Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, G.R. No.

L-23135, December 26, 1967 FACTS: On July 5, 1960 Mariano Sumilang filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon a petition for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will and testament of Hilarion Ramagosa, who died on December 1, 1959. Said document, written in Tagalog and dated February 26, 1949, institutes petitioner as sole heir of the testator. The petition for probate was opposed by two (2) of oppositors appellants herein who questioned the due execution of the document, claiming that it was made under duress and was not really intended by the deceased to be his last will and testament. Aside from merely opposing the petition for probate, the first set of oppositors Saturnino and Santiago Ramagosa also claimed that they, instead of petitioner, were entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased. The other oppositors representing themselves simply as next of kin, appropriately prayed only for the disallowance of the will. At the hearings of the petition petitioner adduced his evidence, and then rested his case on February 16, 1961. Reception of oppositors' evidence was set for July 14, 1961. However, on July 3, 1961 oppositors moved for the dismissal of the petition for probate mainly on the ground that "the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter because the last will and testament of the decedent, if ever it was really executed by him, was revoked by implication of law six years before his death." Oppositors alleged that after making the will Hilarion Ramagosa sold to petitioner Mariano Sumilang and his brother Mario the parcels of land described therein, so that at the time of the testator's death the titles to said lands were no longer in his name. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not oppositors have legal standing in court and they are bereft of personality to oppose the probate of the last will and testament of the testators. 2. Whether or not oppositors have valid claim and interest in the distribution of (the) estate of the aforesaid testator and no existing valid right whatsoever. HELD: To establish conclusively as against everyone and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings, for the probate of a will. The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing the validity of the testamentary provisions is another.itc-alf. The first decides the

execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution. The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of conveyance in favor of the testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and separate from the question of whether the testament was duly executed. For one, if the will is not entitled to probate, or its probate is denied, all questions of revocation become superfluous: in law, there is no such will and hence there would be nothing to revoke. Then, again, the revocation invoked by the oppositorsappellants is not an express one, but merely implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or devise the properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy.itc-alf. In their brief, oppositors do not take issue with the court a quo's finding that they "have no relationship whatsoever within the fifth degree as provided by law and therefore . . . are totally (sic) strangers to the deceased whose will is under probate." They do not attempt to show that they have some interest in the estate which must be protected. The uncontradicted evidence, consisting of certified true copies of the parties' baptism and marriage certificates, support the said court's finding in this respect. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested party has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor. The reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will, is not that thereby the court may be prevented from learning facts which would justify or necessitate a denial of probate, but rather that the courts and the litigants should not be molested by the intervention in the proceedings of persons with no interest in the estate which would entitle them to be heard with relation thereto.

Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 1977 FACTS: The private petitioner, Celia Ilustre-Reyes, filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City a complaint dated June 3, 1976 against her husband, Manuel J. C. Reyes, for legal separation on the ground that the defendant had attempted to kill plaintiff. The pertinent allegations of the complaint are: The plaintiff asked for support pendente lite for her and her three children. The defendant, petitioner herein, opposed the application for support pendente lite on the ground that his wife had committed adultery with her physician.

