the country`s opinion oI the
Court were collected and measured. Whenever possible, these data
were gathered through news reports that were published at the time oI
the dispute. This task was much more easily accomplished in recent
cases, as the role oI the international press has increased and been
Iacilitated by increased technological exchanges. When news reports
containing a leader`s remarks were not available, papers written on
the dispute and the Court`s decision in the years surrounding the
cases were reIerenced. This endeavor was limited in some respects
by language barriers; coverage in English-language press oIten
hinged on the publishing country`s interest in the countries involved
in the dispute, and research did not extend to any Ioreign-language
press. Contemporary reIerences to historical cases were avoided in
order to preserve the historical context as much as possible.
The country`s oIfcial response has been assessed as either
positive or negative in each case, Ior the purposes oI simplifcation
oI measures. However, additional notes have been included and
abbreviated case studies have also been produced in order to more
Iully communicate the variance and details oI the position espoused.
Case Compliance
level
Attitude oI leader
Rights oI Nationals oI the USA in
Morocco
High Support oI court
Ambatielos High Support oI court
20
WULR Jol JI, Issue I Autumn 2010
Minquiers and Ecrehos High Support oI court
Sovereignty over Certain Frontier
Land
High Support oI court
North Sea Continental ShelI High Support oI court
Fisheries Jurisdiction Low Rejection oI court`s
legitimacy
Delimitation oI the Maritime
Boundary in the GulI oI Maine Area
High Support oI court
Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and against Nicaragua
Low Hostile to all
International actions
Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier
Dispute
Medium Support oI court
Maritime Delimitation Greenland
and Jan Mayen
High Support oI court
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Medium Pandering, hostile to
resolution
Kasikili/Sedudu Island High Support oI court
LaGrand Medium IndiIIerence to
proceedings
Arrest Warrant oI 11 April 2000 High Support oI court
Table 3: Compliance and attitude oI leaders
PART VIII: ABBREVIATED CASE STUDIES
34
1. Rights oI Nationals oI the United States oI America in
Morocco: This case concerned itselI with the special privileges
claimed Ior American citizens in Morocco, which was still controlled
by France at the time, as part oI extended consular jurisdiction
established by the United States. Also at issue were certain economic
policies oI France that seemed to unIairly advantage French citizens
over American ones. The two countries had unsuccessIully attempted
to negotiate a settlement, and France fled unilaterally beIore the ICJ
to attempt a diplomatic resolution. The United States never objected
to the application to the Court. Although the United States initially
fled a series oI objections to the merits oI the case, it demonstrated a
deep-seated respect Ior the Court`s judgment by withdrawing these
34 CONTANZE SCHULTE, COMPLIANCE WITH DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
(2005).
21
7&'()%
objections once the Court had rejected them procedurally.
35
The
United States executive branch engaged in Iavorable court rhetoric
36

and took action domestically to soIten the initially harsh reactions
Iavored by the US Senate.
37
France, Ior its part, tread lightly and
tried to present itselI as an advocate Ior Morocco rather than as
an independent party objecting directly to American actions, both
Iearing damage to relations with the United States
38
and remaining
wary oI stirring up pro-independence sentiments in its AIrican
colonies.
39 40
Compliance with the Court`s fnal judgment, which
Iound Iault in both oI the state`s actions, was swiIt and complete.
2. Ambatielos: At issue was whether or not the United
Kingdom was obligated to submit a dispute between its
government and a Greek national to arbitration. AIter the ICJ
ruled that arbitration must proceed, the UK ended its objections
and immediately complied. Although the UK fled objections to
the Court`s jurisdiction and claimed non-exhaustion oI domestic
remedies, the case remained a Iocus oI the government alone.
41
As
the complaint was against the actions oI the government itselI and
did not concern territory or rights which might have an impact on
domestic interests, this confnement oI scope was easy to achieve.
The lack oI British domestic investment in the dispute meant that
the British government could confne its Iocus to legal issues alone
without allowing the case to 'turn political.
42
3. Minquiers and Ecrehos: In the course oI long-running
negotiations, the United Kingdom and France agreed to submit
to the ICJ a dispute over fshing rights on islands in the British
35 Bin Cheng, Bin Cheng, Rights of United States Nationals in the French Zone of Morocco, 2 INT`L & COMP.
L.Q. 354, 354-67 (1953).
