NEW SOLIDARITY

April 29, 1982

Page 4

Part 1: The Suez Crisis of 1956

HOW EISENHOWER BEAT THE BRITISH

by Don Baier
At left, the Suez Canal, whose nationalization by Nasser in July 1956 triggered the crisis. Below, Election Day, 1956: The famous Eisenhower grin was celebrating not only a landslide election victory, but a Mideast ceasefire brought about by Ike's firm action.

There is a precedent for the kind of uncompromising repudiation of Her Majesty's government in Great Britain which President Reagan must immediately deliver to salvage the treaty commitments and international authority of the United States. That is the drubbing President Eisenhower administered to the British, together

with their partners, the French Socialists and the Israelis, in the Suez Crisis of 1956. Tory Prime Minister Anthony Eden, a drug addict obsessed with asserting the naked fist of British imperialism, had orchestrated a joint British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt to seize the newly nationalized Suez Canal and overthrow Egypt's President Nasser. Once again the British would rule the Middle East as a collection of colonial satrapies, while, in the words of Eden's Chancellor of the Exchequer, Harold Macmillan, the United States was expected to "lie doggo." Eisenhower was handicapped with a Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, whose own oligarchical outlook and blackmail tactics to "break Nasser" had helped the British to manufacture the crisis. Dulles was also fanatically scheming to destabilize Russia and Eastern Europe and together with his brother Allen, the head of the CIA, was running Operation Splinter Factorthe famous "Rollback" brinkmanship strategy aimed at breaking up the East bloc. Right in the middle of the Suez Crisis, a bloody revolt erupted in Hungary, which threatened to leave the Warsaw Pact. Russian troops and tanks were called in to crush it, and Soviet Premier Bulganin began issuing threats that the Soviets would rain nuclear missiles against America's European allies if they did not pull out of the Middle East. As if all this were not enough, these dramatic events occurred during the week leading up to the U.S. presidential elections: Oct. 29-Nov. 6, 1956. Eisenhower met the challenge. On his orders, the United States led the fight at the United Nations to condemn the British-French-Israeli invasion. The UN resolution was backed up with the threat of bankrupting the British pound and an oil embargo against Britain and France. Eisenhower kept cool, though privately furious with the Russians, and refused to be drawn into an East-West confrontation. The British and their partners were forced to agree to a ceasefire, and then to withdraw from every foot of the territory they had occupied. The Soviets were censured at the UN. Eden fell from power. Eisenhower was reelected in a landslide. Today, as the British invasion fleet arrives off the Malvinas and Israel conducts bombing raids presaging yet another strike into Lebanon, the "Suez example" strikes terror into the heart of anglophiles. This week columnist Patrick J.

Buchanan threatened President Reagan, "It would , jeopardize vital U.S. interests to allow a second Suez-style debacle." What cheek these British have! Suez was Ike's finest hour. Let Ronald Reagan profit from the example Eisenhower set during that week more than a quartercentury ago when he rescued the United States from certain strategic humiliation at the hands of the British, and the risk of global nuclear war. How Nasser Came to Power For 70 years until 1952, Egypt was run as a British colony. Victorian Britain put a succession of Egyptian rulers in hock with a series of fabulously prediscounted loans, forced the Egyptians to "sell" their 44 percent share of the stock in the Suez Canal company, and finally, when utter bankruptcy descended on the Egyptian khedive in 1882, the British shipped in an invasion force as a "collection agency" and took over Egypt lock, stock, and barrel. At that point, Egyptian assets consisted of a one-crop cotton economy, and the canal. After seven decades of "enlightened" British colonial rule, Egyptian assets had not appreciably increased. A sybaritic 300-pound monarch, King Farouk, a descendant of the khedive, was Egypt's nominal ruler. His time was largely divided between the banquet table and his truly world-class pornography collection. All this changed when a group of young Egyptian officers staged a coup and sent Farouk packing on his yacht. Although the group was formally headed by Gen. Mohammed Naguib, the key figure, and the man who was soon to emerge as the undisputed ruler of Egypt and the premier figure in the Arab world, was Gamal Abdel Nasser. Kicking Out the Brits After a quarter century of "Devil Nasser" propaganda that originated with the British and Israelis, Americans have forgotten, if indeed they ever knew, that in the first years of the Eisenhower administration, Nasser was looked upon as one of the Arab leaders most friendly to the United States, and counted among his closest advisers CIA agents Kermit Roosevelt and Miles Copeland, and later, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Henry Byroade. With all of them, Nasser was on a firstname basis.