The application for support pendente lite was set for hearing and submitted for resolution on the basis of the pleadings and the documents attached thereto by the parties. The respondent Judge issued an order dated March 15, 1977 granting plaintiff's prayer for alimony pendente litein the amount of P5,000.00 a month commencing from June 1976. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating that his wife is not entitled to support during the pendency of the case, and, alleging that even if she entitled, the amount awarded was excessive. The respondent Judge reduced the amount from P5,000.00 to P44,00.00 a month in an order dated June 17, 1977. Manuel J. C. Reyes filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals dated July 25, 1977 asking that the order granting support pendente lite to private respondent. Celia Ilustre-Reyes, be annulled on the ground that the respondent Judge, Leonor Ines-Luciano, had committed a grave abuse of discretion or that said order be modified inasmuch as the amount awarded as support pendente lite is excessive. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not in actions for legal separation the wife is entitled to support from the husband despite the fact that a case for adultery had been filed by the husband against her; and 2. Whether or not in determining the amount of support pendente lite, it is enough that the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence even by affidavits only or other documentary evidence appearing in the records. HELD: It is true that the adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support however, the alleged adultery of wife must be established by competent evidence. The allegation that the wife has committed adultery will not bar her from the right receive support pendente lite. Adultery is a good defense and if properly proved and sustained wig defeat the action. In the instant case, at the hearing of the application for support pendente lite before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court presided by the respondent Judge, Hon. Leonor InesLuciano the petitioner did not present any evidence to prove the allegation that his wife, private respondent Celia Ilustre-Reyes, had committed adultery with any person. The petitioner has still the opportunity to adduce evidence on the alleged adultery of his wife when the action for legal separation is heard on the merits before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City. It is to be noted however, that as pointed out by the respondents in their comment, the "private respondent was not asking support to be taken from petitioner's personal funds or wherewithal, but from the conjugal propertywhich, was

her documentary evidence ..." It is, therefore, doubtful whether adultery will affect her right to alimony pendente lite. In determining the amount to be awarded as support pendente lite it is not necessary to go fully into the merits of the case, it being sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the application, one way or the other, in view of the merely provisional character of the resolution to be entered. Mere affidavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the application for support pendente lite. It is enough the the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record. The private respondent has submitted documents showing that the corporations controlled by the petitioner have entered into multi-million contracts in projects of the Ministry of Public Highways. Considering the high cost of living due to inflation and the financial ability of the petitioner as shown by the documents of record, We find that the amount of P4,000.00 a month granted by the respondent Judge as alimonypendente lite to the private respondent is not excessive. There is no showing that the respondent Judge has committed a grave abuse of discretion in granting said support.

Pastor Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, June 1983 FACTS: Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.), died in Cebu City on June 5, 1966, survived by his Spanish wife Sofia Bossio (who also died on October 21, 1966), their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia Pastor de Midgely (SOFIA), and an illegitimate child, not natural, by the name of Lewellyn Barlito Quemada (QUEMADA). PASTOR, JR. is a Philippine citizen, having been naturalized in 1936. SOFIA is a Spanish subject. QUEMADA is a Filipino by his mother's citizenship. On November 13, 1970, QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of PASTOR, SR. with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I. The will contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of QUEMADA consisting of 30% of PASTOR, SR.'s 42% share in the operation by Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation (ATLAS) of some mining claims in Pina-Barot, Cebu. On November 21, 1970, the PROBATE COURT, upon motion of QUEMADA and after an ex parte hearing, appointed him special administrator of the entire estate of PASTOR, SR., whether or not covered or affected by the holographic will. He assumed office as such on December 4, 1970 after filing a bond of P 5,000.00.

On December 7, 1970, QUEMADA as special administrator, instituted against PASTOR, JR. and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate, which included the properties subject of the legacy and which were in the names of the spouses PASTOR, JR. and his wife, Maria Elena Achaval de Pastor, who claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance. On February 2, 1971, PASTOR, JR. and his sister SOFIA filed their opposition to the petition for probate and the order appointing QUEMADA as special administrator. On August 20, 1980, while the reconveyance suit was still being litigated, the PROBATE COURT issued the now assailed Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable and ruling in effect that the legacy to QUEMADA was not inofficious. There was absolutely no statement or claim in the Order that the Probate Order of December 5, 1972 had previously resolved the issue of ownership of the mining rights of royalties thereon, nor the intrinsic validity of the holographic will. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the Order of execution and garnishment dated August 20, 1980 as well as the Orders subsequently issued allegedly to implement the Probate Order of December 5, 1972 are valid. HELD: When PASTOR, SR. died in 1966, he was survived by his wife, aside from his two legitimate children and one illegitimate son. There is therefore a need to liquidate the conjugal partnership and set apart the share of PASTOR, SR.'s wife in the conjugal partnership preparatory to the administration and liquidation of the estate of PASTOR, SR. which will include, among others, the determination of the extent of the statutory usufructuary right of his wife until her death. When the disputed Probate order was issued on December 5, 1972, there had been no liquidation of the community properties of PASTOR, SR. and his wife. So, also, as of the same date, there had been no prior definitive determination of the assets of the estate of PASTOR, SR. There was an inventory of his properties presumably prepared by the special administrator, but it does not appear that it was ever the subject of a hearing or that it was judicially approved. The reconveyance or recovery of properties allegedly owned but not in the name of PASTOR, SR. was still being litigated in another court. Private respondent challenges the propriety of certiorari as a means to assail the validity of the disputed Order of execution. He contends that the error, if any, is one of judgment, not jurisdiction, and properly correctible only by appeal, not certiorari.Under the circumstances of the case at bar, the challenge must be rejected. Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction is much too evident in the actuations of the probate court to be overlooked or condoned.