36 Rights oI Nationals oI the United States oI America in Morocco (Fr. V. U.S.), 1952 I.C.J.93, Rights oI Nationals oI the United States oI America in Morocco (Fr. V. U.S.), 1952 I.C.J.93,
157 (Aug. 27) (reports oI judgement, advisory opinions, and orders).
37 Richard Young, Richard Young, The End of Amreica Consular Jurisdiction in Morocco, 51 AM. J. INT`L L.,
402, 402-06 (1957).
38 Kurt H. Nadelmann, Kurt H. Nadelmann, Reprisals Against American Judgements?, 65 HARV. L. REV. , 1184,
1184-91 (1952).
39 U.S. Test With France in Morocco Comes to Hearing in World Court, Washington and Paris,
in Open Sessions at The Hague, Will Both Trv to Avoid Roiling North African Feelings, N.Y.
Times, July 13, 1952 at 5.
40 Paris Savs U.S. Hurts Moroccan Interests, N.Y. Times, July 17, 1952 at 3.
41 D. H. N. Johnson D. H. N. Johnson , The Ambatielos Case, 19 MOD. L. REV. 510, 510-17 (1956).
42 World Court Gets 34-Year Ship Case, Greek Buver Of 1919 Surplus Jessels Is Backed Bv
Athens In His Suit Against Britain, N.Y. Times, March 31, 1953, at 19.
22
WULR Jol JI, Issue I Autumn 2010
Channel. The Court`s ruling, assigning exclusive rights to the UK,
was in many ways redundant, since the parties continued negotiating
during the proceedings and independently reached an agreement
between submission oI the case and the issuance oI the Court`s
decision. Although the confict in this state was longstanding,
relations between the two states were excellent; the dispute was
never presented nor interpreted as a diplomatic confict between
the two nations but rather, was seen as an attempt to resolve the
disagreements between individual fshermen oI each country. It was
a 'purely local problem, as Schultz said, and the UK itselI reIerred
to the islands in contention as 'only a Iew rocks.
43
The French
concurred, saying they had 'no risk to wish diIfculties with Britain
just Ior the sake oI two islands.`
44
ReIerral to the ICJ represented
not an escalation, but another procedural path working toward
inevitable fnal resolution.
45
4. Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land: Much like the
Minquiers and Ecrehos case, the dispute between the Netherlands
and Belgium over a shared border was one in which local emotions
dominated. Tensions were even higher between the locals living
at the mutual border oI these two nations, spilling into the greater
political discourse and threatening the planned Iurtherance oI
economic relations between the two states. Although many domestic
leaders acted 'as though vital national interests were at stake,
46

in the merits oI the case the dispute was Irequently described as
'ridiculous.
47
The ICJ ruled overwhelmingly in Belgium`s Iavor,
and the Dutch Iully complied.
5. North Sea Continental ShelI: Germany Iaced Denmark
and the Netherlands in two distinct disputes over a shared maritime
boundary. In the course oI delimitation oI the boundary between
43 Papal Monition on Piracv. To Bolster Claim to Ovster-Beds, The Manchester Guardian,
September 17, 1953.
44 Roval Appetites For Channel Islets. French Case at The Hague, The Manchester
Guardian September 29, 1953.
45 D.H.N. Johnson, D.H.N. Johnson, The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, 3 INT`L COMP. L. REV. 189, 189-216
(1954).*
46 Walter H.Waggoner, Walter H.Waggoner, A Tax-Free Enclave of 30 Acres Contested bv Belgians and Dutch,
Question of *Monarchv Status Is Slated to Be Argued. Before Hague Tribunal, N.Y. Times, August
10, 1957 at 3.
47 J. H. W. Verzijl, J. H. W. Verzijl, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE WORLD COURT, A CASE BY CASE COMMENTARY.
(Leyden, Vol. 2 1966)
23
7&'()%
the three countries, the criteria Ior measurement became a contested
issue. The Court was thus asked to decide the applicable Iormula
under international law rather than to judge a need Ior demarcation
or the actual line to be Iollowed. The case was characterized by a
strong 'common desire oI the parties to settle the dispute and have
the disputed principles clarifed by the court, according to Schulte;
'The matter was oI important, though not vital, interest. All sides
supported the decision to call upon the Court, believing it to be a
useIul tool in resolving a procedural roadblock in negotiations.