Also forgotten is that for more than two and one half years after taking power. Nasser and his Free Officers Movement were the Arabs least hostile to Israel. Nasser's priorities were 1) getting rid of the British and 2) economic development. Inside Egypt, along the banks of the Suez Canal, the British maintained a unique military base90 miles long, on which some 80,000 troops were stationed. Under the Farouk satrapy, the base had become the hated symbol of subservience to Britainespecially after the British troops were deployed to police an Egyptian population on fire with protest and rioting against the British presence. With strong support from the Eisenhower administration, Nasser applied pressure on the British to leave. Finally, in October 1954, he succeeded in extracting final agreement that the last British troops would depart within 20 months. This did not please everyone. One week later, the Muslim Brotherhood, the secret society of "Islamic" fanatics originally created by the British, attempted to assassinate Nasser while he was speaking in the Alexandria Square. "I am still alive," Nasser shouted to the crowd seconds after the shots rang out. "Let them kill Nasser. He is one among many. You are all Gamal Abdel Nassers." Afterward, he initiated a sweeping crackdown on the Brotherhood's underground apparatus. His popularity soared to new heights. Certain persons in Israel were also unhappy with the prospect of British withdrawal. An Israeli covert operation was mounted against American and British installations inside Egyptostensibly to show that Nasser's government was too weak to guarantee the safety of foreign nationals or the canal, if the British left. The Israeli agents were caught and put on trial by the Nasser government, and perhaps it was never intended that the spies succeed. For the scandal this aborted caper produced in Israelknown as the Lavon Affair eventually caused the demise of the moderate Sharett government, resulted in the re-deployment of a special terror unit that had been created under the command of Ariel Sharon and overall responsibility of the British-trained chief of staff Moshe Dayan, and brought out of retirement David Ben-Gurion, whose government was to initiate a series of harsh new military/commando attacks against the Arabs.

Egypt's President Nasser with State Department's George Allen (1.) and U.S. Ambassador Henry Byroade"I don't like the Russians. . . . I like your people."

The Aswan High Dam In November 1954, however, Nasser was sufficiently strengthened by the British commitment to withdraw and optimistic about the future to tell the New York Times, "We want peace in order to spend money that is now being devoted to defense on our economic and social projects." To a U.S. offer to sell Egypt $27 million in arms and supply military advisers, he reacted coolly, rejecting the advisers outright. Nasser's great dream was to build a huge dam on the Nile that would greatly expand Egypt's agricultural capability. This projectthe Aswan High Dam would be the great nation-building work of his government's tenure17 times the size of the Great Pyramid of Cheops, and designed to give Egypt 1.3 million acres of newly irrigable land, and supply 50 percent of Egypt's need for electric power. Negotiations were opened up with the World Bank and the Eisenhower administration to finance this $1.3 billion project, which was declared a national goal for Egypt only three months after the Free Officers Movement took power.

Although Nasser resisted World Bank demands to open the Egyptian economy to surveillance by the supranational financial institution, it looked for a time as if agreement would be reached. But even before Nasser could turn his full attention to financing the High Dam, Sharon's Unit 101 terror commandos were unleashed in the bloodiest raid since the 1948 war that accompanied the creation of the State of Israelthe Gaza Strip raid of Feb. 28, 1955, in which 50 Israeli paratroopers annihilated an Egyptian army camp. Israeli responsibility was documented by the United Nations armistice force, and the raid was condemned by a UN Security Council resolution backed by all the Western nations. But after the Gaza raid, Egypt conducted its own widely advertised policy of guerrilla warfare and terror actions inside Israel, although at a somewhat lower intensity than the Israeli military, which enjoyed clear-cut superiority in numbers, weapons, and training over that of Egypt and the other Arab states. Only the week before the Gaza raid, Nasser had visited the Gaza Strip to forecast for his officers that there would be no major military clash between Egypt and Israel, and that therefore Egypt had no pressing need for new arms. He was embarrassed, to say the least, when events proved him wrong. The Egyptian leader launched an urgent quest for weapons. Now, however, the United States began to stall and simply ignore his requests, although they were supported by U.S. Ambassador Byroade. Nasser traveled to the Bandung conference of Nonaligned Nations in April where he met India's Nehru, China's Chou en-lai, and established himself as a leader of the new Third World movement. And in May 1955, tired of waiting for the U.S. to act on his request, he decided to make an arms deal with the Russians. The arms purchase, formally consummated with Czechoslovakia, established Nasser as one Third World leader who could not be pushed around, but did not endear him to U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, known for his view that, in the Cold War, "neutralism is immoral." Dulles, a former partner in the Sullivan and Cromwell law firm, part of the Anglo-American Council on Foreign Relations network that imposed the World War I Versailles Treaty and the reparations agreements on Germany and then backed Hitler's rise to power, divided the world