Without a final, authoritative adjudication of the issue as to what properties compose the estate of PASTOR, SR. in the face of conflicting claims made by heirs and a non-heir (MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR) involving properties not in the name of the decedent, and in the absence of a resolution on the intrinsic validity of the will here in question, there was no basis for the Probate Court to hold in its Probate Order of 1972, which it did not, that private respondent is entitled to the payment of the questioned legacy. Therefore, the Order of Execution of August 20, 1980 and the subsequent implementing orders for the payment of QUEMADA's legacy, in alleged implementation of the dispositive part of the Probate Order of December 5, 1972, must fall for lack of basis.

Mang-Oy vs. Court of Appeals, September 1986 FACTS: On September 4, 1937, Old Man Tumpao executed what he called a "last will and testament" the dispositive portion of which declared: Lastly, I appoint my son BANDO TUMPAO, whom I named, that after departing from this life, he shall be the one to carry or fulfill my Testament, and that he shall have the power to see and dispose all what I have stated, he shall not change what I have already stated in my Testament so that there is truth in my will. I will affix my right thumbmark at the end of my written name because I do not know how to read and write, after it has been read to me and affirm all what is my Win this 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon this 4th day of September 1937, before those who are present and have heard what I have stated, Pico La Trinidad, Benguet, 4th September, 1937. The contents of this document were read to the beneficiaries named therein who at the time were already occupying the portions respectively allotted to them. Two days later, Old Man Tumpao died. The parties remained in possession of the lots assigned to them, apparently in obedience to the wish of Old Man Tumpao as expressed in his last "will". But things changed unexpectedly in 1960, twenty three years later. On November 4, 1960, the respondents executed an extrajudicial partition in which they divided the property of Old Man Tumpao among the three of them only, to the exclusion of the other persons mentioned in the above-quoted documents. 5 By virtue of this partition, Old Man Tumpao's title was cancelled and another one was issued in favor of the three respondents. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the will, not having been probated as required by law, was inoperative as such.

HELD: The court finds that the document may be sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at the time the said document was executed by Old Man Tumpao in 1937. The said article reads as follows: Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act inter vivos, or by win, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs. On this score, the applicable decision is Albela vs. Albela. In this case, Agustin Albela executed on January 19, 1935, a deed of partition dividing two parcels of land between hisdaughters, Eduarda and Restituta, who indicated their conformity by signing the instrument. They took possession of their respective shares upon his death, but fourteen years later, Restituta ejected Eduarda from her lot, alleging title by purchase from a third party and denying the existence of the partition. Eduarda sued for recovery and was upheld by the trial court on the basis of the deed of partition. In their argument, appellants do not question the authenticity of the above document, but argue against its validity, on the grounds summarized in their brief (p. 7), as follows: Therefore the allegations of the plaintiff-appellee, Eduarda Albela, rest on a document which defies classification. If it is a deed of partition, it is null and void because it is not embodied in a public document; if it is a simple donation of realty, it is also null and void, because it is not in a public document and there is no acceptance; if it is a donation Mortis Causa, certainly it is null and void because it does not follow the rules governing testamentary succession; and if ever it is to be classified as a will, more so, it is still null and void because it does not conform to the requirements of Section 618, Act 190 as amended by Act 2645. There is no difference in legal effect between Agustin Albela's deed of partition and Old Man Tumpao's "last will and testament." Both are sustainable under Article 1056 of the Civil Code, which was in force at the time they were executed Even as Agustin Albela's partition was signed by the two daughters themselves, so was Old Man Tumpao's "will" affirmed by the beneficiaries in their agreement of September 7, 1937, which reiterated and recognized the terms of such "will." While not valid as a partition inter vivos under Articles 816 and 1271 of the old Civil Code, it was nevertheless binding on the parties as proof of their conformity to the dispositions made by Old Man Tumpao in his "last will and testament." We may add that the agreement entered into by the parties in implementation of Old Man Tumpao's "will" did not have to be approved by the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes because the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu was not extended to the Mountain Province. Moreover, the document was not a conveyance of properties or property right. It remains to state that the property in dispute having been registered in 1917, the presumption is that it was acquired during the second marriage and so cannot be claimed by the