48

AIter the Court agreed with Germany that the originally proposed
criteria were unIair, Denmark and the Netherlands easily accepted
the ruling and continued toward productive negotiations, which
ultimately culminated in new treaties.
6. Fisheries Jurisdiction: The Fisheries Jurisdiction cases,
between the United Kingdom, Iceland, and the Federal Republic oI
Germany, are marked by a very diIIerent attitude in public politics
Irom that seen in the cases that preceded them. In a series oI conficts
that became known as the 'cod wars,
49
Iceland withdrew Irom fshing
treaties established with the UK and the FRG, extending exclusive
fshing rights in shared waters. Iceland reIused to participate in any
oI the proceedings, objecting to the court`s jurisdiction despite prior
treaty agreements. When the ICJ ruled that Iceland`s actions were
illegal, the state responded with predictable, continued disinterest,
completely ignoring the judgment and at times actively deIying
it. The Fisheries Jurisdiction case is puzzling to those who accept
traditional compliance theory because it 'presents the unusual
circumstance oI non-compliance by a state that was without doubt
in general committed to rule oI law and democracy.
50
However,
Iceland`s hostile rhetoric Ioreshadowed dangers Irom the start.
Members oI the newly-elected Icelandic government repeatedly
reIerred to the dispute as being a 'matter oI liIe or death
51
Ior the
country, and encouraged the passage oI laws reIerring to the need
48 WolIgang Friedmann, WolIgang Friedmann, The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases A Critique, 64 AM J. INT`L
229, 229-40, (1970)
49 The High Seas. Now, the Cod Peace, TIME, June 14, 1976, at 37.
50 CONTANZE SCHULTE, COMPLIANCE WITH DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 156
(2005).
51 The High Seas. The War for Cod, TIME, Dec 29, 1975.
24
WULR Jol JI, Issue I Autumn 2010
Ior 'exceptional measures to beneft conservation needs.
52
As the
dispute with the UK and the FRG escalated, the Icelandic government
continued to pass numerous laws supporting its position Iar more
than were necessary to enshrine its views. Although the practice was
carried out by a new government, it Iell into a longstanding tradition
oI successive administrations trying to outdo their predecessors
in the protection and promotion oI the Icelandic fshing industry.
53

Compliance in this case was never achieved or even attempted by
Iceland.
7. Delimitation oI the maritime boundary in the GulI oI
Maine area: Facing a disagreement over the maritime boundary,
heightened by the high investment oI fshers in both countries,
the United States and Canada agreed to jointly submit a matter oI
overlapping jurisdictional claims to the ICJ. The Court was given
the authority to decide the boundary in the case, and it ultimately
determined that the boundary lied perIectly evenly between the two
claims. This equitable division Iollowed the pattern oI amicable
relations that was sustained throughout the proceedings. The two
states both Iaced pressure Irom domestic fshing lobbies,
54
so, as
Shulte states, 'submission to the Court was a way Ior domestic
politicians to have the matter settled without having to bear the
political responsibility Ior the result and to Iace the reproach oI their
constituents.
55
Although negotiations had been attempted many
times beIore, their ultimate success was seen as unlikely, and most
agreed that additional measures would be needed to resolve the
issue. In reIerring the matter to the ICJ, both states made eIIorts to
ramp up the court`s legitimacy as much as possible, encouraging
domestic legislative bodies to involve themselves in the process
56

52 Alona E. Evans, Alona E. Evans, Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland). ICJ Reports, 1974,
p. 3, 69*AM. J. INT`L L. 154, 15474 (1975).
53 R. R. Churchhill, R. R. Churchhill, The Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases. The Contribution of the International
Court of Justice to the Debate on Coastal States Fisherv Rights, 24*INT`L & COMP. L.Q. 82, 82105
(1975).
54 Michael Knight. U Michael Knight. U.S.Canada Treatv Faces Senate Fight, Domestic Fishermen Oppose Pact
Setting Boundaries Off Maine * Some Senators Listen Opposed bv Booming Industrv Denounced bv
Pell Regulation and Quotas Retaliatorv Bars, N.Y. TIMES July 5, 1979, at A12.
55 CONTANZE SCHULTE, COMPLIANCE WITH DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 174
(2005).
56 Around the World, Senate Approves Treatv On Sea Border With Canada, REUTERS, April 30,
1981.