into two camps: those who "supported Christianity and free enterprise, and everyone else." The Eisenhower administration, however, still maintained formally correct relations with Egypt after the arms deal, and even after the Nasser government recognized the People's Republic of China. It was the government of Prime Minister Anthony Eden in Great Britain which initiated and led the campaign to "break Nasser." Eden's Colonial Outlook When he came to write his memoirs of the Suez crisis, Anthony Eden admitted that the difference between the American and the British approaches to the Third World was at the heart of the Suez Crisis. The Americans, Eden complained, were too concerned about investment, economic development, and profits, instead of operating in the British tradition of developing a "colonial administration" to maintain political control. Wrote Sir Anthony: "It is worth while to probe deeper into the causes for the frequent divergences on colonialism, which have presented a continuing problem in Anglo-American relations. . . . George III has much to answer for. But it is too easy an explanation. . . . I have no doubt that in part these sentiments are due to a difference to the general problem of relationship of what are often called 'dependent peoples.' The United Kingdom has, for a century or more . . . applied herself to the trustee conception of her responsibilities toward colonial territories. . . . The United States point of view on trusteeship tends to differ. . . . In her judgment, there is nothing wrong in expending large sums of capital in the development of a country and deriving much gain from the process, the American companies or individuals accepting no responsibility for the administration of the country. . . ." Just because Nasser had, with U.S. support, succeeded in getting the British troops on their way out of Egypt, did not mean Eden was prepared to give up British control in the Middle East. The instrument devised for that purpose was the socalled Baghdad Pact, an alliance between Britain, its puppet regime in Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan ostensibly aimed at defense against the "Soviet threat." Eden was determined to force both Jordan and Egypt into membership. Nasser was just as determined to resist. He began mobilizing throughout the Arab world for a new wave of nationalism independent of both East and West.

The Addict Prime Minister Eden, the quintessence of the British aristocracy, again and again became livid with rage as Nasser repeatedly demonstrated his refusal to allow Egypt to accept the status of a "dependent people." The towering temper tantrums of the British Prime Minister, who was known as the epitome of personal vanity, were augmented by a severe drug problem. The 58-year-old Eden, who had spent more than a decade in Winston Churchill's shadow as the Tory Party's heir apparent, had recently married Winston's niece Clarissa Spencer Churchill, a woman 23 years younger than he. Eden also suffered from a painful liver complaint. He began taking amphetamines to give himself the youthful energy he felt he required. By the time of the Suez Crisis, Eden had become what is today known as a "speed freak"subjected to sudden explosive fevers of up to 106 degrees, a symptom of chronic amphetamine overdosage. Eden's displeasure with Nasser reached a peak after Jordan's young King Hussein fired after a quarter-century the commander of the Arab Legion military force, the Englishman John Glubb, the famous Glubb Pasha. Eden believed (wrongly according to Hussein) that the young king was acting under Nasser's influence. Hussein said he fired Glubb because "I was gravely informed that the Royal Engineers of the Arab Legion would have an Arab commander by 1985! The British government. . . was incapable of realizing that one cannot brush aside a nation's aspirations with the words: 'We will talk about it in 30 years.' " Immediately thereafter, Eden launched his campaign to get rid of the man he called "that upstart Nasser." In vindictive spleen, such modern practitioners of the British colonial method as Henry Kissinger have nothing on Anthony Eden. When one of his aides reported to Eden on a diplomatic "dirty tricks" campaign he had devised for harassing and discrediting Nasser, Eden replied, "What's all this about isolating Nasser? . . . I want him destroyed, can't you understand?" When the aide responded that perhaps then they had better think about preparing for an alternative government in Egypt so a successful coup could be mounted, Eden exploded. "I don't want an alternative leader," he shouted. "And I don't give a damn if there's anarchy and chaos in Egypt!"

The British Tory government began to make common cause with the French Socialist regime led by Guy Mollet, whose colonial war to suppress the Algerian rebellion was going badly. The French had become the major arms suppliers to Israel, shipping its most advanced Mystere aircraft to the Ben Gurion government. The French were convinced that Nasser, who backed the Algerian rebels enthusiastically in speeches and radio broadcasts, had to be knocked out if they were to pacify their North African colony. Together with Eden, they began to privately retail the line that the Egyptian ruler was "a militarist" and "the new Hitler." 'We Shall Build the High Dam' After more than a year of British-French diplomatic pressure, repeated clashes between Egypt and Israel, and an all-out mobilization by the Zionist lobby in the U.S.A., the Eisenhower administration, led by Dulles, had chilled Egyptian-U.S. relations. Nasser, however, was prepared to swallow his pride and take what he felt were certain economic and political risks with the World Bank and the United States in order to get the Aswan High Dam project off the ground. In July 1956 he instructed his ambassador to the U.S. to inform Washington that he was agreeing to all its conditions for financing the dam, without exception. Then, Dulles pulled the rug from under the Egyptian President. Not only did the United States inform Nasser it had decided to back out of the deal, it did so with a British-style press release that questioned "Egyptian readiness and ability to concentrate its economic resources upon this vast construction program." Commented World Bank President Eugene Black, "Imagine going to the Chase Bank and asking to borrow ten thousand dollars and then reading in the newspapers that your credit was no good." An angry Nasser was sure this signaled a U.S. capitulation to the British desire to dump him. He told the U.S. ambassador: "You know, I've had a lot to do with the Russians, and I don't like the Russians. I've had a lot to do with your people, and basically I like your people. But this action of Mr. Dulles is an action against me by a great power, and no great power can take action against me without taking into account the necessary consequences. . . . You fellows are out to kill me. And all I can do is protect myself. I tell you this: I am not going to be killed."