respondents as the conjugal property of their mother and Old Man Tumpao. Hence, they are not entitled to retain the entire land as their exclusive inheritance or to collect rentals for the lots occupied by the petitioners.

Fernandez vs.Tantoco, 49 Phil. 380 FACTS: On September 9, 1925, Basilia Tantoco, aged 62 years, executed an instrument purporting to be her will, she being at the time a patient in the San Juan de Dios Hospital in the City of Manila. Her death occurred a few days after the will executed, and application for probate was made by father Vicente Fernandez, parish priest of Malolos. Opposition to probate was made by three brothers and a nephew of the deceased. At the time set for the submission of proof with respect to the execution of the will, the proponent introduced the three attesting witnesses to the instrument, namely, Vicente Platon, Fidel Macapugay, and Placido Suarez, as well as Aurea Gaspar, sister-in-law of the deceased who had been in attendance upon her at the hospital. The instrument shows every external requisite of proper execution, but the trial judge refused to allow it to be probated, for the reason that the three attesting witnesses are not in harmony upon the point whether all three of said witnesses were present together at the time and place when the testatrix and the witnesses affixed their signatures to the document. No testimony was submitted by the opposition, and the criticisms made by the trial judge with respect to the sufficiency of the proof of execution arise exclusively upon the testimony of the witnesses for the proponent. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the will in question was in every respect properly executed. 2. Whether or not an error was committed by the trial court in refusing probate. HELD: In case of opposition to the probate of the will the proponent is legally bound to introduce all of the subscribing witnesses, if available. They are therefore forced witnesses so far as the proponent is concerned, and he is not bound by their testimony to the same extent that a litigant is bound by the testimony of witnesses introduced in ordinary course. It follows that the proponent of a will may avail himself of other proof to establish the instrument, even contrary to the testimony of some of the subscribing witnesses, or all of them. With respect to the will now in question a prima facie case for the establishment of the document was made out when it appeared that the instrument itself was properly drawn and attested and that all of the signatures thereto are authentic. These facts raise a presumption of regularity; and upon those facts alone the will should, be admitted to probate in the absence of proof showing that some fatal irregularity occurred. And such irregularity must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence before probate can be denied.