25
Bratic
and making a joint submission. When the verdict was reached,
both states oIIered Iull and immediate compliance. No subsequent
confict has arisen on the issue.
8. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua: This case between the United States and Nicaragua is
legendary Ior the United States` display oI complete defance oI
the Court, which some worried would pose challenges to the ICJ`s
legitimacy Ior decades aIterwards. (Fortunately, the US`s behavior
seems to have had no such eIIect.) Nicaragua applied unilaterally to
the ICJ in response to a series oI suspicious behaviors conducted by
the United States, which Nicaragua charged as attempts to overthrow
its government, which is a clear violation oI international laws against
interIerence in other states` politics. The US fatly denied all such
charges, and objected Iurther by rejecting the court`s jurisdiction
and legitimacy, reIusing to participate in the proceedings,
57
directly
fouting the judgment set against it, and ultimately withdrawing Irom
the court`s compulsory jurisdiction. From the outset, the American
response was suspect: the Reagan administration responded to the
Nicaraguan fling not with a counterclaim, but with a declaration
oI a state oI national emergency and a series oI harsh retaliatory
sanctions against Nicaragua.
58
In addition to these sanctions, Reagan
also ordered an escalation oI the very same military eIIorts to which
Nicaragua had fled objections.
59
The Reagan administration made
it very clear that they viewed the court as an impediment to their
goals oI military and political coercion in Nicaragua, and even US
ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick dismissed
the court as a 'semi-legal body that did not deserve Iull respect.
60

AIter the ICJ ruled that the US`s behavior violated international law
and ordered that it pay reparations to Nicaragua, the United States
continued its defance, reIusing to comply and repeatedly using its
veto position on the UN Security Council to block any attempts to
57 United States decides not to participate in World Court case initiated bv Nicaragua, 22 UN
CHRON. (1985).
58 Taylor, Stuart. Reagan`s Power Wide under Emergency Law. May 2, 1985. Taylor, Stuart. Reagan`s Power Wide under Emergency Law. May 2, 1985. The New York
Times.
59 Id.
60 Stuart Taylor, Stuart Taylor, Nicaragua Tells World Court that Reagans statements convict the US, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 1985, at A16.
26
WULR Jol JI, Issue I Autumn 2010
Iorce compliance.
9. Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier Dispute: For decades,
El Salvador and Honduras Iound themselves locked in a dispute
over a land boundary that dated back to colonial times. The confict,
which was marked by occasional violence by citizens and even
Iull-scale military involvement, was called the 'soccer wars when
it turned Ior the worse.
61
Although negotiations had continued on
and oII Ior decades, it was not until Nicaragua intervened in the
matter that the case came beIore the ICJ. Both El Salvador and
Honduras were publically supportive oI the court`s jurisdiction,
though they disagreed on the exact issues to be examined. While the
ICJ proceedings continued without problems, the case maintained a
highly political nature Ior a number oI reasons. To begin with, the area
in question was populated by thousands oI Iarmers who had strong
views on their national allegiance.
62
Furthermore, both countries were
led by recently-elected presidents who were motivated primarily to
fnd early boosts to their reputations in Iact, when a verdict was
issued, the El Salvadorian president immediately seized upon the
chance to champion his peaceIul resolution oI an enduring dispute.


Finally, El Salvador and Honduras were at the time embroiled in
a number oI other disputes with one another, so it was diIfcult to
reIrain Irom contributing to a perceived linkage between the many
issues.
63
The court`s ruling did not Iall completely evenly on both
parties Honduras received two-thirds oI the disputed land and El
Salvador was assigned one-third yet both parties were hesitant to
oIIer Iull compliance. Both states dragged their Ieet in compliance,
citing obstacles oI practicality and cost and accusing the other oI
noncompliance. However, the ruling was never explicitly rejected
or defed by either state, with both choosing instead to attempt to
portray their own state as the sole compliant party.
10. Maritime delimitation: Greenland and Jan Mayen:
Norway and Denmark`s case beIore the ICJ concerned a twenty-
year-old dispute over continental shelI boundaries and fshing rights
in the area around Greenland. In extending exclusive fshery zones
61 A Win in the World Court, N.Y. TIMES, October 6, 1992.
62 Id.
63 Excerpts from Latin Leaders Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, December 13, 1989.
27
7&'()%
between two separately-controlled islands, leaders oI both countries
emphasized the economic dependence oI their coastal citizens on
the fshing trade. Denmark appealed unilaterally to the court aIter
bilateral negotiations proved Iruitless. Although Norway never
objected to the court`s jurisdiction in the case, it expressed hesitance
over any possible attempt by the court to draw national boundaries.