The Empire crowd. From left to right: U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Britain's Anthony Eden, Prime Minister at the time of the Suez Crisis, and Eden's Tory sponsor, Winston Churchill.

One week later, on July 26, before a quarter of a million people jammed into Alexandria Square, Nasser delivered a speech that was a history of British colonial policy in Egypt. "The Suez Canal Company became a state within a state, one which humiliated ministers. This canal is an Egyptian canal. Britain forcibly took away from us our right in it. In return for the 120,000 who perished digging it and for the money spend on building it, we get 1 million pounds, or $3 million. Yet the Suez Canal, which according to decree was constructed for the benefit of Egypt, yields 35 million pounds in annual revenues. "We shall eliminate the past by regaining our rights to the Suez Canal. . . . We shall build the High Dam and we shall obtain our usurped right. We shall build the High Dam as we desire. We are determined. Thirty-five million pounds is taken annually by the canal company. Why not take it ourselves? "Therefore, I have signed today . . . a resolution . . . for the nationalization of the world company of the Suez Canal."

At that moment, Egyptian officials were already taking possession of the canal which they were to operate flawlessly for the next three months, actually increasing the volume of canal traffic. 'Hitler on the Nile' The next day, Anthony Eden was given a report from his staff expressing the view that Nasser's action, as he had promised to pay compensation, was entirely legal under international law. Eden took the report, scanned it, tore it up, and threw it in his aide's face. "I don't care whether it's legal or not," Eden exclaimed. "I'm not going to let him do it." Eden announced on national television that the British could never allow "their" canal to pass under the control of "foreigners." The London Times editorialized, "An international waterway of this kind cannot be worked by a nation with low technical and managerial skills such as the Egyptians." Eden's Chancellor of the Exchequer, Harold Macmillan, howled, "This is Munich all over again." The British press headlined "Hitler on the Nile" and "Resisting the Aggressor." "We can't have that malicious swine sitting across our communications" with the oilproducing Middle East, Winston Churchill told his personal physician. In the first hours after the nationalization, the British opted for military action. Not long thereafter, Eden called in Captain B. F. Liddell Hart, one of Britain's more celebrated military experts, to ask his help in drafting a campaign against Egypt. Liddell Hart prepared four successive plansbut each one was sent back to him by Eden, with a request for substantial changes. Annoyed, Liddell Hart decided to send the Prime Minister another copy of his original plan. This, Eden decided, was fine, but he then called Liddell Hart on the carpet to complain: "Here I am at a critical moment in Britain's history, arranging matters which may mean the life of the British Empire. . . . I ask you to do a simple military chore for me, and it takes you five attempts . . . before you get it right." Liddell Hart then informed Eden that he had just approved the original plan. The Prime Minister didn't like being made a fool of. He picked up the inkwell on his desk and threw it at his military expert. When Liddell Hart observed the stain spreading across his light summer suit, he picked up the PM's wastebasket, jammed it over Eden's head, and walked out.

The really infuriating part of it all from Eden's standpoint was that only a few months before Britain had withdrawn the last of its troops from Egypt, and in no way could Britain mount a credible invasion threat inside of six to ten weeks. But the British were determined to destroy Nasser and impose "anarchy and chaos" on Egypt. They began to look around for available partners, and so great was the British desire to punish Nasser that the endemically anti-Semitic Tory aristocrats ("I prefer Arabs to Jews," Eden had once confided while wrinkling his nose) decided, with some enthusiastic encouragement from the French Socialists, that they might permit themselves to make use of Israel. The British proposed that once the British and French fleets could be mobilized to mount an amphibious invasion, the Israelis should invade the Sinai peninsula of Egypt and drive toward the Suez Canal. The British and French would then announce they were intervening in a "police action" to "protect the canal." Initially, the Israelis had the good sense to refuse. To be continued