Fernandez vs. Dimagiba, October 1967 FACTS: On January 19, 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba, now respondent, submitted to the Court of First Instance a petition for the probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed on October 22, 1930, and annexed to the petition. The will instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. The petition was set for hearing, and in due time, Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and Luisa Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate asked. Grounds advanced for the opposition were forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by the testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944 After trial on the formulated issues, the Court of First Instance, by decision of June 20, 1958, found that the will was genuine and properly executed; but deferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and revocation "until such time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will or when the question of adjudication of the properties is opportunely presented." Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration, and/or new trial, insisting that the issues of estoppel and revocation be considered and resolved; whereupon, on July 27, 1959, the Court overruled the claim that proponent was in estoppel to ask for the probate of the will, but "reserving unto the parties the right to raise the issue of implied revocation at the opportune time." On February 27, 1962, after receiving further evidence on the issue whether the execution by the testatrix of deeds of sale of the larger portion of her estate in favor of the testamentary heir, made in 1943 and 1944, subsequent to the execution of her 1930 testament, had revoked the latter under Article 957(2) of the 1950 Civil Code (Art. 869 of the Civil Code of 1889), the trial Court resolved against the oppositors and held the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale." Whereupon, the oppositors elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate Court held that the decree of June 20, 1958, admitting the will to probate, had become final for lack of opportune appeal; that the same was appealable independently of the issue of implied revocation; that contrary to the claim of oppositors-appellants, there had been no legal revocation by the execution of the 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale, because the latter had been made in favor of the legatee herself, and affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the will to probate had become final for lack of appeal. 2. Whether or not the order of the Court of origin dated July 27, 1959, overruling the estoppel invoked by oppositors-appellants had likewise become final. 3. Whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been impliedly revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the proponent on March 26, 1943 and April 3, 1944.

HELD: As to the first point, oppositors-appellants contend that the order allowing the will to probate should be considered interlocutory, because it fails to resolve the issues of estoppel and revocation propounded in their opposition. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the appellant's stand is untenable. It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. As such, the probate order is final and appealable; and it is so recognized by express provisions of Section 1 of Rule 109, that specifically prescribes that "any interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment . . . where such order or judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will." There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was not appealed on time, the same had become final and conclusive. Hence, the appellate courts may no longer revoke said decree nor review the evidence upon which it is made to rest. Thus, the appeal belatedly lodged against the decree was correctly dismissed. As to the issue of estoppel, we have already ruled in Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil. 249, that the presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being primarily designed to protect the testator's, expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedent's ownership and right of disposition within legal limits. Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a will to deliver the same to the Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation (Revised Rule 75). It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. Whether or not the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still appealable or not, the defense is patently unmeritorious and the Court of Appeals correctly so ruled.

The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of conveyance in favor of the testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and separate from the question of whether the testament was duly executed. For one, if the will is not entitled to probate, or its probate is denied, all questions of revocation become superfluous in law, there is no such will and hence there would be nothing to revoke. Then, again, the revocation invoked by the oppositorsappellants is not an express one, but merely implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or devise the properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy. Only the total and absolute revocation can preclude probate of the revoked testament. Dolores Vda. De Gil v Cancio, 1965 FACTS: Carlos Gil, Sr. died testate in Manila on November 28, 1943 instituting as his exclusive heir his widow Isabel Herreros subject to the condition that should the latter die, the estate, if any, would be inherited by Carlos Gil, Jr., the decedent's adopted son. In due time, the decedent's will was duly admitted to probate, the widow Isabel having been appointed as the administratix of the estate. Among the properties constituting the estate were two parcels of residential land and a house erected thereon situated in Guagua, Pampanga. During the Japanese occupation, Isabel and Carlos secured from one Agustin Cancio a loan of P89,000.00 and in payment thereof they agreed to transfer to Cancio the two lots after the same had been finally adjudicated to both or either of the two heirs. Subsequently, Carlos died, Isabela as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband Carlos Gil, Sr., filed a motion in the testate proceedings praying for an order to authorize her to execute the necessary deed of transfer of the two lots including the house erected thereon to Agustin Cancio or his heirs. Copy of this motion was served on Dolores who expressed her conformity thereto in her capacity as guardian of her minor children on October 21, 1954. This motion was approved by Judge Ramon R. San Jose on condition that the original of the deed of transfer should be submitted to the court for approval. As Isabel died sometime in July, 1956, before being able to execute the deed of transfer in favor of Cancio, said deed was executed by Dolores in her capacity as coadministratrix and vendor of the properties, which deed was attach to a motion she filed in the testate proceedings praying the court for its approval. Accordingly, on July 9, 1956, the probate court issued an order directing the co-administratrix to pay the estate and inheritance taxes due on the properties covered by the sale before passing upon the motion filed for the approval of the aforesaid deed of sale. Nothing was done on the matter by the co-administratrix notwithstanding the lapse of several years, and so Agustin Cancio filed a motion in probate proceedings reiterating the former petition of the co-administratrix dated requesting for the approval of the deed of sale stating that the Office of the Commission on Internal Revenue agreed to the registration of said deed of sale notwithstanding the non-payment of the estate and inheritance taxes in view of the fact that the value of the properties of the estate is more than sufficient to answer for whatever estate and inheritance taxes that may be assessed against the estate. However, co-administratrix Dolores C. Vda. de Gil, Jr. filed a strong