However, the court did indeed decide to do so, slightly to Norway`s
advantage. From the start oI proceedings, both parties expressed
strong respect Ior the court. Since the islands in contention were
uninhabited, there was little risk oI stoking local emotions.
64
Strong
relations between the countries contributed to what was widely seen
as an amicable case that stayed out oI public political rhetoric, and
aIter the judgment was issued, the parties continued to negotiate in
order to reach a similar but more personalized agreement.
11. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project: A cooperative agreement
between Hungary and Czechoslovakia which later became
Slovakia to construct locks on the Danube that would Iacilitate
development suddenly became highly contentious when domestic
opposition to the project in Hungary became overwhelming.
Hungary decided to unilaterally abandon its portion oI the project,
leaving Slovakia with a partially-completed structure and a deIunct
agreement. Under intense pressure Irom the European Community,
to which both countries aspired Ior membership, Hungary and
Slovakia jointly submitted the matter to the ICJ.
65
When speaking to
or in reIerence to the European Community, each country made itselI
appear supportive oI the court`s role. However, a diIIerent picture was
painted domestically. In many ways, the dispute between ecologists
and engineers became a stand between Communism and democracy
to which Hungary was newly-converted.
66
The environmental
attention to the issue demanded by Hungarian protestors thus became
a test oI the success oI democratic government in the state,
67
while
64 Jonathan I. Charney, Jonathan I. Charney, Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Maven,
88 AM. J. INT`L L. 105, 105-09 (1994).
65 John Palmer, John Palmer, Hungarv and Slovakia agree to take dam row to world court, GUARDIAN, Apr.
8, 1993 at 12.
66 Nick Thorpe Nick Thorpe, On the Danubes banks, villages drv up. Asvanvraro, Apr. 11, 1993 OBSERVER
at 20.
673 Celestine Bohlen, 3 Celestine Bohlen, GABCIKOJO JOURNAL, On The Danube, Unbuilt Dams But Pent-Up
Anger, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1990.
28
WULR Jol JI, Issue I Autumn 2010
the dam project itselI represented the Iaulty ways oI old Communist
governance.
68
In Slovakia, the government set up a propaganda
website in support oI its perspective,
69
and took to the international
press to plead its cause.
70
Although leaders oI both countries later
backed down Irom these extremist perspectives,
71
the citizenry
remained polarized.
72
When the court ruled that Hungary (and, to a
lesser extent, Slovakia) had acted improperly and sent them back to
negotiations, leaders in both countries Iound it diIfcult to reign in a
riled up domestic political audience to support the issuance oI any
concessions. Negotiations continue to this day, but no progress has
been achieved.
12. Kasikili/Sedudu: The young democracies oI Botswana
and Namibia were given a chance to prove their commitment to
international legal principles in the case oI disputed control over
an island. The two states were Iortunate in their condition, which
was marked by considerable common ground: the states agreed both
on the applicable treaty and on the interpretation oI its language;
however, they disagreed over which branch oI the river that acted
as a dividing line between the two territories was considered its
main (and thus relevant) branch. The leaders oI the two countries,
while maintaining strong relations, called upon a third party,
Zimbabwe, to mediate. The matter was jointly submitted to the ICJ,
and the court was asked to defnitively determine the boundary. The
states` investment in the island arose Irom its potential as a tourist
destination. The island was uninhabited, and thereIore locals had no
investment in the outcome oI the decision. The case was decided
on mostly scientifc grounds, with each country calling upon expert
witnesses and scientifc data rather than political rhetoric to make
its case.
73
Based on this evidence, the court ruled that the island was
under Botswana`s jurisdiction, and Namibia complied, dropping all
claims to the territory.
68 Hungarv Moves to Abandon Dam Profect on the Danube, AP, May 13, 1989.
69 Available at !!!"#$%&'()*)"#)*"+(,-.$&"/-01#))#-2$3+,+(,435675892'.56:7:
70 Hungarv Participates In Danube Profect, N.Y. TIMES, November 21, 1992.
71 Hungarians Ease Stand Over Dam, N.Y. TIMES, August 29, 1991.
72 Accord Signed to Dam Danube, Protest Rallv Is Held in Budapest, N.Y. TIMES, March 1,
1998.