opposition to the petition on the ground that the late Isabel H. Vda. de Gil, Sr. and Carlos Gil, Jr. entered into the agreement to sell the properties without the authority of the court, that the properties subject of the sale had never been finally adjudicated to both or either of the two vendors, and that the alleged deed of sale should only be considered as an equitable mortgage. ISSUE: Whether the original agreement between the late administratrix Isabel and Cancio was without authority of the court HELD: No. The widow and children of the deceased are entitled to certain allowances for their support out of the estate pending its liquidation and until their shares have been delivered to them. It is probably for this reason that both the widow and the son, who were the prospective heirs, borrowed money from Agustin Cancio in order that they may have means to support themselves in the interregnum since the estate was then unproductive, a matter which comes perfectly within the purview of the law. And bearing in mind this situation of the two heirs which happened during the Japanese occupation, the probate court did not hesitate in approving the agreement thereby giving to the administratrix the necessary authority to execute the deed of sale covering the two properties of the deceased in favor of Agustin Cancio provided that the deed of sale be submitted to the court for its approval. And this matter is sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court The Court emphasized that it is within the jurisdiction of a probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication. Consequently, it is error to say that this matter should be threshed out in a separate action.

Godoy vs. Orellano, 1921 FACTS: On January 13, 1919, in consideration of the amount of P1,000 received by the appellant, Felisa Pagilinan, a document was executed by her giving the appellee, Eusebio A. Godoy, an option to buy a dredge for the sum of P10,000. It appears from that document that the dredge is the common property of the vendor and of the brothers Demetrio, Jose, Guillermo, Alfredo, and Paz, all surnamed Orellano; that the condition was that Godoy was to pay the whole price of the dredge within twenty days; and that said option was granted in accordance with the power of attorney executed by her coowners who reserved the right to ratify whatever sale might be made, or option granted by Pagilinan, their attorney-in-fact. The latter's coowners did not ratify the option contract. Before the expiration of twenty days, the appelle was ready to make complete payment of the price, but the appellant failed to deliver the dredge. Then the appellee brought suit in the Court of First Instance against Feliza Pagilinan, Paz Orellano, Jose Orellano, Demetrio Orellano, Guillermo Orellano, and Alfredo Orellano, praying that they be ordered to deliver the dredge, upon payment by him of the sum of P9,000; to pay him the sum of P10,000 as damages, and to return to the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 should the carrying out of the sale become impossible.

The defendants Orellano set up in their answer a general denial of the facts alleged in the complaint and, as a special defense, alleged that the dredge in question was the property of the intestate estate of Julio Orellano, pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila, and under the administration of Felisa Pangilinan; that the plaintiff perfectly knows that said dredge is under judicial control and could not be disposed of without judicial authority, and that the court has never authorized the sale mentioned in the complaint filed herein; and that the defendants Jose, Guillermo, and Alfredo surnamed Orellano are at present under age, and the defendant Paz Orellano is a married woman who had not obtained the consent of her husband before executing the power of attorney in favor of the administratrix. ISSUE: Whether the sale in favor of Godoy is valid. HELD: No. Under the law, the court has exclusive jurisdiction to authorize the sale of properties like the one under consideration and the power of attorney executed by the heirs of Orellano in favor of the administratrix, without authority of court, has no legal effect, and this is the more so, since two of the said heirs are under age, and the others did not ratify the option contract, as provided in the aforesaid power of attorney. The appellant was not, in her capacity as judicial administratrix of the intestate estate of Julio Orellano, legally authorized to sell, or contract to sell, any property belonging to said estate without the authority of the court, and the contract entered into by her with the plaintiff, without this authority, is null and void.

Chavez vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-29169 FACTS: The indictment in the court below the third amended information upon which the judgment of conviction herein challenged was rendered, was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle, one (1) Thunderbird car. Accused were the following: Petitioner herein, Roger Chavez, Ricardo Sumilang alias "Romeo Vasquez", Edgardo P. Pascual alias "Ging" Pascual, Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita", Luis Asistio alias "Baby" Asistio, Lorenzo Meneses alias"Lory" Meneses, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe and Paul Doe. Averred in the aforesaid information was that on or about the 14th day of November, 1962, in Quezon City, the accused conspired, with intent of gain, abuse of confidence and without the consent of the owner thereof, Dy Sun Hiok y Lim, in asporting the motor vehicle abovedescribed. Upon arraignment, all the accused, except the three Does who have not been identified nor apprehended, pleaded not guilty. August 19, 1968

The trial court gave evidence to Sumilang's averment, strengthened by Baltazar's and Cailles' corroborations, that he paid good money for the car. Sumilang was thus cleared. So was Asistio whom the trial court believed to be a mere buyer of the car. And so, the prosecution's theory of conspiracy was discounted. As to the other accused, the court found no case against Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita" and Lorenzo Meneses alias "Lory". The accused "Ging" Pascual was also acquitted for in the first place he was not identified by Johnson Lee in court. As to Roger Chavez, however, the court had this to say: "Roger Chavez does not offer any defense. As a matter of fact, his testimony as witness for the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt." The trial court branded him "a self-confessed culprit. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus, to be freed from imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial which resulted in his conviction he was denied his constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against himself. HELD: Yes. The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final. ALFON vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. L-51201 May 29, 1980 FACTS: Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte through her counsel, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez, praying that her name be changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has advanced the following reasons for filing the petition: 1. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon since her childhood;

2. She has been enrolled in the grade school and in college using the same name; 3. She has continuously used the name Estrella S. Alfon since her infancy and all her friends and acquaintances know her by this name; 4. She has exercised her right of suffrage under the same name. The lower court denied the petition on the ground that the evidence submitted shows that the change of name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon is not proper and reasonable with respect to the surname. The fact that petitioner has been using a different surname and has become known with such surname does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize and change her surname to Alfon. The birth certificate clearly shows that the father of petitioner is Filomeno Duterte. Petitioner likewise admitted this fact in her testimony. To allow petitioner to change her surname from Duterte to Alfon is equivalent to allowing her to use her mother's surname. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be granted. HELD: Yes. The following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name; (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change of' status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion. In the case at bar, it has been shown that petitioner has, since childhood, borne the name Estrella S. Alfon although her birth records and baptismal certificate show otherwise; she was enrolled in the schools from the grades up to college under the name Estrella S. Alfon; all her friends call her by this name; she finished her course in Nursing in college and was graduated and given a diploma under this name; and she exercised the right of suffrage likewise under this name. There is therefore ample justification to grant fully her petition which is not whimsical but on the contrary is based on a solid and reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid confusion.

UY vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. L-22712 FACTS: A petition for change of name was filed by Candido Uy alias Ricardo Uy. Specifically, he wanted to change his name from Uy to Baluyot. Petitioner is a Filipino citizen by naturalization, having taken his oath as such on October 9, 1959. Since birth in 1933 he has resided in San Fernando, Pampanga where he started in 1961 his present furniture business. Still bearing the Chinese surname "Uy," however, he is frequently November 29, 1965