73 W. J. R.Alexander, W. J. R.Alexander, Science, historv and the Kasikili Island dispute,95 S.AFR. J. SCI. 321,
32125 (1999).
29
7&'()%
13. LaGrand: AIter Iacing down the court in 1987 in
proceedings initiated by Nicaragua, the United States had a chance
to redeem itselI in the LaGrand case. The dispute was brought to
the ICJ unilaterally by Germany, which alleged violation oI the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in the case oI two oI
its citizens, who were sentenced to death in the US without being
inIormed oI their rights to consular support as Ioreign citizens. The
United States noted Irom the outset that its Iederal structure posed
particular obstacles to the case the death sentence was issued by
an Arizona court, not a Iederal one yet never contested either the
ICJ`s jurisdiction or the Iact that a treaty breach did indeed occur. In
Iact, the US appeared ashamed oI this violation, and had taken public
steps such as the distribution oI pamphlets emphasizing the guideline
beIore the case was even brought beIore the ICJ. Germany fled its
case immediately beIore the two deIendants were to be executed.
Although the court issued an interim measure oI protection ordering
the US to stay the executions, it was not honored.
74
Germany and
the rest oI Europe were outraged by this act. Although it was not
explicitly considered by the court, the legality oI the death penalty
in the United States added to the polarizing nature oI the case in
Europe. The court ruled against the US aIter proceedings in which
the US Iully and productively participated, and ordered the state to
pay reparations, conduct a Iull review oI the case, and take actions
in order to prevent Iuture breaches. Although the US has since made
great eIIorts to improve conduct in the Iuture, it has neither paid
reparations nor conducted a review oI the case to see iI the omission
oI inIorming the deIendants oI their consular rights would have
aIIected the outcome oI the case.
75
In Iact, the judgment has largely
been ignored, neither complied with nor defed. This may stem both
Irom the Iederal structure oI the US judicial system and the timing
oI the judgment, which was issued just months beIore September
11, 2001.
76
Caught up in other international matters, the US seems
to have made an error in omission by Iailing to encourage Arizona
74 Roger Cohen, Roger Cohen, U.S. Execution of German Stirs Anger, N.Y. TIMES MARCH 5, 1999.
75 Colter Paulson, Colter Paulson, Compliance with Final Judgments of the International Court of Justice Since
1987, 98 Am. J. Int`l L. 434-461 (2004).
76Martin Mennecke & Christian J. Tams, Martin Mennecke & Christian J. Tams, Lagrand Case (Germanv v United States of America).
51 INT`L L. & COMP. L.Q. 449, 449-55 (2002).
30
WULR Jol JI, Issue I Autumn 2010
to take action on the international stage.
14. Arrest warrant oI 11 April 2000: Following the passage
oI a controversial and revolutionary new law, Belgium claimed
jurisdiction to prosecute those who committed international war
crimes in its domestic courts. One oI the country`s frst targets
was the Ioreign minister oI the Democratic Republic oI Congo
(DRC), Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, who was charged with
genocide crimes perpetrated privately beIore he took oIfce. However,
the DRC and much oI the international community argued that
traditional international dealings exempted prosecution oI current
government leaders. The DRC applied unilaterally to the ICJ, and
the court ruled that Belgium must withdraw the arrest warrant and
suspend any prosecutions until aIter the Ioreign minister`s term oI
oIfce ended.
The ruling was a windIall to Belgium, which complied
immediately and Iully. The law was passed by the Belgian parliament,
but it was criticized by members oI the Belgian executive, who
viewed at as too reaching and oI questionable international
legitimacy. Thus, these leaders had been searching Ior an excuse
to distance the country Irom the radical new law since its passage.
AIter courts were immediately inundated with claims Irom around
the world, many began to reconsider the law.
77
Foreign minister
Louis Michel decried the law as opportunistic, and many others
were embarrassed by the image oI Belgium that was presented by
the law.
78
As leaders quickly Iound out, the law also posed problems
in international relations. First, states whose leaders were accused
in Belgian courts took particular oIIense; the Belgium Ioreign
ministry had to work overtime to repair relations with the DRC aIter
the arrest warrant in this case was issued, and worked to publicly
reiterate the importance that Belgium placed on its membership in
the international community.