mistaken for and identified as a Chinese citizen, according to him, to his chagrin, embarrassment and disappointment. Accordingly, he filed the aforementioned petition in order to have a Filipino surname. For a new surname he chose "Baluyot" after former Secretary Sotero Baluyot. It is of record that Sotero Baluyot has been close to petitioner's family since pre-war days, is the godfather of petitioner's father, has interposed no objection and granted his written consent to petitioner's adoption of his family name, following accepted practice in our country. The trial court granted the petition. ISSUE: Whether petitioner has shown a "proper and reasonable cause" to warrant his change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. HELD: YES. In the present case the trial court found to its satisfaction that petitioner was in earnest in his desire to do away with all traces of his former Chinese nationality and henceforth to be recognized as a Filipino. Such desire is in line with the policy of our naturalization laws that applicants for naturalization should fully embrace Filipino customs and traditions and socially mingle with Filipinos. It has not been shown that petitioner has any fraudulent intent in seeking a change of name. No criminal, civil, tax or any other liability on his part, which he may avoid by the change of name, has been suggested. Nothing has been presented to show any prejudice to the Government or to any individual should the petition be granted. In the absence of prejudice to the State or any individual, a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of a former alien nationality which unduly hamper social and business life, is a proper and reasonable cause for a change of name. It is not trivial, whimsical or capricious.

LAPERAL vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962

FACTS: Petitioner respectfully prayed that after the necessary proceedings are had, she be allowed to resume using her maiden name of Elisea Laperal. The petition was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that the same violates the provisions of Article 370 (should be 372) of the Civil Code, and that it is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court.

In its decision of October 31, 1960, the court denied the petition for the reason that Article 372 of the Civil Code requires the wife, even after she is decreed legally separated from her husband, to continue using the name and surname she employed before the legal separation. Upon petitioner's motion, however, the court, treating the petition as one for change of name, reconsidered its decision and granted the petition on the ground that to allow petitioner, who is a businesswoman decreed legally separated from her husband, to continue using her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. Hence, this appeal by the State. ISSUE: Whether or not a legally separated wife must continue using the name and surname she employed before the legal separation. HELD: Yes. There seems to be no dispute that in the institution of these proceedings, the procedure prescribed in Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name has been observed. But from the petition quoted in full at the beginning of these opinion, the only reason relied upon for the change of name is the fact that petitioner is legally separated from her husband and has, in fact, ceased to live with him for many years. It is doubtful, to say the least, whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general, may prevail over the specific provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code with regards to married women legally separated from their husbands. Even, however, applying Rule 103 to this case, the fact of legal separation alone which is the only basis for the petition at bar is, in our opinion, not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of herein petitioner, for to hold otherwise would be to provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory provisions of Article 372.

MOORE vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. L-18407 June 26, 1963

FACTS: Petitioner is an American citizen formerly married to Joseph P. Velarde, also an American citizen, out of whose wedlock a child by the name of William Michael Velarde was born. This child, now 14 years old, was born on January 19, 1947 at Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. The marriage of petitioner to Velarde was subsequently dissolved by a decree of divorce issued by the Superior Court of the State of California on May 31, 1949. After said decree became final, petitioner contracted a second marriage with Don C. Moore on September 29, 1956 at Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., and thereafter the minor lived continuously with the spouses up to the present time. He was supported by Moore who has always treated him with love and affection as if he were his true father. In view of this harmonious relation it is petitioner's desire that the minor be able to use the name Moore after his family name Velarde.

ISSUE: Whether under our laws a minor may be permitted to adopt and use the surname of the second husband of his mother. HELD: No. Our laws do not authorize a legitimate child to use the surname of a person who is not his father, for, as a matter of fact, Article 364 of Civil Code specifically provides that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father. Mention is also made of Article 369 of the same Code which provides that in case of annulment of avoidable marriage the children conceived before the annulment she principally use the surname of the father, and considering by analogy the effect of a decree of divorce, it concluded that the children who are conceived before such a decree should also be understood as carrying the surname of the real father, which, in this case, is Velarde. Another factor to be reckoned with is the fact that the child concerned is still a minor who for the present cannot fathom what would be his feeling when he comes to mature age. Any way, if the time comes, he may decide the matter for himself and take such action as our law may permit. For the present we deem the action taken by petitioner premature.