79
Additionally, Belgian leaders Iaced
external pressure Irom the US and other allies, who were concerned
about the extended jurisdiction that the law asserted, to curtail the
77 Marlise Simons, Marlise Simons, Human Rights Cases Begin to Flood Into Belgian Courts,!N.Y. TIMES,
December 27, 2001.
78 Belgium bans Sharon war crimes trial, BBC, June 26, 2002.
79 Belgiums diplomatic storm with Congo, BBC, July 11, 2000.
31
7&'()%
scope oI the law or eliminate it entirely.
80
The ruling thus gave
Belgian leaders the perIect opportunity to abandon the law without
distancing themselves Irom the loIty human rights ideals that had
initially motivated its passage.) Compliance was immediate and
Iaced no challenges.
CONCLUSION
These case studies reveal that the majority oI cases Iall into
particular categories oI leadership behavior, whose diIIerences have
a determining eIIect on compliance in each case. It is evident in such
cases as Fisheries Jurisdiction, Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and around Nicaragua, and Gabcikovo/Nagymaros project that
the way in which the executive engaged with the issue as a political
project increased the overall polarity oI the dispute. In these
cases, the associated low compliance levels that resulted indicate
a correlation between this politically-tinged rhetoric and compliant
behavior. However, it is clear that an issue`s domestic salience need
not imply this correlation with low compliance; in other cases, the
steps taken by leaders to actively distance themselves Irom the
political drama within their countries and increase the perception oI
the Court`s authority were correlated instead with high compliance
rates. Cases expressing this position include Rights oI Nationals oI
the United States oI America in Morocco, Sovereignty over Certain
Frontier Land, and Arrest Warrant oI 11 April 2000.
These case histories strongly support the correlations
described in both oI the hypotheses: that a leader`s post-judgment
posturing, whether positive or negative, can be predictive oI the
country`s response to an unIavorable ICJ judgment. However, this
relationship does not defnitively determine causality, leaving open
the possibility that an unconsidered Iactor infuencing compliance
would inIorm leaders, encouraging them to shiIt their rhetoric in
order to align with the country`s Iuture position. Such a Iactor,
however, would have to be discernible to the leaders themselves,
and a Iactor oI this sort has not been proposed as oI yet.
80 Richard Bernstein, Richard Bernstein, Belgium Rethinks Its Prosecutorial Zeal, N.Y. TIMES, April 1, 2003.
32
WULR Jol JI, Issue I Autumn 2010
In addition to the two conditions described in the hypotheses,
a third pattern was observed: one oI complete detachment oI
political rhetoric Irom court proceedings. In these cases such as
Ambatielos, Maritime Delimitation Greenland and Jan Mayen, and
Kasikili/Sedudu Island there was virtually no investment oI the
domestic population in the issue. In these specifc cases, leaders had
no motivation either to lend support or attempt to counteract the
emotions oI a domestic constituency. Leaders Ielt a natural desire
to resolve the issue and comply with international law perhaps
a product oI internalization oI norms, iI not Iear oI international
retribution. However, the leaders had no need to justiIy these desires
to their electorates. Equally, actions expressing hesitance to invest
in the Court would have been unIounded.
It appears to be the case, then, that the inconsistent compliance
record observed in democracies in ICJ cases is a result oI a democratic
leader`s unique relationship with his or her electorate, one that is
not shared with the leader`s autocratic counterparts. The risk oI
retributive electoral eIIects Iorce a leader`s rhetoric to align with the
state`s behavior in response to court rulings, either by counteracting
local emotions to support compliance with international law or by
exacerbating these emotions to presage cooperative diIfculties.
This correlation has important implications Ior those
who study world courts as well as Ior the courts themselves. II a
democratic state`s behavior is capable oI prediction beIore a ruling
is issued, the international community may be able to tailor its
responses in order to fnd the most accessible solution Ior the country
one that may possibly allow a leader in a politicized situation to
preserve a Iavorable image with the electorate. In other cases, the
international community can rest assured that compliance is likely
to be oIIered. From a scholarly perspective, this fnding allows Ior
a reconciliation oI the disparate images that had previously been
perpetuated oI general compliance theory, and compliance specifc to
ICJ judgments. The integration oI these two theoretical backgrounds
contributes to a more complete understanding oI ICJ compliance
and international cooperation in general.